Strategic Mobility & Responsive Power Projection

An AUSA Report
Purpose of this Document

• The United States is the world’s preeminent power for two reasons. One is our arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. The other is our nation’s ability to rapidly project and sustain significant conventional military power anywhere in the world. The latter is the most evident and apparent sign of national power, as America regularly deploys forces abroad to defend our interests and allies, deter aggression and conduct humanitarian operations.

• To project this power, for combat or noncombat operations, the United States depends on its varied strategic mobility assets to transport and sustain the forces. These assets are under increasing strain as requirements continue to expand, time to respond contracts and the planes, ships and other systems age and become more costly to maintain.

• This document is designed to be a primer on strategic mobility and to show why this capability is in danger of becoming worn out or obsolescent if resources are not dedicated to its modernization and upkeep. As the United States continues to be engaged, both economically and politically, our armed forces will continue to be a vital protector of our national interests. To accomplish our current and future military missions requires that we lead the way with seamless integrated mobility capabilities that permit the projection of power to anyplace in the world directly from the continental United States (CONUS).

National Security Strategy

The deployment of U.S. and multinational forces requires maintaining and ensuring access to sufficient fleets of aircraft, ships, vehicles and trains, as well as bases, ports, prepositioned equipment and other infrastructure. The United States must have a robust Defense Transportation System, including both military assets and U.S.-flag commercial sealift and airlift, to remain actively engaged in world affairs.

Strategic Mobility, the capability to transport military forces rapidly across intercontinental distances into an operational theater, lies at the heart of U.S. military strategy.

General John M. Shalikashvili, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the foreword to the book So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, by Dr. James K. Matthews and Ms Cora J. Holt
On 20 December 1989, military forces of the United States launched Operation Just Cause in Panama at the direction of the President. As a result of the rapid, decisive nature in which Operation Just Cause was executed, it has become a model for operations of the future.

Operation Just Cause was the simultaneous application of near real-time intelligence, electronic command and control, operational security and deception operations, overwhelming joint forces and decisive leadership at each echelon, to resolve a conflict decisively with minimal casualties. It was this simultaneity, the generation of simultaneous effects that combine to create overwhelming and focused power relative to enemy sources of power (the centers of gravity), that enabled the rapid and decisive victory. **Critical to the concept of simultaneity of operations is the quantity and availability of strategic lift.**

**Recent History of U.S. Strategic Mobility**

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**Operation Just Cause 12/89**

**NCA GUIDANCE:** Present adversary with overwhelming combat power to secure surrender or terminate combat in shortest possible time with **minimum casualties on both sides and absolute minimal collateral damage.**

**Airlift Sorties**
- C-141 (Airdrop) 63
- C-141 (Airland) 43
- C-5 (Airland) 18
- C-130 (Airdrop) 19
- C-130 (Airland) 25

**Forces**
- In Country
  - 13,000 Personnel
- Arriving H-Hour
  - 7,000 Troops
- 16 Maneuver battalions employed by H+24

MOB = Main Operating Base  
NCA = National Command Authorities  
SAAF = Sherman Army Airfield
The deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm ranks among the largest in history. From 7 August 1990 (C-Day, commencement) to 10 March 1991 (R-Day, beginning of redeployment), the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) moved to the United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) area of responsibility—a distance of 8,700 nautical miles—nearly 504,000 passengers, 3.6 million tons of dry cargo and 6.1 million tons of petroleum products. This equates to the deployment and sustainment of two Army corps, two Marine Corps expeditionary forces and 28 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons.*

Despite the successful operation of the plan, Operation Desert Shield revealed that strategic deployment of U.S. forces was too time-consuming and offered our adversaries a chance to achieve their military goals if they acted quickly. After Operation Desert Storm, Congress charged the Department of Defense (DoD) to determine strategic mobility requirements in response to the changing world environment and a revision of the National Military Strategy (NMS) that calls for greater reliance on CONUS-based contingency forces. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and the follow-on Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS/BURU) correctly concluded that the military could increase its deployability only through an investment in sealift, airlift, equipment prepositioning and deployment infrastructures. As a result, DoD decided to acquire 120 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft and 20 large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs), and to preposition ground equipment both ashore and afloat to allow for rapid transitions to decisive operations.

The Army extended this concept into the Army’s Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP), a comprehensive program that addresses infrastructure requirements such as rail, port throughput and airfield improvements, to facilitate movement of personnel and equipment from CONUS bases to Aerial/Sea Ports of Embarkation (APOE/SPOE). Infrastructure and equipment improvements are focused at designated CONUS Power Projection Platforms that include installations, airfields, strategic seaports, and ammunition depots and plants.

* James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Research Center, United States Transportation Command, 1996, pg iii.
The ASMP is synchronized to ensure a total “fort-to-port” Home Station to Tactical Assembly Area deployment system that provides the Army the ability to rapidly deploy a versatile, lethal, expandable and sustainable CONUS-based military force capable of achieving decisive victory.

To fix the shortfall in fast sealift shipping, as identified by the MRS, a proposed total of 20 large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships will be built or converted by the Navy (five conversion and 15 new construction). The Navy has built all five conversion ships and awarded contracts for 14 of the 15 new-construction LMSRs.

The Army strongly supports the continued acquisition of the Air Force C-17 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reduced the original procurement of 210 C-17s to 120 in the early 1990s. Since then, an additional 15 C-17s have been authorized for procurement, bringing the total to 135. To date, 56 aircraft have been delivered. The retirement of the C-141s and the aging of the C-5 fleet argue for more C-17s than the current program provides. Further, there is a demonstrable need for an advanced theater transport to complement and leverage C-17 capabilities and future warfighting concepts.

General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), in his October 1999 testimony to the United States House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, stated that U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC) flew 1,108 strategic airlift missions in support of Kosovo operations: 205 in the C-5, 104 in the C-141 and 799 in the C-17. An additional 66 commercial airlift missions were also flown. For the first time, the C-17 was used as an intratheater airlifter, bringing needed troops, equipment and supplies directly into theater. This type of operation is a precursor of future missions in which combat power is delivered directly onto the decisive points of the enemy to bring about the desired result. While the C-17 performed the bulk of the Kosovo theater support missions, General Robertson cautioned that under other circumstances and due to the limited number of C-17s to be procured, they would be dedicated to the strategic mission and most likely not be available for theater support. **General Robertson attributes this heavy reliance on aircraft to the quickly changing nature of the operational environment and the austere transportation infrastructure in regions today.**
Why Do We Have Power Projection?

- The United States continues to have interests in many parts of the world—interests that vary from defending a critical ally to providing humanitarian aid. Since the end of the Cold War, a majority of the U.S. armed services have been CONUS-based, thus requiring forces to be projected into foreign theaters and operating areas when needed.

- The National Security Strategy of engagement means that the armed services are busier than ever around the world. They require the capabilities to project and sustain them overseas for long periods of time, across the entire spectrum of conflict. Lessons learned by our future enemies from Operation Desert Storm and Kosovo and, to a certain extent, Panama, are to strike hard and quickly and not allow the Americans time to build up their force. The capability to rapidly project a properly selected, properly sequenced and “ready to operate upon arrival” force minimizes that risk.

- This is the essence of Responsive Power Projection, the ability to transport military forces into other theaters and to sustain them while they accomplish their mission for however long it takes. While most countries have some limited capability to project power, the United States is the only nation with the assets and systems needed to project and sustain major combat power anywhere in the world on short notice. This capability—in addition to nuclear weapons—is what makes the United States a superpower.

What Are the NMS Requirements?

*Power projection is the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain U.S. military power in and from multiple, dispersed locations until conflict resolution.*

- The current National Military Strategy is to shape, respond and prepare. This dictates shaping the international environment through engagement, responding to crises or wars and preparing now for an uncertain future.

- Under the National Military Strategy, the United States must retain the capability to remain engaged throughout the world on a number of types of missions and to respond to a number of small-scale contingencies (SSCs) such as peacekeeping, humanitarian response and nation-building. Also, the United States must retain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs). This translates to fighting two Desert Storm-sized operations at the same time.

- To accomplish these peacetime and wartime missions under the National Military Strategy, the United States is dependent on its responsive *power projection* and strategic mobility assets for getting the forces where they need to go at the right time with the right support.
Where Are We Today in Our Strategic Mobility Assets? (as of December 1999)

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is the enabler that allows the country’s leadership to pursue the global engagement strategy. Simply put, the command is the single manager for common user transportation. Its mission is to provide air, land and sea transportation in support of the National Security objectives—in peace and war.

- USTRANSCOM is the unified command with responsibility for providing global shipping and lift of supplies, equipment and personnel. It is a joint command under the unified command plan, encompassing Army, Air Force and Navy components.

- USTRANSCOM is largely a supporting command, with the role of transporting needed materials for the other regional commanders in chief (CINCs). To accomplish this daily global mission, USTRANSCOM relies on the resources of its three transportation component commands: the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC). To achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency, this mobility triad, in turn, leverages the active and reserve components’ military personnel and civilian professionals, as well as the strong partnerships with the commercial transportation industry.

- USTRANSCOM also has input with the services for the development, acquisition and organization of lift assets and systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessels</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Total in Program</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>135 Authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>126 (Analysis of Alternatives Study is reviewing requirement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Retired in 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>KC-135</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>547</td>
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<tr>
<td>KC-10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)</td>
<td>325/208</td>
<td>325/208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B767 (Aero Med)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSMR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready Reserve Fleet</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
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Strategic Mobility Assets

The Army relies on the other services for its strategic mobility. USTRANSCOM has operational control of these assets.

The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is the ground component of USTRANSCOM. It is responsible for the ground movement of military units and equipment within the United States, as well as overseas. MTMC coordinates with the other elements of USTRANSCOM to get CONUS-based units from their posts to the designated sea/air ports of embarkation for movement to the theater.

The Army maintains stocks of equipment and supplies prepositioned overseas in order to speed the deployment of Army formations to likely areas of operation. Some of these sets are on shore in host countries and some are based afloat aboard Navy sealift ships. These prepositioned stocks include:

- **APS-2** in Europe with two brigade sets in North-Central Europe, one brigade set in Italy and a battalion of self-propelled artillery in Norway.
- **APS-3** afloat vessels in the Pacific and Indian Oceans aboard 15 U.S. ships. These ships carry a brigade set of equipment and a corps set of combat service support equipment, as well as 30 days’ supplies for an Army corps. An additional brigade set will be afloat in 2001.
- **APS-4** in the Pacific with one brigade set in Korea as well as sustainment stocks in Japan and Korea.
- **APS-5** in Southwest Asia with one brigade set in Kuwait and one brigade set in Qatar now and a division base set to be in Qatar by 2001.

**Army Prepositioned Stocks**

- **APS-1**
  - CONUS: 11 OP Project Stocks
  - Sustainment Stocks

- **APS-2**
  - Central
  - 2x1 Brigade (2)
  - Region: 5 OP Project Stocks
  - Italy: 2x2 Brigade
  - 3 OP Project Stocks
  - Norway: 155 SP FA Battalion

- **APS-3**
  - Afloat: 2x2 Brigade
  - CSS Unit Sets
  - 5 OP Project Stocks
  - Sustainment Stocks
  - 15 Ships
  - 1x1 (8th) Bde planned FY 01

- **APS-4**
  - Korea: 2x1 Brigade
  - 5 OP Project Stocks
  - Sustainment Stocks
  - Japan: 4 OP Project Stocks
  - Sustainment Stocks

- **APS-5**
  - Kuwait: 2x1 Brigade
  - Sustainment Stocks
  - Qatar: 2x1 Brigade - complete FY 99
  - Div/Bde unit sets - FY98-01
  - Sustainment Stocks - stored out of theater

**For Issue to Deploying Army Units**

OP = Operational  SP = Self-Propelled  FA = Field Artillery
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) represents the naval component of USTRANSCOM. Within MSC, the Navy operates a number of naval, government-owned and government-leased ships to preposition and transport material around the globe. These ships include roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) cargo ships, break-bulk freighters, tankers and container ships.

Sealift remains the safest and most economical way to transport large amounts of heavy or outsized cargo over long distances. In a given MTW scenario, the majority of the Army’s equipment and supplies will arrive by ship, while only personnel and some high-demand assets will be airlifted to the theater.

Principal sealift assets include:

- Fast Sealift Ships. These eight ships belonging to the Navy are capable of transporting an entire Army armored division to any port in the world within two weeks of setting sail. They are maintained in reserve but are at a high state of readiness and can be activated rather quickly.

- Maritime Prepositioning Ships. These ships, a mix of RO/RO, cargo and tankers, provide the Marine Corps with prepositioned equipment. Each of the three squadrons (Europe, Indian and Pacific) of these leased ships carries all the arms and equipment of a Marine brigade as well as 30 days’ supplies. There are three government-leased ships carrying Air Force munitions and one government-leased tanker carrying fuel for all the services as well.

- Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSRs). These government-owned ships are capable of carrying Army equipment and personnel and off-loading them quickly. Twenty of these ships are scheduled to be procured; eight of them will be used in the prepositioning fleets and the rest as transports and for surge requirements.

- The Ready Reserve Fleet. The ships of the RRF are civil-owned and -operated but are available to the Navy in times of emergency or crisis. Made up of 87 RO/RO, cargo, tanker and container ships, this fleet has various levels of readiness and availability depending on the type of membership with the RRF and the type of emergency. In an MTW, these ships would carry the vast majority of supplies to theater.
• The U.S. Air Force component of USTRANSCOM is the Air Mobility Command (AMC), which has control over most of the strategic airlift aircraft in the Air Force inventory, as well as significant numbers of tactical transports and tankers.

• Airlift continues to be the fastest way to project decisive combat power anytime and anyplace in the world. However, airlift aircraft are limited by their capacity and the declining numbers of aircraft (tails). Airlift assets are usually the first sign of American involvement. Airlift aircraft with the American flag visible on their tails are seen around the world on a daily basis supporting national policy objectives, whether humanitarian relief, crisis support or open conflict.

• Strategic airlift aircraft include:
  • The C-17, the newest airlifter in the inventory. This plane can carry the full spectrum of Army equipment, including outsized cargo. The C-17 is the only aircraft capable of carrying outsized cargo to, from and within a theater directly to small, austere forward airfields. Because of these attributes, the C-17 provided most of the lift for Operation Allied Force, for the deployment of Task Force Hawk and for humanitarian relief supplies to Albania. There are 56 C-17s in the inventory, while 135 are authorized for procurement. The Air Force is reviewing a proposal from private industry for an additional 60 aircraft, while Congress has shown its support by authorizing continuation of the existing multiyear contract.

  • The C-141, the long-time backbone of the AMC fleet. These aircraft are nearing the end of their service life (2006) and are increasingly costly to operate. The 162 remaining in the inventory are being replaced by the C-17 (one C-17 to two C-141s) as they become available.
• The C-5 Galaxy, the largest airlifter in the fleet. The 126 C-5s available in the active and reserve inventories are capable of lifting any weapon system in the Army inventory. The C-5 entered the inventory in the late 1960s; its availability is a serious concern as it suffers from severe reliability and maintainability problems, as well as age on the older “A” model.

• The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), which provides additional airlift for personnel and cargo. It is a program under which airlines (using their civilian crews) commit in-service airliners to augment military airlift during crisis situations. There are three levels of CRAF activation, with Stage III as the highest commitment. CRAF Stage I provides about 5 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) and CRAF Stage III provides a total of 26.9 MTM/D. In addition, CRAF provides about 95 percent of passenger airlift demand. Activation of Stages I, II and III requires approval by the Secretary of Defense.

• Other airlift and air mobility assets include:
  
  • The KC-135 and KC-10 tanker aircraft, which provide the Air Force its global reach by refueling other aircraft while in transit. These aircraft are also capable of carrying cargo and passengers in addition to or instead of carrying fuel.

  • The C-130, which is the most numerous theater airlift asset available. There are more than 500 airlift C-130s in the inventory. The Air Mobility Command (AMC) has plans to standardize most of the C-130s into a common C-130X configuration. The C-130 provides most of the theater airlift to U.S. forces, but it lacks the ability to carry outsized cargo.
Emerging Joint Requirements
Per Joint Vision 2010

The requirements of the future must meet the potential threats we see. Those threats are away from America’s shores. We must meet them in a quick and decisive fashion with full dominance. To do this, we must have the capability to project whatever force is necessary. The new information superiority and technologies that are now available give us an opportunity as never before to satisfy this requirement. We must capitalize on these new technologies in the arena of responsive power projection by means of new and innovative strategic mobility initiatives and concepts.

Joint Vision 2010
America’s military preparing for tomorrow: Quality people trained, equipped and ready for joint operations.
• Persuasive in peace
• Decisive in war
• Preeminent in any form of conflict

“Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America’s armed forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”

Why a Joint Vision?
To assist NCA “in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces” (CJCS Title X responsibility)
To provide a common direction to harmonize service views and guide their force development efforts
To advance joint warfighting capability as intended by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act

Joint Vision 2010 aims to keep the United States preeminent in the world—no matter how complex the world becomes. Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for producing forces for the 21st century that can protect and promote America’s interests worldwide. The end state of the vision is dominance across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Information Superiority (IS) and Technological Innovation (TI) are critical “enabling concepts” for the vision. IS and TI enable us to achieve new levels of capability in the operational concepts of maneuver, strike, logistics and personnel protection. Maneuver becomes Dominant Maneuver; Strike becomes Precision Engagement; Logistics becomes Focused Logistics; and Personnel Protection will become Full Dimensional Protection. The six critical considerations—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people (DOTMLP)—representing all elements of military power, must eventually evolve together, to achieve full spectrum dominance.

The operational concept within Joint Vision 2010 which addresses innovative, strategic mobility initiatives is Focused Logistics.

**Focused Logistics**

Focused Logistics is the fusion of information, logistics and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, track and shift assets (even while en route) and deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations. Focused Logistics will extend the reach and longevity of current systems and provide the Joint Force Commander lighter deployment loads, pinpoint logistics delivery systems and a smaller logistics footprint less vulnerable to interdiction or attack.
General Eric K. Shinseki provided this goal as he assumed the position of Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in June 1999:

The Chief’s Statement of Intent

Goal
Provide the leadership—grounded in a vision of the future—to keep the Army the preeminent land warfighting force in the world.

Objectives
- Increasing strategic response
- Developing a clearer long-term strategy to improve operational jointness and to implement the goals of Joint Vision 2010
- Developing leaders for joint warfighting as well as for managing change
- Completing the full integration of the active and reserve components
- Manning our warfighting units
- Providing for the well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members

General Shinseki’s first two objectives articulate his emphasis:

Increase strategic response . . . implement goals of Joint Vision 2010.

To accomplish these objectives, he provided the Army concept:

Soldiers on point for the nation [are] transforming this, the most respected Army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations. . . .

Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint and light forces must be more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile. Achieving this paradigm will require innovative thinking about structure, modernization efforts and spending.

GEN Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff
AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon, 12 October 1999
Strategic responsiveness is the ability to rapidly project and sustain the right mix of mission-tailored lethal, survivable and mobile forces, including support and sustainment, to any point on the globe to achieve decisive results as part of joint and or multinational operations. Notwithstanding lift capability, both air and surface, strategic responsiveness is equally dependent on organizational structure, equipment, operational concepts, training and unit readiness, and support infrastructure.

The Army’s heavy divisions remain unequalled in their ability to gain and hold ground in the most intense direct-fire battles imaginable. With the proper investments in strategic mobility, they become the decisive element in the major theater wars now and in the future. However, these same divisions also are challenged to get to other contingencies where we have not laid the deployment groundwork. Once deployed, it takes significant effort and cost to sustain them. Our light forces—the toughest light infantry in the world—can strike lightning fast, but lack staying power, lethality and tactical mobility once inserted. In general, our logistical footprints for deployed forces are unacceptably large—driven sometimes by unrealistic replenishment demands, but also by a complex inventory of multiple types of equipment, the sheer numbers of which drive up the stockage requirements for numerous lines of repair parts.

To better meet the requirements of the next century, the Army will undergo a major transformation. The concept calls for Army divisions to dominate across the full spectrum of operations by providing them the agility and versatility they need to transition rapidly from one point on that spectrum to another with the least loss of momentum. To do so, the Army will develop a vibrant capability for “reach-back” communications and intelligence to aggressively reduce the size of deployed support footprints in both combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS).
It is the intent of the senior leadership that units deploy essentially with their fighters and critical support needs. At this time, 80 percent of the Army’s lift requirement is composed of the logistics “tail.” The Army will look for future systems which can be strategically deployed by the C-17, but also be able to fit a C-130-like profile for tactical intratheater lift. Prioritizing solutions which optimize smaller, lighter, more lethal, yet more reliable, fuel efficient and survivable options is the goal.

With the proper technological solutions, the senior leadership of the Army will transform all components (Active, Guard and Reserve) into a standard design with internetted command and control packages that allow a combat-capable brigade to be deployed to anywhere in the world in 96 hours; a division on the ground in 120 hours; and five divisions on the ground within 30 days once they have received execute liftoff orders. Being able to do so gives the National Command Authorities (NCA) a genuine deterrent capability. When ordered, the Army (operating in the joint environment) will arrive in trouble spots faster than our adversaries can complicate the crisis. Once there, our forces intend to leverage for de-escalation and a return to stability through their formidable presence. Should deterrence fail, the forces are postured to prosecute war with an intensity that wins with the least cost to both U.S. and allied forces. To improve strategic responsiveness further, the Army has enabled the Army Service Component Commands to function both as Joint Forces Land Component Commands (JFLCCs) and as Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters. Corps will function as JFLCCs, ARFORs and Joint Task Force headquarters.

Strategic Maneuver—Enabling Strategic Responsiveness

Strategic maneuver is the seizure of the strategic and operational initiative by strategically responsive military forces converging at decisive times and locations from any point on the globe. These actions confer a positional advantage that permits the simultaneous application of land, air, space and...
maritime forces and the integration of operational fires and maneuver. When coupled with strategic interdiction and other joint capabilities, strategic maneuver produces a synergy that dominates the situation, containing or terminating the conflict by rapidly setting the military conditions for prompt defeat of the enemy, or setting the conditions for conflict termination through the use of other elements of national power.

**Importance of Intratheater Airlift Capabilities**

The emerging tactics, techniques and procedures brought about by the information revolution stress such concepts as responsive logistics, minimizing the in-theater footprint and maximizing "shooters on the ground." Instead of the steady, massive build-up of forces and supplies in theater, tomorrow’s wars will require extremely swift, on-demand lift directly from CONUS or, if needed, from the intermediate staging base to the crisis response location.

Intratheater airlift, airdrop and airland must be able to interface with strategic mobility forces (air and sea) to provide movement of troops and material in theater to user units at forward operating locations, as well as to provide sustained resupply. Intratheater airlift is an integral part of the battlefield commander’s maneuverability and ability to deliver decisive combat power when and where needed. Theater airlift allows the battlefield commander the tactical flexibility to reposition and maneuver combat forces quickly and decisively.

The C-17 added a new dimension to strategic and theater airlift by being able to perform direct-delivery operations from initial onload to the forward area, thereby eliminating the costly transshipment operations. It also provided for the first time the ability to deliver outsized combat equipment to small, austere airfields in forward areas.
The right mix and configuration of theater airlift aircraft can allow a broad range of on-call capabilities, thereby substantially reducing the need for large forward-area inventory stockpiles. The ability to respond rapidly and reliably to various locations within a theater can also dramatically increase overall system efficiency, requiring fewer committed forces to defend and influence larger areas.

**New Concepts (cont’d)**

**RAPID DOMINANCE: PRECLUSION**
- Preconflict Simultaneous Direct Seizure
  - Credible NCA Option
  - Rapid Maneuver
  - Seize Decisive Points
  - Maintain Positional Advantage
  - Global Fires/Strike
  - Denial Achieved

Strategic Offense — Tactical Defense

**RAPID DOMINANCE: SHOCK AND AWE**
- Ongoing Conflict Simultaneous Direct Seizure Attacks Decisive Points
  - Global Fires/Strike
  - Transportation Hubs
  - POL/Ammo Sites
  - C² Nodes
  - Mountain Passes
  - Airfields
  - Compels Threat to Concentrate
  - Joint-Combined Arms Destroys

Threat Is Put on the Horns of a Dilemma

C² = Command and Control  NCA = National Command Authorities
POL = Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants

**Example of use of strategic preclusion in Kosovo:** Once enemy positions are roughly determined, strategically deployable ground forces are delivered to areas of positional advantage. Enemy can stay dispersed to avoid fires (air and missile strikes) and be defeated in detail or attempt to mass to counter our ground advantage and be interdicted by fires. In either case, the enemy does not achieve his operational goals of either the full conquest of the province or the attending ethnic cleansing. The key is the rapid application of both fire and maneuver simultaneously.
What Must Be Done!

In today’s uncertain world, the question arises: “Could the United States execute a Just Cause-like operation today or in the first decade of the next century?” The question is even more relevant at a time when our armed forces have undergone a 33 percent reduction in force, reorganized and reconfigured themselves and faced a “procurement holiday” in modernization efforts. To address whether the United States could conduct a campaign today using the principles of simultaneity of operations, we need to consider the current power-projection capability in our armed forces. It is imperative that we have a responsive power-projection capability sufficient to ensure that well-trained forces operating jointly arrive at the decisive place on time. In addition, recent conflicts have demonstrated the need for secure en route communications to permit en route planning and rehearsal for our committed forces.

Our armed forces require:

- Additional strategic and theater outsized airlift capability
  - Continue the acquisition of the 135 C-17s; accept the plus-60 C-17 proposal
  - Quickly modernize and standardize the existing C-130 airlift fleet (130X)
  - Improve the C-5’s maintenance reliability
  - Ensure theater CINCs support acquisition of oversized and outsized airlift capabilities
  - Explore and fund vertical lift technologies for an Advanced Theater Transport (ATT)

- Other airlift and air refueling capabilities
  - Continue acquisition of the new suite of aircraft loaders—the 60K Tunner loader and the next-generation small loader
  - Continue modernization of the CONUS and overseas en route infrastructure
  - Modernize the avionics and defensive systems of the airlift and air refueling fleets

- Additional sealift capabilities
  - Continue acquisition of new and renovated fleet of large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships
  - Continue support for the readiness of the prepositioning and Ready Reserve Force fleets
  - Maintain and improve the Joint Logistics over the Sea (JLOTS) capability

- Funding of R&D and S&T exploration and development initiatives
  - Development, fielding, exploitation of Advanced Information Technology (reduce footprint and demand for lift)

- Continued emphasis on quality-of-life initiatives for personnel retention

We cannot afford to be second.
A Robust Rapid Global Mobility Capability guarantees our success.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War
THE ARMY IS THE HEART AND SOUL
OF AMERICA. . . . IT IS IN
AMERICA’S INTEREST TO PROVIDE
AMERICAN SOLDIERS THE BEST AND
MOST EFFECTIVE EQUIPMENT.

DECEMBER 1999

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