Game On: Hypercompetition and Advantage in the PACOM AoR

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Agenda

• Study Background and Overview
• Findings
• Hypercompetition
• China Net Assessment
• Findings and Way Ahead
Research Questions

• What are the strategic “fundamentals” for creating and exploiting windows of transient advantage (hypercompetition) within the contested competitive spaces (the traditional domains, the EMS, and the strategic influence space)?

• What U.S./partner strategy and policy initiatives are critical to mastering regional hypercompetition and securing enduring defense objectives?
Findings and Recommendations

**Vision, Purpose Partnerships**

- The United States has lost strategic initiative in the PACOM AoR and is not currently agile, creative, and resourceful enough for prolonged hypercompetition with PACOM’s pacing rival (China).

- U.S. security partnerships in the PACOM AoR are both the United States’ greatest and most fragile regional competitive advantage.

- Initiate an innovative, purposeful, and dramatic PACOM reset – Rebalance 3.0.

- Reassert regional security leadership through creative cross-domain multilateralism, using all instruments of national power.

**Capability and Capacity**

- U.S. regional posture and forces are inadequate and ill-suited for a hypercompetitive environment.

- Cross-domain allied/partner capabilities are essential to a U.S. regional reset and a new more creative U.S.-led regional security order.

- Construct a disruptive, agile, and resilient regional joint and combined defense architecture – forces, agreements, and footprints.

- Develop a common joint and combined PACOM “operating model” – defining new NDS’ concepts (e.g., contact, blunt, surge, and homeland layers) in a regional cross-domain context.

**Strategic Methods**

- The heavily contested “strategic influence” space is the most important but least understood competitive “domain” in PACOM.

- Rival gray zone maneuver and asymmetric escalation are current U.S. vulnerabilities; effective U.S. adoption of the same would present regional U.S. rivals with multiple dilemmas.

- Initiate a U.S. PACOM reset with a joint and combined, cross-domain gray zone campaign to counter the region’s pacing and priority rivals.

- Reset long-term U.S. and partner regional approaches for sustained hypercompetition employing the “layers of competitive activity”: engage, expand, and contest; dissuade, disrupt, and deter; decide and defeat; reorient and reset.
ToR: Animating Idea = “Hypercompetition”

“Hypercompetition” describes conditions where competitive advantage is not sustainable and/or competitors are persistently attempting to erode the opponent’s competitive advantage.

The Study’s Three Lines of Effort and Nine Strategic Fundamentals adopted from D’Aveni’s Three Methods of Disruption and Seven Strategies (7-S’s) for Hypercompetitive Environments

LOE 1 - Purpose, Vision, and Partnerships
1) Strength of Interest
2) Legitimacy
3) Innovation

LOE 2 - Capabilities and Capacity
4) Strategic Capacity
5) Speed
6) Surprise

LOE 3 - Strategic Methods
7) Shifting Rules of Competition
8) Strategic Signaling
9) Strategic Maneuver

Hypercompetitive military rivalry is a persistent struggle for important but transient advantage across and within highly contested spaces – air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains; the electromagnetic spectrum, and the strategic influence space.
The USAWC study team identified the following nine strategic fundamentals of hypercompetition. And, in the process, answered the first of two key research questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Effort</th>
<th>Fundamental</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose, Vision, and Partnerships</td>
<td>Strength of Interest</td>
<td>Strength and clarity of will, objectives, interest, and risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Broad influence over and cooperative relationships with willing partners.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Predisposition to combine foresight, early recognition, and risk-taking in pursuit of game-changing innovation and opportunity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities and Capacity</td>
<td>Strategic Capacity</td>
<td>Breadth and depth to quickly mobilize resources and harness and blend public, private, and partner solutions to seize opportunities, meet surge demands, and generate disruptive strategic advantages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Capability – through posture, maneuver, re-organization, and re-tasking – to rapidly reframe strategic conditions in one’s favor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>Capability to generate conceptual, cognitive, technological, and positional advantage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Methods</td>
<td>Shifting Rules of Competition</td>
<td>Ability to redefine the character of security competition and selectively weaponize and exploit non-military capabilities and methods.</td>
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<td>Strategic Signaling</td>
<td>Capability to create narrative(s) and use information to advance interests and objectives while eroding adversary position.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strategic Maneuver</td>
<td>Ability to act as a disruptive “first mover” and “fast follower” across instruments of power to unhinge rival advantage and intent.</td>
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These fundamentals are the basis for the study’s net assessment of the PACOM region’s competitive dynamics.
The PRC is the “pacing” U.S. rival. It will persist in purposeful gray zone campaigning and will accept more risk as relative power increases.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>ADV</th>
<th>REL</th>
<th>Salient Factors</th>
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</table>
| Strength of Interest   | PRC |     | - US-PRC disparity of interests: SCS, ECS, and Taiwan  
|                        |     |     | - Which interests -- security, economic, corporate, academia, public?                                                                          |
| Legitimacy             | US  |     | - Competing visions for a new IAP security order. PRC’s “champion of the developed world” gaining on post-WWII era model of “world order”         |
| Innovation             | US  |     | - PRC IP theft, tech transfers, and deep investment in innovation and research will disrupt US advantage                                        |
| Strategic Capacity     | PRC |     | - US has lost diversity and resiliency in strategic industries and innovation base: partly due to PRC hypercompetition, partly self-inflicted |
| Speed                  | PRC |     | - Tyranny of distance disadvantages the US  
|                        |     |     | - PRC “leap-frogging” and “fast follower” proving faster than US bureaucracy                                                                  |
| Surprise               | PRC |     | - PRC continues to disrupt US market share in areas that were once indisputable areas of US advantage: commercial UAS, AI, superconductors     |
| Shifting Rules         | PRC |     | - PRC actively campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict. “Three Warfares” and weaponization of everything creating risk confusion      |
| Signaling              | PRC |     | - PRC more agile at “narrative warfare;” PRC undermining US “rebalance narrative”                                                             |
| Strategic Maneuver     | PRC |     | - PRC shapes the potential future battlefield to its defensive advantage  
|                        |     |     | - US MDB = simultaneous joint ops; PRC Concept = synchronous DIMEFIL action                                                                  |
Findings and Recommendations

**Vision, Purpose Partnerships**

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**Capability and Capacity**

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- Cross-domain allied/partner capabilities are essential to a U.S. regional reset and a new more creative U.S.-led regional security order.

- The heavily contested “strategic influence” space is the most important but least understood competitive “domain” in PACOM.

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Way Ahead

**Goods**

- **Consistency.** Insights, findings and recommendations are aligned with the new National Defense Strategy (NDS).
- **All-domain.** MDO is a way to expand the competitive space.
- **Threat based.** Great power competition drives strategy and planning (see new National Military Strategy).
- **Regional relevance.** A change in leadership in the PACOM AoR offers an opportunity to inform CCDR direction.

**Others**

- **Influence in the AoR?** Wide acknowledgement that the U.S. may lose influence with partners and allies in face of a rising, great power China within the Indo-Pacific (and globally).
- **How do we go fast?** Near consensus that (at present) U.S. is not well positioned conceptually, materially, and institutionally for PACOM’s endemic all-domain hyper-competition.
- **Tipping point?** Hypercompetition is about transient cross-domain advantage; trends forecast a possible permanent U.S. regional disadvantage.

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**U.S. position is vulnerable.** Reducing vulnerability relies on expanding and exploiting the competitive space. Achieving exploitable advantage is impossible without the support of U.S. regional allies and partners.
Discussion
BACK-UP SLIDES

Additional Working Groups, Team, ETC.
Findings and Recommendations (Continued):
Four Layers of Competitive Activity

Get in the Game Now
- Engage allies and partners in a new more creative multilateralism, federating and effectively networking approaches to regional security.
- Expand the competitive space vertically and horizontally; across blended domains of decision and action and highly contested spaces.
- Contest through cross-domain maneuver and pressure rival attempts to coercively reshape the regional security order.

Pick the Right Battles and Accept Good Enough
- Decide and act creatively to counter overt provocation and aggression with the benefit foresight.
- Defeat the rival aggression and deny their purpose by imposing costs on friendly terms while offering rivals viable face-saving exits.

Actively Campaign
- Dissuade by anticipation and early action rival adoption of destabilizing capabilities, methods, or courses of action.
- Disrupt rival designs through persistent cross-domain offensive maneuver.
- Deter rival hostility through credible cross-domain “presence” and cost-imposing approaches.

Regain Balance and Persist
- Reorient under pressure and adapt to meaningful change in strategic circumstances.
- Reset strategy, plans, and posture for persistent hypercompetition.

Contemporary hypercompetition requires constant layered competitive activity across and within what are highly-contested strategic spaces. Hypercompetitive advantage most often goes to rivals that are biased for action and postured to seize transient opportunities.
Study Background – Methodology

- Assembled a high-quality study team of consisting of 4 faculty, 7 resident student researchers, and 4 resident student contributors from the USAWC Carlisle Scholars Program (CSP).
- The study team conducted its research and roll-out in four phases from July ’17 - June ‘18:
  - **Phase I**: Develop preliminary insights.
  - **Phase II**: Refine and test insights.
  - **Phase III**: Record and report findings.
  - **Phase IV**: Socialize results.
- The study proceeded according to the following approach:
  - Assemble an expert community of interest/practice comprised of subject matter experts and senior leaders within DoD, stakeholders/study sponsors, and outside experts.
  - Conduct a literature/policy/plans review; expert/stakeholder interviews, consultations, and roundtables; and original research.
  - Vet insights, recommendations, and findings through the expert community of interest (4x expert working groups and 1x senior review group).
  - Produce a final written report, produce at least one 800-1000 word opinion piece (stretch goal is three); and produce a policy-relevant briefing on key study findings.
  - Socialize findings through extensive post-study stakeholder engagement.

The study team captured the widest, most diverse set of perspectives it could in the time available.
The Expert Working Group

- The Expert Working Group included representatives from:
  - ABCANZ Office
  - Air Command and Staff College
  - AEI
  - Army Capabilities Integration Center
  - Army QDRO
  - Army Science Board
  - CNA
  - CRS
  - CSIS
  - CSBA
  - Institute for Defense Analysis
  - JD Solutions LLC
  - Joint Staff J5
  - Joint Staff J7
  - Marine Corps War College
  - Marine Corps Combat Development Command
  - The Mitchell Institute
  - MITRE
  - NDU/INSS
  - Office of the Secretary of Defense
  - RAND
  - United States Army Pacific
  - U.S. Army War College
  - Air Staff
  - Army Staff
  - Headquarters Marine Corps
  - Navy Staff
THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Study Background: The Precedents
The Research Team

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Japan

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Seminar 16

Andrew Ulmer
Seminar 22

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Seminar 21
Strategic Approach: Expand the Competitive Space

• **Build a More Lethal Force**
  - Establish a tailored and flexible nuclear deterrent, decisive conventional force, and irregular warfare as a core competency
  - Modernize key capabilities
  - Develop and implement innovative operational concepts
  - Ensure a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment
  - Cultivate workforce talent

• **Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners**
  - Uphold foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, and accountability
  - Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning
  - Deepen interoperability and integrate defense strengths for deterrence
  - Shift burden sharing discussion to practical, constructive focus designed to optimize allied/partner constellation to achieve our strategic objectives

• **Reform the Department for Greater Performance & Affordability**
  - Deliver performance at speed of relevance
  - Drive budget discipline and affordability to achieve solvency
  - Streamline rapid, iterative approaches from development to fielding
  - Harness and protect the National Security Innovation Base