Torchbearer
National Security Report

2006 and Beyond:

What the U.S. Army is Doing

An AUSA Torchbearer Issue
March 2006
At a recent AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Breakfast, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Peter J. Schoomaker said he expects 2006 to be “one of the busiest years we have ever had” as the Army continues to modularize the force, transform while at war, implement initial steps of Base Realignment and Closure decisions, reposition itself globally and measure Quadrennial Defense Review implications (see AUSA Defense Report “The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review: Shifting Emphasis,” DR 06-1, March 2006). “We are focusing on a fully resourced Army—active, Guard and Reserve,” he concluded.

In 2006, the U.S. Army is restructuring/redesigning the current force; thinking/adapting its way into the future; transforming all of its supporting business practices; and integrating operating and generating forces. Four overarching, interrelated strategies drive the change at an unprecedented pace. AUSA’s message is straightforward and succinct: To be a campaign-quality force with joint and expeditionary capabilities, the U.S. Army must be better resourced and fully manned.

In this latest installment of AUSA’s signature Torchbearer series, we provide an in-depth look into what the Army is doing in 2006 and beyond. We analyze what must be done to ensure the Army has what it needs to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth. We hope you find this report a useful resource and that you will continue to look to AUSA for thoughtful, credible analysis of contemporary national security issues.

Gordon R. Sullivan
General, U.S. Army Retired
President, AUSA
The Army . . . lives by adapting and it dies by failing to do so.

General William E. DePuy,
First Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (1973-77)

Four years into the war on terrorism, Soldiers (active, Guard and Reserve) remain at the forefront of a continuous, evolving conflict. The strategic landscape is changing and the U.S. Army is changing with it. It is changing from a Cold War construct—shifting away from a garrisoned military focused on size, predictability and mass—to become a global expeditionary force with the speed, agility and lethality to respond to discrete tasks. In the midst of this change, the Army’s vision has remained constant: to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth—the ultimate instrument of national resolve.

The U.S. Army is executing a fully integrated plan—The Army Plan, evolving from the National Security, National Defense and National Military strategies and from combat lessons learned—to deal with current and future challenges. It strives to anticipate—rather than merely respond to—the changing strategic environment. Four overarching, interrelated strategies drive the change at an unprecedented pace. The Army is preparing itself for the year 2006 and beyond by: restructuring/redesigning the current force; thinking/adapting its way into the future; transforming all of its supporting business practices; and integrating operating and generating forces.

The complexity of the 21st century security environment requires more of Army leaders at all levels. To be effective today and tomorrow, the Army is growing a new breed of leader—one more akin to a pentathlete, able to rapidly transition between complex tasks with relative ease. Future Soldiers will be as proficient in irregular warfare operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat. Conventional forces will take on more of the tasks currently performed by special operations forces. With that in mind, the Army is continuing to evolve its training and education systems to grow adaptive military and civilian leaders who are comfortable with leading during times of change and uncertainty. Intellectual change is preceding physical change.

Modular conversion is a critical component of the Army’s campaign-quality force, allowing the Army to be more responsive to combatant commanders’ requirements and providing increased capabilities to the Joint Force. These capabilities include scalable headquarters capable of operating as either a joint task force (JTF) headquarters or a coalition JTF headquarters without significant external augmentation. Conversion to the modular organizations started in 2004 and continues today. These conversions touch all aspects of the Army, 2006 and Beyond: What the U.S. Army Is Doing

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Source: Association of the United States Army
including force structure, training methodologies and the global footprint.

The Army Modular Force initiative represents the Army’s transition from a division-centric structure to one that is centered on the brigade combat team (BCT). The Army is restructuring the active and reserve components to form a rotational pool of 70 BCTs and more than 200 support brigades of various types. The Army plan is to build up to 42 BCTs and retain 75 support brigades in the active component; build up to 28 BCTs and retain 78 support brigades in the Army National Guard; and retain 58 support brigades in the Army Reserve. This plan continues to man, train and equip 106 brigades in the Army National Guard. It standardizes brigade formations across the active and reserve force by organizing BCTs with the manning, equipment and structure they will use in operating environments.

Modular conversion will increase the number of BCTs available for deployments and, in comparison to current force capabilities, will increase the capabilities of each BCT. In combination with the Army’s new readiness model (Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN), Lifecycle Management and other initiatives such as rebalancing the active and reserve components, these conversions will reduce stress on the force by establishing more predictable rotation cycles. Additionally, modular BCTs provide the organizational framework for receiving the advanced technologies that will be progressively fielded across the force as soon as they become available.

Even before the fielding of the first Future Combat Systems (FCS)-equipped BCT, the FCS program will provide advanced technologies to be integrated as they mature into current formations in two-year increments, called “spin-outs.” These new capabilities will directly benefit all U.S. ground forces, including the Marine Corps and special operations forces (SOF) from all services. They will fundamentally alter how the Army deploys, employs and sustains ground forces and will improve the Army’s ability to stabilize contested zones and support joint and interagency teams. The combination of transformation (to build a modular Army) and continuous modernization (to field FCS and other advanced technologies) is producing the future force.

Realizing the future force requires transforming the Army’s institutions as well as its operational forces, creating a synergy between the two that enables the Army to provide better integrated, more effective landpower capabilities to combatant commanders and the nation’s leaders. This transformation includes all of the improvements in strategic agility and efficiencies that result from implementation of The Army Plan, to include supporting business practices transformation and Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions. The Army will be able to execute many of its enduring overseas-presence missions with units deploying from the United States for overseas duty, during rotational windows scheduled and managed as part of the ARFORGEN model.

Fiscal Year 2007 is a pivotal year for the U.S. Army as it accelerates the momentum of transformation to complete the conversions. America must stay the course on resources. Therefore, Congress and DoD must:

- fully fund the Army budget in the 2007 President’s Budget request;
- ensure the Army receives sufficient funding from the FY 2006 supplemental and the FY 2006/FY 2007 “bridge” supplemental;
- ensure supplemental funding to reset equipment for several years beyond major redeployments;
- fully fund and support Army installations, quality-of-life and Soldier/leader training and education programs;
- exempt the Army budget and programs from mandatory cuts; and
- continue support for legislative authorities to provide assured and timely access to the reserve components.
2006 and Beyond: What the U.S. Army is Doing

While we can’t know for certain what kinds of wars we may be fighting in the decades to come, we do know what our priorities have to be, and certainly they include preparing for unforeseen eventualities from full-scale combat operations to counterinsurgency missions, stability operations and homeland defense; creating the best structured, trained and equipped forces for these missions; continuing jointness and connectivity within and between the services to provide commanders with the greatest number of options; arranging the department to conduct a war against agile and unconventional enemies that are tied to no nation state, are unencumbered by bureaucracies and use terror, propaganda and indiscriminate violence to try and exhaust our will and advance their radical aims.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,
News Briefing, The Pentagon, 12 January 2006

Introduction

Four years into the war on terrorism, Soldiers (active, Guard and Reserve) remain at the forefront of a continuous, evolving conflict. The strategic landscape is changing, and the U.S. Army is changing with it. The Army is well under way in transforming itself from a force designed to deter and fight in the Cold War to one redesigned for a changed security environment that will continue to feature a prolonged war against terrorists.
It continues transforming to a larger, more powerful, more flexible and more deployable full-spectrum force. That force will possess increased warfighting capability as well as the capability to perform nontraditional operations, sustain worldwide commitments and relieve stress on Soldiers, families and equipment. In the midst of this change, the Army’s vision remains constant: to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth—the ultimate instrument of national resolve—ready to meet the challenges of the complex 21st century security environment.

To fight in today’s environment while continuing to rebuild, reset and prepare for the future, the U.S. Army is pursuing four interrelated strategies:

• providing relevant and ready landpower to the combatant commanders for the 21st century environment;
• training and equipping Soldiers to serve as warriors and growing adaptive leaders;
• sustaining an All-Volunteer Force composed of highly competent Soldiers who are provided an equally high quality of life; and
• providing infrastructure and support to enable the force to fulfill its strategic role and missions.

The Army Plan—the blueprint for achieving the vision—is driving change at an unprecedented pace. The Army is executing a fully integrated plan to deal with current and future challenges. It strives to anticipate—rather than merely respond to—the evolving strategic environment. Here’s why and how the Army is preparing itself for the year 2006 and beyond.

**Historical Perspective/Intellectual Underpinnings**

The U.S. Army in the late 1980s and early 1990s knew it had to move from the Industrial Age to the Information Age and from a bipolar world with a single, narrowly defined threat to a multipolar world with seemingly an infinite variety of threats. The emerging technology at the time was information—digits and the microprocessor.

As the Army was decreasing in size (from 1.5 million to approximately 1 million Soldiers—560,000 active component, 500,000 reserve component; from 28 to 20 active divisions, most based in the continental United States and structured as 12 active and eight Guard divisions), its senior leadership knew it needed to change and create new capabilities. The problem was to balance readiness to meet contemporary challenges with change (physical, technological) to meet the challenges of the future. To anticipate and master these future challenges, the Army had to create a sense of growth and innovation that could generate new capabilities within the organization. The Army acknowledged the existence of continued strategic uncertainty and developed a process of experimentation and exploration to mitigate that uncertainty. Each experiment and exploration became a thin thread in the tapestry.

The 1992 Louisiana Maneuvers— one thread in the evolving strategic environment—was an exploration of the potential of information technology for land warfare. The Louisiana Maneuvers led to the Force XXI concept and campaign plan. Equally important in this period, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) stood up the Battle Labs, coincident with but independent of the Louisiana Maneuvers, to explore new concepts.

Fortunately, the Army that set out to transform itself in the 1990s had a healthy attitude about experimentation and innovation. That was reinforced with the initiation of the Army After Next (AAN) experiment in 1996, from which the conceptual requirements for the Future Combat Systems (FCS) and the operational concepts for the future force emerged. It was AAN that revealed

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1 The original Louisiana Maneuvers, upon which the 1992 concept was based, took their name from “several high-level, increasingly complex, experiment-based field exercises that the Army conducted, principally in Louisiana, during 1940 and 1941.” James L. Yarrison, *The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers* (Washington, D.C.: Army Center of Military History, 1999), p. 1.
the enormous potential of operational maneuver from strategic distances, i.e., direct attack on enemy centers of gravity. The 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas (which received the latest information technology equipment for experimentation and became known as the “digitized” division), was the first tangible result of the evolution, as the potential of “digitization” became obvious to anyone who stopped to observe.

The Army also realized that technology was not the only relevant change; this was reflected in the October 1999 Army Vision. The Vision’s concept of “strategic responsiveness” spoke to the force’s ability to cope with a vastly more complex strategic and operational context upon arrival in theater. International terrorism, long cultivated in the shadows of weak and failing nation states, openly defied the world’s efforts to achieve universal peace. Experiences in Somalia and the Balkans showed the existing force design did not meet the emerging threats, as the Army’s senior leadership recognized a capability gap in its force structure. Heavy forces could not get to the fight quickly; light forces did not have the lethality to sustain operations. Neither had been trained to cope with the complex physical, human and informational environment in which they would have to operate. Hence, in October 1999, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) concept (a modern Louisiana Maneuvers) arose at Fort Lewis, Washington, as a way to fill that capability gap; it represented a better capability for coping with the complexity at the middle of the spectrum of operations. It became the bow wave of the Army transformation process.

In November 2000, while serving as Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, General Peter J. Schoomaker (now the Army’s Chief of Staff) spoke at an AUSA Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) Breakfast. He stated that U.S. adversaries realized they could not take on America’s military forces symmetrically, and that nontraditional attacks such as the bombing of U.S. bases and ships and other forms of terrorism demonstrated the conscious effort of the enemy to fight asymmetrically.

He said the Army was looking to transform into a fighting force that was more mobile, more lethal and more responsive to conflicts around the globe; that transforming into an adaptive force would take both time and commitment [emphasis added], and that much more time and effort should be devoted to training and leader development to provide the ability to rapidly respond to different types of threats.

The Army’s fielding of the first SBCT (3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division) in less than four years—combined with militarized command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment—marked the beginning of the process that would lead the transformation to the modular force. That first SBCT transformed, trained and deployed in 2003 to combat in Iraq. There it surpassed all expectations, validating the fielding of six more SBCTs on the way to becoming a modular Army and providing the impetus for the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS)-equipped brigade combat team (BCT). Additionally, one of the most significant contributions of the experimentation of the 1990s (and the 4th Infantry Division in particular) was the resultant Armywide improvement in battle command. The 3d Infantry Division’s and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)’s use of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below
(FBCB2) and Blue Force Tracking (BFT) to maintain situational awareness during their historic march to Baghdad in 2003 was a prime example.

The war on terrorism has accentuated the importance of Army transformation and accelerated its course by:

- accelerating the transformation of Army forces into more agile, lethal and deployable units;
- emphasizing the importance of reducing the logistical tail;
- accelerating the integration of new technologies, doctrine and training methods into units in contact with the enemy;
- highlighting the importance of moving beyond joint operations toward joint interdependence; and,
- accelerating the advancements in training and education—creating more adaptive leaders.

At that November 2000 ILW Breakfast, General Schoomaker also stated that transformation must start with the intellect—and that is precisely what has happened and is happening to the U.S. Army. The process of reexamining and challenging basic institutional assumptions, paradigms and procedures has placed the Army on a path to a more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. The decision in 2003 to move from a division-centric to a brigade-centric modular force was a significant thread.

With that in mind, during 2004 and 2005 the Army made five key decisions to accelerate change needed to win today and to continue to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges:

- **Restructuring Army Aviation.** In February 2004, the Army cancelled the Comanche helicopter program. Reallocation of Comanche funding allowed the Army to modularize, modernize and improve force protection for aviation units, to include accelerating the fielding of aviation survivability equipment (ASE).

- **Accelerating the Fielding of the Future Force.** In April 2005, the Army announced refinements (first begun in 2004) of The Army Plan to transition continuously from the current force to the future force to realize the Army’s vision—to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth.

- **Business Restructuring of the Future Combat Systems.** In April 2005, the Army restructured the FCS program for two reasons: to improve contractual arrangements with industry and provide a better framework to manage the cost and schedule aspects of this vital initiative, and to further leverage FCS technologies as quickly as feasible to improve Soldiers’ ability to fight and protect themselves. With improved control and oversight, these new arrangements are paying dividends now.

- **Establishing Business Transformation Initiatives.** In February 2005, the Army decided to implement an Armywide Business Transformation initiative. The goal is to streamline or eliminate redundant operations to free financial and human resources for redirection to core warfighting missions. It is applying a methodology called Lean Six Sigma to all of the business, resourcing, management and acquisition processes to become more effective, improve quality, reduce cycle time and achieve cost reductions (faster, better, cheaper). Just as the Army is leveraging the lessons of war to improve its fighting effectiveness, it is applying relevant corporate best practices to improve business processes and make best use of financial, human and materiel resources. Other key aspects of Business Transformation include Information Management Systems Portfolio Management, Institutional Army Adaptation and Business Initiative Councils.

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• Implementing the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. In February 2006, the Army fully implemented the ARFORGEN model, establishing and coordinating cycles of readiness and training for all active and reserve units. To sustain an ability to execute the National Military Strategy, this model schedules deployment windows for units while balancing the requirements associated with transforming, modernizing, implementing a new global stationing plan and other mission demands.

In addition, in recognition of the challenges of the 21st century, the Army formalized the elements of the *Army Vision: led by capable leaders, organized into modular forces and supported by the institution.*

The real challenge once again is to win today while growing more capable for the demands of tomorrow. **But how?** Given the complex, ambiguous environment in which the Army operates, it must rely upon interdependent processes organized into a cohesive, well-defined model. As with the Rubik’s cube, it is the sum and the sequencing of various interdependent processes—organized into the cohesive model—that results in the desired outcome; **changing one process by itself is not enough.**

**Building the Army Now for Future Complex Interrelationships**

**The Blueprint**

*We need to break free of the gravitational pull of our current doctrine, future concepts and institutional biases. Have the guts to try when you think you know the right direction. These initial efforts should be based on professional judgment, not necessarily fully developed studies, analysis and formal processes. Look at the real need, not what we would like to plan for or what you think we can resource. Set the bar realistically high. Establish stretch objectives. Don’t drive people; rather, develop strategies that invite people to opportunity* [emphasis added].

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to participants in the war game Unified Quest 2006, December 2005

The Army’s nonnegotiable contract with the American people remains constant: as part of the Joint Force, to fight and win America’s wars and help preserve the peace. In support of that Joint Force, the Army provides versatile, robust and agile combat forces, capable of operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners. **The Army’s responsibility, as outlined in Title 10, U.S. Code, is to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land.** The new security environment has triggered a renewed emphasis on the “prompt”—an Army that is agile, quick to respond, adaptable and capable of early conflict resolution—without neglecting the “sustaining,” not only of the Army but also of others (e.g., sister services, combatant commanders, other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations).
The Army Plan combines the effects of the four overarching, interrelated strategies outlined earlier:

- **Providing relevant and ready landpower.** The Army is maintaining the momentum of transformation and modernization. It is increasing the number and effectiveness of the brigade combat teams that have become the essential fighting units. The Army is restructuring to form a rotational pool of BCTs that will sustain global commitments, surge forces for unforeseen contingencies and manage stress on people and equipment. It is also creating the right mix of support brigades as well as rebalancing the force. To win the war on terrorism today and ensure improved capabilities tomorrow, it is modernizing by developing the Future Combat Systems and other advanced technologies. These complementary initiatives—transformation and modernization, reinforced by innovations and improvements to all strategies—will ensure Soldiers are well prepared to execute their missions in campaign and expeditionary settings with joint and coalition partners.

- **Training and equipping Soldiers.** This strategy centers on producing Soldiers armed with the values, combat skills and mindset that enable them to serve as competent, disciplined warriors who reflect a shared ethos. The Army’s training programs both at home stations and at the Combat Training Centers are leveraging combat experiences to grow adaptive leaders who are highly skilled, resilient and able to thrive in rapidly changing environments. The Army continues to equip Soldiers with the best capabilities, weapons and protection the nation can provide—leveraging the national strength to reduce risk to Soldiers.

- **Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force.** This is the first time in modern history that the Army has tested the concept of an all-volunteer force during a prolonged war. It is executing a full range of initiatives and incentives to recruit and retain high-caliber individuals for the active, reserve component and civilian ranks. Caring for Soldiers and Army families through tangible quality-of-life programs provides a sense of belonging and sustains motivation for continued service. Improving Soldier and family housing reflects the Army’s commitment to providing a quality of life that matches the quality of the Soldiers’ service to the nation.

- **Providing infrastructure and support.** The infrastructure maintained by the Army plays a vital role in supporting the Joint Force. The Army is adjusting its global footprint to improve readiness at each of its installations. To free resources for more compelling operating needs, the Army is reengineering each of its business processes. Simultaneously, it is completely transforming infrastructure, consisting of installations, depots and arsenals—and the information network that connects them—to reflect the
deployment requirements and global commitments of the 21st century security environment while becoming dramatically more efficient.

Its plan having evolved from the National Security, National Defense and National Military strategies and from combat lessons learned, the Army is preparing itself for the year 2006 and beyond by:

- restructuring/redesigning the current force;
- thinking/adapting its way into the future;
- transforming all of its supporting business practices; and
- integrating operating and generating forces.

Restructuring/Redesigning the Current Force

To support current global operations and to prevail in the war on terrorism, the Army is increasing the number and effectiveness of its essential fighting units—the brigade combat teams. It is also creating and reorganizing support brigades to ensure that Soldiers receive the logistical, engineering, intelligence, protection, aviation and communications capabilities needed to support the combatant commanders. Additionally, the Army is rebalancing the force by placing the right Soldiers with the right skills into the jobs in greatest demand. Simultaneously, it is stabilizing Soldiers, keeping them with their units longer, to improve teamwork and reduce stress on families. Finally, it is restoring units returning from war to required levels of readiness while concurrently converting them to the new modular design. Readiness of the force is now managed by a new model—Army Force Generation—that establishes a plan for scheduled deployment on an Armywide basis.

Initiative: Converting to a Brigade-based Modular Force. To maximize force effectiveness, the Army is reorganizing to a modular, brigade-based force to achieve three primary goals:

- increasing the number of available BCTs to meet operational commitments while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal to or better than that of previous divisional brigade combat teams.
- creating combat and support formations of common organizational designs that can be tailored to meet the varied demands of the combatant commanders—reducing joint planning and execution complexities.
- redesigning organizations to perform as integral parts of the Joint Force, making them more effective across the range of military operations and enhancing their ability to contribute to joint, interagency and multinational efforts.

Under the previous design, when a brigade was tasked for duty it had to reorganize by taking elements of other areas of the division, such as artillery and engineers, to create a brigade combat team. Modularity significantly changes that approach by creating standing combined-arms brigades containing the capabilities necessary to deploy to a fight—in effect, organizing as they intend to fight. This includes adding access to joint capabilities at much lower levels with more robust network capabilities, more joint and specialized personnel, and enhanced training and leader development. Creating standing combined-arms brigades that contain the capabilities necessary to deploy to a crisis means these brigades reduce the peace-to-war transition time. (See AUSA’s Torchbearer National Security Report “The U.S. Army . . . A Modular Force for the 21st Century,” March 2005, online at http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptLW.nsf/ byid/KCAT-6C4XUJ9.)

Modular conversion is a critical component of the Army’s campaign-quality force. Modular conversion allows the Army to be more responsive to combatant commanders’ requirements and provides increased capabilities to the Joint Force. These capabilities include scalable headquarters capable of operating as either a joint task force (JTF) headquarters or as a coalition JTF.
brigade-based army

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* This chart does not include Army special operations forces. Black text indicates support brigades.
1 Structure decisions still in progress as of 1 March 2006.
2 Does not include Homeland Defense capabilities.
3 Five Theater Army Headquarters, three Functional Army Service Component Commands, one Non-modular Army Headquarters.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army

headquarters without significant external augmentation. Conversion to the modular organizations started in 2004 and continues today. These conversions touch all aspects of the Army, including force structure, training methodologies and the global footprint.

The Army Modular Force initiative represents the Army’s transition from a division-centric structure to one that is centered on the brigade combat team. The Army is restructuring the active and reserve components to form a rotational pool of 70 BCTs and more than 200 support brigades of various types. The Army plan is to build up to 42 BCTs and retain 75 support brigades in the active component; build up to 28 BCTs and retain 78 support brigades in the Army National Guard; and retain 58 support brigades in the Army Reserve. This plan continues to man, train and equip 106 brigades in the Army National Guard. It standardizes brigade formations across the active and reserve force by organizing BCTs with the manning, equipment and structure they will use in operating environments.

Modular conversion will increase the number of BCTs available for deployments and, in comparison to current force capabilities, will increase the capabilities of each BCT. In combination with the Army’s new readiness model (ARFORGEN), Lifecycle Management and other initiatives, these conversions will reduce stress on the force by establishing more predictable rotation cycles. Additionally, modular BCTs provide the organizational framework for receiving the advanced technologies that will be progressively fielded across the force as soon as they become available.

In 2005, the Army’s goal was to convert 11 brigades and one Stryker brigade into modular BCTs. It achieved this goal by converting four brigades from the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault), three brigades from the 10th Mountain Division, four brigades from the 4th Infantry Division and the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team. These BCTs—trained, equipped and ready—are already supporting or will support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2006.

This modular conversion effort is one of the greatest restructurings of Army forces since World War II, and it affects nearly every organization in the Army. Most combat formations and headquarters will be complete by 2008; theater army headquarters will be completed by 2009; and support brigades will be completed by 2011.

**Initiative: Rebalancing and Redistributing Forces.** The Army is both rebalancing and redistributing forces. It is **rebalancing** to create the right mix of Soldiers with critical and high-demand skills in the active and reserve components. Concurrently, it is **redistributing** Soldiers to create the right mix between operational forces (the operational part of the Army) and institutional structures (the generating part of the Army).

To assure timely access to the right types of units and Soldiers, the Army is rebalancing skills within the active and reserve components. It has determined the types of units and skills that are in greatest demand in today’s environment—including infantry, military police, military intelligence, Special Forces, chemical, civil affairs and psychological operations units—and has identified more than 100,000 positions to rebalance. It has accomplished more than half of this rebalancing and anticipates completion by Fiscal Year (FY) 2011.

Increased capabilities in military police, military intelligence, Special Forces, chemical, civil affairs and psychological operations are critical to the war on terrorism and to the long-term support of combatant commanders. This rebalance will decrease the necessity for early mobilization of reserve component units during a rapid-response operation and will eliminate unnecessary structure in the reserve components by 2011. These efforts will optimize the use of available manpower and will equitably distribute unit deployments in support of global commitments. The Army met its goal in 2005 to adjust selected military occupational specialty positions by more than 26,000 positions.

As part of the Army’s rebalancing initiative, it elected to increase the Army National Guard’s domestic capability by converting six brigades into much-needed combat support and combat service support brigades. This move will create three multifunctional combat support and three engineer brigades. These six brigades provide additional engineer, communications, transportation, logistics, chemical and medical capabilities. This conversion provides a better mix of capabilities to meet combatant commander requirements, as well as providing more capability and flexibility to the Army National Guard for meeting their potential state missions.

To sustain global commitments, the Army is increasing or “growing” the operational part of the Army.
The goal is to grow it by 40,000 Soldiers by 2007 (from the 2004 baseline of 315,000) to bring the active duty operational force total to 355,000 Soldiers. This change will be enabled by military-to-civilian conversions and better management of the Individuals Account—formerly known as the Transients, Trainees, Holdees and Students (TTHS) Account. The Army continues to identify and convert positions in the generating part of the Army from military to civilian, enabling it to fill increased requirements for Soldiers in the operational part of the Army. During 2005, the Army met its goal by converting 7,604 positions from military to civilian.

The Army will resorce the troop strength of both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve at the actual achieved strengths of those components. The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve finished FY 2005 with strengths of 333,233 and 189,000, respectively. Three months later, on 31 December 2005, the strengths of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve stood at 333,438 and 187,974. In essence, the Army will fund to the levels to which the Army National Guard and Army Reserve can recruit—up to the congressionally-mandated endstrength of each. With the resourcing of the troop levels of both at actual strength, combined with the maintenance of present total brigade strengths for both components, the nation and its governors will have the necessary forces at their disposal to accomplish worldwide and homeland defense requirements.

The combined effects of rebalancing, redistributing and growing the operational part of the Army are increasing the Army’s overall effectiveness. It is improving the ability to provide trained Soldiers in cohesive formations to the combatant commanders and to support civil authorities, while reducing stress on Soldiers and families.

**Initiative: Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability.** To improve unit cohesion and unit readiness—and to reduce turbulence in units and uncertainty for families—the Army has adopted a Force Stabilization policy. Consisting of a Lifecycle Management component and a Stabilization component, this policy essentially changes how the Army implements its unit manning requirements. Under the Lifecycle Management process, the Army reduces personnel turbulence and improves cohesiveness within the BCTs by assigning active component Soldiers within a specific BCT for approximately 36 months. It also synchronizes Soldier assignments with the unit operational cycles under ARFORGEN, allowing a Soldier to remain in the same BCT throughout the Reset, Ready and Available phases of the ARFORGEN process. This Lifecycle Management process reduces or eliminates the need for Stop Loss and Stop Move policies, but it does not reduce the number of moves for a Soldier and it does not reduce the transient portion of the Individuals Account.

Stabilization, the second component of Force Stabilization, is intended to reduce the number of moves and to reduce the transient portion of the Individuals Account. Stabilization will eventually reduce personnel turbulence, but for the next few years personnel turbulence will remain high as the Army converts structure above the BCTs and units are moved to new locations pursuant to Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions.

Lifecycle Management implementation began with a Stryker BCT in Alaska and has been implemented

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3 Stop Loss allows the Secretary of Defense, through a presidential executive order, to involuntarily extend Soldiers’ active duty service requirements. Stop Move bars Soldiers from moving to new duty assignments due to a pending deployment or other situation linked to Stop Loss.
in nine BCTs to date. Lifecycle Management for the remaining BCTs, except for those forward-stationed in Korea and Europe and the Evaluation BCT (EBCT, to be located at Fort Bliss, Texas), will be completed over the next four years, with a planned completion date of September 2010. The Army will continue to synchronize Lifecycle Management implementation, by time and by installation, while concurrently maintaining its ability to support current operations and the deployment rotation requirements of ARFORGEN.

This initiative fully supports the Army’s efforts to improve stability, predictability and quality of life for Soldiers and families and will help the Army retain Soldiers and families that are necessary for the success of the All-Volunteer Force.

**Initiative: Resetting the Force.** Major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are placing tremendous demands on Soldiers and equipment. Amidst the constant demands of war, equipment is aging far more rapidly than projected. The reset program is designed to address the effects of combat stress on equipment and to prepare the equipment and Soldiers for future missions. (See AUSA’s Torchbearer National Security Report “Resetting the Force: The Equipment Challenge,” October 2005, online at http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptLAW.nsf/byid/KCAT-6GNNXP.) The Army’s reset program is a series of actions to restore units to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. These actions fall into four areas:

- bringing all equipment to Army readiness standards and mitigating effects of intense usage in a desert environment;
- where sensible and affordable, upgrading capability from prewar levels based on Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom lessons learned;
- replacing battle losses and washed-out equipment (damaged to the degree that repair is not economical); and
- reorganizing resetting units to a modular design in support of the Army Campaign Plan.

The goal is to return active component unit equipment readiness to Army standards within 180 days after redeployment and reserve component unit equipment within 360 days. Active component units undergoing modular transformation have 300 days to complete reset and reorganization. The maintenance work is done at organic depots, installations and contractor facilities. The Army has already reset more than 20 major units.

In 2005, the 4th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) completed the reset program. The 2d Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Mountain Division, the 1st Armored Division, the 76th Infantry Brigade (Indiana), the 30th Infantry Brigade (North Carolina) and the 82d Airborne Division are currently in various stages of the reset program.

At the same time, the equipment reset effort is also showing significant progress. The Army goal for 2005 was to recapitalize 6,500 tracked and wheeled vehicles; it exceeded this goal by a significant margin, funding the recapitalization of a total of 7,050 tracked and wheeled vehicles.

As units continue to deploy to and redeploy from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the Army will continue its reset program. The requirement for 2006 is $5 billion to reset 350,000+ pieces of equipment, including 615 aircraft, 7,000 combat vehicles and 30,000 wheeled vehicles.

Through its reset program, the Army is supporting combatant commanders, while simultaneously preparing the force for future operations. Reset prepares follow-on units for deployment and employment; supports training base requirements; modernizes and recapitalizes equipment; and reconfigures units to the modular design. Reset also enables the Army to position itself to be a more globally relevant force, able to rapidly respond to emerging threats and contingencies.
**Initiative: Army Force Generation—The Army’s Readiness Model.** The Army Plan introduces a new readiness model to manage the force and ensure the ability to support demands for Army forces. The Army Force Generation process creates operational readiness cycles wherein individual units increase their readiness over time, culminating in full mission readiness and availability to deploy. Manning, equipping, resourcing and training processes are synchronized to the ARFORGEN process. The goal is to be able to generate forces that will support one operational deployment in three years for the active component and one operational deployment in six years for the reserve component. At lower levels of demand, this model may allow the Army to support one operational deployment in four years for active forces. **This new model is establishing the basis to bring all units to a full state of readiness—people, equipment and training—before they are scheduled to deploy.** It allows the Army to accomplish the following critical objectives:

- reducing uncertainty for Soldiers, families and the communities that support installations;
- improving availability of forces for combatant commanders;
- generating a continuous force of 18–19 BCTs, along with all required support brigades; and
- surging up to an additional 15–19 BCTs in response to crises.

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**Army Force Generation Model**

**Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN):** A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements.

- **Reserve Component (RC)**
  - (Army National Guard, Army Reserve)
  - 6-year cycle (1 deployment in 6 years)
  - 8 division headquarters
  - 28 brigade combat teams (BCTs)

- **Active Component (AC)**
  - 3-year cycle (1 deployment in 3 years)
  - 10 division headquarters
  - 42 BCTs

- Manage readiness and availability of forces.
- Resource priorities based on rotation sequences.
- Rotate idle equipment to needed locations to maximize employment readiness.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army
To achieve the readiness progression required by operational readiness cycles, units transition through three ARFORGEN-defined readiness pools:

- **Reset/Train:** Units recover from previous deployments, reconstitute, reset equipment, receive new equipment, assign new personnel and train to achieve the required unit capability level necessary to enter the Ready force pool.
- **Ready:** Units are assessed as ready to conduct mission preparation and higher-level collective training with other operational headquarters for upcoming missions. These units are also eligible to fill operational surge requirements, if necessary.
- **Available:** Units are within their assigned window for potential deployment. Units will be sourced against operational (Deployed Expeditionary Force Package) or contingency (Contingency Expeditionary Force Package) requirements.

ARFORGEN sequences activities for all active and reserve component Army units, to include:

- reset;
- modular conversion;
- modernization;
- individual replacement;
- Soldier and leader training and education programs;
- unit training;
- employment; and
- stationing decisions.

In sum, the Army is working to balance force capabilities within and across the active, Guard and Reserve to develop a total force with greater capabilities and greater accessibility. This rebalancing will result in a larger operational Army and create more useful brigades across the board. Rebalancing and redistribution of forces among the components continues to create the right mix of those units in high demand such as engineer, military intelligence, military police, chemical, civil affairs, Special Forces and various types of combat service support units. These structure adjustments improve the balance of capabilities among the Army’s components and depend on assured, predictable access to the reserve component. The Army’s plan also redistributes Soldiers to create the right mix of capabilities between its operational and institutional forces.

**Fiscal Year 2007 will be a pivotal year for the Army.** The resources provided will enable the Army to conduct operations while it transforms the force and adjusts its overseas posture. By protecting investment accounts (including over $21 billion for Army National Guard procurement) and adjusting force structure, the Army will provide units that are better manned, trained and equipped for full-spectrum operations abroad and for support to the homeland.

**Thinking/Adapting Its Way into the Future**

_We are transforming to create a future force with a broad set of capabilities to enable our Soldiers to address strategic problems the Nation will face._

*Army Posture Statement,* February 2006, page 6

The war on terrorism and the changing paradigm for maintaining forward presence have created both the necessity and the opportunity to accelerate change from the current force to the future force. In accelerating this transformation, the Army draws heavily upon operational lessons learned and continuous experimentation and exploitation.

The evolution of the Stryker BCT laid the foundation for the development of the modular force. Lessons learned from SBCTs provide new ways of conducting warfare and new capabilities that the Army quickly disseminates throughout the force. Army force
developers continuously challenge assumptions and planning factors and overhaul them as necessary. **The combination of transformation (to build a modular Army) and continuous modernization (to field Future Combat Systems and other advanced technologies) is producing the future force.**

When whole BCTs are fielded with the full complement of FCS systems, these units will generate significantly more capability. Unlike today’s Infantry, Stryker and Heavy BCTs, FCS-equipped BCTs will be able to operate across the full spectrum of operations. The FCS-equipped BCTs will contain more fighting vehicles and more infantry squads than are in today’s Heavy BCTs. They will generate more capability and control more areas with significantly fewer Soldiers than today. They will require less fuel, supplies and other logistical support.

Even before the fielding of the first FCS-equipped BCT, the FCS program will provide advanced technologies to be integrated as they mature into current formations in two-year increments, called **“spin-outs.”** These **new capabilities** will directly benefit all U.S. ground forces, including the Marine Corps and special operations forces (SOF) from all services. They will fundamentally alter how the Army deploys, employs and sustains ground forces and will improve the Army’s ability to stabilize contested zones and support joint and interagency teams.

The future force comprises more than just FCS-equipped modular BCTs. It will be a strategically responsive, campaign-quality force, dominant across the range of military operations and fully integrated with the joint, interagency and multinational security framework. Realizing the future force requires transforming the Army’s institutions as well as its operational forces, creating a synergy between the two that enables the Army to provide better integrated, more effective landpower capabilities to combatant commanders and the nation’s leaders. This transformation includes all of the improvements in strategic agility and efficiencies that result from implementation of The Army Plan, to include IGPBS and BRAC decisions. The Army will be able to execute many of its enduring overseas-presence missions with units deploying from the United States for overseas duty, during rotational windows managed as part of the ARFORGEN model.

The Army is adapting its way into the future through five key initiatives.

**Initiative: Growing Adaptive Leaders.** The complexity of the 21st century security environment requires more of Army leaders at all levels. As the Army has seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Europe, across the Americas and in

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**Army Leaders in the 21st Century “The Pentathlete”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiskilled Leader</th>
<th>Leader Attributes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic and creative thinker</td>
<td>• Sets the standard for integrity and character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Builder of leaders and teams</td>
<td>• Confident and competent decisionmaker in uncertain situations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier</td>
<td>• Prudent risk taker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations</td>
<td>• Innovative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy</td>
<td>• Adaptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Understands cultural context, and works effectively across it</td>
<td>• Empathetic and always positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Professionally educated and dedicated to lifelong learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Effective communicator</td>
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Personifies the Warrior Ethos in all aspects from warfighting to statesmanship to enterprise management. It’s a way of life.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army
peace enforcement operations around the world, the actions of individual Soldiers and leaders can have strategic consequences. To be effective today and tomorrow, the Army is growing a new breed of leader—one more akin to a pentathlete, able to rapidly transition between complex tasks with relative ease. (This will necessitate a detailed study of what constitutes a career pattern, especially in light of increased responsibilities.)

The future environment will demand that Army leaders at all levels be multiskilled, innovative, agile and versatile. Therefore, the Army is continuing to evolve its training and education systems to grow adaptive civilian and military leaders who are comfortable with leading during times of change and uncertainty.

Recognizing that intellectual change precedes physical change, the Army also chartered a task force to review education, training and assignments for leaders. This task force, now months under way, is drawing upon the ideas and experiences of the finest leaders inside and outside the Army. The task force will recommend changes to assess and improve all Army education, training and assignment processes with a view to producing pentathletes.

**Initiative: Leveraging Science and Technology.** Today’s investments in the Army’s Science and Technology (S&T) program are a hedge against the uncertain future. These investments seek technical solutions that can be demonstrated in the near term, explore the feasibility of new concepts in the midterm and pursue the imaginable for an uncertain far term. The dynamic and responsive S&T efforts are focused to enable specific new capabilities in the future force while maintaining the agility to satisfy operational needs of the current force. Capabilities derived from Army S&T are key to winning the race for speed and precision that ultimately provides Soldiers with unmatched warfighting capability.

The goal of the Army S&T program is to achieve transformational capabilities that will enable the future force while pursuing opportunities to enhance current force capabilities. The Soldier remains the centerpiece of all Army S&T investments. The S&T community has demonstrated its Soldier focus in responding to demands of current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing selected technologies for immediate limited fielding, e.g., those to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Future Combat Systems technologies, now in the Systems Development and Demonstration phase, remain the single largest S&T investment in the 2006 budget.

While seeking opportunities to enable the future force, Army S&T is also providing advanced technology to Soldiers deployed to fight the war on terrorism in at least three ways:

- Soldiers are benefiting today from technologies that emerged from past investments.
• The Army is exploiting transition opportunities by accelerating mature technologies from ongoing S&T efforts.

• The Army is leveraging the expertise of its scientists and engineers to develop solutions to unforeseen problems encountered during current operations. Examples of force protection technologies transitioned to warfighters include Interceptor body armor, electronic countermeasures (Warlock) and lightweight armor kits for tactical vehicles.

Industry has supported the Army’s effort by significantly funding their own research and development to ensure Soldiers have the most advanced technology as soon as possible.

To enable the future force, Army S&T is focusing on these major investment areas: the Soldier, FCS, force protection, unmanned systems and mobile wireless network communications. Technologies in these areas include:

• technologies to provide individual Soldiers with platform-like lethality and survivability;

• lightweight, long-endurance electric power generation and storage;

• networked battle command systems to enable shared situational awareness and improved decisionmaking (horizontal and vertical integration);

• networked lethality through standoff precision missiles and gun-launched munitions;

• technologies to identify and defeat IEDs from standoff ranges as well as sensor and kill mechanism technologies to enable active protection systems;

• semi-autonomous and autonomous unmanned air and ground systems; and rapid and survivable communications on the move, capable of simultaneous speech, data, graphics and video over distributed mobile wireless networks across the battlespace.

Initiative: *Spiraling (or “Spinning Out”) Future Combat Systems Capabilities into the Current Force.* Future Combat Systems is the Army’s primary modernization initiative. This program will pioneer the next generation of warfighting capabilities that will improve Soldiers’ ability to find and fight their enemies. While many critics mistakenly equate the Future Combat Systems with its Manned Ground Vehicle component, FCS is actually an integrated system of 18 separate systems, including sensors, unmanned and manned air and ground vehicles and munitions, all focused on maximizing the combat effectiveness of the Soldier, and interconnected by a modern network. Only eight of the 18 systems are manned platforms. But even before the first FCS-equipped BCT attains its initial operational capability in 2014, many FCS systems will already be embedded throughout the force.

The FCS project is currently in the developmental phase. The first unit fully equipped with manned ground vehicles is projected to achieve initial capability by 2014 and to be fully able to fight by 2017. When the Army completes its projected fielding plan in 2025, these new manned ground vehicles will replace 40- to 50-year-old tactical vehicles designed in the 1970s to defeat Cold War enemies.

Through spin-outs, the FCS program will significantly augment the capabilities of existing BCTs over the next several years. By integrating advanced technologies into formations in four spin-outs that will occur in roughly two-year increments, the Army will strengthen the current force in distinct ways:

• The first spin-out, on track for delivery in 2008, will introduce Unattended Ground Sensors, non-line-of-sight launch systems, the Intelligent Munitions System and the Network and advanced communications systems. These capabilities will enhance Soldiers’ understanding of their situation in dynamic battlefield conditions by promoting a common perspective of enemy and friendly locations on digital maps. This improvement will greatly
increase the area that Soldiers can influence and control. The Network will also provide Soldiers with more timely actionable intelligence.

- The second and third spin-outs are currently on track for 2010 and 2012, respectively. These developments will introduce new types of unmanned air and ground vehicles, allowing Soldiers to employ greater numbers of sensors to enable them to see and find their enemies first. These spin-outs will also enable robotic reconnaissance of dangerous areas, mines and booby traps. Their combined effect will increase Soldiers’ protection and enhance the precision of their weapons.

- The fourth spin-out will complete the Network, currently on track for 2014. When completed, this improvement will reinforce the comprehensive efforts now under way to enhance the accuracy and responsiveness of the joint weapon systems designed to support Soldiers.

The Army restructured the FCS program to accelerate the introduction of battle command, the Army Network and other crucial capabilities to the current force—establishing FCS-enabled BCTs—while continuing to build the initial FCS-equipped BCT. Accelerating the fielding of battle command capabilities to establish a more capable and reliable network will support the Department of Defense (DoD) goal to bring the joint community closer to a common operational picture. The Network brings improved situational awareness, which will allow Soldiers to see, understand and react before enemies can.

These battle command and network systems supplied tactical internet capabilities for four divisions and three BCTs in OIF and OEF during 2005. In 2006, the Army will continue to equip the forces with these systems, thereby enhancing mission effectiveness and Soldier survivability.

The Future Combat Systems program is a holistic approach designed to produce a family of manned and unmanned systems that are fully networked, information-based and integrated across the Army as part of the Joint Force. FCS efforts are dedicated to efficiently developing and fielding improved technology, to transforming processes and organizations and to improving the combat effectiveness of the current force and the future force.

**Initiative: Improving Global Force Posture.** Changes in the U.S. global defense posture are needed to support existing commitments, to take account of changing security relationships and to make maximum use of their strategic
potential. The new posture will yield significant gains in military effectiveness and efficiency in future conflicts and crises and will enable the U.S. military to fulfill its many worldwide roles. The United States’ global force posture is essentially the size, location, types and roles of the nation’s military forces and capabilities. Together with overall military force structure, the global posture enables the United States government to assure allies, dissuade potential challengers, deter enemies and, if necessary, defeat aggression. Within the Army, this is also representative of the ability to project power and undertake military actions beyond U.S. borders.

To enhance strategic responsiveness, the Army (within its inherent capabilities) is improving its ability to rapidly deploy to austere fighting environments, to fight throughout the battlespace upon arrival and to sustain operations until victorious. Parallel with the Base Realignment and Closure process, it is identifying critical joint power-projection installations to support the mobilization, demobilization and rapid deployment of Army forces, and enhancing force reception and deployed logistics capabilities to quickly respond to unforeseen contingencies.

To complete the transition to an expeditionary force, the Army is repositioning ground forces to meet emerging challenges and adjusting permanent overseas presence to a unit-rotation model that is synchronized with ARFORGEN initiatives. The Army will return 48,500 Soldiers to the continental United States in Fiscal Years 2004–2011 as it realigns overseas facilities to support the expeditionary nature of the transformed Army. The Army will retain transformed, forward-stationed forces in Korea and in Europe. Both European-based heavy divisions will return to the United States, and the forward presence in Europe will consist of one airborne brigade in Italy, one Stryker brigade in Germany and potentially

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**Army Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)-Related Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGBPS) Moves**

- **Validated FY 2005 realignment of Infantry Brigade from Korea to Fort Carson, CO**
- **Division Headquarters and Aviation Brigade from Germany to Fort Riley, KS**
- **Engineer, military police and various other support units from Germany to Fort Knox, KY**

**Legend**
- Division
- Brigade (BCT)
- Stryker BCT

**Source:** Headquarters, Department of the Army
a rotational presence within Eastern Europe. The Army will also maintain the capability for a rotational presence in the Middle East while simultaneously eliminating many permanent bases. In the Pacific, it will maintain smaller forward-based forces and will station more agile and expeditionary forces at power-projection bases to respond rapidly to any contingencies. Additionally, it will modernize prepositioned equipment sets to enable rotational forces to rapidly execute a wide variety of mission requirements and will leverage improved readiness to increase Army rotational training presence among the nation’s security partners.

The new global defense posture will be adjusted to the new security environment by:

- expanding allied roles, building new partnerships and encouraging transformation;
- creating greater operational flexibility to contend with uncertainty by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations for particular scenarios;
- focusing and acting both within and across various regions of the world; and
- developing rapidly deployable capabilities.

The United States and its allies and partners will work from a different paradigm than in the past. Effective military capabilities—not numbers of personnel and platforms—create decisive military effects and will enable the United States to execute its security commitments globally.

This new security environment requires a more global perspective. The new posture will have a positive effect on U.S. military forces and families. While the Army will indeed be moving toward a more rotational and unaccompanied forward presence, these rotations will be balanced by more stability at home, with fewer overseas moves and less disruption in the lives of family members.

**Initiative: Executing Base Realignment and Closure.**

Base Realignment and Closure 2005 provides the Army with the authority to dispose of excess facilities and installations while realigning and reconfiguring the remaining infrastructure to increase operational capacity and warfighting capability and to take advantage of the efficiencies presented through consolidation and joint activities. This allows the Army to redistribute resources from closed installations to other high-priority requirements. BRAC provides the Army with a comprehensive review of its installation inventory and realigns base facilities with the modular units of the future force.

The Department of Defense and the Army recommended 13 major Army base closures and approximately 50 Army base realignments. BRAC recommendations became law on 9 November 2005; all requirements must be completed by 14 September 2011. The Army is developing implementation plans to execute the BRAC 2005 decisions. BRAC execution should satisfy the following Army goals:

- reducing cost and generating savings of $2.5 billion annually and a 20-year net savings of approximately $60 billion;
- optimizing military value;
- advancing the Army Modular Force initiative;
- accommodating the rebasing of overseas units;
- enabling the transformation of both the active and reserve components as well as rebalancing the forces;
- contributing to joint operations.

Regarding the overall Army transformation, it is important to note that Army BRAC recommendations are linked inextricably to the future force initiatives. BRAC realignments will provide the optimum infrastructure to stand up, train, support and rapidly deploy BCTs. BRAC provides the primary mechanism and basis for locating forces on installations that facilitate rapid deployment in support of global requirements against potential adversaries who threaten the nation’s security.
In sum, The Army Plan is the Army’s holistic strategy to win the war on terrorism while preparing to win the nation’s future wars. The strategy:

• leverages technology to provide Soldiers better capability and protection;
• improves policies on how units reset and ramp up their readiness for the next deployment;
• manages manpower levels for long-term sustainability of the force;
• takes greater advantage of the education and combat experience of returning Soldiers; and
• begins to streamline Army processes in peace and war toward ever greater capability.

**Transforming All Supporting Business Practices**

Transformation of business, resourcing and acquisition processes promotes the long-term health of the Army. The Army is aggressively working to streamline business processes and practices by taking advantage of industry innovation, outsourcing and partnering to become more effective and efficient. Three initiatives spearhead this effort.

**Initiative: Implementing Business Transformation.**

The Army is fundamentally changing how it conducts business. The goal is to streamline or eliminate redundant operations to free financial and human resources to redirect to core warfighting missions. The Army is:

• improving processes to repair equipment and reset forces;
• reengineering manufacturing and administrative processes;
• outsourcing where it makes sense;
• seeking to make best use of economies of scale in all contracted services;
• applying information technology to improve support and eliminate functions where possible; and
• achieving cost savings in software and hardware while pursuing enterprise-level solutions in networking practices.

Across the Army, all business processes are being reengineered to achieve greater efficiency, improve quality, decrease cycle time and reduce cost. The Lean Six Sigma methodology has already produced a marked improvement in manufacturing and repair processes at all depots within U.S. Army Materiel Command. The Army will replicate those successes in all activities.

The Army is improving the process of resourcing the combatant commanders by changing the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. The goal is to commit the right resources into the stewardship of commanders when needed, seek ways to increase corporate resourcing flexibility and increase near-term resourcing responsiveness for current operational requirements to support combatant commanders and an Army at war—today and in the future.

The intent of a redesigned PPBE process is to provide a more robust and responsive financial management system for the force. The 2005 goal was to develop a transparent system that provided a method for conducting cross-functional coordination. The revised process allows all participants the ability to evaluate tradeoffs and prioritize needs within available resources and constraints. The Army established a program budget assessment team to serve as a reviewing committee for all new and updated requirements. When complete, the PPBE process will provide users the ability to update needs and monitor the resourcing process continuously.

Through business transformation, the Army is synchronizing the requirements generation process to support its strategy. The new process integrates and aligns the Army’s strategy map with the *Army Posture Statement*, planning guidance, campaign plan and other associated guidance/documents. This integration and alignment provides a means to balance current and future
demands. A feedback mechanism using performance metrics will be applied to continuously improve strategic performance and results. The result is a process that provides a holistic view of Army requirements to make informed resource decisions.

Another major area of business transformation is initial implementation of the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS). GFEBS provides the Army with an integrated financial management system that will provide web-based, online, real-time transaction and information capability and will be accessible to all Army and DoD components. The GFEBS application will fulfill the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 and will be certified by the U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA). GFEBS will allow the Army to comply with the Chief Financial Officer Act of 1990 by improving performance, standardizing processes, reducing legacy stovepiped systems and providing all levels of leadership with reliable, relevant and timely financial information. The 2005 goal for GFEBS was to award a contract so the Army could begin work; this contract was awarded in June 2005.

Reviewing authority, responsibility and accountability structure is also a key component of business transformation efforts. Ensuring that the appropriate transformation command and control measures are in place, refining the requirements and acquisition processes and restructuring the organizational relationships will improve overall readiness and discipline of organizations throughout the Army.

Finally, the Army is refining its communication effort to ensure that the direction of the Army is clearly understood. Ensuring that the Army has one consistent
message will allow key leaders and decisionmakers to fully grasp the Army’s plan, facilitating decisions and support based on a complete understanding of the Army’s strategic direction.

**Initiative: Maintaining Installations as “Flagships of Readiness.”** Installations are an essential component in maintaining the premier army in the world. They are the platforms from which the Army rapidly mobilizes and deploys military power. Installations play a vital role in training the force and reconstituting it upon return from deployment. Installations also provide deployed commanders with the ability to reach back for information and other support through advanced communications technology. Installations facilitate transformation efforts and support the overall well-being of Soldiers and their families.

Installations continue to face many challenges due to the demands of current operations. For example, to create or convert modular brigades, the Army needs new facilities. It must allocate construction funding for permanent facilities while meeting the 2005 base closure and permanent-stationing requirements. **The Army is currently unable to meet the DoD goal for a facilities recapitalization rate of 67 years.**

Installations serve as “Flagships of Readiness” by providing force reception stations and by serving as power-projection platforms. These installations project—by surface or air—the equipment and other resources needed to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements. To improve projection platforms, the Army analyzed throughput capability of railcars and aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) to measure the performance of these installations. In 2005, the goal was for installations to achieve 100 percent throughput capability for both railcars and APOEs. Deployment requirements and capabilities are being reexamined in light of the IGPBS, BRAC and the Army Modular Force initiative.

The quality of installations remains critical. Depots, training bases and home stations enable the Army to:

- build, train, deploy and sustain operational forces;
- reset and regenerate combat power of returning forces for future operations;
- provide homes, health care, essential support and much of the quality of life that Soldiers and families enjoy; and
- provide the workplace for a civilian workforce of more than 230,000 people performing an increasingly important role in accomplishing the Army’s wartime mission.

Since 2001, the Army has made tremendous progress in enhancing training and generating combat power in time of war. Despite improvements, the Army still requires significant resources to overcome years of insufficient investments in its installations and infrastructure. The Army is committed to reducing the facilities recapitalization rate, currently at 112 years and well in excess of DoD’s 67-year goal. If resourced, the stationing plan will produce installations better able to train and prepare forces for future missions. The plan will also provide a quality of life that Soldiers and families deserve, and help to sustain the All-Volunteer Force.

**Initiative: Developing the LandWarNet Institutional Infrastructure.** The Army is investing in informational technology and training at installations and technology insertions into the modular force to lay the foundation for fielding **LandWarNet.** The Army’s portion of the Global Information Grid, LandWarNet comprises both infrastructure and services. It moves information through a seamless network to better support combat forces and the institutional structures that generate them. The information technology infrastructure will enable operational forces to reach back for data such as repair part visibility and for innovations such as telemedicine. This same technology is improving the ability to manage business operations and to enable deployed formations to reach back for intelligence and other support.

LandWarNet will unify Army networks, allowing units from the tactical level to the combatant commander
level to view the same picture of the battlespace. Under the LandWarNet umbrella, the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) will wirelessly connect vehicles with one another and with distant units, command centers and satellite networks. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) will extend the network to individual Soldiers and sensors, greatly enhancing dismounted battle command on the move. WIN-T and JTRS will give Soldiers increased situational awareness and information depth that currently resides only in units at brigade level and above. WIN-T will replace the Cold War-era Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), and JTRS will replace current single-channel, waveform-specific radios such as the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) with a software programmable family of systems. While WIN-T is under development, the Army is fielding the Joint Network Node (JNN) as an interim communications network solution until the WIN-T matures. WIN-T will enable commanders and leaders to use automated, collaborative decision-support tools to plan, synchronize and virtually rehearse missions on the move, regardless of where they are in the battle space. **Commanders will have the ability to maintain the same mobility as their Soldiers while concurrently maintaining uninterrupted contact with the Joint Force.** Finally, LandWarNet encompasses the full range of technological solutions by spinning mature capabilities—such as JNN—into the modular force while maintaining doctrine, organizations and training to support full-spectrum operations.

The Army has also started the process to plan, develop, implement, operate and sustain a global information infrastructure. The infrastructure will provide seamless and secure interoperability, network services and end-to-end connectivity. The plan will also provide oversight for developing, equipping and training Signal forces. This architecture, however, depends heavily on the development of transformational satellite programs by other DoD components. It will be in synchronization with the Joint Staff plan and will be the Army portion of one virtual network that provides transport and services across the Joint Force.

**Integrating Operating and Generating Forces**

The Army’s generating force, sometimes referred to as the institutional or functional Army, translates the latent power of America’s economy, resources and people into relevant and ready landpower capabilities. **Title 10, U.S. Code, directs the Army to perform certain functions:**

- recruiting;
- organizing;
- supplying;
- equipping (including research and development);
- training;
- servicing;
- mobilizing;
- demobilizing;
- administrating;
- maintaining;
- construction (outfitting and repair of equipment); and
- construction (maintenance and repair of buildings, structures and utilities, and acquisition of real property).

The Army is aggressively working to integrate its generating force (institutional/functional Army) with the operational part to provide a broader and more effective range of capabilities to combatant commanders. For many years, the Army has focused its intellectual energies on transforming its combat forces. Now the Army is beginning to turn its focus to its institutions. Along the same lines as the Army’s positioning of an Army Transformation Team (ATT) with each unit converted to a Stryker BCT to integrate and synchronize institutional Army support in a seamless manner, the Army, in a larger sense, is examining how it can leverage its inherent capabilities to perform specified Title 10 functions such as acquisition, personnel, accessions, logistics, etc., to
better create and sustain operational capabilities for combatant commanders.

Implementation of ARFORGEN will lead much of this change. While having a profound effect on operating forces, ARFORGEN processes also shape the ways the institutional base executes Title 10 and executive agent functions. ARFORGEN leverages new unit designs and operational cycles to provide a sustained deployment posture of operationally ready units in predictable patterns. The process retains the capability to surge combat power for major combat operations.

Like pieces of a puzzle, ARFORGEN processes are necessary complements to ensure that modular conversion, restructuring and restationing initiatives achieve the Army’s objective to be a campaign-quality, joint and expeditionary force. Army formations stationed at power-projection installations are pooled into force packages under ARFORGEN to make expeditionary operations easier to plan and execute. Restructuring across the active and reserve components optimizes Army operating forces to the right capability packages for sustained operations. Generating force and business transformation efforts will simultaneously improve the Army’s ability to man, train and equip its operating forces during a period of dwindling resources and heavy operational demand. Implementing these interlocking concepts will relieve stress on the force, provide time to train, create more predictable deployment schedules and enable the Army to maintain a continuous supply of ready landpower to combatant commanders and civil authorities.

In sum, in 2006 the U.S. Army is:

- sustaining protracted operations in multiple theaters of war;
- executing Armywide modular conversion and resetting forces to dramatically improve joint warfighting ability and readiness for future deployments;
- modernizing ground forces for the first time in several decades by developing the Future Combat Systems;
- realigning its global basing posture to be relevant to 21st century (vice Cold War) threats;
- transforming all of its supporting business practices to improve effectiveness and eliminate waste;
- preserving the viability of the All-Volunteer Force and maintaining quality of life on installations for Soldiers, families and civilians;
- harnessing the lessons of war and incorporating them throughout the Army; and
- changing its culture—enduring change will only result if intellectual transformation precedes and reinforces physical transformation.

The U.S. Army has a plan and is executing it.

What is Needed

After examination of the four strategies and myriad ongoing initiatives, it is clear that to accomplish them, a fully-manned, well-resourced Army is an absolute necessity. The Army cannot absorb the impact of decisions made by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), BRAC 2005 and IGPBS, while transforming and fighting the war on terrorism, without additional funding. Army transformation creates tension between the current and future force requirements and affects the entire operational Army. Readiness must be maintained and there must be a balance between short-term and long-term risk. America’s Army is a key component in the requirement for balanced, complementary forces that will ensure national security.

To sustain the current mission and to prepare for future commitments, the U.S. Army will require:

- acceleration of the momentum necessary to complete the conversion of active and reserve component BCTs to modular force structures, with the requisite headquarters and support units;
• support for sustaining the development of advanced technology from the FCS program, as well as more than 300 other modernization programs, to enhance current force capabilities today with spin-outs of available technology;

• support for Army efforts to synchronize IGPBS, BRAC and stationing of modular forces; and,

• support for initiatives to improve Soldier, leader and unit training and education.

What Must Be Done

We are going to form and we are forming a fully-resourced Army—active, Guard and Reserve. We’re going to break this culture of impoverishment that we’ve been suffering. . . . We’re going to build an Army that is resourced in full, and the rope is going to be strong, and the length of that rope is going to depend on what we can afford.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, at AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare Breakfast, 12 January 2006

The U.S. Army is innovating and continuously improving its ability to operate as part of the Joint Force while ensuring the ability to dominate in any environment against current, emerging and unforeseen threats. In the past when the Army was resource-constrained, one or more of the strings in the strand of rope was pulled completely out, with the expectation that the rope itself would remain strong. The Army cannot afford to have that occur—the strands are all interwoven and interdependent. Removing one or more creates an unacceptable level of risk to the Army and, in essence,
the nation. Likewise, moving resources among all three of the budget allocations (President’s Budget, Supplemental, BRAC) with promises of replacing funds in the future causes the Army’s plan to unravel. Therefore, Congress and DoD must:

- fully fund the Army budget in the 2007 President’s Budget request;
- ensure the Army receives sufficient funding from the FY 2006 supplemental and the FY 2006/FY 2007 “bridge” supplemental;
- ensure supplemental funding to reset equipment for several years beyond major redeployments;
- fully fund and support Army installations, quality-of-life and Soldier/leader training and education programs;
- exempt the Army budget and programs from mandatory cuts; and
- continue support for legislative authorities to provide assured and timely access to the reserve components.

Fiscal Year 2007 is a pivotal year for the U.S. Army. The resources provided to the Army will determine its ability to continue to accomplish its mission and be prepared to meet future commitments.

The rope must be strong, not frayed, and of sufficient length to permit the Army to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth, ready to meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment. The risk to the nation is too great to do otherwise.
Torchbearer Message

The U.S. Army, still at war, continues transforming itself into a new modular force—a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. Its vision is clear: to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth. Soldiers (active, Army National Guard and Army Reserve) are its essence. The combined effects of transformation, modernization, innovation and improvement—reinforced by positive change in the attitudes and behaviors that create the culture of the Army—are helping the Army become the force this nation needs to safeguard its peace and freedom in the 21st century. Its ongoing intellectual and cultural transformation—manifesting itself from the evolutionary visions of the Army’s leadership in the 1980s and 1990s—is dramatically improving how the Army’s leaders, Soldiers, civilian workforce and families are adapting to the reality of protracted conflict. The strategic landscape is changing and the Army is changing with it.

The Army Plan—the blueprint for achieving the vision—is driving change at an unprecedented pace. Executing a fully integrated plan (evolving from the National Security, National Defense and National Military strategies and from combat lessons learned) to deal with current and future challenges, the Army strives to anticipate—rather than merely respond to—the changing strategic environment. In effect, the Army is preparing itself for the year 2006 and beyond by:

- restructuring/redesigning the current force;
- thinking/adapting its way into the future;
- transforming all of its supporting business practices; and
- integrating operating and generating forces.

Transformation of the Army requires the creation of modular designed forces with increased capabilities. This will provide relevant and ready forces that are organized, trained and equipped for full-spectrum joint, interagency and multinational operations supporting future force development. It involves transformation of installations; the way the Army develops leaders and learns; acquisition and fielding; logistics; and human resource systems.

A culture of innovation must be fostered to allow peak utilization of the new equipment, best business practices, technology and tactics. The technique of “spinning out”—inserting technologies derived from Future Combat Systems into the current force—will provide active protection and networked communications, incorporate unattended sensors, take advantage of precision munitions, and integrate aerial and ground vehicles.

To mitigate risk, the Army is taking a series of steps including resetting the forces returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, implementing force stabilization measures, rebalancing active and reserve component forces and increasing the number of available combat brigades through improved force management and modular reorganization. The Army is also working to accelerate advanced future force capabilities and use them to enhance the current force. These systems, and the technologies they incorporate, will allow the Army to remain the world’s dominant landpower well into the 21st century.

Fiscal Year 2007 is a pivotal year for the U.S. Army. It must accelerate the momentum of transformation. America must stay the course on resources. This nation cannot fool itself by maintaining large numbers of forces on paper that, in reality, lack the people, modern equipment, training and support needed to accomplish the missions the forces will be assigned. The ongoing intellectual and cultural transformation is reinforcing a culture of continuous improvement taking hold across the Army. The Army is creating innovation and improvement in its ability to operate as part of the Joint Force. An investment in the Army today is an investment in America’s future.
This is the first time in our modern history that the Nation has tested the concept of an all-volunteer force in a prolonged war. Full funding and support of Army programs is critical to sustain the finest Army in the world.

Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey in testimony before the subcommittee on Defense, House Appropriations Committee, 9 March 2006