The U.S. Army in the Pacific: Assuring Security and Stability
The American military experience in the Asia–Pacific theater has always been a joint experience. The Army has been there from the start, fighting more battles there—63 campaigns—than anywhere else outside North America. But just last month, regional combatant commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III expressed his concern to Congress that today’s security challenges in that most militarized part of the world are serious. In his words, there is no “Pacific NATO” to manage defense relationships or provide a framework for conflict resolution. As a result, the Army’s continuous forward presence in theater since 1898 and its rich history of developing security partnerships in that region are priceless national assets.

The Army in the Pacific has undergone a significant transformation in recent years to be ready to meet 21st century security requirements. As I Corps and its organic commands return from the Middle East, they are being aligned with the region and are prepared to win decisively in the human domain of conflict if necessary. U.S. Army Pacific has become a theater army headquarters that can provide numerous flexible mission command capabilities to the combatant commander when required; it also provides forces for the entire region, enabling Eighth Army in Korea to focus entirely on operational readiness. In addition to executing security requirements with longstanding treaty partners, the Army’s engagement efforts have opened new doors of potentially enormous strategic and operational value—gaining access despite our adversaries’ desires to restrict it. And the Army’s sustainment forces have developed significant new capabilities to ensure that we can win any fight and succeed in a whole-of-government approach to any contingency.

This latest installment of AUSA’s signature Torchbearer series discusses how the Army’s trained and ready forces contribute to the joint force by preventing conflict, shaping the environment and winning decisively if necessary, assuring security and stability in the Asia–Pacific region. We hope that you will find this report a useful resource and that you will continue to look to AUSA for thoughtful, credible analysis of contemporary national security issues.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, USA Retired
President, AUSA

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Executive Summary

We live in the human domain—the land domain. It’s where people are affected—the human state is affected by anything from humanitarian assistance [and] disaster relief to armed conflict. It involves human beings on the ground, and it takes an army to sustain that.

Lieutenant General Francis J. Wiercinski, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, 22 October 2012

For more than 100 years, the Army has maintained a constant presence in the Asia–Pacific theater. Its role in assuring security and stability as a key component of the joint force—to prevent conflict by maintaining decisive advantages via the forward presence of trained and ready ground forces; to shape the international security environment by engaging the human domain, growing positive relationships with partner militaries and reassuring allies; and to win the nation’s wars decisively through prompt and sustained land combat if prevention and shaping prove insufficient—is timeless.

As World War II ended, U.S. Army leadership proved to be the cornerstone of renewed peace and prosperity in the Pacific. The Army’s action at this juncture laid the foundation for some of America’s most critical and most enduring international partnerships. Today, the region has reemerged as one of the world’s most militarily significant and challenging, and the Army’s partnerships are invaluable now that 21 out of the 27 militaries in the region are led by local army officers. The 2012 U.S. defense strategic guidance therefore directed that the joint force rebalance its efforts toward the Asia–Pacific and reinvest in its continued security.

American defense strategy emphasizes that the key to successfully meeting future security challenges in the uncertain times ahead is to engage today in sustained and persistent cooperation with America’s allies and partners. This is particularly true in the Asia–Pacific theater—where about three-fifths of the world’s population resides and more than three-fifths of the world’s economy thrives. U.S. Army forces in the Pacific follow a strategy organized around four core tenets in support of U.S. Pacific Command:

- The Army provides trained and ready Soldiers who are available to conduct and sustain operations throughout the diverse theater on short notice.
- It conducts persistent engagement in the human domain primarily through building relationships, communications and selected capabilities of partner governments’ security forces.
- It empowers the combatant commander with agile mission command capabilities to understand, visualize, describe and direct the response to any immediate crisis or contingency.
- It is a permanent forward presence that lends credibility to the trust generated by bilateral and multilateral partnerships and demonstrates the readiness of America’s expeditionary capability.

Army forces in the Pacific region have undergone a major transformation in recent years to continue to meet strategic and operational requirements. One vital touchstone of this transformation has been the return from the Middle East of I Corps (stationed at Joint Base Lewis–McChord in Washington state) and most of its combat power as well as many of the Army’s theater enabling commands. I Corps and the 25th Infantry Division have developed renewed capability as a Pacific response force—trained, ready and available to respond to the combatant commander’s requirements. Reserve component units, too, have rebalanced in similar fashion and provide a significant amount of the specialized capabilities that the Army requires to operate effectively in the vast Pacific region.

Expeditionary mission command capability is extremely important to the joint force in the Asia–Pacific theater, and the Army provides numerous response options to meet this need. In addition to large-scale assets such as deployable corps, corps (forward) and division headquarters, the Army has developed a smaller-scale contingency command post—a rapidly deployable mini-theater army headquarters—that can perform mission command functions for up to 30 days anywhere in the region without augmentation. In addition, Eighth Army in Korea has completed its transition to a purely operational warfighting command; among the results of this move is its new capability to support joint operations beyond the Korean peninsula.

The Army’s theater engagement and partnership program has been a bedrock of American defense cooperation for many years. Such engagement has become the decisive line of effort in the Army’s theater strategy because it improves the readiness of the Army and its partners, reinforces U.S. commitments, assures regional powers of U.S. intentions and strengthens cooperative networks with emerging powers. Military relationships with the five U.S. allies in the region—Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand—remain strong. In addition to the many other bilateral partnerships it maintains, the Army is steadily growing new partnerships as they become possible with countries such as China, Vietnam and Burma.

Multilateral Army-led exercises throughout the region are central to the development of partner military capacity and the demonstration of U.S. expeditionary capability. Among the most noteworthy exercises occurring during 2013 are Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand, new opportunities in New Zealand, large-scale maneuvers with allies in the Philippines, over-the-shore sustainment training and ongoing direct partnership activities between Asian countries and the Army National Guard.

These capable, persistently engaged forces require world-class sustainment support and cutting-edge training opportunities so they can remain ready to meet any challenge. The 8th Theater Sustainment Command is spread throughout forward bases and power-projection points in the region and provides operational depth and theater-wide capability to reconcile strategic capability with tactical support requirements. Army prepositioned stocks are being reconfigured to support realistic training with partner militaries and to include versatile equipment ideal for partner support. Also, the Army has developed the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability—a transportable capability that replicates the experience of a combat training center rotation—and will begin employing it to train Army units during Fiscal Year 2014.

The Army possesses a broadly capable, flexible disposition of forces throughout the theater that helps guarantee the nation’s ability to rapidly project and sustain unified land operations if prevention and shaping efforts fail to keep the peace. What is needed now is better predictability of future resources, timely provision of expected funding and institutional support for the Army’s contributions to the readiness of the joint force. In particular, joint strategy requires the creation of a Theater Joint Force Land Component Command, a new theater collaborative security arrangement focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and the continuation of recent gains in sustainment and logistics capabilities.

Strategic landpower is the most tangible and durable measure of America’s commitment to defend its interests, protect its friends and defeat its enemies. Security and war are always fundamentally about people, culture and decisions—the human domain of conflict—and strategic landpower exists to shape this domain and prevail throughout it. Unwavering support for a balanced approach to Army endstrength, modernization and readiness to conduct joint operations in the Asia–Pacific theater is key to maintaining a force of decisive action that stands ready to prevent, shape and win when the nation calls.
The U.S. Army in the Pacific: Assuring Security and Stability

Introduction

Even as the Army draws down from more than a decade of constant operations in the Middle East, it remains capable of undertaking independent action to defeat enemies, deter aggression, shape the environment and provide support to civil authorities. At the same time, it can perform across the range of military operations with myriad partners, simultaneously helping friends and allies while deterring foes. The Army’s ready capabilities allow the United States to respond quickly around the world, providing a presence that advances American national security and contributes to global peace and stability. Although demand for Army forces in Afghanistan will, in all likelihood, continue to decrease, the requirement for strategic landpower—especially in the Pacific—will endure. Strategic landpower force—Army, Marine and special operations ground forces that help achieve national-level security objectives—prevent conflict, shapes the environment and ultimately wins the nation’s wars.

The Asia-Pacific region has emerged as one of the world’s most militarily significant and challenging regions. The 2012 U.S. defense strategic guidance recognized that fact and directed a rebalance of effort toward the Asia-Pacific. In the words of the commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), rebalance encompasses all aspects of U.S. engagement—diplomatic, economic and political as well as military—a whole-of-government approach. To accomplish this, the USPACOM strategy centers on three rebalancing efforts:

- geography: renew, modernize, strengthen alliances and partnerships;
- capability: invest in hardware, systems and technologies to sustain force structure;
- capacity: be resilient in response to chronic and catastrophic natural or man-made crises.

The combatant commander believes that to address these rebalances properly, it is imperative to view the Pacific as an “Indo–Asia–Pacific” conglomerate—one strategic arc. (Note: That arc could also encompass Central and Latin American countries, e.g., Chile, that border or have enduring interests in the Pacific.)

U.S. Army Campaigns Since 1775

- 78 in North, Central and South America
- 63 in Asia and the Pacific
- 31 in Europe and Africa
- 8 in the Middle East and Southwest Asia
- 1 Global Campaign (Global War on Terrorism)


Within this strategic arc, the U.S. Army’s role is to be responsive, as part of the joint force, to combatant commands—in this case USPACOM’s—strategy/strategic direction. The Army has designated U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), located at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, as the Army service component command (ASCC) to USPACOM as well as the forward-deployed theater army in support of land operations in the Pacific region. Army forces (under the mission command of USARPAC) demonstrate the potential for decisive land domain operations in the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) both in day-to-day operations and during crisis response. USARPAC’s strategy pursues security and stability through partnerships, posture and preparedness by means of four core tenets: trained and ready forces; persistent engagement; agile mission command; and forward presence. These tenets work hand in hand to achieve Army, USPACOM and Department of Defense (DoD) objectives while setting conditions for rapid responses to a full variety of contingencies and, if necessary, to win in combat. USARPAC’s presence, forward deployed in the region, sends a signal of security, stability and commitment to allies and partners.

As the United States refocuses the instruments of national power on the Asia-Pacific region, it does so in the face of significant opportunities and challenges, especially in an era of declining resources. USARPAC helps assure security and stability in a region vital to the security interests of the United States by providing USPACOM and DoD with capability- and capacity-building landpower. Strategic landpower—the U.S. Army—provides the nation unique capabilities as a credible and valuable contributor to many of the instruments of national power.

**Background**

The United States has had economic interests in the Pacific region since its founding, and the Army has been securing those interests for generations in an environment that has demanded joint security roles among the military branches from the start. In fact, the Army has maintained a continuous presence in this region since 1898 and the Spanish–American War. Today, the United States possesses sovereign territory in the theater spanning from Alaska in the north through Hawaii, Guam and American Samoa in the south.

As World War II ended, U.S. Army leadership proved to be the cornerstone of renewed peace and prosperity in the Pacific. The Army’s action at this juncture laid the foundation for some of America’s most critical and most enduring international partnerships. For example, the rapid redevelopment of Japan and the liberal reforms that took root there were direct outcomes of prescient Army occupation policies—liberalization of and investment in a conquered state that had no precedent in history. Similar support led to the maturation of South Korea as a member of the family of democracies and a stalwart U.S. ally in the decades since.

Following the American drawdown from Vietnam, the Army reorganized. It disbanded the U.S. Army Pacific headquarters and created separate commands in Japan and South Korea that reported directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army. Before long, however, USPACOM recognized the need for a major Army command in Hawaii similar in scope to other military service component commands; in response, the Army stood up U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) and assigned forces that included the 25th Infantry Division.

Throughout the late 20th century, WESTCOM, later redesignated as USARPAC, engaged in several initiatives that have become invaluable to the 21st century security mission. Begun in 1978, the Expanded Relations Program—and its offspring, the USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP)—became a model for maximizing the visibility and practical effect of the Army across the region’s broad geography. These efforts included senior officer visits, Soldier exchanges, regular bilateral exercises, regional security conferences and other forms of military engagement with regional partners. The reassignment of USARPAC as the single ASCC dedicated to the region ensured that the Army’s activities in the Pacific region are responsive to the requirements of the combatant commander and sensitive to the commander’s priorities. Meanwhile, the Army was also establishing prepositioned stocks of supplies and heavy equipment in such strategic locations as Korea, Japan and Diego Garcia (in the Indian Ocean) to create operational flexibility throughout the region.

These decades of continued investment in the Pacific—even as the region rapidly grew to be more prosperous and more densely populated every year—have ideally suited USARPAC as a critical service component.
of America’s joint force in the region. In addition to executing its Title 10 responsibilities as a service component, USARPAC has also evolved into a regionally focused, deployable theater army headquarters with subordinate commands that possess the agility to respond effectively to a wide variety of contingencies. It is capable of supporting major combat operations in Korea, if necessary—new capability that has enabled Eighth Army in Korea to transform from an ASCC into a focused operational-level field army and warfighting headquarters. The Army’s long history in the Pacific and the steps it has taken over the past several decades to create enduring power-projection capability, engage with regional military partners and develop partner capacity are significant national resources for the nation’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

**By the Numbers**

The USARPAC AOR is as diverse as the region is dynamic. The “tyranny of distance” alone causes enormous military challenges in terms of operational planning and logistics. The Pacific basin spans more than 50 percent of the earth’s surface, covering approximately 105 million square miles and stretching across 16 time zones. It includes the Arctic and the Antarctic and tropical jungles in between. The journey from Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington (the Army’s main power-projection base on the West Coast) to USARPAC headquarters in Hawaii is farther than the trip from Los Angeles to New York City—a five-hour flight in excess of 2,700 miles or a sea voyage of more than four days. The journey from Hawaii to Korea is nearly twice as far. Diego Garcia, the location of some of the Army’s prepositioned stocks, is more than 10,000 miles from Hawaii (a 20-hour flight or more than two weeks by sea).

About 60 percent of the world’s population lives in the 36 countries that comprise the Pacific region. Four of these countries are the world’s most populous. The United States is party to seven mutual defense agreements; five of these partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand) are in the Asia–Pacific. Of the 27 Pacific countries that have militaries, the local army is the largest of the services (army, navy, etc.) in 26 of them and the local defense chief is an army officer in 21 of them. Of the world’s 10 largest armies, six are Pacific residents—the United States, China, India, North Korea, South Korea and Vietnam. Four nuclear-armed powers reside in the USARPAC AOR—the United States, China, India and North Korea; two others (Russia and Pakistan) also border the region but lie within other U.S. regional combatant commands.4

Nearly 62 percent of the world’s economy exists in the Asia–Pacific basin. These 35 other countries account for approximately a third of all U.S. trade. The region has led the world in economic growth for 15 years. The Pacific has more people living under democratic governments than any other region of the world—but there also remain some of the last bastions of communism. Indonesia, India and Bangladesh are home to three of the world’s four largest Muslim populations; Christian populations in China and the Philippines are among five of the world’s eight most numerous.

The Army’s uniformed presence committed to the theater totals approximately 79,000 Soldiers, including more than 27,000 in Hawaii; 19,700 in Korea; nearly 15,000 at Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington; 12,500 in Alaska; and 2,500 in Japan. These trained and ready forces comprise two divisions, nine brigade combat teams, two combat aviation brigades and 11 multifunctional brigades. There is a theater army headquarters in Hawaii, a field army headquarters in Korea, a corps headquarters in Washington state and a corps

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4 For the sake of consistency, the statistics presented above are based on those countries that actually comprise the USARPAC AOR. Other countries on the region’s periphery—including Russia and Chile, for example, as well as several, such as Pakistan, that border the Indian Ocean—also influence USARPAC and USPACOM posture.
To shape the security environment, the U.S. Army participates in some form of engagement with 34 Pacific countries (North Korea being the only exception). It conducts 24 large-scale exercises with 12 Pacific countries—nearly half of the states in the region. In 2012, the Army conducted Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) designed to build partner capacity in 19 Pacific countries, and 192 soldiers from Asia-Pacific countries attended U.S. Army schools and training programs.

U.S. Army forces, including special operations forces, support ongoing operations to defeat al Qaeda affiliates in the Philippines and throughout Asia. If prevention and shaping efforts should fail, USARPAC is postured to rapidly project unified land force capability to win decisively throughout the region.

Joint and Army Strategy in the Asia–Pacific Region

Because of the enduring nature of the human and economic interests that the United States has in the Asia–Pacific region, the security strategy of USPACOM is a long-term plan of action. American defense strategy emphasizes that the key to successfully meeting future security challenges in the uncertain times ahead is to engage today in sustained and persistent cooperation with America’s allies and partners. Existing alliances with friendly countries in the Asia–Pacific region provide a crucial cornerstone and help maintain a position of strength, while the expansion of relationships with emerging regional powers helps grow capability and share responsibility.

The focus on international partnership, collective security and capacity building is a critical complement to the primary responsibility of USPACOM to fight and win if necessary. A balanced approach to international security challenges acknowledges the complexity of the security environment, ensures that capability exists across a broad spectrum of expertise to meet any conflict or crisis that might arise and contributes to greater stability and growth throughout the region. USPACOM is first and foremost a warfighting command, committed to maintaining military superiority across the entire range of possible contingencies. But it also recognizes the value of engaging in bilateral and multilateral approaches to the maintenance of regional stability. USPACOM is responsible for preserving the conditions that facilitate movement and secure access for global supply chains, lines of communication and routes of commerce; continuous, secure access to and freedom of movement in the domains of land, sea, air, space and cyberspace are prerequisites to the peace and prosperity of the region. Further, the complex security environment demands a high degree of coordination, unity of effort and integration among many U.S. departments and agencies—a whole-of-government approach that employs all kinds of national power toward national objectives.5

USARPAC—in addition to its Title 10 responsibilities as a service component command—is the forward-deployed theater army in the region that directly supports the achievement of national strategic, theater strategic and operational objectives according to the

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needs of USPACOM. The Army’s forces in the Pacific play a central role in USPACOM’s preservation of military superiority, engagement in multilateral partnerships and maintenance of the ability to gain and hold access across all domains. To accomplish this, USARPAC’s strategy to fulfill the requirements of the combatant commander consists of the four core tenets previously mentioned.

**Trained and Ready Forces.** The Asia–Pacific theater is a highly diverse operational environment. To be fully ready to meet any security challenge that might arise from the spectrum of possible contingencies, the joint force requires that trained and ready Soldiers be available to conduct operations anywhere in the region. The capability to operate throughout the environment at any time presents the combatant commander with numerous options in time of conflict or crisis that no foreign military service enjoys. Indeed, the armed forces of the United States execute Title 10 responsibilities for the region on a daily basis—activities that are central to USPACOM’s mission would be impossible to perform without available Soldiers.

Implied by this first tenet of the Army’s strategy in the Pacific is the requirement to sustain these trained and ready forces over extended periods. To this end, USARPAC is set up not only to support its own trained forces but also to sustain other Army and joint forces deployed into the theater. A hallmark of the Army’s ready forces is their ability to keep themselves and the rest of the joint force in operation for a long duration in time of crisis.

**Persistent Engagement.** America’s theater army in the Asia–Pacific region possesses a tremendous capacity to influence adversaries and allies alike. It can help friendly militaries develop their own capabilities to defend themselves and participate in current or future coalition operations. It can provide American security forces with interpersonal access in peacetime or during contingencies. It can exchange information and share intelligence. It has already been performing all of these tasks for decades.

The Army refers to these types of activities as shaping actions—those joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts that can be developed or continued on an ongoing basis before it becomes necessary to deter potential adversaries via specific shows of force or to seize military initiative and dominate an adversary. It conducts these initiatives because, in times of crisis, “coalitions of the willing” cannot be pieced together only at the last moment; such relationships are developed slowly and enriched with trust that can be built only with time and shared experience. Therefore, the Army employs direct and indirect approaches in the Asia–Pacific theater that build upon the human domain—primarily through fostering relationships, communications and selected capacities of partner governments’ security forces. Specifically, during the past two years alone, the Army has contributed to about 350 distinct engagement events in the region that developed these objectives.

**Agile Mission Command.** In addition to the provision of trained and ready Soldiers and a concept of how to employ those Soldiers in the human domain, the third core tenet of the Army’s strategy in the Asia–Pacific theater is to empower the combatant commander with the leadership and command structure to understand, visualize, describe and direct the response to any immediate crisis or contingency. Such decisionmaking resources are useful not only during the response to a contingency but also everywhere else on the spectrum of possible roles for armed forces—during evacuation operations, enabling foreign humanitarian assistance or providing disaster relief, to name a few.

USARPAC’s mission command resources are unmatched in the region by any other service and are therefore indispensable to the joint force. Army forces in the theater are uniquely able to develop and mature alongside other commands assigned to USPACOM. They are able to provide multiple two- and three-star mission command “nodes” (deployable warfighting commands) that permit the combatant commander to respond to multiple contingencies simultaneously when necessary. These forces also enable Army commands to be culturally astute and regionally aligned, increasing their awareness of specific environments in the highly complex and geographically dispersed Asia–Pacific theater.

**Forward Presence.** The fourth cornerstone of the Army’s strategy in the Asia–Pacific region is to continue to be recognized as a permanent presence—as a friend and ally who has been there for generations and is going to remain for generations to come. The Army’s consistent forward presence contributes directly to the successful
achievement of all of USPACOM’s priorities. It helps guarantee ready access to extremely contentious areas, allowing American and allied forces to achieve positional advantage and to maintain momentum during operational deployments. It lends credibility to the trust sought within bilateral and multilateral partnerships. It demonstrates that America’s expeditionary capability is nearby, allowing both friendly and unfriendly neighbors to witness the readiness of the joint force. USARPAC is the largest force of any American service in Asia—a fact that is not lost on the resident populations there. American allies and partners welcome the Army’s presence that enables American response to any crisis or emerging threat.

**Preventing Conflict in a Ready Posture**

The U.S. Army in the Pacific has undergone a major transformation in recent years so that it can continue to meet the requirements of the combatant commander. This transformation occurred in a series of steps in accordance with the USPACOM strategy and the Army’s own goals to restore balance and set the conditions for the future. It has also been nested within the Army Chief of Staff’s vision for the role of the Army of 2020 in the joint force: to prevent conflict by means of the forward presence of trained and ready forces, to shape the international environment in ways that aid the achievement of short-term and long-term national security objectives and to remain capable of winning decisively if war occurs. USARPAC has had an enduring role as an ASCC, providing trained and ready forces to the combatant commander for many decades. But more recently it has also completed its conversion to an operational theater army headquarters—a strategically agile, expeditionary, warfighting force comprising modular brigades and a host of theater enabling commands. These regionally aligned but globally aware enabling commands provide the commander with reliable and responsive support to execute Title 10 responsibilities.

One vital touchstone of the Army’s transformation in the Pacific has been the return from the Middle East to Joint Base Lewis–McChord in Washington state of I Corps and most of its combat power. Army forces home-stationed in Alaska and Hawaii have also largely returned to the Asia–Pacific region. The combat power of I Corps consists of three Stryker brigade combat teams (BCTs), a combat aviation brigade and a fires brigade as well as several enabling commands including military police, medical support, battlefield surveillance, engineers and organic sustainment forces. Army forces in Alaska include a Stryker BCT and an airborne infantry BCT—a critical component of the Army’s forced-entry capability in the Pacific. In addition, the 25th Infantry Division Headquarters is based in Hawaii along with another Stryker BCT, an infantry BCT, a combat aviation brigade and many USARPAC theater enabling commands. Among these are the 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), the 311th Theater Signal Command, the 45th Sustainment Brigade, the 18th Medical Command and the 94th Army Air Missile Defense Command. Also available is the 29th Infantry BCT (Hawaii Army National Guard), which has combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and has subordinate units distributed across the Pacific region engaged in partnering activities with allied nations.

The critical difference between the situation today and the situation only a short time ago is that nearly all of these combat units were provided by USARPAC many times for deployment in the Middle East, but most have either already returned or will soon return and have no plans to redeploy there any further. For example, Joint Base Lewis–McChord had been providing approximately 10,000 Soldiers per year to Afghanistan and Iraq for almost 12 years; at this time, only about 5,000 JBLM Soldiers are in Afghanistan and most of these expect to return by August 2013. Combat units based in Hawaii and Alaska are also returning to home-station in large numbers. I Corps Headquarters and the 25th Infantry Division have already begun building new capability as part of a Pacific Response Force in
The Army of 2020 in the Pacific

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* Winning our nation’s wars, deterring adversaries, developing cooperative security, defending the homeland and responding to civil crises.

Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Pacific

Support of USPACOM. This new capacity will improve Army responsiveness for carrying out unified land operations and small-scale contingency operations. This force sustains an agile mission command capability that can deploy rapidly to respond to a developing crisis on very short notice.

All of these developments mean that USPACOM now has highly experienced, trained and ready forces available for strategic and operational missions. And USPACOM and USARPAC are taking immediate advantage of these forces’ availability. Approximately 12,000 to 15,000 Soldiers will participate in the myriad exercises and engagements that take place in any given year—forces that until now had to be drawn from elsewhere or merely simulated during exercises because of their absence. Even as the Army faces a shrinking budget, it is investing more—not less—in training exercises in the Pacific. In recent years, USARPAC has budgeted approximately $22 million per year for exercises and engagements with regional partners; between 2014 and 2018, the Army plans to provide an additional $12 million every year to take advantage of the opportunity to build long-term readiness with these available forces.

The many theater enabling commands that support USARPAC have rebalanced and transformed in similar fashion. The subordinate units of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, for example—including the 45th Sustainment Brigade, 130th Engineer Brigade, 10th Support Group and 8th Military Police Brigade—all provided combat support and combat service support throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OEF–Philippines. These units were heavily engaged during the past decade, but they too are now much better able to align their support to the combat units that have returned to the Asia–Pacific.

The vast majority of the Army’s combat support and combat service support units are members of the reserve component, and these units comprise a substantial percentage of total USARPAC capability. Army Reserve units in particular play central roles in the Pacific and provide a great deal of the specialized capabilities that the Army requires to be effective in the vast Pacific region.

Several of the sustainment, engineering and military police units already mentioned employ a mix of active component and Army Reserve Soldiers at any given time. Nearly all Army civil affairs personnel are members of the Army Reserve; the 322d Civil Affairs Brigade that falls under operational control of USARPAC is no exception. This unit’s role is primarily to liaise between combat formations and local civil authorities and civilian populations. It employs the civilian expertise of reserve component Soldiers—such as health care providers, police, firefighters, bankers, farmers and countless others—to provide guidance and support to local populations in the aftermath of all types

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of contingencies, and it helps assess the need for and development of infrastructure projects such as roads, clinics, schools, power facilities and the like. These specialty capabilities lie at the heart of building new partner capacity in the many populous countries in Asia.

The 196th Training Support Brigade is another Army Reserve unit that is widely dispersed among Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa and the west coast of the United States. Its task is to assist and evaluate small-unit training of other Soldiers; it also helps provide military assistance to civilian authorities and helps mobilize reserve component support units that train and partner with other forces throughout the theater. Similarly, the 9th Mission Support Command comprises nearly 3,500 Army Reserve Soldiers who provide trained and ready forces that are constantly involved in 20 of the Army’s broadest Theater Security Cooperation Program exercises. The unit supports unified land operations through theater support, civil affairs capability, maneuver enhancement and engineering capacity and also provides key battle staff in support of Joint Task Force–Homeland Defense. Also, the 311th Signal Command combines approximately 3,000 active duty and Army Reserve Soldiers and civilians to fulfill the Army’s communication mission throughout the wide Pacific theater. These Soldiers play a crucial role in the cyberspace domain; they operate and defend the Pacific LandWarNet, deploy information systems support elements to theater headquarters, help maintain information dominance, provide state-of-the-art communications capabilities and enable expeditionary mission command when necessary. These are only some of the theater enabling commands that have supported USARPAC’s transformation and define what it means to have a deployable headquarters capability.

The Army’s expeditionary mission command capability in the Asia–Pacific theater and the value it provides to the combatant commander can hardly be overstated; it provides response options in this area that no other service can deliver. Among these mission command resources are the USARPAC Contingency Command Post (CCP) and Main Command Post, leadership of Joint Task Force–Homeland Defense, I Corps (Forward) in Japan and Eighth Army in Korea. Of particular significance, today the combatant commander has at his disposal USARPAC Headquarters and 25th Infantry Division Headquarters in Hawaii as well as I Corps Headquarters in Washington state; these deployable, operational mission command nodes—along with the availability of most of their subordinate BCTs and enabling commands—provide essential depth and flexibility to respond to contingencies with forces that were until recently unavailable. Both I Corps and the 25th Infantry Division are in the process of training for certification as joint task force-capable headquarters so that they can provide mission-essential joint mission command capabilities in theater.

In 2011, USARPAC certified the readiness of its own CCP, a small, rapidly deployable cell that brings prompt mission command and liaison capability to U.S. and allied forces in theater. The Army realized that if its corps-level mission command structures were not available—if, for example, a corps headquarters were deployed to the Middle East, leaving the local theater army as the only high-level entity available to respond to a sudden regional crisis—it would be useful for that theater army to have a deployable “representative” headquarters force available as an early response capability.7

The CCP is a 96-person mission command cell—a sort of mini-theater army headquarters. It is designed to be partially deployable within 24 hours and fully deployable within 72 hours and can conduct round-the-clock operations for 30 days without additional augmentation. It can perform mission command for up to

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two brigade-size elements executing non-kinetic operations such as noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance and theater security cooperation.

The capabilities of the USARPAC CCP give the combatant commander a number of useful response options for a range of potential contingencies. In 2009, the CCP concept was tested as a partner with a similarly sized corps forward headquarters in simulation of the conduct of a major combat operation, and in February 2013 the CCP played a prominent role in the annual Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand (which will be discussed later in greater detail). It is a premier contingency response tool (in addition to the rapid response capabilities of the 25th Infantry Division and I Corps) and a resource for the entire Pacific region—where it will most likely execute joint operations and has the capability of acting temporarily as a forward joint task force headquarters. Its ability to act as a first responder to disasters and then transform initial response into enduring partnerships helps counter and deter rival states or groups. The new availability of a CCP in the Asia–Pacific theater is one of the most significant outcomes of the transformation of USARPAC from force provider to operational headquarters and theater army headquarters over the past decade.

A second crucial element of Army transformation in the Asia–Pacific region was the consolidation of USARPAC as the sole ASCC in theater and the conversion of Eighth Army in Korea solely to a warfighting role. This move greatly streamlined and unified the command of Army forces in the region. Eighth Army is able to focus its efforts fully on operational requirements instead of diverting effort to execute Title 10 functions. Eighth Army units have also begun to be employed outside Korea in support of the Theater Campaign Support Plan. USARPAC has developed a specific capability to support Army Forces–Korea in the event of war, just as it has become responsible for meeting Title 10 requirements for all Army forces in theater. The result is a much more unified command structure in which all Army resources are employed according to a single regional security strategy.

The next step in the consolidation of Eighth Army in its operational role is for Army forces to consolidate at two major enduring hubs in South Korea. At Camp Humphreys (in Pyongtek) the Soldier and government civilian population will exceed 39,000 by Fiscal Year (FY) 2017; at Daegu, the population will exceed 5,000 by the same date. Realigning forces from north of the Han River to Camp Humphreys relieves many enduring facilities shortfalls in Korea. It also resolves storage space requirements driven by the vision for transformation of Army prepositioned stocks in the region (discussed later in greater detail). By 2016, elements of the 2d Infantry Division as well as the U.S. Forces Korea/Korea Command Headquarters will be among those forward deployed to Pyongtek. Current proposals indicate that these two bases could reach Soldier and government civilian populations of 53,000 and 8,000, respectively, by FY 2020.

In sum, the Army’s distribution of experienced, ready forces deters conflict, ensures that response capability exists for any contingencies on the spectrum of conflict and does much to develop or restore the capacity of all partner militaries in the region.

**Shaping the Environment in the Asia–Pacific Theater**

American national security strategy in general and USPACOM’s regional security strategy in particular (as described previously) include a strong emphasis on cooperative multilateral engagement. The security challenges resident in Asia are complex and uncertain, ranging across the spectrum of conflict from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contingencies all the way up to the possibility, however remote, of interstate nuclear war—but the United States is not alone in facing these issues. The Army’s theater engagement and
partnership program has been a bedrock of American defense cooperation for many years; now it is also a crucial element of the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan.

Engaging partners is the decisive line of effort in the Army’s strategy to accomplish its mission in the Asia–Pacific theater. USARPAC’s multilateral exercise program not only improves the readiness of the Army and its partners but also reinforces U.S. commitments to alliances, assures regional powers of U.S. intentions to maintain stability and strengthens cooperative networks with emerging powers. Demonstrating the Army’s interoperability and willingness to train for and respond cooperatively to potential crises fosters credibility, trust and confidence in American, allied and partner capabilities. These efforts combine to limit harmful military influences and complement the Army’s unilateral initiatives to deter potential aggression even as they increase the capacity of partner countries.9

8 Indispensable to the Army’s initiatives to shape the security environment are its special operations forces. Dispersed throughout the theater, their persistent engagement behind the scenes complements the Army’s more visible shaping efforts. For a broad description of how special operations forces shape the environment and support the joint force, see AUSA Torchbearer National Security Report “U.S. Army Special Operations Forces: Integral to the Army and the Joint Force,” March 2010, p. 11, http://www.ausa.org/publications/torchbearercampaign/tnsr/Documents/TBNSR-SpecialOperationsForces.pdf. For a specific example of how these forces support the joint force in the Asia–Pacific, see “U.S. Army Special Operations Forces: Integral to the Army and the Joint Force,” p. 17.

Transnational Threats
- Space and cyber vulnerabilities
- Terrorism - migrating IEDs/technologies
- Environmental degradation
- Resource competition
- Weapons proliferation
- Illegal narcotics; illegal immigration; human trafficking
- Piracy
- Natural disasters

The World's 4 Most Populous Countries
- China
- India
- Indonesia
- United States

5 of the 7 U.S. Mutual Defense Agreements
- United States
- China
- India
- South Korea
- Japan

5 of the 7 U.S. Mutual Defense Agreements
- United States
- South Korea
- Japan
- Australia
- Philippines

The World's 3 Largest Economies
- China
- Japan
- United States

The World's 4 Most Populous Countries
- China
- India
- Indonesia
- United States

21 of 27 Defense Chiefs are Army Officers
- Australia
- Cambodia
- China
- Nepal
- Thailand

Total U.S. Army in the Pacific
≈79,000 Soldiers
≈11,400 Army Civilians

The Pacific Theater
- China
- India
- Korea
- Indonesia
- Philippines

PREVENT
- Trained and Ready Forces
- Army National Guard
- Army Reserve

Shapec (Engage and Partner)
- United States
- China
- Japan

Enduring Capability
- Theater enabling headquarters: sustainment, air and missile defense, signal, intelligence, engineering, medical and military police
- Army prepositioned stocks
- Power projection from Washington/Hawaii/Alaska/Japan

WIn
- Support ongoing operations to defeat al Qaeda affiliates in the Philippines and throughout South and Southeast Asia
- If prevention fails, USARPAC rapidly projects and sustains unified land force capabilities in support of USPACOM to win decisively
Trust and credibility, however, are not objectives in and of themselves. Crucial though they are, they provide the foundation for the Army’s engagement campaign in the Asia–Pacific theater. This campaign consists of five enduring goals:

- enhancing overall allied and partner capabilities;
- leveraging partner capabilities to enhance regional security;
- preserving operational access and training access for USPACOM forces;
- limiting harmful military influence; and
- deterring aggression through regional force posture.

The Army maintains and develops resilient partnerships that enhance regional capabilities, limit potential threat effects and assure freedom of movement—providing invaluable options for the combatant commander to prevail in any contingency.¹⁰

USARPAC continues strong relationships with the five U.S. allies in the region—Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand—who are signatories to mutual defense treaties with the United States. The Army employs a full range of partnering activities, from major annual exercises to senior leader engagements to Subject Matter Expert Exchanges. A substantial percentage of the Army’s engagement efforts (and the Army’s highest priority in shaping the environment) is devoted to northeast Asia and the vital relationships with Japan and Korea in particular because of the nature of the threats in that locale. But the Army has also taken advantage of myriad opportunities to expand its shaping efforts into other subregions in the Asia–Pacific theater in the past few years. These initiatives have grown in scale and in number; some of their recent successes are especially remarkable.

The Army’s partnership with Australia has never been stronger. Australia, whose alliance with the United States has been formal since 1951, sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years to fight alongside Americans. Today, the two countries’ bilateral training and exercise program is vibrant and their collective mission command experience after a decade at war is a crucial resource for confronting new challenges together in the Asia–Pacific region. In an unprecedented move, USARPAC recently appointed Australian Defence Force Major General Richard Burr to be its new deputy commander for operations—making him responsible for directing the training and exercises of most American Soldiers in the theater. General Burr is no stranger to commanding coalition troops—in 2008, he commanded all coalition special forces in Afghanistan—but his appointment to USARPAC is a strong symbol of the vitality of the American partnership with Australia. His presence also brings about practical benefits such as increased sharing of intelligence and increased cooperation in planning to respond to contingencies.

China and the United States share an overarching interest in maintaining regional stability and preventing conflicts. As the relationship with China continues to mature, the U.S. Army is continuing to advance engagement opportunities with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army that address mutual concerns and challenges.

Recently, the U.S. and Chinese armies successfully completed a disaster management exchange in China designed to enhance collective capabilities and improve bilateral cooperation. This exchange incorporated a tabletop exercise to hone and synchronize mutual response procedures for an earthquake disaster along China’s periphery. China has also participated in other regional exchanges and conferences and even sent a representative to visit USARPAC headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii, in 2012. Most significant, the Chinese army has expressed interest in hosting the Pacific Armies Management Seminar—the premier army conference in the Asia–Pacific theater, attended by three- and four-star general officers

¹⁰ Ibid.
## Theater Engagement

### Building Defense Relationships

#### Senior Leader Seminars
- Japan
- Korea
- Mongolia
- Thailand

#### Mutilateral Forums
- Pacific Armies Chiefs’ Conference
- Pacific Armies Management Seminar
- Asia–Pacific Military Medicine Conference
- International Military Operations and Law Conference
- Asia–Pacific Multinational Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Conference

#### Executive Steering Groups
- India
- Taiwan
- Indonesia

#### Army–Army Exercises
- Japan
- Indonesia
- India
- Malaysia
- Singapore
- Cambodia

#### Exercises Interoperability
- Command Post Exercise
- Field Training Exercise
- Staff Training Exercise
- Tabletop Exercises
- Full-Spectrum Operations
- Small-Scale Contingency

#### Joint Exercises
- Korea
- Philippines
- Australia
- Thailand
- Japan

#### Unit Exchanges
- Japan

### Developing Partner Military Capability

#### Intelligent OAA
- Maldives
- Japan
- Bangladesh
- Singapore
- Australia
- Malaysia
- India
- Thailand

#### Leader Development
- Indonesia
- Philippines
- Mongolia
- Taiwan
- Thailand
- Maldives
- Japan
- Chile

#### Medical OAA
- Indonesia
- India
- Vietnam
- Sri Lanka
- Philippines
- Mongolia
- Thailand
- Nepal

#### IT and Science Exchanges
- Japan
- India
- Vietnam
- Australia
- Singapore
- Thailand
- Indonesia
- Bangladesh

#### HA/DR Civil–Military Operations
- China
- Philippines
- Indonesia
- Bangladesh
- Mongolia
- Tri-Lat

#### Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- Hawaii
- Guam
- American Samoa
- Federated States of Micronesia
- Republic of Palau
- Marshall Islands
- Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands

#### Contingency Command Post
- Korea
- Indonesia
- Australia
- Japan
- Malaysia
- Thailand

#### Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
- India
- Indonesia
- Thailand
- Mongolia

#### Logistics Operations, Actions and Activities
- Japan
- Philippines
- Malaysia
- Indonesia
- Mongolia
- Taiwan
- Korea

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HA/DR – Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
IT – Information Technology
OAA – Operations, Actions and Activities
Source: Headquarters, U.S. Army Pacific
from the entire region—during FY 2015. In sum, the U.S. Army’s patient approach to engaging with the Chinese military is beginning to pay off. USARPAC’s theater engagement strategy seeks both USPACOM and additional U.S. Army support for a greater voice in the positive development of the military-to-military relationship with China.

Similarly, the Army has been steadily growing its relationship with the Vietnam People’s Army, which has taken a genuinely open approach to increasing its ties with USARPAC as regional security challenges emerge. Senior leaders are beginning groundbreaking discussions to explore the possibility of future unit-to-unit habitual relationships, especially among engineer unexploded ordnance and explosive ordnance disposal companies. There is a real chance that formal professional military exchanges and reciprocal senior leader visits could begin soon, opening the door to a deeper partnership.

The United States has been encouraged by neighboring partner nations to engage Burma as it begins on a long path toward greater transparency. To that end, the commanding general of USARPAC recently participated in a U.S. delegation to Burma led by the Department of State and spoke about human rights from the perspective of a senior military officer. The dialogue laid the necessary foundation for future engagement to be based on continuing reforms in that country—but Burma may soon be included at multilateral events on such topics as humanitarian assistance and military medicine.

However, preventing conflict, shaping the security environment and preparing to respond to a wide range of possible contingencies require more complex engagement as well. It is also critical to keep combat and combat support skills sharp through realistic training while demonstrating these capabilities to other regional actors and developing interoperability with allied and partner countries. Such a ready posture deters aggression and encourages regional powers to align strategically with American interests instead of the alternatives. What follows is an overview of a few of the most noteworthy training exercises that pursue these goals and grow unique Army capability.

**Cobra Gold.** Exercise Cobra Gold, one of the Army’s most enduring annual multilateral training opportunities, occurred in February 2013 for the 32nd time. Although it began years ago as a small bilateral jungle training exercise, seven countries are now among the list of full participants (including the United States, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in addition to Thailand, the host country). In addition, 20 other countries in the region also attend to observe training activities that occur throughout northern and eastern Thailand. For the first time, the United States invited Burma to join the corps of observers as an incentive to continue its internal political reforms. In February 2013, the USARPAC CCP—and, for the first time, soldiers from Korea—played a prominent role.

During Cobra Gold, the learning experience is shared in every direction among the participants because each force shares its own methods and capabilities. American Soldiers who participated in this year’s

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**Indicators of a Strong Defense Partnership**

- Shared threat perception
- Common strategic interests/shared policy agendas
- Political and public support (capacity and will to act on common interests)
- Military resilience (ability to respond to internal and external threats)
- Consistent military-to-military cooperation, collaboration and senior leader dialogue
- Operational access and training access
- Support to peacetime operations
- Tactical and operational interoperability (mission command)
- Equipment/armaments cooperation
- Information sharing
event were able to pass on to Royal Thai Army soldiers many tactical skills that they had picked up during recent years of mainly urban operations in the counterinsurgency environments of Afghanistan and Iraq—skills such as close-quarters battle, short-range marksmanship and instinctive shooting. The Thais demonstrated impressive capabilities of their own and impressed important lessons on the Americans and other participants as well. For example, U.S. Soldiers experienced jungle patrol and survival techniques that they had not encountered before. The advantages of the Thais’ extremely lightweight loadout in the challenging jungle environment were obvious in contrast to the comparatively heavy equipment carried by Americans. Such perspective could be invaluable if the Army is called upon to deploy to such a climate on short notice—just as it deployed to the rigorous environment of Afghanistan on short notice only a few years ago.

Alam Halfa and Koru Kiwi. USARPAC is using its additional engagement funding to add four new exercises, including these two that represent the first time in nearly 20 years in which the Army has been able to exercise with New Zealand. Alam Halfa and Koru Kiwi are major readiness events—command post and field training experiences—for New Zealand, who recently asked the 25th Infantry Division to participate.

The first bilateral Alam Halfa event occurred in May 2012, with Koru Kiwi following in November. U.S. Soldiers shared tactics, techniques and procedures in the exercise of a brigade headquarters-size New Zealand force. There is potential for this cooperation to increase in 2013 and beyond.

Balikatan. Notable for its substantial scope, Exercise Balikatan occurs every April in the Philippines. This spring, approximately 2,800 U.S. Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division will engage in an event that focuses on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Balikatan’s main purpose is to meet the obligations of America’s mutual defense treaty with the Philippines—improving the two countries’ combined planning and interoperability, but (most significant) demonstrating U.S. resolve to support that country against external aggression. Among the key operations that take place at the annual event are civil—military and civil affairs training, field training and a command post exercise.

Joint Logistics Over the Shore. Every year, the Army plays a central role in a key training exercise that streamlines and demonstrates a deployable sustainment capability unique to America’s joint forces. U.S. Transportation Command hosts the annual Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) exercise at different locations throughout the world, during which Army and Navy sustainment units train with heavy equipment to unload deep-draft cargo ships in locations where no suitable fixed port facilities exist.

Central to this operation is the Army’s huge Trident portable pier, a 1,200-foot-long sectioned steel platform that Soldiers can assemble and prepare to deploy from the pier’s host ship. When fully assembled, Trident can withstand ocean swells up to five feet high and can transport every kind of Army vehicle from ship to shore—including combat vehicles, heavy earth-moving equipment, engineering and bridging vehicles, heavy trucks and many others.

JLOTS has received increased attention as a critical capability during the past several years. In 2010, the Army faced exactly this scenario in Haiti—when natural disaster created wreckage at local piers that

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11 During the 1980s, New Zealand established a “nuclear-free zone,” banning the entry of foreign vessels bearing nuclear weapons or propelled by nuclear power (its military alliance with the United States notwithstanding). This caused the two countries’ bilateral alliance to lapse, but military relations are warming once again—as demonstrated also by the reopening of U.S. ports to New Zealand warships during 2012.
threatened cargo ships and forced them to remain off-shore—and employed its ship-to-shore logistics procedures to great effect. Then, in early 2012, an Army modular causeway system mobilized to assist a National Science Foundation mission in Antarctica when its pier facilities became temporarily unusable. Although these real missions as well as the most recent JLOTS exercise in August 2012 occurred in the Atlantic region, the exercise has previously practiced the movement of the 25th Infantry Division across the Pacific in an over-the-shore logistics environment. This experience and capability—unequaled anywhere in the Asia-Pacific region—is a perfect example of how the Army delivers strategic and operational options to USPACOM that enable effective response to the wide range of contingencies that define the security environment there. JLOTS capability has already been proven in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions, but it also creates operational flexibility to respond to anti-access/area-denial strategies employed by adversaries.

Other exercises. The USARPAC CCP will be heavily engaged in several other named security exercises and training opportunities this year as well. In spring 2013, it will take the lead in Australia’s Exercise Pozieres Prospect, a division- to corps-level event that certifies the readiness of Australian forces; in future events, I Corps and 25th Infantry Division headquarters units will also assume larger roles. In June 2013, the CCP is also scheduled to be part of a new joint staff exercise with Indonesian joint forces in Exercise Gema Bhakti.

Partnerships with the Army National Guard. The State Partnership Program reflects an evolving international affairs mission for the Army National Guard. It is designed to leverage the one-of-a-kind characteristics of America’s reserve component, employing the best of the National Guard’s dual civil–military nature to interact directly with active and reserve component forces of foreign nations, interagency partners and international nongovernmental organizations.

State partners participate in a broad range of security cooperation activities. These include homeland defense and security, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, counter-trafficking, disaster response and mitigation, consequence and crisis management, leadership and noncommissioned officer training, economic security, interagency cooperation, border/port/aviation

Ceremony Kicks Off Work on National Guard Center
by William Cole, 15 February 2013
Honolulu Star-Advertiser (reprinted with permission)

The Hawaii Army National Guard ceremoniously broke ground in February 2013 on a new readiness center valued at more than $100 million for the 29th Infantry Brigade Combat Team at Kalaeloa.

When finished, the 55,199-square-foot center will provide 900 Soldiers with the brigade’s headquarters, support battalion and special troops battalion classrooms, an assembly hall and auditorium and a modern kitchen, and consolidate functions now housed in the “rainbow” hangar and a separate building at the old Barbers Point Naval Air Station.

The first of the three phases will cost $30.4 million. What happens with the federal budget, and particularly the threat of sequestration budget cuts, will determine whether the next two phases get funded in coming years.

State adjutant Major General Darryl D.M. Wong, head of the Hawaii National Guard, said the readiness center represents the first new building constructed on Oahu for the Army Guard since the completion of the regional training institute in Waimanalo in 2000.

The readiness center will be more than just a training site for citizen Soldiers heading out on a federal mission, Wong said.

“It will also be a vital staging area in the event of a mobilization for a state mission,” he said.

If a natural disaster strikes, the center would become a marshaling place “for our Soldiers to be able to take care of the people and state of Hawaii,” Wong said.

“These were facilities that were not designed to be [Army] brigade facilities. They were designed for the Navy,” Hawaii National Guard spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Anthony said of the current facility. “They had been renovated somewhat but they were very old facilities.”

Anthony said the runway at Kalaeloa can accommodate C-17 cargo carriers, which will make the new readiness center even more relevant when there is the need for disaster relief.

The National Guard also plans to go out to bid this year on the first phase of a separate $100 million project for new hangars and other facilities to move the Army Guard’s 12 CH-47F Chinook helicopters to Kalaeloa from Wheeler Army Airfield, officials said. Officials said the Guard’s Black Hawk helicopters would remain at Wheeler.
security, combat medical initiatives, fellowship-style internships and bilateral familiarization events that lead to training and exercise opportunities.

The State Partnership Program—now in its 20th year—continues to flourish in the Asia–Pacific theater. At present, the program supports 65 distinct partnership opportunities that occur directly between National Guard units and partner countries. As of early 2013, Army National Guard units from Alaska are working directly through the program with the forces of Mongolia; units from Hawaii and Guam are partnered with the Philippines, while other Soldiers from Hawaii are building capacity in the Indonesian army; members of the Idaho Army National Guard are partnered with forces in Cambodia; Washington Soldiers are coordinating National Guard efforts in Thailand; and Oregon units have recently been selected to begin partnering on a limited basis with Vietnam in addition to their historical relationship with forces in Bangladesh. This forward presence helps the Army sustain and coordinate longstanding, synchronized efforts in theater as an integral part of the Theater Security Cooperation Program. In fact, in every instance, the program and its activities are coordinated by American embassy personnel in the partner country and controlled by the American ambassador. Such interagency cooperation helps guarantee unity of effort and ensures that all resources are employed effectively.

The State Partnership Program helps achieve many strategic goals. By supporting the security cooperation objectives of the combatant commander, the program helps prevent failed states in targeted regions by bolstering the internal capacity of partner militaries. The program also helps improve cultural skills throughout the Army and reinforces Army total force policy by integrating reserve component Soldiers and units into the theater engagement strategy.

The countless Army engagement efforts in the Asia–Pacific theater enable regional security and stability by upholding commitments to provide trained, ready and interoperable forces to allies and key regional partners. These efforts support regional partners as they assume leadership roles in employing land forces as net exporters of security. Army engagement enhances the multilateral land force capacity of these partners and helps them develop military resilience. By focusing on shared security challenges, it expands open lines of communication with those countries in which relationships are constrained by policy limitations. Finally, it sustains positive relationships and access in those countries with limited capacity to contribute to regional security.

**Ready to Win Any Fight**

There is no doubt that the capable and agile Army forces arrayed throughout the Asia–Pacific theater are a major resource for the execution of the USPACOM strategy for the region. Their engagement with allies and partners throughout the theater is vital to the construction of new capability and to American access to existing cooperative initiatives. But these pillars cannot meet the challenges presented by the complex security environment without world-class sustainment capabilities, cutting-edge training opportunities and the support of Army forces playing key roles in winning the current fight so that the whole Army can win decisively and dominate any adversary if required.

**Sustaining the Army in the Asia–Pacific Theater.** The Army’s Title 10 roles—providing prompt and sustained land operations—are especially critical in the Asia–Pacific region in light of the “tyranny of distance” that

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**Army National Guard State Partnership Program Relationships**

- Alaska → Mongolia
- Hawaii → Philippines and Indonesia
- Idaho → Cambodia
- Washington → Thailand
- Oregon → Bangladesh and Vietnam
- Guam → Philippines
challenges joint military capabilities there. The Army’s sustainment power in the region resides primarily in its operational-level 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), responsible for synchronized theater sustainment support and distribution across the entire USPACOM AOR. The 8th TSC provides operational depth and theater-wide capability to reconcile national strategic capability with specific tactical support requirements.

The 8th TSC, like the combat forces dispersed across the theater, is spread throughout the forward bases and power-projection points in the region. It employs active and reserve component units, air and sea transportation resources and numerous additional DoD capabilities to meet its far-reaching requirements. Some of these additional integrated resources include Army Materiel Command’s (AMC’s) contracting and field support brigades, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the Defense Logistics Agency.

Although the Asia–Pacific region is vast, the Army’s sustainment forces have the greatest global reach of any army in the world. By enlisting all available capabilities, the Army can remain ready for nearly any contingency—but sustainment forces depend on access to their seaports of debarkation and aerial ports of debarkation and maintenance of open sea and air lanes. Because future contingencies might restrict the continuous movement of cargo via free access to sea and air domains, the Army is aggressively working to expand its prepositioned stocks and the capabilities they can sustain.

Army Prepositioned Stocks—including APS-3 (afloat in the Indian Ocean) and APS-4 (based primarily...
Army watercraft from prepositioned stocks in Yokohama, Japan, have been utilized in several recent exercises. In the short term, the process of employing them more regularly in support of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force is already underway. In the long term, the Army has USPACOM support for a semi-permanent boat crew rotation into the region, operating high-speed vessels and providing intra-theater lift to support the movement of cargo such as ammunition. The utility of such dedicated, shallow-draft platforms is not only valuable in peacetime but also essential in war—especially in areas where access could be restricted or main lines of communication blocked.

at Camp Carroll, Korea, and Sagami Army Depot, Japan)—ranging from full equipment sets for heavy and light BCTs all the way down to specialized operational project stocks are being completely reassessed and, in most cases, ramped up. When the project is completed, the redesigned stocks will be multipurpose resources and much more versatile than before—in some instances meeting existing capability gaps that require new solutions. They will be capable of supporting unified land operations, major exercises and training, humanitarian assistance and disaster response initiatives as well as many other missions integrating other national and joint logistics partners. This undertaking will substantially increase the Army’s responsiveness to a broad range of future contingencies and will enhance its ability to operate across its 9,000-mile wide AOR in coalition environments or in support of other lead agencies. What is more, as the prepositioned stocks have become more available and more finely tuned to current operational needs, the Army has already begun incorporating the use of its stocks into the many multilateral exercises underway in the Asia-Pacific region; this saves precious training budget dollars, improves the quality of the training with greater realism, tests strategic readiness and showcases American capabilities for partner nations.

One example of how Army Prepositioned Stocks are evolving to meet changing operational requirements is the reconfiguration underway to prepare for disaster response. In the aftermath of tsunami relief efforts in Japan, the Army has positioned significant amounts of critical supplies and specialized equipment at forward locations throughout the USPACOM AOR. Many of these supplies are the types of things that are not readily available elsewhere and which are very difficult to access after a natural disaster—unique items such as sling sets for cargo delivery, helicopter-portable excavation equipment, pioneer kits and many other items that can be matched up with Soldiers on the ground to make an immediate difference in the first hours following a disaster. These are niche capabilities that the Army is uniquely equipped to deliver; forward positioning them and training to employ them rapidly improves their usefulness.

A new Army plan is maturing to preposition unit equipment sets to support troop unit training rotations with partner countries. The Army has included this concept as part of its vision for the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) 2020 program. Units in the Pacific are pursuing the acquisition of additional Stryker vehicle training sets to be used in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Stocks are being modified to support other projects as well, including increased counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) work in Korea and engineering requirements on Guam.

The Army’s Inland Petroleum Distribution System is essential to ensure fuel throughput to support operations at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The Army has recently validated USARPAC’s request—as part of APS 2020—to add 60 miles of fuel pipeline to existing infrastructure in Guam that will ease operations there. For the distant future, work is already underway to create the next-generation system of tactical fuel delivery, ultimately replacing the Inland Petroleum Distribution System and meeting one of USARPAC’s most urgent requirements.

In addition, military logisticians in partner countries envy the central visibility that American sustainment Soldiers have in terms of awareness of equipment stocks and locations and in terms of ability to balance readiness, costs, budget and operational employments. AMC is responsible for this effort in the Pacific. AMC has recently improved its ability to align resource levels with demands across the entire Army—not a simple task, and something that has proved to be a considerable challenge in the past. A new method for tackling this issue in recent months has been the use of exercises in which AMC personnel have walked through specific needs and obstacles alongside USARPAC logistical operators. These drills have resulted in increased communication and streamlining of the sustainment effort in the Pacific.
In all of these ways, the Army has been taking significant and specific action to directly increase its theater operational readiness posture. It has been increasing its flexibility to sustain a wider range of operations and exercises even as it synchronizes with the numerous joint, coalition and commercial enablers that comprise a complete mission support package in as diverse a region as the USPACOM AOR. Prepositioning remains vital to the Army, given the nature of possible future contingencies, and it must be done with precise coordination and maximum support.

21st Century Training: Maintaining the Edge. Because the Army has conducted major joint and multinational readiness exercises with partners in the Asia-Pacific theater for decades, there are many unique training opportunities available. As U.S. forces return from Afghanistan and rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, USARPAC’s exercise and engagement program offers the Army several regional alternatives to traditional home-station training or combat training center rotations. As the Army seeks cost-effective solutions to maintaining readiness and posturing itself again for full-spectrum land operations, these opportunities are especially attractive.

Aligning Army forces to the Asia-Pacific region and rotating them through the regular exercises conducted with partners throughout Asia serves the dual purposes of maintaining Soldiers’ combat edge while learning about the current policy emphasis on the region. Partner countries offer realistic training in high-altitude, mountain, desert and jungle warfare—practically every conceivable climate and environment. These opportunities increase unit readiness and provide Soldiers with invaluable cultural awareness necessary for operating overseas in future coalition environments.

To this end, the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability (JPMRC) is a revolutionary initiative that promises to enhance the training and preparation of the Army forces based in, deployed to and aligned with the Asia-Pacific theater. The goal is to create a transportable or mobile instrumentation capability that integrates live, virtual and constructive training environments; it will also help develop the greatest possible value in after-action training reviews. This capability will greatly enhance home-station training and expeditionary training opportunities throughout the theater—providing USPACOM with regional training capability not unlike that which has long existed for allied forces in the European theater.

JPMRC is not a replacement for the full training experience available at a combat training center in the continental United States. However, the JPMRC concept is similar in style and purpose, and it will reduce the frequency with which entire BCTs will have to rotate stateside from their home-stations in the Pacific (always a considerable expense). In addition to saving money, use of the JPMRC will save combat units the time it would take to rotate stateside, but—just as important—by remaining in theater, they will remain more available to respond to sudden contingencies or to be called upon by the combatant commander to meet strategic requirements.

The idea also leverages and expands upon existing capabilities such as joint exercises, networks and training infrastructure. The Army has decided to redirect the National Training Center’s Exportable Training Capability—Instrumentation System—scalable technology with which training scenarios can be tailored for geographically distant units according to their specific mission sets—to USARPAC for use with JPMRC, which means that the opportunities for expanded realism will only continue to grow. Yet another related initiative, known as the Joint Combined Training Capability, is a bilateral development of the U.S. and Australian armies and would work the same way.

Training of Army units via the JPMRC construct will begin during FY 2014 with select battalion task forces at home-stations in Hawaii. The capability is expected to be fully exportable by FY 2018, by which
time it will support three BCTs per year, integrating with six joint Army exercises and training at least 11 regional partner countries.

**Joint Task Force–Homeland Defense.** Joint Task Force–Homeland Defense (JTF–HD) is USPACOM’s executive agent for homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities. Operated by USARPAC, JTF–HD plays a critical role in winning the current fight. It executes land operations to defeat terrorist threats to the homeland and to conduct operations in support of civil authorities for all hazards, including response to and recovery from natural or manmade disasters.

JTF–HD performs a role in the Pacific region not unlike the role performed by U.S. Northern Command in the continental United States and Alaska. It is postured to support any homeland defense requirement throughout its area of responsibility, and it is structured to command and control military support to civilian authorities during natural disasters or special events such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Leaders’ Meeting. The JTF–HD joint operations area is spread across nearly seven million square miles—nearly twice the size of the United States. This area encompasses Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (including U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll), the Federated States of Micronesia and other small island territories in the Pacific.

JTF–HD facilitates or participates in numerous joint, interagency and multilateral exercises and subject matter exchange programs annually. These increase interoperability and information exchange among key partners and local authorities. Among the most significant of these exercises are the annual hurricane response exercise Makani Pahili, the annual pandemic response exercise Lightning Rescue and numerous other DoD-led homeland defense exercises in civil support and foreign humanitarian assistance.

In 2011, JTF–HD served as DoD’s executive agent for APEC, providing staff augmentation and posturing active duty forces and capabilities where required to support the dual-status commander. Its success in coordinating this substantial effort was due in large part to its long history of interaction and cooperation with interagency partners—experience that built the trust necessary to execute a complex security task. JTF–HD is a good example of an Army-led, mission-oriented initiative that leverages the forward presence of Soldiers in the Asia–Pacific region as well as the Army’s persistent engagement with partner countries to win the current fight while preparing for future contingencies and protecting the United States and its people.

In sum, the Army is taking an innovative, 21st century approach to meeting the challenges that have always confronted the Asia–Pacific security environment. These challenges now demand creative solutions to keep up with the rapid pace of technological change and the buildup of regional powers’ anti-access/area-denial capacity. To this end, the Army has taken many steps to ensure that it has ready forces throughout the theater that are supplied with the requisite support to win decisively when required. Among the most recent steps have been adjustments to the composition and employment of prepositioned equipment in the region, expansion of the capability to respond to WMD proliferation or use by adversaries, new logistics cooperation and oversight procedures, the creation of a cost-effective, exportable and realistic training experience and ongoing developments in executing the homeland security mission. All of these efforts lend new opportunities and flexible, scalable response options to the combatant commander in response to the need for maximum strategic and operational agility.

Army forces in the Pacific are trained and ready, with abundant recent combat experience, and they have returned to being regionally aligned in numbers not seen since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. They are a critical hedge against uncertainty and
their persistent engagement with dozens of allies and partners develops the human domain. They provide a wide range of agile response options to provide mission command and leadership for any contingency. Their timeless forward presence and partnerships with friends and allies in the theater builds trust and inspire confidence—just as the Army has done continuously in the Asia–Pacific theater for more than 100 years. These capabilities prevent conflict by deterring aggression and assuring uninterrupted peace and stability, shape the strategic environment in accordance with U.S. national security goals by building partner capacity and ultimately help the joint force win the nation’s wars.

**What Is Needed**

As described previously, the Army possesses a strong and broadly capable disposition of forces throughout the Asia–Pacific theater; particularly valuable is the Army’s mission command and leadership structure that is in place today—capable of delivering a rapid and deployable response to multiple contingencies simultaneously and quickly scalable (up or down) depending on the level of any future crisis. These agile forces are persistently engaged with the Army’s historical allies as well as new partners who wish to align with American leadership to meet the uncertain future. These Soldiers’ forward presence and the numerous international security exercises they conduct annually with the friendly forces of partner countries help guarantee that if prevention and shaping efforts fail to keep the peace, the Army can rapidly project and sustain unified land operations in support of the combatant commander to win decisively. However, some challenges unique to the Asia–Pacific theater endure.

USPACOM already has operationalized functional commands that serve vital synchronization purposes in the other services. These include the Joint Force Air Component Command, Pacific Air Force; the Joint Force Maritime Component Command, Pacific Fleet; and Joint Force Special Operations Component Command, Special Operations Command–Pacific. The complex security challenges, not to mention the additional burdens created by geography, distance and logistical difficulties, that define the strategic environment make these joint service commands instrumental to USPACOM’s warfighting capability—it’s first and most important function. What is required for a successful strategy and to complete this joint structure is a Theater Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC).

The creation of a theater JFLCC would provide the same synergy (in areas such as mission command, communications and operational planning, among others) for the myriad land forces assigned to or regionally aligned with USPACOM as the other services’ functional commands already provide for the widely dispersed air, naval and special operations units throughout the Asia–Pacific theater. Such an institution would provide four-star operational control and support to geographic joint task forces within the theater along with the sub-unified commands also in theater such as U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan. It would facilitate unity of effort, help preserve unit integrity and ensure uninterrupted support as joint forces execute functions such as movement and maneuver, intelligence, firepower, logistics and personnel support, command and control and force protection. The mission command

**Increasing Army Capability Forward**

**Successes**

- Additions and changes to Army Prepositioned Stocks 3/4 (afloat/Korea and Japan)
- Army Materiel Command support and synchronization; Directorate of Logistics, Lead Materiel Integrator, Army Field Support Brigade footprint
- Hughes Air Defense Radar operational project stocks for Japan
- Inland Petroleum Distribution System 60 Mile Set for Guam

**Gaining Traction**

- Training unit sets for Australia
- 20th Support Command Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear operational project stocks for Northeast Asia
- Operational engineer equipment set for Guam
- Next-generation battlefield fuel delivery system and tactical active component structure

**Work to be Done**

- Stryker Brigade task force training set in Korea
- Training unit sets in other locations
- Other Hughes Air Defense Radar operational project stocks in Southeast Asia
capabilities already resident throughout Army forces in the Asia–Pacific region are prepared to execute this responsibility.

Second, separate and distinct from the need for a theater JFLCC, is the need for the creation of a new theater collaborative security arrangement focused exclusively on planning, training and responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief events. Natural disasters are the single most common security threat experienced by all countries throughout the Asia–Pacific theater and the USPACOM AOR. International response to these occurrences can transcend political or policy-related obstacles to other forms of security cooperation; there is natural impetus for bringing nations together to provide relief. A new collaborative security arrangement would directly complement the most recent developments in bilateral and multilateral relationships throughout the Asia–Pacific region and would greatly enhance the Army’s ability to bring its resources to bear in response to natural disasters. In the meantime, USARPAC is continuing to work through bilateral forums, such as the recent opportunity to engage China and numerous other countries during 2012, to expand the establishment of a combined forum. This could provide the foundation for future growth into a more formal military organization for response to collective crises.

Third, much has been learned during the past decade of war—which has occurred partly in geographically remote locations—about how to sustain a force at war far from the continental United States. The challenge to support warfighting commands in the Asia–Pacific theater is similarly difficult and requires significant resources. Lines of communication are long, and commanders must be very deliberate to optimize precious time, resources and assets—especially because security challenges span the entire spectrum from the uncertainty of large-scale threats to the certainty of future natural disasters. USARPAC is moving toward attaining similar capabilities in terms of speed and effects that other Army forces in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) region learned to achieve in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom. The lessons from those campaigns are very relevant to the Asia–Pacific theater—a place also characterized by its difficult geography and a dynamic political environment.

The Army’s logistical footprint in the Pacific region is centered on prepositioned forward locations that have the task of being prepared to activate quickly and deliver military capabilities across thousands of miles—and to be fully synchronized with joint enablers and commercial capabilities. To meet the need, the logistical footprint must continue to build on the progress already achieved in becoming more flexible. When the sustainment effort becomes fully integrated into a synchronized concept of support, the Army will be in a strong position to leverage the many relationships in which it has already invested and meet all missions across the spectrum.

What Must Be Done

During the past decade, the Army has become very skilled within the relatively narrow focus of providing trained and ready forces through the Army Force Generation process to meet immediate wartime demand; in other words, it has focused on meeting urgent short-term readiness goals. Now, however, the Army must transition into an army of preparation, shifting its focus instead to greater investment in long-term readiness throughout the institution. Because of the diversity that defines the USPACOM AOR and the uncertain nature of the Asia–Pacific security environment, the Army must remain ready to meet any challenge along the spectrum of conflict—providing agile forces to the combatant commander, executing mission command leadership when necessary and prevailing in the human domain all the while. It must therefore maintain forces that are ready to confront any contingency today, thereby preventing much conflict via their capable posture, because natural disaster or major war or nearly any security challenge in between could occur tomorrow. But
now is also the time to develop and exercise the considerable influence that American military forces can bring to bear in shaping the region to achieve national strategic objectives. Critical initiatives are underway along these avenues; the Army requires strong support to realize their full potential.

**Congress and the administration must:**

- restore the Army to a process of timely and predictable funding by acting as soon as possible to correct those defense budget mechanisms that threaten to hollow the force;
- maintain base defense spending at a level of 4 percent of gross domestic product (AUSA Resolution 13-07);
- fully fund Operation and Maintenance accounts to sustain individual and unit readiness (AUSA Resolution 13-07); and
- authorize and fund an operational force of at least 650,000 Soldiers on active duty, an Army National Guard of 360,000 and an Army Reserve of 215,000 within the Army base budget (AUSA Resolution 13-07).

**Congress and the Department of Defense must:**

- increase the Army’s share of the base defense budget to at least 28 percent (AUSA Resolution 13-07);
- fully fund continued participation in joint and combined exercises that are essential to the readiness of joint forces and partner militaries (AUSA Resolution 13-10);
- establish and fully fund a new Office of Strategic Landpower to better enable the Army and its joint partners to dominate the human domain of warfare;
- fund initiatives such as the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability that expand opportunities to increase capacity and interoperability among U.S. and coalition partners (AUSA Resolution 13-10);
- fully fund Rapid Expeditionary Deployment Initiative priorities in power-projection platforms (AUSA Resolution 13-11);
- fully fund the reassessment and rebalance of Army Prepositioned Stocks, including combat weapon systems and sustainment supplies, and continue to increase their role in providing realistic and cost-effective training opportunities with partner militaries (AUSA Resolution 13-11);
- fund realistic joint and combined exercises that preserve the strong operational and tactical relationships among conventional and special operations forces (AUSA Resolution 13-12);
- fully fund technology, equipment, training, personnel and critical infrastructure that enable the Army to support homeland defense missions (AUSA Resolution 13-13);
- fully fund the completion of new USARPAC mission command facilities, a new Army National Guard readiness center for the 29th Infantry Brigade Combat Team and other ongoing construction projects at Army installations throughout the Pacific; and
- fully fund space and missile defense programs including upgrades for Army air defense systems and modernization of facilities at the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site in the Republic of the Marshall Islands and at Fort Greely, Alaska (AUSA Resolution 13-17).

**U.S. Pacific Command must** establish a Theater Joint Land Force Component Command in support of USPACOM to provide the combatant commander with resources parallel to existing operationalized functional commands.

Security and war are always fundamentally about people, culture and decisions—entities that constitute a human domain. The role of strategic landpower is to shape this domain and prevail throughout it—to create conditions that both stabilize people’s daily dealings with one another and generate momentum to bring about the nation’s strategic objectives for a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. To succeed in these objectives, the American military must influence the peoples who live there not only through compulsion but also with support; the Army is well suited to both. As long as people live on land, land forces will continue to be the decisive element of American national security, protecting the nation’s vital interests in ways that no other means can achieve. Our national security hangs in the balance of whether timely and predictable funding will be available in the near future to enable the Army’s indispensable strategic role in the Pacific.
Torchbearer Message

In the complex and uncertain security environment of the 21st century, the Army continues to play a central role in the nation’s defense as part of the joint force. Its mission in the Asia-Pacific theater—where it has maintained a permanent forward presence for more than a century—is to be responsive to the requirements of U.S. Pacific Command, assuring security and stability by providing forces that are capable across the spectrum of possible contingencies. The Army prevents conflict by maintaining credibility based on capacity, readiness and modernization; it shapes the international environment by sustaining strong relationships, building partner capacity and facilitating strategic access; and it applies mission command and combined arms capabilities to dominate the environment and win the nation’s wars decisively.

Four main tenets underpin the strategy that Army forces employ in the Pacific region to accomplish their mission. First, the Army provides trained and ready forces that possess the capability to conduct operations anywhere in the region, thereby presenting the combatant commander with a range of response options no matter what contingency emerges. Second, it persistently engages with other militaries and governments, employing its considerable influence throughout the human domain where security decisions are made. Third, it empowers the combatant commander with agile mission command options that are unmatched by any other service. Fourth, it demonstrates America’s commitment to regional security and stability via its permanent forward presence.

U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) maintains its longtime role as a force provider, but it has also undergone a significant transformation to an operational and deployable theater army headquarters. I Corps and most of its combat power—as well as most of the Army’s Pacific theater enabling commands—have returned from deployments in the Middle East; they expect to remain available and resume their historical participation in major multilateral training exercises. In addition, USARPAC has developed a contingency command post—a mini-theater army headquarters capability—designed for rapid response, and Eighth Army is now solely a warfighting command with new expeditionary roles. In short, the joint force has at its disposal a considerable array of experienced, trained and ready Army forces that are prepared for any task.

These forces also shape the human domain through their engagement with allied and partner militaries in the region. Such efforts limit harmful military influence from adversaries and complement the Army’s unilateral initiatives to deter potential aggression even as they build the capabilities of friendly forces. Formal military exercises (of large and small scales), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, direct partnerships between Asian countries and the Army National Guard, Soldier exchange assignments and many other shaping activities are central to U.S. national security policy. Among numerous other benefits, these efforts preserve operational and training access for U.S. and coalition forces in the event of conflict and leverage partner capabilities to help achieve U.S. goals.

U.S. Army sustainment forces have the greatest global reach of any army in the world; a third critical function that Soldiers deliver to the joint force is the capability to support operations throughout the entire theater over time if necessary. Army prepositioned stocks in Korea and Japan are being completely reassessed and ramped up for the future; they will be employed not only as a strategic stockpile but also in conjunction with major exercises and training and in response to natural disasters. Further, the new Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability will integrate live, virtual and constructive training environments to help guarantee that U.S. and partner forces throughout the theater will remain ready to dominate and win if they must.

Even in this time of diminishing resources, the Army stands ready as an experienced, flexible, lethal force in the Asia-Pacific theater. Its Soldiers are a critical hedge against an uncertain future, and their persistent engagement with dozens of allies and partners develops the human domain. What is needed is the full support of Congress to achieve timely and predictable funding so that the Army’s timeless role in deterring conflict, shaping the environment to conform with U.S. interests and winning decisively can endure. The Army provides invaluable resources to and enables many contingency response options for the joint force; it must receive balanced support to continue its indispensable strategic mission.
Through rebalancing in the next few years, we want to have the right forces in the right mix in the right places in the Asia–Pacific, so that peace and security can continue to prosper in this region. The U.S. forces operating in this region, both rotational and forward stationed, are crucial to our strategy in this part of the world and ensure we have the right formal presence and are ready to provide the right assistance to our allies and partners.

Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
13 January 2013