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Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components: Army Practice, Past and Present

Dennis P. Chapman

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Army Practice, Past and Present Army**

by

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The Institute of Land Warfare
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER

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Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components: Army Practice, Past and Present

by Dennis P. Chapman

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Foreword

For more than three decades, the United States Army has wrestled with the challenge of effectively integrating reserve component units into strategic plans. The CAPSTONE program and its successor, WARTRACE, were prominent among the Army's efforts to resolve the issue.

The Army's decision not to deploy the Army National Guard roundout brigades to the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War sparked considerable debate about the employment of reserve component units and led to the first major and effective reforms in this area, The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 and the Army's robustly resourced Training Support XXI program.

These initiatives significantly improved reserve component unit readiness, as has been amply demonstrated in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, Army attempts to integrate reserve component units into contingency planning continued to be ineffective. The emerging lesson is that attempts to integrate reserve component units into contingency plans by designating the unit's theater of employment and wartime chain of command ahead of time does not work, both because such practice dilutes the integrity of existing command relationships, as noted above, and because the nature, duration, and location of future contingencies is simply too unpredictable.

Therefore, the old contingency-based planning model is being displaced by a cyclical model known as Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Instead of asking reserve component commanders to maintain a constant state of readiness for service in a pre-designated particular geographical region and wartime command, the Army is now using ARFORGEN—under which units are expected to be ready to deploy and execute full-spectrum missions during specified pre-designated deployment windows—for all components. ARFORGEN, coupled with the advances made previously under the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act and Training Support XXI, offers significant advantages over past practices to effectively and efficiently enhance Army readiness.



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September 2008

Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components: Army Practice, Past and Present

Introduction

For at least 35 years the Army has struggled with the problems of integrating the reserve components (RC)—the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve—into national contingency planning and maximizing their peacetime preparation for future wartime service. Between 1973 and 2001 the Army sought to accomplish these goals by integrating RC units into wartime contingency plans and by pairing RC units with active component (AC) counterparts from whom RC units would receive training guidance and information on planned wartime missions. These efforts failed to significantly improve RC readiness during the years preceding the 1991 Persian Gulf War, but were notably successful thereafter.

This paper will briefly attempt to shed some light on how these efforts have evolved over time with an eye toward improved understanding of what has worked, what hasn't and why. (The bulk of what follows applies to both reserve components—the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Where information pertains to the Army National Guard only, the text so states.)

The Cold War Model: CAPSTONE and WARTRACE¹

Prior to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on 11 September 2001 (9/11), planning for wartime employment of RC forces was based on predesignation of specified units for specific roles or contingencies. Two important features of this approach were WARTRACE alignments and Force Support Packages (FSPs).² The Army WARTRACE program aligned reserve component units with specific combatant commander (COCOM) operations plans (OPLANs).³

Under the WARTRACE program, the National Command Authority (NCA) apportioned capabilities—including generic units by type—to the COCOMs, who developed OPLANs for specific contingencies in their respective areas of operation based on this allocation. These plans included a detailed deployment timeline for apportioned forces known as the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), which specified the sequence of movement to theater for all apportioned forces. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) would then identify specific units

(including RC units) for inclusion in the OPLAN in place of the generic capabilities apportioned to the COCOMs. Units so designated would be assigned a wartime (WARTRACE) chain of command, which for RC units was usually different from the unit's peacetime chain of command. The WARTRACE headquarters would provide training guidance to the assigned unit through the unit's peacetime chain of command and might conduct direct liaison with the unit as well. The information so provided was to form the basis of the unit's pre-mobilization peacetime training program.

FSP units were selected RC units deemed critical to warfighting capability that were expected to quickly deploy in the event of a contingency. The purpose of the FSP program was

*to provide the necessary combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units found in Echelons Above Division (EAD) and in Echelons Above Corps (EAC) tailored to support 5-1/3 . . . divisions, one corps, one corps' planning headquarters (HQ), one theater, and one theater planning HQ.*⁴

FSP units, together with enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs) and units with the latest arrival dates (LAD) in theater of 30 days from notice or less, were designated as priority units.⁵ As the term implies, these units received priority over other units (known as "traditional units") for pre-mobilization training assistance and support from FORSCOM and the two Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs).

This scheme of unit missions and priorities was the culmination of almost three decades of evolution, beginning with the Affiliation Program established in 1973 and expanded in 1976. This program sought to improve the readiness of RC units through training relationships with active Army divisions. These efforts expanded again in 1978 when two Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions were paired with active Army divisions under the Division Partnership Program. Formal integration of RC units into actual war plans began in 1979 with the CAPSTONE program, under which RC units were designated for specific roles in the CONUS sustainment base or overseas, initially in Europe and then later in Asia and the Pacific. CAPSTONE finally became the WARTRACE program in 1994.⁶

Under CAPSTONE the Army was to designate for "each unit [a] wartime chain of command, probable wartime mission, and probable area of employment."⁷ The core of CAPSTONE was the Directed Training Associations (DTAs) between specific AC and RC units. A DTA was intended to be a "dedicated year-round training assistance relationship between an AC unit and an RC unit . . . under which the AC units provide training assistance and Annual Training (AT) evaluation to RC units."⁸ Under WARTRACE, the focus shifted from training assistance to integrating RC units into wartime planning by "align[ing] Army units under wartime gaining commands and provid[ing] units with detailed information concerning their wartime mission."⁹

These alignments were intended as “vehicles through which commanders [could] enter into cohesive planning with their wartime chain of command.”¹⁰ Under WARTRACE, CAPSTONE DTAs were replaced by Planning Associations (PLASSNs) between RC units and their designated wartime higher headquarters. Wartime headquarters were expected to provide mission guidance to aligned units that was “sufficiently detailed to enable [wartime] subordinate commands to develop a training program and a Mission Essential Task List (METL).”¹¹ RC commanders were expected to “direct their planning and training efforts” toward this planned wartime mission.¹²

Problems with CAPSTONE and WARTRACE

Unfortunately, WARTRACE and its predecessor CAPSTONE proved ineffective as a methodology for improving RC unit readiness for wartime missions. As early as 1982, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that “many units had not been contacted by their gaining commands, and some units had not received the required training and planning guidance.”¹³ The report cited both problems and progress in implementing CAPSTONE. Of the seven units reviewed in the study, three reported “little progress . . . in implementing the program” and “were generally critical of the time it took to get mission information from gaining commands.”¹⁴ One unit went so far as to characterize its relationship with its wartime gaining command as “practically nonexistent.”¹⁵

Even the report’s examples of successful implementation were problematic in that such success was described only in vague or general terms.¹⁶ Although two units were able to cite concrete examples of CAPSTONE’s positive impact on their training programs, most claims of improvement were vague statements that training was now “focused on specific mission information” or that the unit had “information on the geography and climate where it would be employed.”¹⁷ The report leaves an overall impression, however, of a concept implemented haphazardly and dependent for success on idiosyncratic and inconsistent relationships between wartime higher and subordinate commands.¹⁸

Problems continued after CAPSTONE became WARTRACE. A 1999 study sponsored by the National Guard Bureau found that

the Army’s WARTRACE program fails to meet its intended purpose of ensuring mission guidance from wartime higher headquarters to the [enhanced Separate Brigades] to focus peacetime training and improve preparedness. . . . There is no evidence that WARTRACE headquarters have provided meaningful wartime planning guidance to the eSBs” [emphasis added].¹⁹

In its 1984 report on CAPSTONE, the GAO attributed poor implementation of the program to the “[n]eed for improved management controls,”²⁰ recommending that the Secretary of the Army “implement a reporting system” and “systematically monitor” implementation of CAPSTONE.²¹

Unfortunately the GAO failed to grasp the basic problem underlying CAPSTONE's failure. That absent management controls was not the problem is apparent in the implementation of CAPSTONE's successor, WARTRACE. Army Regulation 11-30, *The Army WARTRACE Program*, provided for specific reporting requirements,²² yet as late as 1999 WARTRACE was no more effective than its predecessor. The root cause of these programs' failure was not a lack of adequate management control—the problem was more fundamental than that. CAPSTONE and WARTRACE failed because their central feature—designation of a wartime planning chain of command separate from a unit's day-to-day peacetime command structure—was conceptually flawed.

Such bifurcated supervisory arrangements fly in the face of one of the most fundamental precepts of military leadership, unity of command. No organization can respond effectively to parallel chains of command simultaneously. The peacetime and wartime chains of command will inevitably have different priorities. The peacetime chain of command is immediately at hand, while the wartime associated headquarters is a remote presence at best; the peacetime chain of command controls unit resources, rates the unit commander, controls his future assignments and exercises legal jurisdiction over the unit and all its personnel and equipment.

Complicating matters for Army National Guard units is the fact that they are under the day-to-day command and control of the state governors through their adjutants general when not federalized by the President. Given such disproportionate influence, the peacetime chain of command will inevitably dominate the unit's agenda, leaving any attempted collaboration with the wartime-associated chain of command to die on the vine.

CAPSTONE and WARTRACE also violated another venerable military principle: unity of effort. No organization will devote sustained attention to any task not directly related to the organization's primary mission without strong and enduring external pressure; absent this, any function not closely related to an organization's core task and principle day-to-day activities will atrophy until it becomes moribund.

This has been true of AC units tasked to mentor and support RC counterparts. AC operational commanders are unlikely to take more than a token interest in the activities of units assigned to them under the WARTRACE program. As would any other organization, the wartime higher headquarters will naturally focus their primary efforts on their core mission of training on their own METL tasks. Secondary efforts—including providing training guidance to WARTRACE units with whom no day-to-day relationship exists—will receive only the bare minimum attention that the organization can get away with.²³ Absent strong external pressure, this attention will dwindle to zero over time. This has been the fate of the WARTRACE program and all of its predecessors.

Reform After the Gulf War

While actual integration of RC units into war plans remained a problem throughout the period leading to 9/11, AC assistance to and oversight of the reserve components improved dramatically during the same period. This improvement can be attributed in part to the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRA).²⁴

Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, AC support and oversight of the reserve components was passive and limited. Regionally based Readiness Groups under the CONUSAs, together with the AC Senior Army Advisors and Inspectors General assigned to the various State Area Commands (STARCs), provided an AC presence, but one whose weak influence had very little impact at the unit level. The AC/RC teaming programs discussed above had become moribund long before the Gulf War and remained so after. Additionally, the conspicuous absence from combat operations of any RC maneuver brigades during the Gulf War gave rise to the widespread perception of problems with combat readiness in RC combat forces.²⁵

This contributed to the 1992 passage of ANGCRRA. This legislation directed the Army to associate an equivalent AC unit with each ARNG ground combat brigade and reserve component combat support and combat service support unit deemed by the Secretary of the Army to be essential to the execution of the National Military Strategy.²⁶

The statute further charged the brigade-level AC associate units with approving the training program of the associated RC unit; reviewing the readiness of the RC unit; assessing its manpower, equipment and training resource requirements; and annually validating the unit's compatibility with AC forces.²⁷

At first blush these requirements look like a mere rehash of the failed AC/RC partnership programs of the past. Such might well have been the case had Congress not mandated the assignment of 2,000 AC personnel as advisors to RC units²⁸ and later increased the mandate to 5,000 personnel²⁹ (although subsequent legislation has reduced this mandated total to 3,500).³⁰ The result was Training Support XXI (TS XXI)—a major transformation of AC support to the RC that implemented the congressional mandates.

The centerpiece of TS XXI was the establishment of 18 Training Support Brigades (TSBs) and two integrated divisions, each consisting of an AC division headquarters and three ARNG enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs), absorbing the old Readiness Groups that had been organized in 1973.³¹ The TSBs and integrated divisions assumed the role of AC associate units for many RC formations mandated by ANGCRRA.³²

Unlike the Readiness Groups that preceded them, TSBs were generously resourced thanks to the congressionally mandated allocation of personnel. For the first time, the Army had a dedicated support structure that could robustly support RC unit training.

Resources were still limited, however, with the result that reserve component units were divided into “haves” and “have-nots.” Priority units received intensive support and formal evaluation each year. Other units were designated as traditional units and received little or no attention.³³ TSBs assisted priority units in developing their Mission Essential Task Lists, Yearly Training Briefs and plans for weekend drill and annual training. TSB representatives attended unit drills, provided input on training plans and performance, and provided formal evaluations each year as part of the supported unit’s annual training.

Formation of the TSBs has had a great impact on mobilization of reserve component units for the global war on terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks, the TSBs were able to rapidly shift their focus to the planning and execution of post-mobilization training for mobilizing reserve component units, to include validating that RC units are ready to complete the missions for which they have been mobilized. Were it not for the TSBs, other AC units would have had to assume this function in addition to their other missions, to the detriment of both RC unit post-mobilization training and the supporting AC units’ own deployment preparations.

Mobilization Planning and Execution After 9/11

TSXXI has proved its worth since 9/11. Unlike in the Gulf War, RC combat forces have participated in large numbers in both the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. The first ARNG combat unit—2d Battalion, 153d Infantry, Arkansas Army National Guard—was alerted on 30 September 2001, mobilized a few days later and ultimately deployed to Egypt for service in the Sinai; since then, more than 25 ARNG combat brigades, two ARNG combat aviation brigades and one ARNG division headquarters have deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, with more deployments expected.³⁴ This is a vast improvement over the Gulf War performance, and the dedicated AC support to RC training has certainly been an important factor in this success.

The actual mobilization of reserve forces since 9/11 has differed from prewar plans in a number of particulars; one of the largest is the selection of units for wartime missions. For the U.S. Central Command area of operations at least, pre-9/11 WARTRACE assignments and allocations of forces—RC or otherwise—have been displaced by annual major troop rotations based on the theater requirements as determined by the COCOM.

The COCOM articulates these requirements as requests for forces (RFFs) generated either as part of the annual planned bulk rotation of troops or as separate, stand-alone requirements. The Joint Staff validates these COCOM requests and transmits them to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for apportionment to one of the services for fulfillment. JFCOM transmits those COCOM requirements apportioned to the Army to FORSCOM, which develops a preliminary apportionment of these requirements among the three components (AC, ARNG and Army Reserve). This

preliminary apportionment is refined, modified and finalized with input from the three components at periodic sourcing conferences hosted by FORSCOM. Additionally, occasional stand-alone requests for forces (“pop-up” requirements) are apportioned among the three components by negotiations among battlefield operating system (BOS) managers and the components.

For requirements apportioned to the ARNG or Army Reserve, the component G3 (operations staff), in cooperation with the respective State Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) or Regional Readiness Command (RRC), identifies the specific units to fill the requirement and transmits the nomination to FORSCOM, who in turn transmits it through Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

For ARNG requirements especially, unit sourcing is a consensus-based process in which state adjutants general exercise considerable influence over the timing of mobilization as well as the deployment missions of their units. Pre-9/11 WARTRACE and FSP designations have become irrelevant; identification of particular units for mobilization has reverted almost entirely to the reserve components themselves.

FORSCOM’s main contribution to this process is articulating any constraints on unit selection and rejecting or recommending approval of the unit nomination provided by the reserve component. In the great majority of cases, the component’s recommendation is approved at all levels and implemented.

During the early phases of hostilities following 9/11, criteria for unit selection for ARNG units were the mission requirement, overall unit readiness, mobilization history of the unit and the unit’s home state, the impact on other operations (including both federal and state missions), and projected force structure changes. Input from unit home states informed the process throughout, strongly influencing the outcome. Selection criteria have changed dramatically as the war has worn on and as the pool of available able units has diminished.

Today, the single most important factor in selecting a unit for mobilization is mobilization history, both of the unit (“flag”) itself and of its constituent Soldiers. Impact on resources available for domestic requirements figures largely in unit sourcing decisions for ARNG units, as the National Guard Bureau has a long-standing goal of ensuring that governors have at least half of their National Guard forces (Army and Air) available at any given time for state emergencies. Theoretically, other factors are considered as well; in practice, dwell time since the last deployment is the dominant factor in unit sourcing decisions.

Even the mission requirement in theater is not always as decisive a factor as one might expect, as the Army has enjoyed considerable success in employing units in Iraq as “in lieu of” substitutes for other units of a completely different type. Combat arms units have become practically interchangeable with one another in

the counterinsurgency role; even combat support units have taken on the security force functions previously allocated to military police; and provisional units such as transportation and headquarters units have been formed. Furthermore, traditional readiness indicators such as the unit status report (USR) play no role in the selection of RC units for deployment, though for major units such as brigade combat teams, they are to be monitored as the sourced unit approaches its mobilization date.

Prior to 9/11, unit WARTRACE assignments were complemented by predesignation of unit mobilization stations (assigned by the CONUSAs), as well as specified planning responsibilities for unit commanders. In addition to the WARTRACE-driven METL development and training discussed above, the unit commanders were required to “establish and maintain liaison with” their assigned mobilization station, which was to include an initial visit within nine months of assuming command and triennial visits thereafter.³⁵ Commanders were also required to submit a Post-Mobilization Training Support Requirements (PTSR) report to their unit’s mobilization station annually.³⁶

These preparations were immediately brushed aside as irrelevant after 9/11 as First and Fifth Armies began assigning mobilization stations based on the throughput capacity of the installation and later began assigning certain mobilization stations with responsibility for units of specific types and implementing standard templates for unit post-mobilization training without reference to pre-mobilization plans of mobilizing units.

A Historical Dilemma: Detailed Planning versus Flexible Execution

In addition to running counter to the concepts of unity of command and unity of effort as discussed above, another serious flaw in CAPSTONE and WARTRACE was the inflexibility inherent in those programs. Tension between a desire for thorough and detailed preparation on one hand and a desire for flexibility in execution on the other has long been a factor in Army mobilization planning.

The Army first began deliberate mobilization planning during the interregnum between the First and Second World Wars.³⁷ Among the many themes that characterized the debate over mobilization policy during this period were two competing schools of thought—one favoring highly detailed, centralized mobilization plans and the other favoring more flexible, decentralized plans.

General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff from 1931 to 1935, favored the decentralized approach—one characterized by significant flexibility to accommodate the many unknowable variations that would accompany a future war. Upon becoming Chief of Staff of the Army in 1931, MacArthur directed that the Army’s “general mobilization plan [be] made so flexible that it would apply to all color plans [as specific contingency plans were then known] with minor variations and adaptations.”³⁸

Despite General MacArthur's preferences, mobilization planning prior to 9/11 was consistent with the centralized, detailed planning approach. WARTRACE designations, mobilization station assignments and post-mobilization planning requirements at the unit level are all examples of the centralized and detailed planning. General MacArthur had warned against such an approach, however, opining that

*the enactment of rigid laws at a time when war is not imminent is not desirable because such action would probably result in measures so rigid . . . as to be a hindrance rather than an assistance in the changed conditions of any future emergency.*³⁹

Case Study: The Roundout Brigades During the Gulf War

A good example of the phenomenon General MacArthur predicted is the saga of the roundout brigades during the Gulf War. At the time of the Gulf War a major feature of the CAPSTONE program was the roundout brigade concept. Under this concept, seven RC combat brigades (six ARNG and one Army Reserve) were designated as the third or "roundout" brigades to AC divisions in the continental United States that had only two of the three required combat brigades.⁴⁰ Many took it as a given that these roundout brigades would deploy with their parent AC units should those divisions be tapped for combat:

*Given the CAPSTONE program . . . many reservists and the congressional delegations that represented them had assumed that in all circumstances the roundout unit would deploy with the parent division.*⁴¹

However, to the surprise of many, these roundout brigades *did not* deploy to the Middle East with their parent divisions. When the 24th Infantry Division deployed from Fort Stewart, Georgia, for example, they took with them the 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning, Georgia, instead of their roundout brigade, the 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia ARNG.⁴² Despite the widespread assumption of many,

*it had never been assumed by the Army Staff that any of the roundout units would deploy with their parent organizations in a short-term scenario that did not involve the Soviet Union.*⁴³

Other reasons argued against employment of the roundout brigades as well: There were more than enough AC combat units available to meet the requirement in the Arabian Peninsula—what the Army needed was combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) forces.

The initial call-up authority of 48,000 supported the call-up of the required CS/CSS units only, not additional combat forces.⁴⁴ Finally, the law as written at the time constrained use of RC combat brigades:

Secretary Cheney cited two reasons for not authorizing the call of the roundout brigades. First, he said, the military had not asked for them. Second, "the

statutory time limits on the use of Selected Reserve units impose artificial constraints on their employment.” He was referring to the restrictions in Section 673b of Title 10, United States Code that limited the call-up to ninety days renewable for ninety days. Too much of that time, he explained, would be spent on mobilization, training, and movement to make the remaining time in the Middle East worthwhile.⁴⁵

Congress ultimately amended the laws then in effect to allow the President to activate RC units for a longer period of time.⁴⁶ Ultimately, three ARNG combat brigades were activated: 155th Armor Brigade, Mississippi ARNG; 256th Infantry Brigade, Louisiana ARNG; and 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia ARNG.⁴⁷ However, none deployed to the Gulf, with or without their parent AC divisions.⁴⁸

The decision not to deploy the roundout brigades during the Gulf War prompted an acrimonious period of charge and countercharge, with the active Army and the Army National Guard trading accusations of lack of preparedness on one hand and bad faith on the other. The reality, however, is probably different. The fact is that the roundout brigade concept was an anachronism—a Cold War construct that was simply not relevant to the circumstances following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In the words of one commentator, “Since that approach was formulated, there had taken place very significant changes in the strategic context, but without appropriate review and revision of the policy.”⁴⁹ He goes on to argue that

[the roundout concept] had been, from the very beginning, a stop-gap measure devised to cover shortfalls in trying to squeeze more division elements out of a shrinking force at a time when the [Soviet] threat surpassed our ability to field a sufficiently robust counterforce. Now that the [Soviet] threat was radically diminished, so might the response be restructured accordingly. But—perhaps because institutions react slowly, especially when political considerations complicate such reactions—no compensatory adjustments had been made in the roundout concept. . . . [W]hen war came in the Gulf, a different set of options was available to force planners than had pertained when roundout was conceived and implemented.⁵⁰

In other words, the strategic context had changed, but the Army’s strategic plans had not. The same could have been said with equal validity about the circumstances facing the Army following the 9/11 attacks. General MacArthur had foreseen such a turn of events when he made his argument for flexible mobilization planning.

The experience of both the Gulf War and the current war on terrorism have confirmed General MacArthur’s foresight, plainly demonstrating that tying RC units to fixed wartime geographical and command assignments is simply not a feasible basis upon which wartime contingency planning for RC unit employment can be accomplished. Recognizing this, the Army has implemented the Army Force Generation

(ARFORGEN) Model to supplant WARTRACE as the primary framework within which to conduct contingency planning for the employment of RC units.⁵¹

ARFORGEN: A New Paradigm in Mobilization Planning

ARFORGEN is a major departure from the CAPSTONE/WARTRACE construct. Rather than attempting to enhance readiness by linking RC units to contingency plans in specific geographical areas under a predesignated wartime chain of command different from the unit's peacetime command, ARFORGEN seeks to enhance both readiness and predictability for RC units by specifying chronological windows, aligned by fiscal year, when units are available for deployment.

Under ARFORGEN unit readiness is managed on a cyclical basis, with units ready for deployment one year out of five as a planning target. ARFORGEN reduces the problem of "haves" and "have-nots" alluded to above. Rather than permanently designating certain units as having "priority" over others and expecting these units to sustain elevated readiness over the long term, the ARFORGEN model assigns unit priority on a rotating basis, with all units rotating through three resource pools: a "reset/training pool" for units recently returned from deployments or major commitments; a "ready pool" consisting of units that have completed the reset process and would be available for deployment if needed; and an "available pool" consisting of units ready to deploy and predesignated to deploy during the current year should a contingency arise. Note that assignment of a unit to the "available pool" does not guarantee that the unit will deploy—it simply means that the unit is available for deployment should a contingency arise during the period that the unit remains in the "available pool."

Under the ARFORGEN model, all units will find themselves at the top of the priority list on a rotating basis. This approach is a significant improvement over past practice, providing predictability to unit commanders, facilitating a deliberate ramping up to peak readiness and requiring sustainment of peak readiness for a reasonable and defined period, rather than indefinitely. ARFORGEN does not allocate units by specific contingency as under WARTRACE. Units are expected to be ready for full-spectrum operations when in the "available pool." If fully implemented effectively, ARFORGEN should ameliorate many of the ills described above.

Conclusions

The Army's experience of the last seven years seems to have vindicated General MacArthur's views on the efficacy of flexible mobilization planning. While the statutory basis for the current mobilization effort has proven adequate, much of Army's detailed prewar planning was rapidly swept away in the on-rush of events.⁵² Happily, the Army has overcome invalid prewar planning assumptions through innovation and adaptation. Nonetheless, this experience should be used to inform and adapt mobilization planning for future crises. Experiences since 9/11 present a number of broad lessons for future efforts to enhance RC mobilization readiness:

First, the existing RC chain of command should be leveraged and empowered. In the words of one venerable and sagacious old book, “[N]o man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.”⁵³ Such has certainly been the case under WARTRACE and its predecessors. The priorities of the peacetime RC chain of command inevitably dominate the RC unit’s agenda. Input from the wartime chain of command will have an impact on the RC unit exactly to the extent that it is consistent with the priorities and interests of the peacetime chain of command, and no more. Accordingly, the regular peacetime chain of command must be adequately resourced and then held accountable for the readiness of its subordinate units.

Second, the RC must be resourced to achieve the readiness goals implicit in ARFORGEN. The RC must be given the resources they need in terms of manpower, equipment, school seats, Combat Training Center rotations, recruiting and retention resources, training dollars, etc. necessary to ensure that units have what they require to ramp up their readiness as they move into the ready and available pools under ARFORGEN.

Third, AC support for RC units should continue to come in the form of dedicated AC personnel who have RC support as their only mission, as is the case with TSBs.⁵⁴ Additionally, these supporting AC organizations should be robustly manned and resourced so that they can have a significant impact upon RC unit readiness.

It will always be tempting to use the AC forces dedicated to RC support as a bill payer to support other priorities. General Eric Shinseki succumbed to this temptation during his tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army (1999–2003), when TSBs were subjected to levies of AC personnel during his push to fully man all Army combat forces.⁵⁵ Congress succumbed to this temptation as well with the 1,500-Soldier reduction in their mandated number of AC personnel dedicated to RC support alluded to above.⁵⁶

Events since 9/11 have demonstrated the shortsightedness of these parsimonious moves. The RC will continue play an integral role in military operations for the foreseeable future. The gains made in the readiness and availability of these units will much more than offset the costs of dedicating an adequate number of AC personnel to RC unit support.

Finally, contingency plans for the employment of RC units must be flexible. The old paradigm of integrating RC units into specific contingency plans prior to the outbreak of hostilities proved a failure. The new paradigm as embodied in the ARFORGEN program, under which RC units are brought to a fully ready status on a rotating basis, shows greater promise.

Flexibility, unity of command, unity of effort, adequate resourcing: These should be the Army’s guiding principles as it moves toward a fully operational reserve for the future.

Endnotes

- ¹ The term WARTRACE and its predecessor CAPSTONE are not acronyms.
- ² See U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 11-41, *Force Support Package Policies and Procedures*, 1 September 2000.
- ³ For an overview of the WARTRACE program, see Army Regulation (AR) 11-30, *The Army WARTRACE Program*, 28 July 1995; and FORSCOM Regulation 11-30, *The Army WARTRACE Program: Program Guidance*, 1 October 2001.
- ⁴ FORSCOM Regulation 11-41, paragraph 4(a).
- ⁵ FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, *Army Relationships*, 20 July 2000, p. 19.
- ⁶ AR 11-30, paragraph 3-1.
- ⁷ Clifford I. Gould, *Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program to Provide All Reserve Components with a Wartime Mission* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 22 September 1988), p. 3. (The General Accounting Office has since been renamed the Government Accountability Office.)
- ⁸ Jerry C. Smithers, *Reserve Component Training Under CAPSTONE: An Individual Study Project* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1989), p. 3.
- ⁹ AR 11-30, paragraph 3-3(a).
- ¹⁰ AR 11-30, paragraph 3-5(b).
- ¹¹ AR 11-30, paragraph 3-6(e).
- ¹² AR 11-30, paragraph 3-6(e).
- ¹³ Gould, *Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program*, p. 1.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ To some extent, the reports of progress cited in the GAO report are more speculative than real, leaving the impression of units more excited by the promise of a new and innovative program than by the actual results achieved at the time of the interview. This is reflected in the language of the report, which states at one point that “[f]ive units told us that, as a result of CAPSTONE, improvements in training either had been or *could be* made on the basis of what they knew about their specific wartime mission” (emphasis added) (Gould, *Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program*, p. 5). The report cites one unit (329th Engineer Group) that was able to significantly focus its METL based on information received from the wartime headquarters and another (324th Data Processing Unit) that benefited from Overseas Training Duty (ODT) with their wartime gaining command (Gould, *Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program*, p. 5). However, my own experience in the Army National Guard tells me that such benefits would likely have been the exception rather than the rule, and even where achieved would have been of fleeting duration.

- ¹⁷ Gould, *Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program*, p. 5.
- ¹⁸ The GAO report did cite one unit interviewed that indicated a possible concrete training focus based on information from the wartime command. This was the 329th Engineer Group, which said that, as a result of information received from its wartime command, "its training could be concentrated on tasks such as setting up mine fields and destroying bridges, air fields, roads, and buildings" (Gould, *Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program*, p. 5). Additionally, Jerry Smithers provides a much more positive assessment of CAPSTONE in his study cited above than I have depicted here. Smithers's 1989 study consisted mostly of a large collection of anecdotal comments about CAPSTONE culled from mail-in questionnaires from, and telephone interviews with, members of RC units, primarily from the Pennsylvania ARNG. These comments portray CAPSTONE positively although problems are noted, including complaints about turbulence in CAPSTONE assignments. (Smithers, *Reserve Component Training Under CAPSTONE*.)
- ¹⁹ Steve Rader et al., *Going to War: Mobilizing and Deploying the Army National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades* (San Diego: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 April 1999), p. 10.
- ²⁰ Gould, *Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program*, p. 6.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- ²² AR 11-30, paragraphs 3-7 and 3-8.
- ²³ I personally experienced this when assigned to a Training Support Brigade (TSB) from 2001 to 2003. One of our client units was the 256th enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB), Louisiana Army National Guard. Despite our training relationship with the 256th, the brigade's officially designated AC associate unit was 4th Infantry Division. This made the 4th ID commanding general responsible for annual assessment of the 256th eSB's readiness and compatibility with AC forces. In practice, this report was drafted entirely by the TSB without input from the 4th ID and signed by that unit's commanding general without revision.
- ²⁴ Public Law 102-484, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Title XI – Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative* (short title: Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00010105----000-notes.html, accessed 29 February 2008.
- ²⁵ The performance of the three roundout brigades ultimately activated—155th Armor Brigade, Mississippi ARNG; 256th Infantry Brigade, Louisiana ARNG; and 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia ARNG—has been a source of great controversy. The ARNG After Action Report on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm takes great issue with the "perception on the part of many in the Defense community and within the media that the three Roundout Brigades were incapable of deploying." The report goes on to state that "[t]he facts are that they met the Army's deployability criteria but were never given the mission to deploy. . . . All of the Roundout Brigades . . . met the readiness deployability criteria established by the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution

System (AMOPES) on the first day of federalization. The deployment readiness requirements were significantly increased for the Roundout units after they were federalized.” *Army National Guard After Action Report (2 August 1990–28 February 1991), Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm* (Arlington, Va.: National Guard Bureau, June 1991), p. 7.

- ²⁶ *Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992*, Section 1131(a), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00010105----000-notes.html, accessed 29 February 2008.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, Section 1131(b). See also FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, *Active Component (AC)/ Reserve Component (RC) Partnerships*, 24 March 2003, paragraph 3-10.
- ²⁸ Public Law 102-190, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993*, Section 414(c), cited in Gary B. James, *Reserve Component Readiness Methodologies: Is There a Better Way?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Academic Year 2003–2004), p. 12.
- ²⁹ Public Law 103-160, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994*, Section 517(a), <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h103-2401&tab=summary>, accessed 29 February 2008.
- ³⁰ Public Law 108-375, *The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005*, section 515, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h108-4200>, accessed 29 February 2008.
- ³¹ For a useful (if dated) overview of the history of the TSBs, see “Training Support Brigades,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-tsb.htm>, accessed 20 February 2008. The implementation of TS XXI was at least partly prompted by Congress, which in section 515 of Public Law 103-160, the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994* (cited above), directed “the Secretary of the Army, by the end of FY 1995, to establish one or more active-component units of the Army with the primary mission of providing training support to reserve units.” Note that the integrated division concept has since been abandoned. The two former integrated division headquarters—24th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division—became 1st Army East and 1st Army West, respectively, after 5th Army became U.S. Army North and 1st Army assumed responsibility for RC support nationwide.
- ³² See FORSCOM Regulation 11-41.
- ³³ This disparity in support led to resentment in some cases; I remember on at least one occasion hearing a Soldier from a non-priority unit referring to the enhanced Separate Brigades as “everything” brigades—meaning that, in that Soldier’s view, the eSBs monopolized all the best equipment and training opportunities.
- ³⁴ Omitted from these numbers are three ARNG brigade combat teams (BCTs) that contributed significant numbers of Soldiers during Operation Iraqi Freedom I but did not deploy their brigade headquarters; two brigades currently mobilized and preparing to deploy to Iraq but not yet deployed; and various small elements and detachments of

BCTs deployed separately from their parent units. Also not included in these numbers are elements of ARNG BCTs deployed to the Balkans, or to Egypt in support of the Multi-National Force and Observers Mission. Data courtesy National Guard Bureau Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division, 18 August 2008.

³⁵ FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment System (FORMDEPS) Vol. III, *Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook, (RCUCH)*, 15 July 1999, p. 40.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³⁷ For a detailed review of the history of U.S. Army mobilization planning through the Second World War, see Merton G. Henry and Martin A. Kreidberg, *Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 20-212, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775–1945* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1955).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 511.

⁴⁰ Theresa L. Kraus and Frank N. Schubert, eds., *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington D.C.: Army Center of Military History, 1995), pp. 70–71.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 70–71.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴⁷ *Army National Guard After Action Report (2 August 1990–28 February 1991)*, p. 7.

⁴⁸ Even when RC combat forces have deployed in large numbers, WARTRACE assignments have had little if any impact on the deployment missions of these units. This can clearly be seen in the pattern of deployments since 9/11. For example, from 2001 to 2007 some 35,328 ARNG Soldiers deployed to military installations throughout the United States as security forces, and another 5,460 Soldiers deployed to Army and Air Force installations in Europe between 2003 and 2007 for the same purpose. These missions were surely not even remotely connected to the WARTRACE assignments of these units. Likewise, for the 28,781 ARNG Soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and the 191,860 ARNG Soldiers deployed to Iraq as of this writing, no effort has been made whatsoever to correlate unit deployments to the deployment of active duty WARTRACE higher headquarters, nor has the geographical location of pre-9/11 WARTRACE missions been considered in deployment decisions. Data courtesy National Guard Bureau Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division, 18 August 2008.

⁴⁹ Lewis Sorley, "Roundout Brigades and the Gulf War: A Commentary," *National Guard Magazine*, May 1998, p. 21.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁵¹ For an overview of ARFORGEN, see Department of the Army, *2007 Posture Statement*, Addendum H, <http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum/h.html>, accessed 1 February 2008; and Randy Pullen, “Force Generation Requires Four R’s,” *Army News Service*, 1 November 2005, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/11/mil-051101-arnews02.htm>, accessed 1 February 2008.

⁵² Most mobilizations since 9/11 have been under the authority of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 12302(a), *Ready Reserve*, which provides for the mobilization of up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve at any one time for up to 24 consecutive months each. See http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=12302&url=/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00012302----000-.html, accessed 29 February 2008.

⁵³ The Bible, King James Version, Matthew 6:24.

⁵⁴ Until recently, the TSBs actually had one major function in addition to their primary role of supporting RC units: coordinating Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). In the event that such assistance was required, the TSB commander would serve as the defense coordinating officer (DCO) and would provide a defense coordinating element (DCE) from his TSB staff. These personnel would work in conjunction with appropriate federal and state agencies to secure the required Department of Defense assistance. The TSBs no longer exercise this function; since 2006 a dedicated DCO and DCE have been embedded with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in each FEMA region. For an overview of MSCA see *Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, Subject: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*, 15 January 1993; and “Department of Defense Support to Domestic Incidents,” January 2008, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/DOD_SupportToDomesticIncidents.pdf.

⁵⁵ For a brief discussion of General Shinseki’s initiative, see Connie E. Dickey, “Army to Beef Up Divisions,” *Army News Service*, 8 November 1999, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991108divisions.htm>.

⁵⁶ Since 9/11 these reductions have proven short-sighted indeed, as the resources required to support the ongoing RC mobilization effort have far exceeded the 3,500—or even 5,000—active duty personnel allocated by Congress. This shortfall was masked during the years following 9/11 as TSB full-time manning was augmented by the mobilization of the many Army Reserve Soldiers assigned to TSBs alongside active duty personnel. The shortage began to bite, however, as these reservists expended the 24 cumulative months of mobilization allowed under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s interpretation of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 12302(a) limiting RC members to 24 months’ mobilization cumulative (although the statute itself uses the word “consecutive” rather than “cumulative”). To cover the resulting shortfall 1st Army launched Operation Warrior Trainer (OWT), under which RC Soldiers returning from duty overseas voluntarily extend their active duty service to support the post-mobilization training of RC units preparing to deploy. According to 1st Army, as of this writing as many as 4,000 RC Soldiers were on active duty under the auspices of OWT.

