



Torchbearer National Security Report



The U.S. Army in 2004 and Beyond: *Strategically Agile & Adaptive*



An AUSA Torchbearer Issue
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In 2004, America and its Army are at war. The U. S. Army is deployed and supporting contingency operations in staggering numbers and at an unprecedented pace. The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) believes that now more than ever, America must have strategic flexibility in the size and composition of its land forces to ensure that the nation’s security needs are met.

At the same time, the Army continues to transform itself. The Army is pressing ahead toward a modular, capabilities-based unit design within joint networks, enabled by a joint and expeditionary mindset. It is moving toward being lighter, faster and more strategically agile and adaptive. Its own internal examination is comprehensive, yet with a sense of urgency. But the Army can’t do this alone; the support of Congress and the Department of Defense is critical to its success.

In this latest installment of AUSA’s signature Torchbearer series, we outline the Army’s 16 focus areas which are, in effect, the engine for change, and analyze what must be done for the Army to be strategically agile and adaptive in 2004 and beyond. We hope you find this report a useful resource, and that you will continue to look to AUSA for thoughtful, credible analysis of contemporary national security issues.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, USA Retired
President



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, our Nation is at war and we are a critical part of the joint team—an Army at War. This is not a new war. Our enemies have been waging it for some time, and it will continue for the foreseeable future.

General Peter J. Schoomaker
Chief of Staff, Army
1 August 2003

As 2004 unfolds, the U.S. Army is fighting now and for the foreseeable future as part of a joint, interagency and multinational team to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), support ongoing commitments throughout the world, and be ready for new missions.

The Army must remain relevant and ready, developing a joint and expeditionary mindset while retaining campaign-quality capabilities. All Soldiers must be infused with the warrior ethos. With this ethos, the Army will meet the combatant commanders' requirements for cohesive and fully trained teams and units—available anytime and anywhere they are needed. In the 21st century, sustained operations are the norm, not the exception, for America's military forces and, in particular, for the U.S. Army.

The Army's responsibility as outlined in Title 10 U. S. Code is to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land. The new security environment has triggered a renewed emphasis on the "prompt"—**an Army that is agile, quick to respond, adaptable and capable of early conflict resolution**—without neglecting the "sustaining."

To rapidly effect necessary and positive change, the Army's senior leadership has established 16 immediate focus areas (listed below) with specific guidance for planning, preparation and execution. In addition, focused logistics is viewed as an integrating function across all focus areas. The overall thrust of the effort is to provide even more "relevant and ready" landpower to the combatant commanders.

Train and Equip Soldiers and Grow Leaders

- *The Soldier*
- *The "Bench"*
- *Army Aviation*
- *Leader Development and Education*
- *Combat Training Centers/Battle Command Training Program*

Provide Relevant and Ready Landpower Capability to the Combatant Commander and the Joint Team

- *Joint and Expeditionary Mindset*
- *Modularity*
- *Force Stabilization*
- *Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Balance*
- *The Network*
- *Current to Future Force*
- *Actionable Intelligence*

Enable the Force

- *Installations as Flagships*
- *Resource Processes*
- *Strategic Communications*
- *Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability*

Actions are underway by the Army to focus efforts on enhancing the professional competence of all Soldiers and leaders; developing and fielding the right equipment faster; reorganizing to establish a truly joint and expeditionary mindset through modular, capabilities-based units; restructuring the active and reserve components to attain relevant balance; integrating and modernizing logistics as part of joint and combined logistics processes; and retooling/adapting approaches to resourcing manpower and materiel. What



is needed is a **strategic flexibility** from the standpoint of readiness of the Current Force, force structure agility and endstrength. To ensure this strategic flexibility, **Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) must fully support the Army's internal examination.**

As the U. S. Army trains, organizes and equips units to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism, execute the Army Chief of Staff's vision and recruit and retain the force, it must be sufficiently resourced; reliance on substantial supplemental funding does not adequately support the sustainment of the deployed force or development of the Future Force. The Association of the United States Army

(AUSA) believes **Congress must fund DoD at an amount approximating 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP); increase the Army's share of the DoD budget to at least 28 percent to maintain readiness; and expeditiously fund future commitments of Army forces for unprogrammed contingencies so the Army is not forced to internally reprogram dollars. Our assessment indicates that Congress must authorize and fund an increase to active component endstrength of 50,000 Soldiers; authorize and fund reserve component full-time manning requirements at 100 percent; and fund the Army's civilian workforce at 100 percent of validated requirements.**

The Army is moving toward being a more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. Wherever the United States has a presence, you will find a Soldier.



This nation's greatest single asset is the kind of men and women who put on the uniform of the United States.

The methods of war have changed, but the need for courage has not.

And we've seen, once again, the courage of the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States of America.

President George W. Bush
16 April 2003




INTRODUCTION

The United States is at war in 2004. The so-called “strategic pause,” if there ever was one, ended on 11 September 2001. America’s strategic military context has changed significantly. Today’s strategic environment is diverse and increasingly complex. The United States Army must adapt to an ever-shifting international landscape replete with new challenges to America’s security while remaining ready to meet more traditional threats to U.S. interests. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the spread of missile technology are all existing dangers that the U.S. Army must address as part of its role in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Simultaneously, the Army

must maintain forward presence in strategic regions to assure allies and deter potential enemies. It must defend the homeland, prosecute the GWOT, keep peace in regions important to U.S. national security, deter war in Southwest and Northeast Asia, and train for future combat. In the 21st century, **sustained operations are the norm, not the exception**, for America’s military forces and, in particular, for the U.S. Army.

That said, is the U.S. Army organized, trained and equipped to accomplish these enduring missions? Is the U.S. Army adequately resourced (people, equipment, dollars) to succeed? As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz stated at the Association of the United States Army’s Sustaining Members’ Luncheon on





8 October 2003, “Wars are won by seizing and holding ground, and only ground forces at the end of the day can do that.” Are the ground forces the U.S. Army is providing to the combatant commanders “to prosecute the war and preserve the peace” sufficiently relevant, ready, agile and adaptive to meet these security requirements?

BACKGROUND


An analysis of the strategic environment, national guidance and operational requirements makes it clear that the U.S. Army must be prepared for operations of a type, tempo, pace and duration very different from those in the past. Structures, systems and processes developed for a Cold War Army or an Army with a “window of opportunity” to transform itself, while valid at the time, are no longer relevant.

America’s role in the world remains critical to regional stability, global economic growth and the expansion of democratic principles. As stated in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, America has three goals: political and economic freedom; peaceful relations with other states; and respect for human dignity. The NSS makes clear that “the enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or

ideology. **The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.**” [emphasis added]


Ends

It is in this context that the Department of Defense (DoD) developed its supporting strategy to protect national interests and achieve U.S. objectives. That strategic framework is built around four Defense policy goals (ends):





- **assuring** allies and friends by demonstrating U.S. steadfastness of purpose, national resolve and military capability to defend and advance common interests and by strengthening and expanding alliances and security relationships;
- **dissuading** adversaries from developing threatening forces or ambitions, shaping the future military competition in ways that are advantageous to the United States and complicating the planning and operations of adversaries;
- **deterring** aggression and countering coercion against the United States, its forces, allies and friends in critical areas of the world by developing and maintaining the capability to swiftly defeat attacks with only modest reinforcements; and



- at the direction of the President, **decisively defeating** any adversary at the time and place and in the manner of America's choosing.

Ways

The U.S. Defense strategy is built upon strategic tenets that support the four Defense policy goals:

- managing risks with respect to preparing for the future while meeting the demands of the present;
- adopting a capabilities-based approach that addresses the uncertain nature of future threats to U.S. vital interests or the vital interests of friends and allies;
- defending the United States and projecting U.S. military power—to include defense of U.S. land, sea, air and space approaches;



- strengthening alliances and partnerships;
- reorienting U.S. global military posture by developing an enhanced forward deterrent posture that renders forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political objectives with only modest reinforcements;
- developing and maintaining a broad portfolio of military capabilities; and
- transforming America's defense.

Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) describes how the joint force (defined as the armed forces of the United States) intends to operate within the next 15 to 20 years. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the armed forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of joint force capabilities. *JOpsC* provides the conceptual framework to guide future joint operations and joint, service, combatant command and combat support Defense agency concept development

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TOP LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES

August 2003 to December 2004

1. Successfully Pursue the Global War on Terrorism

- Reset the force.
- [Develop] high-value target plan.
- [Develop] Global Peace Operations Initiative.

2. Strengthen Combined/Joint Warfighting Capabilities

- Develop joint concept of operations (CONOPS) to integrate air, land, sea and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
- Translate joint CONOPS into acquisition strategy.
- Strengthen combined/joint exercise and training.
- Bring jointness to the lowest appropriate level.
- Sustain an on-call, global precision-strike capability.
- Sustain strategic deterrence.

3. Transform the Joint Force

- [Develop] lighter, more agile, easily deployable military units.
- Instill a military culture that rewards innovation and risk-taking.
- Place experienced joint warfighters in key posts.
- Balance the department's active and reserve components.

4. Optimize Intelligence Capabilities

- Refocus intelligence priorities for new defense strategy.
- Strengthen intelligence capabilities for the 21st century.
- Improve vertical and horizontal intelligence distribution.

5. Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

- Reverse the existing WMD capability of unfriendly state and nonstate entities.
- Establish counterproliferation roles, missions and objectives.
- Deter the global spread of WMD.
- Integrate Department of Defense (DoD) activities with those of other departments.

6. Improve Force Manning

- Develop 21st century human resource approach.

- Implement longer tours, revised career paths, improved language capabilities, etc.
- Rebalance active and reserve forces.
- Sustain quality-of-life, installation and infrastructure enhancements.

7. New Concepts of Global Engagement

- Implement revised Security Assurance and Cooperation Plan and refocus overseas presence/basing.
- Continue to fashion new relationships worldwide, update alliances, build coalition of unequal partners, refocus security cooperation and initiate a foreign constabulary force.
- Continue to assess and refine the Unified Command Plan.

8. Homeland Security

- Clearly define the department's role in Homeland Security.
- Organize the department to implement Homeland Defense and provide support to Homeland Security.
- [Identify] initial missile defense deployments.
- Internally and externally integrate the department's Homeland Defense command and control systems and procedures.

9. Streamline DoD Processes

- Shorten planning, programming and budget system (PPBS) and acquisition cycle time.
- [Execute] Financial Management Reform.
- Shorten DoD processes by 50 percent.
- Output metrics built around balanced risk and President's Management Agenda.

10. Reorganize DoD and the U.S. Government to Deal with Prewar Opportunities and Postwar Responsibilities

- Reduce time to respond; create a surge capability.
- [Integrate] National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.
- Develop departmental and interagency CONOPS for postwar stability operations.

Source: OSD Memo, subj: Legislative Priorities for Fiscal Year 2005 (24 September 2003)



and experimentation. It also provides the foundation for the development and acquisition of new capabilities through changes in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) (*DoD Joint Operations Concepts*, November 2003, page 4).

The Defense tenets and *JOpsC* together outline the **ways** in which the military achieves the goals of assure, dissuade, deter and decisively defeat.

(NOTE: Further reinforcement of this guidance came from the Secretary of Defense in the form of a memorandum of top DoD legislative priorities through December 2004.)

Means

Only a truly joint force can be the instrument or the **means** to execute U.S. defense strategy and achieve its goals. This joint force must be interoperable, fully integrated with other instruments of national power, and flexible enough to rapidly respond to challenges and achieve a variety of decisive outcomes. The joint force must possess an appropriate mix of critical joint force capabilities and employ quality people to provide the President and the Secretary of Defense with a wide variety of options to take decisive action as required. The current U.S. defense strategy implements a “capabilities-based” approach to defense planning.

THE U.S. ARMY’S ROLE

It is with this backdrop that the U.S. Army must organize, train and equip its forces. The Army’s nonnegotiable contract with the American people remains constant: as part of the joint force, to fight and win America’s wars and help preserve the peace. In support of that joint force, the Army provides versatile, robust and agile combat forces, capable of operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners. **But how?**

In November 2000, while serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, General

Peter J. Schoomaker (now the Army’s Chief of Staff) spoke at an AUSA Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) Breakfast. He stated that U.S. adversaries realized they could not take on America’s military forces symmetrically, and that nontraditional attacks such as the bombing of U.S. bases and ships and other forms of terrorism demonstrated the conscious effort of the enemy to fight asymmetrically. He said the Army was looking to transform into a fighting force that was more mobile, more lethal and more responsive to conflicts around the globe; that **transforming into an adaptive force would take both time and commitment; and that much more time and effort should be devoted to training and leader development** [emphasis added] to provide the ability to rapidly respond to different types of threats.

At that ILW Breakfast General Schoomaker also stated that transformation must start with the intellect—and that is precisely what has happened and is happening to the U.S. Army. The process of reexamining and challenging basic institutional assumptions, paradigms and procedures has placed the U.S. Army on a path to a **more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset.**

The Army’s responsibility as outlined in Title 10 U.S. Code is to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land. The new security environment has triggered a renewed emphasis on the “prompt”—an Army that is agile, quick to respond, adaptable and capable of early conflict resolution—without neglecting the “sustaining,” not only of the Army but also of others (e.g., sister services, combatant commanders, other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations). Here’s how the Army is doing it.

APPROACH VIA FOCUS AREAS

When General Schoomaker took the helm of the U.S. Army in August 2003, America was at war and the Army was transforming from its current force to a future force. It became clear that the Army had to continue to move toward a future force but also change



the current one as necessary to meet ongoing operational requirements. This was a significant shift in mindset from accepting a measured amount of risk in the near term. It was also very apparent that the “Current Force” had to be strategically agile and adaptive or risk not being relevant for use by the “Joint Force.”

The Army’s approach is to retain the best of current capabilities and attributes and, at the same time, examine combat technologies envisioned for the Future Force to identify those that can be made available to the Current Force during the transition process.

This “reachback” approach is intended to affect not only equipment but also the doctrine for and the structure of the Army’s basic combat formations to meet the new requirements of the Joint Force as triggered by the GWOT; specifically, to speed the fielding of developing technologies, doctrine and systems to units when they are “good enough” to serve the intended purpose.

The other aspect of the approach is to meld the Army into the Joint Force and to work to create **not joint interoperability** (*the ability to work beside one another*) **but joint interdependence** (*the ability to work as an integrated team, depending on one another for the unique capabilities that each service provides*).

To increase the relevance and readiness of its operating and institutional forces, the Army continues to rely upon two core competencies, supported by a set of essential and enduring capabilities. These core competencies are to: **train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders for the Army and the nation; and provide relevant and ready landpower capability to the combatant commander as part of the joint team.** Enduring capabilities include shaping the security environment, executing prompt response, mobilizing the Army, forcible entry operations, sustained land dominance and support for civil authorities.

FOCUS AREAS

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
In essence, the focus areas collectively are the engine to effect change.

Source: HQDA

To rapidly effect necessary and positive change, the Army’s senior leadership established 16 immediate focus areas and one integrating function—focused logistics—with specific guidance for planning, preparation and execution of action. The overall thrust of this effort is to provide **even more** “relevant and ready” landpower to combatant commanders.

The function of focused logistics integrates four objectives throughout the policies, processes and resources of the Army:

- connect Army logisticians;
- modernize theater distribution;
- improve force reception; and
- integrate the supply chain.



The Army is synchronizing its Rapid Equipping Force (REF) initiative with its Soldier as a System (SaaS) effort to modernize all deploying Soldiers. Soldier equipment shortfalls are quickly identified and selected solutions (either off-the-shelf or near-term development items) are expeditiously fielded. The net result is a Soldier in combat who is properly equipped to accomplish the mission and survive on the battlefield.

The second aspect of this focus area is to determine requirements for individual and collective training. Lessons learned from combat in Afghanistan and Iraq have yielded new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that require dissemination and integration into the training base and units as well as renewed emphasis on basic combat skills for all Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty (MOS).

**Strategically Agile and Adaptive:
Train and Equip Soldiers and Grow Leaders**

The Soldier. “Everybody in the United States Army [has to] be a Soldier first,” General Schoomaker told reporters during a 7 October 2003 roundtable meeting in Washington, D.C.

The Army is refocusing its efforts on producing flexible, adaptive and competent Soldiers who comprise its warrior culture—organized, trained and equipped to fight wars and win peace. To do this, the Army launched a three-pronged effort to:

- modernize the equipment of all deploying/to-be-deployed Soldiers, civilians and contractors;
- determine requirements for individual and collective training; and
- inculcate a warrior ethos in all soldiers by developing situational awareness before, during and after deployments.

At the 7 October event, General Schoomaker went on to say that specialization of jobs in the Army has pulled the service away from the notion that all Soldiers must be grounded in basic combat skills required to defend themselves and their units, but “everybody’s a rifleman first.”

Examples of back-to-basics Soldier skills include mandatory training for all officers and enlisted Soldiers along these lines:

- Every Soldier will be required to qualify on his or her individual weapon twice a year.



SOLDIER'S CREED

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team.

I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.

I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.

Source: HQDA

- New recruits will qualify on their individual weapons in basic training and then again in advanced individual training.
- Every Soldier, regardless of MOS and unit, will conduct at least one live-fire combat drill a year.

The emphasis on individual combat skills is part of a larger program to infuse the entire Army with a “warrior ethos.” The warrior ethos refers to the professional attitude and beliefs that characterize the American Soldier. At its core, the warrior ethos is grounded in the refusal to accept failure . . . makes clear that military service is much more than just another job, that it concerns character, shaping who a person is and what he or she does . . . and is clearly linked to Army values. The warrior ethos requires unrelenting and consistent determination to do what is right and to do it with pride, both in war and in military operations other than war. **The Soldier’s mindset is the foundation.** The warrior ethos, simply stated, is: We

don’t quit; we will never accept defeat; and we will never leave a fallen comrade.

The overall goal of this focus area is to find ways to invest in the Army’s “human potential,” a prerequisite for a strategically agile and adaptive Army. The Soldier will be looked upon as a system and modernized accordingly. In a larger sense, the entire Army’s ethos or professional competence is under review.

The “Bench.” Senior leader development is a key component of making an Army strategically agile and adaptable. The “bench” refers to building a team of innovative leaders for the Army who think strategically at all levels of war. These leaders are trained with a joint mindset and can operate effectively in joint, interagency and multinational (JIM) environments. The Army is rethinking how it grooms general officers to take senior positions at combatant commands and on the Joint Staff. According to General Schoomaker, “We have to prepare people for positions like mine, which



[is] a different kind of preparation than [for] tactical operations.” The goal is to identify, prepare and assign select Army leaders to key positions within JIM and service organizations. This focus area has the personal attention of the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA).

Army Aviation. Aviation is a critical part of the U.S. Army. It is more than just a “transporter” on the battlefield. The goal of this focus area is to ensure the future fleet is more joint, expeditionary and sustainable, giving the Army quality over quantity, according to LTG Richard Cody, Deputy Chief of Staff G3 of the Army. The analysis is holistic and covers helicopters (attack/reconnaissance/cargo/utility) for both conventional and special operations, as well as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and fixed-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft.

The examination of this focus area refers to establishing aviation as a capabilities-based maneuver arm optimized for the joint fight, with a shortened logistics tail. It calls for reviewing modernization and transformation plans for jointness, feasibility and affordability.

A significant investment area within the Army, aviation exhibits the service’s most advanced technologies and concepts. General Schoomaker has pledged to “look very, very carefully at this investment and make sure that it’s in concert with the kind of future doctrine and organization we’re going to run, and in concert with joint operations.” Efforts to date include considering both current operational lessons and recent aviation studies to define how Army aviation will contribute to current and future forces. One specific area of focus will be on making Army aviation more “modular” so that helicopter companies can work “seamlessly” across Army organizations.

Some of the challenges for Army aviation include resetting the aviation fleet returning from Iraq, particularly the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) and 82d Airborne Divisions; identifying which technologies to cascade from special operations aviation forces to

ARMY AVIATION TRANSFORMATION

CSA Guidance: Recognizing the great value Army Aviation brings to the fight, develop a capabilities-based maneuver arm optimized for the joint fight and with the logistics tail shortened.

- A bottom-up review that looks at all aspects of Army Aviation Modernization and Transformation and how its relevancy supports the future force.
- Cascade plan on hold until completed.
- Structure of active component/reserve component aviation to become more responsive.
- Devise plan to fund future Aviation Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build.
- Reset and reconstitute the Current Force to bridge the gap to the future.
- Continue to provide combatant commanders with trained and ready aviation formations.

Metric: Must be able to train it, rapidly deploy it, fight it and sustain it.

Source: HQDA

the conventional aviation fleet; deciding how to refine aviation operational TTPs; and choosing how many aircraft to buy in the coming years.

For the future, the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter is the next-generation system designed to perform armed reconnaissance and attack missions. At this time, fielding of the Comanche to the first unit of action (UA) is scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2009. The Army envisions incorporating Comanche as an enhancement to the fifth Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), followed by elements in selected forcible-entry divisions—the 82d Airborne and the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) divisions—as well as subsequent UAs and units of employment (UEs).

Regarding recapitalizing the fleet of older UH-60A Black Hawks, the Army is considering taking some of the money from that program and using it to buy more of the new UH-60M models instead. It already plans to buy 1,217 UH-60Ms and recap 193 UH-60As over the



next several years to modernize the fleet. In FY 2004, the Army will decide on the scope of the Apache Block III program to extend the life of the AH-64 through 2020. The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior will continue to bridge the gap to the fielding of Comanche, with an expected divestment around FY 2017. The Army will remanufacture the aging CH-47D Chinook fleet to the new CH-47F. Army Aviation is now the proponent for UAVs; the Hunter UAV is serving as the bridge to the extended range/multipurpose version.

Active component/reserve component (AC/RC) organizations will be structured to execute the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) by aligning the force based on the purpose of the formations, and structuring RC aviation to be more responsive to the strategies of Swiftly Defeat the Enemy/Win Decisively (SDTE/WIN).

As LTG Cody concluded in remarks to the AUSA Aviation Symposium in January 2004, “I want capability and we won’t leave it to just the aviation side to pay the bill. Everything is on the table.”

Leader Development and Education. The current leader development education systems are not flexible enough to support a wartime Army. They must be redesigned to train and educate leaders capable of operating as part of a joint team, with the education system supporting an Army at war.

Army leader development is accomplished in three domains—operational, institutional and self-development. In the operational domain, leader development is accomplished by leaders in units through individual and collective training, assessment and feedback.

The institutional domain provides standards-based training and education to develop Army leaders who are:

- grounded in an ethos of service to the nation;
- instilled with a warrior ethos that has a common doctrinal foundation;
- self-aware, innovative and adaptive; and

- capable of successfully operating as part of a JIM team in full-spectrum operations within the contemporary operational environment (COE).

The institutional domain provides training on common Soldier tasks and selected critical technical and tactical tasks. It facilitates self-development by leveraging educational and informational technologies to develop and maintain, distribute and provide access to training and educational materials for individual Soldier and unit use. The institutional domain builds on leaders’ operational experiences and enables life-long learning through resident and nonresident schooling at Army, joint and civilian schools using live-virtual-constructive training domains as a foundation for experimental learning to meet Army requirements. To further strengthen the institutional domain, the Army is developing a strategy for management and accreditation of schools outside the sphere of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Self-development is the third domain of leader development and an essential component of life-long learning. Self-development is a standards-based, feedback-driven, structured program of activities and learning that contributes to professional competence, organizational effectiveness and professional development.

Developing Army leaders to meet the needs of the Army and the nation requires agile and innovative leader development and education systems. This focus area includes reviewing and prioritizing recommendations from all the Army Training and Leader Development Plan (ATLDP) studies and developing a strategy to implement the initiatives. According to General Schoomaker, the Army must ensure it trains Soldiers to operate in ambiguous and uncertain environments.

Combat Training Centers/Battle Command Training Program. The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), the culture-builders in the Army, will refocus on establishing a mindset among Army combat leaders that embraces



requirements for modular, capabilities-based Army forces to achieve joint interdependence in support of combatant commanders' requirements. Training centers were originally built to fight Soviet-style enemies. Soldiers must be training in the types of terrain and under the conditions they will face in modern war.

The Army's CTCs—the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)—and the BCTP will become joint-centric and remain an “engine of change” for the current and future Army. The primary purpose of the CTCs is to develop self-aware, adaptive leaders and ready units for full-spectrum JIM operations. CTCs will accomplish this by integrating a COE and joint operational environment (JOE) into all training. This environment will include simultaneous, noncontiguous and continuous operations in a distributed, global, live-virtual-constructive environment in a JIM context.

Army units will receive rigorous scenarios in the COE including offensive, defensive and stability and support operations as part of modular formations against an unpredictable opposing force (OPFOR). The battlefield will be arrayed in depth to maximize stress on digital command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. A complex environment, including military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), will be a part of each rotation. Instrumented feedback for both formal and informal after-action reviews (AARs) will provide the necessary lessons learned for leaders, units, and the Army at large. Special operations forces (SOF) will be integrated throughout the rotation, as will realistic combat service support (CSS) play to stress the logistics structure. Deployment training will remain a critical aspect of CTC training to include realistic time phased force development data (TPFFD) flow. The Army fully supports the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), where joint integration will become the norm.

Expanding the global reach of the CTCs will be necessary to rapidly respond to future training

challenges to support units preparing for or in combat. As a result, the Army will explore exportable CTC capability with deployable instrumentation and AAR enablers to support a joint and expeditionary mindset.

(NOTE: The Army has started to reengineer leader development and training programs to focus on gaining and sustaining the high levels of expertise on technical and cognitive skills essential for Current and Future Forces. Growing competent, adaptive and self-aware leaders embodied with the Army warrior culture is essential to instill a culture of innovation in the Army.)

Strategically Agile and Adaptive: Provide Relevant and Ready Landpower Capability to the Combatant Commander and the Joint Team

Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. The joint and expeditionary mindset embraces requirements for modular, capabilities-based Army forces to achieve joint interdependence in support of combatant commanders' requirements. A joint and expeditionary mindset is an attitude and a culture and infuses a spirit of joint interdependence across all DOTMLPF activities. The Army will review training requirements, traditional relationships, and development and institutional programs that must change to embed this mindset into the total force. It will develop an action plan to cultivate a joint and expeditionary mindset through changed organizational and institutional behavior. It will propose a new joint logistics concept. Logistics will become adaptable to the rapidly changing needs of battlefield commanders and accomplished jointly so needed materiel can be obtained from a common pool by any type of unit.

Two examples are improved reception of forces in theater and an integrated supply chain. Currently, the Army is hamstrung by the lack of an organized construct that focuses on joint theater-opening tasks. To effectively facilitate the immediate operational employment and sustainment of the expeditionary force flow, the Army will design an integrated theater-



opening capability that can respond on extremely short notice and can execute critical sustainment tasks immediately upon entry.

That theater-opening capability will not be an ad hoc organization. It must be a support organization that has trained to the task. It must be enabled with the right tools to succeed, and it must have the capacity to expand to meet theater growth. The critical operational tasks for this organization include: (1) providing operational sustainment command and control with reachback capability and initial network visibility; (2) conducting theater reception, staging onward-movement and integration operations, to include life support, force protection and port of debarkation operations; and (3) sustaining forces in theater with theater distribution and requirements visibility.

Likewise, the Army will view the supply chain in a holistic manner to ensure the impact of actions across the entire chain, not just at a single level or within a single service, is understood. This joint, end-to-end view is essential if it is to provide the kind of support Soldiers deserve. The solution is twofold: (1) an enterprise view of the supply chain and (2) an agency-and-service integration of processes, information and responsibilities. Ultimately, joint information will be freely and automatically shared among strategic-, operational- and tactical-level headquarters and agencies. Consumers and logisticians from all agencies and services will enter local supporting systems, plug into the sustainment network, and be afforded end-to-end joint total asset visibility (JTAV). As a result of theater distribution improvements as mentioned earlier, combatant commanders will be capable of seeing inventory in motion, as well as seeing what is available at storage locations, and they will be able to rapidly and effectively execute decisions that meet their requirements.

Modularity. Modularity comprises capabilities-based units that enable greater capacity for rapid packaging and responsive, sustained employment to provide more relevant and ready forces to support combatant

commanders. Currently, each time the Army deploys a brigade combat team (BCT) of armor or infantry, it augments the BCT with pieces of other units—artillery, military intelligence, signal and logistics, for example. Eventually it has deployed all of its brigades but still has many elements of units not required for mission employment.

The six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) are a prime example of the Army's force structure evolution to a modular, capabilities-based unit design. SBCT #1, currently deployed to Iraq, will redeploy in the fall of 2004, and SBCT #2 will deploy to take its place. The remaining four SBCTs in the program are in various stages of development.

Most divisions have three ground maneuver brigades. General Schoomaker wants to create four or five maneuver brigades within each division through redesign and leveraging technology, without necessarily increasing the number of Soldiers in the division. A pilot program for the near term will comprise the first two divisions to return from Iraq—the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)—with their division commanders leading the redesign. These initial conversions will serve as prototypes to help accelerate the modular redesign and fielding of the Current and Future Forces. TRADOC is responsible for the far-term solution.

Embedded in modular redesign is an overhaul of the battlefield distribution system. Effective theater sustainment rests on the fundamental concepts of distribution-based logistics. The Army is developing a distribution system that reaches from the Soldier at the tip of the spear to the source of support, wherever that may be. Large quantities of supplies no longer need to be stored forward. Speed and precision are the keys to an effective distribution-based sustainment process.

In essence, the Army must restructure to more modular, capabilities-based forces to better meet combatant commanders' requirements. It will continue to support operational deployments/rotations concurrent with assuming additional missions as needed for our



STRYKER BRIGADES AND HOME STATIONS

SBCT 1 – 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA

- Deployment enhancements include: Aviation task force augmentation, common operating picture for wingmen Stryker vehicles, commercial satellite terminals, enhanced logistics package, and slat armor.
- Unit and equipment began movement to theater Oct 03.

SBCT 2 – 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA

- Ongoing Stryker and non-Stryker equipment fielding and training.
- Executed Stryker Initial Operating Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) at Fort Knox, KY.
- May 04 certification (IOC) at JRTC (may accelerate to Mar 04).

SBCT 3 – 172d Separate Infantry Brigade, AK

- Fielding Rehearsal (Rock Drill) complete Jun 03.
- Split stationing at Fort Richardson and Fort Wainwright, AK.
- Projected certification May 05.

SBCT 4 – 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA

- G-8 Transformation Coordinator on site.
- Fielding Synchronization Conference completed May 03.
- Organizational Design submitted from TRADOC to Army G-3.
- Equipment turn-in begins upon return from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
- Projected certification May 06.

SBCT 5 – 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, HI

- Range upgrades identified.
- Environmental Studies ongoing.
- Fielding Synchronization Conference (Dec 03).
- Projected certification May 07.

SBCT 6 – 56th Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard

- Transformation and training begins FY04.
- Projected Fielding Synchronization Conference (Jun 04).
- Projected certification NLT FY10.



ACR - Armored Cavalry Regiment
 ARNG - Army National Guard
 BDE - Brigade

IOC - Initial Operational Capability
 JRTC - Joint Readiness Training Center
 SBCT - Stryker Brigade Combat Team

TRADOC - Training & Doctrine Command

Source: HQDA

nation at war. Changing the organizational structure of units will be logically consistent with Future Force concepts but tempered by the technological capabilities that are reasonably available within the near term.

To accomplish this, brigade combat teams will be restructured into brigade units of action (BUAs) as the basic maneuver module for Army forces. Once transitioned, BUAs will enable greater capacity for rapid packaging and responsive, sustained employment to support combatant commanders. BUAs will also enhance the expeditionary/campaign quality of Army forces by better enabling joint-coalition operations.

The transition to BUAs will also increase the brigade-equivalent forces available to meet both enduring and emerging mission requirements. The transition will include heavy and light force redesigns that are synchronized with unit rotations. **Ultimately, all active divisions, echelons above division/corps and Army National Guard enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs) will reorganize in conjunction with unit rotations.** The Army will also redesign division and corps headquarters with inherently joint capabilities to employ BUAs. The implementation plan will reflect what is possible today and serve as steps in transitioning to the Future Force.



STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM KEY COMPONENTS



3, 498 Soldiers
1,400+ Infantrymen
250+ Scouts



Stryker - 309



Land Warrior



FBCB2 - 726



Sniper Systems - 15



Javelin - 121



Field Repair System - 7



Shadow TUAV - 4

**An organized network, combined-arms capability
 from company through brigade**

FBCB2 - Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
 TUAV - Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Source: HQDA

do know what are some of the desired characteristics—**stabilization and increased combat effectiveness.**” [emphasis added]

The Army is transitioning to an improved manning system that places greater emphasis on building and sustaining cohesive, deployable, combat-ready units for combatant commanders. Unit-Focused Stability and Home-Basing are two initiatives, among others, that will contribute to force stabilization. Unit-Focused Stability addresses the primary objective of force stabilization—fostering more cohesive, combat-ready forces. This initiative synchronizes Soldier assignments to unit operational cycles, setting the conditions for achieving

Moving toward completely independent echelon-above-brigade headquarters will also enhance modularity. In accordance with the UE construct, a UEx (higher tactical headquarters) and a UEy (operational-level headquarters) will provide the command and control structure into which modular, capabilities-based UAs are organized to meet combatant commanders’ requirements. Both types of UE headquarters, while able to accept joint capabilities such as a standing joint force headquarters element (SJFHQ), will have an organic capability, depending on the contingency, to perform functions as a joint task force (JTF) or joint forces land component commander (JFLCC) headquarters.


Force Stabilization. The Army is looking at new concepts, including a unit manning concept, which would provide greater stability. According to General Schoomaker, “We really don’t know what [programs such as] unit manning [will] look like in the end. We

higher levels of training effectiveness, deployability and readiness.

With Home-Basing, Soldiers and their families will be assigned at an installation for extended initial tours. This will stabilize Soldiers in their units and reduce unit turbulence. Force stabilization will enable units to be more agile and deployable, complementing and enhancing a joint and expeditionary mindset and rotation-based environment. All relevant policies, procedures and regulations are being adjusted to ensure a successful transition **from an individual-centric to a unit-centric environment.**

AC/RC Balance. AC/RC balance refers to reviewing the mix of current forces between AC and RC and redesigning this mix as necessary to improve capabilities.

The Army’s ability to successfully provide the joint team both rapid expeditionary capabilities and the



ability to conduct sustained land campaigns across the full spectrum of conflict requires both active and reserve component contributions. The Army will restructure the Current Force, creating modular capabilities and flexible formations while obtaining the correct mix between AC and RC force structure. This rebalancing effort will enhance the Army's ability to provide the joint team a more relevant and ready expeditionary landpower capability.

The active component will provide rapidly responsive, agile and expeditionary forces that typically respond in the first 30 days of an operation. The availability of adequate AC and RC follow-on forces provides the joint force commander the campaign-quality combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities necessary to achieve operational

and strategic objectives and to conduct sustained land operations. The reserve component will provide strategic depth to reinforce the war fight. They will also reinforce stability and support operations (SASO) and lead the efforts to protect the homeland. Either active or reserve component units may provide units of the other component with additional capabilities not normally resident in those forces. To create and maintain rapidly deployable and sustainable campaign capability and depth throughout the force, the Army will ensure both AC and RC forces are modular, tailorable and capable of coming together in a number of force and capabilities packages. This will allow a reduction in the time now required for mobilization and training and improve the ability to provide combatant commanders with needed forces and capabilities.



The Army will develop force structure options to develop a modular Army with a proper AC/RC mix. The objective is to reduce involuntary reserve component mobilizations for the first 30 days of an operation and predictably deploy reserve component forces not more than one year in six. The Army will reexamine its roles, missions and organizational force mix and develop action plans for a restructured force with appropriate AC/RC mix across the full strategy and force-sizing construct. Some examples are:

- developing plans for ALO-1 (i.e., authorized level of organization; ALO-1 is 100 percent of wartime requirements) active Army units and selected reserve component units;
- addressing near-term solutions for improving the readiness and deployability of existing organizations;
- developing plans for Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students (TTHS) structures for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve;
- exploring the use of smaller RC packages to provide depth to AC structure; and
- studying ways to best use the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).


The Network. The network concerns the development and fielding of **Battle Command capabilities** to enable interdependent network-centric warfare within JIM full-spectrum operations. The Army is focusing on ways to “reach back” into the network to reduce the amount of resources that must be brought into theater. According to General Schoomaker, “The kind of network we need is one where the commander is not stuck at a particular node.”

Concepts such as network-centric warfare, full-spectrum dominance and decision superiority are impossible to achieve without a robust, modular, deployable and always capable network. This network is more than information systems. It consists of individuals and systems located across the entire spectrum of the

battlefield framework. That framework stretches from the individual Soldier on point, through the variety of operations centers in the theater of operations, and stretches back to the Home Station Operations Center regardless of its location. **The Army will shift from a bottom-up approach to one that focuses systems from the top down.** It will analyze the current network(s) from a top-down perspective and develop recommendations in collaboration with the joint/DoD community to increase battle command capability for the Current and Future Forces in JIM full-spectrum operations. The key is to identify baseline capabilities required by the Army to be relevant in a JIM environment. Then a single Army lead for network development and a reprioritization of network developments will accelerate the Future Combat Systems network and improve Current Force capabilities.

Army logisticians will be an integral part of the joint battlefield network with satellite-based communications that provide 24/7 connectivity on demand, enabling them to pass and to receive key data from the battlefield to the industrial base. This connectivity will cover the battlefield, and it will give Army logisticians the agility and flexibility to quickly plug into and unplug from a dedicated network with an asynchronous (stand-alone) capability.

The Army will ensure logistics communications solutions are embedded within the Army’s network and will optimize joint and combined operations in an expeditionary environment. The Enterprise Resource Planning work in Battle Command Sustainment and Support System (BCS3), Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A), Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) and Product Life-cycle Management (PLM+) is critical to implementing fully this foxhole-to-factory-to-foxhole concept. The logistics common operating picture (LCOP) will be improved by this network connectivity, and it will provide the vital link in the joint commander’s ability to see his force and to make decisions based on accurate, real-time information.



Current to Future Force. Transformation is not just focusing on the Future Force, but changing the Current Force as necessary to continually provide more relevant and ready forces. Army transformation occurs within the larger context of continuous change brought about through the interaction of constantly evolving capabilities between Current and Future Forces.

The Current Force is the operational Army of today. It is organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations as part of the Joint Force. Designed to provide the requisite warfighting capabilities the Joint Force commander needs across the range of military operations, the Current Force’s ability to conduct major combat operations underscores its credibility and

effectiveness for full-spectrum operations and fulfills the enduring obligation of Army forces to fight wars and win the peace. The Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become.

The Army will accelerate implementation of select Future Force capabilities to enable the enhancement of the Current Force (Future to Current), improve the implementation of lessons learned from operational experiences (Current to Current), and extend the application of proven ideas, lessons learned and selected capabilities from the Current Force into the future (Current to Future). It will do this by examining opportunities for changing processes that can facilitate this intent. It will



embed Army transformation within joint transformation and *JOpsC* and review current transformation documents and guidance for synchronization with the CSA's intent for change. The Army will generate flexibility for bringing Future Force capabilities into the Current Force by reviewing the Future Combat Systems (FCS) contracts and acquisition approach, and will implement appropriate recommendations of the Welch Panel, which was chartered to examine the organizations and processes that directly impact the Army's ability to achieve at least minimal Future Force capabilities by 2010.

In sum, *the Army is accelerating fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enhance effectiveness of the Current Force.* According to the CSA, "We have to fight [using] the Current Force. We can't fight [using] the Future Force. It doesn't exist. We have to be ready today with what we have to be effective and win."

Actionable Intelligence. Achieving actionable intelligence refers to providing better, more timely information to small units in the field and improving situational awareness—a capability that is said to be a key to preventing the kind of attacks plaguing Soldiers in Iraq.

According to an after-action report prepared by the 3d Infantry Division (ID), the Army's divisions need more organic intelligence assets to tackle missions that range from high-intensity combat to peacekeeping. Lacking the range of collectors, processors and supporting communications systems, the division is not yet ideally resourced for full-system operations, the 3d ID report states.

The Army will redefine intelligence, instilling an Army-wide culture and mindset that every Soldier is a collector in learning, adaptive organizations that leverage inherent intelligence capabilities. It will rapidly implement a system that provides intelligence to commanders with the speed, accuracy and confidence to impact current and future operations (actionable intelligence). It will replace a stove-piped Cold War intelligence structure with universal access to shared

databases, advanced analytical tools, knowledge centers and sensors/collectors, interdependent with theater, joint and national intelligence organizations.

The capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 is a prime example of actionable intelligence at its finest. Skilled human collection, meticulous analysis and rapid dissemination using all available JIM assets resulted in the capture of the highest-priority target of coalition forces in Iraq.

Strategically Agile and Adaptive: Enable the Force

Installations as Flagships. The Army's installations must be resourced to serve as flagships able to project power, support realistic training and provide for Soldiers, families and civilians. The Army will focus on short-term planning strategies for three essential tasks:

- posturing installations as power-projection platforms with robust reachback capabilities;
- adjusting installation support to meet the needs of an Army at war; and
- supporting the well-being of all Soldiers and their families.

Long-term focus will center on making installations quality information hubs, combat preparation and sustainment centers, deployment platforms, secure sanctuaries and holistic communities. This includes the possibility of a reserve component facility being designated to take care of active component families who may have gone home to relatives while their sponsor was deployed. Restoration and modernization will extend well beyond the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years to enable the Army to simultaneously integrate installation plans and programs with Army modernization and force stationing, while implementing the rotation-based system of global engagement.

Resource Processes. The Army will provide resource processes that are flexible, responsive and accelerated to support an Army at war. The Army will leverage *The*




Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006–2023 (“The Army Plan,” Section 1) as a mechanism to develop a concise Army Vision embedded within joint guidance. The Army will align with the new *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (JCIDS-CJCSI 3170.01c) under the context provided in the *Joint Capabilities Development Process* (Aldridge Study). Key tasks include:

- aligning and embedding Army resources processes within the overarching DoD planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE);
- providing “fast-track” responsive resourcing of emerging joint fight requirements to support combatant commanders; and
- developing a joint strategy to provide transparency across the DoD PPBE process to best match scarce resources to “born-joint” capabilities earlier in the resourcing process—**focused on providing responsiveness and flexibility to meet urgent out-of-cycle needs at any time.**

Strategic Communications. The Strategic Communications organization at the Executive Headquarters of the Army exists to develop, synchronize and disseminate strategic themes, messages and talking points to internal and external audiences. A key objective is to engage opinion leaders and decisionmakers and build strong relationships. To meet its mission, the organization is collaborative, strategically focused, effects-based and product-oriented. Overarching themes and messages reflect the strategic context, DoD/Joint Staff directions, public affairs objectives and legislative priorities. Messages are adjusted to meet changes in the audiences in a proactive manner and to gain support and understanding for the Army’s relevance and direction. Products include strategic communications plans, communications materials, outreach events, anticipated issues and communications mechanisms (including the Army website and the Army Senior Leader page). Strategic communications remains, however, every Soldier’s business.

Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability. The Army’s authority is derived from the authority granted the presidentially-appointed Secretary by the Constitution, the United States Code and other foundational documents of the United States. The Army further divides that authority in effective ways to accomplish myriad missions and institutional responsibilities assigned by the President, the Secretary of Defense and other higher authorities. The Army will examine the balance of ensuring compliance with the laws of the nation and proper civilian control of the Army with the need for commanders and supervisors at every level to be given the appropriate authority to accomplish their missions and functions in agile, flexible ways, while at the same time developing and exercising the necessary means to ensure accountability for results. **Clarifying authorities and fixing accountability are enabling operations that affect accomplishment of all Army objectives.** This will make the Army more effective, agile and able to produce and employ its unique capabilities ever more quickly. The Army will integrate its resourcing-system metrics with its results metrics, providing leaders at all levels the information needed to make decisions based on reliable data and thorough analysis. The Army’s measure of results must be meaningful to the senior leaders and to stakeholders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the other services. A steering group chaired by the Director of the Army Staff will conduct an Army-wide examination to establish the proper balance of responsibility and authority, which will strengthen the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) and other accountability systems and processes. The goal is to improve the Army’s ability to accomplish its many missions.

In sum, as General Schoomaker stated in remarks at AUSA’s Eisenhower Luncheon on 7 October 2003, “We are, in fact, an Army at war. . . . We must continue to simultaneously *press ahead* [emphasis added] with both our transformational efforts on a broad scale and our operational commitment.”



The Army *is pressing ahead* toward a modular, capabilities-based unit design within joint networks and enabled by a joint and expeditionary mindset. It is moving toward:


- being lighter, faster, more flexible, more strategically agile;
- bringing forward technology into the Current Force;
- transforming units returning from Iraq, with the 3d Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) comprising the pilot program;
 - four or five vice three brigades;
 - brigade combat teams as the key formation;
- rebalancing the mix of active and reserve components;
- making the heavy force more useful;

- inculcating a warrior ethos;
- developing a joint and expeditionary mindset;
- delivering focused logistics as part of joint and combined logistics processes.

WHAT IS NEEDED

The Army's vision, as articulated by General Schoomaker since he assumed the position of Chief of Staff in August 2003, is **sound, adaptive and far-reaching**:

The balance that we are trying to achieve is to **maintain an Army that has campaign qualities, big fight qualities, but with a joint and expeditionary mindset** [emphasis added]. The nation has developed a national strategy, a military strategy that says we're going to be more proactive than we have in the past. And that means we're going to have to be able to be



strategically agile [and] able to do things faster and farther and deeper than we have before. And we can't do it only as an Army, but we've got to do it as part of the joint team, leveraging other services' capabilities. **That is a different way of thinking** [emphasis added]. (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 1 October 2003)

For the Army to inculcate this "different way of thinking" into its leaders and Soldiers, America must have "strategic flexibility" in the size and composition of its land forces—particularly the Army—to ensure that the security needs of the nation are met.

What is needed is a strategic flexibility from the standpoint of:

- readiness of the Current Force;

- force structure agility (rebalancing and redistributing the force structure design as it exists today); and
- endstrength (having a balance and capability to meet expectations of the requirements, sometimes unknown, of the forces of the future).

The Army has quality Soldiers, probably the best training-framework capability and facilities in its history, values-based leader/Soldier development, and a measure of unit stability. **It needs a bench of trained forces, adequately sized to replace those who might become battle-weary, whatever and whenever the battle might be.**

WHAT MUST BE DONE

The Army has recognized the evolving security environment of the 21st century and is changing



accordingly to become more strategically agile and adaptive. It is reorienting priorities to remain relevant and ready for any and all challenges in the Global War on Terrorism and for other requirements.

Actions are underway by the Army to focus efforts on developing and fielding the right equipment faster, reorganizing to establish a truly joint and expeditionary mindset through modular, capabilities-based units, restructuring the active and reserve components to attain relevant balance and retooling/adapting approaches to resourcing manpower and material. Sixteen focus areas directed by the Chief of Staff, Army are designed to shape the Army from within to provide the combatant commanders the best variety of highly trained, lethal, agile and cohesive units, able to operate as part of a joint force. The Army is well along the road to becoming an even more ready and relevant member of the interdependent joint, interagency and multinational team. **To ensure this strategic flexibility, Congress and the Department of Defense must fully support the Army's internal examination.**

Moreover, the U.S. Army must be adequately resourced not only from the standpoint of compensation and other well-being/quality-of-life issues but also for the operational issues: modernizing/recapitalizing the force; operating installations/bases to train and move the force; and sizing and balancing the active and reserve components to include the right number of full-time advisers for the reserve components. **To do so, Congress must fund DoD at an amount approximating 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP); increase the Army's share of the DoD**

budget to at least 28 percent to maintain readiness; and expeditiously fund future commitments of Army forces for unprogrammed contingencies so the Army is not forced to internally reprogram dollars.

The U.S. Army as part of a joint force must win the Global War on Terrorism, support ongoing commitments and be ready for new missions. The current state of war and the requirements for homeland defense and ongoing military operations around the globe have dramatically shown that the post-Cold War cuts to the Army's size and force structure—active component, reserve component and Department of the Army civilians—are too deep. In short, the Army is overcommitted and undersized. **Therefore, Congress must authorize and fund an increase to active component endstrength of 50,000 Soldiers; authorize and fund reserve component full-time manning requirements at 100 percent; and fund the Army's civilian workforce at 100 percent of validated requirements.**

In addition, as the U.S. Army trains, organizes and equips units to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism; executes the Chief of Staff, Army's vision; and recruits and retains for today and tomorrow's force, it must be sufficiently resourced—reliance on substantial supplemental funding does not adequately support the sustainment of the deployed force or development of the Future Force. **Continued supplemental funding of the Army is not the way to support and sustain an Army at War.** An investment in our national security today is an investment in America's future.

*The Army is changing from top to bottom—
commitment and support from Congress and DoD are essential.*



TORCHBEARER MESSAGE




America and its Army are at war—now. As the year 2003 drew to a close, the U.S. Army had more than 320,000 Soldiers (approximately 215,000 of them on unaccompanied tours) deployed in 120 countries. In Fiscal Year 2004, 26 of the 33 active component brigade combat teams (73 percent) and 20 of the 45 reserve component enhanced Separate Brigades (44 percent) will deploy overseas. During the second quarter of FY 2004 alone, 245,000 Soldiers will be going to, fighting in or returning from combat. Eight and one-half of the ten active component divisions are involved; 169,000 reserve component Soldiers are expected to be on active duty by mid-2004. The Army is at war!

The Army continues to be the decisive component of America's national military strategy and a critical part of the joint team. The Army brings a unique set of core capabilities to the joint team to fight and win America's wars. The Army will organize, train and fight as part of the Joint Force. It is moving toward being a more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. The new security environment has triggered a renewed emphasis on an Army that is “**strategically flexible**”—able to meet its ongoing operational requirements boldly and decisively. It is currently demonstrating this capability in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Sinai, the Balkans and Northeast Asia, even as it continues to defend America.

At the heart of the U.S. Army are its Soldiers—the centerpiece of its formations and the foundation of the nation's combat power. That is why “developing Soldiers with a warrior ethos” is so important to the Army's internal examination of its present and future capabilities. (The **warrior ethos**, or professional competence, is at the heart of the Soldier's Creed: “We don't quit; we will never accept defeat; and we will never leave a fallen comrade.”) It is also important that programs are in place to modernize the equipment of deploying or to-be-deployed Soldiers. This examination challenges the Army in 16 focus areas and positions it to provide even more relevant and ready landpower to combatant commanders.

The Army is pressing ahead toward a modular, capabilities-based unit design within joint networks and enabled by a joint and expeditionary mindset. It is moving toward: being lighter, faster, more flexible, more strategically agile and adaptive; bringing forward technology into the Current Force; transforming units returning from Iraq; and delivering focused logistics as part of joint and combined logistics processes. To ensure this strategic flexibility, Congress and the Department of Defense must fully support the Army's internal examination; increase the DoD budget to an amount approximating 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the Army's share of it to at least 28 percent; authorize and fund an increase to active component endstrength of 50,000 Soldiers and reserve component full-time manning requirements at 100 percent; and avoid relying on supplemental funding of the Army to support and sustain it.

In the 21st century, sustained operations are the norm, not the exception. The Army, as part of the Joint Force, is winning the Global War on Terrorism, supporting ongoing commitments and readying itself for new missions. **Now more than ever, the need for an effective, well-resourced, strategically agile and adaptive Army is real.**



**We're going to move before the other guy moves,
and we're going to reach out and touch him at his place, not ours. . . .
We're going to have to be strategically more agile.**

**General Peter J. Schoonmaker
Chief of Staff, Army
Anabeim, California
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