For more than 150 years, the United States has been conducting stability operations under various names, e.g., low-intensity conflict, military operations other than war, counterinsurgency and small-scale contingencies. Despite a long history of performing stability operations, the U.S. Army did not always embrace these tasks as a core mission.

Over the past five years, however, the security environment has changed significantly. America no longer faces only conventional armies who operate within clearly established political boundaries. It also faces enemies who employ irregular tactics, terror and asymmetric warfare. These enemies are increasingly transnational and dispersed.

Stability operations emerged in 2005 as a mission area for the Department of Defense, the U.S. government, America’s multinational partners and international and nongovernmental organizations. For the U.S. Army and the other U.S. military services, it became a core mission, to be given priority comparable to combat operations. This is a very significant paradigm shift.

In this latest installment of AUSA’s signature Torchbearer series, we provide an in-depth analysis of why stabilizing, securing, transitioning and reconstructing weak, failing and failed states are vital to U.S. security interests, how both U.S. military and civilian activities are critical to stability operations and what specific resources the Army and others require to engage for success in stability operations. We hope you find this report a useful resource and that you will continue to look to AUSA for thoughtful, credible analysis of contemporary national security issues.

Gordon R. Sullivan
General, U.S. Army Retired
President, AUSA

Contents

Executive Summary ........................................ 3
Introduction .............................................. 5
Background ................................................ 6
Stability Operations in Context .......................... 7
Building U.S. Capacity to
Perform Stability Operations ....................... 11
The Role of the Army ................................... 13
What is Needed ......................................... 24
What Must Be Done .................................... 25
Torchbearer Message ................................... 27

All photographs courtesy of U.S. Army
Executive Summary

We must bring together the experiences, resources and ideas from across our nation to develop solutions to the challenges of stability operations.

Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey
7 February 2006 speech at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

The events of 11 September 2001 highlighted the dangers of the complex and unpredictable 21st century security environment. The United States now recognizes that—in an era marked by the increasing power of non-state actors—weak, failing and failed states pose a serious threat to U.S. national security as havens for potential adversaries. Stability operations are not new. What is new is the realization that they play an essential role in shaping the strategic environment, winning wars and securing the peace.

Stability operations—the military and civilian activities conducted across the entire spectrum of operations from stable peace to general war, to establish and maintain order in states and regions—are now given the same weight as offensive and defensive combat operations and are considered a critical part of U.S. military operations. At any point along the spectrum of conflict, offensive, defensive and stability operations are involved to some degree. The U.S. military can expect to remain fully engaged globally for the foreseeable future in stabilizing, securing, transitioning and reconstructing weak, failing and failed states.

However, the U.S. military cannot succeed alone. Recent experiences have reinforced the notion that successful stability operations demand enhanced interagency coordination, with clear lines of authority that result in a unified effort applying all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement. Although the military creates the stability and security that provide space for reconstruction, civilian organizations are best suited to lead the reconstruction activities—such as political and economic development and humanitarian assistance—that enable the indigenous government to resume power after a successful stability operation.

Civilian organizations are working to bolster their capability and capacity for stability operations through such initiatives as the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), established to coordinate the U.S. government response in stability operations. But they are currently insufficiently equipped and funded to fulfill their role. Among other necessities, these agencies need to develop a surge capacity. Civilian reconstruction cannot be postponed until security and stability have been established by the military but must be a part of the initial phase of the operation.

Moreover, Department of Defense policy states that “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”* Landpower remains the linchpin of U.S. military stability operations. While addressing the ongoing demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is already leveraging many of its current initiatives to enhance capabilities and capacity for stability operations. These initiatives include transitioning to a modular force, rebalancing the active and reserve components, growing and developing leaders (called “pentathletes”), establishing or expanding Army support organizations, enhancing training, expanding language and cultural capabilities for Soldiers and leaders, and adjusting global force posture.

* Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, 28 November 2005, section 4.3.
The Army, along with the Marine Corps, is working to capture, analyze and train on lessons learned from ongoing operations. Many of the Army’s lessons learned have been addressed with initiatives, but others require more attention, such as improving the integration of civilians and contractors into planning and training for operations; involving more local employees in reconstruction to stimulate the economy and increase popular support for operations; and developing metrics to measure success and determine when and how the military should hand over operational leadership to civilian and international agencies, and ultimately to the indigenous government.

If the United States wants an Army ready for offense, defense and stability operations, the funds to organize, equip and train that force must be delivered. But this is only part of the equation; a directed, integrated, fully funded approach to stability operations that incorporates all relevant U.S. military and civilian organizations is also required for success. Therefore, Congress must:

- fully fund S/CRS, including the $100 million Conflict Response Fund;
- sanction an independent process to create interagency doctrine for stability operations;
- increase civilian capacity to deploy to stability operations, including increasing the number of State Department Foreign Service Officers and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel;
- change Title 501C(3) to allow nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to write off training expenses with federal institutions to increase NGO participation in training exercises, thereby increasing their realism;
- create a U.S. government funding line to enable international organizations (IOs) and NGOs to train with U.S. government agencies and the military; and
- increase Defense budget funding to 5 percent or greater of the Gross Domestic Product.

The Department of Defense must:

- fully implement/support DoDD 3000.05;
- track implementation of improvements in the U.S. military’s stability operations capabilities;
- fully fund stability operations capabilities throughout the military departments; and
- design and facilitate tabletop exercises, seminars, conferences and training programs in cooperation with S/CRS and civil departments and agencies to convert lessons learned from experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq into true preparedness for future stability operations.

The Army must:

- rethink the predeployment training philosophy for stability operations given the comparable levels of difficulty across the spectrum of operations;
- improve stability operations training by hiring nonmilitary observer/controllers from the interagency, IO and NGO communities to help shape the training objectives. These observer/controllers would be able to reach out to key civilian leaders in their respective groups to help identify the civilians’ training requirements and then work with the training centers to incorporate those training goals. Such efforts would increase the realism of the scenarios and provide greater incentives for the interagency, international and NGO communities to participate in exercises;
- continue implementation of its modular force and active component/reserve component rebalancing initiatives;
- integrate the concept of stability operations into all Soldier, leader and training activities;
- recruit more senior civil affairs professionals into the reserve component; and
- help organize the joint, interagency and multinational effort.
The U.S. Army’s Role in Stability Operations

The Long War is a generational struggle. It will take many years of militarily helping the institutions in the region become more robust and more capable, of providing economic opportunities where it makes sense, of helping to shape people’s thinking about their political futures. [emphasis added]


Introduction

The international security environment has changed dramatically in the five years since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The 2005 National Defense Strategy identified an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges that pose threats to this nation. These threats are becoming increasingly complex. The U.S. Army can expect to remain fully engaged globally for the foreseeable future not only in winning wars but also in assisting to stabilize, secure, transition and reconstruct weak, failing and failed states.

America’s previous conceptions of security, deterrence, intelligence and warning do not adequately address today’s threats. To defeat current and potential adversaries in this environment, the nation must employ, as never before, all forms of national power in a concerted, integrated manner.

In an era of uncertainty, unpredictability, misinformation and misconceptions, U.S. military capabilities alone cannot provide the order and stability necessary for states and regions to recover and reestablish themselves. Civilian activities and capabilities (for example, diplomacy and finance) are also vital to addressing the full spectrum of challenges created by this new security environment. Stability operations—military and civilian activities conducted across the entire spectrum of operations from peace to war to ensure order in states and regions—are an integral part of creating favorable outcomes to accomplish the objectives of the National Security Strategy.

Stability operations are not new. What is new is an increased understanding of not only the importance of stability operations to national security but also the crucial role played by such operations across the spectrum of conflict in the creation of an environment for successful political and economic reconstruction. Recent experiences have reinforced the notion that successful stability operations demand enhanced interagency coordination, with clear lines of authority that result in a

As the diagram shows, the Department of Defense is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.

Source: 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
unified effort applying all elements of national power.

The Army has already taken steps to meet this challenge. Transitioning to a modular force, rebalancing the active and reserve components, growing and developing leaders, enhancing training, expanding language and cultural capabilities for Soldiers and leaders and adjusting global force posture are just some of the measures that enable the Army to meet the unique demands of stability operations. While military leaders may not soon see the kind of civil-military unity of effort they prefer, the experience of recent years has shown that landpower has a unique role and carries disproportionate responsibility in stability operations because of uncoordinated and unresourced efforts across the Executive Branch departments. What are the roles of the military and civilian agencies in stability operations and what can be done to engage them for success in this long war?

**Background**

**Increased emphasis on military stability operations since the end of the Cold War.** Although in the past stability operations have not received the same level of consideration as combat operations, the United States conducted these operations in the 19th and 20th centuries in places such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Europe, the Philippines and Central America with varying degrees of long-term success. The Soviet Union’s collapse spurred an increase in the need for stability operations. Beginning with the 1989–90 military operations in Panama, the United States has increasingly been involved in such operations. In the 1990s, the United States participated in several stability operations: Haiti and Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. These missions revealed the complex and evolving nature of such operations.

Many policymakers in the United States were concerned at the time that the shrinking military forces of the 1990s might be strained by the demands of stability operations and should not be distracted from their main combat responsibilities. However, those concerns were set aside in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, when the United States was reminded of the danger posed by weak, failing or failed states as havens for potential adversaries and of the central importance of stability operations in defending the nation.

In effect, the requirement to conduct stability operations in conflict-prone regions has become one of the growing trends of the post-Cold War security environment. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Transition To and From Hostilities (2004) noted that the United States has undertaken a new stability operation every two years since 1989 and that approximately 80 percent of all United Nations peacekeeping missions have occurred after 1989. Given the large coalition operations in regions such as the Balkans, West Africa, the Indonesian archipelago and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, the trend lines are clear.

**Evolving U.S. strategy.** The March 2006 National Security Strategy reaffirmed the importance of attending to weak, failing and failed states, which was first outlined as early as 2002. One of the key tenets is the creation

---

of “a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for [America].”

By highlighting the danger that these states pose to the United States and the world, the strategy points to the important role played by stability operations in shaping the strategic environment, winning wars and securing peace.

Moreover, the current National Defense and National Military Strategies note that establishing broad, secure and lasting peace requires an active, layered defense that does not simply respond to crises but also seeks to prevent future conflict. This has profound implications for the military: military forces must be able to defeat the enemy quickly, maintain a presence to ensure stability and work to bring about lasting change. That said, as articulated in the National Security Strategy and amplified in the others, the goal can be achieved not by the U.S. Army or military alone but by all instruments/elements of power operating in concert.

**Stability Operations in Context**

Stability operations, as previously stated, are military and civilian activities conducted across the entire spectrum of operations from stable peace to general war, to establish and maintain order in states and regions. Stabilizing, securing, transitioning and re-constructing are the functions performed by military and civilian agencies in conducting stability operations, which lead states or regions to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

These operations shape the environment and seek to prevent conflict. They occur throughout all phases of military operations and require as much emphasis as is placed on military offensive and defensive operations to achieve U.S. national goals. The objective is to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its own security, stability and political and economic activity while eliminating as many of the root causes of the instability as possible, thereby reducing the likelihood of another crisis. When violence is high, the military takes the lead to establish stability and security. However, as violence decreases and the environment becomes more stable and permissive, reconstruction can accelerate; during this period, the military’s role decreases and civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) take on a greater role.

The military’s roles in stability operations include various military missions, tasks

---

and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other elements of power to:

- maintain or reestablish or assist a nation in maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment; and

- provide or assist a nation in providing essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief.\(^3\)

Effectively executed stability operations enable U.S. military forces to rapidly transfer responsibility for transition and reconstruction activities to civilian/indigenous leaders. This allows U.S. military forces to return to their operating bases to reset and prepare for future missions.

Elements of national power.\(^4\) Since stability operations involve both civilian and military activities, it is critical to understand how they operate both individually and collectively.

---

\(^3\) Signature draft version (pending approval of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 31 July 2006.

\(^4\) International and nongovernmental organizations are also important to stability operations but are not included in this discussion because the focus is on U.S. government elements of power.
These activities can be loosely classified under the following instruments or elements of U.S. national power, commonly defined as diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL). Each element is critical to a successful stability operation; the tools used by U.S. agencies such as the Departments of State (DoS), Treasury (DTR), Commerce (DoC) and Justice (DoJ) in stability operations are as important as those employed by the Department of Defense (DoD). All of the elements of power are mutually reinforcing and complementary.

**Diplomatic (e.g., DoS).** Diplomatic—or political—efforts are useful in helping shape the choices of weak, failing or failed governments and adversarial groups or individuals who contribute to instability. In fact, the early investment of political capital may preclude the need for military operations and lengthy post-conflict stability operations. Focused U.S. diplomatic efforts can also help foster the international support necessary for building sustainable peace and for sharing the cost of stability operations. In stability operations, the skills and resources of organizations such as DoS are critical to building the strong indigenous democratic institutions and civil society required for success. DoS’s “transformational diplomacy” program is part of this shaping effort, as are all activities carried out by “country teams” under the supervision of U.S. ambassadors.

**Informational (e.g., DoD, DoS).** Bringing stability to a nation requires winning the information battle. Informational tools, such as public diplomacy or psychological operations, help inform and influence, build indigenous support for stability operations, strengthen the legitimacy of an indigenous government and prevent insurgencies from taking root or gaining popular support. Persuasive themes and messages, grounded in the truth, can be used to inform the population while discrediting adversary or insurgent efforts and preventing them from distorting or subverting legitimate indigenous efforts.

**Military (e.g., DoD).** Military power, across the spectrum of conflict, provides the security, control and stabilization that create space for all other instruments of power to operate. For example, if major combat operations are required, the military conducts stability operations—along with offensive and defensive operations—to create the stable and secure environment that will enable initial reconstruction efforts to expand while creating the conditions for transition from a military-led to a civilian-led effort. The skills and resources of military power are also useful once the peace has been secured, to help indigenous security forces improve their capacities and capabilities.
through, for example, security cooperation activities or training. These efforts, which seek to achieve U.S. objectives, range from the conduct of foreign internal defense activities to humanitarian assistance to the conduct of offensive or defensive combat operations.

**Economic (e.g., DoC, U.S. Agency for International Development).** Leveraging U.S. economic power is vital to conducting stability operations; in many ways, economic development—like political efforts—can substitute for bullets. The ability to jump-start weak, failing or failed economies, whether through direct cash loans, grants or other means, helps to provide employment, to begin to solve endemic infrastructure shortfalls and, when properly audited, to overcome corruption and graft that are serious obstacles to existing host-government economic health.

**Financial (e.g., DTR, DoC).** Financial tools are used to develop the strong, viable financial institutions that facilitate economic growth. These institutions do much to reassure the population that their currency will be reasonably stable, their investments will be safe, their taxes will be fair and their government and business leaders will be free of corruption. Within domestic and international financial circles, the United States, along with its allies and coalition partners, uses financial tools to thwart illegal and illicit activities of state and non-state actors. One method to accomplish this is to deny belligerents the mechanisms by which they raise, transfer and use financial resources. Within the context of stability operations, several key efforts pay dividends: the restoration of financial markets and their associated institutions and the reissue and stabilization of currency.

**Intelligence (e.g., DoS, DoD, CIA).** In stability operations, as in all operations, intelligence supports the activities of the other elements of power. Diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial and law enforcement activities are all dependent upon robust and accurate actionable intelligence. Intelligence is as vital at the tactical level—where Soldiers are directly engaged in stabilizing, securing, transitioning and reconstructing—as it is at the operational and strategic levels—where leaders and policymakers shape the direction and focus of an operation. To ensure successful operations, intelligence sharing and cooperation among civilian organizations, the military and partner nations is essential.

**Law Enforcement (e.g., DoS, DoD, DoJ).** Along with military efforts, law enforcement efforts help to maintain stability and security through the establishment and enforcement of the rule of law. Ensuring that viable judicial, legal and police systems are functional, impartial and largely free of corruption is of paramount importance to the exercise of legitimate government authority and the creation of sustainable peace. A population that trusts the government to consistently apply the rule of law will recognize the legitimacy of its government and be less willing to support adversaries or insurgents. Law enforcement is also essential to maintaining the secure and
stable environment required for stability and reconstruction operations to be undertaken by government, nongovernment and commercial institutions. In the context of stability operations, these efforts include providing training in air- and seaport security, border security, judicial proceedings, prison operations, police work and anticorruption efforts.

To successfully confront the problem posed by weak, failing or failed states, the U.S. government organizations who employ these instruments must be cognizant of underlying social, economic, cultural (religious, tribal, ethnic) and political factors that contribute to instability or conflict. For example, understanding the religious schisms that exist within Islam, the real cultural differences between Persians and Arabs, and the role of tribal leaders in society is vital to determining how to achieve progress within complex Middle Eastern social structures. While this means that all instruments of U.S. power should be used in stability operations—as directed by the 2006 National Security Strategy—it also means that all U.S. agencies involved must consider these factors when they plan operations. For success, the military, along with all involved U.S. government agencies, must operate with more awareness and consideration than ever before.

Building U.S. Capacity to Perform Stability Operations

Civilian capacity. Since stability operations require all elements of national power operating in an integrated fashion, enhanced interagency coordination, clear lines of authority and unified effort across the Executive Branch departments are essential. Currently, the Secretary of State is the focal point for coordinating all U.S. department and agency efforts regarding stability operations. Within the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) heads this effort. It focuses on developing a reliable capability for the government to plan—on an interagency basis—for a timely and effective national response by applying all appropriate elements of national power to address the complex factors that destabilize a specified nation. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of

---

6 Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, published in 2003, also described stability operations as multiagency operations wherein the military is a supporting player.

7 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, 7 December 2005, subject: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, is the authoritative document and is a point of reference for the role of the S/CRS and the relationship between DoS and DoD for stabilization and reconstruction; available online at http://www fas org/sp/irp/irpdocs/NSPD/NSPD-44.html.
The new draft August 2006 Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC)—which is awaiting signature—further reinforces the importance of stability operations in the ultimate achievement of strategic aims. This draft JOC focuses on helping a severely stressed government to avoid failure or recover from a devastating natural disaster, and on assisting an emerging host nation government in building a “new domestic order” following internal collapse or defeat in war.

As discussed earlier, civil-military cooperation is essential for success. For example, in Afghanistan, a joint venture with the Afghan government and coalition forces created one of the most innovative measures to improve U.S. government capability in stability operations: civil-military cooperation teams, called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Led by the military, these U.S. PRTs have three main missions: to strengthen the reach of the indigenous national government, to enhance security and to facilitate reconstruction. The teams include personnel from DoS, USAID, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the government of Afghanistan. Ideally, a U.S. PRT would have more civilian than military personnel; however, due to several contingent factors, the military comprises approximately 97 percent of the team, posing
challenges in matching reconstruction needs to capabilities.\textsuperscript{11}

The Role of the Army

The challenges presented by the 21st-century security environment help focus the efforts of the Army to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders in support of the National Security and National Defense Strategies. The Army organizes, trains and equips Soldiers and leaders who, as vital members of their units, conduct prompt, sustained combat as well as stability operations when required. Like offensive and defensive operations, stability operations occur across the entire spectrum of conflict. The degree to which one type of operations—offense, defense, stability—is emphasized fluctuates depending upon the magnitude of violence. In general war, offensive operations play a predominant role; in times of peace, continued emphasis on stability operations is paramount. Regardless, at any point along the spectrum of conflict, offensive, defensive and stability operations are involved to some degree.

In stability operations, the Army supports U.S. government plans with stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction activities. As stated earlier, many of the activities and operations associated with stability and security tasks occur immediately following

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{diagram.png}
\caption{Full Spectrum Operations}
\end{figure}

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

Stabilization involves activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions; to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic and/or political systems; to create stability in a nation or region; and to establish the preconditions for reconstruction efforts. Security involves the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the local populace, indigenous military and civilian organizations and the U.S. agencies that are conducting operations. Transition describes the process of shifting the lead responsibility and authority for helping provide or foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development and political governance from the U.S. military to the U.S. civilian agencies, and then from the U.S. civilian agencies to the indigenous government. Transitions are event-driven and will occur at that point when the group assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity to carry out the relevant activities. Finally, Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged or destroyed political, socioeconomic and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development. This is likely to be a civilian-led effort and includes addressing the root causes of the conflict to achieve sustainable peace.

or in conjunction with combat operations and require a greater military presence and more military resources. Yet, with sufficient warning and clear national policy direction, they also can occur in an effort to avoid the need for any combat operations. In all stability operations, as the situation becomes more stable and the environment becomes more permissive, the military presence diminishes and becomes offset by other U.S. government entities and their assets as well as NGOs better suited for conducting transition and reconstruction operations.

The Army possesses the core competencies necessary to establish a fully capable force in support of full-spectrum operations. To develop capabilities to conduct stability operations, the Army has leveraged many of its ongoing initiatives, e.g., the modular force, rebalancing of active and reserve components, growing and developing leaders, establishing or expanding Army support organizations and learning from experiences. The overall capability to conduct stability operations enables the achievement of six of the eight transformational objectives outlined in the National Defense Strategy:

- strengthen intelligence;
- protect critical bases of operation;
- protect and sustain forces in distant anti-access environments;
- deny enemies sanctuary;
- improve proficiency against irregular challenges; and
- increase the capabilities of international and domestic partners.¹²

¹² The other two DoD transformational objectives are operating from the global commons (space, cyberspace and international waters and airspace) and conducting network-centric operations. Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, pp. 12–15.
The modular force. Through modularity—its major force transformation initiative—the Army is working to enhance its stability operations capabilities. The Army is undergoing its most significant force structure alteration in fifty years, changing from a division-centric force to a brigade-centric force. This total redesign of the Army is creating a true full-spectrum force, preparing the Army for offensive, defensive and stability operations.

At the heart of the modular force are the brigade combat teams (BCTs). These self-contained entities, each containing approximately 4,000 Soldiers, allow commanders to more easily scale an operation to adjust to the rapidly changing environment of stability operations. Commanders are able to “plug and play” at the brigade level, providing quick and easy access to specialized skills such as civil affairs, sensors, public affairs, etc., depending on the operational environment. At the outset, when stability and security are of utmost importance, maneuver BCTs (Stryker, infantry or heavy) provide a combat-capable force to establish security and provide for stability. As transition and reconstruction activities become dominant, multifunctional and functional support brigades provide capabilities to coordinate with interagency and NGOs and assist civilian agencies, leading to sustainable peace. The modular force allows the Army to support civilian reconstruction efforts while simultaneously providing a combat-capable force if the level of violence or threat of violence increases. These brigades also have the sustainability to match the often long duration of stability operations.

Rebalancing the active and reserve components. Stability operations in Afghanistan and

---

Iraq have highlighted the importance of low-density, high-demand (LD/HD) capabilities such as military police, engineer, civil affairs, psychological operations and medical. When operations in Afghanistan began in October 2001, 98 percent of all U.S. civil affairs capabilities existed in the Army’s reserve component. Demands for such capabilities were also felt during the stability operations of the 1990s, but the large size and long duration of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have further emphasized the importance of LD/HD forces. The Army is currently examining how to restructure the force to bring more LD/HD units into the active force, changing the active component/reserve component (AC/RC) mix to reflect the increased demand for skill sets historically found in the reserve force. It is working to retrain and reallocate 125,000 Soldiers from the LD/HD military occupation skills of the Cold War era, e.g., field artillery, air defense and armor, to the LD/HD military occupation skills needed in the long war, e.g., Special Forces, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations and military intelligence, by 2009. The Army has completed more than 87,000 of the projected 125,000 organizational changes, including streamlining force structure in the reserve component to improve readiness. It will continue to rebalance as it completes modular transformation across the force to alleviate stress in LD/HD capabilities. This effort includes the recent initiative to rebalance Army National Guard structure to meet warfighting requirements, operational demands and defense support to civil authorities.
Growing and developing leaders. The Army is creating the leaders—"pentathletes"—necessary for the full spectrum of operations, whose versatility and adaptability will enable them to learn and adapt in ambiguous situations in constantly evolving environments. According to the Army, a "pentathlete" is a multiskilled leader who is:

- a strategic and creative thinker;
- a builder of leaders and teams;
- a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier;
- skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy; and
- able to understand cultural context and work effectively across it.

This "pentathlete," as a senior leader, is effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations.

The Army has undertaken a major review of training and education at home stations and Combat Training Centers and across the institutional training base to ensure that Soldiers are well led and well prepared for the complexity and uncertainty of stability operations. The challenge is to instill in the force not what to think but how to think.

As a result of the Army’s review of its training and education, cultural awareness and language skills are now emphasized at every level. For example, the U.S. Military Academy has incorporated foreign language and cultural education into its curriculum. The Army has also expanded its Foreign Area

---

Growing Army Leaders in the 21st Century

**"The Pentathlete"**

**Multiskilled Leader**

- Strategic and creative thinker
- Builder of leaders and teams
- Competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier
- Skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy
- Understands cultural context and works effectively across it

**Leader Attributes**

- Sets the standard for integrity and character
- Confident and competent decisionmaker in certain situations
  - prudent risk taker
  - innovative
  - adaptive
- Empathetic and always positive
- Professionally educated and dedicated to life-long learning
- Effective communicator

Personifies the **Warrior Ethos** in all aspects, from warfighting to statesmanship to business management. **It’s a way of life.**

This “pentathlete,” as a senior leader, is effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army
Officer program and requires that all Soldiers deploying to Iraq undergo a thorough cultural awareness program to ensure they understand and respect the nuances of Arab-Islamic culture. However, challenges remain; for example, it is often difficult to accurately predict which languages and cultures will be important for future operations.

Since the late 1990s, the Army has refined its training to prepare Soldiers for stability operations. The Army first adjusted its training concept to include stability operations to sustain the rotation of forces into the Balkans. In line with the Army’s call to “train like you fight,” current force training more accurately reflects the conditions Soldier will face during stability operations. For example, the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, have modified their exercises to include a wide range of realistic scenarios, such as reacting to kidnapping, car bombs and sectarian uprisings and conducting negotiations with village leaders and imams. In fact, whenever possible both the NTC and the JRTC use civilian role players (many of them Afghan or Iraqi-Americans) to portray indigenous populations to enhance realism associated with cultural and linguistic challenges.

Although significant progress has been made, the Army continues to look for ways to improve. One major issue is that most training events and exercises do not include active civilian agency participation. Reduced civilian agency staffing, which reflects shortages in funding and resources, makes it difficult for agencies to provide individuals for training exercises. Since training objectives are established in planning for the training exercises, the lack of civilian participation in planning means that civilian training goals are not included in the exercises. These exercises need more interagency participation to better train all actors for the conditions they will face in stability operations.

Establishing or expanding the Army’s support organizations. The Army is establishing or expanding its support organizations to enhance its capability and capacity for stability operations. Over the past ten years, the Peacekeeping Institute—now known as the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)—under U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has conducted numerous studies to analyze operational- and strategic-level best practices and identify areas where the U.S. government needs to improve capabilities for stability operations; PKSOI’s assistance in the research and development of concepts and doctrine for stability operations will enhance

15 Ibid.
preparedness for such operations within the joint, multinational, interagency and NGO environment. As of 1 January 2007, the Army expects to realign PKSOI from TRADOC to be a Field Operating Agency reporting to Headquarters, Department of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7 (Operations, Plans and Policy). The Army has also established a Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Division within the Army Staff (G3/5/7) to focus on stability operations policy. This new organization serves as the focal point for the integration of all SSTR activities within the Army. It oversees the development of Army SSTR policy, shapes SSTR activity and is responsible for the coordination and integration of activities with PKSOI in accordance with tasking and oversight by the G3/5/7. The SSTR division also represents the Army with other government agencies and NGOs.

To update stability operations doctrine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has appointed the commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the director of the Joint Center of International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). The JCISFA mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commanders and the military services on the appropriate doctrine, practices and proven Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to efficiently prepare for and conduct security force assistance missions. JCISFA, in coordination with various U.S. and foreign agencies, conducts analysis and assists with organizing, training, equipping and advising foreign security forces and rebuilding supporting infrastructure (both institutional and physical).

The CAC, along with the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, recently organized the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. Dedicated to the improvement of counterinsurgency capabilities through research of best practices, improvement of doctrine and education, integration of training programs and outreach to military and civilian organizations, the Counterinsurgency Center is currently overseeing military and civilian subject-matter experts who are writing a new counterinsurgency manual based on lessons learned in the field. The new manual, an update of the interim 1999 version, is part of a senior-level effort to promote institutional change and is slated for publication in October 2006. Besides providing doctrinal guidance, the manual is also intended to “provoke thought” and avoid prescribing rigid rules. The interim manual on stability operations, already in draft form, is scheduled for publication in late 2006/2007.

The Army is also supporting the DoD effort to establish an SSTR and Irregular Warfare Hub—a Center of Excellence—to work with a network of military and civilian organizations and academic institutions. This expert network will coordinate and enhance education and training to effectively employ lessons learned from actual operations, to identify and adopt best practices and to assist in the development of capabilities and capacities for the various organizations of U.S. and partner nations who contribute to stability operations. The hub is expected to be operational in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008.

Learning from experience. The Army has a time-sensitive, comprehensive process to capture, disseminate and train on lessons

---

Iraq - November 2004

Multinational Corps - Iraq
Operational Theme: Irregular Warfare
Type of Operation: Counterinsurgency

Many U.S. adversaries engage both tactically and strategically in asymmetric or indirect methods to counter the clear advantage in conventional war that the United States currently enjoys. This type of warfare, including the U.S. response, is referred to as “irregular warfare.” It is characterized by use of nontraditional forces, methods and focus on eroding the national and political will. Therefore, irregular warfare—one of the five operational themes—is not synonymous with stability operations. For instance, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are categorized as “irregular warfare” and involve the components of full-spectrum operations, i.e., offensive, defensive and stability operations to meet the commander’s objective.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
learned. There have been significant institutional efforts to capture lessons from the field and quickly turn them into recommendations for Soldiers in the field. For example, the Stryker Center for Lessons Learned links forward-deployed forces and captures near real-time lessons and insights from ongoing combat operations to provide operational training and leader development support to units.¹⁸

In addition to the four aforementioned initiatives to enhance stability operations capability—implementing the modular force, rebalancing the active and reserve components growing and developing leaders and establishing or expanding Army support organizations—the Army’s lessons-learned efforts have highlighted other areas for improvement and helped to prioritize the timing and commitment of resources used to increase the nation’s stability operations capabilities. Many of these areas have been addressed with initiatives, but others require more attention.

In 2002, the Army launched the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) program to meet the changing demands of Soldiers who must confront an ever adaptive enemy. Because REF operates in theater, it can provide deployed Soldiers with equipment within 90 days of the identification of a need—saving lives and enabling mission success. For example, 12 hours after notification that the enemy was hiding weapons caches in wells, REF had developed a prototype well camera in theater; it was used by troops the next day to locate the underground caches. Other innovative REF initiatives include Packbots (remote-controlled, full-sensor tracked vehicles), PocketTerps (devices that contain prerecorded translations), Magnetometers (used to search piles of hay, dirt, etc., for weapons) and armor kits (providing four-door, windshield and back-plate vehicle protection).

In addition to quick access to materiel, forces also need quick access to financial resources. The current fiscal and resource tools

available to commanders are based on decisions largely made in the 1980s and do not match the current operational requirements. To succeed in stability operations, commanders on the ground need both ready and available finances to “kick-start” jobs programs, rebuild infrastructure and restart basic public services, as well as instruction and guidance in the best way to allocate developmental assistance to ensure the money is used effectively. These initiatives are an important part of increasing popular support for the operation. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund, which provides U.S. governmental appropriations directly to operational and tactical forces, is a step forward, but it has been neither institutionalized nor rationalized as an integrated interagency program.19

The Army must also work to better integrate private-sector employees and contractors into operations, consistent with DoD’s current initiative to enhance contracting in stability operations. Operational plans and exercises could benefit from increased private-sector involvement.20 This is an important undertaking both because these employees provide competency in skills essential to military operations—such as reconstruction, logistics and security support—and because the number of private-sector employees involved in stability operations is not small: for instance, there are 60,000 private-sector employees involved in U.S. operations in Iraq.

Local private-sector employees should be used whenever possible in reconstruction efforts because this helps to promote stability by stimulating economic activity and decreasing unemployment. For example, near Sadr City in Baghdad, the Army’s 445th Civil Affairs Battalion has developed a farmers’ coalition that will eventually benefit approximately 20,000 people. The cooperative will give local residents a financial stake in reconstruction and stability, thereby making them less likely to support the insurgency.21 Through increased local participation, popular support of the operation increases—thereby denying potential insurgents either recruits or passive popular support.

Despite the advantages of using private contractors, both when and how the United States should employ contractors should be reassessed. For example, although private security firms replace and/or augment military capability, the rules and policy regarding conduct during stability operations are

---

not updated to explicitly cover these actors. The Army discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan that these contractors present challenges to command and control that need to be examined. An accepted code of conduct to which all contractors subscribe must be developed and adopted.

Of all of the lessons learned, perhaps the most critical issue concerns the transition of leadership or authority. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the importance and difficulty of transitions during stability operations. From these experiences, two essential questions emerged: When and how should the military hand over operational leadership to civilian and international agencies, and ultimately to the indigenous government?

The “when” and “how” are determined by many factors. To establish the timing and method of the transition between military-led and civilian-led operations, the level of violence on the ground is one of the decisive factors. As operations in Iraq reveal, this transition will not be neat and quick; the military must continue to provide some level of sustained support during civilian-led operations, both to prevent the deterioration of the security situation and to train indigenous military and police forces to eventually re-assume full authority. With regard to the timing of the final transition of authority to the indigenous government, U.S. experience has also shown the importance of evaluating the local level of governance, as this is where the population interacts most with its government and is usually where the social and economic services critical to sustaining the population’s support are administered.

Currently, there is no standard set of metrics to determine the proper timing. Many factors, such as government legitimacy, are difficult to measure; even factors that are simpler to measure, like the number of indigenous troops trained, are not reliable indicators of stability. Even in successful stability operations—in which an indigenous government is able to assume full authority—the government will not function perfectly and there may still be lingering insurgencies or unrest within the country. Despite the challenges, the Army needs to devote more resources to developing these metrics; without them, it will be nearly impossible to determine if progress is being made.

In sum, the Army continues to identify lessons learned and develop initiatives to improve its ability to conduct successful stability operations. It is adapting force structure, materiel, logistics and unit training to the realities of the contemporary operating environment and is improving military occupational specialty (MOS)-specific, language, cultural and Soldier basic skills. Institutionally, the Army continues study with the Joint Staff on the best way to integrate and effectively
use the private sector in stability operations. Although initiatives have not yet been implemented for every lesson learned, the Army is making significant progress toward building its capability and capacity for stability operations.

What is Needed

Stability operations are expensive and require both human and financial capital to ensure success; no single U.S. service or government agency alone can be successful in such operations. A directed, integrated approach that incorporates all of the relevant U.S. military and civilian capabilities is required. As Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey stated earlier in the year, “We must bring together the experiences, resources and ideas from across our nation to develop solutions to the challenges of stability operations.”

Perhaps the most difficult challenge in conducting stability operations is strengthening interagency efforts. Principally, civilian agencies need a surge capability to deploy in a timely manner to ensure success. Initiatives such as the DoS plan for “transformational diplomacy” (whereby Foreign Service officers are transferred to critical “war on terror” areas) and the Active Response Team (a group of active and retired DoS employees who volunteer to be on a standby status, available for training and deployment) are steps in the right direction.

There are also promising initiatives to bolster interagency cooperation, such as having employees from one civilian agency serve in another agency for some portion of their career. If the interagency process is to work during stability operations, more interagency actors must become accustomed to one another’s institutional cultures and imperatives in peacetime.

There is currently no formal interagency doctrine with regard to stability operations, and the various agencies are left with a voluminous body of literature and doctrinal publications that is too large and complex to navigate. In terms of interagency doctrine, the National Security Council has still not created the interagency doctrine for complex contingencies requested by a presidential directive in 1997. While there is growing interest in the interagency community, there are no legislative mandates for appropriate


action for most departments and agencies and no enduring funding line for S/CRS—the focal point for coordinating all interagency stability operations efforts.

Despite the DoS request for $24.1 million for the S/CRS FY 2006 operations budget and $100 million for a Conflict Response Fund, congressional approvals fell far below those levels. The House approved only $7.7 million of the $24.1 million requested for the operations budget and zero dollars for the Conflict Response Fund, while the Senate met the $24.1 million request for funding operations but approved only $24 million of the $100 million requested for the fund. The FY 2007 request is $20.1 million for operations and $75 million for the Conflict Response Fund. Congressional action on the FY 2007 request must not mirror the prior years because at the current funding level, S/CRS cannot fully support planning efforts, participate adequately in military exercises or deploy civilian response mechanisms to operations. This funding problem must be addressed to build the interagency capacity necessary for U.S. success in stability operations.

Although an integrated civil-military effort is desirable, in the meantime, the United States must continue to rely predominately on military power to confront all of the military, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural challenges presented by stability operations. Moreover, Department of Defense policy states that “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”24 To adequately provide for the long-term, complex nature of such operations, the level of financial resources must be increased, the flow of financial resources must be secured, and the allocation of those resources must be adjusted to meet demands.

Over the past 50 years, landpower has been neglected in funding compared to airpower and seapower. Since the demand for stability operations is increasing and these operations are primarily fought and won on the ground, U.S. military spending needs to reflect the Army’s importance to current and future wars. In the future we can expect increased demands for stability operations. The current and future security environment requires an Army that is full-spectrum capable—able to conduct major combat operations in which offensive and defensive operations are emphasized as well as limited intervention in which stability operations are emphasized.

The Army, too often left to win the peace after major combat operations are concluded, has already streamlined its organization and cut nonessential programs while continuing to meet the challenges of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The funds to organize, equip and train the Army for full-spectrum operations must also be delivered.

What Must Be Done

To be effective in stability operations, the Army requires the assistance of the U.S. government interagency process. Therefore, Congress must:

• fully fund S/CRS, including the $100 million Conflict Response Fund;
• sanction an independent process to create interagency doctrine for stability operations;
• increase civilian capacity to deploy to stability operations, including increasing the number of State Department Foreign Service Officers and USAID personnel;

• change Title 501C(3) to allow NGOs to write off training expenses with federal institutions to increase NGO participation in training exercises, thereby increasing their realism;
• create a U.S. government funding line to enable IOs and NGOs to train with U.S. government agencies and the military; and
• increase Defense budget funding to 5 percent or greater of the Gross Domestic Product.

The Department of Defense must:
• fully implement/support DoDD 3000.05;
• track implementation of improvements in the U.S. military’s stability operations capabilities;
• fully fund stability operations capabilities throughout the military departments; and
• design and facilitate tabletop exercises, seminars, conferences and training programs in cooperation with S/CRS and civil departments and agencies to convert lessons learned from experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq into true preparedness for future stability operations.

The Army must:
• rethink the predeployment training philosophy for stability operations given the comparable levels of difficulty across the spectrum of operations;
• improve stability operations training by hiring nonmilitary observer/controllers from the interagency, IO and NGO communities to help shape the training objectives. These observer/controllers would be able to reach out to key civilian leaders in their respective groups to help identify the civilians’ training requirements and then work with the training centers to incorporate those training goals. Such efforts would increase the realism of the scenarios and provide greater incentives for the interagency, international and NGO communities to participate in exercises;
• continue implementation of its modular force and AC/RC rebalancing initiatives;
• integrate the concept of stability operations into all Soldier, leader and training activities;
• recruit more senior civil affairs professionals into the reserve component; and
• help organize the joint, interagency and multinational effort.

Stability operations have been and will continue to be a core mission for the U.S. government and therefore for the Army. Accordingly, the government must seek to create a synergy among its agencies—both civilian and military—and between the United States and its allies. Although much has been done, more work remains and, unfortunately, the world’s need for an improved response will not wait.
The 21st century security environment is more complex and unpredictable than ever before. The United States must use all forms of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement—in a coordinated and integrated manner, especially in stability operations. Along with military offensive and defensive operations, stability operations—the military and civilian activities conducted across the entire spectrum of operations from peace to war to ensure order in states and regions—are essential to creating sustainable peace. The Army can expect to be fully engaged globally for the foreseeable future, not only in winning wars but also in assisting to stabilize, secure, transition and reconstruct weak, failing and failed states.

Stability operations are not new. But since the events of 11 September 2001, which highlighted the danger that weak, failing and failed states pose as havens for potential adversaries, there is now an increased understanding of the importance of these operations. Stability operations are now given the same weight as offensive and defensive combat operations.

The military alone cannot conduct successful stability operations. The military creates the stability and security that provides the space in which the reconstruction can begin, but civilian organizations are best suited to lead reconstruction activities that enable the indigenous government to resume power. Effectively executed stability operations allow U.S. military forces to rapidly transfer responsibility for transition and reconstruction activities to civilian/indigenous leaders and prepare for future missions.

Civilian organizations are bolstering their capabilities through such initiatives as the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, established to coordinate U.S. stability operations. Regrettably, civilian organizations are currently insufficiently equipped and funded to fulfill their role in stability operations. These agencies need a surge capacity to respond quickly to crises. Civilian reconstruction cannot be postponed until after security and stability have been established by the military but must be a part of the initial phase of the operation.

Landpower is the linchpin of U.S. military stability operations. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have collaborated to improve capabilities through shared lessons learned, new joint organizations and doctrinal initiatives. The Army is already leveraging many of its current initiatives to enhance its capability and capacity for stability operations. Some of these initiatives include transitioning to a modular force, rebalancing the active and reserve components, growing and developing leaders, establishing or expanding Army support organizations, enhancing training, and expanding language and cultural capabilities for Soldiers and leaders. The Army also continues to capture, analyze and adapt based on its experiences in current operations.

**What is needed to ensure success is a directed, integrated, fully funded approach to stability operations that incorporates all of the relevant U.S. military and civilian organizations.** The Army has already streamlined its organization while continuing to meet the challenges of its ongoing global commitments. If the United States wants an Army ready for offense, defense and stability operations, the funds to organize, equip and train that force must be delivered.
We’re in a world where very few things are going to be solved purely militarily. We’re in a world that is going to require interagency cooperation. . . .

Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker
Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee,
subject: Department of the Army’s Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request, 15 February 2006