A Gap in Thought and Deed: Civil-Military Relations and Civil-Military Operations

A Gap in Thought and Deed: Civil-Military Relations and Civil-Military Operations

March 30, 2021


Consideration of the state of civil-military relations (CMR), within friend or foe, is not adequately addressed within civil affairs (CA) doctrine and activities. This gap limits CA’s ability to be an effective tool for influence at the strategic level when in competition during irregular warfare (IW) against great-power competitors such as Russia and China. The few times CMR is mentioned in doctrine, the context is detached from the civilian/academic study of civil-military relations. The lack of CMR awareness in civil-military operations (CMO) and CA operations (CAO) doctrine and activities hinders the Army’s ability to impact a partner or adversary military beyond its operational elements to its strategic culture. If we accept the definition of IW from the Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, namely “a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and effect legitimacy,”1 then addressing CMR is essential for CA to be an effective force in the competition phase, short of armed conflict.

CMR in Competition

First, some background: I had no clue what was happening, but I was proud to be there. It was the culminating event of more than four months of work. The after-action review of Operation Saber Guardian 20172 CMO component was a chance for Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) leaders and planners to discuss items that could be sustained or improved during future operations. The achievement for CA Team–Hungary in 2017, of which I was a member, was following through on a U.S. embassy goal to integrate Hungarian mayors, security studies think tanks and the U.S. embassy itself into the post-operational review.

The conference was conducted in Hungarian. Fortunately, the HDF joint force command head of CMO, i.e., the J-9, whispered highlights to me, while I interpreted the discussion from body language and the presentation slides. The friendly tone of the dialogue seemed to sour after a Hungarian mayor gave his presentation and highlighted areas that needed improvement. There was an agitated back-and-forth between the mayor, a couple of HDF civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) officers and one of the HDF SG17 planners. “Do you understand the issue?” the J-9 asked. “I can’t say I do,” I replied. “The mayor is upset that the Ministry of Defense [MoD] did not highlight and speak more about Saber Guardian’s importance.” “Good, that is an important point,” I answered. The J-9 replied, “Yes, well, the planner from the ministry says we all know why that was not possible and we should just move on.”

We had lost the competition to Russian influence on the institution of the MoD. As a member of the NATO alliance, Hungary had a key role in SG17, with a significant portion of its geography, bases and forces impacted by the operation. Yet neither Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban nor the MoD mentioned the operation to the national media. Any public references were minimal and only in English. In the competition3 for influence4 of a strategic indigenous population and institution (IPI)5—the Hungarian military institution of the MoD—we had left a strategic node of influence or subversion open to our adversary, the Russians. The avenues of civilian influence on the military IPI is something that CA forces had largely ignored, to their detriment.

Clearly, our adversaries are engaged in political warfare aimed at degrading our relationships with partners and allies and at shaping the competition environment to their advantage. Recent events in Hungary are not limited to the above example—Hungary is not alone in its vulnerability to malign influence activities aimed at subverting a NATO member’s military institution.6

Minding the Gap between CMR and CMO

As a social science, CMR studies work at the intersection of political science, sociology and history. A growing body of literature in this field, such as Dima Adamsky’s The Culture of Military Innovation, holds that cultural attributes imprint and drive strategic security behavior. Each nation, Adamsky argues, has a “strategic culture.” This is “a set of shared formal and informal beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which influence and sometimes determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”7

While there is no consensus on a grand theory of CMR writ large, it generally looks at two distinct elements of the triangular relationship between the state, society and the military that defines them. The dominant element of the study is “control.” Control focuses on the question of who guards the guardians—the belief of civilian control of the military in democracies. The other element, borrowing from Dr. Zoltan Barany’s book, The Soldier and the Changing State, addresses the main variables (conditions or policies) that encourage or impede the development of healthy, democratic CMR.8 In this field of study, the elements of control and Dr. Barany’s variables (i.e., avenues of influence) are directed either at subverting the military institution as a whole or at a military-politics operating environment.

To explore the gap, it is helpful to review the definitions of CMO in joint doctrine and the role of CMO in Army doctrine (italics added):

Civil-Military Operations are the activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.9

The role of CA is to understand, engage, and influence unified action partners and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), conduct MGO [military government operations], enable CMO, and provide civil considerations expertise through the planning and execution of CAO.10

Simply put, CMO is a military operation that affects the civil society. Anyone in the military may do it. CA is the part of the Army that enables effective CMO, and when a CA force takes that enabling action, it is considered a CA operation. Where is the gap?

Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, is the military’s guidebook to CMO. The definition of CMO hinges on the term “relations.” Even so, CMR is explicitly mentioned in it only twice. The first is as a description of the nature of CMO (italics added):

Joint forces may operate across a wide range of human habitation, from densely populated cities to sparsely populated rural areas. Every habitation poses a myriad of distinct and unique challenges. Civil-military relations should revolve around positive, often mutually-supportive, relationships with nonmilitary stakeholders.11

Then, further on in the publication, the joint doctrinal understanding of CMR is described as a state of being, not as something to be assessed and understood. “Civil-military relations is established, restored, or maintained by executing the CMO activities of interorganizational cooperation and IPI relationships.”12 The two “activities” of CMR within the publication are called:

(1) Interorganizational cooperation—a unity of effort activity with multiple USG (U.S. government) and other U.S. force elements.

(2) IPI Cooperation—liaison work to ally and synchronize efforts with IPI.

These doctrinal descriptions cover what are essentially liaison activities and do not provide a useful definition of CMR to enable CMO or to develop civil consideration expertise.

Civil Military Engagement (CME), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57-80, is the other doctrinal publication to mention CMR. Cited in Appendix A, it states, “National Guard and Reserve forces may augment CME operations based on requirements by the GCC [Geographic Combatant Commander] when developing civil-military relations.” The reference also does not provide a useful definition of CMR for practitioners. Taken as a whole, the military doctrinal references to CMR take away from and distract the military from the useful academic definition and social science work that would be helpful to those conducting CMO.

The doctrinal basis for CAO is Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations. CA Soldiers are directed to provide civil considerations expertise, yet FM 3-57 does not specifically mention CMR. Does that matter? Consider the doctrinal definition of civil considerations: “The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations.”13 What in the definition is lacking that an inclusion of the study of CMR would enhance? As the introductory story highlighted, in the realm of competition, civilian influence on the military institution, not just military operations, are the center of gravity of a nation’s will to win—or what Carl von Clausewitz calls the schwerpunkt.

In terms of CAO planning and doctrine, the military institution is addressed, albeit scantily. When developing CAO planning “products,” such as an area study or a running estimate, CA elements are required to develop an “understanding [of] the impacts of the civil component on military operations, the impacts of military operations on the civil component.”14 However, in both, military operations are the focus to the exclusion of the military institution. For the area study—a pre-mission evaluation of a defined area—doctrine does require some information key to understanding the military institution and relevant to CMR study under the Governance-Public Administration section. These include:

  • historical background;
  • political control and effectiveness;
  • general military policy;
  • foreign influence;
  • military establishment and the national economy; and
  • quality and sources of manpower: recruitment, conscription and reserves.

However, none of the other sections (listed above) ask the CA Soldier to relate these items to the military institution or the military politics operating environment. This includes areas such as geography, history, people, culture and social structure, religion, governance, environmental management, public safety, rule of law, economic stability, food and agriculture, civilian supply, public health and welfare, cultural relations, infrastructure, public works and utilities, public communications, public education and information and civil information.

The CA planning team (CAPT) is tasked with integrating what are in effect CMR variables into the CA planning process when FM 3-57 directs the CAPT in “developing from civil information the strategic-level civil component factors that inform operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time [PMESII-PT]) and incorporate into the MDMP (military decisionmaking process) or the joint planning process.”15 However, without a clear yet broad enough definition of CMR, the understanding is largely left to the CA practitioner. All too often, that information is not integrated into CAO, to the degradation of U.S. forces’ ability to compete for influence.

Understanding and analyzing the civil component is a daunting task. As is habitually the case, CA personnel direct their activities toward civil component areas where they have the greatest real-world expertise—education, health care, public safety, the environment, etc. Developing a greater understanding of CMR influence on the military institution or military politics is too vital to be allowed to be left as an implied task. Not all elements of the civil component (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure and area structures capabilities organizations people and events [PMESII-ASCOPE]) hold equal weight. Those impacting the military IPI are of utmost importance to CA forces in a time of competition. Current CMO/CAO doctrine leaves the aperture too wide and leads to mission creep. The articulation of a CMR framework within CA activities and analysis is important to focusing the force on a unique component of the human domain that no one else (outside of academia) is addressing.

The CMO doctrine set—JP3-57 and FM 3-57, with the accompanying ATPs—remains overly focused on military operations during traditional armed conflict. These publications do not provide quality guidance on how CMO can be focused on the military institution during the competition phase. The guidelines of a healthy state of CMR, such as Dr. Zoltan Barany has described for building democratic armies in The Soldier and the Changing State, can be adapted to create generalized areas of assessment for a nation’s CMR. A holistic civil consideration expertise can then be turned into avenues of influence that will become levels of action in the political warfare part of competition. The subsequent development and utilization of friendly networks, as well as the identification and countering of enemy networks that can influence a nation’s CMR, will enhance CA’s role as a force to win in competition. Moreover, a stated goal of NATO members and CMO planning is to “encourage human rights, freedom, and democracy with U.S. national interests.”16 Understanding CMR as Dr. Barany expertly lays it out is essential to countering Russian and Chinese aims to undermine liberal democracy.

Creating a CMR Framework for CA Assessments

No grand theory or conceptual framework for CMR that is tailored to assist CA in political warfare exists. To fill that gap, CA practitioners will need to develop a useful and flexible model for CA forces to assess CMR and its impact on the military institution. A growing body of CMR academic literature is supportive of that task, and the CA proponent should utilize it. Dr. Barany’s exploration of the variables that encourage or hinder the development of democratic militaries is useful for examining the topic. It can be difficult for American military personnel to recognize that the principles ingrained in a U.S. national narrative of civilian control of the military may not be widely accepted. The idea that the military is to be strictly nonpartisan and apolitical, even in the United States, is not always realistic. 

CMR, in this regard, exist in a military-political operating environment that can be understood as a triangle of state, society and military components. Within these areas, we can consider the structural, cultural and historical factors that affect the state of a nation’s CMR. CA practitioners should consider:

  • Political allegiance: Consider if civilians are reaching into the military institution, playing favorites, controlling decisionmaking or creating factions—ideological, political or ethnic. Consider the army of the French Third Republic as an example of a military reflecting internal political divisions, where elements aligned with the political left and right. Or, in Hungary, under Viktor Orban’s government, non–Fidesz aligned generals were reassigned to inconsequential positions.
  • Ministry of Defense: Consider if the institution is thought of by the public and civil society leaders to be nonpartisan, apolitical and focused on military effectiveness.
  • Legislature: Consider what is the role of legislative oversight and funding.
  • Developing outside defense expertise: Consider a U.S. embassy–Hungary initiative to enhance the security think tank sectors relevant to the HDF, creating organizations such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies or RAND in the United States.
  • Treaty obligations: Has the nation signed on to security relationships that invite foreign influence? Consider NATO or the Russian Collective Security Treaty Organization that Russia has used to limit the promotion of democracy.17
  • Recruitment: Consider that conscription can be used as a democratizing tool by integrating a national force across socioeconomic backgrounds. Bolivia in the 1950s is an example of recruitment effort having dramatic CMR effects on the state. Conversely, an all-volunteer force can lead to a societal elite.
  • Ethnic-religious divisions: Consider in the United States the ongoing CMR debate on naming U.S. Army bases after rebellious generals as a matter of civil political discussion. In Uganda, in contrast, officers with suboptimal performance or dubious human rights records receive promotions in the Ugandan Defense Forces, more because of tribal affiliations than national standards, with little civil-military discussion.
  • The military as a social laboratory: Consider gender, sexual identity and racial integration in the United States or in Europe—whether brought about by democratic pressure or because it was the morally correct thing to do.
  • The media: Consider how mass and social media are (or are not) given sufficient access to the military institution. This allows for a level of oversight—in Hungary during SG17, the U.S. Army insisted on access for Hungarian journalists and at times embedded them in the exercises to mitigate disinformation.
  • Non-governmental organizations: Consider the existence of independent defense specialists who provide expertise or a sense of oversight. Consider in the United States veterans organizations such as the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars or the Association of the United States Army, or the role of civil organizations such as the American Red Cross as a trusted source for emergency messages from civilian family members to U.S. military personnel.
  • Missions/roles: Consider the missions and roles that the military is relied on to fulfill within the civil component—military participation in domestic programs such as rural development, policing and infrastructure building may bring the military into local political polarization due to the CMR factors listed here.
  • Foreign actors: Consider foreign military and mercenary facilities and training programs or foreign investment in military-significant infrastructure and industry.18
  • Military-industrial complex: Consider how the military is funded: are there overriding military-owned business interests, such as in Egypt?
  • Military role in civil society’s ideological project: Consider what the military is taught about themselves. Consider Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1-0, The Army, which “emphasizes the professional Soldier and the characteristics of the future force that will enable the Army to maintain its commitment to the Nation.”19 What are the norms of organizational culture that the military adheres to? Consider the U.S. military ban on servicemembers conducting political activities while in uniform.

CMR—An Avenue for Influence in Competition

In recent years, the Army has been undergoing a profound doctrinal change, acknowledging the importance of the human domain, human terrain, the human dimension or human aspects of military operations. Moreover, the importance that documents such as the National Defense Strategy place on irregular warfare is a welcome development. Critical to understanding the importance of this change from a CMR and CMO standpoint is the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC, published in March 2018). The intent of the JCIC is to provide an encompassing framework for military operations beyond the simple times of war and peace. It describes this as “competition below armed conflict.” The JCIC set forth several capabilities for the military in this new domain to which a more thorough understanding of civil-military relations would make a significant contribution:20

  • the ability to describe the environment in terms of cooperation, competition below armed conflict and armed conflict, including relevant strategic actors and the relationships with and among them;
  • the ability to forecast potential trends of the relationships between the United States and other strategic actors with respect to cooperation, competition below armed conflict and armed conflict;
  • the ability to understand the current foreign assistance environment in a specified region;
  • the ability to identify, understand and assess relevant legal authorities, constraints and limitations; and
  • the ability to identify and evaluate the interests, intent, capability and capacity of relevant actors to support or adversely affect U.S. interests.

Interestingly, the JCIC also employs yet another term—civil-military dialogue. It defines an effective civil-military dialogue as one that occurs between civilian policy makers and the joint military force “within a continual round of engagement featuring discussion, feedback, adaptation, and refinement of policy and actions to achieve an evolving set of desired strategic outcomes.”21 This definition is perhaps the only time within doctrine that the military refers to the CMR dynamic in a manner consistent with the wider academic literature, in particular the notion of control.

CMO doctrine is also transforming. The conversation this paper hopes to contribute to started with the November 2018 “Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond” white paper. The CMO doctrinal set of JP 3-57 (published July 2018) and FM 3-57 (published April 2019), cited earlier, flowed out of that conversation. Yet, if CA forces are to be “DoD’s primary force specifically trained and educated to understand and shape the foreign political-military environments” per the white paper, then the gap in the understanding and ability to assess CMR must be closed. If it is, CA can fulfill its critical role in influencing the military IPIs during the competition phase. 

We know from the study of military history, and analysis of recent hybrid warfare activities, that military institutions are susceptible to foreign influence. During the Russian seizure of Crimea, we learned that “at the time, Moscow and its allies in Crimea exploited weaknesses within Kiev’s military to undermine its ability to put up a fight, according to interviews conducted by Reuters with about a dozen people on both sides of the conflict.”22 While conducting CMO in Hungary, the U.S. CA team (CAT) experienced Russian influence operations that accused NATO of wanting pensioners to go hungry so that the HDF could buy more military equipment and be used as pawns in a war with Russia. Democratic military effectiveness rests not so much on the quality of equipment or training as on the national will to win when conflict emerges. Strengthening the will to win, and thereby enhancing deterrence in the competition phase, should be a principal mission of CA.

Whether as a CAT or a CAPT, CA forces can affect a nation’s CMR at the strategic level. Indeed, they are the only U.S. government entity with a mission focus that allows for an assessment of the state of CMR. Subsequently, CA activities can be used to develop friendly networks that will strengthen a partner nation’s will to win and guard against malign foreign influence on the military establishment’s key IPIs. Nevertheless, without GCC buy-in to support the effort, Department of State (DoS) assistance through the embassy’s political-military officers to shape the effort and an expanded rotational timeline to allow for the effort, CA’s ability to develop healthy CMR will remain limited.

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) Recommendations for the CA Proponent

For greater inclusion of CMR into CMO and thereby development of CA into an effective force for influence during irregular warfare competition, the CA proponent should consider:

Doctrine: As part of the upcoming revisions to FM 3-57 in 2021, the CA community could consider the addition of more specific references to CMR. These could include:

  • “future CA forces support[ing] partner nation forces in overcoming challenges to civil-military coordination and civil-military relations in their own efforts, systems, and networks.”23 Ideally, this would be matched to a definition of CMR in a future revision to JP 3-57.
  • Revision of CA branch characteristics and principles could include more CMR variables, and designate them as being priorities of assessments and activities. Also, ensure that those listed are inclusive of the military institutions as well as military operations, and equally consider civilian influence of the military-politics operating environment, as it does have a military impact on the civil component.
  • Revisions to ATP 3-57.60 CAO planning could include additions to the area study that incorporate CMR considerations. The running estimate could add a point under Paragraph 5 (Civil Considerations) for State of Civil Military Relations and include a version of Dr. Barany’s general guidelines for assessing CMR in democracies. This would enable a more thorough understanding of CMR as part of the CA planning process.
  • Develop a graphic training aid (GTA) that discusses areas that should be assessed to evaluate healthy CMR while also modifying existing GTAs.

Organization: A CA force’s liaison for CMR activities should be placed within the U.S. embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation. Integration of CA assets within security force assistance brigades (SFABs) can develop holistic problem statements on the state of CMR in the nations in which SFABs operate. Also, consider an expanded role for CA in SFABs in general, focused on developing a healthy state of CMR in particular partner nations.

Training: Training on CA activities needs a paradigm shift that focuses efforts not simply on civilian influence on military operations but on the military institution as well as on how the military institution impacts civil society.

Leadership and Education: The most neglected area of study within CMR is that of civil society. The Civil Affairs Association should pursue opportunities to engage with CMR subject matter experts, such as the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS-AFS), in order to enhance situational understanding. For CA, it would enable a deeper understanding of CMR factors, and for IUS-AFS, it would allow for better understanding of the influence versus control factors within CMR.

Policy: CA forces at the strategic level should work to integrate a cooperative partnership with the U.S. embassy on political-military analysis. A review of current DoD directives and instructions will be needed to ensure theater-level CAPTs can coordinate with DoS regional bureaus. This is essential in developing a whole-of-government approach, which is the only way to properly engage in political warfare and defeat.


Integrating CMR studies into CMO/CAO doctrine and developing a CMR framework into CAO activities is an essential approach to competition. CA forces that possess an understanding of CMR can generate a rigorous analysis of the critical vulnerabilities of a military institution, which would be a uniquely valuable product for political and military leaders alike during the competition phase. In turn, they could then develop networks to defend or attack a military’s IPIs, creating a resilient will to win, or undermining it. The areas of a nation’s CMR are nodes of influence that can become levers of action in competition.

Russian influence on the Hungarian military institution limited the effectiveness of Saber Guardian. Yet, for CA Team–Hungary in 2017, it was the beginning of the competition for influence of the HDF. Our recruitment of Hungarian mayors willing to carry our narrative to their communities, as well as the integration of Hungarian media and security think tanks into the exercise, created a foundation of a friendly network with varied avenues of influence that was able to push back against Russian malign influence activities. Integrating CMR into CMO is a potential CA core competency worth further examination in a world of competition. 

CA forces and CMO activities focus too much effort on viewing civil society as something separate from the military and not enough time on identifying civil influences on our partner and adversary militaries. Partly, this is due to the absence of a robust understanding of CMR in our doctrine and activities. Integrating the social science of CMR will sharpen CA capabilities and enhance our relevance to U.S. partners.

★  ★  ★  ★

Master Sergeant Larry Lloyd is the Civil Affairs Planning Team NCOIC for an upcoming deployment in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. He recently completed his MA in Public Leadership from the University of San Francisco, with an emphasis in Civil-Military Relations.

Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, 2020, 2.

During Operation Saber Guardian (SG17), my civil affairs team was tasked to coordinate strategic messaging with our Hungarian Defense Forces civil-military cooperation partners to mitigate operational impacts throughout Hungary.

“Competition is the condition when two or more actors in the international system have incompatible interest but neither seeks to escalate to open conflict in pursuit of those interests.” Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2018), GL-2. 

“Influence is the means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign-friendly, neutral, adversary, and the enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions.” Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publications (ADP) 3-0, Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2019), 2–5.

Indigenous populations and institutions are “the societal framework of an operational environment including citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, dislocated civilians, and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities.” Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 17 April 2019), Glossary-5.

Lili Bayer, “Hungary defends decision to allow transit of Russian military shipment,” Politico, 31 July 2019; Kamil Klysinski and Piotr Zochowski, The End of the Myth of a Brotherly Belarus? Russian Soft Power in Belarus after 2014: The Background and Its Manifestations (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2016); and Mihail Naydenov, “The subversion of the Bulgarian defence system—the Russian Way,” Defense & Security Analysis 34 no. 1 (2018): 93–112, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1421408.

Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 8.

Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 6.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), vii.

10  FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 1–2.

11  JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, I-6.

12  JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, II-2 and II-3.

13  FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, Glossary-3.

14  FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 2-3.

15  FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 3-7.

16  JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, xi.

17  Mira Rapp-Hooper, Shields of the Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 135.

18  Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “Russia Exerts Growing Influence in Africa, Worrying Many in the West,” New York Times, 28 January 2020.

19  Department of the Army, ADP 1-0, The Army, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2019), iii.

20  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 16 March 2018), 29.

21  Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, 13.

22  Pavel Polityuk and Anton Zverev, “Why Ukrainian forces gave up Crimea without a fight—and NATO is alert,” Reuters, 24 July 2017.

23  “Civil Affairs Operations: 2025 and Beyond,” white paper, version 1.0, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, October 2018, 1.