Battalion and squadron command posts will always face limitations in their ability to disperse and hide in terrain. Equipment availability significantly impacts how each unit executes command post operations. Synchronizing operations and increasing the likelihood of mission success is best achieved by bringing warfighting functions together in one location.

Due to equipment shortfalls, our unit, the 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, out of Fort Carson, Colorado, had a limited capacity to run an expeditionary-style command post during National Training Center Rotation 24-02 at Fort Irwin, California. Squadron headquarters became aware that our expandable command platform would become a prime target for the enemy. Balancing the value of functionality versus survivability is a continuous problem.

As a squadron, we decided to adopt a different approach. Instead of dispersing our equipment, we chose to present the enemy with an identifiable target, diverting attention from more critical assets.

High-Value Objective

Throughout the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team’s training cycle in preparation for National Training Center Rotation 24-02 in October and November and 4th Squadron’s deployment into the training area, the squadron’s observer coach/trainer team consistently warned headquarters elements about how the opposing force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, nicknamed “Blackhorse,” would seek to identify and target command posts to disrupt operations. Just like we have a high-payoff target list, which informs artillery targeting, the enemy also is hunting for key logistics, maintenance and command and control nodes. This holds true not only for the training environment, but also is seen in the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Unfortunately, at the squadron/battalion level, the ability to disperse, disguise and deceive is limited. There are constraints on specialized functions provided by vehicles, power generation and coaxial cables’ reach. Despite having maximized our squadron’s command post mobility with an expandable truck platform for staff functions, we found ourselves with a large vehicle sporting numerous antennas and power generation in tow, indicators that screamed of the importance of these vehicles.

During mission preparation, a co-author of this article, who is the operations officer for the 4th Squadron, discussed the issue with the operations shop NCOs, particularly assistant operations NCO Staff Sgt. Samuel Guerrero. Guerrero initially proposed to replicate the shape of our tactical operations center (TOC) on a different truck using camouflage netting and poles.

With multiple inputs from the squadron staff, the staff decided to create a fake command post footprint using less-critical vehicles and equipment. This led to creation of the deception tactical operations center, or mock TOC.

The Right Mix

While staging for force-on-force training, the squadron staff experimented with different layouts for the squadron’s TOC. We strategically placed our Satellite Transportable Terminal closer to the mock TOC and positioned drone-busters and Stinger manportable air defense systems at observation posts. We positioned mobile command vehicles far enough away from the mock TOC to minimize damage from artillery fire.

Additionally, life support and vehicle traffic was staged in the deception zone to reduce observable patterns of life around the actual TOC. By placing the deception area to the rear, we hoped the enemy would prioritize targeting the rearmost element, assuming it to be of higher importance.

Following Magruder’s Principle, which states that it’s easier to maintain an enemy’s preexisting beliefs than try to change their beliefs, we aimed to exploit enemy assumptions about traditional command posts. These usually include the maxims that the largest vehicle cluster likely is a command post, and that communications equipment, power generation and antennas typically are close to the command post.

Collecting Information

Even during prebattle training, Blackhorse could use unmanned aerial vehicles to collect information on 4th Squadron’s formation. Only after our initial movement into the training area did we enter the range of Blackhorse’s indirect fire. We attempted to maximize terrain during the early battle period, but Blackhorse managed to detect us using unmanned aerial vehicles. The enemy had to choose which group of our vehicles would be the center of its 30-rocket volley.

Regrettably and fortunately, the mock TOC was destroyed. Regrettably, we “lost” equipment and some personnel. Fortunately, the main TOC was not targeted—further proof our concept was working.

Unfortunately, we lacked necessary vehicle dispersion to prevent damage to other TOC vehicles. This provided us with just enough time and space to rapidly deploy most of our vehicles away from any repeated artillery strikes. Mission Command vehicles quickly conducted a survivability move and reassumed control of squadron operations.

Using Terrain

During our first implementation of the mock TOC, we learned two crucial lessons. First, if we could not achieve dispersion, we needed to place a terrain feature between the fake and real TOCs. Second, opposition forces had to balance what they found first with what appeared more important. We needed to ensure that the opposing forces saw something convincing early on so they might stop looking elsewhere.

In the second battle period, we moved into a mountainous area full of natural berms, called wadis. We strategically placed the squadron TOC in a 30-foot-deep wadi and used a parallel wadi 100 meters west to host the mock TOC and an observation post armed with drone-busters. Terrain separated both features, and observers could easily misidentify them as separate entities if viewed from above.

For multiple days, 4th Squadron staff successfully defeated drones before Blackhorse could identify the TOC location. Our main command post remained unidentified throughout the period, and we never needed to move due to indirect fire.

During 4th Squadron’s defense, enemy vehicles finally infiltrated past other friendly forces with the task of identifying our primary obstacle belt. The enemy vehicles identified and destroyed the mock TOC. This, again, provided time to maneuver combat platforms to a position to destroy the enemy vehicles in our area. The team in our deception area continuously provided us with early warning and convinced opposition forces that they had destroyed the area’s command post.

Simultaneously with the defense, the observer coach/trainers targeted every command post participating in training with indirect fire. Due to the terrain that we selected for the squadron TOC, we were assessed to have no damage to any vehicle inside the wadi. We were the only TOC that did not need to relocate during the battle period due to the enemy’s inability to pinpoint our location or place effective indirect fires on our position.

Adaptive Concept

The mock TOC concept continued its effectiveness throughout 4th Squadron’s time at the National Training Center. We learned and adapted the concept based on enemy actions through the training event.

First, the enemy looks for clusters of vehicles, communication equipment and antennas. Unmanned aerial vehicle video quality can only be so clear. Giving the enemy a convincing cluster of large items to look at forces it to choose what to expend its artillery assets on.

Second, remove unnecessary equipment from the TOC area and add to the deception. The unusual collection of assets at the mock TOC sowed additional doubt in the Blackhorse targeting team and helped keep our headquarters off the enemy targeting list.

Third, show them the deception first. Enemy forces have limited time to detect and act before the target moves again. In our case, the mock TOC would absorb most of the artillery.

Finally, enable the deception area as an observation post with capabilities to defeat certain threats. Placing drone-busters and Stingers in our observation posts and using the mock TOC as bait proved effective.

Combining terrain-masking and deception proved crucial to our squadron command post’s survivability. It also created a unique motivational source for the staff as the idea and effort to make the mock TOC look more realistic grew. Destruction of the mock TOC on multiple occasions served as both an annoyance and source of pride as our experiment continued to succeed.

Other organizations could adopt this general concept and improve on it for both training and combat. We developed the idea with equipment on hand and with limited ability to improve.

With proper planning, units wouldn’t need to use vehicles as targets and could construct the deception plan with expendable materials and extra antennas. A larger unit could scatter fake command posts and logistics nodes across the battlefield, making the enemy guess with lower probability of success.

Methods to implement this simple idea are bound only by creativity and resources.

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Maj. Nicholas “Nick” Lund is the operations officer for the 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado. Previously, he was chief of future operations, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division. He deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Capt. Jacob Nuding is the planner for the 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division.

Capt. Andrew Shriver is the assistant operations officer for the 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division.