Introduction

Today’s U.S. Army—active, Guard, Reserve—faces an extremely complex and uncertain strategic operating environment. Coming decades are likely to be marked by persistent engagement and conflict—confrontation by state, nonstate and/or individual actors who use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. Globalization and technology, radicalism, population growth, resource competition, climate change and natural disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and safe havens are but some of the major trends of the 21st century security environment. The potential for cascading effects from combinations of events or crises arising from these formidable trends compounds the risks and implications for the nation and its allies and partners. In this environment, the Army—as part of the joint force—will continue to have a central, enduring role in implementing the national security strategy, resulting in a high demand for Army forces and capabilities.

Army forces will be essential components of joint operations to create sustainable political outcomes while defeating enemies and adversaries who will challenge U.S. advantages in all domains: land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace. Joint operations are critical to cope with such complexity, and the Army’s contribution must provide unique capabilities and multiple options to the President, Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders. These capabilities include tailorable and scalable combinations of special operations and conventional forces, regionally aligned and globally responsive combined-arms teams and foundational theater capabilities to enable joint operations. To do this, innovation is critical, both for the operational and the institutional Army.

The Army’s senior leadership has added “set the theater” (i.e., presence with the purpose of increasing capabilities and capacities) and “shape security environments” (i.e., work to further partner and allied relationships and foster understanding and cooperation) as core competencies to emphasize the Army’s role in providing options to joint force commanders across the range of operations, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingencies, security force assistance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This is in keeping with the Army Operating Concept (AOC), which calls for regionally engaged and aligned Army forces to establish a “global landpower network,” shape security environments and prevent conflict. The presence or arrival of credible Army forces demonstrates U.S. resolve and commitment to partners and adversaries.

While developing this concept, Army senior leadership began to prudently invest Army resources in the Indo–Asia–Pacific region to meet current requirements and build flexibility for the future. The 2012

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Army Forces in the Pacific

The Army is a global force which currently has 45,000 Soldiers deployed and 80,000 forward-stationed worldwide in 150 countries. The Pacific theater, with its vast distances and diverse climates and populations, serves as a perfect test-bed for the Army Operating Concept. The Indo–Asia–Pacific region spans 9,000 miles from the Maldives to California, covering 13 time zones, 105 million square miles and 50 percent of the Earth’s surface area. The region encompasses more than 1,000 languages and every type of climate. USPACOM’s AOR comprises 36 nations and territories (27 of which have armed forces), as well as six of the world’s 10 largest armies and five of seven U.S. mutual-defense treaty alliances. USPACOM, through its assigned forces, enhances stability in the region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence and military readiness.

Since the Army has made a significant investment in rebalancing to the AOR, USARPAC, as the Army service component command to USPACOM, now has approximately 106,000 active and reserve component Soldiers assigned and/or aligned to the command. USARPAC engages with regional partners and allies in more than 130 events in 34 countries annually. The largest service component command in the theater, the Army in the Pacific has a storied history, having earned 63 campaign streamers in its 116 years of continuous presence in the Pacific theater.

Since the 1953 Korean War Armistice, the U.S. Army Pacific has had a continuous force presence forward-stationed in Korea. The presence and capabilities of these “ready to fight tonight” forces in Korea, as well as the Army footprint in Japan since World War II, have enabled Northeast Asia to recover both economically and politically from a devastating World War while maintaining stability during the Cold War. The presence of U.S. Army forces signaled then, as it does now, U.S. resolve and commitment to the region. These forces’ contribution cannot be overstated.

This presence and the close relationships fostered between the U.S. Army and host nations have yielded more than bilateral mutual security benefits—they have created opportunities to engage with nations throughout the region through multilateral exercises, exchanges and dialog.

National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the subsequent 2014 NDS emphasized a whole-of-government focus on the security and prosperity of the Indo–Asia–Pacific region. To support this strategy, the Army assigned a four-star general officer to lead the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the first since 1974, and began to resource the rebalance in other tangible ways. In the past 30 months, the Army has increased the forces assigned and available to the theater by approximately 40 percent. It made available I Corps and additional units based at Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington, as well as the 25th Infantry Division, the 8th Theater Support Command and other commands such as the 351st Civil Affairs Command, an Army Reserve command headquartered in Mountain View, California. The Army “fenced” USARPAC forces from the global force management pool and increased manning priorities in Korea. It bolstered and made available its Indo–Asia–Pacific regionally aligned forces—defined as all forces focused on that area of responsibility (AOR), including permanently-based, forward-positioned and rotational forces—for use by the commander, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Today USARPAC is the Army’s largest Army service component command (ASCC). The Army now has an opportunity—through an innovation called Pacific Pathways—to put its new concept into practice.

Pacific Pathways

For many decades, Army forces in the Pacific have conducted exercises and engagements with allies and partners to enhance training opportunities and sustain expeditionary skills. These have been so successful that allies and partners requested additional exercises of increased complexity as well as more bilateral training and exchanges. Just as important, U.S. interests have been strengthened by them. Unlike previous postwar periods, the Army is not required to establish new permanent bases; in fact, it is facing unprecedented fiscal conditions forcing it to reduce its endstrength, possibly well below what Army senior leaders assess as prudent. Without permanent basing and with increasingly diminished funding, the challenge has become how to increase the quality and quantity of engagements with allies and partners in the region in a cost-effective manner. Pacific Pathways has demonstrated that this challenge could be met and has validated the elements, tenets and operational art described in the AOC.

Simply stated, Pacific Pathways—a deployment derived from a brigade combat team (BCT) augmented with mission command capability, aviation, sustainment and other enablers—participates in multiple joint and Army bilateral exercises that already exist in the USPACOM AOR. This takes place after the unit has participated in a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation—the pinnacle of the U.S. Army’s institutional training readiness system. The highly trained and ready task force must accomplish major exercise objectives developed jointly with allies and partners.

The units deploy from home stations at the peak of readiness to “cut pathways” across the region, moving from one exercise to the next (as intermediate objectives for the overall operation) over the span of about 90 days. Existing bilateral exercises are the centerpiece; other training events and activities, such as table-top exercises, subject-matter-expert exchanges and unit exchanges requested by allies and partners, complement the exercises and continue to build unit readiness between the conclusion of one named exercise

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and the beginning of the next. This extended period of four to six weeks in the host country improves interoperability, fosters professional relationships and develops respect for host-nation culture and capabilities while simultaneously familiarizing U.S. units with diverse operating environments. Upon the conclusion of a deployment, the task force returns to home station having not only improved relationships with U.S. regional allies and partners but also increased training readiness. The tailored force elements return to their respective parent organizations and rejoin the available pool for contingency response if required.

This methodology ensures both mission and fiscal predictability as units are able to focus preparatory training and resources on their specific pathway exercises. While the current concept leverages a CTC rotation as the precursor to a pathway, future pathways may use improved home-station training venues and the exportable Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability training package as a certification tool to prepare a future pathway unit for employment. This flexibility provides an increased opportunity for all available units to experience and take advantage of a pathway to enhance training readiness and maintain expeditionary capabilities. This operation allows leaders and Soldiers at multiple echelons to train in the AOC while their activities contribute to USPACOM objectives and those of allies and partners.

Pacific Pathways creates a forward-presence, expeditionary approach that expands and increases readiness beyond the scope of traditional exercises conducted singularly. It improves Army expeditionary capabilities by stressing the systems that enable units to project communications across the vast expanse of the Pacific theater. It increases readiness through expeditionary commitment into regions other than those in which Army forces have routinely operated. This innovation is proving to be an effective way to clarify relationships among theater army, corps, division and brigade command levels, with more key lessons learned than from the most challenging Command Post Exercises conducted in the past. Participation is also presenting opportunities for greater leader development as leaders face real-world complexities and learn the importance of strengthening relationships with partner-nation militaries. This is another example of how the Army can build agile, expeditionary thinking and adaptive leaders.

Most important, Pacific Pathways provides a tangible Army rotational presence as part of the rebalance to the Indo–Asia–Pacific while also providing additional capabilities for the USPACOM commander should crises emerge during iterations. This increases in a meaningful way the depth of military-to-military relationships and numbers of Army forces and enabling capabilities available for joint application in theater without additional permanent basing.

**Participating U.S. Soldiers and Equipment**

A battalion-sized element consisting of approximately 700 Soldiers from the 2-2 Infantry (Stryker) Task Force, plus about 500 enabling troops from support units with Army aircraft, Stryker vehicles and other supporting equipment.

**Strategic Benefits**

**Rebalance**
- Tangible demonstration of U.S. commitment to Indo–Asia–Pacific region security and stability

**Persistent Engagement**
- Deepens and broadens U.S. Army relationships with allied and partner nations at both collective and individual troop levels
- Enables partner nations to seek increased and enhanced engagement opportunities

**U.S. Army Readiness and Responsiveness**
- Provides greater mission and fiscal predictability for U.S. Army forces
- Develops adaptive leaders and Soldiers for complex missions
- Provides additional Army capabilities and flexible options for U.S. Pacific Command
- Supports operational preparation of the environment and contributes to setting the theater

**Source:** U.S. Army Pacific
Operationalizing the Pacific Rebalance

Pacific Pathways is a tangible demonstration of U.S. commitment to the security and stability of the Indo–Asia–Pacific region. It deepens and broadens U.S. Army relationships with allied and partner nations at both the individual and collective levels of training. It also enables partner nations to seek increased and enhanced engagement opportunities. Moreover, it increases Army readiness and responsiveness through greater mission and fiscal predictability and multiple opportunities for Soldier and leader development involving complex missions. Finally, this innovative approach provides additional Army capabilities and flexible options for USPACOM.

The first deployment comprised Soldiers from the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, into the Indo–Asia–Pacific region from late August to early November 2014. This organization was augmented by units and staff from the 25th Infantry Division, I Corps and U.S. Army Japan. Throughout the duration of the deployment, the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade’s critical assets—including UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters and HH-60 Black Hawk medical evacuation aircraft from Hawaii and AH-64E Apache attack helicopters from Colorado—brought agility and speed to the operations. Building upon the units’ enhanced readiness gained at the National Training Center (one of the Army’s CTCs) prior to deploying into theater, the commander divided his subordinate units between annual exercises Garuda Shield in Indonesia and Keris Strike in Malaysia. He then consolidated them for a culminating training exercise—Orient Shield—in Japan. These three exercises offered realistic training in a variety of climates, terrain and environments. For example, during the preparation for the live-fire portion of the exercise, operators of a Raven unmanned aerial system flew approximately 35 hours in diverse terrain, which would have taken 18 months to accomplish at home station in familiar terrain. These training opportunities not only increase unit readiness but also provide Soldiers and leaders with the cultural awareness and familiarization necessary to operate in overseas contingencies with coalition partners in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations.

An operation such as this—with multiple entries into and exits from sovereign foreign countries and sequenced over an extended period of time away from home station—demanded adaptive junior leaders and detailed planning skills in senior staff. Significant leadership development at the tactical and operational levels resulted from this deployment.

Home-station activities such as use of Family Readiness Groups, establishment of rear detachment commands, management of split property and development of installation support are typically not required for short-term exercises but were necessary for Pacific Pathways. Exercising these functions is not a drill; they are required for success along the pathway and build readiness in a way that home-station training cannot. During the operation, senior leaders of the BCT developed expeditionary, distributed, decentralized mission command from home station across the Pacific region into three different host nations and maintained constant linkage through mission command systems to division and corps elements that coordinated higher-level support for the mission. Integration and interoperability skills were
This first iteration was invaluable and proved to be a cost-honored from the highest to the lowest levels. BCT staff and leaders integrated with host-nation forces and linked with U.S. country teams and embassy personnel. Notably, leaders assessed that troops routinely had to perform at levels higher than their current grades due to the complexity of the environment. Units reported that morale was high across the board, particularly among junior Soldiers, as many had not experienced other deployments or operations.

Leaders at I Corps noted that the iteration forced the corps staff to maximize its operational capabilities. It dictated the necessity for 24-hour operations, integrated planning horizons and, through distributed (at times expeditionary) mission command, allowed I Corps to execute the deployment concurrently with other corps requirements and operations. Other critical activities such as logistical, medical and signal support tested their flexibility and adaptability.

Logistics planning and synchronization were exercised at all levels—strategic, operational and tactical. Throughout the deployment, various field-expedient origin-to-destination solutions were created. Coordination among the BCT, the 25th Infantry Division, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command enabled units to perform assigned missions by exercising strategic deployment assets and systems as well as international coordination that increased operational readiness through a series of load, move, receive and support cycles. Support from the 807th Medical Command and other organizations—such as the explosive ordnance detachment, the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear unit, the Defense Logistics Agency, Office of Defense Cooperation, various State Department agencies and partner-nation military and government organizations—enhanced unit training and interoperability.

The enhanced readiness and training garnered from this first iteration was invaluable and proved to be a cost-effective means to effect strategic engagement throughout the theater. Under the previous model for conducting these long-standing partnership- and alliance-strengthening exercises, individual units were able to participate in only a single exercise and then returned to home station. Moreover, under the old design, the costs for three separate exercises were significant. Pacific Pathways accomplished the same three exercises for approximately half the cost and gained additional training including the exercising of mission command at the corps, division and BCT levels.

The Way Ahead

Because Pacific Pathways operations involve a series of major exercises within the AOR and are tied directly back to objectives within the Theater Campaign Plan to prevent conflict and shape the security environment, they provide a campaign quality that brigade-, division- and corps-level headquarters cannot achieve in home-station training environments. Operational assessments conducted by USARPAC, in conjunction with country teams, shape the design of future operations and allow commanders at all levels to link observed outcomes to future requirements. The concept is a vital tool that the Army can leverage to develop operational-level thinkers and adaptive leaders as it actively deters and de-escalates conflict in the Pacific.

USARPAC’s innovative approach and I Corps’ dedicated alignment to the Pacific provide additional capabilities and flexible options for the commander of U.S. Pacific Command in addition to enhancing strategic responsiveness. This responsiveness will only be increased in the coming years as the concept is further integrated—as part of the joint force—with air and maritime strategic and theater lift, as well as the continued use of prepositioned equipment sets. Already certified as a joint task force, I Corps has proven it is a strong integrating headquarters and will be the operational lead for future deployments. Through these vital shaping operations, I Corps will continue to build readiness through active employment of its capabilities in support of theater objectives.

The Commanding General, USARPAC, has set a steady-state objective of three 90-day rotational pathway deployments per fiscal year. This construct enables efficient logistical support. It also maximizes engagement opportunities and exchanges with allies and partners within each rotation. These trained and ready forces will also bring additional capabilities to support the more complex bilateral training and exercises requested by partner nations—additional capabilities dedicated for the specific pathway and available because of the efficiencies inherent in the concept.

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5 Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. It challenges commanders to cultivate a bias for action in their subordinates, develop mutual trust and understanding and exercise moral nerve and restraint. For more, see the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Mission Command White Paper,” 3 April 2012, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/missioncommandwhitepaper2012.pdf.
For the first deployment in 2015, USARPAC, in coordination with U.S. Transportation Command, contracted a Military Sealift Command (MSC) Kocak-class operational vessel. This vessel provided enhanced operational capabilities for onboard command and communications, maintenance, medical, rotary-wing aircraft, fueling, bulk water and mess to support deployment and contingency training tasks for 100 onboard military personnel. These capabilities have a direct positive impact on USPACOM training and readiness as well as providing the USPACOM commander enhanced flexibility to respond to crises such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief while the vessel executes Pacific Pathways operations in the Western Pacific.

Complementing the large Kocak-class vessels for Pacific Pathways operations are the Army’s Landing Craft Utility 2000 (LCU 2000) vessels. These smaller operational sealift assets, each with a 13-Soldier crew, are 174 feet long and can carry troops and equipment to austere port environments on the Pacific Rim littorals. Currently there are two LCUs executing missions in support of Pacific Pathways and theater cooperation and engagement events. Their mission is called Pacific Utility and Logistics Support Enabler–Watercraft, or PULSE-W. These Army watercraft enhance strategic responsiveness options by providing the USPACOM commander with increased overall logistics support to joint operations and as a connector to larger vessels for in-stream ship-to-shore transfer and sea-basing. The LCUs will also participate in and support joint and logistics over-the-shore operations throughout 2015 and beyond, thus providing an additional cost-sharing opportunity for all commands involved and reducing costs to the Army while fulfilling joint requirements. Army port operations throughout each stage of this deployment exercise mission command and units’ ability to conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration for future missions and contingencies.

These vessels and crews provide the joint force with flexible, responsive and cost-effective operational sealift capability. They have supported myriad joint operations, including III Marine Expeditionary Force ammunition and equipment movements to exercises; Joint Special Operations Task Force–Pacific retrograde operations; Air Force container movement between Korea and Japan; Joint Munitions Command movements from Korea to Japan; and multiple theater cooperation engagements with U.S. Pacific partners in Japan, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.

Strong demand for these Army maritime assets will continue to develop support relationships for contingency operations, joint exercises, joint opportunity lift and theater cooperation engagement support. To strengthen USARPAC readiness and responsiveness, the Army must stay in motion in the Pacific. Pacific Pathways, PULSE-W and the Logistics Support Vessel forward-deployed concept put USARPAC in motion in the Western Pacific, which pays huge dividends in increased readiness for USARPAC, USPACOM and the joint force. In addition to leveraging Army maritime capabilities, in the future Pacific Pathways will also provide a unique opportunity for integrating the Total Army’s National Guard and Reserve elements, as well as the joint force, to meet specific host-nation engagement requirements.

As this methodology evolves, USARPAC will leverage opportunities such as dual-purpose training; capabilities like humanitarian assistance/disaster relief prepositioned activity sets in partner nations; rotational force deployments; acquisition cross-servicing agreements with partner nations; mutual logistics support agreements; and joint and Army funding mechanisms for enduring resource solutions. Prepositioned activity sets will facilitate pathways employment, other rotational bilateral training opportunities and potential crisis response missions by reducing the high equipment transportation costs inherent in the Indo–Asia–Pacific region.

The Army developed and implemented the Army Operating Concept to mitigate risk worldwide; however, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (also referred to as sequestration) has created disproportional, indiscriminate reductions in the Department of Defense budget that directly impact Army readiness, end-strength and modernization. Sequestration also affects concepts such as Pacific Pathways in reaching their intended goals and objectives despite the best efforts of the leadership. In the Pacific region, with its vast distances, it is critical to demonstrate American resolve and capabilities in a timely manner to prevent conflict, shape the environment and give U.S. forces the best capability to ultimately win the next conflict. Sequestration hampers the strategic responsiveness of the joint force due to the potential for inadequate airlift and sealift. The Army has a sound plan to maximize its capabilities worldwide; it needs to be resourced accordingly. Relief from sequestration is an imperative.