

General Thoughts: Seventy^{-five} Years with the Army



Writings of
General Frederick J. Kroesen
United States Army Retired

Revised edition 2007

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Seventy Years

-five

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**Institute of Land Warfare
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
Arlington, VA 22201-3385**



Cover Design
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Technical Support
Southeastern Printing and Litho

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Originally published as
General Thoughts: Seventy Years with the Army,
edited by Clayton R. Newell
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Revised Edition
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Institute of Land Warfare
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Arlington, Virginia 22201-3385
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
Foreword

Every so often I meet a soldier who is that rare combination of warrior and writer, one who understands the complexities of war and can communicate his insights in common-sense prose. Such a soldier is General Frederick J. Kroesen. During his four decades in uniform he was an active participant in four wars—World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War—and was wounded in each of them. He wears the Combat Infantryman's Badge with two stars awarded for leading troops in combat as a company commander in France during World War II, as a battalion commander in Korea, and as a brigade commander in Vietnam. He also commanded a division in Vietnam.

Along with his deep and abiding appreciation of the rigors and challenges of infantry combat at the tactical level, General Kroesen understands the complexities of planning and preparing for war at higher levels. He commanded two divisions, the 23d (Americus) in Vietnam and the 82d Airborne in the United States, as well as VII Corps in Germany. While wearing four stars, he commanded the U.S. Army Forces Command, served one year as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and completed his active service as the senior commander of the Army's forces in Europe during four years of the Cold War.

General Kroesen's Army service extends beyond his active duty years. Before enlisting in the ROTC program at Rutgers University, he was already well versed in Army life. He grew up with the horse artillery battery his father commanded in the New Jersey National Guard, helping care for the horses and frequently accompanying the unit on field exercises. Since his retirement, he has produced a substantial body of thought-provoking articles and essays that reflect his deep and abiding concern for the future of America's Army and the nation it serves.

This anthology is a revised edition of *General Thoughts: Seventy Years with the Army*, published in 2003. This new edition comprises most of the articles contained in the 2003 version (some selections he wrote while on active duty as well as many of the ARMY magazine articles he has composed as a senior fellow with AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare) plus additional ARMY articles and other items written after the 2003 publication. They are thoughtful reflections on a wide variety of subjects that remain as relevant today as when they were first written. The book is organized topically to make it easy to find subjects of particular interest, and each section includes an introduction that provides background and context. But it is also autobiographical, and I encourage all readers to begin with the very personal first chapter, "General Thoughts—Seventy-five Years with the Army." In it, an extraordinary soldier gives us some insight into his life of service to the Army and the nation.



Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army Retired

24 August 2007

Acknowledgments


It is customary and proper for an author to be allowed space to thank those who have inspired, aided and assisted in his work. I appreciate such an opportunity and want first to thank my colleague, Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army, Retired) Clayton Newell, who is responsible for the organization of the first edition of this book, for the research required to assemble the articles to be considered, and for the judgment of what to include. Without him the project would have floundered indecisively for who knows how long. Closely associated and implementing his efforts, Sandra J. Daugherty and the staff of the Institute of Land Warfare produced the first volume, and she also managed and organized this second edition.

I thank also General (U.S. Army, Retired) Gordon Sullivan, President of AUSA, and Lieutenant General (U.S. Army, Retired) Ted Stroup, who heads the Institute of Land Warfare, for their encouragement and their willingness to make it happen. Mary Blake French, the editor of *ARMY* magazine, has for years rewarded me with opportunities to air my thoughts. And Rowe, my wonderful wife of more than 60 years, has insisted for a long time that I had to do this.


Beyond those few are a host of others—commanders, colleagues and subordinates—who served as role models, mentors, examples and generators of thoughts and ideas, both of how and how not to do things. One of the columns included in this book reveals that I consider my two years of enlisted service as among the best in my overall military education. I hope much of the how and how not of those years is reflected in what I still believe. It is not possible to cite everyone who made such contributions, but I am most appreciative of the inspiration provided by their collective contributions. It is one of my profound regrets that I never expressed adequately my recognition and thanks for the day-to-day contributions and excellence I observed, and from which I benefited so markedly, from that grand host of soldiers with whom I served.

I think what I am really saying is that I want to express my appreciation to the U.S. Army. I have observed it for most of my life and have been inspired by its culture, its history and the people who created its reputation. Everything I believe and everything I've written is reflective of what I learned from that culture and history and those people. If I have managed to convey anything useful in this volume, I owe thanks to an institution that enjoys my profound respect.

This second edition has deleted a number of dated articles from the first and replaced them with columns written in the past five years. I hope that substantively there has been improvement.



August 2007



General Thoughts: Seventy-five Years with the Army

General Thoughts: Seventy-five Years with the Army

My first contact with things Army was at the age of five, when my father put me astride a horse for the first time. We were at the National Guard armory in Lawrenceville, New Jersey, home of the 112th Field Artillery, Headquarters Battery and Batteries B (later D) and F. But my real association began at age ten when my parents moved into the house my father built next door to the armory's far paddock, the one with the pond—a wading pool for the horses. From then on until I went to college, I spent most days at the stables.

I became part of a small group of boys who "hung out," learning to feed, groom and otherwise care for horses and being rewarded by being able to ride almost every day. When our parents allowed, we would hang around on drill nights and watch the Guardsmen in their training activities. In time, naturally, we had to form a club. We named it the Rocking R and, of course, adopted cowboy gear as our preferred garb—ten-gallon hats, blue jeans before they were fashionable, boots if you could afford them, kerchiefs, etc.—all so we could ride our range in style. We soon adopted cowboy names—"Slim Blue" was our leader, the oldest and toughest and best rider of the group—and of course a club logo. **R** adorned just about everything we could attach it to.

One boy was the superintendent's son, so we had an "in" with the management. We garnered a club room, a windowed gable in the hay mow of one of the stables. We watched and learned from the harnessmaker, the blacksmith and the tackmen, and we rode with the truck drivers. We helped unload feed trucks and cut and baled the hay that grew on the armory's grasslands. We helped the attendant at the Red Room (the officers' club) clean up after parties, encouraging him to regale us with stories of what went on the night before. And we were constant companions of the night watchman, a single stableman who was detailed to a lonely, 12-hour vigil every night without us.

After a couple of years we obtained permission to use the riding hall on Friday nights. We could ride—draft horses only, not polo ponies or jumpers, bareback (that is, no saddles)—and we could play games, including broomstick polo (with brooms and a soccer ball). We formed our own polo team, but it was foot polo using

cut-down polo sticks and running around the riding hall as though we were riding horses.

When Fridays became Rocking R nights, we really had to get organized. Our membership was limited to eight boys—no girls allowed—and we had to have rules about our activities, hours of use, care of the horses we rode, and so forth. Membership varied little as the years passed—four boys from Eggerts Crossing, a black community west of the armory, and four from the local white areas. Race was never a consideration for membership and, in fact, never a subject of discussion except when one of our group was insulted or refused service somewhere. Among ourselves we were just equals.

One other boy, Larry Falwell, and I were somewhat more avid in our devotion to horses, and the horse trainer, Sergeant William (Bill) Lawton, began to rely on us more and more as exercise boys and for help in



Young Fritz Kroesen displays his horse "Lady Buck" in 1935.

breaking and training the remounts that came each year from Front Royal, Virginia. The trainer and the officers always selected from among the remounts the horses they believed could be trained for polo and show-jumping, and Larry and I would go to work as unofficial assistants. In my teen years I became quite proud of a number of horses that I thought I had helped train when they made their way to the polo field or the show ring.

My father served in the First World War in Siberia, Russia, as part of the American Expeditionary Force at Vladivostok. He was a Muhlenberg College student in 1917, and he left after one year of college to join the Army and go to war. He somehow was chosen to go to Officer Candidate School at Fort Myer, Virginia, and was commissioned there in February 1918 as a second lieutenant of infantry. I do not know much about his World War I service, but I do know he ended up in Vladivostok and served until about 1920. He was released overseas and spent another few months traveling around the world. From Vladivostok he went to Japan and China and through the Indian Ocean, stopped off at Ceylon, as Sri Lanka was called then, and traveled back to New York through Europe. So he acquired a view of the world that most people didn't have in those days. After returning home, he married his high school sweetheart and began his civilian life. Sometime in the 1920s he joined the New Jersey National Guard, and in about 1928 he became commander of a battery in the 112th Field Artillery at the Lawrenceville Armory in Trenton. By 1940 he was a lieutenant colonel due to command a Quartermaster regiment.

The superintendent at the 112th Field Artillery Armory was First Lieutenant Lyman Burbank. It was his idea to organize a Boy Scout Mounted Troop. It grew out of a summer vacation excursion when a National Guard captain took eight kids on about a ten-day horseback ride from the artillery armory in Lawrenceville, over the Delaware River into Pennsylvania, through Bucks County, and back into Hunterdon and Mercer Counties in New Jersey. Most of us were sons of the National Guard officers in the 112th or were in some way associated with it. I was the youngest—I was nine years old and the oldest were 12 or 13. We had a great time on the trip, a true adventure for young boys.

It was on this trip that Sergeant Bill Lawton, the aforementioned horse trainer, drove our chuckwagon



Frederick J. Kroesen, Sr.

and picked our campsites each day. He was badly sunburned, so we dubbed him "Pinky." He is over 90 years old now and still known as Pinky. Lieutenant Burbank was inspired to organize the first, and I think only, mounted Boy Scout troop in the country. It was recognized and licensed by the Boy Scouts of America. It was supposed to be only for scouts who were at least 15 years old and who had attained First Class rank. Scouts had to apply for and get on a waiting list to join the mounted troop, which was limited to about 50 boys. Lieutenant Burbank had a son who was only 12 and who was not a First Class Scout, and he had me as a next-door neighbor. I was only ten and not even qualified to be a scout, as the minimum age then was 12. Nevertheless, Burbank wanted the two of us to be members of the troop because we both knew how to ride well, and we could show kids that horses were not something to be afraid of. So I became a mounted Boy Scout at the age of ten and remained one until my senior year in high school. During that time, I spent almost every Saturday morning at a Boy Scout meeting and rode horses all year long until the National Guard was mobilized in 1940 and took the horses away with them. It was an interesting organization, and Lieutenant Burbank ran it just as he would a cavalry troop and

contributed some additional understanding of things military among my experiences. The troop held its one and only reunion in 1983, 50 years after its founding. I was happy to be in attendance with a surprising number of the former members.

As a result of those years with horses, I would have preferred to join the cavalry when I joined the Army, but infantry was the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) course at Rutgers, so I became an infantryman. I have never regretted it. As it turned out, after leaving home for college, I did not ride a horse again until after World War II, and I never resurrected my interest in horses.

My father died in 1940, when I was 17 and a senior in high school. We had never talked about his experiences in the Army or his family. For some reason I had not reached the age of curiosity about those things. I never knew much about my ancestors until many years after he died, when I became interested in genealogy, and with some help from others who were doing the same thing, got to learn more about where I came from. My male ancestors were among the first settlers of New Amsterdam. One, who was born in 1639 in the Netherlands, came to this country in 1660, settling in Brooklyn (then Bruecklyn). The woman he married, Nealtje Jans Staats, was born here in 1640; her parents had come to New Amsterdam in the 1630s. My ancestor was one of the first owners of 160 acres of Staten (then Staaten) Island, which he divided between two sons. The Dutch Reformed Church on the north shore of the island has their initials carved in the cornerstone. One brother sold his property and bought 160 acres of Bucks County, Pennsylvania. I'm related to very early settlers of Brooklyn, Staten Island and Bucks County.

My mother's family was German, and they came to the Delaware Valley area in the early 1800s. My parents were high school sweethearts in Phillipsburg, New Jersey, and they married in 1921 after my father came home from Siberia. I was born in Phillipsburg in 1923 in my grandmother's house, which still stands on Heckman Street.

My maternal grandfather, George Lewis Shillinger, owned a general store that he ran while serving in many local political positions. He was the school commissioner, county surrogate and member of the Board of Freeholders among other things. He died in 1913 at age 56, and my grandmother, with the help of her children,

continued to run the store. It was always a treat to visit the store, smell the pickle barrel and coffee grinder, help myself to some candy, and climb the ladder used to reach cans and boxes stacked on shelves that reached to the ceiling.

John George Schillinger (the "c" was later dropped) is my earliest known ancestor in this family, a great-great-grandfather. He was born in Germany in 1791 and came to this country in the 1820s. He was famous in his hometown of Easton, Pennsylvania, as the man who made black walnut rifle stocks that he carried on his back to Philadelphia, 57 or more miles down the Delaware River. He would leave home at 2 a.m., usually on a Saturday, arrive in Philadelphia around 9 p.m., deliver his wares, sleep a few hours, and walk home on Sunday.

When my parents were married, my father went into private business, then worked for the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce in Trenton for a few years before he went into full-time National Guard service as the superintendent at Sea Girt, New Jersey, for three years. He left there to go into business with H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who had left the New Jersey State Police in the late 1930s. The two of them bought the Middlesex Transportation Company. They owned three trucks and were in business for about two years before Johnson



Jean Shillinger Kroesen, Frederick Kroesen's mother

and Johnson bought the truck company. They kept Schwarzkopf on, but in 1938 they let my father go. He had been the executive vice-president. It was not a very good time to be looking for a job, but because of the experience he had in the National Guard and his connection with state officials, he was appointed to the Unemployment Compensation Commission. It was one of those agencies that were started under Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. This one paid compensation to people who had lost jobs.

After World War I, my father was a member of the American Legion, active in the organization when he lived in Phillipsburg. When we moved to Trenton he did not attend meetings or social affairs, although he was still a member. Although he was a Mason in Phillipsburg, he never joined a Masonic lodge in Trenton. He spent his extra time at his National Guard duties, his avocation and second profession. He used to say sometimes, "I wish I had stayed in the Army." He did enjoy it. It was one of those hindsight things, and he would say, "I could have stayed in the Army. I could have gotten a Regular Army commission." I'm not sure how he knew that, and I don't know whether it is true, because the Army was reduced in size quite drastically after World War I, the way it is after every war, and the opportunity to remain was probably questionable. But he occasionally voiced regrets that he had not pursued a full-time military career.

My father expressed himself about the international situation on many occasions, and he was quite prescient in predicting the oncoming of war. That is one reason he was so serious about his National Guard duties. He could foresee the need for military forces, and I was made very much aware of that. He was also farsighted about Communism. He had seen the ruthlessness of the Soviet Communists and the way they expended people when he was in Siberia. He followed events in Europe and warned me early about Hitler, and he warned me early about Josef Stalin and the Communists of Russia.

Having grown up with the National Guard, my early ambition was to become a lieutenant in the National Guard so I could play polo. You had to be an officer to play polo with the 112th Field Artillery and the other National Guard teams from around the state. That was the beginning of my interest in military affairs. I also spent time at Pine Camp (now Fort Drum), New York, at Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania, and one year at

Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, from the time I was about 12 or 13. I went to summer camp with the National Guard and worked for the officers. I kept their tents clean, polished their boots, made their bunks, and those kinds of things. Whenever I could, I would sneak out on the range with the troops, riding on a caisson or on my own horse. I was tolerated as a unit mascot for three or four years, so I had a decided interest in things military. My father encouraged my interest and said he would help me get into West Point if I wanted to go there.

I took the examination for West Point for Congressman D. Lane Powers. I came in about third or fourth place, so I did not receive an appointment that year. My father had planned to send me to a prep school, but when he died, I couldn't pay for it. I wrote to the school and asked if there was a way I could still attend on a scholarship program or by working my way through, but I never heard from them. Since they didn't answer my letter, I took and passed the state exam for a scholarship to Rutgers University. I attended Rutgers because the scholarship paid my tuition, and I thought I could study something that might lead me to a military career.

MY TRIP TO WEST POINT

One Saturday in November I went to West Point to see a football game. Army was going to play Louisiana State.

We had a good time riding thru the mountains.

When we got up there we met some friends. We went straight to the football grounds. Just as we got there the teams came out on the field. It was a very good game. The most exciting part was when the Louisiana State punted and Steeker caught the ball on his own three-yard line. He ran all the way down the field for a touchdown.

At the end of the game the score was Army 20, Louisiana State 0. It was a very good game. I enjoyed it very much.

Fred J. Kroesen, Jr., 4th Grade.

Originally published in Trenton, New Jersey's Lanning Elementary School newspaper in 1931, this is Frederick Kroesen's first known published work.

After my father died, my mother went to work. She was very fortunate, in that she was offered my father's job. He worked for the state of New Jersey and had been relatively close to the governor when he was the superintendent at the National Guard installation at Sea Girt for about three years. In those days, the governor had a summer home there. I believe that because of my father's connection to the governor, my mother was offered his position. She didn't know much about the job initially, but she had some very good help from other people who advised her, coached her and helped her. (One of them, Charles H. McCray, would become my father-in-law.) So within two or three months after my father died, she went to work and was able to support herself.

My mother did not have to contribute to my education because I had a state scholarship, and I worked and saved enough to pay for my expenses. She put my brother through high school and he went on to odd kinds of educational experiences, including some at Rutgers, although he never graduated. He went into the Army in February 1943 and became a pilot in the Army Air Forces. He was commissioned two days before I was, so as a second lieutenant he outranked me, even though he was two years younger. I met him when the war ended. I was in Germany and he was in England, flying B-17 Flying Fortresses. I obtained a one-week leave to London, traveled to his airbase, and surprised him. I walked into his squadron area and found him walking down the street. By that time I was a captain and he was still a second lieutenant, so he never got to exercise his one-time seniority.

When I got to college, I decided try out for the crew. At Rutgers you cannot row on the crew and do much of anything else. You're too tired, in the first place, but there is no time to play baseball or other spring



1942 Rutgers Varsity Crew: Back row (L to R): Fritz Kroesen, Pete Cartmell, Bill Keeler, Joe Puleo, Bob Fardelman, Chris Maggio, Bob Akeson, Ray Finlay. Center: Herb Irwin.

sports when you're rowing. We had only one crew member who also played football. I was fortunate to make the varsity crew in my sophomore year, something of which I've always been proud.

I also worked while I was in college in different kinds of jobs, none of which is very meaningful today. I worked in an airplane factory called Fleet Wings, in Bristol, Pennsylvania, where I carried airplane parts. When a piece of wing, an aileron or rudder would end up at the end of the production line, I would pick it up and deposit it where it was supposed to go for shipment—not a very challenging position, but it was better than being a riveter. I worked for the Pennsylvania Railroad at the freight transfer in Trenton and one summer for the New Jersey State Employment Service, interviewing people who were out of work, trying to place them in new jobs.

I worked for the Thermoid Rubber Company in Trenton for a short time when I ran out of money early in one year. I worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, swinging a one-hand sledgehammer all night where asbestos brake lining was baked. The lining would be put in a form with a lid that had to be wedged closed. I swung the sledgehammer that put the wedges in both

sides of this form and then hung the thing on a big hook to carry it through the oven. At 7:00 a.m., I would leave work, drive to New Brunswick and attend class at Rutgers, sometimes until four in the afternoon. Then I would go home and sleep between five o'clock and ten o'clock, when I would have to get up and go to work. Somewhere in there, my mother would feed me. It was hard physical labor. I stayed with it from November to February breathing asbestos dust, and after awhile the time when I was supposed to be sleeping, I spent coughing and being awake. When I got to the point that I could not stay awake in class or do much of anything else, I decided that the money wasn't worth it. I had paid all my bills, but I think my last paycheck was all the money I had left when I quit that job.


Because of my father's influence, I was aware of the international scene and was not surprised when the war came along and we got involved. But I was surprised at the way it happened—it wasn't the Japanese that I thought were going to attack us. Nobody, in those days, seemed to give any credence to the Japanese being able to do such a thing. I was walking down College Avenue in New Brunswick on 7 December 1941 when somebody yelled out the window of the fraternity house and said, "The Japs have just bombed Pearl Harbor!"

In August 1942 I signed up in the Army's Enlisted Reserve Corps, a necessary step for acceptance into the advanced ROTC course at Rutgers. Then in March 1943, ROTC ended, and I was ordered into active service as a private (E-1), along with 60 or 70 of my classmates. The infantrymen among us were sent for basic training to Fort McClellan, Alabama, for what was supposed to be a 13-week course. We started out in

Company A of the 9th Battalion, but after about six or seven weeks of training, that company was disbanded and we all went to Company B of the 14th Battalion and started the program all over again. Six or seven weeks into that cycle, the Army increased basic training to 17 weeks. We were in our 12th week when we found ourselves transferred again, this time to Company B of the 23d Battalion, where we lost a few more weeks of training. As a result, it took about six months before what we came to think of as the "Black 50" (50 unlucky infantrymen from Rutgers) finally finished basic training. From there, after a brief stop back at Rutgers, we went to Fort Benning, Georgia, to attend the Infantry Officer Candidate School (OCS). In August 1944, I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the infantry. This was about two months after I would have been commissioned if the Rutgers ROTC program had not been terminated so our entry into the service could be "accelerated." I have never begrudged those two years of enlisted service, however, recalling them even now as two of the best years of military education I ever received—and during the course of my career, I attended a regular succession of the Army's schools, including the War College.

Those two years ingrained in me a deep respect for Army training methods and the value of longer periods of training. The Rutgers Black 50, after those six months of basic and four months of OCS, went to war. More than 40 of us went to infantry and tank platoons in combat, and not one of us was killed in World War II. There is a lot of luck associated with that fact, but I have always thought that our extra months of training, boringly repetitious sometimes, back-breaking and stressful most of the time, had much to do with our good fortune. I have been an advocate of longer training periods for new soldiers ever since.

My first assignment as a second lieutenant was to the 63d Infantry Division at Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi, where I became the Weapons Platoon Leader in Company E, 254th Infantry. Two months later I accompanied the unit to France. The company deployed with about 200 men, and from November 1944 to the end of the war in May 1945 we fought the Colmar campaign in northern France, then through the Maginot and Siegfried lines. We crossed the Rhine, the Neckar and finally the Danube at Leipheim in Bavaria, where the company suffered the last of its many combat casualties. My first sergeant told me that he had



Photograph of Private Kroesen's Enlisted Reserve Corps identification card.

accounted for the names of about 660 men who had deployed with the company or were added or dropped and rejoined during that period of combat. In May, only 44 of the original 200 men in the company were left, 16 of whom had been wounded, evacuated, then returned to duty. That number includes about 15 administrative personnel who did no fighting, so only 29 of the original fighting men remained, and only 13 of those were there the entire time. All in all, it was an exciting and terrifying experience, for which we were awarded two Presidential Unit Citations, the Arms of the City of Colmar and the French Fourragere.

I was the only officer of the six originally assigned who was still with the company when the war ended and the only one of 16 who served in the company from Camp Van Dorn to the end of the war. I had a number of close calls during the fighting which made me fully appreciate the dangers that face infantry soldiers in combat. In the Colmar Pocket in December 1944, I was with the 3d Platoon in a farmhouse taken over from a French unit. We had one squad in the buildings and two in the snow outside. Enemy mortars started a fire in a barn attached to the house, and we left the house for foxholes. Getting the platoon deployed and organized left me little time to dig my own foxhole. At dawn, I was digging a hole, down only 18 inches in the frozen ground, with two othermen, Whitney and Flynn, when three or four mortar concentrations bracketed our position. We decided that as the only exposed Americans, we were certainly the target, so we chose discretion over valor and escaped to our company headquarters in town, arriving unscathed. We rejoined the platoon that afternoon after dark.

In January we were on a road march to Jebsheim, France. The column was at a halt awaiting progress of Company F, leading the battalion into town. I was seated on the edge of a foxhole talking to Kereszturi, a machine gunner, when a German tank about 500 meters away fired an antitank solid shot round. It hit Kereszturi in the shoulder, and he was killed instantly; I was unscathed. Later, we were deployed in an open field west of Jebsheim planning to pass through Company F to enter the town. I was lying in a shallow slit trench with a small parapet when an enemy mortar shell landed on the parapet and failed to explode.


We thought that occupying Jebsheim would be a mopping-up exercise, but the Germans surprised us with a heavy defense. As the weapons platoon leader, I was



In 1943, Private Kroesen went to basic training at Fort McClellan, Alabama. While there, he was quartered in a tarpaper shack with 23 other trainees.

moving to reconnoiter the 1st Platoon position. I approached a barn just as an enemy mortar shell came through the roof. Lieutenant Mac White was wounded and evacuated, never to return.

During the fighting I was escorting Lieutenant Dan Van Sant, who had been wounded and gone for weeks, back to his 3d Platoon at a street junction. We climbed to the second floor of a house and were peering through shutter slits so I could show him where the platoon was deployed when a burst of enemy machinegun fire came through the window and struck him in the arm and shoulder. We were standing shoulder to shoulder, but I was not scratched. Van Sant was evacuated and received his second Purple Heart for less than two days of combat. He never returned to the company. One evening after dark, I was escorting the company executive officer, Lieutenant George Rogerson, from the command post to a forward position. As we were walking in the street, an enemy machine-gun burst struck Rogerson behind his right ear. I was just ahead or just behind him but offset enough inches to be



In May 1945, First Lieutenant Joe Archer, Captain Kroesen and First Lieutenant Ken Mancini pose for this photo in Aub, Germany, celebrating the end of World War II.

untouched. Rogerson was evacuated and returned in April as the assistant battalion executive officer. On another night, I decided to relieve Lieutenant Warren Maupin, the 2d Platoon leader, on watch in the second floor window. I called to him that I was coming up, and as we met at the top of the stairs, an enemy machine-gun burst struck him in the arm but missed me. Maupin was evacuated and never returned.

During the fighting in Jebenheim, all the company lieutenants were wounded and all except me were evacuated, but we had earned our first Distinguished Unit Citation. When our captain, Howard Wilcox, was called to be the battalion executive officer, I suddenly found myself in command, a position I held until the war ended.

Another close call occurred when we were attacking the Siegfried Line in March 1945. I was accompanying Jack Whitney, an original weapons platoon member who had earned a battlefield commission, to his new assignment with the 2d Platoon when an enemy shell exploded in close proximity to us. Whitney was hit in the knee; I was untouched. He was evacuated and never returned. It was his first day of combat as a second lieutenant.

There were many other dangerous occasions during that war, but I never seemed to be in as close proximity to the danger as I had been in Colmar and the Siegfried Line. Artillery fire, strafing by enemy and friendly aircraft, and tank and small arms fire struck others around me, but I ended the war thinking I had had a charmed life.

Three small unit actions taught me lessons about combat that I remembered for the rest of my career. First, I claim to have been the commander of the first company in Seventh Army to attack the Siegfried Line, an honor that devolved as a happenstance. The Army plan provided that the veteran 3d and 45th Divisions would be the main effort in the penetration of the Siegfried, with the 63d Division moving in support on their left flank. One of our regiments was to seize a hill mass short of the fortified positions; then my regiment, in a column of battalions, with my battalion in a column of companies, would attack the Siegfried. Company E was the lead company in that formation and because the 63d's operation went very well, my company hit the pillboxes, trenches, dragon's teeth and wire entanglements before either the 3d or 45th's units got there.

The company performed very well, capturing bunkers, moving through the trench lines and taking prisoners as we went. We beat off one counterattack, then late in the afternoon suffered through another. At that point I had three platoon leaders yelling on their radios and sending runners to tell me they were out of ammunition, had suffered too many casualties and feared they would have to surrender when another German attack came. Taking counsel of our fears, I withdrew the company to the best defensible terrain I could find before I set out to find my battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel William J. Bryan, to tell him what I had done, all without any direction or authority from him.

I expected I was in trouble, but when I reached the battalion command post I attacked the staff for allowing me to run out of ammunition, for not committing another company to help and for whatever else came to mind. I was exhausted, mad at the world and uncaring about what was to happen next.

The following morning Company F passed through my position and attacked the same area again. What a surprise when they found no enemy, just a dozen empty pillboxes that we had abandoned the night before, a key segment of the Siegfried that no one

occupied for nine or ten hours. Company F proceeded rapidly to complete the penetration of the line, allowing the waiting tank battalions of the 6th Armored Division to pass through and exploit the breakthrough. Things proceeded so rapidly thereafter that no one except me seemed to remember my maladroit handling of the situation. But I learned a lesson: Persevere; when all seems lost, all resources expended, remember that the other guy has been fighting as long as you have and just might be in worse shape than you are.

Weeks later in Wuerzburg, after days of leading the attack, Company E got a respite—battalion reserve—while Companies F and G attacked abreast. What a disappointment when that afternoon Company F, with a tank destroyer platoon attached, was stopped cold by enemy holed up in the small town of Reinsberg and our battalion commander told me to right things. We had been following Company G and were already abreast of Reinsberg and in position for a flanking attack. I deployed the company, two platoons abreast, and we moved across open fields until fire from the town caused everyone to hit the dirt. At the same time a platoon of four Sherman tanks hove into view behind me, then charged into the fray, a second lieutenant in a lead tank waving to me and pointing at Reinsberg. As I was giving hand and arm signals to get my infantrymen up and running, my radio operator told me I had a call from Colonel Bryan. I had to stop and

hunker down with a radio to learn that a tank platoon was being attached, a bit of news I didn't really need at that moment and an interruption I could have done without. However, at the instant I had to stop for the radio's call, I saw Private First Class Clifford Wise jump to his feet, wave his arm at others and take off running in the middle of those tanks. In five minutes it was all over as the whole company followed Wise into the town, and five minutes after that I was on the radio to the Company F commander with a snide "Okay, it's safe for you to come in now!" I thought Company F should have done the same things Company E did.

I wasn't at all grateful at the time, but I learned two things: first, that tanks are an invaluable enabler for an infantry assault—this was our first experience of having tanks immediately available, attached for my use. From then until the end of the war I pleaded, argued and fought to have that platoon with me every day, learning more all the time about tank-infantry cooperation. (As an aside, it was that experience that led me to choose to attend the Armor School Advance Course five years later.)

The second lesson was the recognition of the impact that one soldier can have. PFC Wise, in one impetuous moment, had galvanized a whole company to charge hell-bent into what might have been withering enemy fire—considering Company F's situation—and demoralized an enemy force. I had seen many brave actions by Company E soldiers prior to this, but this was when I realized what an Audie Murphy or Alvin York can mean to a combat action.

Late one April afternoon sometime later, the 1st Platoon led the company toward the town of Gros Altdorf, our final objective for the day. The town lay 500 meters ahead, behind a railroad embankment and in front of a large, wooded hill. As the platoon moved down a slope following a road into town, they came under the greatest volume of enemy fire we had experienced since the Siegfried Line. Machine guns, mortars, artillery and tank fire poured down, and as I moved forward to learn what was happening I saw Lieutenant Frank Donovan, the 1st Platoon leader, standing in the road with pistol drawn, ordering his men not to panic and run. Another artillery concentration convinced them that Donovan's .45 was a lesser threat, and the whole platoon dashed back over the crest behind them.



Captain Kroesen was an Assistant Motor Officer of 7748 Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT) at the time the unit was disestablished. He held this position in 1947 in Karlsruhe, Germany.

While Donovan got reorganized, I probed the approach with squads from the other platoons, finally deciding it was mass suicide to try to assault that town. Instead I conceived a plan for a night attack. I left the company in Donovan's hands and went to the rear seeking my battalion commander. When I explained our situation and my plan, I was very disappointed to hear, "The 253d [a sister regiment] will get ahead of us if you are not in that town by nightfall."


I argued that the Germans were not going to attack the flank of the 253d in that 500 meters I had not crossed, that I would still be in Gros Altdorf at dawn when we were scheduled to continue on, and that a night attack would deny German observation and fire on our movement. It was then I learned that the deciding factor was that the 253d would be getting ahead of us and my 254th regimental commander would not be happy.

In a state only slightly below the apoplectic, I said, "Colonel Bryan, my rifle company will go with me anywhere I lead them, but this time they will be going because you are leading them. Just let me know when you are ready."

After a short, deathly silence, a reexamination of the night attack plan resulted in approval of what I wanted to do. The night attack captured the town at a cost of one casualty—one soldier wounded when he triggered an antipersonnel mine. As we entered one corner of the town, the Germans, aware of our presence, pulled out. The sounds of departing tanks and artillery in a situation like that generate a decided sense of relief, no matter that in the morning you'll be wondering where you'll run into them again.

I learned from that small episode that a commander's responsibility for the lives and welfare of his men demands that he risk the wrath of a superior to fight for what is right. I don't know what caused Colonel Bryan to change his mind that afternoon, but I do know it was worth my career if necessary to save the lives I was sure would be lost if we had attempted a daylight attack.

All of those small lessons, learned in rifle company operations hardly meaningful in the Great War, were useful to me on later occasions in my career. I don't recall ever again flirting with insubordination, but there were occasions when I did not hesitate to speak my mind as forcefully as I knew how. And there were occasions when I reminded myself that as bad as things seemed, just maybe the other guy was finding them worse.



Rowene Wilder McCray left Penn State University to marry Corporal Kroesen on his way to Officer Candidate School.

V-E Day, 8 May 1945, came shortly after we had crossed the Danube to capture Leipheim. I was nine months out of OCS, already a captain and now convinced that I wanted a career in the Army. That conviction suffered questions and qualms for the next 20 years, but they were never serious enough to change my mind.

I remained in Germany after the war, serving in the 36th and 100th Divisions, then in an intelligence agency. The 7748th FIAT (Field Information Agency, Technical) was a unit established to exploit German industry. During the war it had been called the T-Force. After the war it received its more formal designation and pursued a mission of inviting representatives of American industry to visit German factories, laboratories and other industrial sites for the purpose of discovering techniques, processes or hardware that might be useful in the United States. I was one of six lieutenants and captains who planned the excursions and traveled with them around the American Zone. I visited or drove through most of the towns and on most of the roads in Hesse, Baden, Wuertemburg and Bavaria and learned a great deal about how German industry had survived the war before I returned home to the United States in 1947.

My wife (Rowene Wilder McCray), who had left Penn State University to marry me when I was a corporal on my way to OCS, joined me in Germany in 1946, one of the first dependents to arrive. The Army was not foreign to her. As a child she had accompanied her parents on a three-year Army tour when her father, another World War I veteran, was recalled for Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) duty. Then she was re-acquainted with "the Army way" at Fort Benning while I attended OCS. Now we were establishing our first household, and after a couple of false starts we were enjoying a large house, two maids, a gardener and someone to stoke the furnace. We were blessed with our first child, a daughter, in 1947. It was not a happy time when I put them on a plane to fly home, then waited almost two months to follow on a troop ship. That was to be only the first of many of those times that are not counted as "separations" when Army families are apart. We were still to learn about maneuvers, field training exercises, temporary duty, short school periods, and who knows what else that do not count when the Army adds up the time between "hardship tours."

When the Korean War came along in 1950, I was attending the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with orders to go to jump school and then to the 82d Airborne Division, my first troop duty since 1945. After two years at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, I went to Japan

and then to Korea with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT), where I saw combat as an acting battalion commander. Battalion command was a heady experience for me. I went to Korea as a battalion executive officer, but within a day or two my battalion commander left on emergency leave and I was in command of the 1st Battalion. It was only about six weeks to the end of the war, but there was a lot of excitement during the last Chinese offensive. I had another close call in June 1953 when I was visiting my rifle companies on Hill 604. All was quiet, so I chanced a run across the forward slope of the hill. An enemy direct-fire weapon took at least three shots at me before I crossed the military crest only slightly wounded. Fortunately, the charm was still working. While commanding the 1st Battalion, I had ample opportunity to learn more about leadership, command and the functioning of a staff. Brigadier General William Westmoreland was the commander of the 187th RCT at the time, and it served me well to be on his "remembered" list as he went on to be promoted to four stars and become the Chief of Staff of the Army.


That command experience also served me well when the regiment returned to Japan. The regimental executive officer was replaced by the 2d Battalion commander and, although I was still a major, I inherited another battalion command position. I spent the next 14



Major Kroesen (standing at left) points out a phase of a training demonstration at Mori, Kyushu Island, Japan, to (from left) General John E. Hull, Brigadier General Roy E. Linquist and Colonel Henry K. Benson in June 1954. (U.S. Army photo by PFC Gene Crosswhite)

months testing my training ideas, learning command responsibilities, and promoting professionalism and the cohesion of the units of the battalion. I initiated one program that I thought innovative when I proposed that every platoon leader plan, organize and execute his own field training exercise. I did not care whether he built a defensive position, attacked a hill, went scouting and patrolling, or engaged in any other of the myriad things a platoon might do, but he had to move to the field in one of our training areas and spend at least three days there. If he forgot something, he did without (e.g., rations, water, ammunition or perhaps his return transport). If his platoon was without something to eat or drink for a day or two, or if they had to walk 20 miles on their return trip, he learned some lessons he would not forget again.

That year also had an occasion when we found ourselves preparing war plans. Not widely known then or now, when Dien Bien Phu fell our commander, Brigadier General Roy Linquist, was warned that the 187th would be the first unit to go if the United States decided to send help to the French in Vietnam. That was in 1954.



In July 1968, Colonel Kroesen discussed daily operations during Operation Pocahontas Forest with battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Fred Cully in Vietnam.

I returned to the States in January 1955, in command of the advance party when the regiment returned to Fort Bragg. The move was part of Operation Gyroscope, an early experiment in unit rotation, as the 508th RCT replaced the 187th in Japan. I served with the 187th until July 1955 when I left to attend the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

My next assignment was with the Army Security Agency (ASA) where I became a member of the ASA Board. My job was research and studying ways and means to improve ASA support for the combat forces. I spent more than two years learning wargaming and other research techniques and had my first exposure to contracting for civilian services and support for an Army program. For those two years I was a COTR (contract officer's technical representative), drawing up and then executing the terms of a contract with a civilian firm. It was a side-track to a normal infantry career pattern, but the war-games kept me involved with tactical planning and operations, and it was an eye-opening education in signals intelligence and security.

It was during that assignment that I observed that our intelligence system is organized to pass information upward, to inform immediately the Secretary of Defense and the President while just incidentally passing the word down to battalion and brigade commanders. I spent years thereafter complaining to my intelligence colleagues, but only recently has there been a change in the thrust of their efforts.

Then I attended the Armed Forces Staff College, my first exposure to joint and combined operations, before shipping off to Thailand for a tour with the joint military advisory group there. For a number of reasons my family had not joined me in Japan after the Korean War, so Thailand was the first family overseas tour in 12 years, and the first ever for the two children we had added. The trip to Bangkok began with something of an adventure.

As we passed the point of no return on our 14-hour flight over the Pacific, our plane lost an engine. Our pilot reassured the passengers that we would be quite safe on three engines and oh, yes, an Air-Sea Rescue Service plane was being dispatched to escort us. That last announcement generated much consternation and conversation about why that was necessary if we were all quite safe on three engines. Four hours later the agitation had died down when the pilot announced that



In August 1968, 196th Brigade Commander Colonel Kroesen is in Antenna Valley, just west of the Que Son District in Vietnam. (U.S. Army photograph)

the Air-Sea Rescue plane was coming up on the port side. Those at the port windows saw an old B-17 Flying Fortress arrive and then disappear off the tail, never to be seen again. The B-17's top speed of 180 knots could not match the more than 300 knots we were still doing on our DC-7's three engines. We finally got to Tokyo 12 hours late for our 24-hour layover. In due course we completed 33 hours of flying before landing in Bangkok in hot, rainy July, not quite ready for our next adventure.

Thailand was another digression from an infantryman's pattern. My colleagues were all up-country with infantry divisions, regiments and battalions when I reported to Colonel Arthur K. (Bill) Amos, a great but irascible infantryman himself, who informed me that I was going to be the advisor to the Royal Thai Army Logistics College. He greeted me with, "They don't know a damn thing about combat logistics out there. The whole damn curriculum is about industrial production and labor relations and government controls and—damn it, you're going to teach them how to provide logistics

support to the Army in the field." I expressed some reservations about my qualifications for such a task before he said, "Damn it, you've had two tours in combat so you know what you needed, now go out there and tell 'em how to get it to you."

While my wife searched for a house for us to rent, I gathered my four pages of notes on Leavenworth's explanation of the Army's new COSTAR (Combat Support to the Army) organizations that I would study and use to revamp the Thai Logistics College's curriculum. Mine was not a popular intrusion into a comfortable faculty that had been teaching the same lessons in only two three-month courses annually for many years. But once again I broadened my knowledge base, all the while advocating those things an American "expert" was supposed to know how to teach. I did not receive a Thai decoration upon my departure from that position, but I did receive high marks from Bill Amos.

Returning again to the United States, I attended the Army War College in 1961 and, following my student year, I spent three years as a member of the faculty. It was family time. Four years through the same high school for our older daughter, through junior high for our son, and through grammar school for the youngest. It was Boy Scouts, Little League, the Teenage Club, swimming pools, bowling and all the things kids do. Family life was "normal" while I was absorbing more education, dispensed by high-level military, government and esteemed people from around the world. It was an ideal mid-career respite.

Just two months before the United States committed Army forces to Vietnam, I was ordered to the Pentagon, where I spent three years in force development helping expand the Army to 1.5 million soldiers. My bosses there deemed me so essential that they would not release me for a command assignment until the spring of 1968. Once again I had been thrust into an assignment for which I had little or no preparation. Force development and force management were subjects unknown to the Army outside of a small group in the Pentagon charged with the functions, a condition that continued until the formation of the Army's Force Management School in 1995.

I entered the field just as the Army deployed the 173d Airborne Brigade to Vietnam. Simultaneously the Army was authorized an endstrength increase of 133,000

and directed to add one division and three separate brigades to its structure. Three years later the Army had grown from 950,000 to about 1,500,000 soldiers and had more than 400,000 of them in Vietnam. The Army program, which was needed to identify the units to be formed, to assemble the personnel and materiel to fill those units, and to train them for their combat missions, was centered in the Plans and Programs Directorate of ACSFOR (Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development).

In my three years in that job I came to think that my office was running everything in the Army except combat operations, their logistics support and the school system. Satisfying COMUSMACV (Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) demands for structure entailed dovetailing manpower, materiel and money requirements into the annual budget, limited each year by the Defense Department's assumption that the war would end during the fiscal year. Coupling these demands with sustaining the Cold War credibility of our forces in Europe and Korea and with the needs to program new equipment, such as Hawk battalions, into the Army was a worthy and time-consuming challenge. We are forever indebted to a small group of dedicated, selfless staff officers who served during those years of

Army "buildup" plans to make possible the commitment of the forces needed for the Vietnam War.

I found the quantity and quality of paperwork in the Pentagon astounding and appalling, so I set about a one-man effort to do something about it. I began by demanding that my office write brief and clear messages, letters and reports, employing simple, direct sentences and all approved abbreviations and acronyms. I do not recall having much impact on that Army-wide problem, but upon my departure my subordinates rendered me the Blue Pencil Award, which hangs proudly among the mementos of my career. I was so touched by the award that I continued my quest for 15 more years, much to the delight, I am sure, of other generations of staff officers.

I finally got to Vietnam to command the 196th Light Infantry Brigade of the Americal Division. I may have been the first brigade commander to keep his job for 12 months, all others having been caught in the short-sighted six-month rotation policy of the Pentagon's people managers. While serving in Vietnam, I earned my third Combat Infantryman's Badge—one of my proudest possessions—and my second Purple Heart, having already received one in World War II. I had been wounded in the Korean War also, but never reported to




Colonel Kroesen with six of the fourteen battalion commanders who served in the 196th Infantry Brigade in 1968 and 1969.

the aid station, hence never claimed my Purple Heart for that war.

My assignment to the Americal Division was a surprise. When I left the United States I was traveling on orders to command the Riverine Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, but upon arrival in Vietnam I was greeted by an officer who said, "Sir, if you will give me your baggage ticket you can wait for me over there on that L-20. We're going to Chu Lai." Thus I learned something about personnel management in wartime—managers at MILPERCEN (Military Personnel Center) filled requests from USARV (United States Army, Vietnam) with specific names for specific slots; MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), however, citing the uncertainties of combat requirements, could ignore those assignments and use the arriving officer as they saw fit. In my case, a request by the Americal Division commander, Major General Sam Koster, resulted in my assignment to command the 196th Infantry Brigade. I will never know what I missed by not being in the 9th Infantry Division, but my assignment to the Americal could not have been more rewarding.

First, I inherited a brigade that had an exceptional staff and knowledgeable, experienced battalion commanders. We had a structure unique to only four other brigades in the theater—i.e., we had our own organic field artillery battalion, support battalion, assault engineer company and aviation detachment while still enjoying the ability to call on the normal division supporting elements to reinforce our actions. In later years, when the Army engaged in "tooth-to-tail" studies and struggled to reduce the size of its divisions, I was always a voice observing that the 24,000-man Americal Division was a very good organization for combat.

Shortly after I assumed command, the brigade was ordered to conduct Operation Pocahontas Forest, a foray to move farther west in Quang Tin Province than the division had ever before ventured. For almost six weeks we established new fire bases and prowled the jungle, but with little effect. The enemy chose to retire rather than fight. Nevertheless, it was a valuable



The Kroesen family in their backyard, 1968: (L to R) daughters Karen and Gretchen, wife Rowe and son Frederick III (with Hansel).

operation from my standpoint. I was able to put in practice my theories of command and leadership and to convince subordinate commanders and staff officers that I meant it when I preached:

1. This is a commander's organization and all decisions are made by commanders. Staff officers cannot say "no" to a commander. If a commander's request cannot be fulfilled, the staff must convince me and I will say "no."
2. Operations are conducted under mission-type orders wherein subordinates are told what to do, not how to do it. Subordinates make decisions, take action and employ resources to accomplish their missions without interference or micromanagement from on high.
3. The brigade staff will work for subordinate battalion commanders, striving to fulfill their needs for successful operations. (Philosophically, my intent

- here is to focus a staff outward and downward, on supporting operations rather than on pleasing the brigade commander or higher headquarters.)
- The brigade will function properly when all leaders from squad leader to battalion commanders are making decisions and taking action appropriate to their positions in the command chain. Each decisionmaker then reports: "Here's what I found, here's what I am doing about it, here's why I am doing it, and here's what I need to do it better."

During Pocahontas Forest, six of the 11 maneuver battalions in the division came under control of the 196th Brigade, a tremendous challenge and excellent training for the brigade staff and supporting elements. At the conclusion of the operation we were calling ourselves the 196th Light Infantry Division and looking for new worlds to conquer. I proposed to our new division commander, Major General Charlie Gettys, that with one more battalion we could turn south and clear the area west of the 198th Brigade's AO (area of operations). Initially he agreed and a seventh battalion was added to the 196th task organization, but a day or two later, before any action was initiated, General Gettys realized that a

7-2-2 line-up of battalions in brigades was not a balanced way to conduct divisional operations. The 196th went back to being a four-battalion organization, and the 198th pursued the enemy to their west.

It was after Pocahontas Forest that General Gettys informed me that he had asked General Creighton Abrams, the new COMUSMACV, to extend my command tour from the standard six months to a full year. I was most pleased when the request was approved because I personally wanted to stay on and because I thought the six-month rotation policy both ridiculous and a disservice to troops. There is no way to build consistency and stability in an organization when the command chain is in constant flux, thus no way to generate esprit de corps or to sustain morale at a high level.

My one-year tour in command provided, among many lessons, an appreciation for a weakness in the Army's efficiency report system. During that year, ten of the 11 maneuver units of the division were attached at one time or another to the 196th for operations. As a result of that and of the normal rotation policy, I was required to rate 14 different infantry battalion commanders. At the time we were using a report form requiring a comparative rating and each commander



America Division commanders in November 1971, just prior to inactivation.



*Major General Kroesen assumes command of the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) on 19 March 1972.
(U.S. Army photo by SP5 Morris D. Gannon)*

was identified as number one of six, or three of seven or some such number. Since almost all ratings were being given upon the termination of a commander's tour, he was at the time the longest serving and the most experienced, and had invariably done a commendable job, so it was easy to rate him high on the scale.

Realizing that my ratings were almost all ones and twos, when I returned to the United States I visited the Chief of the Infantry Branch at MILPERCEN and offered a summary rating of the 14 commanders, one in which I would indicate those I thought had qualified to go to the War College or ultimately to become general officers. His reaction was, "Please don't. I wouldn't know what to do with the information—there's no way to enter it into the system." He had identified what I thought then to be a weakness in the system, one that I continued to believe should be rectified in later years as I continued to rate colonels and lieutenant colonels but had little opportunity to make comparative judgments of their potential for future service.

I returned to the Pentagon for two more years in a position one level higher than I had been before, this time as a brigadier general. Once again I learned something about the personnel management system.

My initial orders as a brigadier general were to report to Fort Hood, Texas, to be the chief of staff of III Corps. Instead, my boss, the ACSFOR, Lieutenant General Art Collins, marched down the hall to the Army Chief of Staff's office to declare my essentiality as a force manager. The Chief of Staff, General William Westmoreland, acquiesced and I went back to work, this time tearing down the structure that I had spent three years building.

Under the Nixon administration, as we "Vietnamized" the war, the Army lost five divisions and about half of its endstrength, the draft ended, and VOLAR (Volunteer Army) was adopted. "The Army wants to join you" became the recruiting theme, barracks were painted in pastel colors, and leaders held meetings at which soldiers expressed their concerns and made recommendations about how to run things.

I was happy to be a staff officer during that period, but the challenges associated with reducing the force were just as great as had been those of expanding it. Balancing structure, manpower, materiel and money to meet strategic requirements, sustain readiness and modernize the force and its facilities put me once again at what I was convinced was a main part of the centerpiece that ran the Army.

Less than two years later I was given about ten days' notice to report to COMUSMACV as his J-3 (operations officer). My wonderful wife sold a house, moved furniture and family, and helped me get ready to go. As I had been ordered to report wearing the insignia of a major general (I was on the promotion list), my wife and daughter pinned on my second stars in our hotel room just before delivering me to the airport for my trip to Saigon.

My J-3 assignment lasted less than three weeks. General Abrams, COMUSMACV, decided to relieve the commanding general of the Americal Division and selected me to be his replacement. To say I was pleased is a colossal understatement. Becoming a division commander had been a hope ever since I had learned of my promotion to brigadier general, and to take command, even of a division due to be inactivated in only five months, was the fulfillment of a career ambition.

Nevertheless, it was with some foreboding that I planned my next-morning trip from Saigon to Chu Lai. Just hours earlier, General Abrams had learned the



In May 1972, Major General Kroesen receives his Distinguished Service Medal from General Creighton Abrams at the end of his second tour in Vietnam at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

America soldiers had planned an antiwar demonstration on the beach at Chu Lai for their Fourth of July celebration. He had learned also that the acting commander planned no action to prohibit or prevent the demonstration. My hurried movement was conjoined with his instructions to forestall any antiwar activity and to do whatever was necessary to restore the effectiveness of the America Division. Accomplishing the first task was merely the passing on of COMUSMACV's orders and expecting them to be obeyed. The second task was more demanding since I was quite unaware of what problems might be affecting the division's performance.

I held an early commanders' meeting followed immediately by a staff meeting. At both I expressed the command philosophy I had developed as a brigade commander and established my claim to the legitimacy of my knowledge of the mission of the division, the area of operations and ARVN (Army of Vietnam) 2d Division, with whom we were partnered. I also expressed my personal personnel policy that I followed every time I assumed command of an organization. I explained that I believed every soldier had somehow in the past proved his right to the insignia of rank he was wearing and further, that he had demonstrated qualities and capabilities to do the job to which he was now assigned. No one was to fear a "house-cleaning" of personnel, and I said to them, "Let's just get on with what has to be done."

But I found I had worries. The division was overstrength, yet its rifle companies in the field averaged

fewer than 50 men, despite which they were still sent on company missions designed for full-strength units. I found security to be quite lax in the division's base compound, where barbed wire fences had collapsed and fighting positions deteriorated while the division engineer battalion was building basketball courts on firebases instead of refurbishing defenses. Otherwise, I found the command in good condition, with confident commanders and staffs functioning well, and the entire support establishment sustaining the force well logically.

The personnel strength problems were twofold. First was the common practice of moving men to the rear. It had become normal that after six months in the field, jobs were found in the rear area for men waiting out the completion of their tours. Thus those rifle companies I worried about had more men in their rear areas than they had in the field. I knew it would be traumatic, but I ordered the rear areas emptied and required that no company of less than 100 men would be assigned a combat mission.

But I also found that the division had four or five thousand ghosts, men assigned but never joined (my status two years earlier with the 9th Infantry Division), men wounded and evacuated but never dropped from the rolls, and men who had shipped out at the end of their tours but were still being carried as present for duty. Straightening out that problem to the satisfaction of USARV became a 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week job for the division's adjutant general, and it still took weeks to solve.

The security problem stemmed from the success the division had enjoyed in its AO over the previous three years. For those who had been there earlier, myself included, it was apparent the war had been won, that the enemy threat was almost nonexistent. The division had accomplished the mission of denying enemy use of Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces, and the local population was pursuing peacetime interests with little thought about security.

The debacle at Firebase Mary Ann in March of 1971 was a shock. The North Vietnamese still had the capability to infiltrate the area and launch effective

strikes in selective locations. The perceived inadequacies of the division chain of command during the Mary Ann fight had instigated my assignment and now, almost three months later, gave me leverage in my demands for improving security. We didn't do anything spectacular, but in the division's last months in country, we had no more newsworthy attacks on our installations.

Beginning in September, the division began to evaporate. One battalion at a time was inactivated, the personnel dispersed, and most of the equipment and installation facilities were turned over to the 2d ARVN Division. All in all it was a very efficient, workmanlike administrative dismantling, directed by Colonel Bob Malley, the Division Support Command commander, and carried on simultaneously with continued combat patrolling and actions necessary to guarantee that the enemy would make no use of the area. In November the division sergeant major and I carried the American flag back to the United States and took part in a simple inactivation ceremony that removed the 23d Infantry (American) Division from the active roles of the Army.



On 10 November 1972, 82d Airborne Division Commander Major General Kroesen prepares for a routine proficiency jump at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

I returned to Vietnam to be the deputy commander of the XXIV Corps, again overseeing the redeployment of units to the United States and the dismantling of the corps. In March of 1972 the corps colors left for Japan and a new headquarters, the FRAC (First Regional Assistance Command), was organized with me as the first commander. Nine days later the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) launched their Easter offensive. The FRAC had been organized initially to concentrate on administrative and logistical matters. It was MACV's intent that henceforth all combat requirements would be handled by ARVN commands. But the NVA attack soon revealed weaknesses in the ARVN I Corps headquarters capabilities and immediate steps were necessary to restore the XXIV Corps G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 (Operations) functions to coordinate the air-ground efforts needed to stem the enemy offensive.

Another exciting period of combat ensued as the North Vietnamese captured Quang Tri Province and the South Vietnamese initiated the actions required to reclaim it. Before I could complete that task, however, I departed Vietnam to take command of the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Except for my tour as a rifle company commander in 1945 and my other combat tour commands, the assignment to the 82d was the best of my career for pure soldiering—and my last. As the Army's premier "ready force," the division had sufficient call on resources—people, things and money—to conduct all kinds of challenging training that was carried out not only in the continental United States but also in Alaska, Panama, Greece, Turkey and Canada as well. Some of the early training innovations that led to the development of the Army that demonstrated its prowess in Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm (Persian Gulf) were initiated by the 82d while I was there.

My first days with the 82d were spent listening to staff briefings, visiting subordinate units and becoming reacquainted with Fort Bragg. I held an early commanders' meeting at which I offered one of my favorite observations: We run the Army with inexperienced people—almost everyone is doing his job for the first time, so it is not possible to think we will be mistake free, that we won't do some dumb things, that we won't truly be learning on the job. My purpose, as always, was to assure everyone that I would not run a zero-defects division, that mistakes would not be career-threatening, and that I wanted everyone to gain

education and valuable experience from his tour of duty. I then went on to explain my understanding of the division's mission, my command philosophy, my belief in decentralization of decisionmaking, my charges to the division staff, my reliance on the proper functioning of the chain of command, and all of the policies and procedures I had learned in previous commands. But this time I was able to end the meeting with, "Oh, by the way, this is not the first time I've commanded a division."

My training philosophy has always been centered on battalion competence. I believe that if battalions are well trained and well prepared for their combat missions, their small units will automatically be ready and their ability to assume their role with higher echelons will be routine. As a result, the division's training program prescribed four major activities for every battalion annually.

First was an ORTT (Operational Readiness Training Test) to be conducted by the ADC (assistant division commander) for operations. Second was an EDRE (Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise), when a battalion was called out and deployed in 18 hours, actually flying away for an airborne drop in the conduct of a simulated combat mission. Third was an off-post exercise, planned and executed by the battalion commander and his staff, who were solely responsible for where to go, what to do and how to get it done. It was a popular requirement and commanders exercised some interesting and challenging ideas, venturing to the deserts of New Mexico and to a National Guard training area in Idaho, following the trail of Rogers' Rangers in the Adirondack Mountains of New York, and assaulting Puerto Rico. The fourth requirement was an annual Command and Inspector General's inspection, an educational process that told each commander how well he was doing his job.

The program made for a busy year. The division had 19 battalions, and the scheduling for all of them to complete the four major activities was a challenge for everyone. Many battalions were committed piecemeal rather than as whole units—a field artillery battery, an engineer company and a tank company with an infantry battalion on an EDRE, for example. Many of the activities had to be dovetailed with joint exercises

or other commitments ordered by higher headquarters. Thus, two battalions with a brigade headquarters went each year on Deep Furrow, a NATO exercise in Greece or Turkey, and each battalion was credited with an EDRE or an off-post exercise for their participation.

I was able to participate in almost all of those exercises in one way or another. After 17 years without a parachute jump, I was starting all over again with new equipment and new techniques, but it all felt natural in the pit of my stomach when I saw the green light go on again in the back end of an airplane.

A Mideast crisis in 1973 triggered a real-life warning order from the Pentagon, alerting the 82d for an immediate deployment. That kind of call is the cornerstone of the division's training program, so the next 18 hours were routine, but it was a more exciting routine with an overarching tenseness because it was real.

Despite the top-secret classification of the order, word spread sufficiently to assure that family farewells were tearful, and the Fort Bragg community responded with a serious commitment to support the move. I was called upon for two decisions: Do we take ammunition? Do we rig for an airborne assault? Neither question was answered by our directive, and I had been given no indication of what our mission would be or even where we were going. Nevertheless, the answers



Joint Training Exercise Exotic Dancer VI: On 4 April 1973, Major General Kroesen inspects the landing zone of the 82d Airborne Division's 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry (Airborne) at Jarmantown, North Carolina.

seemed obvious to me and, without asking, I prescribed that our basic load of ammunition would accompany us and that the assault echelon of the leading brigade would plan for a parachute assault. I did not believe we would be committed into a crisis area without authority to use force if necessary, therefore the need for ammunition. I also did not think we could count on having secure airfields on which to conduct an airlanded operation, hence the decision to go prepared for a parachute assault.

Well within our allotted 18 hours, the "ready" brigade was standing by at Green Ramp, our marshalling area at Pope Air Force Base, but no C-141 aircraft had arrived for us to load. That was the beginning of a three-day wait that ended when the alert was called off and the troops returned to barracks. It had been an excellent training exercise, and we did a lot of studying of our actions to learn how to improve our response to a real mission. But the occasion was important to me because I was able to act as I preached. Without direction from above, I did not immediately ask for instructions, for "how to do it" direction. I made decisions and then informed the higher headquarters of my plans, well prepared to make changes if so ordered, but way ahead of the game if I was right.

Another happening in 1973 brought less than sought-after notice. I was appointed to a promotion board to help select the next crop of brigadier generals for the Army. After about three weeks of work studying the records of more than 3,000 colonels, 12 board members voted to select 50 of them for promotion. Among the 50 were five of the six colonels serving in the 82d, an unprecedented happening and one that drew much unfavorable and questioning comment about the influence of General Mel Zais, who billed himself at the time as the "senior airborne soldier in the Army" and me, the serving commander.

I was quite pleased, in the years that followed, that the judgment of that board was validated by the subsequent promotions of all five of those officers to two-, three- and four-star rank. I was also pleased to



The 1973 82d Airborne Division commanders. Back row (L to R): Colonel Jim Boatner, Colonel Ed Partiau, Colonel Roscoe Robinson, Colonel Alfred (Sandy) Sanderson, Colonel Vernon Lewis. Front row (L to R): Brigadier General Cal Benedict, Major General Kroesen, Colonel Volney Warner.

note that the sixth colonel was promoted the following year and that the successors to each of those officers also were all selected for promotion and actually matched the number of stars of their predecessors.

Colonels Volney Warner, Ed Partain, Roscoe Robinson, Vernon Lewis, Jim Boatner and Al (Sandy) Sanderson earned a combined total of 16 stars before they ended their careers. Their successors—Frank Cochran, Guy (Sandy) Meloy, Bob Elton, Jim Lindsay, Max Thurman and Carl Weidenthal—also earned a total of 16 stars. Given that kind of help, it would have been difficult for me to fail in the job.

In 1974 I reluctantly left Fort Bragg for Europe and a short orientation period with V Corps in Germany before taking command of VII Corps in Stuttgart. The challenge of being "ready to meet the Russians tomorrow morning" demanded full-time attention. It had been 27 years since my last tour in Europe, so I had a lot of catching up to do. The post-Vietnam Army had become a shambles, wrecked by the government's management of that war, but the advent of the volunteer Army, accompanied by a developing equipment modernization program, was promising better things for the future. I quickly learned that the quality of our Army was being restored rapidly. Even then, in 1975 and 1976, I became quite confident that the Americans, Germans and Canadians of the Central Army Group were not about to be overrun by any Russian juggernaut.

My only frustration as a corps commander, and one that remained a concern through the rest of my career, was with the political controls established by the United States and the NATO governments on our ability to fight. The requirements for obtaining permission to fire across borders, to employ nuclear weapons, to plan for chemical retaliation and to guarantee against civilian casualties were all so stringent that we conceded tactical initiative to the enemy at least up to a time when we could convince our government that we were really losing.

Nevertheless, corps command was another wonderful assignment, particularly in Europe where coordination and cooperation with German, Canadian and French forces brought coalition warfare into sharp focus. I learned to have great confidence in our allies and truly believed we would be capable of not losing in any contest with the Warsaw Pact. Note, I did not say capable of winning because I was quite aware that winning required a massive commitment of reserve forces from the United States, a realization that was most important to my understanding of the mission of my next command.

I also came to have great admiration for the German people, who, in a country the size of Oregon, tolerated the presence of a million soldiers who marched regularly across their lands, cluttered their highways, annoyed them with flying and firing exercises, and did damage that was seldom adequately redressed. But they were a people who knew they were on the frontier of freedom, and they accepted their lot stoically and with few complaints. Americans in general found good friends in Germany and Germans, in general, admired and respected and were grateful for the presence of the Americans.

I left Europe in 1976 to command the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM) at Fort McPherson, Georgia, my first four-star assignment. There my job was to prepare, except for the U.S. Marine Corps, the only reserve of landpower that existed in the Free World. It was FORSCOM's responsibility to train and prepare all of the deployable forces of the Army and the U.S. Army Reserve located from Alaska to Panama and Hawaii to Puerto Rico for commitment to war. In addition, FORSCOM supervised Army National Guard training nationwide. Maintaining contact with the command structure and sustaining a knowledge of the readiness problems of the command were demanding tasks that required many days of travel every month of the year.

In 1978 I was called to be the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, a short-lived tour in which I was still learning the full scope of my responsibilities when I was assigned to be Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR) and Commander of NATO's Central Army Group. I had had many interesting, demanding and challenging assignments up to that point in my career, but none of them matched that of CINCUSAREUR in complexity or comprehensiveness. The force structure of USAREUR was not as large as FORSCOM's and the geographical area (from England to Turkey) not as great, but the threat was closer and more dire. The dependent



The 1974 82d Airborne Division commanders. Back row (L to R): Colonel Frank Cochran, Colonel Max Thurman, Colonel Jim Lindsay, Colonel Carl Weidenthal, Colonel Bob Elton, Colonel Sandy Meloy. Front row (L to R): Brigadier General Joe Fant, Major General Kroesen, Brigadier General Volney Warner.

population was a responsibility unknown in FORSCOM, and the training and preparation for coalition warfare were requirements that posed added responsibilities unaddressed in previous commands. The requirement to deal with all levels of the host nations' governments, each with its own laws, rules and expectations, was a complicating factor. Once again, the requirement to be "ready to go to war tomorrow morning" became the driving demand on my time and energies.

While serving as CINCUSAREUR, I had my final close call. In September 1981 the automobile in which I was riding through Heidelberg was taken under direct fire by a terrorist who fired two RPG-7 antitank grenades. The vehicle was damaged by the first shot, and my wife, Rowe, and I both suffered superficial wounds. The gunner missed the car with his second shot, so I lived to receive my third Purple Heart for being wounded in my fourth war, the Cold War.

I was privileged to command the Army's forces in Europe for four years, retiring from active duty in April 1983, more than 40 years after my enlistment during World War II. It was a lifetime I am sure I could not live through again, but if I had to try, I would not want to change very much. I would just like the opportunity to do some things better. Since my retirement I have been a self-employed consultant in national and international security affairs, which has provided the opportunity to remain involved with the Army. As a senior fellow with the Association of the United States Army's Institute of Land Warfare and a contributing editor to *ARMY* magazine, I have written on a variety of national security issues.


While in uniform, I saw combat and was wounded in four wars—World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War. There were a number of close calls that made me very much aware of the dangers and demands soldiers face in combat. I

experienced the normal combat activity of being under artillery fire and direct fire, being strafed by enemy and friendly aircraft, and having my helicopter fired at on a number of occasions. In all my combat experience I never closed with the enemy to engage in hand-to-hand combat. I may have shot one German at a distance of less than 50 meters, but the results of that encounter are unknown because it happened in the midst of a confusing melee. That extensive combat experience has shaped in large part my perspective of war and how the Army must prepare for its future challenges. The selections in this anthology were written with that view in mind. I hope the Army's future leaders will find them of some interest.



In 1983, General Kroesen relinquishes command of U.S. Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR) to General Glenn Otis. General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), passes the colors.





The Army

The Army

I have been associated with the United States Army in one way or another for most of my life. During my formative years I spent a considerable amount of time with my father's Army National Guard field artillery unit. I spent 40 years in uniform in a career that spanned four wars. Since my retirement in 1983 I have followed the Army's activities as a national security consultant and as a senior fellow at the Institute of Land Warfare, the "think tank" of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). Not surprisingly, as a result of all that I have developed some very strong feelings about the U.S. Army as an institution.


The Army is a values-based organization with a long tradition of service to the nation. I have included a number of pieces in this section that highlight that tradition. When I was the commander of the 82d Airborne Division I was invited to address the commissioning ceremony for Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) cadets at my alma mater, Rutgers University. My remarks to those young men and women about to embark on a military career outlined the challenges and opportunities facing them. In 1996 I wrote a short history of the Army for the Institute of

Land Warfare, and the version of that paper ("The U.S. Army—Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow") that was published in *ARMY* magazine is included here. It outlines some of the ongoing challenges the Army faces in maintaining its capabilities in peacetime.

An essential element of the Army's success has been, is and will be its noncommissioned officer corps. These enlisted leaders have always set the example and led the small squads and teams of soldiers unhesitatingly into battle. I am a great admirer of the NCOs that serve in all components of the United States Army. I first learned about their importance very early in my career. The first sergeant of my first combat unit in the 63d Division was a Regular Army soldier who had joined the service in the 1930s. He was a very competent and capable leader who generated a most admirable respect among both the officer and enlisted complement. In his presence, you realized how much the rest of the soldiers admired and respected him. When we got into combat, he felt a responsibility for assuring that I was doing my job as a platoon leader. He did it without making it apparent that he was checking on the lieutenants. When he was wounded and evacuated, I missed him for about two months and was most grateful when he came back, because his replacement did not quite measure up to what he was. Knowing him was a key part of my education about what a good NCO should be.

Most of my early experience with NCOs was on-the-job training. When I went through basic training, sergeants were the people who got you up in the morning and who made you do your jobs during the day, but even in officer candidate school, there was no formal instruction about the roles and responsibilities of NCOs. Today the United States Army has the best noncommissioned officer corps in the world because we instituted an education system not found in any other army. British sergeants major are famous professionals, but on the whole, the British NCO corps lacks the formal education we provide in the noncommissioned officers education system (NCOES) developed by the Army as part of the transformation that came after the Vietnam War.

The decision to fight the war in Vietnam without mobilizing the reserve components meant that the sustaining base for the NCO corps did not exist. As a result, NCOs finishing a tour—especially infantry,



engineer and signal corps soldiers—found themselves on orders to return to Vietnam in only a few months. Many of them opted to leave the Army instead. By 1968 the Army was forced to establish an “instant NCO” system. The best people graduating from basic training were given six additional weeks of training and graduated as sergeants (E-5) and staff sergeants (E-6). By and large, they were good men who proved to be good combat leaders, but they were not replacements for the NCO corps that had been lost. They were not the noncommissioned officers to whom the ordinary soldier could turn for advice and counsel. Nor could they be expected to instill confidence, maintain morale and develop discipline among their charges. As a consequence, many of those instant NCOs became a part of the problem instead of help for finding a solution.

After the Vietnam War, the Army recognized the need to redevelop a professional corps of noncommissioned officers. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed the noncommissioned officer education system, a school system that NCOs had never before enjoyed. For almost 200 years, the American Army had enlisted soldiers, sent them through a period of basic training and then depended upon on-the-job experience to qualify them for promotions. Formal training was limited to specialists, cooks and bakers, mechanics, technicians and so forth. Master sergeants and sergeants major were not specialists. The new NCOES changed that, and now NCOs are trained and educated much the same way as the officer corps.

I have included herein two pieces about the Army’s noncommissioned officer corps. The first comes from a talk I gave to the Sergeants Major Academy in 1978 when I was commanding U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). At the time, the Army was just recovering from its post-Vietnam trauma, and my remarks to the assembled sergeants reflect that period. The second, “NCOs: Not Only the Backbone But the Vital Nerve System,” is a 1992 article that followed a second visit to the Sergeants Major Academy. It appeared in *ARMY* magazine after the end of the Cold War to emphasize the unique and essential contribution noncommissioned officers make to the Army. It still reflects my fundamental beliefs about our NCO corps.

The first soldiers to fight for American values were ordinary citizens who saw the possibilities of a new nation. Today the tradition of citizen soldiers is preserved

in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. I grew up with the New Jersey National Guard in the 1930s. In those days, there was a club-like atmosphere among the people who were in the Guard, particularly the officer corps, and Sunday polo was the big event. I know there were among them some who joined the Guard just to play polo, and when I was growing up among them, that’s what I wanted to do. But at the same time I realized that there was an element among them that was very dedicated to the military. My father was one of them. He was a civilian for 50 weeks each year and a soldier for only two, but he was serious about his military avocation. He saw World War II on the horizon without knowing, really, what it was going to be.

After World War II, I remained in Germany on active duty until 1947. When I shipped back to the United States, my first assignment was with the Organized Reserve Corps. At the time, the Army was reconstituting the National Guard of the United States and the Organized Reserve Corps. My assignment was in South Portland, Maine, where I became the advisor to a field artillery battalion, a field artillery group headquarters, a coast artillery 16-inch gun battery and a coast artillery mine battery. They were paper organizations with lists of names of World War II soldiers who had a Maine address when they went into the Army years before.

My first mission was to help the commanders track down those names and talk them into joining their units and the Organized Reserve Corps. It was an interesting time, and I gained much respect for the men who agreed to join the Reserve when they were not being paid for it. They had no idea that they would receive any kind of credit or remuneration for their service. They did it out of patriotism, loyalty to the country and recognition of the need for the nation to have reserve military forces in being.

It was very rewarding for me to have been part of that project, although I was not an artilleryman. I was not technically qualified to advise and counsel my field and coast artillery units, but I was able to obtain training literature and materials, help them get organized and show them how to operate a .50-caliber machine gun at summer camp. I felt I made a satisfactory contribution to getting the U.S. Army Reserve organized. While I was an advisor, Congress passed the laws that authorized pay and retirement for Reservists who achieved certain credits for their service and would be authorized a retirement stipend when they reached

age 60. It was the beginning of today's United States Army Reserve.

My next real contact with the reserve components came almost 30 years later when I was commanding Forces Command, from 1976 to 1978. During my two years in command I visited active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units in 39 states and made it to the extremities of the command—Puerto Rico, Panama, Hawaii and Alaska—and to all the states with major National Guard or Reserve organizations, training areas or installations. While in that job I reawakened my appreciation for the contribution the reserve components make to the Army.

While I was in FORSCOM, the National Guard and Reserve were going through a traumatic transition. During the Vietnam War their ranks were filled with large numbers of soldiers who had joined primarily to avoid the draft. When the war ended, we began a period when the six-year enlistments were expiring and the draft avoiders were not reenlisting, so Reserve and National Guard units were losing personnel in droves. When I arrived at FORSCOM in 1976, there was great concern in the Pentagon that something drastic might have to be done to rebuild the reserve components. But I had a much different view; I believed that the reduction in strength in the National Guard and Reserve was actually a purging of an element that we did not really want or need in the armed forces. What I found in my visits to the Guard and Reserve units was a nucleus of people who were professionals in their chosen avocation. I found a very large core of both officers and noncommissioned officers dedicated to assuring that the Army Reserve and Army National Guard would be potent military forces if they were called upon in an emergency. They are people who appreciate the need for the military, but prefer to make their contribution in their home towns as an adjunct to their civilian professions rather than with a full-time commitment. But they are very professional in their own right. Today it is impossible to think of them as being able to be as fully prepared and as capable as the full-time Army when they only get 39 days a year to train, but they have a nucleus that can be expanded and relied upon in times of crisis. Their contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan are immeasurable and absolutely essential.

In 1998 I wrote "It's Time for a True Appraisal of the Real Base Force Requirement" to establish the fundamental need for a sustainable active structure to

satisfy the national military strategy and to explain why the Army National Guard is such a critical part of the Total Army. More recently, the war on terrorism prompted me to write "Expending the Force" and reflect on the role that Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers play in a large war and why they cannot be considered an inexhaustible source of manpower. "Expending the Force II" and "Expending the Force III" followed in short order to express the need for long-term force development and force management for the active and reserve components of the Army if we are to assure the continuing quality and capability of our armed forces. "Additional Army Endstrength Needed" is a discussion of the size the Army should be to accommodate the mission load that was foreseen twenty-five years ago and which is still a requirement for perhaps the next twenty-five. It aligns with "The Future of the U.S. Army," which follows, expressing factors that are pertinent to the organization of the force. In the final piece, "Transformation," I addressed some critical force development factors that must be considered as the Army continues the evolution of its Objective Force. The concept of transformation is not new to the Army, but it is a big job that must be done thoughtfully if we are to get it right. In 2007 the requirements for an adequately sized Army have not yet been satisfied.

Rutgers ROTC Commissioning Ceremony

[Remarks given at the Rutgers University Reserve Officers Training Corps commissioning ceremony in 1973 while commanding the 82d Airborne Division]

I have been associated with the Army since my enrollment in ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps] at Rutgers in 1940. I made my choice of a career in the regular Army when I was about the same age as most of you who are graduating today, and I have never been sorry and I have never looked back and wished I had chosen some other field.

In a short time some of you will be entering the Army, the Air Force or the Marine Corps for a tour of active duty, or perhaps for a career. Others will receive a short period of training and then return to civilian life and a period of service with the reserve components. Regardless of which path your future follows, I think it is important that you understand that you have been

offered an opportunity that is more than just a job or an obligation, it is a way of life.

The military services all have customs and traditions of which we are proud, and which set us a little bit apart from the rest of society. We have standards of comportment and deportment which others find different, perhaps strange. We are accused of having "military minds," and while I may have my own definition of the term, I am happy to agree that we do have, and further that we ought to have, military minds.

We are men and women who enjoy a sort of nomadic existence and who have families who do not mind too much being uprooted year after year to move to some new part of the country or new place in the world. We are men and women who can establish ourselves anywhere rapidly, accomplish a task which has to be done, and be ready to move on. We can do this because the military system has a certain sameness, a familiarity, a sense of purpose which allows an individual soldier or airman or marine to associate himself with the conditions, the people, and the mission he is currently assigned. We live constantly with a sacred trust, assigned to us by the people of this nation, and whether they realize it consciously or not, it is always there.

A few minutes from now, when you are administered the oath which is prerequisite to your commissioning, an occasion which is the most important part of this ceremony, you will accept a full measure of responsibility for this sacred trust. If you do not keep it tucked in a small corner of your mind continuously, you are not accepting that which the American people have invested in you. That trust entails constant preparation and readiness to come to their defense when their security and their way of life are threatened.

I do not mean to give the impression that military service is all adhering to customs and traditions and waiting around for a war to start. I assure you that military service can provide you with intellectual and physical challenges equal to those of any career. There is almost no civilian walk of life which does not have a military counterpart that equals or surpasses its challenges and opportunities.

We have demands in the fields of electronics and aviation that require as much talent as you will find at AT&T or the Boeing Corporation. We have problems in vehicle design and maintenance which compare with

those of General Motors and Greyhound. We have budgetary and fiscal problems unmatched by any organization in the world, and we have problems of management, public relations, and community service that involve contacts with large segments of our population and civilian communities across the country and in foreign lands. And we have the challenge of leading men and women in preparation for or execution of a combat mission—and there is no more awesome responsibility than that of being responsible for the lives of others.

As to whether any of you can get involved in any of these fields, I can only relate personal experiences. I have never had an assignment that was not mentally challenging and rewarding personally, or that failed to satisfy my desire to do something useful. Fifteen years ago as an infantryman and alumnus of the Rutgers College of Agriculture, I presented a 30-minute lecture to a group of 200 electronics engineers and scientists at the University of Michigan on a paper that I wrote based on a study I was involved with for more than two years. I observed to them that it was probably the only opportunity they would ever have to hear a lecture from someone whose formal education qualified him only to plant corn.

Nothing has prevented me from having a wide variety of different jobs in my career. I have had assignments as an intelligence officer, as a logistician, as a budget manager in the Pentagon, as a manpower programmer, and as a manager of the total force structure of the U.S. Army. And I have been responsible for the actions and for the lives of men in combat, from a company of 200 men to a division of over 20,000 soldiers. I work now at the business of preparedness and combat readiness with 15,000 of the finest cross-section of men* you will ever find gathered together in one organization, civilian or military, anywhere in the world, the 82d Airborne Division.

Your opportunities to do the same kinds of things are unlimited. ROTC officers, products of our universities and colleges, make up more than 50 percent of the officer corps. You represent the leavening of academic influence recognized as so necessary, and every rank in the services has its fair share of ROTC graduates—from four-star general officers and down.

* This was long before women were assigned to the division.

These things are in your future if you want them. Your immediate responsibility upon joining your service, whether active or reserve, is to make yourself a reliable, respected member of the team you are assigned to join. You will find a group of experienced soldiers willing to help you, willing to let you learn on the job, and willing for you to be inexperienced and to make mistakes. They will ask only that you be willing to learn, that you accept seriously your responsibilities because we are in a serious business, and that you work at developing your professional qualifications for your duties.

You will find among your commanders and among the noncommissioned officers who work for you, a recognition that they are responsible for your training, education, and development as officers. They will not spoon feed you, but they will assure you an opportunity to develop your skills, your interests, and your professional competence. They are concerned with your continuing ability to satisfy the responsibility of defending the United States, and they recognize that you represent the hope for continuity in the future.

For those of you who will return to the reserve components, what I have said is equally, perhaps even more appropriate. Our nation, historically, has relied on its military reserves to meet national emergencies, and this period of our history will be no exception. You too are faced with a way of life that will make demands upon you and that will require conscious dedication.

The credibility of our defense posture today rests in great measure on the ability of reserve units to mobilize rapidly and to be trained and ready for a combat mission

upon mobilization. You also will find that the challenges of leadership and responsibility bring the greatest reward a soldier, or any other man or woman, ever gets: the self-satisfaction of facing a demanding, significant task and knowing you have done it well.

I welcome each of you to the corps of officers of the military services and I wish each of you a rewarding and satisfying military career.

The U.S. Army— Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, March 1996.

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USA Ret., contributed to this article.]

The U.S. Army, older by a year than the nation it serves, descendant of the fighting men and militias of colonial history, legacy of the soldiers who fought America's wars for more than 200 years, remains today the instrument that ultimately counters threats to our national interests. The Army engages in land combat, confronting, dominating and destroying enemy forces and their ability to resist the imposition of policies pursuant to the national goals of the United States.

Only the Army conquers land and populations for the purpose of instituting the will of our people and our government. From the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781 to the Safwan Conference in 1991 that ended the hostilities of the Persian Gulf War, the Army has created the fundamental conditions of settlement for almost all of the confrontational disputes in which we have been involved.

Today the Army continues to be the critical member of the joint team of the armed forces, the arm of decision. It is simultaneously the force that is fully dependent on the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force to deploy it to an area of crisis and to deliver means of support and sustainment until a decision is reached. The Army is comfortable proclaiming, "We won the war, but we never could have done it without the Navy and the Air Force!" as not only a reflection of past successes but also of a continuing, more demanding requirement for the future.

The Army today, active and reserve, is second to none in the world in quality and capability, employing skilled, superbly trained and motivated soldiers, equipped with superior weaponry and technology and using systems, operational techniques and doctrine evolved



over centuries of successful warfare. The operational prowess demonstrated in Operations Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm (Persian Gulf) will serve as paradigms for military commanders of future centuries and for political leaders who must contemplate the use of military power.

For the first 200 years of our existence, the people of this nation responded to each dire national crisis by building the armed forces needed to end satisfactorily the threat then extant. Without exception we had time, for varying reasons, to produce or obtain the wherewithal required for the successful prosecution of war.

On most occasions the costs of being unprepared at the outset were offset by the ultimate successes of the forces constructed. But the lessons of that history coupled with the geometrically explosive growth in lethality and effectiveness of today's weaponry, equipment, transport and forces establish that time is no longer a guarantor against failure.

Armed forces already in existence and ready for employment is the condition that must be the norm for the foreseeable future.

Since World War II, the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO, massive retaliation, graduated response, whatever the national strategy, the requirement to be prepared to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously has been fundamental to the structure of our armed forces. Given the state of the world today, there is no change in the realization that the engagement of the United States in one theater of operations can signal an opportunity to an aggressor in another part of the world. The demand of today's national strategy, that we remain prepared to fight in two major regional conflicts almost simultaneously, is no more than today's validation of the findings and recommendations of legions of national strategists who have studied the problem for the past 50 years.

It is true that the threat to the United States has abated and can only be defined as nonspecific. Fear of an intercontinental nuclear attack has lessened. Fear of a Warsaw Pact army overrunning Europe has disappeared. Fear of a third world war is almost nonexistent. But acknowledging that military power and the resort to war around the globe are ongoing and continuing threats is axiomatic. World peace is not at hand, and where it exists at all, its continuation demands a vigilant and capable deterrent power.

The national strategy of the United States and its subordinate national military strategy today require that the Army be prepared, as required by Title 10 of the U.S. Code, for "prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land" whenever and wherever committed. It must be capable of rapid reaction across a full spectrum of operations, from general war to limited war to the engagement of paramilitary forces to operations other than war, a category limited only by the will of the Commander in Chief who determines a need for military action to cope with a national crisis. It must, with the assistance of the other services, sustain itself and its efforts for the duration of conflict.

This historic mission remains the fundamental reason for the Army's existence; however, the reason we have an army today is, as it has been for half a century: as an integral of the armed forces of the United States, to deter an enemy from taking military action inimical to the interests of the nation and, if that deterrence fails, to engage the enemy swiftly and decisively to guarantee an outcome satisfactory to our political aims. Only the Army can conclude a conquest. Only the Army can control an enemy's land, infrastructure and people.

The U.S. Army is a collective mass of disparate elements, each of which contributes uniquely to the purpose of success on the battlefield. The mass is divided grossly into the combat forces, of which there are three categories: combat, combat support and combat service support, and all others that make up the great sustaining base of the Army.

Combat forces engage the enemy, seeking dominance over land and the people who live there through the destruction of their powers to resist. Combat support forces contribute specialized forms of firepower, maneuver capabilities or intelligence collection that improve the performance and chances of success of the combat forces. Combat service support forces provide and sustain the resource requirements of all of the forces committed in the combat zone. A proper balance of these three kinds of forces is essential to sustained combat action anywhere in the world.

Combat forces include varied infantry forces—airborne, airmobile, mechanized, mountain, special operations—armor, cavalry, air defense and some artillery, aviation, engineer, signal and intelligence forces who carry the battle to the enemy.

Combat support forces are other air defense, field artillery, engineer, signal and intelligence forces supplemented by military police, transportation and forward support elements of the logistics systems that operate near the combat forces and reinforce or expand the power of the combat forces.

Combat service support forces are all others. Administrative forces operate the personnel support and service systems, logistics forces provide supply, maintenance, and transportation functions; medical units treat, cure and evacuate personnel to maintain the health of the command; and signal and engineer units build and maintain the communications routes necessary in modern warfare.

Behind the combat zone and stretching to the continental United States is what can be called the infrastructure of the Army. In the theater of operations, behind the combat zone, the communications zone is the area in which the deployed support and service installations and units are located.

The movement of personnel, equipment and supplies into and out of ports and airports, the repair and rebuilding of equipment, the hospitalization of the wounded, burial of the dead, the conduct of civil affairs or military government are all functions requiring space, time and organizations. The sustainment of combat operations, along with the maintaining of forces in the field who are not fighting, requires the continuing pursuit of communications zone activities.

The communications zone is anchored in the United States, home to the Army's support base and the bulk of the sustaining infrastructure. Headquarters, Department of the Army and nine major commands acquire, organize, train, equip and ready for war the resources required to build fighting forces. The broadest functional responsibilities fall to Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and Army Materiel Command. Medical Command, Intelligence and Security Command, Information Systems Command, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Criminal Investigation Command and the Military District of Washington take on specialized supporting roles. The remaining Army components are deployed forward. They are U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Pacific, Eighth Army in Korea and U.S. Army South.

The coordinating nucleus of the Department of the Army is the Army Staff. Collectively, it acts as the agent

of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army in supervising the activities and operations of all organizations of the Army. The Army Staff conducts long-range planning, resource determination and allocation, the development of Army-wide objectives, the formulation of broad policy guidance, and the supervision and control of operations designed to maintain an army ready for war.

Together these active Army elements, along with the Army National Guard (eight divisions and 21 combat brigades) and the U.S. Army Reserve, at respective strengths of 357,000 and 203,000, total approximately 1.1 million soldiers dedicated to the Army's mission. The combat, combat support and combat service support forces of these components total approximately 865,000 soldiers.

In other words, almost 80 percent of the total Army is deployable to a theater of war for combat operations, not all at the same time, not all with the most modern equipment, not all having reached the same level of training and readiness, but all designed and organized for use in a combat zone.

This total combat capability is sustained in peace and war by the Army's infrastructure, 30 percent of the active force, less than 22 percent of the total force. Some expansion of the infrastructure occurs under wartime, full mobilization conditions, but current plans require no additional installations and add personnel only to extend hours of operation by existing facilities.

Undergirding the Army commands and agencies is a culture reflecting almost 400 years of military history peculiar to the American nation. Beginning in 1607 in Jamestown and 1620 at Plymouth Rock, the new settlers became an instrument of conquest and, with few exceptions, soldiers were merely the defenders and protectors of the settlers.

In such fashion the colonies expanded, and the new nation extended its control over the vast area of North America that has become the United States. The Minuteman became the symbol of immediate response to danger, while the active soldiery served as reserve forces committed to rout the enemy when attacks threatened the pioneers and their encroachments.

The practice is truly a phenomenon in recorded history, duplicated only, and in some aspects, by the Boers in South Africa and the Canadians who followed

their fur traders westward. The norm of history reflects the exploits of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Genghis Khan creating empires by military conquest followed by civil administrations kept in power by military garrisons.

Their pattern has been the paradigm for more than 2,000 years, whether the Norman conquest of Britain, the Spanish subjugation of Latin America or the World War II attempt of Adolf Hitler to define the Thousand-Year Reich. Only in America was the cutting edge forged and sustained for almost 300 years by the civilian populace.

Three important elements of Army culture derived from this practice. The first is military subservience to civilian control. From the earliest responses to civilian calls for help through the dire crisis of a civil war, the armed forces of this country have never threatened to supplant or overthrow the civil government, nor have they refused any mission or commitment established by the government as a legitimate interest of the nation. The American people have been uniquely blessed with a military that has never sought power over internal affairs or government operations.

The second cultural derivative is an Army comprising 26 military branches, each with its distinct heritage, its peculiar insignia and the loyal convictions of its assigned personnel.

Today's Army began as ten infantry companies activated by the Continental Congress in 1775. Subsequently, military activities identified the need for engineers, signaleers and artillerymen. The horse provided mobility, and the cavalry claimed its role in the expanding Army. As each specialty group evolved, pride in its contributions caused it to adopt uniforms, distinctive headgear or items of insignia that identified membership and, incidentally, bragging rights and celebrity status.

The third element of Army culture is a strong reliance on the reserve components. More than a million soldiers are today engaged in civilian pursuits in their daily lives, but their avocation is a devotion to being prepared and ready for military service in time of national crisis.

The wisdom of our founding fathers, who opposed the creation of a large standing army, is honored today by the policy of maintaining in active service only the eighth largest army in the world while relying on more

than a million men and women civilians to answer an emergency call to service that guarantees our immediate and long-term military prowess.

The U.S. Army of the future will be an evolving successor of the Army of today, adapting and adopting new technologies, more effective equipment and improved techniques in a quest to remain master of the battlefield. Many refer to the coming years as a new age—the information age in which information is collected and shared with an immediacy never before contemplated.

The military stage for this age was set with the establishment of the global positioning system and advances in modernization and microprocessing. The Army of the future will exploit these information technologies.

The strategic necessity of the Army, the mission of deterrence followed by guaranteed victory if deterrence fails, and the principles of war will remain unchanged in the coming years. These absolutes form the foundation on which the future Army structure will be based and on which the successful pursuit of the nation's aims and goals will depend.

There is no doubt that the threat to the worldwide interests of the United States has changed. There is argument that economic structures and political extremism have supplanted an enemy's military forces as the greatest threats to the nation. The demise of the Soviet Union and the lack of superpower capacities in any other nation have contributed to the persuasion that military defense is now almost unnecessary, certainly of lower priority among the affairs of the government.

Unfortunately, the causes of the Persian Gulf War, the need for an invasion of Panama, the American reaction to Somali unrest and now the attempt to stabilize the situation in Bosnia provide examples of the continuing need for military power and the judicious use of such power in pursuit of legitimate American interests. In fact, we face an array of threats ranging from regional war, through lesser conflicts, to a variety of peace and humanitarian operations.

When the intense emotions that nationalistic and fundamental ideologies generate are combined with the availability of weapons of mass destruction, more reliable means of delivery and high-technology weapons, the unpredictability and volatility of the threat come into focus. Clearly, we have not arrived at the period of

peace and stability that would justify abandoning our military stature.

Following the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, two U.S. administrations have studied the world situation and concluded that a baseline force capable of responding to two almost simultaneous military conflicts, comparable to the Persian Gulf War, is a continuing requirement. The Army uses the term Force XXI conceptually to describe the forces necessary to meet this threat and accomplish the continuing mission. The dimensions of this force, the elements of its composition, and the organization and doctrine for its deployment are undefined.

The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the inexorable crumbling of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the Cold War foundation of the U.S. armed forces. From 1989 to the present, defense management has been preoccupied with identifying what size and for what purpose we need these forces. During this period, two principal policy decisions controlled the pace of reductions and the ultimate target numbers.

First, the Bush Administration's baseline force, produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and approved by the Secretary of Defense, projected an Army of 12 active and eight reserve divisions at a strength of 520,000 active and 567,000 reserve. In this structure many active units required reserve round-out augmentation to be at full strength.

At the same time, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, after a "bottom-up" review (BUR), proposed a force of ten active divisions at a strength of 476,000. The BUR force, which proposed a complete withdrawal of divisions from Germany, was later adopted by the Clinton Administration but modified to leave a two-division corps in Europe and a strength figure of 495,000. Both the baseline force and the BUR force were proposed as adequate for the national military strategy requirement.

Given the current national strategy, the proper size of the Army, now dictated at ten divisions and 495,000, and proposed by some at eight divisions and 450,000, remains a matter of arguable conjecture. Given the current BUR force augmented by the two divisions remaining in Europe, both the baseline and BUR analyses seem to have come to similar conclusions that 12 divisions and about 550,000 soldiers satisfy the strategy. As the Army proceeds to design and develop

Force XXI, it would appear prudent to seek the capability of a 12-division, 550,000 force as its objective.

Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm provide convincing if not irrefutable evidence that highly trained, technologically superior and properly motivated soldiers enjoy overwhelming advantage on the battlefield. The proper application of such resources by skilled commanders resulted in victory in 48 hours in Panama, in 100 hours in the Persian Gulf.

Guaranteeing the ability to repeat those performances in the future depends entirely on two fundamentals: first, funding the training, education and readiness programs that produce trained, motivated, capable soldiers, units and organizations; and second, funding a continuing and comprehensive modernization program that adapts and adopts technological and materiel advances that guarantee that U.S. forces will be the best equipped on any future battlefield.

Force XXI is complex. It depends on continuing hardware improvements (new or improved weapons, radios, transport or materials-handling equipment), on adopting new techniques for assimilating and distributing knowledge (intelligence collection, the exploitation of computer communications), and on the dissemination of information to all echelons and across the spectrum of military operations. It depends also on the updating of doctrine for training personnel to employ these things most effectively in battle.

At present, and for the foreseeable future in the current defense program, the funds for Army modernization are woefully inadequate. We are not guaranteed an Army ten or more years from now that will outclass its potential foes. We are programming potentially for costly, less efficient and less effective campaigns if we do not increase support for Army modernization.

At a time when our air and naval forces are not only the strongest in the world but also are devoid of any serious threat to their prowess, it would seem a good time to divert whatever funds necessary to ensure that Army modernization is accomplished on a reasonable time schedule. The imbalance among the services can be corrected.

World War II created the medium in which the exaltation of airpower became a natural phenomenon. German Stukas led the Blitzkrieg. Japanese Zeroes laid

waste Pearl Harbor and the U.S. Navy. The Royal Air Force Spitfires prevented the invasion of Britain. Strategic bombing created havoc at Coventry, laid waste much of German industry, and ended the war with Japan with an overwhelming application of firepower at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The carrier displaced the battleship as the potent weapon of sea warfare, and pilots basked in the glory of Billy Mitchell's exoneration. The conclusion that airpower won the war and was unquestionably the wave of the future was widespread and solidly anchored by the exaggerated claims of its proponents.

Little attention was paid to the fact that the decisive moments of World War II, the culminating points, occurred when land forces reoccupied North Africa, captured Guadalcanal or Iwo Jima, invaded Normandy, overran Germany and had to occupy Japan to confirm victory. The die had been cast, and the perception of the public, the press, the U.S. government, and the shapers of military concepts and doctrine raised airpower to the dominant feature of military thought. Defense reorganization in 1947 created the U.S. Air Force to manage and exploit the new capabilities.

The Korean War, stalemated when the costs of a decisive land campaign were more than we wished to pay, had little effect on the growing faith in the Triad, the linkage of long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear delivery by submarines. In the 1950s, the guarantee of nuclear dominance was the principal objective of defense planners and budgeteers.

The Cuban and Berlin crises of the early 1960s spawned a sudden realization that ground forces still had a role in military confrontations, and the Vietnam War again demonstrated that airpower alone does not settle things and that landpower tentatively applied foregoes any possibility of decisive action.

Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf again have proved the absolute requirement for land forces to achieve the ultimate objective, always with the support and augmentation of airpower and sea power as essential elements of modern warfare.

With few exceptions, the Army has fought its battles for resource allocations during this entire period defensively and as an unwelcome participant in defense affairs. Only in the Kennedy Administration and the early Reagan years has the Army budget approached adequacy and then never at the expense of the other

services. The Kennedy initiatives produced Army forces in the early 1960s that earned a respect not enjoyed by American forces since World War II. They also established the credibility and foundation of today's special operations forces, now recognized as a valuable integral of our military capabilities.

The Reagan years provided the funds that procured modern equipment, supported the recruitment and training of high-quality personnel, and sustained the activities that promoted the effectiveness and capabilities demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. Perhaps most important was the commitment to progress that promoted the initiative and innovation that resulted in the exploitation of strategic intelligence and communications systems supporting the war. Despite stresses, strains and requirements for expediency, field commanders were better served by the high level hierarchy than ever before.

These aberrations aside, the Army has struggled to obtain a 25 percent slice of the defense budget, more often than not having to do with less and suffering program damage because of it. The Army share of the defense budget has been dwarfed since World War II by the demands of the other services. The costs of the Triad alone have exceeded the amounts of money spent on the total Army. Coupling those costs with the needs for conventional air and naval forces created the pressures that delimited the Army share in most years and prescribed an annual negative growth record for the years 1986 to 1995. No enterprise, no matter how efficient, can sustain itself on a budget that provides, continuously, for less than absolute needs.

In the past 25 years, despite the surges provided by the end of the Vietnam War and the Reagan Administration that allowed the fulfillment of many Army modernization initiatives, the list of Army programs terminated for lack of funds is long and depressing.

The Army has never equipped the total force with the latest, most effective equipment. The long-term penury, in comparative terms, of the Army budget has ensured that the Army costs less per person than any service, but this statistic is no consolation when it affects the future of the force.

Regardless of this history, the Army today is robust, better equipped than its potential adversaries, better manned and trained than any army in the world, and confident of its ability to satisfy its role in the national

defense program. To sustain this excellence, however, the Army needs a modest \$2 billion to \$4 billion in additional funding annually for the next five years to ensure that it enters the next millennium with a modern, capable organization with which it can continue its role as a guarantor of the continued interests of the people of the United States.

Sergeants Major Academy

[From an address presented to the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy on 12 June 1978 as the commander of U.S. Army Forces Command]

Although the Army collects all kinds of quantitative data for readiness reports, there is no measurement for attitude, for willingness, for the morale of an organization, for the confidence of soldiers in their unit, for the corps of professionalism that we have in the whole Army today—all the things that add up to the spirit of the organization. The most important factor in the readiness of any organization for combat is that spirit. And while we have to respond to the bureaucracy and its requirements for statistics in readiness reporting, I am much more inclined to assess the readiness of a unit by looking at all those factors. I think spirit is the most important. Spirit is the one thing that will determine how an organization fights when it has to go into combat. Statistics are important because they identify resource requirements in an organization and are a measure of the potential effectiveness of an organization in combat. But it is the spirit that reflects the confidence of soldiers in themselves, in other members of the organization, and in the chain of command.

The requirement for noncommissioned officers to provide a leadership role in the development of an organization cannot be overstated. As senior NCOs you have all heard that the noncommissioned officer corps is the backbone of the Army, but if the NCO corps is not also the spirit of an organization, it will never have one. It will never have the kind of leadership that it needs to go into combat and win. There are almost nine hundred soldiers in an infantry battalion, more than three hundred of which are noncommissioned officers. That is one-third of the battalion. Soldiers look to sergeants for leadership in the face-to-face and day-to-day requirements that develop the moral and morale characteristics that are the cornerstones of the esprit de corps of an organization. That day-to-day leadership

is the mission noncommissioned officers must assume and carry out. That mission gives the command sergeants major and noncommissioned officers the reputation of being pretty hard-nosed people, the guys who set the standards.

Those three hundred sergeants in each battalion are the people that have to make the chain of command function. A chain of command, everybody knows, has to be a conduit for orders, directives, advice and counsel—all those good things that come down from on high. But a chain of command that is truly working is one that functions from the bottom up. It begins with a sergeant who has the ability to size up a situation, consider the resources available, and use the training, experience and confidence he has in himself to make decisions about what needs to be done and report to his platoon leader: "Here's what I found, here's what I did about it, and here's why I did it." Then if the platoon leader is the same kind of guy who can make decisions based on the resources he has available and report back to the next level in the chain of command the same three things: "Here's what I found, here's what I did about it, and here's why I did it," then the chain of command is truly functioning the way it should. The Army has to have noncommissioned officers who are willing to make decisions, take action, and do what has to be done. They have to do that in peacetime to gain the experience, training and confidence so they can do it in wartime.

Some years ago we went through a pretty bad period of time in the United States Army in which we started to overcontrol the chain of command from the top down. It began during the Korean War when we went into a stalemate for about two years. We did not have enough to keep corps commanders busy, so they started to specify what rifle companies would send out patrols, where they would go, which routes they would follow, what kind of reports they would make, and how long they would be gone. We had three-star generals worrying about what captains and platoon leaders should have been worrying about. As we got into the Vietnam War, we continued the same kind of thing where we had "squad leaders in the sky" telling the squad leaders on the ground how to fight their war. That practice took the initiative away from the noncommissioned officers and junior officers. It got everybody looking over his shoulder waiting for somebody to tell him what to do and how to do it. We can't afford that in the next war.

You all have heard many times that we are going to have to fight the next war outnumbered and outgunned by an enemy with more equipment than we have. To do that we will need people all down the chain of command who are willing to make decisions, take action and do things that need to be done, without standing around waiting for the next guy higher to tell them what to do and how to do it. That is the important thing in combat readiness. That is the important thing in preparing units and organizations for the kind of war we are going to have to fight, but they are not measured in the readiness report. You find out about real readiness when you visit units and organizations and talk to officers, noncommissioned officers and troops. That is how you find out whether that kind of confidence is there, whether those kinds of decisions are being made, and whether the chain of command is being encouraged to work from the bottom up instead of the top down.

Personnel readiness in the Army today is a subject of great controversy. You have all read in newspapers and reports and heard from congressmen and all kinds of learned people about the people problems that we have in the Army. There is a lot of skepticism about the quality of today's soldier, the raw material out of which we someday will replace today's leadership corps. But I maintain that today's soldier is as good as those we have always had. He is good, he is trainable, he is willing and he is capable of accomplishing any mission that we assign him if he has good leadership. Statistically, we can prove that he is good quality. The AWOL rate is down, courts-martial are down, and crime rates are down. The number of high school graduates is up. All these things seem to prove that soldier quality is good, and for those who want to talk about how good the volunteer Army is, they can always cite those kinds of statistics.

At the same time, those who want to prove that there is something wrong with the Army cite the kinds of things that say we are representative of today's society, and that we reflect the ills of that society. There are the educational shortcomings of those who come into the service. You all know that we are engaged in a big argument about whether to rewrite the manuals and the training literature at the eighth-grade reading level or the fifth-grade reading level, because today's soldiers cannot read well enough. We all know that our soldiers come to us from an expanding drug culture in the civilian world. They come from the throw-away world where

people do not respect equipment and do not take care of it the way we think they ought. And they are all part of the buy-now, pay-later and live-in-debt society where a young man thinks as soon as he graduates from basic training and AIT he is qualified to get married, buy a car and find someplace for his new wife to live outside Fort Bliss or Fort Campbell or some other place that he cannot afford. We all know that they present motivational challenges that their older brothers or uncles or fathers never seemed to have when they came into the Army. They do not respond as readily to discipline because they come from a more poorly disciplined society than most of us remember.

The American Army has always been representative of our society; we always obtained the bulk of our raw material from the same general elements. It has never been the kid who graduated from high school and was immediately going to college or had a job waiting for him that we looked to as a recruit. Our soldiers generally came from the unemployed, those who did not know what they were going to do with their future, those who joined the Army to get away from something, or just to be adventurous, or to look for something different from his hometown.

It is no different today. We have our fair share of American manhood and womanhood, resources that we bring into the Army today and for whom we are responsible as we make them into soldiers and combat organizations. We, the leaders of the Army, have the job of molding them into what the Army needs. And if our leadership is up to it, we are going to find that the raw material we have is sufficient to the task. I have heard all the criticisms and all the people who are questioning the quality of today's soldier, and I disagree with them primarily because I have confidence in the leaders that we have, in the corps of officers and noncommissioned officers who have to put this Army together.

In talking with the command sergeant major of FORSCOM about the raw material that is coming into the Army, I had to remind him that most of us seem to have forgotten how raw we were when we first came in. What a poor batch of raw material we must have seemed to the noncommissioned officer corps and the officers when we went to basic training. I can tell you my platoon sergeant did not think much of me in the first eight or ten weeks that I spent under his tutelage at Fort McClellan, Alabama. And I would venture that

most of you had the same kind of problems. If anybody in those days asked the NCOs or officers: "What do you think of the raw material you are getting in the Army?" they would not have answered positively.

Today I think we can give ourselves pretty good personnel ratings. We have a satisfactory recruiting and retention program. We are bringing in good quality people who are going to keep this Army in good shape. We get a lot of criticism from the outside about the fact that two years ago we were eliminating 40 percent of the men who came into the Army before they finished their first three-year enlistment. That figure is down to about 30 percent—still pretty high—and the complaint is that we are not making maximum use of the resources we have available. I say to them that with the 60 or 70 percent we have left, we are giving the nation the best quality Army it has ever had, and we are maintaining all of our strength requirements. We are not suffering because we are eliminating the misfits, the ones that cannot manage, and the ones that do not measure up to our standards of conduct and performance. I also remind critics that if you want a good quality organization you look to an example like a professional football team and count the number of men that go to summer camp, figure out how many are lost in the first couple of months, and look at the 44 players that remain when the National Football League season opens.

If you want good quality you start with a large number of people who fight for the positions that are available. We cannot prove before we enlist a man that he is going to be a complete success, so we have to be able to eliminate those who do not measure up. As long as we can retain 60 or 70 percent, maintain the quality and maintain the strength that we want, I do not see that anybody should have too much of a complaint about those we get rid of in the first three years. I think the kind of personnel management which allows the company and battalion commander and the non-commissioned officer corps to identify the misfits and get rid of them is one way of assuring that our personnel readiness is good, and that the quality of the Army remains high.

In the materiel readiness business, perhaps the greatest challenge we have is recognizing the real problem. As senior officers and NCOs, we are still not fully aware of the demands our equipment, our weapon systems, our mobility systems, and our communication systems all place on the Army. We have not recognized

that we have made the Army an equipment-intensive organization. Although we are not in the league with the Air Force or the Navy yet, we still have three major items of equipment for every four soldiers in the Army, and that means a lot of maintenance and a lot of stuff to take care of. While we are more equipment-intensive, we continue to be 100 percent people-dependent and, unlike the other services which employ systems and hardware to fight, the Army must continue to employ men to fight battles, and those men have to be assisted by hardware and equipment.

I believe men win wars, not equipment. But our equipment is only going to be as good as the soldiers who employ it. We rely on the individual soldier's ability to influence ever-larger segments of the battlefield using weapons of ever-increasing sophistication, range and lethality. We must be able to optimize the capabilities of this new equipment-intensive Army with the capabilities of human beings who will continue to be the dominant feature in land warfare.

In the 12 to 14 weeks of training that a brand-new soldier receives upon joining the Army, there is no way for him to become a complete professional. There is no way to give him more than the fundamentals of soldiering, the fundamentals of his particular MOS [Military Occupation Specialty] and the job he is expected to do when he joins his organization. We are not going to have trained and ready soldiers if we do not sustain individual training. Every unit or organization in the Army has to have an individual training program that continues to train each soldier and sustain individual skills. You all know that the forgetting curve is steeper than the learning curve, and if we do not keep soldiers from forgetting they will do it automatically. The organizational chain of command has to ensure that they are properly trained and capable of fighting in a crisis.

Our Army today is as good as it has ever been. And notice that I did not say it is better than any Army we have ever had. You cannot really measure that kind of thing until you go to war. But I think this Army is as good as any one I have ever gone into war with; it is as good as any one I have trained with in peacetime; it is as good as any other army I have ever seen; and it is certainly vastly improved over the one that came out of Vietnam five or six years ago. We were not in a very good state of readiness back then. But now the threat of war with the Soviet Union requires us to be more combat ready than we have ever been. We have

imaginative training programs that give soldiers some idea of the stress of combat, or at least as much as you can get in training. We have come out of that past five or six years with a damn good Army that is a tribute to the officer and the noncommissioned officer corps, particularly junior officers—the lieutenants who had to face the indiscipline and poor standards—and senior noncommissioned officers who had to retrain the NCO corps while coping with the same kinds of problems of indiscipline and poor standards as well as inexperienced officers. In that period of time we reestablished discipline, professionalism and standards that we can be proud of in the Army today. The nation may never understand the debt owed to you and your fellow NCOs who have been in the Army during the past five or six years. You have made great contributions to this Army, and I appreciate the opportunity to come here today and share these thoughts with you.

NCOs: Not Only the Backbone But the Vital Nerve System Link

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, September 1992]

As a consequence of the end of the Cold War, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev visited the United States as a guest of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. One day of that visit was spent at Fort Hood, Texas, where III Corps troops demonstrated the tactics and techniques of armor warfare that were later to serve them so well in the Persian Gulf War.

Upon his return to Washington, Marshal Akhromeyev's comments to the Army Chief of Staff about our Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle and battle tactics were relatively perfunctory when compared with one more surprising observation. He was, he said, astounded by the role played by the noncommissioned officers of the command. They gave briefings, directed activities and answered questions. They were in charge much of the day. Most important, they were obeyed with alacrity and treated with great respect by the enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers alike. In his career, the marshal had not seen their like in any army, certainly not in the Red Army of the Soviet Union, where authority and responsibility rested only with commissioned officers and political commissars.

The classical representation of the role of the noncommissioned officer has for years identified him as

"the backbone of the Army," an accolade that brings to mind a vision of stalwarts who guarantee the honor, integrity, fortitude and esprit de corps of the force. I would not want to alter that vision, for it is an apt portrayal of a vital role an NCO must play; nevertheless, it has long been my contention that the analogy fails to portray the far greater scope and responsibility associated with the corps of men and women who must do far more than exhibit the posture of a heroic statue.

In my view, the NCO corps provides not only a skeleton on which to hang the body but, more important, the nerve system that allows the body to function. When a finger touches hot metal, nodes of the nerve system make sure not only that the finger reacts but also that the whole hand recoils, the arm withdraws automatically, and the brain is informed so that follow-on action can be initiated. Nerves dictate the first response, quick reaction, while allowing the brain to decide whether to "send for the doctor" or "turn off the stove," or both. It is just that kind of role that the NCO corps must fulfill in any successful army.

The fundamental mission of the NCO corps is *automatic execution* of the doctrine, the customs and the orders of a command. It is the assurance of execution that guarantees that an army can function in accord with its plans and the intentions of its commanders. It is the NCO complement of any command that watches over the conduct of soldiers as they do their duty in response to the dictates and desires of the chain of command.

The job is not simple, for automatic execution in a corporate structure as large and complex as the Army does not occur naturally as it does in the human body; instead, it is the culmination of the two pursuits that are NCO responsibilities—training and discipline. The training of soldiers to be competent in the skills required in their military specialties and in the peculiar demands of their assignments must be complemented by an adherence to discipline that assures that a soldier will respond immediately and correctly as a matter of routine and in a crisis. Critics in the social sciences have long deplored this as a demand for "blind obedience," a derivative of the "military minds" at work. In fact, it is only the same discipline required by a good football team when it reacts to the snap of the ball or a good orchestra when it hits notes clearly and on time.

The job is constant. Every soldier's learning curve is matched in some degree by his "forgetting curve," so

repetition, attention to demonstrable knowledge, and constant testing or examination to ensure the readiness of the individual requires routine supervision by the NCO. The forgetting curve applies equally to matters of discipline. "Don't drink the water!" and "Wear your steel pot and flak vest!" in Vietnam were admonitions that gave way to "Don't pick up duds!" and "Always carry your gas mask!" in the Persian Gulf, but the assurance that they would be remembered and abided by was an NCO responsibility in both wars.

This fundamental mission is not exclusive of other duties and responsibilities. No NCO is required only to supervise and develop the skills of individual soldiers assigned under him. He must also ensure that they develop collectively to form the team that is a squad or a tank crew or a gun section, the small elements that must work together and fight together if necessary. He takes on the responsibilities of the football coach. He also has responsibilities peculiar to his own assignment—reports to superiors, the conduct of training, the employment of his unit, and the care of his soldiers and their families. He does not actually provide for the care of these subordinates, but he does make sure that the system provides it—he instructs his soldiers in the use of the system, he informs his superiors when the system is not providing.

He must also be prepared to substitute for the officer corps. Every NCO is familiar with the exigencies of the service that result in his having to serve as the alter ego of the lieutenant or captain who is "not yet assigned," or who had to depart before his replacement arrived, or who had to be gone for six weeks of schooling or 90 days of temporary duty. During those periods, motivation and leadership, normally the responsibilities of the commissioned officer, devolve also on the NCO. The Infantry School teaches lieutenants that "Follow me!" is their creed; when lieutenants are absent, sergeants step forward.

A final NCO responsibility, one that is unwritten, unproclaimed but real, nevertheless, is the responsibility for training, molding and caring for second lieutenants—and for a lot of first lieutenants and captains, too. Most company grade officers arrive in a unit to do a job for the first time. Most noncommissioned officers go through cycle after cycle of new leaders, most all of whom have new ideas for improving upon the records of their predecessors. The imbalance in experience is significant

(although, obviously, first sergeants have to be first-timers at some time also), and it is the NCO who must restore it. With full awareness of the need for tact and diplomacy, he must offer advice, prevent disasters and incorporate the officer into the team he has to lead. It is a demanding role, one for which no formal training is provided, but it should also be a very satisfying one because in the corps of Army officers, the good ones never forget the NCOs who guided them to their successful careers.

The NCO corps of the Army has grown and matured in its role in the past 50 years. In World War II, good noncommissioned officers were spread very thinly through the force, and it was only the lucky lieutenant or captain who found a platoon sergeant or squad leader or first sergeant who was fully, professionally competent and more experienced than himself. The NCO corps got by on dedication, patriotism and on-the-job training.

In Vietnam, things got worse. Given the failure to mobilize the Reserve and the one-year tour, the Army began to recycle NCOs, particularly in the combat arms. Many who returned from Vietnam then found themselves ordered to return in only six to nine months. Reenlistments dried up and the "instant NCO" courses began. "Honor graduates" from basic training were selected for six more weeks of training designed to make them E-5 and E-6 NCOs. They were good soldiers who performed yeoman service, but they were not truly competent, knowledgeable noncommissioned officers.

Once again, the officer corps, itself suffering from the same personnel management policies, found itself lacking the skeleton and the nerve system it needed to make the body function. The history of indiscipline, indifference and inefficiency, and mind-numbing stories of fraggings and mutinies are all a reflection of the erosion of the NCO corps that occurred between 1967 and 1971.

The recognition by commanders that NCOs needed schooling and training spawned NCO academies and other *ad hoc* activities in which units and organizations attempted to overcome the fact that the Army had no formal training system for soldiers once they finished basic training courses, but it took the Army until the 1970s to recognize the need and to commit the resources required for the noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES) that we have today.

In my last assignment, as commander in chief, U.S. Army, Europe, I commented to a division commander who had served with me at an earlier time that we, the Army, were truly better than we had been just five years before, and the principal reason for that was the greater professionalism of the NCOs, an improvement that was becoming manifest even in the early days of NCOES. In these days of shrinking budgets, cutbacks in structure and elimination of functions, it is mandatory that the vital role of the NCO corps be recognized and assured of continuing viability. The only guarantee that the Army will remain a collectively responsive body, able to function professionally in the next international crisis, will be the performance of its total nerve system, operating out of that cord in its backbone.

It's Time for a True Appraisal of the Real Base Force Requirement

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, February 1998]

“Downsizing,” the term coined in the last few years to mean the reductions suffered by business, industry, labor and management as well as by the armed forces, has now reached a point in the U.S. Army that is causing great internal strife. For the past few months there have been hints, allusions and inferences along with outright charges and blatant claims that the Army and the Army National Guard are at dagger points, or at least loggerheads, over how to accommodate, assign, share or allocate the forces, manpower, materiel and money of the Total Army.

Since the Bush Administration and the Colin Powell-led study that became, in essence, the first Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army has been beset by a constant demand for a reduction of structure, manpower and dollars, and for a greater effort to do more with less. The Clinton Administration, with the Bottom-Up Review, has annually tightened the budget screws while increasing the operational tempo of the Army’s forces and draining the research, development and acquisition budget.

For years, the Army handled these demands admirably. It reduced manpower with little or none of the trauma associated with the force reductions of earlier eras; it restructured to satisfy the demands without seriously compromising its ability to respond to crises. It developed Force XXI, Army XXI, Army Vision 2010 and other programs to manage its meager resources through the coming decades so that there has been a

reasonable promise of a continuing battlefield superiority for the foreseeable future.

Whether the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review is the proverbial straw breaking the Army’s back is yet to be ascertained, but it is certainly contributing to the strain in a disruptive way. The *Washington Post* on October 20 headlined a story, “National Guard, Regular Army in a Tug of War,” and proceeded to show the two factions vying bitterly for resources.

It is true that the Department of Defense has continued to advocate a two-war national security strategy and a consequent requirement for adequate landpower, but it has done so while effecting a constant erosion of the resources allocated for the job.

General Colin L. Powell, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established a base force requirement of 12 active and eight National Guard divisions and a Total Army of about 1.1 million to do the job. Defense Secretary Les Aspin decided the same job could be done by ten active divisions and 15 “enhanced” National Guard readiness brigades, that is, the combat power of five divisions. The Total Army strength would be about one million. Aspin, however, also stipulated that the Army would be fully modernized to guarantee complete battlefield dominance.

Since the Bottom-Up Review, the annual erosion of resources has continued and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review has the ten-division, 15-enhanced readiness brigade force at its lowest level yet, sustained by a smaller operation and maintenance budget. It is revealing to realize that the money now authorized to modernize equipment for the first-to-fight troops (XVIII Airborne Corps) will not provide new weapons and other equipment to them for five to eight years.

The Army has bravely proclaimed that it will continue to meet its national military strategy requirements, will continue to be the highest-quality force, will continue to modernize, and so on. Comparing the “minimum requirements” expressed six years ago for the base force and the “minimums” stipulated each year since for accomplishing the same mission, it does not seem unreasonable to question the credibility or credulousness of these claims. And when one observes the internal strife between the active component and the Army National Guard now becoming public, it would seem that an outside appraisal of the situation might be in order.

Congress, never the best at sponsoring studies, is nevertheless responsible for raising the Army. It is the element of government that is the ultimate agency in determining how much is needed for the Army and how it is to be sustained and supported. It seems to be a proper time for Congress to take a serious look at what the real needs of the country are.

For more than 50 years, since World War II, every rational and sensible study of our national strategy has concluded that we must be able to counter threats in at least two war theaters simultaneously. Thus, this requirement should be a given, a foundation on which the need for an Army can be built. For that same 50 years, the Army, and now the joint commanders, have prepared contingency plans for responding to crises around the world. Today the most obvious contingency plan requirements are for a restaging of the Persian Gulf War or a reignition of a Korean conflict. Actual force requirements for these contingencies must be classified, but history alone reveals that if either requirement is for less than seven or eight Army divisions, the planners must be extraordinary optimists.

Congress, of course, can obtain the actual numbers and should determine that two sevens or eights add up to much more than the ten divisions now in the active force. That same calculation should lead to a recognition in Congress, in the Department of Defense and in the Army, that National Guard divisions are needed for reinforcement if the two-war strategy must be executed. There is no "silver bullet" or magic elixir that is going to alleviate the requirement to put American soldiers on the ground in adequate numbers to resolve major international crises that threaten the vital interests of the nation.

Congress can also obtain the figures pertinent to requirements for sustaining these forces in the field. When the ten-division Army was limited to a strength of 495,000 in the active force, it was widely acknowledged that some of the structure would be hollow, that actually 517,000 soldiers were needed to fill all units. Since those kinds of figures are readily available and almost unassailable, the resources required for an adequate total force can be determined.

If Congress agrees, considering the problems of today's Army, that the time is now for a true appraisal of the real Army requirement, the study should not take long, and the results should establish a real base force that we must sustain indefinitely.

The recently published National Defense Panel report is not providing this answer. Spokesmen for this panel have made clear that their charter was to present "alternatives," not a recommended solution, in its December report.

Expendding the Force

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, November 2002]

The news, not extensively noted, that some of our National Guardsmen and Reservists are to be retained on active duty for a second year ought to be causing discomfort among more than the individuals concerned, their families and their employers. There ought to be some major concern among the force programmers and the personnel managers of all of the armed forces, although the Army has the greatest worry.

It appears to this interested observer that we are expending the force and doing little to ensure its viability in the years to come, years we have been assured it will take to win the war on terrorism. The quality of our effort, high and commendable during the first year and showing no signs of deterioration, can in the long run only be sustained by preparing now for the force we will need then. Barring the unlikely scenario of an all-out war and full mobilization, soldiers now fighting the war on terrorism, with a few exceptions, will not be available for fighting two years from now. Units and organizations of the reserve components, mobilized for the first year of war, will not be available for more of the same service off into the indefinite future. It might be prudent now to ask the managers who decreed the current second-year Reservists' extensions what they plan for the third year.

The force structure of the Army was designed to meet the two-war scenario of an earlier national strategy. Every unit had a mission to be performed when and if those two wars became a reality. The change to a somewhat more nebulous strategy has not affected the force planning that assigns units to fulfill the troop requirements of the worldwide combat commanders' war plans. Employing a unit of the reserve components on active duty to guard an airport for a year effectively forecloses on its availability for its intended mission, again, barring a full-mobilization scenario. Once such a unit completes a one-year tour, to say nothing of two years, it assuredly should not be subjected to a recall in less than three or four years, the time necessary to

learn the effect of the active duty tour on the retention of personnel affected. Repetitive recalls are not normally the pattern contemplated by reservists who have already chosen not to be in active service.

The answer, of course, is to increase the size of the Army. On 10 September 2001, the Army was too small for the missions with which it was charged, a fact reported by both the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army in congressional testimony of that year. On 11 September, Army mission requirements grew significantly; the Army did not. The mobilization of reserve components does not change the size of the Army. It instead begins the expending of it and establishes the need to begin planning for the replacement of that which is being used up.

If an Army unit is decimated in combat, we replenish it with soldiers who are trained, equipped and ready. If they come from the training base with those qualifications, the system is working properly, but they had to have been added to the force and trained and equipped before they were needed. When instead such replacements are reassigned from other units because the training base cannot supply them, we degrade the capability and readiness of the units from which those personnel are drawn.

Veterans of the Vietnam War will remember the impact of the latter policy. Within three years Army units in the United States and Europe had been shorn of their noncommissioned officers, had lost their combat effectiveness and were serving as staging posts for soldiers waiting to go to Vietnam or to get out if their terms of service expired in time.

World War II veterans may remember training their units for an expected overseas movement and being hit by "the levy" when one-third to one-half of their platoon strength shipped out as replacements along with one or two brother platoon leaders from their units. Morale, cohesion, esprit de corps and readiness plummeted as everyone addressed a new training cycle to absorb yet another batch of recruits.

Assuring the sustainment of combat capabilities means increasing the size of the Army so that it can rotate fully prepared units if possible, individual soldiers if necessary, into the war zone. It requires force development that assures the right kind of structure is activated and force management to employ it properly. Another item of recent news, also not widely noted,

observes that 30,000 special operations forces personnel are not enough to carry on the current war. That fact is in itself a clarion call for a force development plan addressing the need, but one that also acknowledges the need for employing conventional forces through time. Commitment of brigades of the 10th Mountain (Light Infantry), 101st Airborne (Air Assault) and 82d Airborne Divisions and the U.S. Marine Corps has already occurred, and a continuing rotation of these forces must be programmed.

Given a potential war with Iraq in addition to prosecuting the war on terror, the versatility and resiliency of the Army's force structure will again be tested. The infantry and Army aviation will bear the brunt of the war on terror. The armor and mechanized forces will carry the war to Iraq, and artillery fire support will be needed for both wars. Only a comprehensive, innovative force development and force management program can sustain both efforts over time.

Without such long-term preparation, we will see a return to the Vietnam deterioration, and we will exchange the outstanding battlefield superiority we now enjoy for an ever-decreasing effectiveness.

Expendng the Force II

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, December 2002]

The October AUSA Annual Meeting offered, as always, an opportunity to hear some direct observations and expressions of concern by today's Army leaders. I was particularly interested in subjects that bore relevance to the concerns I wrote about in the recent past ("What to Hope For," *ARMY*, September 2002, and "Expendng the Force," *ARMY*, November 2002).

In furtherance of those concerns I noted the following: Every senior leader spoke of his pride, confidence and conviction that today's Army is without peer in today's world and that it has the vision, the understanding and the promise of technology that can sustain its dominance for the foreseeable future. But none of what I heard relieved me of the concerns expressed earlier.

Many speakers noted that "today" we have more than 180,000 soldiers deployed in more than 80 countries around the world. Given that this deployment has become "normal" in the last few years it is apparent that a *prima facie* case for an endstrength of 540,000 already exists.

No speaker advanced that number, indeed none expressed publicly a need for a specific endstrength increase even though citing the difficulties of maintaining today's operational tempo and personnel tempo. One speaker, in answer to a question, did acknowledge that today's requirements are being sustained by the resources of five divisions and that if we apply the standard "one deployed, one training to go and one recovering," we ought to have 15 divisions in the active force. But sustainment of our current commitments into the indefinite future was not a subject addressed in any presentation of which I am aware.

No speaker, either, addressed the looming demands of military operations against Iraq. I would not presume to predict what these might be, but I can observe that they are overand above the bulk of the 180,000 already committed. Only by calculating (hoping?) that an Iraqi campaign will be completed in days, or at most a very few weeks, can we contemplate accomplishing the task with forces in being.

Once again, I have complete confidence in today's Army against any adversary. But when we begin to expend it we must have the force development and force management measures in being to assure sustainment of its prowess.

There is, in addition, the moral responsibility of providing those committed to combat with the best training, leadership and resource commitment that we can afford. Major General Guy Meloy's article, "General Ridgway's Personnel Management Policy" (*ARMY*, November 2002), is a splendid advocacy of the value of a pretrained organization and a stable chain of command on its combat effectiveness. Not all divisions were able to adopt the Ridgway policies, but their effect is even apparent today if one attends an 82d Airborne reunion of its World War II veterans. We have units in the field today that have every promise of being as good as or better than those earlier formations, but sustaining that excellence demands advance attention.

The 82d Division trained for almost two years before it was committed to the Sicily invasion and then it fought until the end of World War II with most of the leaders and most of the soldiers it began with in 1941. Contrasting that experience with any Vietnam War division provides an immediate revelation of force management requirements and the benefits of longer-term planning and preparation. Somehow we have to convince the Defense Department and Congress that our long-term interests

demand some short-term commitments. The first of these is an adequate endstrength increase followed by the time to train individual soldiers in the squads, platoons, sections and A teams in which they will go to war. We are, after all, on our own timetable. The Gulf War, not World War II or Korea, should be the model for preparing to do this job, and sustaining the effort for the long term should have a high priority.

Expendng the Force III

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, January 2003]

In the past few weeks a number of articles have been appearing regarding our "secret Army" and the pros and cons of privatizing and contracting out functions now performed by military and civilian manpower. Perhaps this is a solution to my worries about expending the force and not planning for its sustainment into the future. Perhaps the master plan will provide for replacing today's combat forces with retrained mechanics, personnel clerks, supply specialists, truck drivers and West Point professors, all of whom can be replaced by contract personnel. Certainly in an all-volunteer force it should not be difficult to convince those soldiers to transfer from the "tail to the tooth" in our structure, thereby doubling or tripling the infantry, armor, artillery and special operations strength.

As one of the founders of MPRI, an organization prominent in the articles addressing these subjects, I have long been an advocate of contracting for services—selectively contracting. The original purpose of MPRI, foreseeing the downsizing of the armed forces projected by the Bush administration of the late 1980s, was to contract for those things the services would not have enough officers and noncommissioned officers to continue to perform. Coincidentally, we would be putting retired soldiers back to work in the profession they had spent 20 or 30 years learning. But we were careful to offer to augment, not to supplant active duty personnel, and we never proposed taking over the direction of a program. The principle involved was that if a function was essential, the responsibility for that function would remain with the active service hierarchy. MPRI had no intention, no pretensions of running things for the Army, just furnishing personnel and advice to help the Army leadership do its job.

That was 15 years ago, but contracting was by no means a new idea. The Army had for years contracted

Privatizing Possibilities
 Spaces (Potentially Eligible for Private-Sector Performance)
 According to the Army Non-Core Competencies Working Group
 (Third Wave Privatization)

Functional Proponent	Military	Civilian
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology/G4	18,402	35,122
Civil Works/Chief of Engineers	318	32,269
Financial Management & Comptroller/G8	1,879	3,581
Installation and Environment/installation Management	1,314	22,012
Manpower and Reserve Affairs/G-1	18,065	9,839
Manpower and Reserve Affairs/G-3	12,952	22,304
Manpower and Reserve Affairs/The Surgeon General	916	15,094
Manpower and Reserve Affairs/Center for Military History	2	260
G2	712	2,349
General Counsel	373	638
Chief Information Officer/G-6	3,059	9,716
The Inspector General	292	93
The Auditor General	0	954
Chief of Public Affairs	443	679
Total Army	58,727	154,910

Source: U.S. Army Documents

for think-tank help with its studies and, particularly in Europe, was already contracting for installation house-keeping services, employing host nation civilian personnel and contract organizations. The practice has burgeoned over the years, and now companies like Kellogg Brown & Root, DynCorp and Boeing are managing installations in almost all areas where we have troops.

The growth and success of this practice have drawn the attention of reporters and other critics. Costs and controls are being questioned. The status of contract personnel on the battlefield and the guaranteeing of continuing service in combat are murky and unsettled questions.

The charges and innuendo about the “secret” Army are yet to be clarified and answered, but there is no question that privatization is with us for the long haul.

Despite my advocacy of contracting, I have also for many years expressed a belief that in some ways the Army was better off when we made our own horseshoes and minie balls. That is just a way of saying that there are some things that should never be privatized. We don’t want a university taking over the Infantry School. We don’t want a think tank restructuring the Army. We don’t want a shipping company deciding what supplies to send to a combat zone.

The current speculation about privatizing deserves serious attention. One article projects nearly 214,000 spaces, more than 58,000 of them military, as under study for conversion, with many functional areas seemingly subject to complete changeover. This is not the place to study or analyze how and why and which, only to observe that the principle of not turning over control and direction of functions is still appropriate. When all of the spaces assigned to the inspector general, to manpower, to acquisitions and to intelligence (among the 14 different categories) are under consideration, application of the principle becomes very important. General Washington did not hire a man named Von Steuben as a contract consultant when he needed an inspector general.

An inference to be drawn from observations made concerning this program is that it will provide more soldier strength for the core functions of the Army. There seems to be a presumption that soldiers replaced by contractors will remain a part of the end strength, thus increasing spaces available for the combat forces. Unfortunately there are two contravening factors: first, it has never happened before, and second, there is no companion structure increase associated with the proposal. If those 58,000 spaces are to be retained for a couple of new divisions, a Ranger regiment and more Special Forces A teams, the overcommitted Army

might enjoy some relief in its current operating tempo-personnel tempo situation. Without such a structure increase and instead, a loss of endstrength, the concerns about expending the force and the difficulties of sustaining the long-term effort will only be exacerbated. Given the apparent disinterest in any increase in Army endstrength, it is hard to believe that a privatization program will contribute much if anything to long-term combat effectiveness.

Additional Army Endstrength Needed

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, February 2007]

For the past five years, through various expressions of opinion, resolutions and public advocacy, AUSA has called for an increase in the size of the Army. In December 2006, in testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, our Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, revealed that Army brigades are now spending less than a year in "dwell time" in the United States before their next deployment. He went on to advocate that we "grow the Army" as a "wise and prudent action."

I don't know the linkage between that speech and the sudden outpourings of reporters, columnists and pundits who published articles entitled "Stretched Too Thin," "The Nation Needs a Bigger Army," "Bush Seeks a Larger Military" and others, all within the last two weeks of 2006. It is gratifying, of course, that these wise and learned observers have come to the realization that the Army is too small and that we can look forward to their as yet unrevealed advice concerning how the increase will be achieved. We can also anticipate counterclaims that the Army is as large as we need, as large as we can afford.

My interest in the size of the Army goes back a long way, but restricting my thoughts only to what followed the end of the Cold War, I think there are factors that are pertinent to the question of the Army's size. When downsizing was first considered by the George H. W. Bush administration, the Army proposed—and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell endorsed—an endstrength of about 650,000. Defense analysts and budgeteers whittled the figure, and the Army accommodated to a 575,000 target. Subsequently that number shrank in stages to the 482,000 authorized, augmented by a temporary increase to 512,000. None of those reductions was accompanied

by changes in the National Military Strategy or the mission load of the Army that had judged initially a need for 650,000.

Then there is the once credible three-for-one formula that advocates that for every force deployed for an extended period we will have another preparing to go and a third recovering from its previous commitment. Exceptions to this rule of thumb are many and often cited, but the announced aim of today's leaders is for a force that can commit active Army brigades for one-year combat tours followed by two years at home station before they are called again to return to combat. (The aim for the reserve components is one year deployed followed by five years at home stations.) Given today's consistent demand for 200,000 to 220,000 deployed, the total endstrength requirement becomes 600,000 to 660,000.

Today's terminology expresses much the same demand. The operational forces, 43 brigade combat teams and approximately 90 support brigades, total 480,000. The total generating forces—Training and Doctrine Command restored to a healthier strength, Army Materiel Command, Installation Management Command and TTHS (transients, trainees, holdees and students) account—exceed 600,000.

There is ample evidence and justification for additional Army strength. AUSA's long espoused need for an increase of 100,000 is not hard to endorse. In fact, most of our military commitments have been for unforeseen crises: who predicted Grenada, the Panama invasion, the defense of Bosnia, the liberation of Kuwait, the need to destroy the Taliban? It is also a fact that hot spots like the Sudan, Somalia and Palestine, coupled with threats to South Korea and Taiwan or the anti-American animosity growing in Latin America, virtually guarantee a continuing pattern of such commitments. Without specifying how 100,000 spaces should be allocated, we can confidently recommend that the Army force generation system will determine the long-term force structure required to build and sustain our national security requirements for the foreseeable future.

The need for a strong land warfare capability is apparent. The need for Congress to raise and sustain that capability is likewise apparent. It is late in coming, but the country cannot afford to ignore the demands for an adequate Army necessary for the protection of our national interests. It will take time and we will be

asking for continuing inordinate sacrifice from today's soldiers to tide us through the months and years until the growth is complete and the Army is once again sized adequately for its missions.

For me, there is one clinching argument. The United States won only three of the wars in which we engaged in the second half of the 20th century—Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf. In each we employed overwhelming power and won in a matter of hours. In each we had an adequate force structure, military control of operations and, in general, public approval and support. In each we suffered minimum losses of personnel and materiel and inflicted only minor collateral damage on the civilian populations. In each we paid up front for a capability that avoided the costs of continuing casualties and escalating budget demands. The lesson is there for all to see and understand: It is time to restore our land forces to the war-dominating power they have exhibited in the past at a manpower strength that assures sustainment during a long-term crisis. That number—100,000—would be a good start.

The Future of the U.S. Army

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, July 2005]

The future of the U.S. Army will be determined by how closely we can adhere to principles and practices that, in the last half century, built the unmatched, almost invincible forces that we sent to war in the Middle East in the past 15 years. Through that period the Army was a combination of superbly trained soldiers, well-educated and experienced leaders, a well-exercised command and control system, and a total support system incorporating intelligence, communications and fire support with logistic and administrative systems capable of surging to satisfy the most demanding requirements. Coupled with imaginative and innovative leadership and a versatile, malleable force structure, that Army has continued to add commendable chapters to the long history it inherited.

The coming together of that Army was not an accident or just a lucky happenstance. Its development was directed and guided by history, by experience, that greatest of teachers, and by leaders who identified the fundamental needs and applied the pressure necessary to satisfy them. The pending QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) and the ongoing transformation of the Army are opportunities to establish the long-term

force structure and resources required to guarantee continued excellence.

It is obvious to soldiers that winning a war almost always demands men on the ground who can occupy and control terrain and dominate populations. Thus, manpower is the prime essential and the Army, considering bits and pieces of evidence, currently is inadequately manned. Transferring personnel to fill units scheduled to deploy is common practice even while the Army is implementing a unit rotation policy. The results, if scuttlebutt can be believed, are incidents of soldiers on back-to-back deployments, soldiers who have spent three of the past five years on hardship tours and soldiers leaving the Army, particularly the reserve components, because of the optempo. They are used up. The recruiting command has expanded to almost 8,000 spaces, which means that thousands of faces have moved out of the deployable force structure, exacerbating the fill requirement for units about to deploy. These are but a few of the anecdotal indications of the need for more manpower.

Simultaneously, although soldiers are still being trained superbly, drill sergeants and other training cadre are suffering increased demands on their time and the long-term education of the Army is being slighted. NCOs are receiving "constructive credit" for NCOES courses, quotas at officers' service schools are being reduced or going unfilled and students are being released early from the Command and General Staff course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in order to return to their units to train for deployment. The Army's commitment to graduate study for the officer corps is now a minor fraction of the program that served today's Army while it was developing.

There is no question that learning on the job in combat is the best education that soldiers ever get. Those who experience a few months of combat gain a practical advantage not provided by any other training, but learning is accomplished better by those with a solid grounding in doctrine and other tenets of a profession. World War II leaders who learned rapidly on the job had had the benefit of excellent formal schooling between wars.

Unfortunately, learning on the job also results in fiascos that ought not to have happened. The Huertgen Forest battle in World War II and the protracted fight for Pork Chop Hill in Korea are examples of disasters caused by commanders who failed to understand some

of the principles of war. The mistakes currently being exposed about Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan are another example of the inadequacies of learning on the job.

Technology, the improving of techniques over time and the effect of new equipment on doctrine are best studied in the school system. The World War II officer corps, well-educated militarily, suffered a lack of practical field experience because the lack of an adequate force structure and minimal budgets precluded any major exercises for more than 20 years.

Then the Louisiana Maneuvers and major exercises of the 2nd Armored Division in California were belated attempts at modernizing across the board. Thereafter, on-the-job training in units preparing for war concentrated on individual and small unit proficiency; major unit excellence was a product of the command capability and determination of the senior commanders. On the whole we were served well by quality officers and a core of enlisted soldiers who responded magnificently to the demands placed upon them.

The U.S. Army, in every crisis since World War II, has been without peer in furnishing support to forces in the field. Fire support, the infantryman's best friend, has been the envy of all other armies as its timeliness, accuracy and quantities are unmatched in the world, whether referring to mortars, field artillery howitzers or close air support. The total system of target intelligence, communication between observers and guns, computer assistance and the supply of munitions guaranteed the massing of fire support whenever and wherever needed. The move to greater reliance on precision-guided munitions may or may not, in the long run, preclude the need for massed fire, but a precursory decision on that issue seems questionable.

Complementing the combat support systems have been maintenance, transportation and medical systems providing service well forward, with a consistency unmatched by other armies and other services.

The American people, Congress and the Defense establishment have, belatedly on occasion but never failing in the long run, pressed the largesse of our production and technology on the forces engaged in combat.

The Army has always had a supporting structure capable of receiving, transporting and delivering,

whether a 70-ton tank, a box of widgets or gallons of ice cream, to the troops in the field. Combat service support structure, always a whipping boy for the tooth-to-tail attacks, continues to be the long pole in the tent when sustainability of forces in combat are examined.

The QDR, where we are going and how to get there, and the simultaneous transformation of the Army, radically changing its combat structure and adopting new doctrine, both provide an opportunity and a responsibility to identify the total structure needed to satisfy the Army's missions. The manpower needed, the long-term program for education and training and a robust support establishment are calculations that will guarantee the modernization and sustenance of the total professional organization that the American people expect.

Transformation

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, August 2003]

It is difficult to filter fact from fiction, practical proposals from wishful thinking or proven technology from pie-in-the-sky schemes when reading columns in today's newspapers and magazines and listening to TV and radio experts about Transformation. The Army, it seems, is doggedly pursuing an Interim Force of Stryker brigades to be followed by the as yet undefined Objective Force. Simultaneously, word out of the Defense Department (leaked or otherwise) seems to promise a drastic change in Army structure on a much more accelerated schedule, eliminating divisions and building brigades of special operations forces that can be employed rapidly, at minimum cost but with devastating effectiveness. Meanwhile, the field commands, fighting today's wars and planning for contingencies, demand resources for maintaining the battlefield prowess of today's forces.

The reconciliation of these demands will be made by the Defense Department. The issue of structure, however, deserves attention not really needed for these other efforts, both of which can proceed normally through program and budget cycles. So, at the risk of being accused of not minding my own business, I want to offer some thoughts that come to mind when considering the subject of Transformation.

- The Army has been transforming itself for 228 years. It is not a new requirement; it is done rapidly sometimes, slowly at other times. It has been done wrong (think pentomic and VOLAR) and done right

(think 1975 to 1990, JustCauseandDesertStorm). It does best when it controls and evolves, worst when dicta from on high prescribe changes—not because the aim is bad but because the directors are almost never aware of the magnitude of the job.

- Technological change and growth in the last century was phenomenal, contributing to an almost geometric gain in the battlefield capabilities of every kind of military unit. Not least among those nurtured by new tools is the individual soldier. Throughout history the soldier has been at the end of the line for research and development except for the last few years with the Land Warrior program, dedicated to developing an all-around, versatile combat soldier superior in all ways to any of his predecessors.

Today's technology means that every unit commands a broader, deeper, more encompassing battlefield role. It also means that smaller units or fewer units are needed to accomplish missions. Note that I didn't say smaller and fewer—the principle of mass continues to be a major factor in war, and numbers of soldiers on the ground still matter for concluding a campaign in which the defeat of an enemy still entails the control of geography and population.

(An aside to this argument is the observation that those who killed the Crusader failed to consider that one Crusader battalion could do the work of three M 109 battalions. Even at 40 tons, a Crusader battalion would have required less transport overall than the three battalions it could have replaced.)

- During the last century or so the Army division became the basic building block of the Army. The division is the organization built for sustained combat; that is, it includes combat forces that can engage an enemy and supporting forces that can sustain its capabilities over time. In today's Army it is triangular; that is, it has three brigades of three battalions that each have three fighting companies. It has an aviation brigade, four battalions of field artillery and an engineer battalion to provide a versatile combat capability. It has an intelligence gathering capability adequate for its commander's immediate needs. It has transport that links it with its sources of supply; it has a battlefield maintenance capability to keep its equipment running; it has a medical complement for treating and evacuating battle casualties; and it

has administrative support that can receive and process replacements, pay the troops, distribute mail and maintain records.

- Divisions have come in many sizes, from 10,000 to 12,000 in airborne and mountain divisions of the past, to a 24,000 design prescribed in the 1960s by the G-series Table of Organization and Equipment that was never implemented. The Americal Division in Vietnam, with 12 maneuver battalions, exceeded 24,000 because its brigades were designed originally to be independent and added additional artillery battalions and engineer and aviation units not found in other divisions. It proved to be a very effective combat organization.

There seems to be much talk today that the division is too large, too cumbersome, too heavy for today's wars, that brigade-size forces are much better suited for swift deployment and the combat requirements of the new century. Well that may be, as long as it is remembered that in current configuration, they are not provided with any staying power and they cannot sustain themselves indefinitely. Further, three brigades do not equal the total power of a division, and if you want the combat power of three brigades, the most efficient organization for providing it is the division. To say that brigades can be supported by the assets of the corps has to presume either deployment of a corps or of detached corps assets which I believe could be best employed if they were already an integral part of a division.

There is nothing wrong with employing a brigade to conduct a raid or as the assault element of a major encroachment. Brigades can be tailored for such operations, and the brigades organic to divisions are quite suited for such commitment. Reorganizing the Army to make the brigade the basic combat unit, however, begs the issue of adequate sustainment.

For those who believe a brigade can be structured to provide the sustainment capability, I say of course it can, but what you have built will be a small division and we ought to call it that. A small division organized for offensive warfare with only two brigades and smaller supporting forces can be structured ideally for today's wars.

For those who question a two-brigade structure, I suggest a study of the organization and operations

of the 4th Armored Division in World War II. It had only seven maneuver battalions, always employed under two combat commands (the brigades of that day), and its record of offensive operations from Normandy to the end of the war exceeds perhaps those of any other division.

- The primacy of infantry on the battlefield has been a contentious question for centuries. On occasion, the horse, the elephant, the machine gun, the tank, the airplane, the atomic bomb and maybe a few other items have heralded the demise or at least the diminishment of the infantry's battlefield prowess. I have no trouble giving credit to the impact of all of those weapons on today's battlefield, but none has yet supplanted the soldier on the ground as the culminating factor in winning wars. Physical control of terrain and dominance of an enemy population is still the only way to win a war.

We didn't really win World War I. We agreed to an armistice and put our faith in a treaty as an instrument that brought "victory." We did not occupy the enemy's territory, did not dictate to his populace, hence we had to resume the conflict in World War II. We won that because we did occupy the ground and dictate the terms of our future association. That contrast is equally applicable to our winning and losing in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and today in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Perhaps the only war that did not have to be won with troops on the ground was the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the theory of communism was so catastrophic that the threat to the free world evaporated, and taking control of the area was unnecessary. If such a threat is to recur it will be a new development, not a continuation of an unresolved set of issues.

Today's infantry is again—or still is, if you accept my thesis—the Queen of Battle. Today's air, armor, artillery and Land Warrior accoutrements make his job easier, but the infantryman is the absolutely essential element for fighting the war on terror and winning, finally, the war with Iraq. Future structure modifications in the Army will have to accommodate this need.

- Despite the contention regarding the infantry, the requirement for armor is not diminished—just park a tank at an Iraqi crossroads and observe the impact

on the people. However, we have only six armored and mechanized divisions and, surveying the world scene, there are significant formations of armor that we must be prepared to confront and defeat. It behooves us to retain all of the armored and mechanized forces we now have.

We have the best tanks in the world and the best armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces. It behooves us to continue research and development efforts to assure that we maintain our relevant superiority with all of that equipment. Technological superiority does not guarantee success, but it does make the job easier when it is employed properly.

- Perhaps the most vexing question to be answered by force planners will be how much is enough. Going back only to the end of the Cold War during the first Bush Administration and the major reduction in forces that ensued, our first plan for the Army reduced it to 12 divisions and a proposed 540,000 soldiers. The Clinton Administration settled on ten divisions and 480,000. Both plans, of course, stressed that these forces would be completely modernized and supported fully for their resource and training needs.

The current Bush Administration has retained the same ten-division structure, but it is relying on large contingents of the reserve components to meet our daily operations requirements.

I have been writing for the past year that we are expending the force, wearing it out and failing to take steps to ensure the Army's viability and capability for the duration of our current conflicts. There are, almost daily, reporters' observations, columnists' opinions and e-mail complaints that support my contentions. The Army is too small for its mission load, and actions to guarantee its continued effectiveness either have not been initiated or are insufficient.

Current complaints (problems?) vary. Soldiers from the 3d Division are quoted saying it is time to rotate home. Others come home from Iraq and are assigned to a unit going to Bosnia. Others finish a tour in Korea and become replacements for Iraq. The 2d Squadron, 6th Cavalry deployed with V Corps from Europe to the Mid-East for seven months, then was returned to the United States to be reequipped with the new Apache Longbow system, a fitting reward for an outstanding combat record. Its personnel, however, have been scattered to fill pressing replacement requirements in other units. FORSCOM

has flat run out of military police units to meet deployment requirements. Stop-loss and the extension of reserve component soldiers' active duty requirements are not popular measures.

Simultaneously, we are now reading that the Army failed to prepare, organize or train for its post-hostilities role in Iraq. Given the priority of training for combat and the commitment to war-time missions, it is not surprising that post-hostilities requirements were not separately addressed. But for those of us who remember World War II and the arrival in Germany of the pretrained military-government organizations, it is apparent that with an adequately sized Army such preparation could have had a higher priority and been possible today.

Finally, there is that observation, publicized a few months ago, that the structure now relies too much on a requirement to mobilize reserve component forces, that the active Army should be able to meet a greater range of missions without a reserve call-up. That plaint conjures two thoughts. First, it is another indicator that the Army is too small, that another 500,000, returning us to the 1965-size Army, would provide a force that could respond to more requirements using active units only. Second, it brings to mind that 30 years ago the Army Chief of Staff, to prevent another Vietnam meltdown of the force, said we should never again go to war without mobilization, and he initiated a structure reform that guaranteed that end. Abandoning that policy most assuredly means a return to the draft and risks again isolating the military from the home-town support experienced in both of our Mid-East wars. Unfortunately, that Chief could not prevent a future meltdown caused by a failure to expand the Army to meet wartime needs.

The purpose of this article is not to offer solutions or a recommended course of action. It touches superficially on some of the factors to be considered in the force development process that should be the basis of any restructuring. It is also to say that the size of the force, one adequate for its mission, should have a significant influence on its final design.

Growing the Army

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, May 2007]

Requirements for a larger Army transcend those of the immediate present. Solving the problems of the effort in Iraq and Afghanistan is and will be the job of

the forces in being, and only if the problem persists into future years will Army expansion begin to play a role. If the commitment does persist, however, thinking that today's Soldiers, most of whom are returning to a combat theater for the second, third or fourth time, will in another three years be returning for a fifth or sixth tour, combines wishful thinking with disastrous force management. The most pressing need to grow the Army is the possibility that the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns will continue.

Aside from that primary requirement, growing the Army has even as great an importance for the long-term health of our military establishment and the nation's ability to satisfy its national military strategy. We are sustaining our current war capabilities by expending our materiel assets and overtaxing our manpower. We are either ignoring our strategic requirement for coping with another major contingency or we are presuming too great a capability for the other services to handle such crisis. We have depreciated if not endangered our future by reducing the resources available to TRADOC for the training and education of our leadership and to AMC for the research and development of new equipment and technology. We are contracting for services once provided by "in being" Army structure and expertise.

A number of forces have been at work for the past twenty-five years to cause the current conditions. First, the desire for the "peace dividend due the American people" at the end of the Cold War. The drastic reductions in the military forces, especially the Army, were in fact deletions of capabilities. The first Persian Gulf War, fought before those reductions took effect, provides a comparison of the troop basis available then and now. The loss of 300,000 active Army Soldiers was a precursor of what "doing more with less" is now costing.

The tiresome, age-old contention that technology replaces manpower on the battlefield is always a reason to reduce the size of the Army. It cost us two more divisions in the downsizing of the early 1990s when the remaining ten were to be fully equipped, modernized and manned with highly qualified technicians. It inhibited any thought of additional manpower in 2001 and 2003 when our current wars commenced. The realization of the need for infantrymen to control territory and populations always seems to come late to decision makers at the highest levels.

"Contracting out," a sometimes sensible, sometimes expedient and sometimes almost covert means of adding capabilities to an inadequate structure, has also had the effect of limiting the size of the Army. Sensible when Soldiers were relieved of kitchen police and grass cutting duties so they could devote full time to training. Expedient when neither the Army nor Navy could man the port operations in Vietnam or when Soldiers and Sailors were not trained sufficiently to repair and maintain the new missile systems entering the force. Covert when a hundred thousand contract personnel augment the force in Iraq when during the same period additional Army strength was deemed unnecessary.

Contracting, supposedly a cheaper and more proficient practice, is not a panacea. Rules, regulations and laws have not kept pace with the expansion of the system. Commanders' authorities and responsibilities for task assignment and definition, for job performance,


for personnel management and discipline and for war zone liabilities are unclear and troublesome. The recent fiasco concerning outpatient care and processing at Walter Reed Army Medical Center may well have a linkage with a contract for these services. Too often the contracting officer, not the commander, becomes the decisionmaker regarding contract specifications; then fulfillment becomes a matter of interpretation rather than the commander's will.

The long-term health of the Army, the ability to satisfy the requirements of our National Security Strategy and the capacity to sustain any lasting operational commitment are today an absolute demand. Recognition and acknowledgment have come late and counterargument has already spawned, but the requirement must not be ignored, diminished or postponed further if the Army is to be competent and prepared for its enduring mission.



Celebrating the 2d Armored Cavalry victory in the German Cavalry Boeselager competition, 1982.





Leadership

Leadership

During 40 years on active duty I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to command soldiers from platoon to army level. But I embarked on most of my early commands with little or no leadership training. Basic training and OCS (Officer Candidate School) did a good job of preparing my individual skills. But I think my biggest deficiency upon becoming a platoon leader in 1944 was leadership development—the identification of my responsibilities and what I should know about taking care of troops and preparing them to go to war. My primary concern was preparing myself and the plans for our operations. I had to learn that I had a responsibility to make sure that every man was ready to go the next day. I learned on the job that leadership plays a tremendous role in getting soldiers ready for combat and that successful combat operations are almost 100 percent the result of good leadership—not necessarily by the guy who was appointed to be the leader, but the one who took over the leadership position, the one who functioned as the leader when the situation demanded.



I became a company commander in the midst of combat in World War II and had to learn how to command as I went along. During the Korean War I commanded a battalion as a major when the assigned commander left on emergency leave. There was no precommand course to teach me the ropes. My brigade command came in Vietnam after I had been out of the troop-leading business for about 13 years, so once again it was a lot of on-the-job training.

My company and field grade commands were almost all in combat zones, so I learned first hand why men fight. They fight for each other. The principal thing that keeps men fighting together in combat is their need for the respect of their own buddies. As a soldier in combat, I am not going to let that man next to me see how scared I am, or how inept and inadequate I am. In good combat units soldiers are thinking, "These are the guys I want to go to war with. I have trained with them and they are the ones who I hope will be there when the time comes." And the converse is also true. If a soldier wants his buddies to be there for him, he can't let them down. That's the reason small units fight, and good leaders provide for them properly, accommodate their needs and resource requirements, and see that they get all the support that can be made available to them.

The leader's primary responsibility in combat is to make decent plans. The platoon leader who sends his platoon on a frontal attack against a heavily fortified position, and gets them all wiped out, does not have the respect a leader must have when the next time comes. Leaders must learn to make good decisions. They have to do it with the understanding that while there might be some casualties, good leaders do what they can to minimize them. That kind of leadership is absolutely mandatory. I think we have a lot of it in the American Army.

Although I have seen many leaders in combat, I never had a hero with specific traits that I tried to emulate. There were some I respected very much. During World War II, I saw General Alexander Patch, the Seventh Army commander, only once. He arrived in a mud-spattered jeep with three stars on the front. He, his aide and his driver were driving into the combat area with no pretensions and no folderol associated with his presence. He wanted to know what was going on, and he talked directly to the troops. He impressed me with his demeanor, his interest and his obvious knowledge of what was going on and why it was happening. Now, on the other side of the coin was my division commander, whom I never saw without the most beautifully shined boots and leather leggings. His uniforms were always spotless, immaculate. He traveled with an entourage in a spit-shined three-quarter-ton command and reconnaissance vehicle with air defense vehicles in front and behind and a contingent of military police for security. He arrived that way wherever he went, and it was an event wherever he showed up. I really didn't appreciate that man until I found out that he also was a great combat soldier. He trained our division, and he had it functioning better than any other that I saw during the war. I only got to appreciate him after the fact, but I never wanted to emulate the way he presented himself. I hope I was more of the General Patch kind of guy when I visited troops.

During my career I learned to appreciate leadership as an art, not a science. There are many scientific principles associated with being a commander and a leader, but the art of putting them all together is an individual thing that everyone has to do his own way. To be a successful leader, you have to be convincing, in your own way, to your followers. No two great leaders are cut from the same cloth. The differences between Eisenhower and Bradley, between Patton and MacArthur are so obvious when you study any of them that it is hard to believe that all were such successful senior commanders in the same Army. They each did it differently. And if you study famous leaders such as Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Winston Churchill, you find the same kind of disparity in character and characteristics.

Over the years, I've thought a great deal about leadership, and I've decided that effective leadership begins with a philosophy of personal values and methods, but that it is the implementation or practice of that

personal philosophy that brings about successful leadership. I have included herein a number of items that reflect my views on the philosophy and practice of leadership.

The first is taken from a lecture at the Army War College in February 1979, when I was the Vice Chief of Staff. In 1995 I set out to write something about what I had learned about leadership, and it appeared in *ARMY* magazine as "Command Philosophy: Principles of Leadership." In "The Future" I wanted to remind the Army's leaders not to get so wrapped up in technology that they forget the importance of leadership. The article "'Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death,'" written in 2002, was my reaction to what I viewed as many uninformed observations that our troops were not participating in the ground fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the opening campaign of the war on terrorism.

The last item in this section illustrates some practical aspects of leadership. When I commanded USAREUR (U.S. Army Europe) and 7th Army I made a point of attending all battalion and brigade commanders' courses to talk to the new commanders, but in January 1982 I missed a course when the weather cancelled my trip. To let those commanders know I hadn't forgotten them, I sent each a letter explaining what I would have told them. I have included a copy of that letter in this section.

The Art of Command

[From an address to the U.S. Army War College
on 23 February 1979]

When I was asked to come here and speak on "the art of command," my first reaction was that it would be presumptuous of me to accept. I am not overly comfortable with a subject that strikes me as one which somehow should be reserved for the great names of our profession, those who have been the artists and architects of military history. But I was reminded of a soldier who came up with a gem of a thought as he was leaving chapel one Sunday after hearing a thunderous oration on the Ten Commandments. He was dejected, glum and worried, but he brightened perceptibly as he shook hands with the chaplain and blurted, "I never made no graven image!" I decided I might be struck by some such useful thought on this whole subject. And I finally accepted when I read the first paragraph of the scope of this lecture, which starts off saying this is to


be a personal philosophy. That appealed to me since I have opinions about everything and have never hesitated to express them. I assure you it will be just that, a personal philosophy, no references, no historical studies or notes, and no lesson plan on leadership.

"The Art of Command"—the title itself sounds somehow out of place in this scientific age. We are uncomfortable with terms that cannot be measured, quantified and computerized, and you can do none of these things with "art." Its effect can be experienced, sometimes with overwhelming force, but it is not something that can be pinned down, dissected and analyzed. However, it does exist! Art is what made Rembrandt more than a portrait painter, what made Beethoven more than a song stylist, what made Grant and Lee and MacArthur and Patton more than drill masters.

In these days of egalitarianism, it is difficult for some people to acknowledge that there is such a thing as talent, such a thing as intuitive skill, such a thing as innate ability that sets one person apart from the crowd. Yet we all know that it happens. There are leaders whose troops will go to hell for them, there are leaders that can inspire almost unbelievable devotion, there are leaders who can turn a unit around by their very presence, and many of us have been fortunate enough to serve under such leaders. And so, you wonder, if there are such masters of the art of command, such natural-born leaders, such artists, why don't we identify them and assign them to command positions and leave them there?

Well, obviously, there are two good reasons: First, they are difficult, almost impossible to identify in advance; in a place-time environment you will miss as many as you find, and quite probably many that you think you have found will be mistakes. Second, there are just not enough of them to go around. MacArthurs and Pattons and Ridgways and Abramses are few and far between. They are the exception, not the rule.

All professions suffer from a shortage of the greats. In an article in the October 1978 *Harpers*, Professor Jacques Barzum of Columbia University discussed the state of the professions today. Although writing primarily about the medical and legal professions, his words have meaning for all professions. "We must stop and think



Representative Steve Horn (R-CA) and General Kroesen at the 1995 General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Awards ceremony, 17 May 1996. (U.S. Army photo)

what a profession as an institution is for," he wrote. "It is to turn people who are not born teachers, born builders, born advocates, or born healers into good imitations of the real thing."

Think about that for a moment. It is the reason we are all assembled here today. It is the reason the War College and the Staff College and the branch schools exist—to turn the vast majority of us who are not born leaders into "good imitations of the real thing." Now there's a phrase guaranteed to bruise a few egos, but of course it doesn't apply to the born leaders among you, those who don't need to be made into imitations. Nevertheless, you will not suffer from being reminded that no one can take command competence for granted—or can assume that since he is a lieutenant colonel or colonel or general that he is a leader by definition.

Back to the art of command. Let's first acknowledge that there is some element of science involved in any art. There is a science on how to prepare a canvas and how to mix paints that all painters must know. There is a science on how to read music and how to transcribe notes that all composers must know. And there is science involved in military leadership. We prepare ourselves to become leaders by studying the principles of

leadership, universal characteristics of leaders, and case studies of historical decisions to draw lessons from them. We learn troop-leading procedures, what things to do, when to do them and in what order, but mastery of all these scientific processes is only a beginning, a foundation for being a good imitation.

Having mastered the science, it remains quite apparent that leadership is truly an art, the talent through which a leader is able to exercise his personal qualities and strength of character to cause other men to do what he wants done. Harry Truman said it is the “ability to get other people to do what they don’t want to do, and like it.”

If leadership were not an art, then Grant and Lee; Patton and Patch; Churchill and Hitler or any number of disparate personalities could not have had parallel success as leaders. It is why one succeeds while another—apparently equally endowed with brains, education, experience and other positive traits—fails. I said earlier: Leadership is the ability to apply your own personality to persuade others to do what you want done.

Sometimes it is a platoon leader calling “follow me!”; sometimes it is the overwatch of a company or battalion commander; sometimes it is the direction provided in a sound plan or the logic of a decision that instills confidence in subordinates—successful leaders know instinctively which technique to use when as instinctively as an artist knows how to apply color and light to a painting or a musician knows when to add syncopation to a song.

Now, despite what I’ve implied about leadership being an art, it nevertheless is seldom a spontaneous phenomenon. Every crisis negotiated successfully by a group is the result of some leader taking charge and directing immediate action. He might have been Superman, previously unrevealed, who sprang into the breach from nowhere, but more likely he was someone whose training, experience, character and fortitude had prepared him for the moment, for the opportunity to be presented, a man whose leadership was built on a foundation, building blocks which made his leadership a natural consequence.

The first of these building blocks is confidence—confidence in yourself, obtained from a recognition that you have a thorough knowledge of duties and responsibilities and a conviction that you can do things right.

Self-confidence, demonstrated over a period of time, coupled with a daily adherence to principles and standards which create confidence among subordinates in your capabilities, day-to-day success in doing tasks—routine tasks for the most part—expertly, impressively, whatever you are called upon to do, even those tasks you may question; day-to-day activities which build confidence of soldiers in your capacities, your judgment, and the decisions you make.

Just as an aside to this discussion, confidence has a much broader application than as a foundation for leadership. It is also the cornerstone of readiness, preparedness for combat, for potential combat effectiveness. If soldiers are confident of themselves, of other members of their team, of the chain of command, they will be ready for combat. And the greatest contribution to morale and esprit de corps in any unit is the knowledge, the confidence that you can do well anything you are called upon to do—the confidence gained by day-to-day demonstration of doing everything well.

A second building block in the foundation is willingness to accept responsibility, make decisions, take action, and do what needs doing at any level—from fire team leader to division commander. To know the capabilities, limitations and resources available and be ready and willing to apply them to the task or problem or crisis at hand. To be able to report, “Here’s what I found, here’s what I did, and here’s why I did it.” The willingness of leaders to take action is absolutely essential to our success. If all our leaders look back for direction to ask what to do and how to do it, we will not succeed. There are times when a leader needs to coordinate the actions of subordinates—immediate subordinates such as company commanders watching over platoon leaders—not battalion or brigade commanders directing platoon operations or placement of squads. When that happens, squad leaders and platoon leaders will soon be doing nothing but awaiting instructions from battalion or brigade commanders. They will never have the opportunity to learn by making mistakes and gaining experience from those mistakes.

A third building block of the leadership foundation is an honest concern for the welfare of subordinates. In today’s life-support system, a real leader provides resources and facilities, satisfies wants and needs, and as many desires as prudent. It is more than just being

“in charge of”—it is truly “responsible for.” This is especially applicable in this age of centralization and consolidated facilities—pay, clothing issue, large shared barracks, dining facilities all centralized and consolidated—but a leader’s responsibility for the welfare of troops is not lessened because someone else is the provider. The biggest detriment to developing and maintaining high morale and esprit in a unit is the troops’ perception that no one cares, that there is no honest concern on the part of the leaders.

The final building block is fostering teamwork. For it is by working together that success is achieved. For many years the Army has done a great job at focusing upon the individual, at providing him equal opportunity for advancement and assignment. We’ve been concerned with MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] tests and SQTs [Skill Qualification Tests] for qualifying individual soldiers, and we’re concerned with giving individual evaluation reports—OERs [Officer Evaluation Reports] and EERs [Enlisted Evaluation Reports]. As result, I think we run the risk of a very unhealthy egocentrism developing in the total leaders corps of the United States Army—officer and NCO. Combat is a collective enterprise. Wars are not won by individuals. We need Audie Murphys and we need Sergeant Yorks in combat operations, but we also need an understanding among all soldiers that combat is a collective effort and success in combat comes only if the team works together. Wars are won by units and organizations engaged in a collective effort in which individual contributions and sacrifices must be secondary to the needs and the welfare of the whole.

Another aside: The overriding, all-encompassing, predominant, paramount (pick your synonym) characteristic of every army on every battlefield is the constant presence of fear. Fear for one’s life, a continuing dread interspersed with periods of lurking awareness and an unconscious worry punctuated with moments of abject terror, the kind that causes and breeds panic. But there is a second kind of fear—one that your peers will discover your weakness, a fear that you will let them down, a fear that you will destroy their respect for you and destroy in turn your own self-respect. It is the second fear that makes successful armies; that makes men stand in battle; that makes men sacrifice themselves for patriotism, for their friends, and for the organization. Cultivate that fear and that makes units win battles. Demand that men in your unit develop

respect for each other, so they will fear losing the respect of their friends—thus preventing the loss of self-respect—and you almost guarantee success and guarantee your success as a leader.

These four blocks—confidence, willingness to make decisions (and accepting responsibility for them), honest concern for the welfare of subordinates, and teamwork—form the foundation of leadership. These requirements apply to everyone who has to lead other men. In an infantry battalion there are six commanders—the battalion commander and five company commanders. But there are more than 300 leaders in that battalion, down to squad level—37 percent of the soldiers in the battalion are in leadership positions, in charge of and responsible for soldiers. Each one has a responsibility to train himself first, to establish command and control of his own emotions and actions, to set the example, to make decisions, take action, then to train his subordinates so they will be fit replacements for himself sometime in the future. Training leaders is the most important part of a training program.

The War College curriculum covers many areas of endeavor. You represent the core of senior Army leadership, at the pinnacle of a capable, professional, dedicated officer and noncommissioned corps. When you rejoin the ranks of that corps of leaders, you will be offered the greatest honor and you will accept the most sacred trust the American people can bestow—the trust of other soldiers’ lives. There is no guarantee you will ever reap the hero’s reward—how many Pattons matured and retired between 1918 and 1939? The finest rewards you will achieve will not be promotions or decorations or selection for bigger and better things; they will be the respect of the soldiers who work for you and the self-satisfaction you will know from having done your job well.

Command Philosophy: Principles of Leadership

[Reprinted from ARMY, May 1995]

Not long ago, at a meeting with a small group of today’s Army, I was asked, “Sir, what is your philosophy of command?” At that moment I suffered the uncomfortable feeling of being unprepared; I wasn’t sure I had such a philosophy, and I knew I had never asked myself that question, so I had not previously formulated an answer.

But an old soldier is almost never at a loss for words, so I allowed my brain to follow my mouth through an assortment of leadership principles and practices in which I have strong beliefs. In what must have been a rambling discourse, I constructed an edifice that in five minutes or less I offered as my command philosophy.

Later, when cogitating my offering, I was satisfied that I'd said nothing wrong and that I had made points that I thought germane, but I also found myself wondering whether I had actually said it right. The question has irked me ever since. I finally decided to spend some time trying to do it better, and now I'm willing to ask for a critique from a new audience.

I'm not sure why my questioner wanted to know the answer to this question, but if he was curious maybe some others are also. So I offer a philosophy of command that I think was pertinent to my years in the Army and that just might contribute to an argument the next time someone else makes the same query.

The cornerstone of this structure is the belief that a commander must have absolute confidence in his or her own decisionmaking abilities and a willingness to make decisions under pressure. These are not arbitrary, dogmatic or imperious decisions made because one is a commander, but, rather, are decisions based on a conviction that "Given what I know, this is the best thing to do right now!" That, followed by a determination to accept responsibility for the consequences, establishes the moral foundation of this philosophy.

It is always comforting to know that knowledge, experience and all of the facts bearing on a case were the basis for each decision, but Yogi Berra is said to have observed, "When you come to a fork in the road, take it."

The wisdom of that counsel is quite apparent when one realizes that there is a constant supply of forks in the road that every commander travels, and he can never stop at those junctions and await divine guidance. Foresight, forethought and situational awareness will prepare him to decide even when the forks are unforeseen and unexpected, but the willingness to do it with only the facts at hand is the mark of a real commander.

Nothing stymies progress faster than indecision followed by inaction. An army piles in confusion at that fork if no decision has been made. The command that functions by waiting for the next higher commander to

prescribe what to do and how to do it will never act with the dispatch required on the battlefield—yesterday, today or tomorrow. From squad leader to corps commander, it is decisionmaking that sparks all performance.

Next, confidence in decisionmaking has to be complemented by an equally strong conviction that subordinates will see to the implementation of decisions. A commander has to know that he can assign missions, then rely on his command to execute them. He has a right to expect this, but his real confidence comes with the recognition that his subordinates are also professionally qualified, personally capable and dedicated to fulfilling the mission.

Such confidence is developed over time as a commander prescribes and supervises training, establishes the techniques and procedures of operations, becomes personally acquainted with his personnel, and assigns or reassigns duties and people. It becomes, ultimately, a command confidence that no mission is too tough, no one else can do it better when his command reflects the same confidence in its commander, for confidence is a two-way requirement, and every commander has to earn the respect of those who work for him if he intends to build a great organization. The most formidable test of this requirement occurs when personnel are new to each other. A command must believe that a new commander is qualified and capable, but even more important, the new commander must accept that his complement of subordinates has somehow, somewhere, proved itself capable, that each soldier has earned his insignia of rank and has demonstrated his ability.

He deserves professional respect. If he has shortcomings, they will have to be corrected later because a new commander will come early to a fork in the road and, particularly in combat, must make his decisions based on a belief that his command can and will execute effectively.

It is important that no one should feel threatened by the arrival of a new boss, that everyone should believe that he will have a fair chance to continue his performance and to advance. When a new commander starts his tour by firing those he perceives in short order as incompetent or insufficiently attuned to his philosophies, he weakens the organization, at least temporarily. Sometimes it is appropriate, even necessary, but he must

recognize that he may galvanize resentment among supporters of those dismissed and create antagonisms that his newly appointed commanders and staff officers will have to overcome.

He may solve these problems as he builds a team of selected people who provide the basis for the good decisions of the future, but the Army is seldom well served by turbulence, especially when the careers of the unanointed are scarred and the psyche of an organization takes time to recover.

A third principle of my command philosophy is the requirement for a commander to realize that he needs help; he cannot go it alone. Internally he has subordinate commanders or leaders and always some kind of staff. For a platoon leader that staff may be only his platoon sergeant and his radio operator, while a corps commander stumbles over a staff assistant at every turn. But at every level, appropriate help is available.

Whatever the complement, it is mandatory that a commander engage everyone in the fulfillment of his mission—subordinate leaders in execution and his staff in the obtaining and distributing of all support that can be provided to those leaders.

At higher levels, beginning at the battalion, the synchronization of military operations with the support they require, and deserve, is one of the most complex endeavors attempted by mankind. No commander can be successful if he tries to do all of those things himself or if he does not enlist and exploit the help he has available. Further, he must ensure that every member of his staff is dedicated to providing all available support, not to him, but to his command—the subordinates charged with carrying out his directives.

I was appalled one day, some years ago, to hear a very senior officer say, "The job of my staff is always to keep higher headquarters off my back—give 'em what they want, keep 'em happy and let me get on with getting our job done." (That occasion is the reason I said earlier that an old soldier *is almost* never at a loss for words; I was about speechless at that moment.)

My expectation of staff officers is that they turn their attention to the command, looking outward and downward through the echelons to figure out how to help, how to ensure that subordinate commanders can accomplish the tasks assigned, looking back only to demand that higher echelons provide it. I can think of

no quicker way to distract them from this task than to tell them that their first priority is to please higher headquarters.

Finally, when it comes to seeking help, a commander has to remember that a most valuable source is external, that is, his boss, that next higher who assigned his mission and the staff that works at his level. If nothing else, one can get experienced advice and counsel, but more important, given my expectation concerning a staff's orientation, it follows that I expect the staff at my boss's echelon to be working for me, providing me with the wherewithal to accomplish my mission, and it is my responsibility to put demands on the system.

Most important, perhaps, is the requirement that when a commander has planned for the full use of the resources he has been allocated to do a job, he must ask himself, "How can I do it better?"

If more of something will improve the prospect of success, reduce the anticipated costs or accelerate the achievement of the mission, it is incumbent upon him to ask.

He owes his troops the attempt to get more fire support, better intelligence, another tank battalion or a new communications link. He may not get it, but he is morally bound to try, regardless of what it is he sees a need for.

What kind of squall would we have had for Desert Storm if General H. Norman Schwarzkopf had been hesitant about asking for another corps when he found himself in Saudi Arabia with forces adequate for defense, but with a pending offensive mission?

Given those three principles, any command philosophy has to be rounded out with attention to enlightened leadership, an effective training effort for both personnel and units, an honest concern for the welfare and well-being of all personnel, assured family satisfaction along with job satisfaction in today's Army, and the development of a true conviction that the command is engaged in a worthy cause, a noble enterprise, a rewarding venture.

I cannot guarantee anyone a successful command tour in our Army or any of the services, but if I had a chance to do it all over again, I would start with what I learned the first time around. And my command philosophy now is all about what I think I learned then.

The Future

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, January 2000]

The fall season of national security conferences is over. Any number of organizations, institutions and think tanks invited learned men and women to tell other learned men and women just what is wrong with the national military establishment and how to fix it. I attended some as an interested observer, concerned about the current state of the Army and its future.

I learned about strategic responsiveness, rebuilding American power, the revolution in military affairs (RMA), science, technology and military strength, and the need for change, always the need for change.

I learned that defense thinking is not keeping pace with technology. Strategic agility is mandatory. Strategic challenges are different, but our military has not transformed to cope, especially the Army, where thinking is "prehistoric." Advanced conventional capabilities mean that our offensive forces could be restructured substantially and thereby have strategic applicability. Nuclear forces have been reduced in importance, but we must look beyond the Triad for new and better delivery systems. Weapons of mass destruction are proliferating and defenses are required. Strategic nuclear forces remain our greatest deterrence. The intelligence system is broken. Our military culture is threatened, and our ability to attract manpower is questionable.

I learned that to cope with this panoply of problems—*pardon me, challenges*—we must have new thinking, more money, more resources dedicated to defense, but there is no advocacy group in Congress, no public protestation and no universal understanding of the need. Therefore, additional funding is most unlikely, and the problems will have to be solved at about current funding levels.

Finally, I learned that military leadership is overwhelmed by the demands of daily operations, social experiments and the annual struggle of the budget cycle, so change and the RMA must be directed and managed by civilian leadership.

The learned persons who provided me with this situational awareness did not make many, if any, specific proposals. I don't count "We must improve the health of the institution," or "We must restore credibility," or "We must respond to the changed international environment" as specific. Instead there seemed to be a

presumption that someone—"they"—will have to do it. As I reflected on my experiences of the past 50 years, it struck me that "they," once again, really will have to be today's military leaders.

Somehow, despite daily demands and social experiments, Army leaders will have to propose, fight for and manage the changes that they themselves decide are needed and can be afforded. New doctrine, if needed, will again have military authors. I flatly disagree with those who say that civilian leadership will have to control the RMA because I remember those years when civilian secretaries, systems analysts and whiz kids had their turns and almost destroyed the Army.

Our military leadership has always been able to rise to the challenge when allowed to shape policies and make decisions.

DePuy and Gorman and Starry are names that revolutionized the education and training of the Army. Abrams, Weyand, Rogers and Meyer brought aboard the equipment that modernized the force. Thurman, Stiner and Downing planned and directed Operation Just Cause and Powell and Schwarzkopf and Yeosock mastered the demands of Operation Desert Storm while Vuono and Sullivan planned both the downsizing and the Army of the future. All were up to the tasks of the time, and all fought the budget battles and somehow obtained the support they needed. All were testimony that our officer corps has an abundance of round pegs to fit into the round holes of the structure required by a combat situation or to address the intellectual challenges of the latest RMA.

Today's Army leaders face some daunting demands: the Army's role in national military strategy, the maintenance and improvement of power projection to worldwide trouble spots, the expectations of the RMA advocates and the drain of resources required by the operations tempo of the time.

The need for military statesmanship is clear and the promise of outside help is meager. Visionaries will float proposals, critics will carp at the lack of progress, budgeteers will demonstrate thrift and legislators will excuse the diversion of funds to more popular programs. Yet, ten years from now we have to believe that we will add two or three more names to our roster of glory and say that these were the leaders who directed and managed the latest revolution in military affairs, who

guaranteed current capabilities and protected the future of the Army. No other scenario is acceptable, but for those whose blood-sweat-and-tears efforts are necessary, those who have gone before can tell you, the Army is worth it.

“Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death”

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, March 2002]

One more Pentagon spokesman has just assured me that the latest anti-Taliban activity was conducted with the aid, advice and assistance of our special operations soldiers, but that they did not take part in actual combat. The statement, routinely offered now, reassures mothers, fathers, wives and children that we are doing all we can to prevent casualties among their loved ones. It also assures everyone that our rules of engagement are designed to protect our forces, thus guaranteeing that no one in Washington will have to explain unwanted losses of our men.

Unfortunately, such policies are also a great disservice to the troops engaged and a direct violation of fundamental principles of leadership. They contribute to the worldwide perception that Americans avoid casualties even to the detriment of mission accomplishment; that we haven’t the stomach for a real fight.

This disparaging view of our fortitude has been fed in recent years by our abrupt withdrawal from Lebanon after the Marine barracks was bombed, by the same reaction in Somalia after the “Black Hawk Down” incident, by the disparaging observations that we fought the war with Yugoslavia from a 25,000-foot altitude to guarantee no pilot losses and now by the continual reminders that we are only advisors and counselors. The impression is that no mission is worth a loss of life and that is a far cry from the guiding principles of our earlier history.

“Give me liberty or give me death!” “Our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor,” and even the regimental motto “I’ll try, sir!” are personal commitments to sacrifice in the face of danger to the nation and forgotten guidance when we demand no casualties as a factor in operational planning.

Leadership as taught and practiced in our armed forces begins at squad and platoon levels where “leaders,” not commanders, are in charge. “Follow me”

is not just a slogan. It is a way of life in combat for sergeants and lieutenants whose job it is to lead the way, to set the example, to inspire by doing. It pervades our higher commanders’ roles as well, as we expect them to ride to the sound of the guns and to seek first-hand appreciation of what is going on. Great commanders of the past were a known presence among their troops.

The principle of participation was also ingrained in the advisors that we distributed around the world after World War II. General James Van Fleet was conspicuous among the Greek army forces committed to save Greece from Communist revolutionaries. Our captains and lieutenants accompanied Korean troops in their combat operations during the Korean War, suffering hardships and accepting risks equal to those of the soldiers they served. In Vietnam our commanders shared command and control helicopters with their counterparts, accompanying them on Army of Vietnam (ARVN) combat actions. Advisors in Special Forces camps, districts guarded by popular force platoons, and all ARVN battalions were expected to be present and take part in the combat operations of their units. With few exceptions our advisors were highly respected, well-liked, wanted and considered essential by their counterparts. Their acceptance stemmed primarily from their presence and willingness to take part, share risks and endure hardships.

Nothing turns off a combat soldier’s respect faster than the perception that a colleague is hanging back, a reluctant dragon, a fearful participant concerned first with his own safety. No explanation that “policy” or “rules of engagement” dictates the self-protection of our soldiers is going to convince the anti-Taliban troops that we are in full support of their actions. The continual insistence of Pentagon spokesmen that we are not participating in combat is not going to change the view now held by the terrorist world that we will quit when it really gets tough.

If the objectives of our war on terrorism are valid—let me repeat, if the objectives are valid—then the commitment of our soldiers fully and completely to the task is not only justified but also an absolute requirement.

We should allow them the full range of participation in pursuit of their mission. In the long term, in the strategic equation, our costs will be minimized.

[Transcription of a letter to USAREUR commanders]

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 09403**

28 January 1982

Dear Colonel _____:

On Friday, 22 January, I failed to keep my appointment with you and the other Brigade and Battalion Commanders' Course attendees. I regret that; it is only the second course I've missed in almost three years, and I want you to know I attach great importance to what we try to do there. This letter is to try to encapsulate what I would have spent an hour telling you at Vilseck.

First, I would have welcomed you to the USAREUR chain of command and congratulated you for having been selected as a commander. The Army can provide no greater honor to a soldier than to assign him the responsibility of command, particularly in a theater which is a frontier of the Free World, where command can mean the very lives of soldiers placed in your charge. My congratulations are sincere, but I want them also to be a reminder of the grave trust the American people have placed in you.

Your mission is simple: prepare your units as a whole and your soldiers as individuals to go to war, on short notice if necessary, to accomplish the tasks for which your organization is designed. Train your unit to standards and a state of readiness from which you can surge to maximum readiness in periods of tension or crisis. You cannot sustain a peak of readiness indefinitely, but you can sustain readiness which demonstrates daily to your soldiers that they are in an organization that is professional, capable, and worthy of their confidence. That confidence, of soldiers in themselves, in each other, and in the chain of command whom they see daily is the true measure of readiness in this command. I do not assess readiness from the Unit Status Report, still referred to as the Readiness Report, a collection of statistics which tell only whether you have the resources from which to create readiness, but from my appraisal of the confidence I see in the faces and the actions of your soldiers. You owe them training and a day-to-day excellence in all activities that create that confidence; you owe them both professional and psychological preparation for war.

You will learn, if you have not already, that I truly believe in decentralization, that I give only mission type orders, that you are told what has to be done but not how to do it. That is a philosophy that I believe should pervade the whole command. I believe in a chain of command that functions from the bottom up, one in which every leader is a decision-maker, willing and able to take action to solve problems, react to crises, or initiate a response to a need. To develop such a chain of command, we cannot have zero-defects commanders at any echelon, rather we must have leaders willing to allow subordinates the opportunity to make mistakes, to learn from experience. Correct them, be demanding of them, prevent repetitive errors, but do not destroy their willingness to continue to decide. We must consciously train leaders in peacetime to make decisions so that we don't have them in wartime waiting for the squad leader in the sky to tell them what to do and how to do it. I don't expect you to wait

around for someone to tell you what has to be done, what priorities apply to your business, or just how you go about accomplishing your mission. I don't expect you to do any different with your subordinates

I would have spent some time last Friday reminding you that you are not alone, that you have all the help you need if you only ask. Every headquarters above you exists almost exclusively to provide you the wherewithal needed for your mission. The staff at the next higher headquarters is, in truth, working for you and its attention must be on your needs and the help they can give you. The USAREUR staff (never "my staff") exists to serve two corps commanders, four division commanders, a number of brigade and support command commanders, and thirty-six community commanders, all of whom can turn directly to this headquarters for help. I expect the staff to react to their needs, to provide resources, advice and counsel, or anything else required to make mission accomplishment easier, surer. So, if you can do your job one percent better because you ask for help, you owe it to your soldiers to ask. Everything you need can't always be provided, but you'll never be wrong in asking.

Finally, I would have told you that your day-to-day activities, in addition to serving your mission, must be concerned in equal measure with the welfare and well-being of your soldiers, civilian employees, and their families. In peacetime, this concern approaches the importance of the mission itself. And despite all the help I promised from the staffs above you, not one of them relieves you of responsibility for taking care of people. This is a peacetime Army; it must provide job satisfaction for soldiers and employees and simultaneously, family satisfaction for their dependents. We have run-down facilities, a lack of housing, poor working conditions, inadequate training areas, and a widely dispersed, inconvenient support system, all of which has to be coped with, overcome in some way to prove to soldiers that someone does care. There is no greater contribution to high morale and esprit de corps than day-to-day excellence in whatever you do; there is no greater detriment to good morale than the perception that nobody gives a damn.


I would have ended my talk saying that I haven't told you anything that you don't already know, but that I wanted you to hear from me those things that I think are important, a general philosophy regarding how I think this command should operate. I would have reminded you again that your mission is to prepare men and women, Soldiers, both professionally and psychologically, to go to war; that your mission is a sacred trust delegated by the American people, the fathers and mothers of your soldiers. I would have told you that I hope war does not come on your watch, but that if it does, I hope your conscience will not be bothered about what should have been done to get ready but wasn't. And if war doesn't come, that the legacy you owe to your successor is an organization better trained, better prepared than the one you found when you arrived.

Then I would have reminded you that you are engaged in your chosen profession, doing what you've always wanted to do, so both you and the people working for you ought to enjoy the hell out of your tour of duty. There is time for doing it, doing it right, and finding time for the peacetime pursuits that make a few years in Europe a very worthwhile place to be. And I would have said "Good luck! Any questions?"

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. KROESEN
General, USA
Commander in Chief





Force Management

Force Management

The United States Army is a large, complex organization that must be constantly ready to perform a wide variety of missions anywhere in the world to protect and defend the interests of the American people. This daunting task is further complicated by the changing nature of war, threats facing America, and technological developments that constantly create new weapons and equipment that must be integrated into the Army.

The senior leadership of the Army must manage the force to ensure it can accomplish whatever mission may be asked of it. This entails creating and maintaining an appropriate force structure and then keeping the units and organizations in that structure in a constant state of readiness.

My education in the Army's force structure began in 1965 when I joined the Army Staff as a member of the Plans and Programs Directorate of ACSFOR (Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development). I was in the Troop Programming Division which was concerned primarily with manpower and the list of troop units required to fill the Army force structure. It was a high-pressure assignment because I started just as the Army began its expansion for the Vietnam War. When I joined the office, the Army was in the throes of issuing activation and reorganization orders for adding

a new division, three new brigades and a raft of other organizations. The job of the division was to ensure that the Army retained a balanced structure for its worldwide missions while building the forces to fight the war in Vietnam.

Troop programming identified the force structure to be added to the Army. In the early stages of the Vietnam buildup it was a constant struggle to properly time the activation of units and organizations that were requested by MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) and get them trained and shipped. ACSFOR had to program the time required for an organization to be activated, filled with equipment and personnel, and then trained in time to meet its deployment schedule. It generally took five months of training for a battalion-sized unit and three months for a company-sized unit. The DCSPER (Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel) needed to know the manpower requirements to fill that structure, including the grades and Military Occupational Specialties (MOSSs) of soldiers on the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). The DCSLOG (Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics) had to know the materiel requirements for the structure.

Coordinating the DCSPER and DCSLOG efforts was a challenge. The seasonal sine wave of the draft, the demand for casualty replacements in Vietnam, the rotation of soldiers to and from other overseas commands, and the varied time requirements for MOS training complicated the availability of personnel. Industry's production schedules, interruptions and the long-term requirements for major items of equipment made the logisticians' plans uncertain. Accumulating all the resources for a unit commander so he could complete a training schedule and meet all readiness requirements in time to meet the deployment schedule of the DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations) was a 16-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week work requirement. I was blessed with a smart, dedicated, selfless staff who designed and implemented a system to make it all work.

It was an interesting three years, and there were times when I felt as though that office was running what constituted the foundation of the Army. But I was ready to leave and take command of a brigade in Vietnam. As it turned out, however, it was not long



General Kroesen assumes command of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in 1976. On his left and right are Major General John Henion and Lieutenant General Sam Walker, respectively.

before I was back in the force structure business. In 1969, after my brigade command tour, I returned to the Pentagon to become the Director of Manpower and Forces, one echelon above the office that I headed before my departure. This was when the withdrawal from Vietnam and the reduction in the size of the Army were underway. All the effort that had gone into building the force structure and raising the Army's manpower from 960,000 to 1,500,000 soldiers from 1965 to 1968 had to be reversed. We called them teardown plans, in contrast to the buildup plans that we had been responsible for in previous years. I spent a year and a half inactivating elements of the Army, reducing manpower requirements, and shrinking the training establishment and the support structure as Army forces returned from Vietnam. I had just as interesting a tour of duty then as I had in the earlier three years, but it was a much more frustrating and disheartening period because I was presiding over another pell-mell self-destruction of American military power.

My tours in the ACSFOR taught me a great deal about the Army's force structure. I learned how the Defense programming and budgeting system works and spent many days defending Army requirements before congressional committees and Defense Department staff officers. I became quite knowledgeable of what the Army's requirements were, how they could be fulfilled, and what the priorities were for allocating resources to assure that we continued to maintain an effective Army. I had direct contact in that job with the Secretary of the Army and many of the assistant secretaries. Fighting the battle for the future Army force structure was a continuing intellectual challenge.

The ACSFOR was eliminated from the Army Staff as part of the 1974 reorganization. Parts of it went to DCSPER, parts of it went to DCSOPS, and parts of it went to DCSRDA [Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition]. The Army has suffered from the loss of that staff agency; there is no longer a focal point for force development activity. It is a fragmented operation now monitored by the PA&E (Program Analysis and Evaluation) office, which is a centralizing focus but does not have the authority of a principal in directing force development activities.

My experience in building and then disassembling the Army that went to Vietnam gave me a long-standing interest in force management. Since my retirement I have written a number of articles on the subject, four

of which are reprinted here. In "What is Hollow?" (written in 1999), I reviewed the many requirements that the Army has to fill with its limited personnel strength. Two years later "Army Structure: A Primer" described the challenges the Army faces in explaining the complexities of its force structure. "Designed for Europe?" was my reaction to the self-styled experts who want to redesign the Army by increasing firepower at the expense of maneuver forces. The increased tempo of operations for forces since the beginning of the war on terrorism prompted me to write "Preparing for the Long War" in early 2002 to draw attention to the need for taking action now to protect and sustain the Army's capabilities for future wars.

Another component of force management is readiness. From my study of history it is apparent that, with the exception of the Panama invasion and the Persian Gulf Wars, American military forces have been unprepared for the initial stages of every conflict they have fought. Those campaigns, i.e., Panama and the Persian Gulf, demonstrated what our military can do if it is properly prepared and supported. The 1991 Gulf War is the prime example of what can be achieved when we are truly prepared for war. It was the commitment of resources to the military forces during the 1980s that allowed them to build the capability that made a mockery of enemy resistance. It is the only war the United States was really prepared in advance to fight, and we won it with virtually no casualties.

But readiness is more than simply being prepared to fight. The United States had a very good Army in 1965. It had been rebuilt after Korea during the Eisenhower years and after the Cuban Crisis in 1961. From the Kennedy administration the Army received resources it had been wanting for a long time. There was a buildup in the early 1960s much like that of the early 1980s during the Reagan administration, so the Army was a confident, professional organization from 1960 to 1965, and it went to Vietnam in very good condition. The United States had an Army that was prepared properly in 1965 to go to war, but the nation was not ready to employ or sustain it properly. The military was committed piecemeal with policies that assured a sort of self-destruction.

For example, there was the one-year rotation policy. It seemed like a good idea, but it destroyed the noncommissioned officer corps. If a sergeant stayed in the Army in the infantry or the engineers or the signal corps, he

served a year in Vietnam and returned home, but nine months later he had orders to go back. Many of the NCOs left the service rather than take multiple combat tours. And then there was the decision that because Vietnam was considered a combat theater, everyone received combat pay. That was great for the morale of the troops sitting in Saigon watching the PX, but it was not so great for the morale of the infantrymen in the field. It was a bad policy that created discontent. Then there was the fervent attempt to furnish everybody with everything. We sold radios and TV sets in the PXs and served ice cream on the fire bases. With all this stuff pouring into the country, we had to have people to take care of it all and we ended up with an overblown support establishment. There was no mobilization of the reserve components, leaving the active Army to sustain itself. That is how it came down to doing it with draftees led by brand-new second lieutenants supported by brand-new helicopter pilots. By 1968, the Army was a shadow of what it had been in 1965. It was not really ready for that war, any more than it had been for any others. The Army was in better condition to start it; it destroyed itself as it was going along.

I have long been a strong advocate of readiness. Two articles from *ARMY* magazine examine readiness in the mid-1990s when the accomplishments of the Persian Gulf War and the benefits of maintaining a high state of readiness were fading from memory. "Drawbacks and Dangers of the 'Tiered Manning Policy'" questions the concept of keeping units at less than full strength in peacetime while "Readiness: The Lion in the Fight" is a reminder of the importance of keeping the Army ready for future wars. "Force Planning for Today" is a discussion of opposing philosophies concerning what kinds of forces are needed and some of the factors to be considered when designing the structure.

What Is Hollow?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, February 1999]

Almost 20 years ago Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. (Shy) Meyer made headlines when he described the Army as "hollow." Since then the term has cropped up routinely as columnists, commentators and members of Congress raise questions about readiness, capabilities or the warfighting capacities of the force. It is again in vogue as many writers ask whether the recent congressional testimony by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff—when they warned of the services' shortcomings—is now describing hollowness. But ask the question, "What is hollow?" and the answer is, generally, "Uh, you know, it means the Army's not ready or it isn't trained or it can't fight." Seldom does anyone have an idea of the right answer.

Hollowness is not a recent phenomenon. It certainly has been with us since World War II. Very simply, the term describes what force managers understand to be a discrepancy between "spaces" and "faces" in the Army structure. Every unit in the Army has a designed structure with spaces for soldiers organized by squads, sections and platoons that make up a company. Each space has an identified need for a soldier of specified rank and military occupational specialty. When every space is filled properly, there is a face associated with each space, and the personnel readiness of the unit meets its readiness requirement.

When a soldier is missing, however, there is a space unfilled, in effect, hollow. When a soldier is untrained for his job, his space is not hollow, but the training readiness of the unit is affected. When the number missing and untrained grows to a point that the unit cannot function properly or cannot accomplish its combat mission, it becomes a hollow unit.

This same system holds for equipment. Every unit is authorized and has spaces for so many weapons, so many vehicles, so many radios, so many computers, so many radar sets and the like. Whenever an item of equipment is missing, there is an unfilled or hollow space in the unit's structure, and when the hollow spaces get too numerous, the logistics readiness of the unit is affected and its rating falls.

Since this is an understandable explanation of hollowness, how do we explain that if the Army is authorized 480,000 soldiers and it reports regularly that it has 480,000, it is having trouble with hollowness? The answer to that question, unfortunately, is not simple.

The Army also is authorized or directed to have, in the active force, ten divisions organized in four corps. Each unit in those organizations is authorized soldiers and equipment. So many men and women generate requirements for pay, postal service, recreation facilities, medical support and a whole host of other services. So much equipment generates requirements for maintenance and repair support, ammunition and fuel handling, repair parts supply and so on. (For brevity

and simplicity, this discussion is limited to the active Army. The reserve components also have hollowness problems, but the issues and causes deserve a separate explanation.)

The Army completes a Total Army analysis biennially to determine what kind and how many units are needed in the Total Army to support and sustain its ten-division force if it is sent to war. That analysis has established that ten fully structured divisions require 495,000 active duty spaces, some 15,000 more than the 480,000 faces authorized to fill them, and we have three choices for accommodating the shortfall: designate 15,000 spaces not to be filled, that is, man all units at about 97 percent of their authorized strength; inactivate whole units or reduce the authorization level of some units, leaving the structure less than complete if we have to go to war; or implement some combination of the first and the second.

The first solution establishes an immediate and measurable hollowness, and an impact on the readiness status of units. It is favored, generally, by commanders in the field who have a recognized force structure requirement associated with their missions and an automatic demand on the system when a crisis occurs.

The second solution, favored by systems analysts, staff officers, budgeteers (that is, the Defense Department, the administration and Congress), reduces the costs of the force and assumes a risk that any crisis can be met by less than the total force or that time will be available to make up the shortfall by mobilization.

Obviously, the solution always chosen is the third, the compromise combining one and two, but this leads to more complexity and confusion. Included in the requirement for 495,000 is the trainees, transients, holdees and students (TTHS) account—soldiers who are transients moving between assignments, trainees who have just entered the Army and are not yet qualified to fill a space, hospitalized soldiers not available for duty and students who are attending the various schools at which the Army provides continuing education for career soldiers. Once defined as “the horde that is always going and coming but never seems to arrive,” TTHS is a whipping boy for all cost-conscious planners. If the Army would just reduce the weeks of basic training, shorten the courses in its education system, cut its accident rate or stop moving people to new assignments so frequently, it could cut the TTHS totals

and put more people in the force structure. If it would balance the student load through all months and stop moving people mostly in the summer, it could overcome the wave motion that now afflicts this account, drawing more people out of the structure and affecting readiness when the account is oversubscribed. Since there is no absolute figure for TTHS, it will always be a contentious issue, but the pressure to reduce its numbers and thereby reduce the endstrength and save money does not let up. Historically, TTHS has been about 12 to 14 percent of the total strength, and prudent management dictates that such an allowance should be recognized and programmed.

Then there is the problem of priorities. If the 82d Airborne Division is to be the first to fight and might deploy in 18 hours, we had better keep it at 100 percent strength. (The division commander will tell you that something higher is more appropriate if you want to deploy at full strength.) To restore that 3 percent we took away earlier, not only for the division but also for all other early-deploying supporting forces, we have to reduce other units even more, hence the authorized level of organization (ALO) system. Based on their priority for deployment to combat, the Army restricts some units to ALO 2 (90 percent of their full requirement), others to ALO 3 (80 percent) and still others to some lower number to provide the faces for units at ALO 1. The ALO system is a management technique that has served well for about 40 years to protect structure and satisfy strength needs of the various priorities of units. Significantly, the ALO system does not reduce equipment authorizations; an ALO 3 unit still has to manage and maintain 100 percent of its equipment.

Unfortunately, there are other priorities that must be accommodated. The Department of Defense has a large complement of soldiers, mostly generals, colonels and master sergeants. The Army has not only a 100 percent fill requirement but also an overlap; that is, the incumbent does not leave until his replacement is in place and acquainted with his duties. The unified commands, the Joint Staff, the Army’s Pentagon complement and other government agencies all demand 100 percent fill, and all of them drain faces from forces in the field. The actual strength requirement to fill these needs is from 110 to 115 percent.

Next are the operational requirements. Aside from the normal overseas forces in Europe and South Korea, the Army is averaging about 35,000 soldiers on missions

in nearly 70 foreign nations. From the brigade in Bosnia to two Special Forces soldiers in Mongolia to a company on a Partnership for Peace exercise, the units involved bring manning to 100 percent before they deploy. For those missions that are rotating requirements, a replacement unit also has to be filled and trained, thus doubling the demand for manpower for such missions. The Army has long contended that it needs three brigades to sustain a one-brigade mission: one preparing to go, one there and one recovering and retraining. I maintain it needs more because the inevitable losses that occur to the brigade deployed (reassignments for schools or promotion, compassionate transfers, illness and injury, expiration of terms of service) require the manpower of at least another third of a brigade for a one-year tour of duty.

Another perennial problem of the volunteer Army is that the Army allows new recruits many choices of training and stationing. When not enough recruits want to be infantrymen or cavalry scouts, personnel managers are unable to fill those spaces with properly trained and qualified faces. The Army complicates such a problem by increasing the number of infantry and cavalry soldiers on recruiting duty so they can advertise the benefits of joining those branches, a step that further reduces the quantities of soldiers assigned to these units.

Likewise, when military policemen or engineers find themselves in great demand for deployment on operations other than war, causing a consequent requirement for excessive family separations, job satisfaction suffers, retention rates fall and an imbalance in Military Occupational Specialties occurs. Again, the proper fill of units with qualified personnel is affected.

Finally, there is the albatross called "borrowed military manpower." No post commander has ever had the manpower resources needed to operate and maintain his installation without borrowing men from the tactical units stationed there. When times are good, such as when operations and maintenance funds are adequate, contracting for guard duty, grass mowing, landscaping, cleanup and minor painting and repairs reduces the need for troop labor, but the requirement never seems to disappear completely. A normal means of providing this labor is for a division commander to give the mission of "post guard and details" to one battalion for one or two weeks. During that time, the battalion satisfies all requirements and limits training to

individual studies and practice for the troops not committed. This is not exactly a hollowness issue, but the battalion training cycle is interrupted and readiness is affected. When O&M [operation and maintenance] funding goes down and labor contracts are not renewed, the drain of borrowed military manpower increases.

Much of the discussion of the Army's personnel system applies also to its logistics system. The U.S. Army normally has little trouble filling its equipment spaces as most items are in adequate supply and units are fully equipped almost from their day of activation. There are specific items of equipment, perhaps new models that are in short supply or new equipment still in production, that are not available in quantities necessary to equip everyone, but overall, quantities of equipment seldom cause hollowness problems.

Maintaining that equipment, however, is another story. Every unit's table of organization and equipment prescribes its mission as though it is fully manned and equipped, that is, every rifleman present and every man with a rifle. Accomplishing the mission of an infantry rifle company would become problematic if a significant number of riflemen did not have rifles. The situation affects most units when we introduce them to the maintenance system. Almost all equipment must be "turned in for maintenance" when it needs repair. Either it is inactive or unready in its supply room, motor pool or tank park waiting for a part to be installed, or it is evacuated to a "higher echelon of maintenance"—a specially equipped unit, trained to repair a tank or a radio or a bulldozer. While the item is awaiting repair, it is not available either for training or for combat, and a unit's logistic readiness is affected.

Logisticians point with pride at the readiness rates they have been able to maintain for the Army's major items of equipment. Tanks, routinely now, are 90 percent available, helicopters are 80 to 90 percent. (U.S. Air Force logisticians are generally proud of a 70 percent combat-ready figure for their aircraft.) As a commander, however, I always complained—no one ever told me I could be satisfied with 90 percent mission accomplishment because I only had 90 percent of my tanks. I spent many years insisting that 100 percent availability should be the goal and that a system should be devised that could guarantee 100 percent. Otherwise, units are sent into combat without what their tables of organization and equipment prescribe as required for their missions.

When operation and maintenance funds are short, repair parts are used and not replaced, or not replaced in time or in quantities needed, and equipment sets are idle, awaiting repair. Each item idle is absent from its space in a unit's table of organization and equipment and contributes to hollowness.

The management of the personnel and logistics systems that are the foundation of the Army's readiness is not easy even when resources are adequate for the task. When the money supply adversely affects the recruiting of new soldiers, the quantity of repair parts that can be purchased or the amount of training ammunition that can be provided, readiness is affected and the hollowing out of Army units occurs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been careful to say in some recent statements that the military's high-priority forces are not hollow, that they can respond to a crisis at full strength, fully equipped. He does not elaborate on the condition of other forces that have been levied for people and things to provide that full strength.

The worrisome problem today is that the Army is maintaining a tempo of operations and personnel turnover that erodes the long-term capacity of the service to sustain its quality, its professionalism, and the job satisfaction and family satisfaction of its people. The Army needs either an increase in its size and its budget or a reduction in its mission requirements. Meanwhile, the rank and file of the Army, the soldiers shuffled to and fro to satisfy all requirements, the majors who have to write the orders directing and controlling the turmoil, and the colonels and generals whose organizations are constantly unstable just have to live with a problem that demands extraordinary management skill. They should know that their predecessors experienced the same frustrations and still built the forces capable of winning our wars. It was never easy.

Army Structure: A Primer

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, May 2001]

A sine wave of interest in the Army's tooth-to-tail ratio is due to crest again as the new administration engages in its appraisals of U.S. forces and as the deadline for the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) approaches. We can anticipate observations that an Army division has too few shooters and too many supporters. No comparisons in this regard will be made with the Navy or Air Force, but we will read that "every

Marine is combat-trained." Once again the Army will have to explain its structure and its functioning to prevent a meat-ax reduction of some of its essential elements.

What the Army is

The U.S. Army is a collective mass of disparate elements, each contributing uniquely to the overall mission of battlefield success. The mass is divided into combat forces, of which there are three categories—combat, combat support and combat service support—and all others, which make up the sustaining base or infrastructure of the Army.

Combat forces engage the enemy, seeking dominance over opposing forces, land areas and populations. Combat support forces contribute specialized forms of firepower, maneuver capabilities, signal communications and intelligence information that enhance performance and chances of success on the battlefield. Combat service support forces provide and maintain the resource requirements of all forces in the combat zone. A proper balance of these three kinds of forces is essential to sustained combat action in any and all theaters of war and throughout the broad spectrum of military operations.

Combat forces include varied infantry forces (airborne, air assault, mechanized, mountain and special operations), armor, cavalry, air defense and some artillery, aviation, engineer, and signal and intelligence forces who carry the battle to the enemy. For the purpose of definition, all soldiers assigned to a division are identified as combat forces personnel, regardless of their branch of service.

Combat support forces are other air defense, field artillery, engineer, signal and intelligence forces, supplemented by military police, transportation and forward support elements of the logistics systems, that operate in close proximity to the combat forces and that contribute directly to the engagement under way.

Combat service support forces include administrative forces that operate the personnel replacement system, military pay and accounting, mail delivery, military justice systems and mortuary services. They include the logistics forces, the quartermaster, ordnance and transportation units that deliver food, fuel, ammunition, repair parts, replacement equipment and special supplies (barbed wire, construction materials) and those who repair and maintain the equipage of the force in the field. They include the medical forces that treat and

evacuate the sick and injured and maintain the health of the command in the field. Also, they include more signal units that build and maintain the long lines of communication, engineers who build and repair roads and buildings, military police and many other units that assure the functioning of all the support services.

Interwoven among these forces are the headquarters that through five echelons (corps, division, brigade, battalion and company) maintain command and control of the forces by directing operations, reporting successes or failures and allocating appropriate support and services among those pursuing the objectives of the command. Each headquarters directs actions designed to accomplish a mission, to coordinate and synchronize all possible support for the combat forces engaged and to obtain any and all information that will assist commanders' decisionmaking.

Behind the combat zone and stretching all the way to the continental United States is the infrastructure of the Army. In the theater of operations behind the combat zone, the communications zone is the area in which the deployed support and service installations and units are located. The movement of personnel, equipment and supplies into and out of seaports and airports, the repair and rebuilding of equipment, the hospitalization of the wounded, burial of the dead and the conduct of civil affairs or military government are all functions requiring space, time and organizations. The sustaining of combat operations, along with the maintenance of all forces in the field, requires the continuing pursuit of communications zone activities.

Located somewhere in the theater of operations are the unified command headquarters, key command elements in the echelons above the corps. Each of these headquarters exercises command and control of its assigned forces and directs the combat operations appropriate to its mission. Each unified command normally has an Army component, sometimes directing land force operations, sometimes acting only in a support role, and assuring that Army forces are trained, equipped, supplied and capable of performing their land force mission.

Also in the theater are combined headquarters, the international headquarters that direct the operations of forces allied to engage in a military mission. Often, these headquarters will draw logistic and other support from U.S. Army sources.

Communications zone tentacles reach from a theater of war to the Army's support base in the continental United States. Headquarters, Department of the Army and nine major commands acquire, organize, train, equip and ready for war the resources required to build fighting forces. Rounding out the structure are the Army components of the unified commands and defense agencies, all of which require Army manpower and other resources.

The coordinating nucleus of the Department of the Army is the Army Staff (ARSTAF). Collectively, it acts as the agent of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), in supervising the functions, activities and operations of all organizations of the Army. ARSTAF conducts long-range planning; determines requirements, allocations and priorities; develops Army-wide objectives; formulates broad policy guidance; and supervises and controls the building and sustainment of the Army.

Together the combat, combat support and combat service support forces of the active and reserve components, collectively termed the operating forces, total approximately 791,000. This means that almost 79.6 percent of the Army is deployable to a theater of war for combat operations—not all at the same time, not all with the most modern equipment, not all having reached the same level of training and readiness, but all designed and organized for employment and utilization in the combat zone.

That total combat capability is sustained in peace and war by the Army's infrastructure, collectively termed the generating forces. These forces comprise 21 percent of the total Army. Some expansion of the infrastructure occurs under wartime full-mobilization conditions, but current plans require no additional installations and add manpower only to extend the hours of operation by existing facilities. Even some of this 21 percent is deployable to the communications zone overseas.

This infrastructure forms the base upon which the Army is built and sustained. It includes the training installations, where new recruits are taught the basics of soldiering and the advanced skills that create rangers, medical corps personnel and cooks. It includes the educational institutions that periodically increase the knowledge of noncommissioned and commissioned officers. It includes the Army Materiel Command that

links the needs of the Army with the industrial might of the nation, for both the design and delivery of the wherewithal needed to fight. It includes the Army personnel management system that ensures the flow of people into and throughout the structure, their career management, their welfare, recreation and remuneration. It includes the base hospitals of a medical system that guarantees the health of the force. It includes criminal investigation, justice and incarceration systems and facilities. It also includes the administrative resources and talent required to operate and maintain the vast complex of posts and stations on which the Army is quartered, trained and maintained.

Today, this base of support is organized, prepared and capable of mobilizing, deploying and sustaining the landpower forces of the nation in all activities contemplated by today's national military strategy.

How the Army functions

Given this total Army structure, it is necessary to understand that the mass operates as an integrated whole, not as a collection of parts operating separately. It is a mass of manpower attempting to dominate a battlefield, and all elements function to satisfy that purpose. It is like a large machine, a truck, for example, that cannot deliver its load unless all of its parts are present and working. It includes parts that at times are idle, such as the windshield wiper, but that are vital under certain conditions.

All soldiers receive basic combat training. While those assigned to the Army's continental U.S. base are not expected to see combat action, each of them is subject to deployment into the combat zone as an individual replacement. In effect, every soldier, except medical and chaplain corps personnel, or unless physically or otherwise restricted, is a potential shooter.

The Army's requirement to move personnel through and among its various elements leads to the identification of another part of the force that is not included in the structure so far discussed. Historically, from 12 to 15 percent of the Army's strength is in what has been described as "a great horde always coming or going that never seems to arrive." Trainees, soldiers undergoing initial entry training before being assigned to units, transients, soldiers traveling to and from assignments, patients in hospitals and incarcerated prisoners called "holdees," and students at schools are all personnel not

assigned to units and temporarily unavailable for assignment. They are referred to as TTHS.

It is often proposed that eliminating the TTHS category would allow for a 12 to 15 percent reduction in the Army's requirement for people, without any change in the structure—just assign such soldiers to units. Even though they are not present for duty, they can be returned to their units rapidly if a crisis occurs.

Countering such proposals is a constant demand faced by Army leaders. The justification for such a group of individuals is simply that, if you want a combat-ready Army, you train with full-strength units. To force a unit to prepare for war while 12 to 15 percent of personnel are absent is inefficient, unwise and a risk that soldiers should not be required to accept. It is also a guarantee of unreadiness.

Finally, completing the roster of those unavailable for training, there are always groups of soldiers performing essential or mandated duties that keep them from units in the structure. Soldiers bolstering the recruiting effort and those assigned to advise the reserve components are examples of this category.

The continuing Army

The Army is manned, equipped and organized to fight the nation's wars anywhere in the world. It is capable of accomplishing its missions because it includes all of the parts essential for combat operations in any terrain, in any weather and against any known enemy. It does not contain nonessential parts; it does not contain parts that do not have to be organized and trained in peacetime. Its size is dictated by the national military strategy and the missions derived from it.

The Army also is a dynamic, ever-changing mass. New weapons, new diagnostic maintenance equipment, a new forklift and new medical innovations all affect the size and structure of various units at the working level of all organizations. Without exception, since the time the Army had to manufacture its own horseshoes, changes have modified the tooth-to-tail ratio, always with the intent of making the teeth more effective and minimizing the administrative tail. Such change is a constant demand, a sought outcome that will guarantee the most effective force at the most efficient expense. Moreover, it is change that develops new doctrine, new methods and techniques for employment, for fighting wars or for engaging in the many and varied peacetime operations essential to our national strategy.

The Army remains dependent upon the American people, their members of Congress and those in the executive branch of our government understanding its mission and resource requirements. The nation courts disaster on the international scene if it has an ineffective and unready Army.

Designed for Europe?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, June 2001]

Do you get tired of reading learned treatises that tell us we must reconfigure Army forces away from the "model designed for a conflict in Europe" to one designed for "conflicts of the future"? Are you astonished that technology will transform future warfare and that we must be prepared? We have been reading and hearing these common themes for more than a decade, and the tempo of the drumbeat is increasing as more and more experts wish to influence the new Bush Administration over things military.

What, if anything, did these people think of our operations in Grenada, Panama and Haiti? Were they somehow deficient or defective because they were conducted by a force designed for Europe? Was the designed-for-Europe force structure the cause of our loss of South Vietnam? Was it merely fortuitous that VII Corps, straight from the plains of Europe, was available for Desert Storm? The answer to all of those questions is that the Army force structure has retained and demonstrated the flexibility and versatility needed to respond to each crisis of the moment.

To guarantee that responses of the future will continue the successes of the past, someone has to insert some fundamental thinking into our new models. All war, to be successful, must be conducted by realizing the synergistic effects of firepower and maneuver. Firepower, whether a spear or an atomic bomb, whether delivered by air, by cannon or by a soldier planting a satchel charge, must be accompanied by an exploiting maneuver force that can take charge of a land area, a population or an enemy military position.

World War II ended when firepower, the atomic bomb for which there was then no defense and no counter, prompted the Japanese surrender. But the war was won when the occupation force, the maneuver force, brought about a change in government, demilitarization and the people's acceptance of American domination. Contrast that end with the recent "war with

no name," when firepower alone was used to punish Yugoslavia. Despite the surrender of the Yugoslav government, none of the announced objectives of the war were achieved because no maneuver force was employed to exploit what firepower had made possible. Ethnic cleansing continued during the campaign; the Yugoslav Army was not seriously degraded, and Milosevic remained in power for months.

History provides examples of firepower only, sometimes maneuver only, as in ancient sieges, bringing about the termination of hostilities, but it has no examples of wars being won conclusively without some combination of fire and maneuver that finally imposes the will of the victor.

That lesson is important to any redesign or transformation of the military forces of today. Technological improvement in firepower, in delivery systems and in soldier capabilities cannot be war-winners themselves. They must instead be contributions to the total war-making requirement that combines fire and maneuver to achieve a satisfactory final result.

For the most part, today's redesigners want greater firepower capabilities and smaller maneuver forces. Little thought seems to be given to the fact that the Army and Marine Corps are already too small for their missions, already called upon for an operational tempo that is degrading their readiness, their effectiveness and their capability to conduct the maneuver activities necessary to win a war. Maintaining that capability to maneuver elevates in importance what is now called the legacy force, the one with today's equipment and capabilities, the only one available for employment on short notice and the one that requires more divisions than it now has to assure that we can satisfy the national military strategy.

The legacy force is organized quite well with the equipment it has available. It will evolve deliberately and routinely by adopting new technology as it becomes available, without, it is hoped, upsetting the balance of firepower and maneuver that must be maintained.

Preparing for the Long War

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, January 2002]

Lessons of the past are, we hope, an influence on Congress and the Department of Defense as the nation girds for a war that might be a challenge for some time

to come. Surely they realize that the front-line soldiers of today will not be the ones fighting the war two years from now. For whatever reasons—termination of service, combat rotation, casualties—the replacement of everyone committed has to be contemplated now.

It takes two years to train a special operations soldier and a comparable time for aviators, medical corpsmen and many other specialists peculiar to the kinds of operations foreseen for this war. Those people should be somewhere in the replacement pipeline now.

The problem is not new, but we have not faced it since the Vietnam War almost 40 years ago. Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, Desert Storm, the war in Kosovo and all other combat operations since Vietnam were fought and ended by the forces initially committed. Replacement requirements were negligible and the personnel management system did not have to adjust to wartime needs.

On 10 September 2001 the Army was too small for its missions, a fact that became clear during the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) preparation and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Secretary of the Army had already identified a need for an increase of some 40,000 in endstrength. On 11 September, those mission requirements increased; to what extent is yet to be determined, but certainly by some multiple greater than one. The size of the Army, however, did not change—the mobilization of reservists does not change the size of the Army, which is structured in its totality for peacetime missions and an initial response to crisis. One of the significant facts about the QDR is its shallowness; it does not provide for the staying power needed to fight a drawn-out conflict.

In 1965, with an Army of about 950,000 soldiers, the decision to commit forces to Vietnam triggered an immediate addition of 133,000 new soldiers and an authorization to activate one more division and three separate brigades. A concurrent decision not to mobilize the reserve components had wide and far-reaching impact. At the outset it had little influence on the conduct of operations, but, because reserve units could not be called, CONARC (Continental Army Command) had to create turbulence in the force, inactivating large numbers of active duty units to obtain the resources needed to activate many others to substitute for those that could not be mobilized. That practice continued for almost three years as succeeding Army buildup plans

sought to fulfill the needs of MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam).

The decision to fight the war without mobilization coupled with the personnel policies established for managing the active force resulted over time in a severe degradation in the quality of the Army. First the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who were committed early to the fight returned to the United States after a one-year tour, only to be ordered back to Vietnam three or four months later. Foreseeing the promise of repetitive tours in Vietnam, they began leaving the service in droves, necessitating the creation of an NCO course in which soldiers who had completed their initial entry training in the Army were held for six additional weeks and graduated to the NCO ranks.

The junior enlisted force and the junior officers of certain branches, who were committed to Vietnam as they finished their qualifying training, faced the same rotation demand. Reenlistments dropped, necessitating ever-increasing draft calls and an expansion of the OCS (Officer Candidate School) program. By 1968 the war was being fought by newly drafted soldiers, “instant NCOs,” second lieutenants fresh out of OCS, brand-new helicopter pilots and as many colonels and lieutenant colonels as personnel managers could find to serve six-month command tours. The draft numbers caused DoD to inaugurate “Project 100,000,” the drafting of 100,000 mental category IV personnel (the lowest acceptable mental capacity qualified for military service) to satisfy the demand.

The Army had grown to almost 1.5 million, but that additional strength was still inadequate to satisfy the rotation base requirements when more than 700,000 were stationed overseas. Imaginative explanations were invented to justify reports that forces in Europe and Korea were still meeting readiness standards, but the facts were that discipline, effectiveness and professionalism were deteriorating at alarming rates. Soldiers serving in Europe in those years will be forever grateful that the Warsaw Pact did not decide to go to war then to capture Western Europe.

No one today disputes the stark realities from which the Army had to recover after its withdrawal from Vietnam. Great credit has devolved on the architects who rebuilt the U.S. Army from its historic nadir in 1972 to the world-class capability it displayed in Just Cause and Desert Storm, but little attention has been

paid to the causes of the conditions from which it had to recover. Today's Army is far smaller than that of 1965. It is structured to respond effectively to the current crisis, but for the long haul it is, if anything, in worse straits than it was in 1965—it hasn't had that 133,000-person infusion that would initiate actions to protect the future, and it doesn't have an adequate rotation base for the numbers committed to overseas missions.

Congress, given its responsibility to raise and sustain the Army, should know that the leaders of today's Army and DoD have not experienced long-term war. The planners and programmers of the 1960s and the institutional memory from World War II and Korea are gone. The POMs and QDRs and Future Years Defense Programs provide for going to war on an "expend the force" basis. Sustaining the force for long-term operations demands action now to prevent the deterioration of our capabilities.

Drawbacks and Dangers of the "Tiered Manning" Policy

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, September 1995]

The latest sobriquet for one method of reducing the Army's manpower requirements is "tiered manning," an expression for explaining that 80 or 90 percent of the TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment] strength is enough for a peacetime force. Given a robust pool of individual reservists, made up principally of soldiers recently discharged, units can be filled quickly and deployed to a crisis area with dispatch. Thus, major savings in manpower costs are available with no noticeable impact on the readiness or capabilities of the force.

Tiered manning is a subset of "tiered readiness," the currently proposed system of maintaining only a portion of the Army in an immediately deployable status. Reduced readiness for other segments is tied to calculated deployment patterns—first-to-fight are resourced fully, all others bear reductions of personnel, money, training tempo and so on, but tiered manning is the key element.

The attractiveness of this proposition among budgeteers and systems analysts always results in the question to force managers, "Would you rather have ten divisions at 90 percent strength or nine divisions at 100 percent?" Since the military leaders are strapped to a national military strategy that demands ten divisions

(or 12?), their answer has to be ten divisions at 90 percent, and "we'll make it work."

The dilemma is not new, harking back to post-World War II concerns and plaguing every generation of force programmers since. Normally the Army leadership comes down hard on requirements for force structure (16 active divisions during the Cold War, 12 divisions after) and makes do with the endstrength provided by the administration and Congress. Only occasionally, or when publicity about the "hollow Army" made an impact, have the consequences of these policies become an issue.

This article is an attempt to inform the advocates of tiered manning that there are some major drawbacks to the policy that ought to be considered. I prefer to call them commanders' issues because they are the concerns of those who have to make operational decisions such as ordering units and organizations into mortal combat.

First, some background: All deployable Army units are organized under TOEs that specify the grades and Military Occupational Specialties (MOSSs) of every soldier, and the identification and numbers of every item of equipment. The TOE is designed to authorize for a unit the resources it needs to conduct its combat mission.

It is not an "exact science" document, suffering from constant second-guessing about the proper size of the rifle squad, the inclusion or exclusion of mortars in the weapons platoon, and whether the platoon leader needs a radio operator.

Whatever decisions are made on such questions, the TOE is a consensus document that says: Today, these are the minimum needs of the commander charged with the mission specified in the document itself. No provision is made for accomplishing 80 or 90 percent of the mission.

Morally, the Army owes each commander 100 percent of his TOE before it dispatches him to combat, and "before" means he should have the time to integrate, to unite and to train with the newly arrived before his commitment.

Practically, this is not always possible. Every squad leader in combat learns to accept replacements one night who have to fight the next day, meaning that the Army has chosen a lesser-of-evils practice—it is worse to leave him shorthanded than to furnish him men who

have to be molded into his squad in the midst of the confusion and chaos of combat.

Again, practically, when the Army tries to fulfill its moral obligation to one commander, it may damage or disrupt its commitment to others. When, following the Tet battles of 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to deploy the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, he decided also to damage the readiness, cohesion and capabilities of the 1st and 2d Brigades that were called on to fill the shortages in the 3d. The 3d Brigade went to Vietnam less than fully trained, and the 1st and 2d spent months recovering from the losses inflicted on them.

Understanding the requirements of the TOE makes it clear that no commander would choose to receive a new item of equipment or 10 to 20 percent of his manpower on the eve of his departure to a combat zone. No matter how well trained individually, all soldiers, particularly leaders, need time to become members of a team and do not function at full efficiency until they have. No piece of equipment is worth its cost if the men of a unit are not trained to use it.

It should also be clear that no field commander ought to support a policy that commits him to training his unit or organization with less than his authorized resources. And I make that statement despite my career-long admiration for commanders and military units that have accomplished miracles while fighting undermanned, short of equipment and in apparently hopeless circumstances.

Given an understanding of these requirements, the budgeteers and systems analysts suggest that only part of the force need be ready for immediate deployment. After all, our transport limitations foreclose on deploying more than one corps in a period of 30 to 60 days, so designating XVIII Airborne Corps as the contingency corps and consigning all others to a follow-on role makes sense—economic sense that overrides the TOE requirement.

Perhaps, except for two factors: First, XVIII Corps may not be the right organization for the crisis at hand. I do not second-guess the deployment of a brigade of the 82d Airborne to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield, but I believe an equally ready, equally deployable armored or mechanized brigade might have been preferred. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) went to Panama, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) to

Haiti, and, transport considered, it would seem the 25th Infantry Division (Light) in Hawaii might be the best choice for a Far East contingency. Given a force of only ten divisions, I maintain that each of them could and should be the first choice in one of the variety of scenarios pertinent to today's world.

Second, there is an unappreciated, almost unacknowledged psychological problem associated with being designated "follow-on" or some such term. Soldiers know, when not under the gun, how to relax, take it easy, postpone the hard work when they are not high on the Army's master priority list.

Inspired leadership cannot overcome the practical knowledge that there really isn't any need for us to be ready for the Super Bowl. And it does not take a genius to understand that the machinations associated with readying a 90 percent battalion for a trip to the National Training Center are only a temporary peaking of readiness that will evaporate immediately upon return to the home station.

The Army, unfortunately, has given credence to this practice in the past. During the Vietnam War we had "selected reserve forces" when certain National Guard units were designated for equipment modernization, more resources for training and an authorized over-strength.

The result was some better trained reserve organizations along with a preponderance of the left-out units whose readiness deteriorated noticeably in the subsequent months. Again, unfortunately, the Army has designated "enhanced brigades" of the reserve components, and, I believe, the experience is being repeated.

I have often observed that the long-term success of the 82d Airborne Division is directly attributable to its priority for resources, a factor never lost on the commanders of our other divisions.

Given the reduced size of today's Army and the potential for the employment of any one of them at any time, I believe all ten divisions should be of equal priority and that the Army's budget should provide for that, just as the Navy's budget provides for equal-priority Marine divisions.

There is still another facet of this debate—it is called "borrowed military manpower." The practice of borrowing soldiers from their assigned positions to

perform duties for which a commander has no authorized manpower is as old as the Army itself. Every commander has peacetime requirements and responsibilities that are not provided for with manpower in the TOE or in the tables of distribution (TD) that authorize resources for the nondeployable parts of the Army.

Not many years ago soldiers cut grass, provided help around the barracks, picked up the trash, and performed guard and kitchen police (KP) duties as a routine part of the job. It took 200 years for the Army not only to recognize that this practice was a readiness distraction, but also to do something about it. In the 1970s, we began contracting for civilian KPs so that soldiers could attend full-time to training. The operation and maintenance (O&M) funds in the annual budget increased sufficiently in the early 1980s to allow commanders to contract for grass-mowing and other housekeeping duties and to hire civilian guards for the installations.

The result was the intensified training that created the Just Cause and Desert Storm Army that established standards of performance that will be paradigms for the next century.

Borrowed military manpower has never been eliminated as a commander's burden to bear. All divisions operate on a training cycle that allows one of its battalions to provide the manpower to satisfy the daily post housekeeping needs, and recognition of such demands resulted in the 82d Division for years being authorized a strength of 103 percent or 105 percent of its TOE requirement. Now, it should be noted that the problem is returning in greater force as O&M funds shrink with every budget cycle.

It was gratifying to read an article in the newspaper recently that in this year's defense budget Congress assured that readiness requirements were fully funded, but this article went on to say that savings were ordered in other lines of the O&M budget. Let it be clear that the reduced funding was for functions that will translate into increased borrowed military manpower next year and that training and readiness will be adversely affected because of it despite the assurances otherwise.

There are other nagging manpower problems that add to the tiered manning equation. The generally accepted fact that 10 percent of our female soldiers are pregnant and, therefore, nondeployable for six to nine months at a time, provides a rough calculation that

more than 7,000 are nondeployable at any given time. That figure is either a minuscule 1.4 percent or almost half of a division, depending on the point to be made.

Another battalion of soldiers is nondeployable because they are HIV positive, and there are other finite numbers associated with hospital patients, prisoners serving time and that large group of soldiers called trainees—students and transients who are moving between assignments and not available for day-to-day training with the deployable Army. All of these daily shortages affect the numbers a commander can take to the field for routine training sessions every day because budget factors never seem to provide for the numbers actually involved.

Given an 85 percent starting strength, there should be no doubt that company commanders and platoon leaders will be training with two- and three-man tank crews and five-man rifle squads every day. They will not have the small teams whose members can look around and say, "If we go to war tomorrow morning, these are the guys I go with." More important, they can't say, "We are confident that we are a team fully trained to do the job."

Another little noted fact about reduced manning is its impact on maintenance. When there are only eight or nine drivers for ten high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), maintenance demands overtime work or some form of administrative storage for excess equipment. Since the TOE prescribes the ten HMMWVs, most commanders opt for overtime, but when all of the other manpower demands reduce the driver availability to four or five, overtime becomes double time, and both maintenance and morale suffer.

I lived through the time in the early 1970s when the Army succumbed to the promise that giving up three divisions (from 16 to 13) would result in better support, more adequate resources and better manning for the smaller force. The real result was that the force structure changed and the budget calculations didn't—the divisions ended up with the same level of support they had had before the change.

Finally, there is the chronic problem of the undermanned officer corps. Congress, in its wisdom, has never provided a general for every general officer's position in the TOE and TD structure of the Army—nor has it provided a total officer corps to meet the same

requirements. But it has decreed that all joint assignments will be filled, and that 5,000 officers will be assigned to reserve component duty and other high-priority billets.

The Defense Department, likewise, never reduces its requirements for the DoD staff or DoD agencies to 80 or 90 percent, and no Pentagon office is manned at a reduced figure. All of these 100 percent requirements, which draw on a total strength of only 85 percent of total needs, result in colonels doing generals' jobs, lieutenants filling captains' positions and sergeants leading platoons.

I have long noted that we run the Army with inexperienced people—almost everyone is doing his job for the first time, from squad leader to corps commander—but we exacerbate the problem when we adopt the practices that combine inexperience with inadequate preparation.

The Army education system is designed to provide certain preparation for being a company commander and more for commanding a brigade. When we put lesser ranks in those positions we assume the risk that is always associated with a lack of qualifications, and we meet crises with wholesale reassignment of qualified people who take charge of units they do not know and have not trained.

Considering all these factors, how can we let the budgeteers and systems analysts inflict tiered manning on the military forces? We should instead be demanding that either the national military strategy be changed, thereby reducing structure requirements, or that the resources required to fill the authorized structure be fully funded. Any compromise of either demand is a risk to national security or a disservice to those who may have to fight the nation's battles—and either is unacceptable.

Readiness: The Lion in the Fight

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, March 1997]

“Repeatedly, the leaders stress that readiness is the number one priority for our force.”

That statement, or something similar, has become a litany for all spokesmen commenting on the “future of the armed forces,” the “impact of budget limitations,” or the “shaping of requirements and resources to implement a more realistic national security strategy.”

I have long been an advocate of readiness as the first priority for a claim on our resources. For 12 of my last 15 years in the Army, I was a commander of troops at war, ready to go to war tomorrow morning or ready to deploy in 18 hours to any theater of war, and I was daily conscious of the responsibilities associated with readiness. I did my best to assure our forces were manned, equipped and trained with the best that could be provided. Mission accomplishment in the shortest possible time and with the fewest casualties demands no less when we commit soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen to mortal combat.

In that period I lived through the Vietnam War, the postwar programs that led to the “hollow Army,” and the resurgence that began when the Defense budget was augmented by the Reagan administration. It was gratifying in my last years to work with a budget that provided 100 percent of training funds needed, that fully funded the fielding of the Abrams tank, the Bradley, the Apache and the other equipment that modernized our forces. It was also gratifying in 1991 to observe the professionalism and competence of our forces in the Persian Gulf War that resulted from the adequate budgetary support they received during the previous decade.

Yet all during the time that I was a spokesman for readiness, a demander of resources, I was conscious of the fact that I had colleagues in the Pentagon, Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) who were protecting the future of the Army. TRADOC revamped officer education, created the noncommissioned officer education system, clarified doctrine, and introduced new and more effective training techniques for both soldiers and organizations. The Chief of Staff and the Army Staff argued successfully for 16 divisions. They also, along with AMC, took care of the priorities for research, development and acquisition that assured that the Army of the future would be as well prepared as were the forces in the Persian Gulf.

Unfortunately, it seems that in the last few years, the “downsizing” of the forces and their budgetary support has occurred simultaneously with a subtle change in the attention and perhaps the responsibilities of today’s leaders, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act may have contributed to that change.

That act put the commanders in chief in the program and budget business, and since every commander in chief thinks first about going to war tomorrow morning,

readiness immediately added powerful spokesmen wherever and whenever budget decisions were discussed. Further, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was accorded greater authority and responsibilities, and his first priority has to be readiness as he advises the Secretary of Defense and the President about our capabilities for military intervention in the crisis of the day. When coupled with the demand for minimum or no casualties whenever we commit forces, the argument for readiness becomes overwhelming.

In that milieu, the Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Marine Commandant have become, first, members of the Joint Chiefs who must explain how they have guaranteed readiness with their allocation of resources. Only secondly are they the senior representatives of their services, concerned with the future but limited to apportioning only the leftover resources to the task. Even then, they work for secretaries whose primary allegiance is to the policy of the administration establishing the priorities and whose increased authority over resources, another Goldwater-Nichols change, gives the secretaries final say on the budgets.

TRADOC is still pursuing great ideas—Army XXI, battle labs, the information age battlefield, the Army After Next. The research and development program suffers no lack of innovations to explore, and there is no shortage of need for the acquisition of equipment and supplies—but all the people engaged in these efforts are fighting over the leftovers. Goldwater-Nichols has made readiness the lion in the fight, while research, development and acquisition (RDA), maintenance, construction and the rest play the role of the jackals.

The outcome of this change is quite apparent in any study of the Army budget, where it is obvious that the research and development accounts, compared historically with other budget slices or with other services, or just measured against demonstrated need, are ridiculously inadequate.

At the same time, funding for Army XXI and other initiatives suffers “stretching out,” and war reserves, prepositioned materiel and other equipment wear out faster than they can be replaced.

In this year of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the related congressional inquiry regarding the future of our military establishment, we will be better served in the long run if the great minds at work look beyond the superb, ready forces of today when they

construct the framework for the military establishment of the future.

Now, however, they have to guard against the pendulum swing. Most recently, papers, comments, speeches and observations are noting the shortage of funds for RDA, and much is being said about the need to divert resources to “guaranteeing the technological edge.” Predictably, those most concerned about the advance of technology are promising that it will allow us to do more with less, so we should cut force structure now, or man the structure with fewer people, or adopt a “sine wave” system of readiness to provide the funds to provide the “silver bullets.” All such measures are aimed at maintaining a facade while the structure crumbles.

The armed forces required to satisfy the national military strategy, the requirements for readiness of those forces and the program needed to guarantee future battlefield dominance total a funding demand that is not being provided. Let us all hope that those engaged in the momentous reviews being conducted will restore “the common defense” as the highest priority commitment, one that will sustain today’s readiness while simultaneously protecting the needed force structure and increasing the support that will guarantee the future.

Force Planning for Today

[Reprinted from ARMY, May 2004]

Last month I raised two questions. The first deals with following an offensive or defensive campaign to win the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and against terror. Proponents of the offensive want to hunt down the enemy using any and all means available, temporizing only when means’ limitations require a delayed effort or when political factors prohibit action. They do not, for example, advocate a preemptive strike in the territory of a NATO ally, but they would advocate that the ally engage in a cooperative effort.

Defensive proponents oppose preemptive action, favoring security measures and a modern containment policy that emphasizes continuing diplomatic efforts to reconcile the differing political philosophies that are the root cause of today’s problems. Our success in the Cold War provides arguments for the potential of such a policy.

For practical reasons, both factions support measures advocated for both courses of action. The argument

becomes one of how much and how many resources are committed. Both sides, for example, want to protect aircraft passengers and prevent another 9/11, but differ on how best to do it and the resources needed. Both sides advocate an adequate military establishment that will guarantee our liberty and well-being, but its size and composition are a continuing controversy. The only complete break between the sides is by a small but noisy element that wants to withdraw now because we should not have gone there in the first place.

The prime factor in reconciling these positions is, of course, our National Security Strategy (NSS). It is probably safe to say that the Bush administration, despite not publishing a comprehensive NSS, has voiced a determination to take the offensive, to be preemptive, to hunt down and destroy our enemies. That, it seems, is a clear message to the military establishment to shape the National Military Strategy (NMS), to build and employ the forces necessary and to ask Congress to provide the wherewithal.

Unfortunately our NSS is both impermanent and subject to resistance, undermining, misinterpretation and change. The Clinton administration was certainly in the defensive camp, despite a couple of forays into offensive operations, and the current aspirants for the Democratic nomination for this year's presidential race give every indication that they will readopt some version of containment if they are elected. Small wonder that our allies are confused and our enemies wait hopefully for the next administration. The dichotomy that exists in Congress today and the opposing views of our political parties seem to preclude a return to bipartisan foreign policy, but there are some clear benefits if the system could be restored.

The National Military Strategy is the second question addressed—the requirement to meet the demands of offensive warfare over the period of time calculated as necessary to win a war. The Army system responding to this requirement is force development, a plan that extends the current force into the future, adapting new equipment, new doctrine and new organizations into the force as rapidly as industrial production and the Army budget allow. Force developers are guided by quadrennial reviews and the Joint Vision and Army Vision documents that provide guidance regarding the force capabilities being sought.

Unfortunately, those documents do not address fighting wars of long-term, indefinite commitment in

which we are now engaged. Some further guidance is needed concerning the forces to be activated, employed and sustained for the task. In World War II, that guidance, for the Army, was provided by General George C. Marshall, who assumed the responsibility for determining what size Army was needed and what would be its composition. His plan was followed with few exceptions, and we won that war with the force that he molded and shaped between 1941 and 1943.


The Vietnam War Army, however, was designed overtime in response to demands placed on the system by COMUSMACV (Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam). Initially, in June 1965, when President Johnson committed forces in Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense directed an increase in Army end strength of 133,000 and structure additions of one division and three independent brigades. An Army Buildup Plan was prepared to incorporate those changes. It was followed by Buildup Plans II and III in subsequent years as MACV expanded its requirements, and Plan IV was working when a change in the political direction of the war cancelled the additional expansion of the force. In all cases, those plans stretched over a period of seven years, that is, the current year plus six in the future.

In all cases, those plans were restructured by budgeting directives that presumed an early end to hostilities, thus limiting the procurement of both supplies (munitions) and equipment that had long production lead times.

Today we are faced with war that may require years of commitment. We are in need of three things: first, a bipartisan National Security Strategy that comes to grips with the threat we face and the commitment needed to overcome it, a strategy that will promise consistency through administrations to come. Second, we need a determination of the force levels required to sustain a National Military Strategy that satisfies the NSS—an expanded joint vision incorporating requirements for an ongoing war and that proves as perspicacious as General Marshall's some 60-plus years ago.

Third, we need a public information program that informs the American people, our allies and friends of what we are doing and why, and just incidentally acquaints our enemies with our determination to see things through.

Some of us old soldiers will not be around to see the end of this war, but we would like to know that we are on course for ultimate success.



Preparing for War

Preparing for War

I have served in four wars, three of which—World War II, Korea and Vietnam—involved combat. The fourth, the Cold War, was focused on deterring war with the Soviet Union. The Army spent about 40 years preparing for a war that never came, but it was extensive preparation that eventually won that war. Historically, armies spend much more time preparing for war than they do actually fighting. The United States Army has been no exception. Even when the Army was engaged in conducting a war, there were always major portions of the force that were preparing to join the fight.

The selections in this section address a variety of disparate activities that involve preparing for war. How an army prepares for war largely determines how it will conduct itself when the fighting starts.

The first two articles discuss the overarching requirements that dictate National Military Strategy,

namely the President's National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy. They are the foundation upon which the structure, composition and training of the Army in being are programmed.

Two elements of conducting war that the Army must get right at the beginning are intelligence and operations. Good intelligence will reveal the enemy's strength and capabilities, which allows the fighting forces to prepare properly. Conducting operations to counter the enemy's strengths relies on a command and control system that can coordinate and synchronize all aspects of the combined-arms team. The first two articles, "What Should a Command Post Do?" and "Intelligence, Now a Two Way Street?" address those crucial elements of preparing for war.

Some aspects of the Army's preparations for war have to do with issues being debated in American society. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, there was considerable debate on whether mothers in the Army should be deployed to a war zone. "Motherhood and Combat: Will Protesters Back Policy Shifts?" presents my views on the question. A couple of years later, there were congressional hearings on another societal issue that has a significant impact on the Army—the question of homosexuals. I was asked to explain how the issue affects Army units, and "That's Cohesion" was the result.

The war on terrorism that America has been waging since the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon is being fought with the most sophisticated arsenal the world has ever seen. A critical element of that war is space—it has given the Army new and interesting capabilities. Much of what is now available has been in development for a number of



years. I first became involved with the capabilities of what space could do for the Army when I worked on a 1987 BDM study, "Army Man in Space (ARMIS)." In 1994 I wrote a paper for AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare summarizing my thoughts on the subject ("The Army in Space," Landpower Essay No. 94-10, October 1994). Shortly after that essay was published, a slightly revised version appeared in *ARMY* magazine. That article is reproduced here.

A fundamental characteristic of American military operations since the end of the Vietnam War has been the cooperation of all the services working together. Modern warfare is a complex business and requires integration of the unique capabilities that each service brings to the fight, but attaining that goal is not always easy. Two articles in this section, "Whither the Chief of Staff?" and "Jointness," examine some aspects of how the Army and the other services are preparing for working together in war:

When I commanded VII Corps in Germany, readiness was a key element of my command philosophy. The letter that promulgated that philosophy outlines attention to readiness based on the demands of the Cold War when Army forces in Germany were arrayed to deter an attack by the Warsaw Pact.

The final entry in this section is a discussion of "Army Education" and its impact on preparing for war, both historically and for the future.

The National Military Strategy

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, August 2004]

The publication of "A Strategy for Today, A Vision for Tomorrow" by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff provides some substantial guidance for the achievement of the goals and objectives of our National Security Strategy (NSS) that are dependent upon our ability to employ military power. In effect, this document establishes our National Military Strategy (NMS) in furtherance of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) published earlier by the Secretary of Defense.

In simple terms, the President wants help to make the world better, not just safer. He wants to win the war against terrorism, using all the elements of national power—political, economic, psycho-social and military—in an "active strategy," while fostering the cooperation of allies, partners and friends in a global

effort and simultaneously improving our capability to prevent attacks on our homeland.

The Secretary of Defense translates that guidance into four objectives for the armed forces:

- Secure the United States from direct attack.
- Secure strategic access and global freedom of action.
- Establish security conditions for international order.
- Strengthen alliances.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then directs the services to:

- Win the war on terrorism. Act now to stop terrorists before they attack again; root out international terrorists; eliminate their bases of operation; counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and establish a global antiterrorism environment.
- Enhance our abilities to fight as joint forces, creating a seamless total force. Strengthen our multinational collaboration.
- Transform our forces "in stride," fielding new capabilities, adopting new concepts and combining technology, intellect and culture to ensure the development of forces able to generate decisive results.

The NMS document then expressed in more detail the priorities, threats to our security, campaign capabilities and the parameters of force design and size, expressed as 1-4-2-1 (defend the homeland, deter forward in four regions, be capable of two almost simultaneous "swift campaigns" and win decisively in one of them). It ends with a short paragraph that begins "appropriately resourced, this strategy will achieve the goals of NSS and 2004 NDS, effectively balancing military and strategic risk over the long term."

That final paragraph, in two words—"appropriately resourced"—sums up one of the two great problems for providing an adequate defense posture. The other is the design of the structure needed to accomplish the 1-4-2-1 strategy. There should be little doubt that some inadequacies exist, certainly in the Army, when those two requirements are studied. The extensions of overseas commitments, the short cycles of repeating deployments of units, the retraining and commitment of artillerymen and others to infantry and military police duties, stop loss, repetitive call-ups of reserve component

forces and most recently, the recall of individual reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve furnish conclusive evidence that the Army structure is hardly adequate for today's mission load. If another one of those "swift campaigns" arises, the ability to take it on is questionable at best.

The normal reaction to a document such as the NMS or the Quadrennial Review or the Joint Vision series is congratulations to the authors for their intellectual foresight before it goes into file drawers around the world until it is time to refer to it in preparation of the next edition.

This would be a good time to change that normal reaction. Our nation is faced with a long-term threat, a dire and lethal determination to disrupt our lives, our fortunes and the sacred honor that our forefathers bequeathed to us. That threat deserves the genuine concern of today's generation because they may well have to pass their responsibility onto the next; "long-term" means that the end is not now predictable.

The threat should also pique the interest of Congress in terms of the adequacy of our ability to cope with the demands upon our armed forces in the coming years. It would seem that a bipartisan committee effort, perhaps the Army caucus, might initiate two necessary studies to fulfill their responsibility to raise and provision the armed forces. The first would define the total force required and the second would calculate the resources required. Both studies would have to deal with absolutes and not be restricted by the resource limitations normally associated with the annual Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and budget statements. Given a long-term identification of need, the development of POMs and budgets can more logically prioritize and apply available resources.

Detailed requirements of the first study would identify the Army and Marine forces needed to carry the fight to the enemy and sustain the effort over time, the training establishment needed to assure the continuing availability of properly prepared individuals and units and the logistics structure required to support the



General Kroesen and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger look over a minefield along the border between West Germany and East Germany in 1981.

operational effort. It would also establish the air wings, carrier task forces and other elements of the Navy and Air Force that would be needed.

The second study would calculate the resources needed, the manpower, the demand on the nation's industrial base, the transportation and communications systems and finally the dollar costs.

Moving back up the chain of guiding documents to the President's NSS, it is obvious that there is also an opportunity for other agencies to produce long-term political, economic and psychosocial studies addressing the same problems. For the first time in our history, we could have a total government effort pointing the way to where we are going, how we hope to get there and how much it is likely to cost.

More on the National Military Strategy

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, September 2004]

When reflecting on requirements for a successful achievement of the objectives of our National Military Strategy, it is apparent that we must cope with a long-term threat, already years in the making and promising a determined effort by those who have declared war on us. It is also apparent that, considering the sporadic and tactical nature of the attacks against us, we are not going to lose this war quickly. We have time to adapt, to transform (today's buzzword), to restructure, to make

the changes necessary to wage this war most effectively, efficiently and economically.

Perhaps our most pressing need is the awakening of the American people to the seriousness of the war and the dire consequences of losing. The Islamists, the term now used to identify the radical terrorist element of Islam, are today's totalitarians. Their ultimate and announced purpose is the destruction of all infidels—and destruction means eliminating, killing, beheading, using weapons of mass destruction or whatever tools and tactics are available to achieve the end sought. They live among and are sustained by the Islamic populations, much as the Nazis were sustained by the Christian population of Germany and the Russian communists by the peasantry of that nation.

It is not because those populations are or were power-mad or bloodthirsty, but rather because their alternatives were grim at best, likely terminal if they objected or resisted. The plight of the ordinary Iraqi citizen today is a reminder of the danger of opposing the aims of the totalitarian few. The grim alternative for infidels is conversion to Islam, the choice once offered to the Greeks and southern Slavs by the Ottomans.

We are today coping remarkably with the demands of this war, apparently making steady if unspectacular progress. Our successes, however, have been tactical, and they have been achieved by expending the force and, apparently, betting that we can end this thing in a hurry and therefore will have no need for long-term sustainment. (I am reminded that in 1966 the Defense program and budget were limited by the assumption that the Vietnam War would end in fiscal year 1967.) I do not second-guess the judgment that we might wrap things up in Iraq in a short time when I ask, "What if we do not?" If we increase the resources to prepare for the long term, then end things early, we will have wasted only money. If we bet wholly on a short war and are wrong, the consequences are incalculable.

Today, morale in the services remains high; the dedication and determination of soldiers and marines is commendable, and the effectiveness of our forces continues at a high standard. But equipment is wearing out, the patience of families and industry is wearing thin, and the repetitive deployment of units and individuals is at least disgruntling. Those are only the immediate consequences.

A more lasting impact is on the Army's education system where faculties are stripped of teaching personnel, student quotas go unfilled and courses are shortened or eliminated in order to return officers and NCOs to units preparing to deploy. The long-term result of such action is the development of a less qualified, less capable corps of leaders and the loss of expertise for the faculties of the future. Some have deemed it the "dumbing down" of the Army.

So, there is dire need, there is time to cope and there is a capability to study, plan and program to address our problems. There is a need for direction—for some agency, the Defense Department, the Army or Congress—to get on with the task.

Meanwhile, I am reminded again of Vietnam. In 1965, when we first committed troop units to that war, the President authorized an increase of 133,000 in the Army's endstrength, specifying only the addition of one division and three independent brigades—about 25,000 structure spaces. We made good use of those additions and in fact needed twice as many more spaces before the buildup ended, and we still did not have the sustaining force that we needed. It is that experience that led me in the past to write that the addition of 100,000 soldiers to the Army would be a prudent investment.

Now I think that we are three years late in making that commitment, but considering the 1-4-2-1 strategy of the National Military Strategy, we can become much better prepared for a second "swift campaign" if we have a larger Army, particularly since our current campaign is not very swift.

What Should a Command Post Do?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, January 1993]

The echoes of Desert Storm and Just Cause will reverberate into the future as worthy companions of Cannae, Waterloo and Gettysburg on the short list of campaigns that have been both the grist of military history and the challenge for contemporary leaders who must plan to do as well or better the next time military power is needed.

Operations Desert Storm and Just Cause will become textbook classics of how to win battles, how to win wars. Both are examples of superbly planned and executed actions that demonstrate conclusively that the

military mind really is capable of coping with the most complex of human endeavors: the conduct of war.

Given the professional forces, the soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen who were so splendidly prepared for their missions, the leaders of these two campaigns were quite able to put in the record convincing examples of how to do it.

Nevertheless, as in every military campaign, there were lessons learned; there were shortcomings identified; there were problems not satisfactorily solved.

Recently, I had the privilege of serving as a member of an Army Science Board study project that addressed one of these problems: command and control "on the move." The study was commissioned because the after-action reports of many senior commanders in Desert Storm cited their difficulties in exercising command of their forces over the great distances that developed as their units spread widely and rapidly across the desert terrain.

It is not my purpose in this article to recount that study or its recommendations, but instead to address a subject found to be ancillary to the overall study: the organization and functioning of the command post.

The study group, as it visited military installations, organizations and headquarters and talked with many Desert Storm and Just Cause commanders, found differing conceptions of what a command post is for, how it is to be organized and why it is a critical element of any scheme for commanding and controlling on the move.

As a military member of the study group, I found myself the arbiter who had to explain to my civilian colleagues just how the system is supposed to work.

As I pursued my charge, I could find little in the way of doctrine prescribing the purpose and functions of command posts in any of the services and no common prescription for satisfying these requirements among the commanders who raised the command and control on the move issue.

I developed my own primer and offer it to the doctrine writers of the future who may be called upon to produce a manual on the what, why and how of command post operations.

Command and control entails the capability of a commander to do three things at all times: command

military operations of his subordinate forces, direct the support activities that are essential to the conduct of those operations and determine when and how to ask for help.

For these purposes, he must have direct and constant communications linkages with his subordinate commanders, supporting forces and agencies, his staff and the next higher authority in the chain of command.

The organizational entity that serves to pursue and provide for these purposes is the command post, the CP, and the commander is an integral part thereof, whether physically present or absent visiting his subordinates or meeting with his commander or some supporting organization.

Unfortunately, historical references to the CP come replete with stories that General Custer's CP was his saddle, that General Patton commanded the whole Third Army with only an aide and a jeep driver, or that in Desert Storm, "my TACCP only had 13 people, and we ran the whole operation."

The exaggeration of all such claims is apparent to anyone with an understanding of what a CP must accomplish, but I will leave to the reader, notwithstanding the vital importance of a commander's personal influence, a determination of whether or not General Custer's saddle could satisfy the following.

The mission of any command post at any echelon is twofold. It must ensure that the commander is continually abreast of the developing situation, and it must ensure that subordinate commanders are provided with the means necessary for them to accomplish their assigned missions.

Accomplishment of the first task requires that a CP be immediately aware of and able to pass to the commander all of the following:

- Change of mission. Normally a commander will receive this information directly from his commander, but a CP must be alert for such a change and prepared to pass the order when direct commander contact has not occurred.
- Intelligence or intelligence information that can affect the conduct of operations. This includes information concerning enemy capabilities, movements and intentions, any change in the status or availability of friendly forces, and weather and terrain information.

- Continuing operations status. A commander must have a portrayal of the current situation, particularly the progress being made by subordinate commands in accomplishing their missions. He also needs an understanding of activities of adjacent commands which bear on his own operations.
- Current status of support.
 - Fire support, both the organic means controlled by the commander, that is, his own organic artillery and aviation, and the additional means provided by supporting air and naval commands.
 - Administrative support, the personnel and logistics information that bears on the effectiveness of forces and their ability to sustain operations.
- Other critical information. There is a myriad of other activities such as communications problems, medical crises, civil disasters and so forth that may affect operations or that may be the basis of a request for help from higher authority.

Accomplishment of the second task, that is, ensuring that subordinates are furnished the necessary means, requires all of the above plus a capability to monitor the ongoing delivery of support to subordinate commands, the effectiveness thereof, and the capability to influence the allocations, delivery schedules and priorities that guide the actions of supporting commands.

It entails an administrative communications network that can track support activities all the way to a consuming unit and that can maintain records of directives, reports and requests generated by the command.

Expressed in other terms, that twofold mission requires that the overriding function of a command post is to ensure the synchronization of activities that contribute to successful military operations. These activities include:

- Obtaining information concerning the strength, disposition and capabilities of enemy and friendly forces, terrain and weather that allow a commander to develop a concept of operations.
- Developing the plans and orders necessary to put the commander's concept into effect:
 - A plan of maneuver.
 - Directives that ensure the preparation of supporting plans (fire support, close air support, air

defense, airspace coordination, administration, signal, nuclear-biological-chemical, engineer barriers, special operations and others that may be pertinent to a particular operation).

- Providing reports of activities to higher headquarters.
- Preparing requests for additional resources whenever it becomes apparent that the command will fail in its mission or that it can do its job faster, better or at less cost, especially human cost, if added means can be made available.
- Maintaining contact with adjacent commands that are pursuing the same or related missions.

The basic requirements for accomplishing the CP mission include a complement of competent personnel, a mobility that guarantees continuing contact with subordinates, and a communications linkage that provides for the necessary flow of information and data.

For practical purposes, the CP functions described above have to be accomplished at all levels, from platoon to corps and higher.

The platoon leader and his platoon sergeant, with help occasionally from a mortar forward observer, do the job mentally, with vision limited to line-of-sight and communications with the outside world available only by radio in the company net or by runner.

A company commander has a little more help—a FIST (fire support team), visits by battalion staff officers, and an executive and first sergeant who help manage—but, generally, his CP functions in reaction to the immediate crisis.

From battalion up, the CP becomes more complex and, in fact, grows into a number of installations and groupings needed to accomplish its mission. Various elements, termed the command group, the tactical CP, the forward or main or rear are segments formed by a commander in accord with custom, doctrine or the peculiar needs of a given situation.

A division of labor and a duplication of vital activities provide both for a passive security against enemy operations and for continuity of operations when one or more elements is damaged by enemy action or shuts down to move.

Regardless of the structure, each segment is concerned with one or both of the tasks identified above.

The commander must be equipped, first, with the mobility that allows him to visit his subordinates in the field and the scene of any crisis that affects his operations; second, with the communications that allow him to receive and pass on essential information and data at any and all times.

He must be accompanied by a staff that can guarantee his mobility and the necessary information flow. At times he will operate from a forward echelon of the CP, variously termed the command group, the TAC (tactical CP), or the forward CP.

This echelon is normally concerned only with the conduct of current operations, what is going on right now; therefore, wherever the commander is, he must be in direct contact with the CP nerve center where all information is received, analyzed and compiled to provide an up-to-the-minute description of the situation. This nerve center is normally referred to as the tactical operations center, the TOC, and every echelon of the CP, for redundancy and continuity, must have some form of TOC so that element can take over the current operations function in an emergency.

The second echelon of the CP is a facility that manages all of the resources and all of the information and data being provided from all sources in support of operations.

This echelon remains abreast of ongoing operations while ensuring the continuing development of detailed plans for coming operations; maintaining records of the plans, directives, reports and requests for assistance that are prepared; and directing the administrative and logistical support operations of the command.

This echelon is sometimes consolidated, more often split into main and rear CPs, and often further subdivided to allow incremental movement or to increase security.

Overall, the CP must be prepared to operate in from two to six or seven segments, assuring a constant TOC capability to keep the commander informed and the remainder of the command abreast of ongoing operations and support requirements. Given the lethality of today's battlefield and the potential speed of movement of opposing forces, mobility for all CP segments is mandatory.

The ability to communicate while in motion, to exercise command and control on the move, is required by the commander and by those elements of the CP

that must be equally abreast of the situation, that is, the element designated as the TOC at each of the various segments of the CP.

A command group is a small detachment that can operate independently (temporarily), normally forward of the tactical or main CP where it can monitor more directly the current activities of subordinate commands. It comprises the commander and those assistants he considers essential.

Habitually, a commander will include intelligence, operations and fire support officers along with the personnel necessary to provide mobility, security and communications for the group.

On occasion, he will want other staff officers (engineer, signal, logistics, civil affairs) if the situation indicates that one or more of such special interests will require close monitoring or quick decisions.

The command group requires communications capabilities that ensure continuing contact of a commander with his subordinate commanders and that provide each staff officer with the linkages he needs to obtain the specialized information pertinent to his interests and responsibilities.

Only in very exceptional circumstances will this require anything more than an ability to display information; there is no need to be able to store or manipulate data or to prepare or maintain records by members of the command group.

The responsibility for communications linkages runs always from superior to subordinate and from supporter to supported. A commander is not required to maintain contact with his superior—only the reverse is true.

A maneuver unit does not maintain contact with his fire support unit—the responsibility is in reverse. Nevertheless, such a system requires that a subordinate or a supported command provide an accommodation for the linkages necessary for the superior or a supporter to ensure communications.

Thus, in a command group, a commander must provide for the facility that a superior furnishes for entry into his command net.

He must ensure that materiel essential to a supporting command's functions, for example, an air-ground radio, is accommodated in the command group. If the fire support coordinator is required by a commander to

accompany him in a helicopter, then the fire support officer's communications equipment must also be included.

Army commanders have always been governed by tables of organization and distribution and by general principles of structure in our armed forces, but they have also had the authority to design the structure and manning complements of their CPs.

They will continue to do so because the determination of what resources and what information is essential in the pursuit of a mission begins with the commander. He alone determines what means and what information are essential, considering first and always the resource allocations provided or limited by higher authority.

Much of their resource allocation and information comes to him automatically, through the functioning of the military system in the field, but he must act to request what he needs and to prevent an inundation of resources he cannot absorb and information he cannot use.

Supporting agencies must accommodate to increases and decreases in demand that are initiated by a commander. An aircraft or artillery piece does not deliver fires that are uncalled for; a logistian does not send forward a fuel tanker just because it is available; and the intelligence system should not deliver information or data that is inconsequential to the command echelon being supported.

None of the above guarantees that an individual commander may not demand that additional or modified capabilities be available in his command group or his command post. The principle to be established should be that additional requirements entail first the redistribution of that commander's own resources, not a demand on the system to provide him with more.

Too often in our military history, command posts have burgeoned with materiel and personnel withheld from subordinate units at some cost to their effectiveness. Weighing this impact and deciding how much is enough is a command decision requiring serious consideration.

If a commander requests augmenting resources for this purpose from his superior, he must do so with the full realization that he is requesting that his commander reallocate from within his limited stocks.

There is one final caution that is germane to the organization and functioning of the CP. It is that CPs

operate amid chaos and carnage, conditions conducive to irrational judgments, hasty conclusions and frustrating delays.

One last requirement, therefore, is that someone in charge create an aura of calm, collected activity that guarantees against inadequate and inappropriate actions and orders that jeopardize successful mission accomplishment or the lives of the people engaged in the enterprise. It is in this pursuit that the art of leadership, among commanders and staff officers, replaces any doctrinal checklist of what is to be accomplished.

Intelligence: Now a Two-Way Street?

[Reprinted from ARMY, September 1994]

There were so many disagreements within the intelligence community . . . there were so many disclaimers, that by the time you got done reading many of the intelligence estimates you received, no matter what happened they would have been right. I mean, you know—[laughter]—that's not helpful to the guy in the field.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing,
12 June 1991

With those words, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf aired a frustration shared among field commanders through the ages of military history. Most suffered some form of intelligence deprivation, sometimes because of an inadequate or uncertain capability to provide the product, just as often because the product was not disseminated in a usable or timely fashion.

In *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement*, authors Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, investigating the causes of the debacle at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, observed ". . . in both services [Army and Navy] it was more important to know something than do anything about it." The problem at Pearl Harbor was not the lack of indications of Japanese intent, it was the failure of "the system" to react.

Historians plumbing the archives long ago discovered that the surprise achieved by the Germans in the Ardennes when they launched the Battle of the Bulge was the result of the same phenomenon. The system had detected many indications, but it failed to assemble them into a warning of the impending action.

Complacency and inattentive watch officers were still plaguing the system in December 1944, three years after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The exploding capacities of technological means to collect, process and distribute intelligence information that have become available since World War II have not demonstrably affected the way things work—at least up until 1991 when General Schwarzkopf found himself less than satisfactorily served by the system then extant.

The commanders of Urgent Fury (Grenada) and Just Cause (Panama) would, doubtless, contribute their own versions of the same story.

Needless to say, following General Schwarzkopf's appearances before Congress, the intelligence community took notice. Robert Gates, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), determined that his organization should attempt to do better, and he created a new associate deputy director of operations for military affairs to direct and coordinate efforts to support field commanders.

Other intelligence agencies, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, gave voice to their determination to do better, and the services themselves have announced intentions to streamline and improve timeliness. And Congress, of course, has also set about dictating change that will guarantee better performance in the future.

From a field commander's viewpoint, the intelligence system has always suffered from one fatal flaw: its concern with informing the higher echelons. That concern has resulted in the structuring of a system more attendant, significantly more attendant, to notifying the President than the company commander.

Skids are greased, skis are waxed, and synapses open channels that carry information upward while commanders along the way must make do with spill-over. Later, when the information has been evaluated, interpreted, digested into real intelligence, it is returned to commanders as their daily intelligence summary, one of the many intelligence summaries regurgitated by the system, informing them of what they needed to know yesterday, last week, perhaps last month.

This is not the fault of intelligence officers who are as competent, dedicated and determined to fulfill their mission as any other segment of the armed forces. Their desire to serve their commanders and their commands

is genuine, but their linkage to the intelligence system, except for those elements belonging to the command, is upward through the echelons.

A battalion S-2 [intelligence officer] deals directly with a reconnaissance platoon, some ground radar and night-vision devices, and the firsthand reports of subordinate commanders, all of which he dutifully reports "up the chain." When he needs aerial photography, signal intelligence or facts gleaned from prisoners, he waits for help from on high, from elements also reporting first up the chain. At each higher echelon, someone is looking for and distributing information that lower echelons need but not necessarily as the priority task.

The system is responding to the insatiable demand of the higher echelons, the demand that makes it mandatory that the President learn immediately of the latest crisis while everyone else is sufficiently informed to start divining, then answering, his questions.

Only one example is needed to make this point clear: The CIA advises the President and the National Security Council on all matters of foreign intelligence related to national security and reports regularly to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the defense subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees of both houses, with substantive briefings to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Armed Services Committees of both houses, and such other committees and individual members of Congress who request intelligence information.

Aside from the mission of "coordinating the nation's intelligence activities," the CIA is not directed to report anything "down the chain." In fact it does, as do all other intelligence agencies, but that is the result of practical awareness of the need and value of such action, not a response to a mission assignment.

As communications have improved, greater centralization of the control of military operations has occurred, and more and more decisions are reserved for the highest echelons where the requirement for detailed intelligence grows with the capability to receive and process ever greater numbers of bits of information. Given the requirements associated with centralization and reporting demands, it is understandable, not necessarily excusable, that reporting down the chain enjoys a lesser priority in the total system.

When one considers the peacetime tasks of the CIA—watching the clash of civilizations, the implosion of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the ethnic cleansing efforts in Rwanda and the Sudan, the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, terrorism on many fronts, and the ferreting out of the networks and functioning of drug traffickers—it is not mysterious that the structure and operating mores of the organization are not designed for wartime combat intelligence distribution.

Now, however, the CIA is engaged in an honest effort to amend its procedures and priorities, not to reduce its attention to high-level needs but to simultaneously react to the needs of a field commander. Mr. Gates' new directorate not only has been endorsed by James Woolsey, Gates' successor, but also has prospered because of his direct interest and allocation of resources.

The associate deputy director for operations/military affairs (ADDO/MA) and his Office of Military Affairs (OMA) has grown to 40 people, 15 of them from the military services and headed by a major general who is truly a part of the operations system. In effect, we now have one element of the CIA whose priority and principal function is down the chain. From a commander's viewpoint, it is an innovation, one that is needed at all agencies and echelons of the intelligence system.

The mission of OMA is to ensure that the CIA is informed of military needs and that CIA intelligence products are distributed to the military commands. To ensure routine support for this mission, the ADDO/MA heads the Military Support Policy Council, in which representatives from all other directorates are charged to ensure the two-way flow of information. In practice, this council has done its job, and the full integration of the ADDO/MA into the inner workings and daily activities of the agency is precluding the need for routine meetings.

OMA also reviews joint doctrine, particularly the newly written, and operations plans to ensure that the CIA is aware of concepts and requirements, and can adapt its own procedures to accommodate the military way. In doing this, the office reviews the intelligence communications and dissemination concepts of the Joint Staff, the services and the joint commands to ensure compatibility.

Finally, OMA is acting as a catalyst in an effort to assist and strengthen the human intelligence and joint targeting activities of the Defense Department and the subordinate commands.

Most important to the military establishment, however, has been the assignment of CIA representatives to the Defense Department and Joint Staff in the Pentagon and to the guaranteed access of the unified commands to the support of the agency. This access now ensures full CIA participation in military operations, not only in live action, but for the first time in history, in planning, training and readiness activities.

Today, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of Defense holds a staff meeting, he has a CIA staff officer present to act on all issues that require the attention of the intelligence community. Too, when the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe, plans a Mideast exercise, he has CIA exercise intelligence for his subordinates to contemplate.

The adoption of these new policies and procedures has already provided substantial payoffs. The cross assignment of personnel, long recognized by the services as mutually beneficial, is now producing a greater understanding between CIA operators and their Army, Navy and Air Force counterparts.

The participation of CIA officers in training exercises has fostered a better understanding of military needs and the rationale of the commander's EEI, his expression of the essential elements of information that inform the intelligence community of what he wants to know.

And the briefing program established by OMA for all key commanders and staff officers and for all new generals and flag officers has broadened the education of these leaders into the what, how and why of this new cooperative venture.

Most significant, however, is the development today of a common understanding of actual, ongoing intelligence operations. CIA assets at work today, covering the Balkans, Rwanda, Southwest Asia or Latin America, are contributing real-time intelligence information that our field commanders are using. Just as important, CIA operators are learning to employ and exploit military collection capabilities in their search for information, a new and expansive contribution to the agency's worldwide surveillance efforts.

All of these activities, covert included, are now reviewed jointly by the CIA and the military services, first to ensure coverage of all requirements and then to prevent duplication of effort.

Overall, an old field commander has to be impressed with the progress that has been made, with the determination of the senior intelligence agency to do it better, to foreclose on a future commander's statement to Congress that he might have been served better. If the concern shown by the CIA and the actions taken to alleviate it are being adopted by the other agencies and organizations of the intelligence system, that foreclosure will be ensured.

The storm cloud on the horizon, of course, is the question of funding. The CIA has invested substantially in these changes, committing existing resources at the expense of other programs and activities during a period of declining budgets.

We must hope that the Clinton administration and Congress will recognize that a major Persian Gulf problem is well on the way to solution because of the changes already made and will accommodate the need for the resources that must be available to continue the program.

They will find, if they need to ask, the testimonials of soldiers and sailors and airmen in the field who are convinced that we really are doing it better and who do not want to revert to the system they knew before Desert Storm.

Motherhood and Combat: Will Protesters Back Policy Shifts?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, April 1991]

The month of February brought a rash of columns and letters in our newspapers and television news segments expounding on the heart-rending problem of mothers forced to abandon their children to go to war. Two congressional bills were introduced to overturn existing policies and direct changes excusing mothers from deployment orders.

The Defense Department was forced to issue statements defending the policies that have provided equal opportunity for mothers who wish to volunteer and volunteers who have chosen to be mothers.

Where were these people when those policies were being formulated? Why weren't they heard when some

of us were contending that motherhood and soldiering are not compatible professions?

For ten of my last 11 years of service, I was a commander of major Army commands in the United States and overseas. I supported the demise of the Women's Army Corps and the integration of women across a greater spectrum of military specialties. I support today the use of female helicopter pilots in the air assault operations in the Persian Gulf, but I opposed the continued service of women who became mothers (unless their husbands were not in the service). I recommended changes in policies regarding single parents and married couples with children, and I strongly opposed the assignment of women to combat organizations. I am certain that a large majority of the Army's serving commanders felt exactly as I did.

Except for the women in combat units argument, which is still a live issue with some people, all of these issues were resolved by the equal opportunists and the feminists of the world. The abandoned children, a female prisoner of war and the portent of potential orphans in Desert Storm are the harbingers of the whirlwind on the horizon when we have to engage a first-class enemy.

Today's authors, members of Congress and others who represent the American public ignored or were disinterested in the changes foisted on the armed services to bring about the current situation.

I am inclined to say it serves them right and to point out that waiting for a war to start and then demanding that the Army send home soldiers (mothers) who are trained, qualified and needed at their wartime posts is quite inopportune. I am inclined to wonder whether some hasty decree by the President to bring mothers home (as demanded by some) might create even more problems for the services. Shall we discharge them, end their careers, deny them their equal opportunity?

I am inclined, based on experience, to believe that the same people who want them home will also demand special treatment, special categories for mothers that will guarantee all rights and privileges regardless of the impact on military service requirements.

The issues associated with women in military service are many and varied. They have not been resolved satisfactorily in the past because the decisions have almost all accommodated special interests and pressure groups—expedient, explainable and

noncontroversial politically. The lessons of the Persian Gulf will establish a need for changes in our policies, and we have to hope that the voices now being raised in protest will be heard in support of the things that must be done.

That's Cohesion—C-O-H-E-S-I-O-N

[Reprinted from ARMY, April 1993]

Author's note: As many of those who have served in the armed forces know, at the heart of the controversy over admitting homosexuals is the effect it would have on unit cohesion. As vital as it is to readiness, however, cohesion is extremely difficult to define; often, the best understanding that those who discuss it can manage is to point out that "those who have served know." It's true, but how do you explain its importance to those who haven't served, many of whom will be following the congressional hearings on the issue which are to begin this spring?

In its efforts to promote understanding of the preponderant military position on the homosexual issue, ARMY asked me to look back over 40 years of military service and explain what cohesion means to me.

Cohesion. The act, quality or state of cohering (as tangibly or morally); a sticking together of the tribal group.

Webster's Third International Dictionary is brief and to the point in defining a word that has become quite newsworthy in the past few weeks as soldiers and pundits, sailors and members of the clergy, psychologists and members of Congress debate the impact of President Clinton's proposed change to the ban on homosexuals in the military service.

All the participants in the ongoing discussions seem to acknowledge that the quality of cohesion is important, but few take the time or show an inclination to explain what the term means as a factor affecting military order, discipline and mission capabilities.

Because I believe that cohesion within military units is of critical significance to combat effectiveness, I believe a complete explanation of the term is essential to those discussions, and I offer the following in the

interest of a common understanding of the concerns being expressed.

If there is one absolute in the requirements for training soldiers (a term I will use to encompass sailors, marines and airmen in this paper) for combat, it is the requirement to instill confidence. Every soldier, as he prepares himself for whatever his military duties demand, must ultimately be supported by three pillars of confidence.

First, he must be satisfied that he knows his own job, can perform it well and will fulfill his obligations in time of stress or crisis. He becomes confident that he will not let his squad leader or the man in the next foxhole or the other members of his tank crew down because he didn't learn his job.

Second, he must be just as confident of the abilities and dedication of the soldiers he will go to war with, those who make up the small teams that fight a personal war such as a rifle squad, a howitzer section or a cavalry scout section. The mutual confidence that these soldiers develop is the cornerstone of their performance as a team.

Third, every soldier must believe in his chain of command. He must be confident that the leaders who give him orders, who direct him in his life-threatening activities, are also fully competent and infallibly capable of making the right decisions and directing the right actions.

For the ordinary soldier, the leadership of concern is made up of sergeants, lieutenants and captains, the leaders he sees daily and whose competence and capability he can gauge. He needs exposure occasionally to colonels and generals, whose primary function at his level is to endorse his confidence, but he tends to equate their competence with that of the lieutenants and captains he deals with every day.

When crews and squads and sections are manned by soldiers who are sustained by these pillars of confidences they begin to cohere, to develop cohesion. As they do things well, as they meet the challenges and trials of training together, as they pass tests and demonstrate prowess, their mutual respect grows, and a bonding develops.

In peacetime, such bonding promotes not only greater success in unit activities but also personal friendships and relationships that extend to off-duty

activities, to macho claims of superiority at the enlisted men's club, and to standing together when challenged by other crews or teams—or by marines or paratroopers or "guys from Fort Podunk."

In wartime, in the crucible of combat, such bonding becomes a deep emotional experience. It creates a willingness to risk, even to expend one's life in the interest of the group. In periods of combat, high stress or crises, bonding evolves into true love, a unique love among men that is completely asexual, platonic and called, for want of a better term, brotherhood.

It is a condition not necessarily describable by all who are affected, but it is real, nevertheless, manifesting itself for years after it happens.

World War II veterans' associations still have annual reunions of men who are drawn to each other's company fifty years after experiencing the birth of their brotherhood.

Brotherhood is not peculiar to the military. It occurs in many other professions in which high stress, life-threatening conditions and mutual reliance are requisites, but it is an essential element for military success. Without it, units break down, missions are not accomplished, battles are lost, and wars become disasters.

Not every tank crew, infantry squad or howitzer section enjoys the development of true cohesion. Obviously, some small groups of men are not compatible. Not every soldier builds his three-legged stool of confidence.

Some men are not trustworthy, some are antisocial, some are not sufficiently selfless, and some antagonize because of personal habits, ambitions, discriminations or competitiveness. Often cliques or factions develop antagonistic groups that destroy teamwork and mutual undertakings.

The challenge of military leadership is to identify and correct behavior that threatens cohesion, to assemble and reassemble soldiers into workable teams and create the environment in which cohesion can thrive.

It is the threat to this environment that combat soldiers fear when confronted with demands for the integration of women or of homosexuals into combat units. There is every possibility that the introduction of sexual influences will cause conflict among the soldiers of the Army's small units and thereby affect adversely the cohesion of the unit.

Men covet women, men vie for the favor of women, men protect women—not all men, and not all to the same degree. In the animal existence of mortal combat, the primal urges of both men and women will serve to disrupt, if not destroy, the unity of purpose and effort of the unit to which they are assigned.

It is this same concern that combat soldiers have about the introduction of homosexuals. By definition, homosexuality is atypical, aberrant sexual practice. To introduce and thereby condone the presence of a homosexual in a unit is to introduce the factor of sexuality.

Regardless of the self-control the homosexual individual may practice, the problems of mutual acceptance, mutual respect and the impact on cohesion will arise, and the ultimate development of brotherhood will be out of the question.

The second leg of the confidence stool will be absent.

The problem is compounded when superior-to-subordinate relationships are complicated by the presence of a homosexual in either position.

Even the suspicion that sexual favor is a factor in that relationship will be enough to destroy confidence in the chain of command, both by the individuals directly involved and by others who will observe and talk about what is suspected.

The third leg of confidence will be badly damaged in units and organizations plagued with such a problem.

No Army can function effectively or consistently if its personnel are denied one or two of the pillars of confidence. No soldier can long endure in combat, or even prepare himself adequately for combat, if his confidence is limited to his own mastering of the role he is expected to play.

He will never enjoy the satisfaction of serving in a cohesive unit, and he will certainly never understand the meaning of brotherhood.

The Army Role in Space

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, November 1994]

Fighting wars on land, where the ultimate determination of winning and losing occurs, does not seem to demand an Army presence in space or the Army's use of space vehicles. But there are good and sufficient reasons to show that Army requirements, particularly

in wartime, demand that space be acknowledged as a joint arena, one to be manned by all services, responding to the needs of all components. Space activities cannot be relegated to support status where an outside agency furnishes a product in response to requests from commanders in the field.

Modern technology has made available a wealth of systems that transcend the areas of interest of all unified commands and their components. This is especially true in the fields of intelligence, communications and logistics, and it has a major influence on operations and fire support.

The potential of satellites and space stations to contribute directly to mission accomplishment by even the smallest joint task force commander requires a direct linkage between him and the supporting platforms. In practical terms, that means that a field commander must be able to task, directly through his own agent, an intelligence collector, a logistics monitor or a communications link.

With space technology the commander can "see deeper," can observe enemy activities as they occur and can monitor the execution of his own operations as they are happening. These are basic needs never best satisfied by an agency directed to support or to cooperate or to allocate among competing demands.

Specifically, a land force commander needs space-based means for the following:

- tactical surveillance of enemy dispositions and movements;
- communications beyond line of sight that can build and then modify needed voice and data networks when tactical operations result in force reorganizations;
- monitoring his own forces' operations, providing him with more rapid maneuver control and reaction capabilities;
- early warning against air, rockets and missiles targeted against his operation;
- target acquisition for his own air and long-range missiles;
- monitoring logistical operations to provide management information that will ensure constant, continuing resupply, avoid bottlenecks and dangerous concentrations stockpiles, and accelerate activities in response to enemy actions.

The alternative to a joint space command is a defense space agency or the assignment of space activities to a single military service, one that would act as an executive agent for the Defense Department. In practice, neither of the alternatives has ever proved satisfactory over a long period.

The Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, in the long term, have added a layer of bureaucracy but have not truly improved service to the military departments or, more significantly, to the forces in the field. The services have all retained a large part of the systems that were to have been eliminated or reduced in size, because, in normal priority, defense agencies serve the Defense Department first, then the services.

On occasion, the assignment of a function to a single service has satisfied a requirement. For the most part, however, time proves that the services being supported by an executive agent are dissatisfied with the service, object to the priorities extant and make modifications to satisfy their own needs.

As one example, for many years the Army maintained engineer construction battalions to provide wartime airfield construction and repair service for the Air Force. Over time, the Air Force perceived that the Army did not prepare properly for the role and would not perform it adequately and was apt to divert these battalions to other missions. The result was Air Force activation of its own "Red Horse" engineer battalions, specially equipped for airfield work.

Joint commands have a more impressive record. The Joint Transportation Command, the Special Operations Command and the various area unified commands, in furtherance of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, enjoy the full support of their components and of Congress. The success of these commands, currently enjoyed by the Space Command as well, argues for the continuation of the status quo. The Army role in space will continue to justify the existence of an Army component of this command.

Whither the Chief of Staff?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, September 2001]

In his book *Waging Modern War*, General Wesley Clark, U.S. Army retired, former SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe], is critical of the service

chiefs for inserting themselves into operational matters and exerting influence concerning the employment of their forces in the war against Yugoslavia. He cites particularly the Army Chief of Staff for his perceived opposition to the employment of Apache helicopters on missions in support of the Kosovo liberation forces. Moreover, he questions the apparent reticence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body for its lack of support for the land war campaign plans prepared as a contingency in the event that the air campaign failed to accomplish the total mission. He opines that preoccupation with the national military strategy requiring preparedness to fight two nearly simultaneous theater wars causes the service chiefs to argue against committing resources to other missions and causes them to work at cross-purposes with a joint/combined theater commander.

Simply stated, General Clark believes that operations are matters settled between the theater commander and the Secretary of Defense, who is advised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or between the theater commander and the head of the multinational organization that is directing the conduct of a war, in this case NATO's Secretary General. The job of the service chiefs, indeed the job of all national services, is only to support and sustain the forces committed to those operations.

In a recent speech extolling the virtues of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, U.S. Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) would seem to endorse General Clark's position. He contends Goldwater-Nichols "intended to push them [the services] firmly back into their legislatively assigned role—organizing, training and equipping forces to carry out the missions assigned to the commanders in chief."

Representative Skelton compares the "failures" of Vietnam, Desert One, the S.S. *Mayaguez*, the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, Beirut and Grenada with the "14 years of outstanding success" following the bill's passage, particularly Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Storm. He argues with conviction that we now do it right and that we have the right kind of education system and the right personnel management system to assure that joint activities will continue to receive the priorities they deserve. He warns against any heretical thinking that would return us to the mistakes of the past.

In my opinion, both of these positions are too absolute. I believe the successes of the last 14 years are more the results of skills qualification tests, Army training and evaluation programs, the National Training Center and the modernization of the forces that occurred in the 1980s, along with an adequate operation and maintenance budget that has permitted full-scale training. This is not to denigrate the Goldwater-Nichols Act's innovations, but execution is more important than organization, and the command techniques employed in Just Cause and Desert Storm, when interference from Washington was minimized, were instrumental in those successes.

The role of the service chiefs has changed, but not appreciably. Goldwater-Nichols made them a corporate body with one spokesman responsible for advising and counseling the Secretary of Defense. It did not relegate them only to organizing, training and equipping their forces. In the March 1997 issue of *ARMY* magazine, in "Readiness: The Lion in the Fight," I maintained that the chiefs' concern for the future of their services was weakened when Goldwater-Nichols made support of the theater commanders in chief (CINCS) the highest priority. Every CINC has to be concerned with going to war tomorrow morning; therefore, readiness is always his first priority, and the Joint Chiefs, collectively, must be concerned first with supporting and sustaining the forces committed. All other requirements play second fiddle, and the Army's research, development and acquisition budget of the past 15 years is proof of this contention.

This also means, however, that the chiefs have a voice in the conduct of operations. True, they do not make the decisions, but they are charged to advise and recommend. The theater CINC is not a dictator whose every wish is a command and whose every command is the final word. When General MacArthur wanted to assault Inchon, the Joint Chiefs had every right to object to and oppose his plan. They were wrong in their judgment, and President Truman overrode their recommendation, but they were fulfilling their role.

Military operations, the most complex of human endeavors, have to be conducted by a corporate body, one in which personalities contribute independently. Decisionmakers are few, but proposals, opinions and recommendations are rampant until the decisions are made. No one who knows him would believe that General Carl Vuono, then Army Chief of Staff, did not

voice strong opinions about the conduct of Operation Desert Storm before and while he was organizing, training and equipping the force to go to that fight.

In the future, our command and control system will differ from the past if only because different personalities will be in charge. We do not need any major reorganizations or doctrinal innovations to guarantee success. We do need an adjustment of priorities that will allow the chiefs to fund adequately the future of their services while they are advising and counseling about operations. We do need also for the corporate body of generals and admirals who happen to be in charge at the time to answer first the question, "Can't we all just get along?"

Jointness

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, February 2003]

Winston Churchill is quoted as saying, "What is the use of living if not to strive for a noble cause?" Perhaps I have one.

In early December the Lawton (Oklahoma) *Constitution* carried a column by Richard Sinnreich that disputed the appropriateness of the Army-Navy football game rivalry when we should instead be promoting harmony, symmetry and jointness. His article poses a number of questions. Isn't interservice rivalry anachronistic in these days of "purple" operations? Shouldn't the service academies be overcoming, not contributing to, cultural differences? Yes, soldiers, sailors and airmen need special skills, but shouldn't we pattern their education on the medical profession in which all become physicians before becoming cardiologists, ophthalmologists, psychiatrists or brain surgeons? Don't we need a common curriculum at the service academies to instill an acceptance of jointness philosophy, a uniformity of thinking about how to fight wars?

The column showed up on my e-mail screen one evening followed by a torrent of both condemnatory and congratulatory messages from a lot of interested observers and the military alumni. Comments ranged from doing away with the academies completely to demanding a better foundation in the core competencies of each service. There is significant support for a new, common, all-encompassing joint curriculum at all the academies—perhaps even at the Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel—and one observation that we



General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and General Kroesen at the Eurosatory defense exhibition in Paris, June 1996. (Photo by Mary Blake French for ARMY)

should learn from the Japanese, who have only one academy producing officers for all services.

The argument divides naturally between those who want to develop experts in the specialties of land, sea and air warfare as their first priority and those who want how we fight to be the driving consideration for the basic education of all officers. Ancillary to both viewpoints is if, whether and how the academies contribute to the opinions of the advocates.

One perhaps should be wary of wading into this argument, but I believe there are some fundamentals that should be respected. First, the purpose of the service academies is education, not training. We want graduates who are educated men and women, able to think, decide and act in accord with the lessons they have learned about our national aspirations, needs and culture. We don't want automatons adhering to cookie cutter thought processes designed as "all they need to know."

We also want the academies to be cornerstones of character building. Standards of honesty, integrity, selflessness and devotion to the nation are vital to an understanding throughout the services that the officer corps is unquestionably deserving of respect, acceptance and loyal support.

Given such graduates, particularly ones exposed to military history, culture, customs and discipline during their undergraduate days, their training as platoon leaders, submariners and pilots is not a difficult transition. All services know how to train their entry-level leaders

through experience and the variety of challenges that can be posed when engaged in basic troop leading.

For those who think these requisites demand a single, common curriculum at West Point, Annapolis and Colorado Springs, I only ask: Does the Ivy League have one curriculum for political science? Do Johns Hopkins and Harvard Medical have identical courses? How do MIT, Georgia Tech and Cal Tech address the basic sciences? Why do any courses have electives? I expect the answer in all cases is that varied fare is the norm and that the professions are all stronger as their graduates debate, reconsider and evaluate what they learned.


So, when or how do we introduce jointness into the education system? The demands for joint indoctrination, training and education are overstated, sometimes overwrought. In the Army, certainly, company commanders, battalion staff officers and battalion commanders think "jointly" whenever they plan or execute a mission in the field. Coordinating intelligence, fire support, mobility and countermobility, logistics support, communications and any and all other contributions that balance resource requirements with availability for accomplishing a mission is joint thinking on the basic level. The command and staff colleges are the place to ensure that this thinking incorporates naval gunfire and close air support in fire support plans and includes air and sea transport into logistical plans. Thereafter joint thinking occurs normally at brigade, division and higher levels and I believe that all of our joint commands today are manned by officers well enough versed in the procedures and techniques of joint planning. Demands for better jointness training are not coming from the joint commanders.

These beliefs do not answer all of the criticism of the current system. One e-mail avowed that too many majors and lieutenant colonels flounder in their first joint assignments. I expect those same people would also flounder in their first Pentagon service assignments, and I am inclined to think we are only observing proof of the Peter Principle.

Other e-mails attack interservice bickering about the Defense budget and seem to think that can be stopped by better indoctrination in jointness. I can only say that the green uniform never contributed to solving disagreements among armor, air defense, aviation and artillery officers over the relative values to be assigned the Abrams tank, the Patriot missile, the Comanche and

the Crusader in the Army budget. No amount of purple thinking is going to solve the problem of dedicated program advocacy by those who have spent years developing a new weapon or plane or truck or submarine. It certainly won't change as long as Congress and the Defense Department continue to deal with the three services as entities.

We may not have reached the ultimate, the best education system for our military profession, but I believe we have one now that is more than satisfactory, one that in fact is the envy of all other armed forces in the world. We are engaged in a unique profession—modern war is the most complex of human endeavors—and designing an education system that is unique to its requirements is certainly explainable and defendable. It need not be patterned on any other system. I can agree that there are flaws and shortcomings. The loss rate of academy graduates is much too high, and all services must do a better job of motivating them to commit to full careers in the military. I am also in favor of the academies establishing graduate courses at which all officers can aspire to master's degrees and doctorates in military history, leadership and military science. But if the superintendent at West Point should ask, I would tell him that if he is accomplishing the basic tasks specified above, my only advice for 2003 is BEAT NAVY!





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, VII CORPS
APO 09107

AETSCG

1 October 1976

FOREWORD

1. If war were to begin in Europe today it would be "come as you are!" We would begin the fight in our current readiness posture, with personnel prepared only as they have been prepared by their commanders to that moment. There is no higher priority peacetime task than to train to insure that that preparation is the best that can be accomplished. We must train today and everyday for combat tomorrow morning.

2. In the coming training year commanders will assure that the following policies guide their training programs and that positive action is taken to achieve progress in each of the areas specified:

a. Training of Leaders:

(1) A formal program of instruction will be required for officers and noncommissioned officers which is based upon FM 100-5 Operations and the new "How to Fight" series of field manuals. The US Army philosophy and doctrine published in these manuals must become a matter of second nature to all Army leaders.

(2) Simultaneously junior officers and noncommissioned officers will be trained as experts in the basic skill qualification test (SQT) requirements for the enlisted men of their units. Officers and noncommissioned officers must be capable of training, teaching, and testing their men in the basic MOS requirements essential to the proper functioning of the unit and organization of which they are a part.

b. Training of Individual Soldiers: The training of individual soldiers must be aimed at a continuing sustainment of the fundamental knowledge of soldiering and the requirements peculiar to each man's assigned MOS. Individual training is to be highlighted by the annual requirements for MOS testing, SQT testing (as appropriate), basic weapon marksmanship qualification, and the Army physical training test. Incorporated in this training is the requirement that among the men of each unit, one or more men will become truly expert in the use and the care and maintenance of every item of equipment found on the TOE/MTOE. Routine reconnaissance and orientation on terrain important to the general defense mission will be an integral part of individual training.



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c. Unit Training:

(1) The primary objective to be achieved by an organization's unit training program is the development of a truly professional battalion, a battalion in which the commander and staff can employ, control, and support the fighting echelon (companies) or organic units, can conduct combined arms operations by properly employing any and all attached units, can obtain rapidly and concentrate effectively any and all means of fire support, and can accomplish all of the activities essential to assuring that all classes of supply, support, and service are provided.

(2) Concurrently, the program will provide for the following:

(a) ARTEP for every unit, every echelon up to and including the battalion.


(b) Training of all small unit teams (tank crews, scout platoons, fire teams, mortar squads, etc., and all special purpose teams (redeye, GSR, NBC, etc.)) to reach the same proficiency as that specified for individuals.

(c) Routine command post exercises for training brigade and higher level commanders and staffs.

(d) An annual brigade field training exercise, incorporating insofar as possible all elements of a combined arms task force employed against an actual force simulating an enemy formation.

(e) Routine alert exercises, designed to prepare all units for emergency deployment to combat, and incorporating ammunition uploading, the closing out of kasernes, the inclusion of host nation support activities, the establishment of communications networks, and reconnaissance and movement into and through the general defense terrain area.

3. Every commander's training program must be designed to reflect the particular and peculiar needs of his organization. Fund availability, training time requirements, access to the major training areas, local facilities and areas or the lack thereof differ for every organization. For these reasons, every commander must design and develop his own program, but every commander must do so with the full understanding that if he goes to war tomorrow he will have to answer the question asked by his own conscience, "Have I done everything I ought to have done to prepare these men and this unit for combat operations?"



FREDERICK J. KROESEN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

Army Education

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, August 2005]

The cost and value of the Army's system of education periodically come into question as budgeteers, force managers and visionaries seek ways to do more with less money, less manpower, more technology and better techniques. In times of crisis—wars, depression or congressional budget battles—the tooth-to-tail argument is resurrected, and the support establishment becomes the whipping boy in the search for unnecessary, expendable manpower spaces and the dollars spent on the support structure.

Headquarters, particularly post headquarters and the higher echelons of Army command and control in the continental United States, are favorite attack sites. Army Materiel Command, which once had thousands of soldiers assigned, is now barely recognizable as a military command. Transportation, communications, the Medical Corps, Finance Corps and other administrative services have been largely civilianized. Many functions are now contracted out. Only the recruiting command, during wartime, bucks the trend.

But Training and Doctrine Command, the largest target, continues to be threatened during almost every budget cycle. The dispersed and widespread officer schools, the NCO education system (NCOES) and the training bases for new recruits are manned and managed by large contingents, and trainees and students make up the bulk of the trainees, transients, holdees and students account that seems, to the uninformed observer, to be an extravagant and profligate waste of manpower.

Over the years there have been many proposals, plans, experiments and directives aiming to reduce the demands for educating and training soldiers. Very shortly after World War II, during which an Army needing millions of soldiers still found it necessary to extend basic training from 13 to 17 weeks, systems analysts and money crunchers promised that eight weeks of basic was quite enough. Many spaces were saved in the trainees account, and the reduction of training cadres saved even more. But the requirement continued moot for years, through the Korean War and certainly into the Vietnam years, when every division in that country found it necessary to establish training detachments to provide one to four weeks of basic augmentation training for all newly assigned replacements. The spaces saved in the training base in the United States were more


than matched by those needed in Military Assistance Command, Vietnam to finish the job of basic training.

Other experiments over the years have included a ground general school that was to consolidate combat arms (infantry, armor, artillery) at one institution. Faculties and cadres have been reduced, sometimes with severe impact on the quality of instruction or the quality of life of the remaining staff. Long courses have been shortened—at less than five months a soldier can remain assigned and fill a space in a unit, reducing the requirement for one manpower space. School quotas have been reduced, thereby reducing the students account and saving spaces. And most recently, officers have been released early from the Command and Staff course to rejoin units training for deployment.

Through the years the Army school system has been considered an extravagance by a long line of analysts and resource managers. The number of man-years associated with officers' basic and advanced branch courses, the staff colleges and the War College is a major investment. Add jump (parachute) school, Ranger training, language and special operations qualification, an executive course in systems analysis, the force management course and perhaps a year or two in a postgraduate master's or doctor's degree program, and the cost and time spent for an officer's career are significant. Double that to pay for the NCO education system and it is easily apparent that there must be savings available. What profession, other than perhaps medical, demands that kind of professional education?

In addition, there are always those who will argue that practical experience, on-the-job training, is better than the schoolroom for educating military leaders. World War II officers, the greatest generation, were almost entirely on-the-job learners. Only the very senior leaders had any extensive schooling between the wars, and the noncommissioned officers had none. The crown jewel of this argument is Douglas MacArthur. Did you know that after four years at West Point, MacArthur never attended an Army service school?

I certainly will say nothing denigrating on-the-job training or the fact that combat experience is the best education a soldier ever gets. I am a product of such education, having commanded three rifle companies before attendance at the basic infantry course was waived and long before attending the advanced course. I then commanded a battalion in Korea three years



before going to the Command and Staff College. But I also was astounded at what I did not know about command at those echelons when I did get to those schools. I have always known that I would have been a better commander had I had that schooling first. I also know that what I did not know from my on-the-job experience could have had dire consequences. Many of our battlefield fiascos resulted from the inadequate capabilities of commanders in the field.

I don't have any qualifying statistics or comparative measurements to prove my contention, but I believe the unmatched successes of the Panama, Persian Gulf, Afghan and Iraq campaigns are the result of three things: first, Grenada, which identified weaknesses in joint operations and the steps taken to improve them; second, the National Training Centers, which in fact provided real standards for on-the-job training and experience; third, the Army education system, which continually upgraded the officers' courses and which accomplished a great leap forward as the NCOES matured into real education.

I know there are many other factors—technological gains in weaponry, ammunition, communications, improved logistics, better joint efforts—but the quality of the manpower element to put everything together and manage it in combat is the absolute that made those operations classic.


In the early 1980s, at the end of a Reforger exercise in Germany, I remarked to a fellow commander with whom I had worked for years, saying, "We're better than we were—why?" The answer that I think we agreed on was NCOES. The formal schooling of NCOs, then still in its infancy, was already having a notable impact.

Army education is not designed to produce future MacArthurs. It is instead a system that provides ordinary men and women with knowledge of the fundamental demands and practices that will assure a competent functioning of the Army. "How the Army runs" is the subtitle of the Force Management Course at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. If that phrase is expressed as a question, the answers are provided most efficiently and effectively in the Army education system for both the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.

I support and endorse much of the recent change in courses of instruction for junior leaders. They will be better platoon leaders and company commanders, but most of the new courses strike me as training, not education. The long-term leadership quality of the Army requires education of the type provided by the 10-month courses of the past. Reducing the Leavenworth and branch school courses to five months reduces the education potential of that schooling and relies on the War College and the Sergeants Major courses as the only truly educational experiences in a soldier's career. If such schooling guarantees the battlefield prowess in the future comparable to that of the recent past, it is more than worth the investment. The protection of our national interests, the prestige of the nation and the lives of soldiers are dependent upon the continued excellence of our military education.

A Quadrennial Defense Review year is one in which the Army can express a demand to protect the long-term quality of its corps of leaders. We need an Army large enough to accomplish its ongoing war missions, while simultaneously providing for the professional education of its officers and noncommissioned officers that will guarantee their future capabilities.





Conducting War

Conducting War

My introduction to war in the 63d Division in World War II was a great learning experience. To me, combat is the most challenging and the most rewarding of all human enterprises for those who live through it. There is no question that I do not want to go through a combat period again, and I certainly do not advocate going to war just so people can get that experience—but, because of the mental and physical demands of combat, those who live through it have learned lessons that are not available in any other walk of life.

Combat taught me to rely on the collective judgments of a group of men. When a platoon, or even a squad, has been properly trained and motivated, I have great confidence that it will continue to function in combat even though some elements of that squad or platoon may fold immediately under pressure. There are natural leaders among American soldiers who come forward in times of crisis to hold a small unit together, keep it functioning, and accomplish the mission at hand. I am quite aware that failures of units do occur, but my experience is that when I gave mission-type orders to squads and platoons, or to my company, I had great confidence that they would carry them out. As the war went on—despite the turnover of personnel and the loss of subordinate leaders, the changeover of platoon and squad leaders—I had confidence in my ability to explain to people what it was I wanted them to do and then rely upon them to do it. I learned that responsibility bred confidence. If I treated a squad leader as though I expected him to accomplish the tasks and mission and bear the responsibilities of his position, I was much more apt to get a satisfactory performance out of him than if I destroyed his confidence or made it suspect by telling him what had to be done and exactly how he should do it. Very early in my career I became a believer in mission-type orders to subordinates.

War has been a great teacher for me, and I believe that it has lessons that must be studied constantly. This section includes a number of pieces about war.

The first is taken from a lecture presented at the University of Charleston in 1991 in which I outlined my thoughts on the subject.

The article “No Silver Bullet Can Promise Success in War” cautions against relying on some sort of wonder weapon to win wars without the use of ground forces. Veterans’ Day 2000 prompted me to write “War,” a short article that expresses some of my views on the subject.

I am a strong supporter of landpower and an advocate of its crucial contribution to any military campaign. The United States Army today is the pre-eminent landpower in the world. A final decision in war depends ultimately on deploying ground forces that can occupy contested territory, control a population and enforce regime change. Even in today’s high-technology world, it takes soldiers on the ground to confirm victory. Technology continues to provide new weapons and systems that give the Army the capability to fight anywhere in the world under almost any circumstances, but ultimately, Army success depends—as it always has—on American soldiers who must close with the enemy and conclude a conquest. History tells us that



Colonel Kroesen aboard his UH-1 (“Huey”) helicopter over Quang Tin Province in Vietnam sometime in 1968.

until ground forces occupy the land and subdue the population of an enemy, a war cannot be considered over and won. That is not to say that air and sea power don't play a crucial role in warfare, especially when weapons such as precision guided munitions can attack enemy forces from long ranges, reducing the capabilities of enemy forces to fight an effective ground campaign. It is simply that there is no substitute for having soldiers on the ground to convince an opponent that the war is over and we have won.

I have included four articles that focus on land warfare. In September 1990, as the Persian Gulf crisis was developing, I wrote a short piece for *Defense Review*—"Smart Weapons May Help, But Wars are Won by Soldiers on the Ground"—as a sort of counterpoint to the many articles appearing in the media at the time on the high-technology aspects of warfare. "The Most Effective Bet Is Still 'Boots on the Ground,'" written in 1996 for *ARMY* magazine, is a reminder that putting forces on the ground sends a strong message of resolve to a potential opponent. The war on terror that our President initiated in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon prompted me to write "Ready for War," a reflection on whether we might do better at preparing our soldiers for the challenges of combat. About six months later that war prompted me to write "The Future of Land Warfare: An Opinion" to argue that the most effective weapon against terrorists will be well trained, properly equipped and highly motivated infantrymen.

I started as a private in the infantry, and I have always thought there is no better way to start an Army career. But I came to the realization early that infantry combat is an animal existence; there is probably no human challenge that brings greater stress or tests a man's physical and psychological readiness for anything the way infantry combat does. During World War II we did not know that the weather in Germany was the worst it had ever been that winter, but there was snow cover from November to the middle of March. We lived in the snow. That's a tough thing to do. We were in houses once in a while, but most of the time we were out on the ground, living in foxholes. We never had tents, nobody ever carried them, and we didn't get a shower from December to March.

Infantry has been the decisive combat arm throughout history. From the time the first group of

Neanderthal or Cro-Magnon humans decided to act forcefully and in unison, we have had wars. That first group of soldiers were all infantrymen. They picked up rocks and tree branches and charged their enemy bent on carnage and destruction and winning. Incidentally, the first artillerymen came shortly thereafter. They held back and threw their rocks. Ever since then there have been constant predictions that the infantry's days on the battlefield were numbered.

The latest threat to infantrymen is the belief that technology will take over and destroy enemy formations with long-range weapons. Infantry will be replaced by civil affairs soldiers who will move in to control the cowed and defeated population. I just cannot accept such a proposition, believing instead that the infantry soldier will continue to be the essential element of the Army's combat arms team. Even now, as the nation follows the slow process of rooting al Qaeda terrorists out of the rugged Afghanistan countryside or ponders the recent war with Iraq and the urban fighting required to ensure victory, there is no substitute for the infantry soldier. The two pieces reflect my thinking on infantry over the years. "The Ultimate Weapon of War" was derived from remarks made in 1980 to a symposium on infantry in Hamburg, Germany, when I was the commander in chief of the Army's forces in Europe. In "Bum Rap" I tried to debunk the frequently heard criticism from some quarters that American infantry is weak, timid and unwilling to fight aggressively.

For thousands of years men have labored to develop wonder weapons that would end the infantry's primacy, and sometimes they have had temporary success. There has been a constant flow of new weapons, new protection and new tactics, but war still relies on infantrymen to take and hold objectives the enemy cannot afford to lose and to cow and control populations. The Assyrians overran the Middle East on horses. The English developed the long bow to engage their opponents at a distance. Artillerymen used grapeshot to discourage massed attacks. The machine gun and poison gas stymied the doughboys of World War I. Tanks and aerial bombs took their toll in World War II. Through it all, however, the infantry persevered and in the final outcome held their position—and deservedly became known as the Queen of Battle. American infantry has always carried that designation proudly, and there is every reason to believe it will continue to do so in the nation's future wars, wherever they may be fought.

The final article, added in this edition, discusses the controversial topic of women in combat. The experience gained in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has had a profound effect on this issue. My opinion, revised somewhat from previous thoughts, is included herein.

A Lecture on War

[Adapted from a lecture presented at the University of Charleston on 1 October 1991]

My purpose here is to talk about war—good wars, bad wars, big wars, long wars, short wars, maybe even cold wars—with some observations about why and how wars are fought. My focus will be World War II, but I want to make three points at the outset:

First, these are my opinions, not those of a speech-writer.

Second, I am not an advocate of war. Wars are terrible, tragic, wasteful, terrifying human endeavors—they are mankind's most inhuman form of international, intertribal, interstate intercourse—and the good guys don't always win. But history is principally a story of military conquest. The towering figures of history—Alexander, Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon, Hitler, and even Washington and Lincoln—are names made famous by military prowess or military actions. Military names overwhelm all others, and the military profession is rivaled only by religion and medicine in its effect on mankind. They rival prominent religious leaders such as Jesus Christ, Mohammed and Buddha, and artists and scientists such as Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Louis Pasteur, Freud, Archimedes and Socrates in name recognition. Given such historical prominence and influence, war must be studied no matter how bad it is, how distasteful a subject.

Third, I am an unabashed advocate of landpower. I believe strongly that armies are the decisive instrument and the principal weapon to be employed to win wars. The objectives of every war fought in the 20th century were achieved only when the land had been occupied and when people were dominated by forces on ground. The objectives of the Persian Gulf War announced by President George H. W. Bush and the United Nations were to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. And you will recall that not one Iraqi unit was withdrawn, not one Kuwaiti government office was restored, and not one piece of Kuwait was returned to rightful owners during the 40 days of air and missile attacks, precision

strikes and the most professional air campaign ever waged, yet all these objectives were achieved 100 hours after ground operations began. Those who say that we didn't complete the job and didn't finish off Saddam Hussein either lack an understanding of the objectives sought or are in disagreement with them.

I will acknowledge one exception to landpower's supremacy. In World War II, Japan's surrender was prompted by the atomic bomb. But that event was the culmination of the extensive land and sea campaigns that established military superiority and demonstrated the Allies' capability to retake land. It was the appearance of a new weapon, the atomic bomb, against which there was no defense and no retaliation possible, that finally forced the Japanese capitulation. Other exceptions are claimed, such as the Russo-Japanese War that was settled in 1904 by firepower when the Japanese sank the Russian Great White Fleet. And there are examples of gunboat diplomacy such as the surrender of the Spanish commander in Manila and Bey of Tunis when American warships appeared in their respective harbors, but those were no more wars than the U.S. air attack on Libya in 1986.

I acknowledge that my views on landpower are not universally held. Airpower advocates believe the Persian Gulf War was really won by the air campaign and that the land campaign was not needed. They also believe the World War II invasion at Normandy was unnecessary because Germany would have succumbed sooner if greater resources had been provided for the air war. But I contend that without the Allied invasion, Germany would have continued to resist until either an internal revolt seized control of the government and people or the Russians put all of Europe under Soviet domination.

My point is that if, despite all common sense, reason and negotiation, a nation has to go to war, it must contemplate the costs and consequences of employing landpower and putting armies on the ground, to settle things—not completely, not forever, not always satisfactorily, but it takes a land war to settle the argument that started the conflict.

There are many people, particularly intellectuals, who consider war exceptional, a perversion of normal political and foreign policy process, and therefore not worthy of serious study. Intellectual opposition to the study of war is almost always driven by political attitudes. The antiwar and antimilitary attitudes that

deplored the Cold War for 45 years were all based on the belief that I “ain’t goin’ to study war no more” because it won’t happen again, it will go away. In reality, what will happen is that wars won’t go away just because we don’t study them. But wars are not fought by scholars—I recall none in my platoon in 1944.

In fact, war has been recognized as a legitimate pursuit in international law as the final resort of the political process. History is replete with stories of military conquest. If you don’t believe it, look at the history books to see what else was going on when Genghis Khan was overrunning Eastern Europe or when Rome and Carthage were fighting the Punic Wars. For that matter, what else was happening in the world in January–February 1991? Why wasn’t CNN somewhere besides the Persian Gulf and Scud target areas in Israel? History tracks wars because wars shape the political destinies of nations.

The causes of war require cataloguing. Every war fought is for a different set of reasons, but the common theme is a threat or perceived threat to a nation’s national interest in the actions being taken by another. Historically, the threat of military conquest and the establishment of control or even the extermination of a nation and its people has been the principal cause of war. As a result of war, Carthage ceased to exist, India was subjugated to British rule for a century, and California joined the United States. In each case, the losers fought because they feared the ultimate outcome would be inimical to their national interest or at least to the interests of the government then in control.

In World War II, hostilities were the result of the free world’s recognition that Germany and Japan could not be allowed hegemony over a continually growing segment of the world’s land mass. Currently the same theme is causing wars—Serbians and Croatians are at war as are Azeris and Armenians—as each side perceives a dire threat to their existence or to their long-term national interests that can be resolved by no other means. Interestingly, none of these combatants is joined by allies because no others perceive a threat to themselves or see any benefit to be derived from joining the fray. It is also interesting that the United States lost in Vietnam because we never understood the threat. In the Persian Gulf War there was a perceived threat in the free world that national interests could not allow control of Mideast oil to be in the hands of Saddam Hussein.

The reverse side of a listing of the causes of war is prevention of war. It is not so much that a threat does not exist, rather that potential war is not worth the risk, that conquest is not worth the cost. In my opinion, the Cold War never turned hot because the Russians, despite tenets of expansionism in Communist doctrine and despite military readiness and capabilities, never found western Europe worth the risk, whereas the quelling of uprisings in East Germany, Hungary and Afghanistan was. On the other hand, the West’s moral outrage at the takeover of Czechoslovakia and the destruction of the Hungarian freedom fighters did not extend to the risk of war to do something about it.

What is the most peaceful nation in the world? Switzerland gets my vote, and it probably stands high on any list. But in past 300 years, the Swiss have spent more money, effort and manpower per capita on military preparedness than any of the warring nations of Europe. They fought no war because their neighbors respected their strength and determination. I have toured Swiss defenses, and they dwarf the Maginot Line by comparison.

With that background, I want to turn to World War II. I will make some comparisons to the Persian Gulf and some allusions to Korea, Vietnam, Grenada and Panama. World War II was an enormous undertaking. No human endeavor in history compares to it—the Pyramids in Egypt, the Great Wall of China and the Suez and Panama Canals pale in comparison. In six years of hostilities, 34 nations fielded more than 70 million soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen plus uncounted numbers of guerrillas and underground fighters. The United States had 12 million men and women in the military services in 1945. Out of a population of 150 million people, 15 million served in the war and seven million served overseas in the three and half years America was in the war. That means 10 percent of the population were in uniform and about 5 percent saw service outside the country. Worldwide there were 15 million battle deaths and 38 million civilian deaths. The economic impact was enormous: \$1.6 trillion in direct cost, and more than \$1 quadrillion in total costs. Almost 9,000 ships were sunk. By comparison the current (1991) U.S. merchant fleet totals about 250 ships. The war mobilization for major participants was total—whole industries were created to build 300,000 aircraft and 60,000 tanks. Shipyards built one ship per day.

The United States faced two powerful enemies located at opposite ends of the world. Thousands of miles of ocean supply lines had to move enormous tonnages of every commodity imaginable. It required 25,000 tons a day just to feed the seven million service personnel overseas. The magnitude of management requirements would put today's Exxon, IBM, GM and Ford boards of directors in shock. By contrast, the Persian Gulf War expanded the existing armed forces of 2 million to 2.5 million with a limited mobilization with only a six-month commitment. That represents about 1 percent of the U.S. population, and only 20 percent of that number served in the theater of war against a single adversary.

The United States was almost unprepared for World War II. We had initiated the draft and stepped up arms procurement, but despite watching Europe at war for over two years and China and Japan for almost ten, we were surprised, unprepared and almost incapable of military action right after Pearl Harbor. We survived because we won the battle of Midway with the little Navy we had left in a close encounter and because our allies already at war kept the enemy occupied while we mobilized, trained and equipped the forces needed to win. For two years we engaged peripherally. Navy forces were defending in the Pacific while Army forces augmented the British in North Africa and then combined with Marines to take the first small offensive actions in the Southwest Pacific theater at Guadalcanal.

In the end we had built a juggernaut that was by far the most capable Army and Navy the world had ever seen, but it took three years to put it together. World War II was fought by a very small nucleus of professional soldiers, less than 250,000, augmented by willing but only partially-trained Reserve and National Guard soldiers, both plagued with overage, incompetent and incapable personnel such as 45-year-old lieutenants. That nucleus, principally an officer corps that had learned its trade academically, assembled and equipped the 12-million-man force of 1945, training it quickly—and unfortunately minimally—before deploying it, employing while learning through on-the-job training, and leading it to a complete and total victory.

This leads to another comparison with the Persian Gulf War, which was fought by professional armed forces, trained better than any in history, fully equipped with the world's most lethal, most reliable, most effective armament, and capable of defeating the world's fourth

largest army and air force in an overwhelming demonstration of military prowess. The difference between being ready and unready for a war is measured in comparisons of time required, casualties suffered, and the risk of losing. In that regard, the Persian Gulf War established a standard that future commanders and national leaders will have to attempt to emulate while historians remind them of how it should be done. It was probably the most successful, most conclusive demonstration of military professionalism the world has seen.

In passing, two other wars—Grenada and the Panama invasion, Operation Just Cause—were lesser demonstrations of the same principle: overwhelming power applied by fully trained, properly equipped forces achieved success in a very short time, both actions over almost before the world was aware of them and certainly before any other power could interfere. Had we not been so efficient in those operations, there was the potential risk of an effort from the Soviet Union and Cuba to interdict supply lines, jam communications, or engage our aircraft or naval ships with missiles.

The present generation of soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen will be forever grateful to the leaders of this nation who provided the resources essential to the state of readiness and capability that the armed forces have achieved in the past decade. By contrast, the Pearl Harbor debacle and the abandonment of thousands of soldiers on the Bataan Peninsula and marines on Wake Island are examples of the costs associated with being unprepared and unready. In the Korean War we had the disaster of Task Force Smith, the first hastily thrown-together American force dispatched from Japan to Korea that was just swallowed up by the North Koreans because it was untrained, ill-equipped and completely incapable of accomplishing its mission. If we want almost 100 percent of our sons and daughters to come home from the next war, as they did from the Persian Gulf, the lessons of history, the importance of readiness must not be forgotten.

Finally, World War II is almost always thought of as a good war, a just war, one that we and our allies suffer few moral compunctions about. Our whole population was sure that Hitler was bad and the Japanese despicable. The world had to be rid of their military machines, and the atomic bomb was good. At home the self-propaganda we generated produced a populace that endured gasoline rationing and food shortages, bought war bonds at phenomenal rates,

donated pots and pans to aluminum drives, and went to work to develop an industrial giant that produced anything and everything needed to win the war. The Army and Navy developed forces that could fight in the deserts of North Africa, the plains of Europe, the mountains of Italy, the jungles of the Southwest Pacific, and the Arctic islands of Kiska and Attu.

In only three years we dominated the seas, controlled any airspace we chose, and had ground forces that could assault any beach or capture any objective. We won a great victory. Besides that, during the war the Army prepared for the postwar peace by training more than four thousand personnel in military government. When the war ended the United States had people trained to control populations, restore order, and encourage and stimulate peaceful pursuits—political and economic. We could do anything and we knew it. Then we self-destructed. From August 1945 to June 1950 we reduced a magnificent military machine to one that could not stem the tide of a third-rate Communist satellite (North Korea) or win against a second-rate power (Red China).

So, my purpose tonight was not to provide a complete course on World War II but to whet your appetite for knowing more about it, learning how that war came to be thought of as so good and why we felt so good about fighting and winning it. The library contains a wealth of fascinating material about this greatest of human enterprises. It contains good lessons and bad about what was done and how it was done. And I believe a study of that kind of history is important to any generation, because repeating the positive and avoiding the negative might be important at any time in the future. The world is not yet safe for democracy and we do not yet have a preventative against a new Hitler or Saddam Hussein or a reincarnated Napoleon wanting to conquer the world.

I may be wrong—I am after all afflicted with that awful disability called the military mind, so I may not be seeing things clearly. But I'm pleased that I could be here tonight to share these opinions.

No Silver Bullet Can Promise Success in War

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, July 1996]

The recent Israeli shelling of the U.N. compound at Qana in Lebanon, despite pinpoint intelligence and

precision guidance, resulted, in a matter of minutes, in a political disaster from which the Israelis have not yet recovered. Employing firepower alone risks such mistakes and almost never obtains any decisive results. No Israeli kibbutz has been abandoned because of Hezbollah rocket attacks. And no Hezbollah capabilities have been shut down by Israeli counterfire.

This action has a direct bearing on the current and almost never-ending effort to define the proper size and composition, the future roles and missions, and the supporting budgetary allocations of the armed forces that seems to be a growth medium of expanding proportions. Perhaps the increasing numbers of think tanks, coupled with an insatiable demand to fill the available news outlets, make this phenomenon inevitable, but it also requires that those assaulted by the torrent of theories, schemes, learned dissertations and pet peeves of any number of authors must have a solid foundation of some basic truths as they weigh new ideas and revised concepts for fighting wars.

Among these truths is, first, the recognition that political ends must provide the purpose for any commitment to war. A clear expression of the political objectives sought provides both guidance for the military effort and a task for which costs, risks and probabilities for success can be measured.

Second is the constancy of the principles of war. Searches for and expressions of these principles are centuries old, and today there is no universal agreement on what they are or how they should be identified. But there are principles; they do govern military actions; they do influence and control success or failure in war. Adherence to principles, however expressed, is required by the leaders of military forces and all the components of the forces under their commands.

Third is the understanding that modern war, for American forces, is a joint affair. For any foreseeable and logically valid contingency, we must be capable of employing air, land and sea forces to accomplish our ends. The Navy has always recognized this requirement, and even during the battles over unification of the armed forces 50 years ago, it managed to retain its own land and air components. Joint action, as now prescribed by the growing set of doctrinal manuals being written for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the sound method of going to war.

Fourth, and most important, there is no magic elixir, no silver bullet, no overwhelming weapon or system

that can promise success in war. This realization modifies the third truth listed here. The horse, the phalanx, the elephant, the armored knight, the crossbow, the cannon, the ironclad, the machine gun, the tank, poison gas, the airplane and the atomic bomb have all had a turn at being the overwhelming means on the battlefield. But each also had limitations that wily inventors and soldiers found ways to exploit and overcome.

The temptation to rely on some new magic weapon or tactic is one reason for the perennial criticism that the military mind is always preparing to fight the last war over again. It is also the reason that between wars we are beset by advisors and counselors who can introduce the latest technological marvel, reduce the peacetime establishment, save billions of dollars and still guarantee battlefield success.

Today's silver bullet seems to be a stealthy airplane carrying a precision guided munition that can destroy any target with a first-round hit, devastating the defenseless enemy who will then immediately sue for peace on our terms. Accepting some form of this argument allows any number of defense experts to propose great reductions in fighter squadrons, Army divisions and naval task forces, all of which become unnecessary because the physical control of territory, whether land or sea, will be incidental to the imposition of our will on the enemy.

Countering that argument ought to be simple. No magic bullets, even those that have won battles, or even wars, have been enduringly decisive.

In a few years, when the currently touted conveyance is not so stealthy and the electronic guidance systems are nullified by countermeasures, the silver-bullet advocates will find themselves preparing to fight the last war, or engaged once again in a frantic search for a replacement silver bullet.

Nevertheless, the Holy Grail of reduced defense spending guarantees the commitment of large numbers of wishful thinkers who want to believe in magic and who want to believe the guarantees of success offered by the lowest possible bidder who is touting the efficacy of some kind of surgical firepower. The greatest challenge to the honest brokers searching for the best way to guarantee the future security of this nation is a never-ending endeavor to convince the American people and their representatives in government of the validity of

the fifth and final basic truth: Wars are won when military forces occupy areas critical to any enemy's existence, dominating the enemy populace and their armed forces to a degree that assures their defeat.

This fifth truth demands that the other four be recognized, exercised and followed to assure future success. For purposes of efficiency, effectiveness, cost and risk reduction, it demands use of the current silver bullet, whatever it might be, but it employs that means only along with all others to achieve the battlefield dominance that destroys an enemy's will to resist.

There is no cheap way in today's world to accommodate the fifth truth. There is only the geometric growth of risk when we modify and minimize our needs by adopting a transitory if not fanciful capability for the latest silver bullet.

War

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, February 2001]

Veterans Day 2000 brought an outpouring of remembrance and goodwill, particularly toward veterans of World War II and Korea—World War II because they are disappearing rapidly and Korea because it has reached its semicentennial. There seems to be a spreading and heartfelt interest in the experiences of veterans, and the many local activities promoted presentations and discussions covering a wide range of those interests.

At one such gathering I was the only participant who was a veteran of four wars: World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War. Thus I was afforded some time to express my thoughts on what I had learned about war. I said I thought I had learned five things that should be significant to all Americans, if not to the people of the whole world:

First, war is the most inhumane of all human endeavors, the most tragic, the most wasteful, the most destructive, the most terrifying. Wars provide the culminating points for the evil that men do. When William Tecumseh Sherman said, "War is hell," he was not exaggerating, and so any decision to go to war must be made with the understanding that participants are to be committed to a holocaust in the making.

I also learned that there are things worse than war: When personal freedom is denied, when fear is a constant, when lives and livelihoods are spent under threat, and when trust and confidence in fellow men,

even among families, are undermined by the subjection of a populace to an absolute regime, the human spirit suffers degradation and destruction. People are reduced almost to an animal-like existence.

It is not difficult to distinguish between good and evil in war, and among those who have been conquered by evil, there is a universal wish that they had fought harder, longer, more determinedly to prevent their loss of freedom. Their legacy is lifelong remorse.

Then, I learned that war settles things, not always fairly, not always satisfactorily and almost never completely, but it does settle the question of the moment. World War II settled that the German Nazis and the Japanese were not going to rule the world. Korea settled that the North was not going to conquer the South. Vietnam settled that Ho Chi Minh's regime would unify that nation. Desert Storm settled that Iraq would not annex Kuwait. The Cold War settled that communism and Marxism were delusions.

But the Korean and Persian Gulf wars are examples of things not settled completely. Each of these remains an unfinished conflict, and either can erupt into war again, which would undoubtedly involve other nations, including the United States. Even our Cold War victory has not brought a permanency of peace to the participants.

In 40 years of pursuing a military profession, I learned that war is the most complex and complicated human endeavor. No other activity demands a greater mental and physical commitment over an indefinite time span than that required to man, equip and train forces needed for combat, then to employ them for as long as it takes to reach a decision. The time, effort and brainpower expended in planning and executing Operation Overlord, the D-Day invasion of France in World War II, are not only incalculable but also unimaginable. And the same is true of the Inchon landing in Korea or Operation Just Cause in Panama. For a nation to attempt any military campaign without employing its best and brightest brains is the height of folly. It seems ridiculously obvious to say that, but military history is awash in bumbling stupidity that has cost lives, mismanaged battles and lost wars. It should also be obvious that the magnitude of the task guarantees that no individual can do it alone. Alexander the Great, Napoleon and George Patton all needed a vast assembly of contributors to carry out their designs.

Finally, I learned that the history of man is principally a military history. Theology and medicine may claim rivalry in their impacts, but a study of history is a study of Caesar, Charlemagne and Genghis Khan, or for us, Washington, Grant and Lee, Pershing, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Schwarzkopf. Their campaigns reveal the lessons that provide the only hope of avoiding war in the future. Those lessons are many, but the overriding message is that peace is the product of strength, the strength that deters attack in the first place or that overwhelms those who miscalculate it. Consider only the example of Switzerland, which has not fought a war in hundreds of years, and the Persian Gulf, where a properly prepared, trained and equipped Army, Navy and Air Force won a war that will serve as a paradigm for centuries.

War remains a recognized and legitimate form of international intercourse, and it promises to be with us for years to come. We can deplore that fact and work to prevent it, substituting all manner of other pursuits, but it appears that future history will be dominated for some time by the same forces that shaped the past. That being so, the words of the preamble of the Constitution "provide for the common defense" are as appropriate now as the day they were written and as challenging as they have ever been for those charged with raising and provisioning the armed forces.

Smart Weapons May Help, But Wars Are Won by Soldiers on the Ground

[Reprinted from *Defense Review*,
September 1990]

In the recent PBS documentary "The Civil War," one of the more poignant nuggets of military wisdom was in the report of a common soldier writing home to say, "I only shoot the privates." Left unsaid was the reason—privates were engaged in the lethal business of trying to kill him, and his salvation was to get them first. Officers and sergeants—leading, inspiring, communicating, planning—could be dealt with later.

Should the Persian Gulf crisis become a shooting war, the sage counsel embodied in the Civil War soldier's statement must not be lost on our national leaders. It is a historical fact that wars are finally won when soldiers occupy the land or destroy the capabilities that are critical to an enemy's ability to continue the fight.

That is not to say that enemies have not resigned from battle in recognition of an overwhelming threat that is perceived as making their situation hopeless. The Japanese surrendered in World War II for exactly that reason. But even then, it was the physical occupation of Japan that concluded the conquest and drove home to the Japanese people the realization of their defeat.

But the perception of hopelessness and the recognition of an overwhelming threat are in the eyes of the beholder, and an enemy can never be counted on to reach a logical conclusion that he is faced with such. Adolf Hitler didn't. The Kaiser did. The defenders of the Alamo didn't. Lord Cornwallis did. The North Vietnamese ignored it and won their war anyway.

It is important to realize today that, if Saddam Hussein is not cowed by the overwhelming threat or by the economic war being waged against his aggression, any plans to defeat or destroy him must include the means and methods to "shoot the privates."

Theories, schemes and pronouncements that a war with Iraq can be won relatively cheaply—using only firepower or a naval and air blockade—must be given some credence because they might be enough, and Saddam Hussein might be another Cornwallis. But if he is a Ho Chi Minh or Davy Crockett reincarnate, we had better be prepared to couple our firepower with the maneuver of our frontline ground combat forces to achieve our goals in the Persian Gulf.

The Most Effective Bet Is Still "Boots on the Ground"

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, November 1996]

Many stories in recent newspapers have covered accounts of a decision to deploy American ground forces to Kuwait—a warning gesture designed to contain Iraq's continuing urge to expand its hegemony in the Middle East. While this is not intended to advocate such a move in this case, it should be clear that if we really wanted to protect Kuwait from Saddam Hussein, the best bet for doing so would be by putting troops on the ground. American troops on the ground have been successful for the last half-century in contributing a significant deterrence factor on contested borders and at flash points around the world.

The recent events in Kurdistan provide one more example of the sterility of employing firepower alone.

When Iraq attacked and occupied Irbil, we fired off a few million dollars' worth of cruise missiles and flew in some B-52s to inflict punishment for the transgression. Success was proclaimed when Saddam put some troops on the road, moving south from Irbil. Yet Saddam and his friends still control the city, and thousands of Kurds fled to the Turkish border, where some were promised further evacuation, even to the United States.

For whatever reason—humanitarianism, wisely or not—following Operation Provide Comfort, the United States promised to protect the Kurdish people from Saddam Hussein. The means employed were social work among the population, the "no-fly zone" and the threat of dire retaliation if Saddam violated the terms of the cease-fire agreement. The inadequacy of these means is now apparent.

How much more likely is it that we would have fulfilled our promise to the Kurds if the troops now in Bosnia were located in Kurdistan instead?

This is not to say we should have taken such action any more than to say we should not have made the promise. It is only to contend that those decisions ought to be linked.

If we would have gone to war to prevent the Warsaw Pact from overrunning Western Europe, then it was prudent, practical and less costly in the long run to station deterrent forces in Europe for more than four decades. If we would go to war to prevent the North Koreans from invading South Korea, it has been both wise and effective to demonstrate our resolve by having troops on the ground in South Korea since 1950. And today, if we believe the Iraqi threat is real, and if we would go to war again if Iraq attacked again, the only commitment that carries conviction will be troops on the ground—first to deter, then to lead the only effective war-winning action.

The lesson once again being demonstrated is that landpower—Army and Marine forces on the ground—is the ultimate decisive force in international disputes. This is a lesson that must not be lost on the political decisionmakers who are contemplating the makeup of the armed forces of the future.

In the coming year, a number of serious studies aimed by the administration and Congress at identifying our future national security force structure requirements have been scheduled. Among the study participants are



In June 1972, Major General Kroesen jumps from a UH-1 "Huey" helicopter high above Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This was his first jump with the 82d Airborne Division following a retraining orientation. It had been 17 years since his last jump, with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in 1955.

bound to be those advocating the "silver bullet" solution, which today means precision-guided weapons delivered from afar as the guarantee of deterrence against an unfriendly incursion into some ally's territory. Among them also will be those who describe themselves as "cheaphawks," people who want the "strongest possible defense for the least amount of money." Each of these factions must be made to realize that no additional number of B-2 bombers, no additional naval ships patrolling the Persian Gulf, even with marines aboard, would have prevented the latest Iraqi incursion, and no additional cruise-missile targeting that resulted in civilian casual-ties would have been politically palatable to the world. Boots on the ground have always been and will continue to be the most effective and, in the long run, the least costly way of getting these jobs done.

A Long Haul

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, April 2004]

The shadow of 9/11 has stretched into another calendar year and, understandably, is addressed regularly by columnists, members of Congress and the man on the street with the question "How long?" Discussions and dissertations attempting to answer that question are divided between the all-out warriors and the diplomats who want reasonable negotiated settlements. There is also no shortage of advocacy for some compromise that incorporates some measure of each of these solutions, the middle road.

There is also an argument extant between those demanding victory and those who believe that a modern form of the containment policy is more appropriate to our continuing efforts. That argument might also be expressed as a requirement to be offensive, hunting down the enemy, as opposed to a defensive strategy that stresses security measures and seeks to deny the enemy success while his strength and capabilities wither.

Exploring the intellectual foundations and compelling arguments of those opposing opinions is a recommended subject for a doctoral dissertation and is beyond the scope of this offering. In contemplating what is being written on these subjects, however, there is one requirement that is integral, requisite to whatever strategy is developed. It can be expressed in many ways—as the need for endurance, for sustained long-term effort, for consistency of commitment, as the determination to see this thing through at whatever the cost.

Those who are predicting or hoping for a quick end to our current predicament are almost limited to a "Declare victory and go home!" exhortation. They recall that if this same counsel, expressed in the midstage of the Vietnam War, had been followed, we could have saved untold lives and resources and arrived at the same end. But there is not much support for such a course of action today. Leaving Iraq or Afghanistan on some predetermined, preannounced date declaring that we had won would get our Army home faster, but it would certainly also contribute markedly to the terrorists' ability to pursue their ends on their time schedule. A stable Iraq is now almost mandatory to continued progress in the war on terror.

That being the case, history should tell us that this is to be a long war, a not unusual occurrence in the last 5,000 years. A clash of diametrically opposed philosophies is never settled rapidly nor, necessarily, rationally. The Peloponnesian War lasted 27 years. We had The Hundred Years' War in the Middle Ages and The Thirty Years' War in the 17th century. The Arab-Israeli conflict is approaching 60 years with no end in sight. The Punic Wars required 128 years before arriving at a final settlement. Even the World War took two phases and lasted from 1914 to 1945 and some might claim it did not really end until the collapse of the Soviet Union another 45 years later.

Wars do settle things, not necessarily satisfactorily, not fairly, perhaps not conclusively and maybe only

temporarily, but they have been a legitimate form of international intercourse because they do settle questions deemed insoluble by other means. We are engaged in a worthy enterprise that promises to have an extreme impact on our nation's future, but we cannot hope or plan for a quick resolution. For a force engaged in transformation, fighting three wars simultaneously and engaged in more than 100 nations around the world, fulfilling treaty requirements, surveillance activities, training commitments and many other missions, preparation for a long haul must remain the primary requirement. We cannot afford any deterioration of this effort because we have failed to commit adequate resources or presumed a too soon finish.

It is not easy to prepare a populace for a war that might not be resolved by the generation currently fighting. It is even more difficult to explain why, particularly to the American public who historically are impatient for success. Both the Korean and Vietnam Wars should have taught us that preparing for a long haul is an essential element of our national strategy if we are intent on winning.

In 1941 General George C. Marshall, with the full confidence of President Franklin Roosevelt, conceived the plan for the total force needed to win World War II and embarked on its execution. His vision was remarkable—all but one of the Army and Marine divisions activated by 1943 were used in combat to win that war.

A comparable vision today would be a classified bit of information, but those of us not privy to such a plan have to believe there is one.

Ready for War

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, December 2001]

The news that we are at war evokes some emotional reactions among old soldiers—first might be the realization that we've been at war for a long time, but we've been letting the other side wage it. Too many terrorist acts of the last 20 or so years have gone unresolved, unpunished. Then you start thinking about what this really means and wondering whether you and the rest of the retired community have done all you could to prepare this generation to go to war.

You worry about the individual soldier—not his innate abilities or his willingness to do the job, for we

know that growing up as an American, growing up in freedom, has always been the best preparation for our young. In every generation the response of our soldiers has been more than adequate to the need in terms of spirit, determination and willingness. The American soldier is second to none in his ability to cope with the demands of any crisis.

But have we taught them that war is a dirty, ruthless endeavor that requires each individual who finds himself in the combat zone to be prepared to take lives, establish control and accomplish the mission even at the cost of his own life? We hope that his first thoughts when he meets the enemy will not be of "consideration of others," tolerance and diversity training, but rather the hair-bristling of the hunter spotting his quarry. We hope he realizes that his enemy's intent is his destruction, that the enemy's indoctrination and training are designed to produce a fanatical determination to destroy him.

Do we have to remind our noncommissioned officers that the backbone of the Army is strong and resilient only when they attend to it, when they serve as resolute examples guaranteeing adherence to standards, customs, rules and regulations? We want them to remember that they are responsible for the nerve system of the Army, that intangible that causes automatic reaction to a crisis, when soldiers do what they've been trained to do without hesitation or question. Noncommissioned officers have to ensure that the Army functions according to its doctrine, to its formalized requirements for organization and operation. Most important, they have to remember that combat is a collective enterprise; that they must draw together all of those "armies of one" and assure that they function as teams called squads, sections, platoons and tank crews.

Have we convinced today's lieutenants that they are called leaders because they have to be out front, showing the way, inspiring, reassuring and setting the example? Have we taught our captains, at the lowest rung of the ladder of commanders, that command means obtaining and organizing every bit of support that can be found for the subordinates carrying out their missions? Do they know that saluting the flag and saying "Yes, sir!" to a task assignment does not foreclose on their responsibility to ask for resources and support that will make the job easier and increase the likelihood of success?

Does every soldier, enlisted or officer, realize that success comes from a three-legged stool called confidence—every soldier confident in his own abilities, confident in those with whom he is going to war (his squad, platoon, company) and confident that those who give him orders, assign missions and direct operations are also fully competent? These thoughts and many more intrude on the reveries of those who are now retired from the Army. We have more than curious interest in the soldiers in today's Army. They are our legacy, and those we trained to take our places do, after all, reflect on how well we prepared them for their role. I have no qualms, no doubts about their long-term success—I'm proud of our legacy. But I can still worry that we might have done it better.

The Future of Land Warfare: An Opinion

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, June 2002]

Since the early days of World War II, the role of landpower has been the subject of almost constant debate. Prior to that, from ancient times through World War I, even through the Sino-Japanese conflict of the 1930s and the Spanish Civil War, wars on land were won by armies, and no one proffered alternative means. There had been naval wars which were won and lost by competing powers, but nations were not destroyed, populations not conquered and land areas not taken under control by naval power. Nations were saved from those consequences when enemy fleets were defeated and the ability to invade thwarted by naval defenses, but, despite those kinds of operations, the business of conquering land or of defending land was almost exclusively army business.

In the 1920s, however, the early airpower advocates began proclaiming the view that airpower, that is, firepower delivered by air, could wreak such punishment and devastation on an enemy that surrender could be compelled and land combat almost precluded. Occupying forces might be required, but they would not have to fight to gain entry. That view gained ascendancy and credibility when the atomic bomb brought on the final surrender of Japan. President Harry S Truman and his Secretary of Defense practically dismantled the Army between 1945 and 1950, and President Eisenhower fostered massive retaliation as the doctrine of the Cold War, believing in the promise that atomic/nuclear power

delivered by air was the cost-effective way of assuring the nation's military dominance.

Vietnam also became a ground force war, one won eventually by the North Vietnamese despite the complete absence of an air force on their side and an almost unlimited air campaign on our side that delivered bomb tonnage far in excess of that expended in World War II. Grenada, Panama (*Just Cause*) and the Persian Gulf (*Desert Storm*) were won when ground forces achieved the objectives of those campaigns. Operation Desert Storm is particularly instructive: After weeks of the most professional air campaign in history, not a single United Nations objective had been achieved, but after four days of land combat, victory was complete.

The war against Yugoslavia to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo became one occasion for which airpower adherents could claim complete victory as the Serbs succumbed to the bombing campaign. Explaining what we won, however, has been an embarrassing effort ever since. In fact, we obtained a surrender that changed little in the political situation except a cessation of our attacks, a modern version of the old playground demand, "Say uncle!"

None of this is to denigrate or belittle the contributions of airpower to the conduct of war. None of the land campaigns could have been conducted as successfully, as rapidly or as effectively without the air operations that delivered firepower, acquired intelligence, assured mobility and delivered logistic support. Modern war cannot be conducted without these capabilities, but winning a war, achieving the objectives of a war, can be accomplished only by forces on the ground that take control of populations and land areas.

While we and the Western world were learning lessons about how to conduct military campaigns and win the Cold War, our potential enemies were assimilating some lessons of their own. From Communist guerrillas in Greece to the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, the world has been treated to a continuing series of conflicts, insurgencies and shadow wars of various dimensions that feature what is now called asymmetrical warfare. The term has come to mean a capability to attack with means and techniques for which an enemy is unprepared or incapable of responding in kind. Examples include the use of chemical or nuclear weapons against an enemy who has no defense or retaliatory capability; cyber warfare to destroy communications

and intelligence systems; and terrorism to sow panic and destroy infrastructure. None of our potential enemies has the capability or the wherewithal to build forces to challenge us on a conventional battlefield. They might employ their army in an overt strike in an area remote to us, as the Iraqis did in the seizure of Kuwait, but if we choose to counter such a move, the operation quickly becomes no contest.

The successes of modern unconventional warfare are significant. Algerian Arab terrorism drove the French to grant independence to that nation. Mau Mau terrorism resulted in Great Britain's loss of Kenya. North Vietnam exploited the guerrilla efforts of the Viet Cong, establishing the base for their winning strategy. The Shah of Iran was brought down by internal terror tactics. Zimbabwe was created by years of guerrilla warfare that is still being waged against a remnant white population, and the African National Congress, employing the same means, has taken control of South Africa.

Castro's Cuba and the current strife in Colombia are Western Hemisphere examples, while insurgencies in the Philippines and Indonesia provide examples of the spread of terror tactics to Asia. Today's most grievous case study of modern war is, of course, the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinians, employing an ever-expanding series of terrorist techniques, are opposed by Israeli conventional forces that rely on their infantry to root out the targets of their attack. Armored and mechanized transport is used to move and support the Israeli assault troops, but wiping out terrorist cells is primarily an infantry job.

Unfortunately, following World War II the Western world concentrated for almost 50 years on the Cold War and built its defenses to cope with a Soviet conventional attack into Western Europe. We designed armies for that purpose and air forces to launch counterstrikes against anything from a local incursion to a nuclear bomb. Terrorist attacks and guerrilla activities were considered police problems unless and until they reached the scale exemplified in Algeria and Vietnam.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the perceived easy success of the Persian Gulf War have resulted in drastic reductions of the conventional forces of the West, but a continuing adherence to the structure developed through the last century. NATO armies and air forces today resemble closely those of the Cold War, and the

American military in the United States is still primarily the conventional force of the past. We have had a slow growth of special operations forces during the past 50 years, but their size today is insufficient for the operations in Afghanistan, where the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Airborne Division and a Marine contingent—conventional forces all—have been committed.

Our principal effort to cope with terrorism, except in Afghanistan, has been diplomacy. A cease-fire, a meeting of the leaders of the adversaries, followed by a conference to work out a "peace agreement," is the world's and the United States' solution to the national and international crises that continue to occur. Unfortunately, even when they are successful they result only in two armed camps eyeing each other hostilely, as in Cyprus, or two armed camps separated by a peacekeeping force, as in the Sinai, or in a temporary alleviation that fails to solve a problem and breaks down into new fighting, as in the mid-East today—Camp David, summit talks, the Oslo agreement and UN resolutions notwithstanding.

The portent for the foreseeable future is for a continuation of the current pattern, at least unless and until a peer competitor appears to build another *Wehrmacht* or Red Army to invade and conquer some portion of the world. Terrorism, unconventional warfare, guerrillas and asymmetrical attacks have become the forms of modern war, and coping with that realization is the responsibility of our military establishment. Deplored the use of suicide bombers, car bombs and attacks on civilian women and children is not going to halt such practices as long as the perpetrators perceive that they can achieve a favorable political impact. The tactics, techniques and organization of our armed forces have to cope with this kind of warfare. It is the warfare of today.

The question of how armies will organize, equip and function to do their job is, of course, another contentious issue, one that engages the thought processes of a wide variety of pundits, politicians, authors and academicians as well as spokesmen for all of the armed forces. The Army has been engaged for a few years in a transformation, organizing interim forces equipped with today's best technology and hardware as it seeks to identify and program resources to achieve the Objective Force of the future. The other services are hard at work to assure that our mastery of the air

and our control of the seas cannot be challenged, hence to assure that another Persian Gulf War will yield the same result wherever it might be fought. There should be no question that these capabilities have to be maintained.

The threat today can be identified by one word: terrorism. The counter to terrorism is not a police responsibility; it is a military requirement, and the principal tool to be employed against terrorists is the infantryman.

Today's war against al Qaeda is furnishing the paradigm that must evolve into our capability to achieve, ultimately, the objectives essential to winning. Small groups of infantrymen (whether called Rangers, Special Forces, Marines or something else, they are today's infantry), supported with adequate firepower from the air, by long-range rocketry or missiles or from the sea and with insertion, logistic support and extraction capabilities, will be the forces conducting these operations. (Some may remember the successes enjoyed in past wars by LGOPs—little groups of paratroopers—who found themselves spread over wide areas of terrain, in Sicily, for example, and created havoc in enemy rear areas.)

The strategy and operational concepts for conducting this war will be dominated by one principle of war: the offensive. Carrying the war to the enemy is an absolute necessity. Defensive measures, the elaborate and costly schemes to provide "home security," contribute little toward winning. Finding and immobilizing or destroying the terrorist warriors and the means they employ to conduct and sustain operations are the only way to victory. LGOPs—or LGOMs (little groups of marines) or LGOISs (little groups of infantry soldiers)—who are superbly trained and equipped, supported by long-range precision fires, reliable intelligence and instant communications, must seek out worldwide nests and networks of terrorists and destroy them. They must be followed by other ground forces whose missions will be peacekeeping and assuring that terrorist reconstruction is prevented.

Our Army is already minimized in armor and mechanized forces. Seven divisions, active and reserve, some of which are only two brigades strong, certainly comprise a high-risk force, even when augmented by our armored cavalry regiments. When one considers the armored forces of potential enemies (Iraq, North

Korea) and those in what might be termed uncommitted nations (Russia, China), it should be obvious that we cannot reduce further this part of our Army.

In like fashion, comparisons of our artillery capabilities with those of other nations, where we have been outranged and outgunned ever since World War II, make it also obvious that we need the Crusader [self-propelled howitzer system] and an adequate artillery structure to employ it. The conventional battlefield threat still exists, and Crusader is a true technological leap ahead that we must promise our combat troops.

However, the crying need for coping with today's threat is for infantry, all types of infantry. It matters not how they get to the battlefield or what terrain they must fight in; the fact is that terrorism will have to be defeated by soldiers on the ground. We will need parachute, air-land, amphibious and mechanized transport for these troops, and we will need specialized training for them to fulfill their roles in airborne, amphibious, conventional and special operations.

In this regard, the Land Warrior Soldier System and its future modifications become the most significant research, development and acquisition program for the modern battlefield. The increased effectiveness and improved survivability of the infantryman generates increased confidence, the single most important attribute of the LGOIS.

Their numbers today are inadequate for the tasks ahead. The active Army now includes some 70,000 reserve component soldiers to accomplish some of the missions added in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and to sustain the combat operations now being conducted. However, using National Guard and Army Reserve forces is in effect a way of expending them. This is not a war for which we can mobilize for the duration; therefore, when we call up a reserve unit, it will return to its inactive status in 180 days and be unavailable again perhaps for years. Theoretically it can be recalled, but practically, reservists neither contemplate nor tolerate serving frequent or multiple periods of active duty, most certainly not if they are employed in a combat role. They are dedicated to emergency service. If they wanted to serve more, they would have joined the active service in the first place.

How many more infantrymen do we need? Only a detailed force structure study can provide the answer. A good peacetime rule of thumb is a deployable force

three times as large as the number deployed on overseas missions plus the training and logistics bases required to sustain the total force. In wartime, combat casualties, combat tour limitations and other personnel management policies increase requirements to three and a half or four times the deployed strength. The failure to provide an adequate sustaining base during the Vietnam War resulted in a drastic, debilitating deterioration of our Army. It should never be allowed to happen again. Realizing that the soldiers fighting in Afghanistan today will not be the ones fighting two years from now, we must build the sustaining base and maintain the combat force for today's operations.

The Ultimate Weapon of War

[Remarks made to the Symposium on Non-Mechanized Infantry in Hamburg, Germany, 30 April 1980, as published in *RUSI*]

I am a firm believer in the lessons of history. There is no point in repeating the mistakes of our forefathers when we still have so much virgin opportunity for new and original blundering. I remain in continuous amazement over mankind's inability to recognize history's lessons and be guided away from reliving past disasters. I am also aware that history can provide false or distorted lessons if its interpreters build in a bias or rely solely on facts which support a narrow point of view. I hope such will not be the case today.

Throughout mankind's recorded history, people have tried to develop wonder weapons which would end the foot soldier's primacy on the battlefield. Occasionally, the infantryman was eclipsed, as when the Assyrians mounted horses and conquered the ancient world, but each time the infantry was given or found new weapons, new tactics and new forms of protection and returned to dominate the art of war. Today's firepower advocates are quick to cite individual triumphs by the English longbow, the machine-gun, grapeshot, gas, tanks and even massive aerial bombing, but none can show us a non-nuclear weapon which consistently or conclusively proves its superiority over the infantry soldier.

Several years ago, John Keegan wrote, "In war, possession is ten points of the law and the infantry are the bailiff's men." All of war's history supports that statement. Over 40 years of continuous struggle in Vietnam was ended only when the enemy finally occupied the territory of South Vietnam. The victory

was secured in a brief, violent campaign by a force composed almost exclusively of light infantry. Four decades of terrorism, limited objective attacks, bombing and negotiations were almost incidental to the outcome.

For the tank enthusiast, modern experience is replete with examples of tank attacks which met disaster because they were not supported by accompanying infantry. The ill-fated charge of the Russian 24th Tank Corps at Tatsinkaya in 1943, and the more recent demise of the Israeli Adon Division in the Sinai in the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, stand in testimony to the value of infantry against tanks and the consequences of infantry's absence in support of tanks.

We constantly hear someone saying, "The best antitank weapon is another tank." While the logic of that statement is difficult to dispute, as tanks combine the essentials of firepower, mobility and shock action, its accuracy has not always been accepted. In the aftermath of Operation Crusader in 1941, General Gott, Commander of the British 7th Armoured Division, wrote, "The German will not commit himself to a tank versus tank battle. In every phase of battle he coordinates the action of his tanks with antitank guns, field artillery and infantry and will not be drawn from this policy." Another veteran of the 7th, Brigadier John Strawson, stated: "Rommel's Panzers were quite clear that, whereas tanks dealt primarily with the enemy's infantry and soft vehicles, the destruction of tanks was mainly the job of antitank guns. This theory was put into practice, but not at the expense of close and permanent integration of tank, gun and infantry teams." Both generals were analysing the reasons for the defeat of their division by Rommel's Afrika Korps. Gott, a tanker, attributes the salvation of Operation Crusader finally to the tenacity of British and Indian infantry.

Three decades later, Soviet advisers to the Egyptian Army evidently took those fundamentals into account. In 1973, Egyptian tanks were held well back as bait for Israeli armour. In the forward areas, almost at the extreme ranges of supporting tank guns, infantry teams, armed with Sagger antitank missiles and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and well covered by artillery and mortars, entrenched themselves in a series of mutually supporting ambush sites. In the first engagement Adon's Division lost an entire tank battalion, followed by a second that night when Israeli tanks, unprotected by infantry, were attacked by small groups of Egyptian infantrymen armed only with RPGs. By the time Egyptian tanks

attacked the next morning, Adon's Division was too depleted to hold its sector; its defeat was reversed only when the Egyptians were met by Israeli infantry.

I cite these cases for two reasons. First, they represent the type of careful planning and doctrinal cooperation among all elements of the combined-arms team essential to success on the battlefield. Second, because both are desert warfare operations, fought on terrain in which infantry has little vegetation and few towns in which to conceal itself and where the soil is generally poor for entrenchments. Yet in each, dismounted infantry prevailed.

I am prone to speak often of the utility of light infantry in heavily forested, hilly or urbanised terrain where small groups of infantrymen, employed with anti-armour weapons in mutually supporting positions can easily dominate narrow, canalised avenues of approach. The lessons of combat in the Middle East and North Africa tell us that similar success can be achieved by infantrymen under far less favourable conditions.

Too often we hear that light infantry cannot survive in Europe because they will not be able to move fast enough to react to a fast-moving tank attack and that massed Soviet artillery will make mincemeat out of an infantry unit, even in prepared defensive positions. Both thoughts are conjured up by those who refuse to read history or are too inept to comprehend its lessons. The first assertion is foolish because infantry is used to secure and hold strongpoints, not to chase tanks across the battlefield, nor to stage counterattacks against massed armour. The second assertion ignores the numerous examples in all armies, on all fronts, of infantry units not only surviving massed enemy artillery bombardment, but also stubbornly holding their positions against combined air, tank and artillery attacks, yielding their positions only when forced out by opposing infantry at close quarters. Soviet artillery is no more destructive today than in World War II or, than the 150mm and larger-calibre guns employed during World War I. The chief improvements in artillery since that day have been achieved in fire control, range and armour protection against counter-battery fire, none of which have much influence on the intensity or destructiveness of an artillery barrage. Photos of the moonscape produced by artillery at Verdun, the Somme or Flanders reflect some of the most intense barrages ever experienced by man. What those photos do not show is that only weeks or months of repeated infantry assaults at

enormous cost were able to alter the shape of the line, despite the tons of steel delivered by artillery.

Our own more recent experiences in Indo-China tend to confirm the lessons of past wars. Our units repeatedly encountered stiff resistance by groups of dazed but still effective enemy infantry, even after intense bombardment by B-52s, fighter bombers, rocket-firing helicopter gunships and artillery. On the reverse side, I know of few commanders who would not agree that they were more concerned about small groups of sappers penetrating their base camps than all the rocket and mortar attacks the enemy could deliver.

Another factor often cited by those advocating the supremacy of tanks, attack helicopters, artillery or air power is that the next war will be fought at long range with opponents rarely able to close to less than 1,500 meters, well beyond the range of the infantryman's Dragon, LAW and machine-gun. Well, if that war comes any time soon, the pundits are in for a rude awakening. We cannot hit what we cannot see, and the 14 hours of darkness in midwinter, snow, rain and the many days throughout the year when fog lasts until noon or even all day are limitations that today's weaponry cannot readily overcome. The same is true of our opponent's weapons. Those realities and the availability of tactical smoke-generating devices in abundance lead me to believe that the next war will be won or lost at the 300-meter range just as in the past.

General Patton, one of the greatest military men in history, was an officer who understood the role of the tank in warfare and exploited its capability to the fullest. He also understood the value of infantry. His diary contains some interesting observations on the organisation of ground forces for battle. It says that the ideal composition of a corps, and the organisation he strove to obtain for all corps assigned to his Third Army, is one armoured and three infantry divisions. Why not the inverse ratio? Because the infantry gave him flexibility, staying power, security, immediate defence capabilities and a capacity for broad, persistent offensive operations that could find enemy weaknesses to be exploited by armour. He recognised and reacted intuitively to the fact that the tank is an offensive weapon and he knew he had to have the infantry to guarantee the success of his armour.


The infantry General Patton knew and valued so highly came in three categories: paratroopers for

dislocating enemy defences through deep envelopments; light infantry to clear, reconnoiter and protect, and mechanised infantry to accompany his tanks during the exploitation or counterattack. What people today are prone to forget is that most of the divisions involved in the greatest battles of World War II were light infantry. During the breakout from Normandy, Allied forces had a total of only six armoured divisions among the three participating armies. In the east, Guderian's entire Panzer group of 19 divisions included only five Panzer divisions during the war's greatest battle of encirclement east of Kiev. In that battle, Guderian advanced 245 miles in only three weeks and contributed to the capture of over 665,000 Russians, and the Ukraine—all with primarily infantry troops.

What does all of that connote for our mission in Western Europe? We are here to defend, and defence is inherently an infantry role. Our infantry should be used to hold strongpoints centered on villages, cities and forests while tanks support from defilade positions and counterattack from a reserve role. Too many commanders cross-attach armour and infantry in order to provide tanks to all battalions. Then they plan their defence by finding locations for their tanks and filling in the gaps with infantry. I believe that sort of stilted thinking holds the seeds of catastrophe. When defence is the mission, I believe we need to ensure that all battalions have infantry to dig in and hold critical positions astride key terrain. That is the key to a successful defence. Tanks should fill the gaps.

Having said all of this, I do not for one minute consider other elements of the combined-arms team to be less important than the infantry, nor do I fail to appreciate the value of mechanised infantry as an essential complement to armour. What I am suggesting is that despite all of man's technological advances in weaponry, there really has not been much change in man's adaptiveness and his instinct for survival. Despite the destructiveness of the atom bomb, there are still thousands of survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Soldiers on the battlefield are equally resilient and better prepared for such catastrophes. Those are among the reasons that I believe the infantryman continues to be the ultimate weapon of war. We will defend the Western World if we have the infantrymen who refuse to lose it. We will win the next war and the one after that if we remember what history reaches us about putting men on the ground to control it. I have seen today's

infantryman in the field in Europe meeting all kind of difficult missions and challenges. He is little different from infantryman I first met 37 years ago. I believe he will never be replaced.



In 1982, General Kroesen and Secretary of the Army John Marsh meet during a REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercise.

Bum Rap

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, November 1991]

Recently, while reading a manuscript by General Paik Sun Yup, a Korean soldier's recollections of the Korean War, I was struck again by an observation that has troubled me for many years. In paragraphs of accolades concerning our employment of firepower, the professionalism of our officer corps, the awesome power of our armor and air-to-ground teamwork, General Paik also includes an observation by a Chinese general named Teng Hau: "But their infantry is weak. Their men are afraid to die and will neither press home a bold attack nor defend to the death."

That sentiment has been around for years, popping out of columns and essays and articles and other literature extending back to World War I. Learned treatises have been written denigrating or denying the fighting spirit of Americans. It is common for a columnist or essayist to casually include some critical comment about the "well-known American aversion to tough combat." I realized I was reading about another of those problems that my generation of soldiers had failed to

resolve and had passed to today's leaders, that is, had failed to establish for the minds of the world that the American soldier is as valorous, as determined, as dedicated as any other.

Neither history books nor the contemporary news media coverage of the Rough Riders ever alluded to an unwillingness to charge San Juan Hill. None has ever suggested that the armies engaged in our Civil War were lacking in courage or that Pickett's Charge was made by men unwilling to press a bold attack. No one implies that Cemetery Ridge was defended by men "afraid to die." The U.S. cavalry of Indian Warfame has always been intrepid; at least it was until political correctness began to tarnish its image. There are historical recordings of cowardice and less than brave occurrences by American troops but never was there an assignment of a lack of intestinal fortitude to the force as a whole from the days of Lexington and Concord through the quelling of the Philippine insurrection. Why did that change? Does today's infantryman suffer some character flaw that his ancestors did not have?

I spent some time as an infantryman in three wars. I observed quite closely the behavior and the military qualities of the infantrymen of World War II, the Korean War and Vietnam, and I was afforded many opportunities to make comparisons with French, German, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese and perhaps a few others of the soldiers engaged in those same conflicts. As a military history enthusiast, I have read with great interest accounts of the prowess of the British, the Russians, the Turks, the Japanese, the American Indian (when they were enemies) and many other soldiers of historical renown.

In reaction to long years of interest in the subject, I have developed a great respect for the combat soldiers of most nations among whom the will to live and the willingness to die were ever-present handmaidens to performance; furthermore, I have observed that underestimating the fighting qualities of enemy soldiers, whatever nation they represent, has proved fatal to many leaders who presumed them to be "rabble in arms" or *untermenschen*. Given the contemporary popular appraisal of American fighting men, it would be quite understandable if some future enemy commander made the same mistake.

At the risk of alerting a future enemy to the realization that American soldiers may be worthy opponents

after all, I would like to stake a few claims, all based on personal experience or a close study of factual records:

- When combat is desperate—for example, two units fighting a life-and-death struggle—Americans are much more likely to be the victors.
- When combat is a surprise—for example, two units arriving simultaneously at a location—Americans are much more likely to react effectively and gain the upper hand.
- When combat is sustained—for example, two units in a drawn-out, debilitating, morale-destroying standoff—Americans are much more likely to survive and win in the end.
- When combat requires initiative, ingenuity and inventiveness, Americans will win in a walk.

I could make this a long dissertation by citing a number of examples to prove that these claims are correct. Contemporary military history has provided and continues to provide proof of my contentions, but rather than document them, I will just say that my claims are conclusions I have come to after encountering a few instances of the filth and blood and terror associated with mortal combat, when my life depended upon the valor and staying power of American soldiers who were with me.

If I am right, how do I explain the misconceptions of so many others who disagree and who make counterclaims? Well, quite easily, actually. There are two factors that have caused the birth and growth of an unfair reputation. The first is the American way of doing things. As a people, we employ machines and devices and techniques whenever possible to do our work. We employ jackhammers instead of picks; we use electricity to replace manpower; we ride rather than walk to work; we exploit every mechanical or technological means in preference to personal exertion. Is it shocking then that we would rather send an RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) than an infantry patrol to observe an enemy?

Given the determination of the American people to provide anything and everything a combat soldier needs, from ammunition to ice cream, and the largess American industry has made available in all our wars, it seems only logical to me that American soldiers should be expected to be smart enough to press the advantages these things provide. Because other nations have not

been able or willing to equip their soldiers equally well is no reason that ours should not overwhelm them with the means available rather than engage in fistfights that would prove their manhood.

There has long been a distinction among the services that is expressed simply: the Navy and Air Force fight with machines employed by men, the Army and Marine Corps employ men assisted by machines. Since World War I, however, with the introduction of the tank, the ground forces have sought to modify if not eliminate that distinction as more and more they are able to fight with machines and husband their manpower. The quest has improved effectiveness and has saved lives, but it has also contributed to the misperception that our soldiers are less brave.

The second reason is enlightened leadership. The American corps of officers and noncommissioned officers does not expend soldiers in the tradition of the "charge of the light brigade." Today, it is the training and the penchant of sergeants and captains and major generals to explore other means, to assemble other forces, to exploit firepower first, before even considering an infantry assault. If another few hundred artillery shells or another air strike will make it easier or perhaps unnecessary to expose soldiers to mortal danger, there are not many occasions when the leader or commander will not be able to take the time to ask for help. Other leaders, other armies not blessed with the American cornucopia of equipment and technology do not often have such a choice and, in fact, are not trained to look for one. But, again, there is no logical reason that American leaders should not exploit their advantages.

No other army has a noncommissioned officer corps that compares with ours. Throughout the world, NCOs are disciplinarians, enforcers of rules and rote. Only in the American Army are they also decisionmakers. Squad leaders are expected to make decisions appropriate for the employment of their squads. Platoon sergeants are expected to be able to act as platoon leaders. No other Army has a library as rich in tales of sergeants and corporals who have carried on the battle when their officers have been lost or rendered ineffective.

No other Army has an officer corps trained to assemble intelligence, to mass fires, to obtain reinforcement, to assure logistics support and to tie everything together electronically the way Americans

are. German doctrine stresses *Auftrag Taktic*—the encouragement of initiative at all levels of command, in other words, a requirement to take action, not wait for some higher commander to tell you what to do and how to do it—as a battlefield essentiality; Americans practice *Auftrag Taktic* to a far greater degree than the Germans or any other army I have seen in the field. Our training at the national training centers promises that our leaders will continue to do so. It further assures that our officer and NCO corps will exploit alternatives and reduce the calls for infantry heroism, but it also contributes to the impression that, because our first reaction is not to charge the hill or to stand and die, we lack the intestinal fortitude to do so.

Neither of the factors cited above guarantees that crises demanding the sacrifice of soldiers will not occur, but experience since World War I has been that they occur in the American Army with ever-decreasing frequency. When it does happen, the novelty probably assures that the unit will appear reluctant as its leaders first search for an alternative, but it is my contention that in the end the soldiers involved will, more often than not, prove more than equal to the task.

I do not know whether or not it is possible to convince the pundits, military reformers and finger pointers that they have been wrong about America's soldiers for a long time. I know the Persian Gulf War will not help because it all appeared to be so easy. We squashed an unworthy opponent whose soldiers were unwilling to fight—worse than ours! We were so superior technologically that mettle was not tested. The war was so short that the flaws in our psyche never developed.

All of that is the more likely trend of the critics than any really objective assessment of the performance of our soldiers and marines, especially since there is a general belief that the Iraqis never tried. No account of the actions they took and the efforts they attempted has ever been published, and no credit is given to some very real determination in some Iraqi units.

Why is this an issue? Why do I identify it as a problem unsolved by my generation? Simply because a lie repeated often enough and emphatically enough can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I do not want future American soldiers to lack confidence in their fellow soldiers, in the men and women whom they may have to fight beside in the next crisis. That confidence and the mutual respect it generates is the first among absolutes when the quality of a force is measured. Based

upon my experience, that quality should never be suspect if our own Army leadership remains aware of the facts and prevents any erosion of confidence among the troops.

Women in Combat

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, May 2006]

The awarding of a Silver Star to a female soldier for her performance under fire should be a significant factor in the continuing argument about women's role in combat. Her performance earned a well-deserved recognition, but it also calls attention to the fact that other women routinely are earning Combat Action Badges for their solid professional performances under fire. Their actions and reactions ought to remove concerns about duty, honor, country as well as their reliability under fire and their dedication to and accomplishment of their missions. Confirmation of this comes from male soldiers whose answer to a question about their views is generally, "They're as squared away as we are." Firm assignment policies ought now be settled and announced once and for all.

Yet there are two opposing philosophies and active opposition to the current policies regarding these assignments. The first is the legalistic argument that the Army is violating the law by assigning women to forward support companies and other elements of the new modular brigades. In practice, the role of these companies and small detachments is no different than it was when they were assigned to the division support command (DISCOM) or other divisional units and employed habitually "in support of" a brigade. That assignment policy raised no hue and cry in the past, but now we have both the legislature and the judiciary involved in enforcing the letter of a law that needs either reinterpretation or revision to recognize a long-standing, satisfactory way of employing female personnel.

What we do not need is the modification announced by the Army that says the assignment policy will not change, but if the brigade is ordered into combat, female soldiers will be withdrawn from the unit and barred from deployment into a combat zone. Nothing can be more damaging to readiness, effectiveness, esprit de corps and morale than to break up a team just before its commitment to a mission, suddenly replacing up to 20 percent of its personnel with new faces who are an immediate assimilation problem. No commander or his subordinate leaders should be subjected to such a


challenge just before his commitment to the ultimate role they are facing, and it is more than a disservice to soldiers whose lives may be endangered by a reduction of a unit's capabilities.

The second philosophical contention is that of feminists still demanding that women be assigned to all branches and any position regardless of the current restrictions barring assignment to infantry, field artillery and special operations units. This argument has now been going on for more than 30 years, and there certainly is enough data and factual information on which to base a decision that settles the question.

My own recommendation is that the Defense Department should issue a ruling requiring the services to identify every MOS that demands physical qualifications that every soldier assigned must demonstrate. Thus the combat infantry soldier, who may be required to engage in what might be termed National Football League line play without rules, the ordnance ammunition handler, the armor tank mechanic and others who require greater physical strength and endurance will not be soldiers unqualified for their jobs. Applying consistent requirements will not discriminate between male and female; it will instead eliminate those whose assignments unnecessarily burden or endanger other members of their squads or sections.

Such a rule should eliminate charges of discrimination, prejudice or male chauvinism. It would not end the role of DoD agencies concerned with women in the services who are pregnant, single parents or non-deployables to address issues as the services attempt to resolve conflicts of combat readiness and effectiveness with the rights and policies regarding individuals. Years of saddling the services with impractical, burdensome solutions to such problems continue to be a field open for policy revision.

Such a rule will not satisfy the arguments and concerns of those of us who believe men are the warriors who protect our civilization, women are the nurturers who guarantee the future and the twain should not be committed to the combat task. It will not satisfy the concerns regarding the treatment females may be subjected to as prisoners of war. But it seems that America has, by commission or omission, ignored or accepted or endorsed the role now being played out in today's wars and any revisions of the role will have to await a future assessment of rights and wrongs.



Lessons from American Wars

Lessons from American Wars

The American nation and its Army are well into their third century of existence. During that time the Army has risen to every challenge, and American soldiers have gone into harm's way around the world to defend the nation, protect its citizens and preserve its interests. It is a proud history and one that continues to add new chapters. It is important to study the Army's history to prepare for the future. The past contains many lessons, and using those lessons to repeat the positive and avoid the negative is important in preparing for tomorrow's challenges. The likes of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden remind us that the world is not yet a safe place. There is still no easy way to prevent the rise of another Hitler or a reincarnated Napoleon. But the United States, by maintaining a strong Army that understands its obligations to the nation and the sacrifices of the soldiers who have stood in its ranks for more than two centuries, stands ready to prevent any attempts they might make to conquer the world.

The history of American wars offers many lessons that remain valid today. The first two articles in this section examine a few from World War II and Korea. "The Lessons of Pearl Harbor" is a reminder that it takes fire and maneuver to win wars. I wrote this article in 1996 to take issue with the growing chorus of air-power advocates who see the Army as unnecessary in future wars. "The Pitfalls of Settling for Less: Korean

War Lessons" is a reminder of the importance of setting appropriate objectives in war and then doing what is necessary to achieve them.

I first went to Vietnam in 1968 to become a brigade commander in the Americal Division. When I assumed command of the 196th Brigade it was in very good condition. Morale was high in all the battalions, and I thought the commanders had a sense of confidence that only a very good combat outfit could have. The brigade had been tried severely under fire and had proven that it was a capable, professional organization. I was pleased to take over in a very active sector of the division's area of operations. The brigade had the largest geographical area, and I realized shortly after I got there, when I visited the other two brigades during my orientation period, that the 196th had the most active enemy threat and less restrictive operational rules.

The other two brigades in the division were tied to fire bases and to missions that kept them close to the coastline. They were in areas that had been very active in the past, and defensive activity conducted from their fire bases was the normal mode of operation. The 196th, on the other hand, had an active area that extended halfway across Vietnam toward Laos. Offensive action, constant patrolling and searching for the enemy kept the brigade sharp. There was daily activity against the enemy and a regular requirement for fire support from the infantry's mortars and the artillery battalions in the brigade sector. It did not take me long to realize that the primary function of American military force in that area was to deny the enemy use of the terrain.

When I explained our mission and methods to new battalion commanders, I made sure they understood that their job was to deny the area to the enemy by routinely putting American forces in every grid square of their sectors. I found that constant denial operations were the best way to provide protection not only to the American installations but to the Vietnamese people who lived there. I think we instilled enough confidence in the local population that they could pursue their normal lifestyle without too much fear of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese raids. That did not mean there was not ever a mine in the roadway or a bridge destroyed, but we responded quickly to those things and denied the enemy any opportunity to establish any kind of a base of operations in our area.



Captain Kroesen and friends in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1945.

It had been 13 years since I had last held a command. I had commanded a battalion as a major in Korea, so I was not given a battalion while I was a lieutenant colonel. I spent my years from 1955 to 1968 in staff duties, going to school and on the faculty of the Army War College. Frankly, I was ill-prepared professionally for the job of commanding a brigade. For example, I had never fired the M-16 rifle. I had a lot of catching up to do in basic soldiering and in remembering the requirements for command. In one way it was helpful because it demanded my attention. It was not something I could ignore, so the intensity with which I pursued my own reeducation was perhaps better for me in the long run, because I learned important lessons that stayed with me for the rest of my career. Combat is the greatest teaching theater ever devised and, for those who live through it, the most rewarding.

We had some very successful combat operations and some very successful civic action projects while I was commanding the brigade. I was most proud that during my year with the 196th Brigade we were able to reestablish the district of Hiep Duc, the westernmost district in Quang Tin Province. That story is the subject of "Hiep Duc: Triumph and Tragedy." In some ways it is a microcosm of what the United States accomplished and where it failed in Vietnam.

In more than two centuries of American history, the U.S. Army was really only prepared for one war—the 1991 Persian Gulf War—and in that conflict it astounded the world with its performance. Unfortunately, we may have learned some wrong lessons from that war. Because it was over so quickly with extraordinarily few casualties, the Army's years of preparation have been overlooked. The foundation that made the awesome display of military prowess that ended the ground war in less than 100 hours was laid well before the shooting began. Welltrained, wellled and well supplied military forces cannot be prepared overnight.

The Army that fought the Gulf War planned and executed the most professional military operation ever conducted in the history of the world. And that includes Alexander the Great, or Caesar, or the Germans when they attacked Russia. No other army can compare, in professionalism, to the Americans who fought the Persian Gulf War. They established the standard by which all military operations will be measured for the next 500 years.

The U.S. Army was so much better prepared and equipped than the Iraqis that it was like putting the Chicago Bulls of the 1990s against a high school basketball team. It was not because the Iraqis did not fight, and it was not because they did not have a pretty good army. There were a lot of good Iraqi soldiers who tried to fight. They had been quite successful fighting against Iran for eight years, but in 1991 they were overwhelmed by an army that was vastly superior in its professional abilities. Battalions of Iraqi tanks were wiped out by our ground troops before the Iraqis even knew they were coming under fire. But one of the most significant statements I read about that war was that of an American sergeant who said, "But we could have traded our equipment for theirs and still whipped them."

Like millions of Americans I followed the progress of the war as the United States built a coalition, sent military forces to the Persian Gulf, and executed the strategy that ejected the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Unlike many others, however, I had the opportunity to express my views on the war in a variety of places. Along with two of my retired colleagues, I provided an assessment of the developing situation in an article ("Our Deployment into the Persian Gulf") for the November 1990 issue of *ARMY* magazine. In December 1990 I appeared before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) to express my views on an integrated air-land campaign, and in January 1991 I prepared an assessment of the strategy for the International Security Council (ISC). Both my opening statement to the HASC and my paper for the ISC are included here.

After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, advocates of airpower came to the fore, once again arguing that future wars would be fought primarily from the air. Only rudimentary land forces would be needed to mop up any loose ends on the ground after the enemy succumbed to an intensive aerial bombardment conducted with minimal risk to American pilots and crews. An Army War College analysis of something called Halt Phase Strategy prompted me to write "*Would You Really Rather Have Airpower?*" in which I provided a reminder that the recent lessons of airpower are not all they seem. "*We Won?*" revisited that idea in late 1999 after the NATO bombing of Kosovo appeared to have won that conflict without the aid of ground forces.

On 11 September 2001, terrorists attacked the United States homeland using commercial aircraft as weapons of war. By crashing airliners into the World

Trade Center towers in New York City and into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., they provoked America's war on terrorism. Almost overnight, the military forces of the United States found themselves preparing for a new kind of war. Like war's before, adequate preparations for this new war will take time. In late 2002 I wrote an article drawing attention to the necessity of preparing the Army for what promises to be an extended war against an elusive and changing enemy. "What to Hope For" cautions against making preparations based on what we think might happen rather than using sound planning principles to prepare for what may be America's next war.

Two columns, added for this edition, are historical pieces. One, "A Ruff-Puff Solution," addresses the ultimate strategy of the Vietnam War, a strategy that may have pertinence to the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other, written at the beginning stages of the agitation for withdrawing the Army from Iraq, is a look at past wars and the various ways of "Terminating Conflict."

The Lessons of Pearl Harbor

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, August 2001]

Pearl Harbor, recently dramatized in a motion picture epic, a television special and several books, suddenly struck me as an almost perfect example of why firepower only is a failed concept as a war winner.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was a brilliant military operation, successfully hidden from intelligence detection, successfully cloaked by diplomatic subterfuge, and so effectively carried out by operating forces that opposition was overwhelmed before it could begin. In vernacular parlance, it was a first-round knockdown, always a serious predicament in any kind of fight.

Yet Pearl Harbor was, in fact, a strategic failure. When the Japanese fleet retired to its home waters, it had left behind a cauldron of destroyed equipment, a serious depletion of trained manpower and a suddenly very vulnerable enemy. It also, however, inflamed the American psyche and awakened a sleeping giant, who needed time to get himself organized to fight back and ultimately to win—in much the same way that Hitler's bombing of London, another firepower-only effort, only strengthened British resolve.

How different things might have been had that initial strike force included a landing force capable of seizing and securing Oahu. One can imagine any number of scenarios of how the war might have continued if we had lost control of the Hawaiian Islands, but it is not hard to conjecture that our Navy would have concentrated on the Eastern Pacific. The battles of Midway and the Coral Sea would not have happened. Guadalcanal would still be an unheard-of place, and perhaps the war in Europe would not have gained instant priority in Washington.

With Pearl Harbor in their hands, would the Japanese threat to our west coast have caused public opinion to deny our massive help to the Russians? Would the European war have followed a different course? It is likely we would not have mounted the North African invasion if Hawaii had been held by the Japanese. Then the Casablanca Conference would not have occurred, and unconditional surrender might not have been the demand of the Allied leaders.

Almost any logical scenario following a supposed Japanese seizure of Hawaii leads to a prolongation of World War II and an uncertainty about its conclusion. It is probable that the sleeping giant would never have lost, but it is quite likely that he would not have swept the world of his enemies as completely as he did, or on the same timetable.

All of those scenarios, all of that potential outcome, did not happen because the warlords of Japan thought that they could inflict a knockout blow with firepower only. They had not learned the fundamental lesson of military history: Fire and maneuver win wars.

No matter how many times and how often that lesson becomes apparent, it never seems to gain universal acceptance. In World War II, we heard that we would bomb the Germans into submission, but in April 1945, when crossing the Danube, my company lost its last soldier to some of those Germans who had still not submitted.

In 1945, the atomic bomb—firepower—resulted in the Japanese surrender. However, the war was actually won only when the maneuver force occupied those islands, took control of the land and the people, changed the government and established a new society. The bomb did not do that—a sizable contingent of landpower did. It was fire and maneuver, from island to island in the Southwest Pacific, that put us in position to exploit the effects of those bombs after they were exploded.

In Vietnam, “bombing them back to the Stone Age” was a popular thought, and indeed we expended bomb tonnage in a greater quantity than we had used against Germany trying to do that, but we did not win that war because we never employed a maneuver force to threaten the destruction of the communist regime.

More recently, there was Kosovo, perhaps the hollowest victory we have ever achieved. Yes, the Serbs surrendered, but none of the original objectives announced as our reason for launching the war was ever attained. We have since, hesitantly, employed some forces on the ground, and we have an uncertain peace because they are there, but a conclusive win never occurred because a maneuver force was not employed.

There are today many voices questioning the future of the Army, its utility and capability to fight modern wars. They promise that technological solutions with long-range precision guided weapons negate the need for soldiers or marines on the ground. They promise that an enemy land campaign can be stopped and overwhelmed with firepower only, a first-round knockout.

Let us hope that our country’s leaders will realize the false prophecy of such promises and will understand that success in war demands at least the threat of employment of forces on the ground, who can wrest control of land and people from an enemy wherever his base of operations may be.

The Pitfalls of Settling for Less: Korean War Lessons

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, August 2002. The speech was delivered at a conference sponsored by the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and Old Dominion University.]

When I agreed to deliver a speech to the MacArthur Foundation [regarding the 50th anniversary of the Korean War], I went immediately to T. R. Fehrenbach, a revisit to his book *This Kind of War*. I wanted to refresh my memory of the stark revelations he presented of just how bad things were when we committed an unready, untrained and ill-equipped Army to the mission of defending South Korea. We committed them piecemeal, beginning with Task Force Smith and continuing with bits and pieces of the 24th Division. We committed them to join the Republic of Korea Army

that was also unready, untrained and ill-equipped. Together we were almost totally incapable of halting the invasion from the North.

Fehrenbach, with clarity and great perspicacity, describes the condition of all three armies engaged and brings to life the terrible realities faced by soldiers who were in fact “cannon fodder.” That the survivors of those first weeks could finally organize and defend the Pusan Perimeter is testimony to the fighting qualities of Americans and Koreans, even those who do not know they possess the fortitude, intrepidity and bravery that have marked battlefields throughout history. That fact and the fundamental soundness of our Army’s organizational structure and functioning, coupled with the fact that the North Koreans had far outrun their logistic support, combined to save us from the ignominious disaster of being driven into the sea.

I have never read a comprehensive survey of why and how the deterioration of the World War II Army was allowed to happen. I was in it and I had no idea of how bad it was and only much later came to the realization that the destruction of the force could not have been accomplished more thoroughly if it had been deliberate—in fact, being a government program, a deliberate attempt at destruction could not possibly have been so successful.

It also became apparent to me only much later that no one ever paid for the policies and decisions that brought about that deterioration. President Harry S Truman and his Secretaries of War, Navy and Defense have to be high on any list of the culpable, but there were also many famous Army names among those who allowed it to happen—Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur and Bradley among them. Then there was the press, the news media whose principal stories of those days were “bring the boys home” and “the atom bomb makes armies obsolete.” Finally there was Congress, where the ultimate responsibility for “raising the Army” seems to have been completely ignored. I should think that today, as we are in the midst of the Korean War 50-year memorials and commemorations, there is ample need for some doctoral dissertations and book-length exposes of those subjects.

I shall not try to answer questions raised by those observations. I want to focus on two aspects that I believe have had far-reaching influence, and which might also provide topics for intellectual inquiry.

The first of these is that Korea is the first war we did not win—we did not lose it either, of course, but we settled for less. (I know that hindsight tells some that we did not really win at other times either, 1812 for example, but the majority claim has always been that we won them all. The Battle of New Orleans furnished conclusive proof that we won even though it was fought two weeks after the war ended.)

Not long after President Truman committed us to the defense of South Korea, the worrying began about widening the war and involving the Russians. After the Red Chinese entry there was the worry that Chiang Kai-shek would attack China. World War III and the possible use of nuclear weapons became specters on the horizon, and much learned discussion was aimed at preventing any provocation on our part that the Russians might use as a reason to come to North Korea's aid. President Truman, in the end, took counsel of these fears—not his alone as almost all his advisors, his Cabinet and the Joint Chiefs held the same view. The result was a long, costly stalemate that served no real interest and leaves us even today with a continuing threat of conflict renewal.

I believe it also sowed seeds of the same kinds of limitations that we adopted for the war in Vietnam. Once again, taking counsel of the fears of his principal advisors, President Lyndon B. Johnson, attempting to set an example for the world, especially for the Chinese and Russians, prohibited or limited operations that would have expanded the war into Laos or Cambodia and refused to consider decisive ground operations in North Vietnam. Again, we paid dearly for a long stalemate and an unsatisfactory conclusion.

Comparing those wars to operations that came later—the recapture of the Falklands by the British, the elimination of the communist threat from Grenada and the destruction of Noriega's tinhorn dictatorship in Panama—provides some interesting contrasts in the reasoning and actions of our commanders in chief. Extending such inquiries to the Persian Gulf War will reveal the contrast of an overwhelming military victory undermined by a diplomatic decision, caused again by taking counsel of one's fears, in that case, apparently, a fear of world public opinion concerning the carnage wreaked upon the retreating Iraqis.

Finally, the Cold War, which everyone knows we won, also has aspects of settling for less. There has

been no punishment, no retribution for the years of threat, for the expenditure of resources, for the lives lost and the misery inflicted. Much of the bureaucracy that sustained the Communist world is still in power or in influential positions able to use titles and rhetoric to stay in power. Few traitors and fellow-traveling spokesmen in the West have been publicly exposed, let alone punished. We have presumed that the triumph of democracy and capitalism would provide all the guidance the world needs, and we have proceeded in hope that that presumption is correct.

This is not to judge whether we should have done things differently, only to suggest that this is a topic that has not been sufficiently explored, and one that may have grave import for the nation's future.

One of the grave dangers we face today will be the precedent of "settling for less" in the war on terrorism. Over time, as costs mount and casualties occur and as equipment and munitions are expended and have to be replaced, the demands for a negotiated settlement will become more strident and the determination to finish the job may begin to erode. If we do succumb to attempting a diplomatic solution, we will face indefinitely the terrorists' threat to renew operations, much the way we are still facing the threat from North Korea today, 50 years after such a settlement. If someone would calculate the costs of the continuing stalemate in Korea and compare them to costs that might have been if we had won that war outright, the value of winning would be clearly apparent.

A second concern regarding Korea: It was a major step in the centralizing of control over military operations. My experience in World War II, as a platoon leader and rifle company commander, was one of receiving an order that specified my mission, leaving to me the job of figuring out how to accomplish it. In the Colmar pocket, where my battalion earned a Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation, my mission, as platoon leader in the French town of Jebsheim, was: "Clear the left (east) side of the street, coordinate with the French company clearing the right side and report back when you reach the south edge of town." I never reached the south edge of that town. Three days later my whole battalion, another battalion and I do not know how many French troops had captured about three thousand Germans and earned our citation. Nobody told us how to do it.

When we reached Germany I was told to defend along the Blies River in the Saarland. I was then the company commander. I deployed my three platoons and my weapons platoon where I decided they should be, and my forward observers plotted their defensive concentrations and barrages where we thought they should be. No higher commander dictated anything except calling me to require a patrol across the river to capture a prisoner. I decided when, where and how.

When I was told to attack the Siegfried Line, I was given a 1:100 K map and three aerial photos of the pill-boxes and dragon's teeth complex in my assigned sector and told to be ready at 4 a.m. but not to move until ordered. (We would wait until a sister regiment had secured a flank objective.) I made the plan of how I would employ the company, the avenue of approach we would take, how I wanted fire support plotted, the timing of the operations, and so on. No one told me how to do it.

I have many more examples of this kind, but the point is that it was that experience that caused me to notice that things were different in Korea—perhaps not in the first few months of the war, but after the truce talks began, during the stalemate years. With no major operations going on, division and corps commanders began doing busywork, prescribing patrols, the routes they would follow, the time they would stay out, the equipment they would take, the fire support to be provided—details that for centuries had been the prerogatives of company commanders and platoon leaders. They planned small operations in great detail and established limitations that prevented subordinates from exercising initiative, and the determination to avoid casualties became a prime concern. By decree from on high, corps and division commanders could not employ more than two platoons in offensive action. The only opportunity for a company or battalion commander to use his initiative occurred when countering an enemy initiative or when the plan from on high went wrong. Communications, compared to today, were primitive and transport of commanders was by jeep, so total control was still a thing of the future, yet the lower commanders risked their careers if casualties resulting from their initiatives were considered excessive.

It was in Vietnam that the centralization of control reached an apex, with the White House dictating bombing targets and division and brigade commanders playing “squad leader in the sky.” We reached a condition in

which the chain of command was in a state of dysfunction.

I have always maintained that a chain of command must function from the bottom up as well as from the top down—with every squad leader making squad-leader decisions and reporting to his platoon leader, “Here’s what I found, here’s what I did, and here’s why I did it.” When squad leaders have someone telling them not only what to do but how to do it, they stop being leaders, and so do platoon leaders and company commanders. Initiative is stymied and decisionmaking is replaced by waiting to be told. Combat action becomes tentative and military action bogs down.

In Vietnam low-level commanders were subject to a cluster of helicopters carrying higher commanders calling for information, offering advice, making unwanted decisions and generally interfering with what squad leaders and platoon leaders and company commanders were trying to do. There is no more effective way to destroy the leadership potential of young officers and noncommissioned officers than to deny them opportunities to make decisions appropriate for their assignments.

Just Cause and Desert Storm gave an indication that we might be recovering from the Vietnam malady, but each of those operations, the first two in which we exercised the initiatives of offense at the outset, was of short duration; each was executing plans prepared in advance, so there was no conclusive evidence that things have changed. At least the White House was not doing the low-level planning. Again, however, our actions in Bosnia and our war against the Serbs, the Kosovo War, demonstrated a flat-out return to centralization. Activities, rules of engagement, restrictions on means, targeting of bomb strikes, and so on, were all prescribed from on high, up to and including the civilian hierarchy of NATO.

Now we are engaged in another war, a paradigm shift in operations requirements and techniques. So far neither of the above concerns has surfaced as a problem. Our announced policy is to go on the offensive and win, and our troops in the field in the early operations had the decisionmaking authority they needed to conduct their missions. But the voices of dissent are carping about the unnecessary casualties, the inappropriate use of extreme force, alternate means (read diplomatic solutions) to achieve our goals, and the need for more stringent rules of engagement. The first

complaints about overcontrol from on high have surfaced and been addressed at Pentagon briefings.

Lessons from the wars of the 20th century are both appropriate and significant for the wars of the 21st. Not all of those lessons have been explored or sufficiently explained by our scholars—there is much that can still be written—but the future employment of military power ought to be affected by such lessons, and our senior leadership must be aware of the pitfalls of “settling for less” and the overcontrol of operations if our nation is to employ the best means of conducting and winning wars.

Hiep Duc: Triumph and Tragedy

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, July 1994]

In December 1968, the people of Hiep Duc, the western district of Quang Tin Province, were living in refugee camps in the east, near Tam Ky, the province capital. They had been there for up to three years, following the destruction of their district during the 1960s by the Vietcong and by the early incursions of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

Their district town, also called Hiep Duc, was reduced to rubble in one of those attacks and was almost indistinguishable as trees and grasses reclaimed the land. The district, which encompassed the western half of the province and extended to the Laotian border, was almost devoid of population, and there were no villages or hamlets in existence.

The last remnant of civilization in the area disappeared when the American-Vietnamese Special Forces camp at Kham Duc, 30 kilometers farther west, was abandoned to the NVA in the spring of 1968.

Quang Tin was the protectorate of the 196th Infantry Brigade, known as the Chargers. The brigade had been there for almost a year and in July 1968 had conducted Operation Pocahontas Forest, an excursion deep into Hiep Duc, which was successful in demonstrating that they were truly masters of the area.

An idea was born in the following weeks that perhaps the Hiep Duc district town could be reestablished, and the refugees could reclaim their land and livelihood. Who proposed the idea is not known now, but it was heartily accepted by the brigade commander, whose staff went to work to study the feasibility of accomplishing the job.

Province chief Colonel Hoang Dinh Tho became an early supporter of the idea and set about the things the government had to do. Among them was the tough proposition of convincing the refugees that it was the right thing to do, that they would be protected and could return to a normal life.

In early January 1969, the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry moved westward with a helicopter assault to a large grass-covered hill that overlooked the former town of Hiep Duc and the Song Thu Bon, a beautiful river that marked the eastern boundary of the Hiep Duc district.

They built a firebase and named it Siberia, both for its remote location and undesirability as a place to be stationed and for the World War I link of the 31st Infantry Polar Bears with the area. The 31st had been stationed in Vladivostok in 1918.

By mid-January, all was ready, and one day a rattletrap convoy of Vietnamese army and civilian vehicles, accompanied by a variety of U.S. Army cargo and fighting vehicles and watched over by a few helicopters, made its way from Tam Ky through the districts of Thang Binh and Que Son to its destination.

The convoy carried everything needed for the instant reestablishment of Hiep Duc—people, livestock, tents, lumber, sandbags, tin roofing, some household goods, charcoal, fishing poles and a Regional Forces (RF) company for local security.

After the convoy left Que Son, it proceeded haltingly over a road long ago eroded and gullied by the monsoons that had come and gone through the years when no maintenance was performed.

Finally, the last vehicle arrived, and its tired complement of people joined those already there, most glumly contemplating a wilderness they were supposed to call home. Among them, fortunately, was that nucleus of leadership that always sparks such an enterprise, and in a short time, 200 men, women and children had staked out family locations and were at work preparing some kind of shelter.

Life was hard and not very rewarding during the first few months, but progress was steady. Fields were tilled and rice planted, more substantial housing appeared, and the fishing was good. The new district chief grew more confident, and two locally recruited

Popular Forces (PF) platoons prepared defensive positions around the new settlement.

The RF company was withdrawn, but the Polar Bears, the men of the 31st Infantry with a battery of 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, remained watchful and protective. As the months passed, the harvests came, and the town was reborn as a thriving, healthy, happy place.

Two years passed, and the former 196th Brigade commander was back in Vietnam for another tour; as soon as he could, he paid a visit to Hiep Duc. When he looked down from a helicopter at acres and acres of green rice stalks, at a well laid out cluster of buildings, at a dock with sampans coming and going, at water buffalo with the ever-present little boys on their backs, he turned to the others on board and said, "This is one of the proud moments of my life."

He felt that he had played a part in the restoration of something worthwhile, that he had made a small contribution to the reconstitution of a nation's pride and strength. He was observing evidence that the good guys really were winning that war. If ever there was doubt about the value and virtue of the American contribution and commitment to Vietnam, it was swept away by that single panoramic view of a town redeemed.

The 196th Brigade was gone now, and firebase Siberia stood empty. Hiep Duc was secured by its own PF platoons and by the 5th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, which now was responsible for the same general area that had once been jointly protected by the 5th and the 196th.

The 5th Regiment did not have the troops needed to occupy Siberia continuously, and it paid only occasional visits to Hiep Duc. The district chief was not as comfortable as he had been when the Polar Bears were there, but he was as confident as any town leader who lived at the edge of South Vietnamese civilization.

Tragically, however, Hiep Duc was doomed. The Americal Division, parent organization of the 196th Brigade, was withdrawn from the war, and Quang Tin was left with almost no American presence. The 196th, now an independent brigade, had moved north to Quang Nam Province and was protecting the port city of Da Nang.

When the NVA launched its Easter offensive in March 1972, one of its harassing attacks sent a regiment

into western Quang Tin where, once again, Hiep Duc was overrun and destroyed. Once again, those who could save themselves fled eastward and rejoined the refugee population along the coast, their three-year quest for normalcy at an end.

The Charger Brigade commander, then serving farther north in Military Region 1, reflecting on the tragedy, suffered true remorse over the entire affair. Had it been a mistake to restore Hiep Duc? Were the casualties among those people to weigh on his conscience? Who was at fault for the raising then dashing of hopes of a small town of people who wanted only to care for themselves and live in peace?

Americans will never answer those questions satisfactorily because we remain divided and contentious about what we did there, but it is certain that most soldiers of the Polar Bear battalion who were there in January 1969 will remember and be remembered by a small group of Vietnamese for a noble effort.

The continuing progress of civilization demands that kind of experiment. Perhaps the experience will help some day to teach the American people that once committed, we should stay the course, fulfill the promise and guarantee the pledges we have made.

Only then will some of us Vietnam veterans rest more easily over the legacy we created in that unhappy war in that tragic land.

Our Deployment into the Persian Gulf

[Reprinted from *ARMY*. Taken from "Our Deployment into the Persian Gulf—Three Views," November 1990.]

American armed forces, particularly the Army, are already under attack—not by Iraq or the military might that can be brought to bear in the Middle East, but by the learned pundits and naysayers of the American news media. After Iraq's armor crossed the Kuwaiti border and while American forces were still en route to the crisis area, no shots having been fired, we were reading that our forces are really designed to fight the Russians; that our equipment won't last in the desert; and that serious gaps exist in our antiarmor, antiair, chemical defense and logistics support capabilities.

Unquestionably, there is an abundance of grist for this mill. The research and development community is always loaded with ideas, proposals, pilot models and

prototypes that will perform better than equipment in the field. There are always examples of equipment we could have had but don't:

- Congress killed the Viper, still the best shoulder-fired antitank weapon in the world, but not available to troops almost ten years after it could have been, while we continue to depend on the outmoded LAW [light antitank weapon] and the Swedish-designed AT4 [disposable antiarmor rocket-propelled grenade].
- The Department of Defense killed the Sergeant York, an excellent antiair system for which there is as yet no substitute.
- The Army delayed the development of a light mobile gun system, read light tank, many believe, to protect the development and procurement of the M1. (Knowledgeable soldiers insist the delay concerns questions of lethality and survivability of the proffered designs.)
- Every echelon has delayed the fielding of a light helicopter, a 25-year Army quest for an aerial platform that can perform a modern cavalry mission.

Such a list is long, impressive in its potential impact and fraught with opportunities for hindsight and second-guessing. It seems time, therefore, to address the other side of the balance sheet, the good things about our Army in the field that balance if they do not negate the points being trumpeted by the critics.

First, today's Army is the best-trained, best-prepared-for-war Army we have ever had.

By any measure, individual personnel qualifications exceed those of any earlier Army, but it is the revolutionized Army training system that has turned that raw material into the most professionally competent force we have ever had.

The Army's Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), after 200 years of on-the-job learning, has produced a middle-leadership corps without peer in the armies of the world. The Army's skill qualifications tests now assure that individual soldiers know their jobs and their responsibilities.

And, above all, the training of units, battalions and brigades at our national training centers has subjected commanders and staff officers to the most grueling

peacetime learning experience ever devised. We are the envy of every other army that has sent observers to Fort Irwin, California, or Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, or our other learning centers to see how we do it. The professionalism of the U.S. Army is known in military circles worldwide, and the forces in the Middle East today reflect that quality.

Second, the overall quality of our equipment is pretty high, certainly better than our enemy's. In the past 40 years, whenever our equipment was matched against "theirs"—that is, against an enemy equipped with Soviet materiel—we have seldom found ours wanting in any respect. There have been controversies about this—the AK47 rifle touted as superior to the M16, the T64 tank outgunning our M60—but on the whole, there has been no contest. The kill ratios of the Yom Kippur War, the most recent test in the Middle East desert area, are convincing testimonials to our superiority. So, even though our marines have M60A1 tanks and infantrymen are armed with M16s, they will not be disadvantaged in any confrontation.

This in no way negates the need for new, more modern equipment. Outclassing potential enemies on the battlefield is a continuing requirement, one achieved only by a dynamic research and development (R&D) program and a healthy procurement of new or improved technology. There has been no detectable letup in Russian R&D, no reason to believe that the equipment available to Russian client states will not continue to improve; thus, there can be no halt to modernization programs for our armed forces.

To mark time in this arena is to fall behind, and to fall behind is to be outclassed by enemy technology on the battlefield. We owe to our soldiers the best equipment we can buy. Anything less is a breach of faith and a courtship of dishonor by the people of the United States.

Third, the deployability of our forces is remarkably effective. It is fashionable today to deplore our lack of mobility, the shortage of airlift, the lamentable state of our sealift, and from a purely professional point of view, no one knows better than the Army that we are not overly well served by the lift provided by the other services. Nevertheless, there are today tens of thousands of soldiers, airmen and marines in the sands of the Middle East who were not there three months ago.

No other nation could have moved its forces with such dispatch and efficiency, and none could sustain

such a force during an unlimited commitment. We assumed a risk when we deployed the first brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, for it was then most vulnerable to an enemy attack, and it had only limited combat capabilities. However, the promise of continuing force deployment and sustainment, even with the less than robust lift the Army has complained about for years, made the risk acceptable. There was no worry at any time that we had offered another Bataan peninsula expendable force that could be overwhelmed by the Iraqis.

There has been a serious argument, waged for years and still to be resolved, concerning how much lift is enough, but that argument has no bearing on how and how well we employ the lift we already have. We need more SL-7 fast deployment ships; we need the C-17 or more C-5s; we need a more versatile intratheater airlift capability, but we are not undeployable or ineffective with what we have.

Finally, we are not poorly organized for contingency wars. The handwringing appraisals of our Soviet-oriented force structure are ridiculous in their almost automatic conclusion that we are not suited for "contingency missions" somewhere else in the world. We deployed the 82d Airborne Division and two Marine expeditionary forces first—infantry forces augmented with a few tanks for initial defense purposes. They were the most available, quickest reacting and the best suited for the initial mission. (Defense is the infantrymen's war.)

They were followed by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), day-and-night tank killers with their Apache helicopters and more airmobile infantry. Then, as fast as they could be moved, heavy Army forces, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 1st Cavalry Division and the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) rounded out the force and provided it with a more mobile, more versatile armored counteroffensive capability.

All of these commands were organized from the much-maligned Soviet-oriented Army; all had a role to play if a European war had occurred, and none had to be reorganized for its Middle East mission. Despite the descriptions of the Army as "a lumbering beast" that ought to be lighter, quicker and more deployable, we need the M1 Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle in this particular contingency area. If we need further reinforcement, the divisions now

stationed in Europe are exactly the kind we need for building a greater force for desert operations.

Those who think they cannot operate in the desert are ignorant of the records of the readiness and sustainability rates associated with training on the desert at Fort Irwin.

The Army needs a lot of things. It could be better. It needs a modern light helicopter. It needs the Army TACMS, the midrange tactical missile system that is just as usable in the Middle East as it would be in the NATO environment. It needs an antimissile system and improved antiair and antarmor defenses. It needs a versatile and effective chemical retaliatory capability, not to initiate chemical warfare but to assure that enemy employment will not result in a disastrous asymmetry of battlefield force effectiveness. It needs an understanding that its tactical nuclear weapons, short-range, low-yield weapons have a battlefield utility unmatched by any other form of firepower and that employment is not an automatic trigger for an international nuclear holocaust.

The Army is a potent force without all of these things. The Army remains the instrument of national power that can control the land or deny the enemy control of objectives critical to the enemy's success. It is better, more powerful than it has ever been in the past, and it will prove itself appropriately suited for its current mission, given the continuing political decisions that have made its deployment efficient and effective.

No amount of gainsaying criticism should be allowed to undermine the confidence of Americans in the quality and capabilities of their Army or its determination and dedication to the task at hand.

The Persian Gulf Crisis

[Statement before House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Second Session, 101st Congress, 13 December 1990]

Mr. Chairman:

I am honored to have been asked to appear before this Committee to express my views regarding an integrated air-land campaign in the Middle East. In the beginning, I want to establish that I believe a prime requisite for the development of such an option is the availability of forces to carry it out. In this regard, I

want to express my support for the military actions that have already occurred. It is my opinion that the military decisions that have been made were necessary in light of the mission assigned; were appropriate in light of the potential threat to the interests of the United States and the United Nations in the area; and were timely in light of the resources available and the requirement to be prepared for future actions.

Initially, I believe we employed the proper force—infantry and airpower—first to deter a continued Iraqi offensive, then to defend Saudi Arabia if it became necessary. Then we deployed more mobile mechanized and armor forces to provide for local counterattack and counteroffensive operations to improve our defensive capabilities. And finally, we are now deploying a sufficiency of heavier forces which, in light of the UN resolution and the U.S. statement of objectives, are absolutely essential to the credibility of any offensive option and to the success of such an operation if it is required.

Unquestionably we must employ economic sanctions and a naval blockade, and consider the possibility that a firepower-only campaign might be successful, but each of those options is strengthened significantly by the presence of an adequate, credible land campaign capability. Having such a force present is both militarily sound and psychologically important. I do not subscribe to the argument that being prepared somehow proscribes a more peaceful alternate solution.

If the employment of force is never necessary, we can stand the second-guessing that will occur regarding the costs and what might have been a better strategy. But if the employment of force does become necessary, a force inadequate to the task will become a tragedy.

There is no question that timing is a problem—and delay in a decision to employ these forces impacts on training, readiness, morale, maintenance, supply and perhaps other areas that influence the utility of the force in being at any given time. But these are problems that our armed forces have coped with for years, are experienced in finding solutions for, and which can be managed. It will not be easy, but it is far from impossible.

Now, as to the task at hand and the purpose of these hearings today, I have been a listener to those who have gone before this week and I do not want to repeat things that have been said. But I would like to take a little time to speak about the requirements for

planning an air-land campaign, some of which have not been addressed specifically by previous speakers.

First, there are three prerequisites for such planning, none more important than that a commander have a complete and comprehensive understanding of his mission, i.e., what it is that his superior intends for him to accomplish. Without a clear picture of the objectives he must achieve, all planning is no more than an intellectual exercise.

Second is the requirement for a detailed knowledge of the enemy, the threat complex that can be employed to prevent the accomplishment of an assigned mission.

And third is the same need for an understanding of the resources made available for the mission—not just knowledge that an airborne division is in the troop list, but an understanding of what an airborne division can be counted on to accomplish. Likewise, a working knowledge of marine amphibious capabilities, the use of antiarmor helicopters, the capacities of engineer forces as mobility and countermobility agents, and the limitations that might be imposed by weather or darkness or the terrain.

Those three things constitute what I call a commander's midnight oil-burning task. Not only he but his staff as well must educate themselves thoroughly in those three areas of interest, demanding all the help they can get from any who are committed to support their operations.

Given that knowledge, a commander then has three planning demands. First he must formulate a concept of operations, that is, a plan to use the resources he has been furnished to achieve the objectives assigned while incidentally thwarting the efforts of the enemy.

Second he must ascertain the logistical feasibility of what he wants to accomplish, determining whether to modify his concept or to demand additional or other resources to assure its success.

Finally, he must formulate the command and control structure required for directing, monitoring and modifying the execution of his plan.

With that planning accomplished a commander can issue orders to his subordinates. He should do this with such clarity and completeness that they will know how to continue their efforts even if they never hear from him again.

There are hundreds of ancillary requirements for such a campaign that are major considerations for a commander and his staff. Rules of engagement, airspace management, restrictive rates of supply, intelligence operations, deception plans, rear area security, contingency plans and operational and communications security are a few spokes in the wheel.

If it is all done well, a combined forces commander will have accomplished a planning task which I believe is more complex than any other human endeavor.

That is a thumbnail sketch of campaign planning requirements. I will be happy to expand on these comments or to delve more deeply into any of the requirements as we proceed this afternoon.

Persian Gulf Military Strategy

[Prepared for the International Security Council, 17 January 1991]

The term "military strategy" is defined by Webster as the science and art of command exercised to create conditions of advantage when meeting an enemy in combat. It is a term more restrictive than national strategy or international strategy, being in fact inclusive in those terms as a partner to political, economic and psychological strategies which can be embarked upon by a nation or group of nations. The distinction is important because I have been asked to address two questions regarding strategy and I intend to treat with them in the limited context of military strategy, clearly separating myself from other members of the retired military clan who have expressed opinions on economic sanctions, diplomatic missions and political solutions for the Persian Gulf crisis.

The two questions are:

1. What military action does the buildup of forces by the United States and its allies imply?
2. What is the proper strategy for the use of these forces?

And I have been asked to address these questions from the perspective of a landpower advocate, an identification which I also believe requires some explanation, but I will address that point later.

Let me begin this discussion with the unequivocal statement that I agree with and support the military strategy already undertaken, that is, the decisions and

actions of the past five months that have moved 400,000 Americans into Saudi Arabia and have brought a sizable contingent of allies into the same area. I believe those actions have provided the only sound base from which we can consider future operations when or if they become necessary.

Initially, our first priority task was to defend Saudi Arabia, to deter or prevent continued offensive operations by the Iraqis beyond the Kuwaiti borders. We deployed the most rapidly available forces, the ones we have trained and equipped for immediate contingencies—U.S. Air Force fighter squadrons, a Marine Expeditionary Force, the 82d Airborne Division and the communications, intelligence and surveillance means needed to keep those forces under control and informed. That was military strategy at work and the execution of that strategy brought our first success—the Iraqis did not attack Saudi Arabia. I agree, they might not have anyway, but I heard that about the Russians in Europe for about 40 years and I'm still glad to have been part of the NATO forces that just may have had some influence on any Russian contemplation otherwise.

Our second task was to guarantee the continuing success of the first, and we deployed the balance of an Army corps which brought our first mechanized and armor forces and an air assault element heavily equipped with antiaarmor helicopters. We introduced a local offensive, counterattack capability which improved our defensive fighting effectiveness. More Marines and more tactical air rounded out the combat force necessary to assure the constancy of the success already realized, and we complemented that effort with the mobilization and deployment of the reserve forces needed to provide the logistical and administrative support required. In execution, no force in history has ever done it better; very few, if any, have done it as well.

The third task demanded by the overall mission was to prepare for offensive operations if they become necessary to satisfy both the United Nations' and the President's declaration that Iraqi forces would have to withdraw from Kuwait or be driven out. The military strategy for accomplishing that task has been the subject of strong debate for the past few months as those who advocate a firepower offensive as being all that is needed have had to contend with arguments that a land war of maneuver will also be required. In my opinion, the argument is almost irrelevant—but remember I am

speaking solely of the factors that are of military significance. For those concerned with costs, with economic disruptions or political problems, "irrelevant" is a contentious word.

Again I believe the proper decisions were made and a proper strategy was followed. If offensive operations are to be necessary to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait, then the threat to launch those operations must be accompanied by the availability of the means to carry it out. In my opinion, for the United Nations' resolution and the President's statement of our purpose to be credible, i.e., "If you don't go, we will evict you," the presence of an adequate total force—land, sea and air—in the area and ready for use is absolutely essential. In this circumstance the presence of airpower only is a promise of punishment, and severe though it may be, it is not a promise of mission fulfillment.

We made the decisions to create that credible force, to put on the ground the 400,000 and more Americans who established that credibility. And the reason for my statement that the argument regarding a firepower-only or a land war is militarily irrelevant is because it applies to how we should employ the force, not to whether it is needed for credibility. We don't know whether Saddam Hussein will succumb to a firepower-only offensive, but we know now that if he doesn't, he is fully aware that we have built the force necessary to take the next step.

So, in answer to my first question (What military action does the buildup of forces by the United States and its allies imply?), I believe that it implies our conviction that a capability to accomplish the mission assigned by the UN and by the President has been established. It is hoped that it will cause Saddam Hussein to conclude that we will be successful if an offensive campaign is undertaken.

I do not accept the argument that the presence of this offensive capability somehow impinges on the possibility of a diplomatic or economic or some other peaceful solution. I do not accept the argument that the presence of such forces somehow demands that they be employed—that generals and admirals will force decisions that will start the war. In the history of this nation there has never been an occasion in which the military has been other than a tool of our government; there has never been a threat by the military to displace civilian governmental control; and I have never known,

or known of, an American general or admiral who would start a war in the Persian Gulf just because he had the forces available to engage in one. It is a ridiculous contention.

I want to add here, parenthetically, that if this strategy is wrong, that is, if we really don't need the force we have deployed because we can accomplish our purpose with something less, we will, in the end, have wasted only money. If, on the other hand, we deployed something less than needed to do the whole job, we might find ourselves expending what we had deployed—another Bataan Peninsula force—or find ourselves desperately piecemealing in the forces needed to prevent such a catastrophe. In war, it is far better to mobilize and employ 200 percent of what is needed than only 99 percent—and in the long run less costly.

My second question is: What is the proper strategy for the use of these forces? Now, suddenly, the irrelevant argument becomes the question of the day. Now the firepower-only advocates can express their theory that Saddam Hussein can be brought to his knees by air strikes that carpet-bomb his forces, that destroy critical targets, and that deny him the ability to command and control or logically support his army in the field.

I am not impressed by the either/or arguments that have taken place regarding such claims. No sane commander, given modern means to employ firepower, would not first engage in preparatory fires that he would hope might be decisive. The example of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is too convincing to be ignored. The Japanese retired from World War II when they were faced with an overwhelming threat against which they could neither defend nor retaliate. There are other examples in history of commanders and kings who gave up under such circumstances. Lord Cornwallis did at Yorktown, many medieval sieges were successful and the Kaiser ended World War I with his forces still in France and Russia because of the military power and potential finally arrayed against Germany.

But there are many more examples in which firepower only or the threat of overwhelming force was not enough. Adolf Hitler never surrendered, Ho Chi Minh ignored the impact of seven years of bombing, and the defenders of the Alamo thought that facing overwhelming numbers of Mexicans was not a reason to give up. The perception of hopelessness in such cases is in the eye of the beholder, and we have no idea

whether Saddam Hussein is Davy Crockett or Ho Chi Minh or Lord Cornwallis reincarnate.

If the Iraqis decide to resist, to hold on to Kuwait, or even perhaps to attack themselves, the scheme of allied operations will have to change from an air campaign to an air-land campaign. When I said earlier that the term "landpower advocate" might need further explanation, it is that I am an air-land power advocate. I would never undertake a land forces-only campaign, but once again I remind you that Ho Chi Minh did exactly that.

In any event the air campaign will be modified to incorporate air interdiction and close air support as high-priority supporting tasks for ground operations, and the principal effort of the Central Command will be to drive Army and Marine forces to secure objectives critical to the continued operations of our forces or which deny the enemy the ability to continue his operations. At the operational level of war such objectives can be transportation hubs where air, rail or highway facilities converge, they can be seaports through which the enemy is resupplied or which are needed for the continuing supply of your own forces. They can be points of dominant terrain from which land forces can command a wide sweep of the ground with surveillance and long-range fires to deny the enemy any use of the area. They can be psychological—the capture of a nation's capital is always a major factor impacting on a populace's willingness to continue to fight.

I was not asked specifically to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in this crisis, but I believe they should be a consideration in any appraisal of our current strategy, and I found a niche right here to bring up the subject. I am a believer that tactical nuclear weapons are or should be a significant battlefield factor. They are the most cost-effective—and not only in dollars, but in manpower, force structure and logistical support—they are the most cost-effective means of massing firepower available. The Army's short-range, low-yield weapons can be employed with minimum collateral damage, probably no civilian casualties, but with devastating impact on military forces deployed in the defensive formations employed by the Iraqis. Selective employment of air-delivered weapons can

improve geometrically the effectiveness of an interdiction campaign.

It is quite true that nuclear weapons carry a great load of political baggage. Over the years the argument about these systems has been completely one-sided, and the spokesmen citing nuclear holocausts and nuclear winters and the inhumanity of weapons of mass destruction have carried the day without opposition. But there is a strong military case to be made in such a debate, and my concern has been that no one makes it. I would like to know that our field commander was able to consider their employment, identify the military advantages and disadvantages, and make a recommendation accordingly. If the President then determines that some other course of action is better, for whatever reason, we can be satisfied that he was aware of the nuclear alternative. I can hope that such occurred in this crisis, but I have seen no indication that it has.

The decision regarding the best way to employ the forces made available to the U.S. Central Command is the responsibility of one man, the commander in chief, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. His position is a lonely one—because he must and should hold that responsibility singularly while the rest of us hope that we have put the right man in that predicament. But he is also a man beset with more advice and counsel than he can possibly use. Every commander has a staff to help him do his thinking, but the higher he is in the military hierarchy, the bigger his staff becomes, in addition to which he is forced to absorb more and more advice and direction and cogent observations from outside his command. In General Schwarzkopf's case, the output from his supporting services—Army, Navy, Air Force—in the Pentagon, the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense and national agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Logistics Agency—is joined by the deluge offered up by members of Congress and their staffs,¹ by columnists and editorialists,² and by think-tank and retired military armchair Napoleons, so I have decided that he does not need another scheme proposed today by me.

He has had five months to study three subjects in which he must qualify for a graduate degree. They are:

¹ The House Armed Services Committee displayed on national television an operations map with four avenues of approach and three critical objectives, along with a tutorial explanation of how and why such a plan can be made to work.

² On 15 January 1991 *The Washington Times* provided an eight-page campaign plan portraying their war-winning proposals.

1. A complete understanding of his mission and the guidance and direction he has received from his superiors.
2. An exhaustive appraisal of the enemy and his capability to interfere with or defeat that mission.
3. A thorough utilitarian knowledge of the forces made available to him for employment to accomplish his mission.

Among those three things, the first is most important. Unless a commander understands completely what he is expected to accomplish, the ultimate objective he must strive to achieve, his campaign will be forever in danger of foundering. I believe this requirement is most difficult for those who advocate an air-only campaign because they deal in target arrays and the inflicting of punishment, not in the attainment of objectives. Since "unconditional surrender" seems an unlikely demand in this crisis, the relationship of target arrays to the elements of the mission should be spelled out beforehand to assure that accomplishment of the total mission is guaranteed.

And he has had five months to contemplate the first five essentials of his plan:

1. His concept of operations, i.e., his explanation to his subordinates and superiors of his plan to accomplish his mission.
2. His directives to his subordinate commanders.
3. His satisfaction that his plan is logically feasible.
4. His system of command and control.
5. His demands for the resources he needs to do it better.

With my apologies to Clausewitz, planning a military campaign is and should be simple—it is in the execution of the plan that military genius is a most desirable attribute. And to Sun Tzu when I wish for our side that we have planned the greatest of military campaigns—one that need not be fought because the enemy sees the hopelessness of his situation.

A Ruff-Puff Solution

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, November 2006]

Recently, perusing a printed version of a speech by Lewis Sorley, author, scholar and retired soldier, that reassesses the ARVN (the Army of the Republic of Vietnam), I was reminded of several things that mirrored

my experience and my convictions about the years 1968 to 1972. The ARVN became an effective fighting force. President Nguyen Van Thieu became a wise, competent and determined leader. The Territorial Forces became a reliable local security complement of the military establishment. Finally, between 1969 and 1972 that war was actually won by the South.

Proof of that winning was the failure of the North's 1972 Easter Offensive in which the North was defeated on all fronts by the ARVN with the help of the U.S. Air Force and the logistical sustainment provided by other U.S. elements. It was the help promised by the Nixon administration that justified the withdrawal of American forces during that same period.

The ultimate loss of South Vietnam, caused by the terms of the Paris peace accords of 1973 and the congressional denial of subsequent air and logistical support, does not change the observation that the war was won at the end of 1972. There are many lessons from that period that are germane to our current situation in the war on terrorism and in Iraq.

The most important of these lessons might be reflected in the sentence: "The Territorial Forces became a reliable local security complement."

In 1968 General Creighton Abrams became commander of the U.S. Forces in Vietnam, and in 1969 the newly elected Nixon Administration came to power advocating the Vietnamization of the war.

General Abrams, who had the previous year been the deputy commander in Vietnam, recognized that the do-it-ourselves "search and destroy" strategy would have to evolve into a clear-and-hold campaign that would require improved capabilities of not only the ARVN but, most important, the Territorial Forces as well. The RF (Regional Forces controlled by province chiefs) and PF (Popular Forces responding to district and village chiefs) were commonly referred to by American troops as the ruff-puffs. They were the local militiamen too old or too young for the ARVN, soldiers retired or medically discharged from the ARVN, and yes, deserters who had become worn out by years of service in the ARVN and who just went home but were still willing to carry a gun to protect the local populace. They had to provide the "hold" if the new strategy was to be successful.

General Abrams set about arming, equipping and training the ruff-puffs. The M16 rifle, replacing the World

War II M2 carbine, became the symbolic guarantee that he was serious. Indeed, many Territorials received the M16 before the ARVN was fully equipped. The effectiveness of the ruff-puffs improved rapidly, local security was enhanced and the Viet Cong, the local Communist underground, ceased to exist, but for a few diehards. One of the most telling benefits was the fact that joining the ruff-puffs was an acceptance of and commitment to the government of South Vietnam and its leadership. No other grassroots political program had a beneficial impact that compared to this one.

When we measure today's worldwide terrorism threat against our local security capabilities it seems apparent that there is a common need for improvement. It is not time to issue M16s, but it is time for our "neighborhood watch" groups to expand their concerns, plan their responses, establish communications linkages and consider methods of reinforcement in a period of crisis. The need for rifles, helmets, body armor and more may well be future factors.

We should also hope that the Iraqi government is aware of this lesson, that it has embarked on its own neighborhood watch effort, encouraging the population to invest in its own security. Surely the rank and file of the people oppose the terrorist acts that are disrupting normal life in their cities and towns and will respond to an effort to organize themselves to provide security, especially for their children.

It would be pleasing to learn in a couple of years that neighborhood watch groups have become Iraqi ruff-puffs and have taken over the local security role throughout the country.

Terminating Conflict

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, August 2006]

The news has been rife for the last month or so with demands from Congress, pundits and others that we withdraw from Iraq now or at some specified date. It is widely claimed that we've done enough, and three and a half years of expended soldiers, materiel and money is burden enough without adding more of each to the continuing cost of war, that if we don't do it now, the Iraqis will never assume responsibility.

Any number of old clichés come to mind—"the past is prologue," "history repeats itself," "those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it" and "in war there is no substitute for victory." With

those observations in mind, this history of war termination by our government should be of interest today.

Beginning with the Revolutionary War, almost always we settled our military conflicts before initiating diplomatic efforts to confirm the ongoing relationship between combatants. An early exception is the War of 1812, which ended by treaty in 1814, some weeks before Andrew Jackson won the Battle of New Orleans. It was, however, that battle that convinced the British that they were not going to reacquire their American colonies. The general rule held through World War II, when the "unconditional surrender," first demanded by Ulysses Grant, became the mantra of the Allies, determined to destroy the German and Japanese attempts to dominate the world. And for the first 169 years, we won all our wars.

Since that time we have engaged in eight notable conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, the Cold War and the ongoing war in Iraq, Afghanistan and against Islamo-Fascist terrorism. We won five of those, tied one, lost one and the last remains undecided.

Four victories were recorded when we dominated militarily and dictated the final settlement. One, the Cold War, was won when our potential military prowess caused the bankruptcy of our adversary.

Korea, when we settled for less and attempted to negotiate a satisfactory result, evolved into a two-year costly stagnation on the military front followed by 53 years of continued confrontation that today has us concerned about the capabilities and intent of the enemy. The resources expended in those years to guarantee the freedom of our South Korean allies have been an inordinate burden on the American taxpayer, and the ultimate outcome is yet to be determined. That this could be a pattern if we settle for less in Iraq is certainly one possibility.

The one war that was lost, Vietnam, is the one that we attempted to settle with diplomacy from the outset. Every military action was designed to send a message that settlement required only reasonable accommodation by the North to the fact that a Republic of (South) Vietnam could continue to exist and a warning that we could escalate further if they did not capitulate. (This is a form of strategic appeasement that the United States and U.N. have urged upon Israel to obtain an Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist. Trading land for

peace, giving back the Sinai, withdrawing settlements, abandoning Gaza, not building the border wall—all are examples of such an approach, yet the conflict, in its 60th year, continues unresolved.) In furtherance of this message, we gave a timetable of withdrawal that was executed over a two-year period. When our forces were reduced to air power plus two Army brigades, the North launched its 1972 Easter offensive, the beginning of a three-year campaign that conquered the South and won the war. Our withdrawal from the military conflict, negotiated conclusively by the Paris Peace Accords and finalized when Congress denied funds for continued support of the Republic of Vietnam, sealed the fate of South Vietnam, and millions of people in Southeast Asia lost lives and livelihoods as a result.

I was a participant in four of those wars and have no trouble concluding that winning is better than the alternatives, that withdrawing from Iraq before it has a stable government will repeat the Vietnam experience, will result in a chaotic civil war in that country and will be claimed as a complete victory by the terrorists. Withdrawal will also inexorably give rise to a demand for abandoning Afghanistan as well and consign us to fighting the war on terrorism from within our own borders.

The logic of this argument seems so apparent that it is difficult to understand how some have concluded that withdrawing our forces now or announcing a withdrawal schedule can possibly result in a favorable outcome.

Would You *Really* Rather Have Airpower?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, January 1999]

In July, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College published *Halt Phase Strategy*, an analysis of the latest promise of the airpower advocates. The author, Earl H. Tilford, Jr., calls the concept “new wine in old skins.” My reaction is somewhat more acerbic; it is old snake oil in a plastic bottle.

I will nottry to improve on Dr. Tilford’s conclusions, but his excellent exposé provides an opportunity to add some thoughts to what he has observed. His conclusions, in simplified form, are that the halt phase strategy is not a war-winner, is narrowly focused on defeating armor in open warfare and has little application to “full-spectrum warfare” as it is now defined.

I have great admiration for U.S. Air Force friends whose P-47s, P-51s, F-80s, F-86s and A-7s furnished much appreciated close support in three wars. I cheered the B-17s and B-24s that overflowed my foxholes in 1944 and 1945, but I learned as a lieutenant that they were part-time soldiers, great when they were available but not to be relied on routinely. They were never there at night, or in bad weather or when “priorities” sent them elsewhere.

Has that changed? Not in the Persian Gulf War, where the old limitations were exacerbated by policies that kept fixed-wing operations at a 10,000-foot level. To my knowledge, it has not changed today, despite the additions of night vision, infrared sensors and “smart” bombs.

The Army has paid a high price for the unfulfilled promises of airpower since World War II—between wars in budget battles and during wars in facing enemy capabilities with which we were unprepared to cope.

Halt phase strategy promises to stop an enemy ground offensive with a firepower-only countereffort, the firepower to be air-delivered from bases that can be established in short order in the theater of operations. Except for some security forces to protect these bases, landpower can be mobilized by calling up reserve component forces that will deploy to mop up and occupy the area conquered by airpower. *Voila!* The active Army can be reduced to the small units needed to protect air bases, and the money saved can buy F-22s, Joint Strike Fighters and other modernized airpower.

Beginning in World War II, airpower was a tremendous asset as it created havoc and panic among enemy forces caught in the open. Even then, it did not prevent the escape of significant German forces back across the Rhine. Airpower was far less effective against fortified locations such as the Normandy beaches and the Siegfried Line, and it was almost totally unusable for almost two weeks against the German Ardennes offensive. The same limitations applied in Korea, where airpower could not stop the Chinese that stretched from the Yalu River to the demilitarized zone and in Vietnam where the Ho Chi Minh Trail remained functional for the entire war despite more bomb tonnage than we expended in World War II. In the Persian Gulf, more than one month’s expenditure of the most proficient air campaign in history failed to achieve a single objective established for that war.

After each war, including the Persian Gulf, the airpower advocates claimed that with more resources, a more comprehensive operations plan and a little more time, all could have been won without the necessity of large-scale land operations. They are now sure that the next war will offer another opportunity to prove their case. Their arguments always remind me of socialists who explain socialism's failure to work as being caused by inadequate resources and a lack of time. Seventy years of that noble experiment in the Soviet Union, where all of the resources were available all of the time, was apparently not enough. I suspect that the next war will provide the same airpower lesson as the past.

Unfortunately, today's slick presentation of the halt phase strategy enjoys great reception among those who want national defense guaranteed by the lowest bidder. The lessons of history, the sound logic of the joint application of fire and maneuver, and the decisive role of landpower seem to have little influence on such thinking. Even with the wondrous capabilities of today's technology, airpower is still a part-time participant that cannot provide the final, decisive action that wins wars.

Dr. Tilford has provided an important report for the Army. We need to ensure that his appraisal reaches a wide audience and is given strong support by the Army hierarchy.

We Won?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, November 1999]

There may be an *ARMY* magazine reader or two who remembers an article entitled "Would You *Really* Rather Have Airpower?" (January). The author of that piece argued that wars are not, cannot be and have not been won by the application of firepower (airpower) alone. I expect those readers, after reading, hearing and watching accounts of the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia (Serbia) are now awaiting that author's willingness to "eat crow." Everybody knows that a 78-day air campaign resulted in the capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic, the removal of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo and the restoration of their homeland to thousands of displaced Kosovars.

Well, the author (who, me?) is willing to acknowledge that those results were achieved, but because they have little relevancy to the objectives that we set out to attain, they also have little relevancy to the question of winning or losing.

The fundamental purpose of this campaign was to end the "ethnic cleansing," the practice of removing Albanian, Islamic and Gypsy people from their homes in Kosovo, either killing them or driving them to exile. The result, actually, was to accelerate, expedite and expand the process because nothing prevented the Yugoslav army from stampeding into the province and stepping up operations to complete the job. Ethnic cleansing continued, much more effectively, through the entire period, abetted unfortunately by a couple of misplaced NATO air strikes.

A secondary purpose was the destruction or degradation of the Yugoslav forces engaged in the cleansing campaign.

Official NATO figures claim almost 100 tanks destroyed, but a British report contends that we may have destroyed 11 armored vehicles, or perhaps it was only seven. Whatever the number, the Yugoslav army that departed from Kosovo did so in good order with little apparent degradation of its capabilities. We did establish that its air defense was woefully ineffective, especially when we kept our aircraft up and out of range of their battlefield weapons.

Another objective might have been the deposing of Milosevic. If so, the transferal of the initiative regarding when to end it to Milosevic allowed him to decide when infrastructure damage and civilian casualties had reached the limits of tolerance.

Months later, with a costly United Nations occupation force in-country, ethnic cleansing seems to be continuing, albeit at a lesser intensity and against other people. Milosevic is still in power, and the victors are debating how to fund the rebuilding efforts that are needed. That funding might be available to Serbia is another initiative that we have transferred to Milosevic, who now seems to have a promise that if he resigns, NATO will help the recovery in Belgrade and other areas destroyed by our bombs.

If this situation reflects the promise of winning through airpower, perhaps some second thoughts are in order. Ignoring the moral and legal questions associated with the decision to go to war with Yugoslavia and accepting that it was necessary, would it not have been far better to launch another "Just Cause" operation (the Panama campaign that deposed Manuel Noriega)? The simultaneous airborne seizure of multiple objectives could have established the NATO presence while the

Yugoslav army was still outside the borders of Kosovo. The removal of that army from Kosovo would never have been necessary unless it had attacked the NATO forces, in which case it would most likely have been severely mauled if not fully destroyed.

A Just Cause operation would have stabilized Kosovo and prevented ethnic cleansing, thereby precluding the need for "restoration of their homeland" to thousands of displaced Kosovars.

Finally, such an operation would have posed a far more tangible threat to Milosevic's reign as the possibility of an invasion of Serbia and the capture of Belgrade became more credible.

Of course, it would have taken more time and greater effort, and cost more initially, but the results, if the operation was at all successful, would today be much more satisfying and the long-term costs a great deal less.

These thoughts are not second-guessing the military commanders who directed and managed the air campaign against the Yugoslavs. They and the airmen involved performed magnificently. They were engaged in "getting it done." The questions "what to do," "why to do it" and "how to do it" are always political and the responsibility of higher authority. It is those questions that are addressed here.

These thoughts also presume the availability of the resources needed for such an operation. It is not clear that today we have the capability of mounting another Just Cause, which may be the reason we did not, but if that is the case, the next Quadrennial Defense Review has another problem to solve.

The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that we can afford the time and the costs required to do a job right. We must hope that next time our leaders will heed the lessons that a comparison of the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign offer.

What to Hope For

[Reprinted from ARMY, September 2002]

The American public, that portion that reads newspapers and listens to talking heads, is being inundated with "plans for attacking Iraq." A large collection of columnists, commentators, retired colonels and generals and just plain reporters, each with, he hopes, a credible link to "leaks from the Pentagon," is

expounding on what we have to do, how we have to do it, how much in the way of resources will have to be committed to the task and when will be the opportune time to launch.

This, of course, is not a new phenomenon. Not much more than a decade ago the same attempts at prophecy provided the why and how we would take down Noriega in Panama and restore the freedom of Kuwait. Look back through your files and try to find a presentation that correctly predicted how either of those operations would be conducted. The *Congressional Record* has a number of learned presentations by members of our leading think tanks, all of which were inadequate, incorrect or just flat wrong.

On at least two occasions I was asked to proffer my ideas for these campaigns. I refused, saying I had confidence in those charged at that time with the responsibility for such planning and that I didn't think they should be diverted from their duties to have to comment on what I might say. I hope today that the Joint Chiefs and their commanders in the field are not spending valuable time rebutting the plans and ideas being published in newspapers and newsmagazines.

There is one disturbing aspect of many of these plans, particularly those that claim a link to the Pentagon. It is that they are based on assumptions or presumptions or hopes concerning the actions or reactions of others. It is presumed that a Kurdish force will join in an attack from the north. It is hoped that Iraqi army forces, demoralized by the power of our air attacks on critical objectives, will not oppose the "small force" we will need on the ground. It is believed that the Iraqi people, given the opportunity to depose their dictator, will support our efforts and add strength to the operation. It is anticipated that an air campaign will bring down the Iraqi government.

Not long ago the President of AUSA, General Gordon R. Sullivan, wrote a book entitled *Hope Is Not a Method*. Can any thought be more apropos when considering the problems promised by the military commander who embarks on a campaign based on hope? Hope contributes nothing to the resources required, to the organization of the forces or to the scheme of maneuver that will attain the objective of an operation. When considered at all, hope is no more than an excuse or an explanation of inadequacies in the plan, a reason for not providing the total effort that might be

needed. It is also a promise of disaster if the hope is forlorn.

Once again the Vietnam War provides the lesson. How many times did we hope that a bombing pause or a resumption of bombing or the decision not to bomb Hanoi or not to blockade Haiphong would bring our enemy to an armistice? We poured resources—men, materiel, munitions and money—into the effort, but for almost seven years our national strategy was based on the hope that North Vietnam would cease and desist because of the reasonableness of our endeavor and in fear of the escalation of our application of power.

Hope is not a method, but we need it today if only to hope that our military leaders will not be incorporating it in any future plans or strategies.

Caveat Emptor

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, July 2003]

Caveat emptor is an apt warning in these days of immediate expressions of lessons learned from the Iraqi Freedom campaign. It has not bothered a rather large number of commentators, pundits, columnists and other authors that they do not know the facts of the matter, that performance appraisals, equipment shortcomings and weapons' effects are yet to be measured and catalogued. We do not know why the Iraqis failed to fight better—PSYOPS or just being overwhelmed by a professionalism they could not cope with, or both?

We do not know yet the relative influence of the campaign plan (competent, flexible), the increased situational awareness (of commanders and soldiers alike), the improved synchronization (greater speed, more jointness), the degree of technical superiority and the comparative states of training and readiness of the forces; nevertheless, we are being told that new concepts of warfare have been established, new approaches have been approved and major structural revisions will be required. It has been opined that the value of the Abrams tank has been enhanced, thereby calling into question the need for the Stryker. The vulnerability of the Apache has been highlighted and its future usefulness questioned. The Marines have demonstrated a previously unrecognized deep thrust capability. The versatility of our combat service support formations now allows us to operate long

lines of communications without the need of major security forces.


I do not know the truth about all of those observations, opinions and claims, but I certainly think it is too early in our studies of the campaign to decide on some of those far-reaching ideas. I also think it is important to recognize that the legacy force (a term no longer in favor, but one I like as describing the force in being, the force we go to war with tomorrow morning, whenever that tomorrow comes) won this war. Mechanized (designed for Europe?), airborne, air assault and Marine forces not only were needed, but they also accomplished their missions credibly and with dispatch. Their value was not enhanced; it was validated.

The vulnerability of the Apache, or any close support aircraft, has not changed. The result of one hastily conceived, poorly planned operation is a severe lesson learned, but not a cause for the consignment of Apaches to the scrapheap. In contrast, it is also not the time to question the need for the Stryker. Who knows if getting more Stryker brigades in the theater faster wouldn't have accelerated the starting time, added forces and reduced the risks without delaying the outcome?

I am surprised that some have discovered a new Marine deep thrust capability. Don't they remember the Korean War? Marines went deep into Korea in more than one operation and held a front line position in the center of the peninsula when the armistice was signed. I maintain that the Marines can go as deep as anyone as long as the Army's combat service support structure is robust enough to provide their combat wherewithal.

Perhaps the less said about the security of our logistics forces and the lines of communications the better. That, it seems to me, was one of the risks the planners accepted and one in which they were proved right. Next time is next time, however, and planners will have the same risks to consider. Let's hope they don't decide just on the basis of Iraqi Freedom's success.

There are lots of lessons to be learned from this war, but as with all wars, serious detailed study will be required. Let us not be distracted by conclusions hastily advanced; they are as likely to be wrong as they are to be right.



Miscellany

Miscellany

This final section includes a number of pieces that didn't fit neatly into any particular category. They reflect some important issues, so I wanted to put them into the book somewhere.

I wrote "Would You *Really* Rather Have a Marine?" to point out some of the fallacies that arise when comparing the Marine Corps with the Army. The article was instigated by claims that the Marines—every Marine a combat soldier—are a much better bargain, that relatively speaking they provide "more bang for the buck." It was at a time, after the Persian Gulf War, that serious force structure issues and the endstrengths of the services were being debated in Congress and by the news pundits. I did not expect the article to generate enthusiasm among my Marine friends, but I also had no intent to denigrate or disparage their contribution to our military prowess. Both services have critical roles in our defense establishment; both are deserving of full budgetary support for the roles they fill.

"Budget Forgets Land Victory is the Ultimate Arbiter" was written shortly after the Persian Gulf War. It examines the crucial link between resources allotted in the defense budget and capabilities required for the Army to maintain a viable land force for future wars.

In my last active duty assignment before retiring, I wore two hats—one as the commander in chief of United States Army, Europe and the other as the commander of NATO's Central Army Group. From the vantage point of a senior commander in the alliance, I gained an appreciation for the capabilities of its military structure and the responsibilities of member nations to participate in that structure. With the end of the Cold War came considerable debate about the future of NATO. While observing the discussions that centered on increasing its membership and broadening its mission in the mid-1990s, I wrote two articles for *ARMY* magazine concerning proposals for changes to the alliance that seemed to ignore military implications. Since I wrote these articles, NATO has added three new members (in 1999) and invited seven more nations to participate in accession talks (in 2002).

I have supported the general proposition of NATO expansion. I believe security threats continue to justify the existence of the alliance. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic all know that freedom is not free, and they have given positive impressions of their willingness to be contributing members. Now it must be determined that the next new members will also be willing and able to add their fair share to the military structure. As talks with seven potential new members go forward, the



On 3 March 1983, General Kroesen says farewell to Germany's II Korps in Ulm.

concerns raised in 1997 and 1998 strike me as still relevant and worth revisiting.

I was still in Germany after World War II ended in Europe when I first became aware of the atomic bomb being used at Hiroshima. At the time I was relieved and grateful because the bomb ended the war in the Pacific and there would be no invasion of Japan. After the war I had no real interest in nuclear weapons until the Korean War, and then I was mainly curious as to why they weren't used. When I attended the Army's Command and General Staff College in 1956 I learned about the tactical potential of atomic weapons such as the 280mm gun and the Honest John rocket. Their battlefield utility made me a believer in the efficacy of small-yield, short-range nuclear weapons on the battlefield. While at the Armed Forces Staff College in 1959 I had to write my first thesis. Because I had become convinced that tactical, short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons had a significant role on the battlefield, I wrote on how I thought the next war could be fought, limited in scope even with tactical nuclear weapons. The next war, Vietnam, did not happen that way, but I still have a copy of that paper, and I continue to be a believer in what I said then, particularly while "non-proliferation seems a hopeless quest."

Nuclear weapons are the most effective way to mass firepower. In the 1950s I believed, accepted and promulgated the Army's doctrine. We had tactical nuclear artillery and missiles, and we practiced with them. But in the 1960s interest in nuclear weapons shifted to strategic systems, centralized control and decisionmaking at the highest levels. Army doctrine withered as war games, exercises and maneuvers limited nuclear play to a climactic detonation that signaled victory and the troops went home. There was no reference to nuclear weapons in the Army War College's war-game manual—no tables, no statistics, no effectiveness data, no explanation of commanders' considerations or factors pertaining to their use.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, few officers had any knowledge of or interest in planning the use of nuclear weapons. During those years the debate became completely one-sided as international nuclear holocaust became the headline topic. Experts assumed escalation to a global exchange would be automatic after the first atomic weapon was fired, and nuclear winter would be the result. Unfortunately, the Army did nothing to keep significant tactical nuclear weapons or doctrine viable.

There were no advocates for them at high-level headquarters, joint or combined. They dropped from sight except when the budget provided for warhead modernization and new missiles. Strategic nuclear weapons became valued for their deterrence and were considered of no use once the war started; tactical nuclear weapons were remanded to a limbo from which they never emerged.

I deplore the current situation, not because I advocate using nuclear weapons but because I believe there should be a military option for planning that would give potential enemies something to worry about. While I am very much aware that any use of nuclear weapons carries considerable political baggage, my concern is that advisors, counselors and experts (including many senior military ones) who oppose any use of nuclear weapons outnumber and outshout those who might present an alternative option. I would like field commanders to be able to consider, plan and measure the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear weapons and make recommendations for their use, if such use were deemed advisable, rather than completely ignoring them.

Three articles reprinted here from *ARMY* magazine reflect my continued belief that there is still a place for small-yield nuclear weapons in the Army's arsenal, and that they can be employed in a rational manner without blindly leading the world into a holocaust. I wrote the first piece, "Limbo Status of Tactical Nukes Leaves Serious Readiness Gap," during the Persian Gulf War. In it I explained how a tactical nuclear capability would have provided additional flexibility during the deployment of forces to Southwest Asia. The second article—"Does Anybody Care?"—written eight years later, revisits the question. Since that piece was written, Pakistan and India have both detonated nuclear weapons, North Korea has revealed that it has long had a nuclear weapons development program, and Iraq is widely believed to have been working toward building a nuclear bomb. Most significantly, the Russians have reiterated, in their tactical doctrine, a reliance on nuclear firepower on the battlefield. These events only strengthen my long-held conviction that the United States must begin to rebuild its tactical nuclear capability. I do not like to contemplate a situation in which a U.S. deployed force has to face a nuclear capable enemy without having a credible capability of its own. The third article, "Tactical Nukes," sums up those considerations of a current threat.

The article "A Message for the Less Than the Best and the Brightest" was my reaction to an issue that recurs periodically in the Army. Whenever the Army faces a major reduction in its force structure there are concerns that its most capable leaders are going to leave for greener pastures, but in spite of those worries the institution has sustained its quality and furnished the leadership essential to meet every crisis.

Added columns include two on the always contentious issue of relations between the military and the news media, and three that are testimonials to our veterans and the national holidays associated with our war history.

Would You *Really* Rather Have a Marine?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, December 1994]

A recent Congressional Budget Office report, which finds that there is "more to cut" in the defense budget, has again raised the question of which service provides the most bang for the buck. The question comes just as the new Commission on Roles and Missions is beginning its inquiry and follows a number of recent articles and observations on the same subject.

General Carl E. Mundy Jr., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), says, "I think the utility and affordability of the Marine Corps [becomes obvious under examination]. If you trade it in you don't get much. We're 6 percent of budget overall. That's 10 percent of the manpower of the armed forces for only 6 percent of the budget, and they're all fighters!"

Our nation's newspapers have published any number of columns and letters from marines who point out that the marine tooth-to-tail ratio is the highest, that we get almost 100 percent combat-capable people at an operation and maintenance (O&M) cost of \$12,800 each, compared with the \$29,520 being paid by the U.S. Army for its soldiers. (These figures reflect the operation and maintenance funds included in the fiscal 1994 defense budget divided by the endstrength of each service. Military pay, being equal for all services, plays no part in comparisons of cost-effectiveness.)

Some of us old soldiers, always on the lookout for ways to improve the Army, decided to find out why these figures were startlingly different and what recommendations we could make to the Army Staff that would help them turn out combat soldiers at half the price.

One of the first things we learned as we began to study the problem is that we have to get the Navy to fund some things for us. The U.S. Marine Corps O&M budget only covers 84 percent of the Marines' endstrength (per USMC justification of estimates, February 1994). The U.S. Navy budget furnishes the rest. We don't know why that is, but we recommend that the Army ask the Navy for a comparable 16 percent of its O&M.

Then we learned that the Navy pays not only O&M but also all RDT&E (research, development, test and evaluation) and acquisition costs associated with USMC air operations, that is, the air wing of every marine division that makes it a MAGTF (marine air ground task force). Well, the Army doesn't have many fixed-wing aircraft, but we can explain our comparable need for rotary-wings and request the same coverage.

The Navy already budgets all RDT&E, acquisition and O&M for maritime prepositioning ships that give the USMC its rapid-response capability. Why not ask them, in the interest of efficiency and economy, to do the same for the 12 ships that the Army funds for the same role?

This same funding system pays for amphibious ships as well, but we don't believe the Army should ask to share that support. The Army can ask to borrow those vessels when they have to make an amphibious landing again à la World War II, Inchon and the like.

In regard to the development of new equipment for assault operations, the Navy is paying for the V-22 Osprey, the advanced amphibious assault vehicle and the landing craft air cushion. Again, some trade-off will have to be arranged, but we ought to be able to find matching Army programs that the Navy could support for us.

As we got deeper into our study we found that the Navy budgets for all force communications, for all medical support, for the USMC officers being educated at the U.S. Naval Academy and in ROTC, and for much of the administrative and service support associated with headquarters and other joint activities in which marines are employed—*inter alia*.

Well, then things started to get complicated. The Army pays for the recruiting stations where the Marines look for their few good men. The Army trains (and pays for) marine artillerymen, air defenders, missilemen

and engineers. The Navy furnishes (and pays for) all chaplains and medical personnel and trains all marine aviators. And, would you believe, the Air Force trains marine military police.

We haven't begun to cost out the corps support package that the Army provides for a marine division or MAGTF when it is committed to sustained operations. Since the Navy doesn't establish land-based communications, maintenance, supply, medical, intelligence, armored cavalry or corps artillery support for these divisions, we don't know how to ask them to budget for these services. But meanwhile, even without such calculations, we can total up some of what we know so far.

Transferring funding for only those things specified above as O&M provided by the Navy (with small contributions from the Army and Air Force) would reduce Army costs by \$4.34 billion.

Dividing by the Army's endstrength of 540,000 shows that we can lower the Army's cost per soldier by about \$8,000. Not a bad savings, but suppose on the other hand we divide the Navy money by the Marine endstrength of 174,000. Now we find that we have to add more than \$20,000 for each marine in service. Actual detailed accounting that we have done calculates comparable O&M costs at \$28,590 per soldier, \$35,990 per marine. We are still working on the comparisons of RDT&E, procurement and the corps support troops.

Now, we are quite aware that figures don't lie and that liars figure, but the main point of this article is: please, Roles and Missions Commission, start everything out on a level playing field where players, items of equipment, services and support activities are all counted the same way.

Try to remember that the cost of operating the Washington Redskins is not found just by totaling the players' salaries.

Budget Forgets Land Victory Is the Ultimate Arbiter

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, August 1991]

In the May [1991] issue of *ARMY*, my "Front & Center" article, "Limbo Status of Tactical Nukes Leaves Serious Readiness Gap," identified the limbo of tactical nuclear warfare as a problem that Army leaders of the past have failed to solve. This article identifies another challenge the current Army officer corps faces because

we who have gone before have left the legacy of non-solution.

The problem is the Army's share of the budget.

Desert Storm was likely the most perfectly planned and brilliantly executed military campaign in history. It is one that will be studied and, if possible, emulated by the military leaders of future centuries. Desert Storm proved once again the conclusiveness of land combat in the settling of disagreements between states—rightly or wrongly, deplorably, wastefully, perhaps only temporarily, but land war settles things.

There is no question that the air and naval campaigns, equally brilliant, made this land campaign relatively easy, paved the way for the smashing triumph and reduced—almost eliminated—casualties among the ground forces. It is also true, however, that not one Iraqi unit was withdrawn from Kuwait, not one legitimate Kuwaiti governmental office was restored, not one piece of Kuwait was returned to its rightful owners during 39 days of air and missile attack; yet all three of these objectives were achieved in 100 hours after ground operations began.

In the middle of that 45-day war, the executive branch of our government published its plan for the 1992 and 1993 budgets and the five-year defense program (FYDP) for 1993–97. It proposes, from 1990 to 1993:

- Active manpower reduction—349,200, 48 percent Army;
- Reserve manpower reduction—164,600, 81 percent Army;
- Civilian manpower reduction—109,000, 50 percent Army;
- Total Obligation Authority reduction—\$15.2 billion, 54 percent Army.

When projected to 1995, the trend worsens as, for example, additional manpower reductions of 140,000 are 59 percent Army.

In effect, the President's program will reduce the manpower strength of the armed forces—active, reserve and civilian—by 771,000, 11 percent overall. The Army, the decisive arm of our military establishment, will lose 424,000, 22 percent overall. (Exactness of these calculations is subject to argument because the numbers change, but the overall impact is relatively constant.)

Further study of the budget would reveal equally imbalanced projections for procurement and research and development (R&D) dollars. In effect, the “strategic systems” are supported, the tactical systems must make do. The Army, in order to mortgage the light helicopter program, has to close down the M1 tank line, fail to equip the Total Army with SINCGARS (single channel ground-to-air radio system) and maintain a shoestring R&D effort.

None of this is surprising to anyone who has been witness to the military programs of the post-World War II period. The advent of the atom bomb triggered immediate and ever-growing interest in the strategic systems.

The triad of manned bombers, ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and world-ranging submarines became the cornerstone, keystone and lodestone of Department of Defense (DoD) policy and the promise of lasting peace between the superpowers through deterrence and “mutually assured destruction.”

The triad grew appendages and additional legs as ground and air cruise missiles, the Minuteman, Midgetman and MX versions of the ICBM and carrier-based battle groups all drew strategic systems budgetary support over the years.

Meanwhile, the Army inched along in a modest effort to modernize its forces, a process stymied first by the costs of the Korean War, which brought us only the 3.5-inch rocket launcher. Tank development went into a 20-year limbo, and only Army subterfuge and stubbornness kept the helicopter alive.

The Vietnam War brought us the TOW, night-vision devices and the M16 rifle, but the MBT-70 died aborning, and the Cobra attack helicopter was only a Huey modification.

Real modernization awaited the mid-1970s when the Army’s Big 5 program (pared from Big 8) proposed a new tank, new attack helicopter, new air defense missile, new infantry fighting vehicle and a new utility helicopter along with some ancillary equipment such as a new tactical radio and a shoulder-fired antitank weapon.

The program came to fruition in time for the Persian Gulf War. Substantial procurement funding during the Reagan years along with, for the first time in memory, an adequate budget for training and other operation and maintenance needs, created the overwhelmingly superior

Army that destroyed utterly the Iraqi army occupying Kuwait.

Even then, the Army did not have its one-man antitank weapon, the Viper having been killed by Congress a decade before. It also did not have a real antitactical missile system, making do with a patchwork Patriot system to oppose the obsolescent Scud missile. The ATM (antitactical missile) had never excited any real support in the higher levels of Defense because the inaccuracy of enemy missiles caused them to be dismissed as a “nonthreat.”

A return to the pre-Persian Gulf and pre-Reagan years seems to be promised by the current President’s budget. Congress will modify that budget, of course, but the end product promises to keep the Army at something less than 25 percent of the dollars to be made available and the Army systems at a much lower priority than the strategic systems of the other services.

There is some kind of bias in our system of strategic appraisal that has always been exploited by the other services. Seventy-five percent of the earth’s surface is water, hence the maritime strategists establish an absolute requirement for naval power. The Pacific Command is defined automatically as a “maritime theater” regardless of the fact that the last three wars we fought there were primarily land campaigns.

One hundred percent of the earth is covered by air, and that fact provides impressive background for discussions of strategic firepower delivery and the utility of air for power projection. The world is the Air Force’s theater of operations, and quick reaction and massive impact in pursuit of our national interests are its promise. B-1 and B-2 bombers, F-15, F-16 and Stealth fighters and the ATF (advanced tactical fighter) make routine appearances in the modernization program while the Defense Department and Congress worry to death the Sergeant York, the follow-on to the M1 tank and perhaps the Comanche light helicopter.

The Army’s only big-ticket item today is the Comanche, and its future is hardly secure because B-2s, SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), C-17s and GPALS (global protection against limited strikes) garner higher priority and greater support from DoD, OMB (Office of Management and Budget), Congress and the news media. The light helicopter continues to be treated as a “nice to have” item in those circles rather than an essential for future land warfare.

Once again, the solution for the Army's problem is not apparent, and it is not simple. Efforts in the past, such as General Maxwell D. Taylor's *The Uncertain Trumpet*, have not had lasting impression. The Army has never generated a public information program that glorifies its role or its essentiality. The Army school system has emphasized jointness and the unified nature of modern warfare perhaps to the detriment of the importance of land campaigning, which has been carefully identified as AirLand Battle.

Let us hope that the next generation of Army leaders can do better. There is a need for strong, respected and reliable spokesmen who can convince the decision-makers of the future that the capability to conduct land warfare, to control land masses and their populations, remains the ultimate demand of the military establishment of the United States.

The Military Aspects of NATO Expansion

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, June 1998]

Now that the U.S. Senate has ratified the current NATO expansion proposal and presuming that all other member nations will also approve, perhaps it is time once again to point out that NATO is a military alliance, that expansion entails military ramifications and consequences.

A year ago, I joined the discussion of NATO expansion with a one-page article ("The Debate Over NATO Expansion," "Front & Center" [*ARMY*], January 1997) that expressed this same observation. The article also emphasized that military aspects should continue to dominate if not exclude the political, economic and social programs that many spokesmen seem to want to include in the NATO charter, and that adding territory without considering the contiguity and other influences of the added terrain and the military capabilities to be contributed by the new nations is not militarily sound.

In the past year, I have not read discussions, exposes or proposals regarding military requirements attendant to expansion. I have read a number of columns, reports and discussion points explaining the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris on 27 May 1997, that, in general, express three "understandings":

- Adding new members will not overextend NATO or demand additional commitments of its members.

- No additional army divisions, air wings, naval carriers or submarines will be required to defend new territories.
- There is no requirement to station existing NATO forces or nuclear weapons in the territories of the new members.

Unfortunately, I believe these understandings, usually associated with modest cost estimates, were developed without reference to the practical requirements of conducting military operations, and I would like to suggest that the following considerations will require attention if new members are added.

First, NATO has an organizational structure that can respond rapidly to a military crisis and function in command and control of operations. At the top, for any operation, is a headquarters made up of like-minded people who are equipped, trained and organized to function using a common operational doctrine. The headquarters commands units and organizations equipped, schooled and trained under the same doctrine, interoperable if not interchangeable on the battlefield. The current structure has to expand and perhaps relocate if it is to incorporate the forces of the new nations. This expansion may not be considered to be a big problem, but it is one that entails resources and costs and violates one of the understandings concerning the stationing of forces.

Second, NATO has built common systems of communications, logistics, fire support, standard ammunition, port operations and petroleum, oil and lubricants pipelines to serve all of its forces. All of the new members' armed forces are of Warsaw Pact design and their equipment is operationally and logically incompatible with these NATO systems. Since the NATO security guarantee requires its forces to defend its borders, hence to operate in all of its areas, some steps must be taken to create an interoperability. Again, this is not an insurmountable problem, but these steps entail more resources and costs, particularly in logistic ramifications, another violation of the understandings.

A third requirement is that of common understanding. NATO long ago adopted English as its common language. Although the current 16 nations have ten different native tongues, the need for common understanding and common communication in the exchange of command directives, intelligence information and operational orders made the adoption of one dominant language a practical step. Today, a command of English

is prerequisite to an assignment at a NATO headquarters, and English-speaking soldiers find they can operate among all of the armed forces of NATO. The impact of this requirement is that the new nations must prepare themselves to operate in English, not internally but certainly whenever their units are to be employed in coalition and when their officers and NCOs are assigned to NATO headquarters. Unlike the other requirements, there is not much cost associated with language training, but it does demand commitment and the acceptance of some delay in the development of compatibility among the forces because of the time required to develop language skills.

Another military factor is the continuing existence of nonmember states within the external perimeter of NATO. Switzerland always has been a nonthreatening island of nonmembership, but with the extension of NATO boundaries eastward, Austria becomes another neutral zone, benefiting from association with NATO but making no contribution. If and when the Baltic states join (favorites because of their Western orientation and their embrace of democracy), Sweden, Finland and Slovakia will be behind the lines. Such areas present military complications, blocking transportation routes, flight paths and waterways. The former Yugoslav states separate Greece and Turkey from their NATO partners and complicate consideration of Romania and Bulgaria for future membership. Each of these "islands" presents its own complications for military planners. It seems that, whereas membership should first be the result of an application by a state that voluntarily wishes to join, the current members, in the interest of military efficiency, ought to be demanding that others join in order that the defense mission remain a sensible unifying requirement.

There is also an overarching military requirement. The standardization of doctrine, the interoperability of equipment and organizations, and the common supportability of operations all require the commitment of compatible quality forces. New nations must be apprised of NATO standards for assuring the quality of the forces that will be integrated in the NATO structure and take part in NATO operations. A commitment to meet such standards should be a prerequisite for membership, and a willingness to be tested for quality should be a continuing requirement. Although such standards exist rudimentarily in NATO doctrinal publications, they have been used only for training, not for testing. The original NATO nations, allies in World War II, had

developed already a familiarity with these common demands, and each new member joined with forces already committed to the same methods and techniques. The absorption of new forces whose differences are marked is a good reason for formalizing a system that will contribute to long-term compatibility and interoperability.

The Debate Over NATO Expansion

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, January 1997]

The pros and cons of NATO expansion have been explored exhaustively in the years since the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Many of the "think-tanks" in Europe and the United States are continuing to hold conferences and seminars where learned scholars discuss whether we should or should not expand NATO—if so, who, when and how; if not, why and at what risk. The subject is always good for a column when a syndicated writer faces a deadline with an empty in-box.

After listening at these meetings and perusing much that has been written, I have come to believe that two thoughts have evolved as the most common, the most advocated, the most preferred and—in my opinion—the most ridiculous, the most unworkable, maybe even the most dangerous.

The first of these ideas is that, to expand, NATO must first broaden its mission. The security of Western Europe today, after all, is not a concern; therefore, unless NATO becomes more political, economic and social, it will become irrelevant. NATO, described liberally as the most successful alliance in history, should have no trouble embracing other fields and applying its practices to the solution of other problems. Europe and the world will benefit handsomely if we just exploit success.

I deplore the thought. NATO has been successful because, from inception to the present, it has been a military alliance focused almost exclusively on military security matters. Those who advocate that it become something more are merely exposing the failure of politicians, economists and the United Nations to solve their problems as well as the military has over the last half-century.

NATO's reason for being is the security of Western Europe. If it is to expand its mission it should only be to embrace the security of more of Europe, an expansion

that should demand that, militarily, new members bring a contribution that justifies including them in the wider area of protection. A military case can easily be made for including the states of Eastern Europe—principally through displacing the frontier of freedom eastward—but the ability and willingness of these states to provide the necessary contribution remains a matter of contention.

The second general theme most commonly proffered is that we can be selective in offering new memberships, to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, for example, while holding out hope for others who have joined the Partnership for Peace agreement. Thus, Slovakia, the Baltic states, Ukraine, maybe even Russia, can become members if they are truly democratic and want to join.

There should be no objection to such expansion if, as postulated earlier, the military contribution is equal to the extended risk, but none of the advocates of this kind of expansion touch on the military incongruity that will exist. The Baltic states are favorite candidates because they are “western oriented,” they are democratic, they are small and need protection. They are also either an island or a salient, depending upon Poland’s status, that is militarily indefensible unless more of the surrounding territory is also incorporated in the alliance. This highlights my second point of contention with expansion advocates: no one mentions the holes in the cheese—Austria, Sweden, Finland. (And when was the last time anyone mentioned that little bit of Russia that once was East Prussia, sitting to the west of the Baltics?)

How can we contemplate extending NATO eastward without demanding the consolidation of the entire area to the west of any new eastern boundary? It matters not that these countries have not applied for membership; it matters most that NATO has not demanded that they do so for the collective good of Europe. Extending NATO eastward includes these uncommitted nations within the frontier of freedom, under the NATO security umbrella. They should not enjoy this luxury without contributing to it.

Limbo Status of Tactical Nukes Leaves Serious Readiness Gap

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, May 1991]

Over the years, the Army has been faced with problems it has been unable, unwilling or uninterested

in solving. They are found in all components of the structure and in almost all of the management disciplines associated with military operations and their support. Some think they include “insolubles”—the size of the rifle squad, for example, which no one, from Hannibal to General William E. DePuy, U.S. Army retired, has ever established satisfactorily for his contemporaries, let alone the legions of force structure analysts that have followed.

The officer corps, particularly the captains, majors and lieutenant colonels who will be leading the Army of the future, should know that there is a history of nonsolutions that those of us who have gone before have left as our legacy. We are not proud of that, but failure to acknowledge failure is not a way to spur progress, hence this effort to highlight one of the things that needs to be done.

The problem is the limbo of tactical nuclear warfare.

For more than 35 years, the Army has built and fielded short-range, low-yield, mobile nuclear systems that promise firepower on the battlefield that can be militarily significant if not, perhaps, decisive in some combat situations. These systems have been costly in dollars, in personnel diverted to this specialty, in training, security, and logistics efforts expended to maintain them, and in the research and development programs undertaken to assure modernization. To date, despite three major wars and a number of other skirmishes, not one of these weapons has been employed, and prospects for their use in the future are not bright; instead, there is a definite and serious advocacy for their elimination altogether from the Army’s arsenal.

Unfortunately, there has been almost no argument about the wisdom of such sentiment because the subject has been addressed by one side only. In the past 30 years, the specter of an international nuclear holocaust, the threat of nuclear winter, the horrors of mass destruction and the inhumanity of neutron bombs have been instituted as ubiquitous truths of nuclear warfare. And there has been no voice countering the claims and caterwauls of the doom sayers.

In the mid-1950s, the Army had a doctrine for the employment of its tactical nuclear systems, it had a research and development program for its hardware, and it had training programs for its personnel. It all made sense, and in its entirety it promised a militarily significant tactical tool. It was held in relatively high regard and

caused the Army to restructure itself into “pentomic” divisions better suited for employment on a nuclear battlefield.

The hardware producers furnished the Army with the Davy Crockett, atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), the Honest John, artillery warheads and the 280mm atomic cannon, and promised the Little John and the Nike-Hercules. And the war gamers of those days spent their time proving that “Army 70” and “Army 80” designs had to be nuclear capable, acknowledging simultaneously that this meant a dual-capable structure that could also deal with minor conflicts in which only conventional weapons would be needed.

The 1960s brought the beginnings of the erosion of the total system that had been established. The Defense Department, while stripping the Army of half of its field artillery because of the availability of atomic projectiles and more effective close air support, became enamored with the need for higher-level control of nuclear weapons and the conviction that escalation to ever bigger and more destructive warheads would be automatic when the first atomic shell exploded. It established control systems that assured that no one could inadvertently, or for unauthorized purposes, explode a weapon without first obtaining positive, direct release for such action. The President would decide when even a fractional kilo-ton weapon would first be employed. The era gave rise to theories that later became dogma requiring “demonstration” shots and signals to the enemy that the price of aggression was going up if they did not cease and desist.

Unfortunately, the Army seemed to acquiesce to all of this enlightened thinking.

The pentomic division, which had many problems unconnected with nuclear doctrine, was abandoned for a new structure. The Davy Crockett was discarded, with no objection from the infantry commanders who had been overwhelmed by the regulatory system they had been saddled with, and with little complaint from the purveyors of doctrine. The atomic cannon had only a short life for much the same reasons, although it also gave way to more efficient, longer-range Lance and Pershing missiles. Finally, the Vietnam War turned the Army’s attention to a conflict in which its arsenal of atomic weapons, in truth, had no role to play.

In the 1970s, the Army’s preoccupation with making itself a volunteer force and with the absolute need for

modernization of its tank, armored personnel carrier, helicopters, signal communications, air defense and *myriad* other items of hardware, forced the nuclear systems into a lower priority for budget dollars or program consideration.

The 1990s saw the demise of the Nike-Hercules with no nuclear replacement planned for the Patriot, the elimination of the Pershing and the obsolescence of the Lance with no agreement or approval for a follow-on version, and the scrapping of ADMs. The 155mm howitzer warhead, in bad need of replacement, excited little attention or support at any level. The demands for centralized control reached into the military commands as the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces Europe (SHAPE) decreed that selective employment plans produced by corps and army groups need no longer be prepared; thereafter, decisions on when, where and how nuclear weapons would be employed would be directed from SHAPE. Nuclear exercises became tests of procedures for battlefield control and security, and the exercises ended with the routine demonstration shot that had come to characterize these activities.

In today’s world there is a role for the Army’s tactical nuclear systems. They provide the most efficient, cost-effective way to employ massive firepower on the battlefield. They might well furnish the decisive element of support for a critical ground force maneuver. Most important, they might be needed for salvation of a contingency force committed on some mission for which reinforcing forces are going to be too little or too late. The most recent case for this argument is the Persian Gulf deployment of one brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and one marine expeditionary force. If the Iraqis had chosen to continue their offensive into Saudi Arabia at that instant, the United States might well have been faced with a Hobson’s choice: expend the forces committed (another Bataan Peninsula) or attempt an evacuation (another Dunkirk). In such circumstances the availability of tactical nuclear artillery might well have provided the guarantee of both a successful incursion and the time required to assure adequate reinforcement.

These weapons can be employed safely, without fallout or contamination or environmental damage, particularly if enhanced radiation versions are used. They can be employed against military-only targets—soldier against soldier—with no resultant automatic escalation to bigger, more destructive weapons or the international nuclear holocaust that we have been taught to fear.

They are a military tool, more efficient and more lethal than any other weapon employed through military history. They are one more technological advance that furnishes today's military commanders an option for successful warfare that their ancestors did not possess.

Unfortunately, it is also quite clear that nuclear weaponry over the years has picked up an inordinate weight of political baggage. Besides the fears of holocausts and environmental catastrophes, there is the contention that the United States must set the example for the world, must remain on the high moral plane that decries any use of such inhumane means of mass destruction. The President and his military advisers today would be hard-pressed to justify the employment of these weapons and might find it even harder to explain such action in the aftermath of war. The continued second-guessing of President Harry S Truman's decision in August 1945 is proof that criticism will be forthcoming no matter the reason.

So, if these contentions have any merit, the Army is in danger of losing a militarily significant battlefield capability. The Army's officer corps, perhaps with help from the marines, must face this issue or lose by default, because there are no other champions of these weapons addressing the subject. We need a program that reeducates the public, retrains the fire support community, reenergizes the research, development and acquisition system and informs the command and control structure, including the President, of the advantages and capabilities associated with nuclear fires to help him make decisions on future courses of action. Nuclear fires will seldom be the only or even the best answer, but on those occasions when they are, we need to ensure that the President can make an informed, logical and justifiable decision.

Does Anybody Care?

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, July 1999]

Almost a decade ago President George Bush seized the moral high ground in the political world by stripping the U.S. Army and Marine Corps of their battlefield nuclear weapons. The Pershing and field artillery warhead joined the Davy Crockett, the Nike Zeus and the atomic demolition mine in the discard pile. Since that time, not one of the known nuclear powers has joined us in eliminating or renouncing the use of their weapons, and at least two (India and Pakistan) have

conducted tests that demonstrate their willingness, perhaps intent, to arm themselves with such capability.

China has been in the headlines because its successful espionage program seems to have obtained all it needs to know to build any kind of nuclear threat it desires to have. Does anyone believe its spy effort is just a sporting event—that it spied only to see if it could, not because it intends to develop the systems it has uncovered?

More recently, the Russians announced that they will be relying more on their battlefield nuclear systems as they reduce the size of the Red Army and substitute technology for the mass that they used to maintain. This announcement—along with the fact that our disarmament experts cannot establish that any Russian warheads have actually been destroyed despite the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty agreements and reduction treaties—ought to be setting off an alarm somewhere in our military establishment.

Beyond those known developments are the continuing speculation and worry about what the North Koreans, the Iraqis and the Iranians are up to, to say nothing of potential terrorist threats.

Couple these developments with the billions we have spent and are contemplating spending to develop a conventional antimissile missile defense, and it seems to me that somebody ought to be thinking about resurrecting a U.S. nuclear weapon program that might do more to deter war in the next century than almost any other initiative. If we are concerned that an enemy nation might fire an ICBM with a thermonuclear warhead at the United States, why is it immoral to fire a Nike Zeus-type warhead into space to destroy it? Would that not be a cheaper and more reliable way of protecting the country? If we are serious about "power projection" and the national military strategy of winning two major theater wars almost simultaneously, why should we not deploy nuclear firepower to the battlefields on which we are engaged, both to reduce the numbers of troops needed and to speed the deployment of adequate firepower with the deploying forces?

Short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons that can be employed with no radioactive fallout should be available to the forces whom we intend to put in harm's way. Beyond that, can we actually contemplate deploying a force with only conventional firepower against an enemy both capable of and intending to use

battlefield nuclear weapons? Battlefield weapons are designed for soldiers to combat enemy soldiers; they are not automatically precursors to an international nuclear holocaust.

This is, of course, a politically incorrect subject, but it is also a subject that may involve national survival. It can easily evolve into a subject of national importance if somebody does not care enough to rejoin the issue soon.

Tactical Nukes

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, December 2006]

The recent worldwide focus on North Korea's nuclear test reminded me that being the only known Army alumnus still advocating tactical, short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons for our Army and Marine forces, I should address the subject again. A contact with an old friend, Sam Cohen, the inventor of the enhanced radiation warhead, dubbed the neutron bomb, provided an additional incentive for this column.

Mr. Cohen and Joseph Douglass coauthored "The Nuclear Threat That Doesn't Exist—or Does It?" (published by Financial Sense Online in March 2003 and still available on the Internet).

The article provides a brief history of the neutron warhead, which was incorporated in the tactical arsenal for a few years, then abandoned when President Bush (the first) decreed the destruction of tactical weapons.

The neutron bomb was a fission-fusion warhead; a minimized plutonium fission component triggered a fusion reaction that provided a burst of high-energy neutrons that would wipe out any military force within a thousand or so meters of the explosion but do little damage to the infrastructure of the area. The small fission trigger provided minimal structural damage and insignificant radiation fallout.

The ideal weapon of this type is a fusion-only warhead, and the balance of the Cohen-Douglass article discusses the practicality of a deuteriumtritium (heavy water) component that can be ignited by burning a substance called a ballotechnic explosive, popularly named red mercury by the Russians who discovered it. The authors have reason to believe that a baseball-size, 10-pound warhead is both possible and probable in today's world.

Officially our government does not recognize the existence of red mercury, our nuclear laboratories labeling it a half-baked scam. I have no intention of getting in the midst of a whether-or-not argument. My concern is "what if?"

The North Korean test has been variously reported as a .5KT, a 1 KT or a low-level failed attempt of a greater yield. Whatever the intent, the good news might be that the explosion was fission triggered and that we are dealing with known technology. But if the North Korean announcement of a .5KT war-head was correct, the North Koreans could be testing what Mr. Cohen describes as an excellent battlefield tactical weapon, one that could be devastating to conventional forces not comparably equipped and prepared to operate on a nuclear battlefield.

Our nuclear capabilities and policies limit us to massive retaliation and, of course, we can practically obliterate the industrial capacity, such as it is, and the governmental structure of North Korea. That will be of little solace if a blitzkrieg supported by tactical nuclear weapons has a North Korean army occupying the South and a government already moved into Seoul. Our guarantees to the South Koreans would then demand an unlikely, properly equipped invasion force that does not now exist.

I believe that the fact that our quadrennial defense reviews, the QDRs, have never addressed the battlefield nuclear threat should be of concern. Our abandonment of those weapons was never reciprocated by the Russians or any other nuclear power. Our disinterest in the pursuit of the fusion-only warhead, using our own version of red mercury, might have dire consequences for our future. I would like to know that our research-and-development community is on top of all of this, but there hasn't been any leakage of such interest into the public domain if that is true.

There is little institutional memory of battlefield nukes in the Army today, and it is fast decaying and disappearing among the retired. New doctrine and training publications make no mention of the subject and certainly all of the materiel assets have long been recycled or passed into junk piles. There are also no fond memories of the burden borne by commanders and units charged with storing and securing the systems, hence there is no enthusiasm for starting over. But the threat is there and contemplating the plight of

conventional forces attempting to stall an enemy employing tactical nukes in a blitzkrieg offensive is not just an intellectual challenge—it may well be an operational necessity in the not distant future. Some thought to address such a problem will not be time or energy wasted. Imagining that 10-pound ball in the hands of a Special Forces A-team certainly opens a whole new field of ideas.

A Message for the Less Than the Best and the Brightest

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, December 2002]

Once again the newspaper is telling me that the best and the brightest are leaving the Army, the officer corps is beset with disillusion, dissatisfaction and unhappiness, and our noncommissioned officers are convinced that senior leaders are not in touch with reality. I cannot dispute these reports, but I would like to converse a bit with soldiers who are still around.

In late 1945, with about three years of service to my credit, I decided to apply for a Regular Army commission. Around me were untold numbers who could not wait to get out of the Army. Among those, I was told, were the best and the brightest, who were returning to college or graduate school or better-paying civilian pursuits. None of my ROTC or OCS classmates joined me in applying, but I did not care. I liked the Army, and I was quite pleased, in 1947, to accept a Regular commission.

One of the things that made an Army career appealing was my conviction that I could do my bosses' jobs better than they could, so the future had to be bright for anyone who could foster change and make improvements. That conviction wavered slightly when I was exposed to the Army's officer education system, where I was appalled at how much I did not know.

I went through the post-World War II period, when a purposeful destruction of the Army could not have been more effective than the one we went through. When we went home on leave, my wife's friends had one abiding question: "When's he getting out?"

That period was followed by the Korean War. I arrived late, then remained for 22 months, away from my growing family during a period when R and R, home leave and overseas phone calls were unheard of. I

learned after that war that the best and the brightest were leaving because of the appalling conditions we were living under. All of my friends who had been recalled to serve in Korea could not wait to get out (again!). And my wife's friends were still asking, "When's he getting out?" Actually, I believe she asked that question more than once.

There was another exodus of the best and the brightest in the early '60s because the Whiz Kids were taking over. President Kennedy wanted to turn the Army into Special Forces, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara discouraged any lieutenant colonel over 40 from thinking he would ever be promoted again. Then, of course, two or three years into the Vietnam War, the best and the brightest saw the spread of indiscipline and the drug problems as harbingers of a hopeless future and departed in droves. The professional noncommissioned officer corps dissolved and, of course, without the cream of the crop around to help, those who remained in the officer corps were not making great headway in solving some of our chronic problems, either.


Vietnam was followed in the early '70s by the elimination of the draft and the volunteer Army (VOLAR), when we painted the barracks in pastel colors and told potential recruits we wanted to join them. President Carter's "malaise" certainly applied to the Army of that period, and all the smart people looked for something else to do. Somehow, though, during that post-Vietnam era, some of the "not so best and brightest" reorganized the Army, settled on modernization requirements, fixed the endstrength and structure, adopted a revolutionary training and education system and evolved new doctrine for tying the whole together as a formidable contender for battlefield domination.

In the early '80s President Reagan embarked on rebuilding our military capabilities. In effect, he provided funds for the programs that the less-than-the-brightest had devised in the '70s. Unfortunately, after all those periodic losses of the best and brightest, he had inherited the Army leaders who apparently had stayed in the service only because they could not do anything else. From among that motley agglomeration, he had to find people to lead a rehabilitation, absorbing the new technologies and sophisticated equipment, training to the new standards, adopting the new doctrines and finally fighting new wars in Panama and the Persian Gulf.

Can you imagine how much better we could have done if the best and the brightest had been available? How much faster than three days in Panama or 100 hours in Kuwait might the best and the brightest have accomplished those missions?

Somehow in my 40 years, the “less than the best” and the “not so bright” held the Army together, accomplished every mission assigned and drove the modest but effective modernization that kept us ahead of the rest of the world in military capabilities. They accommodated themselves to low pay, poor housing, morale-sapping inadequacies and even to the imposed-from-above fallacies and fantasies, such as Project 100,000, VOLAR and much social engineering. They kept a reasonable structure intact, revolutionized training and deterred Cold War adversaries from provoking a hot war. Among them were the architects of the Army that was ready for Panama and the Persian Gulf, and among them also were the leaders who were trained, educated and motivated by the less-than-the-best-and-the-brightest to go on and win those wars.

The message to those who have not joined the latest group to depart: The mission of the Army has not changed, and among you the nation is counting on finding the leaders of the future. The challenge is no less demanding, the rewards are no more enticing, but the satisfaction of future mission accomplishment will be a legacy of which you will always be proud. Hang in there. The nation needs you.



General Kroesen presents an AUSA watch to 1996 General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award winner Captain Steven Miska, 15 May 1997. (U.S. Army photo)

The Army's Birthday

[Reprinted from ARMY, June 2007]

The U.S. Army was born on June 14, 1775, when the fledgling Continental Congress, itself a controversial body, authorized the formation of 10 companies of infantry. The date, now Flag Day, celebrates our 232nd birthday, and we are as fully engaged in a war every bit as critical to our future as the one faced by those Continental troops.

In the more than 200 years between those two wars the Army has accepted and fulfilled myriad missions, tasks and assignments that helped fashion the most versatile and adaptable entity known to our society. We fought our nation’s wars, always effectively, sometimes brilliantly. We matured over time, learning from the past; adapting to and adopting new methods and techniques, new weapons and technology; training and educating ourselves over the years; and thus maintaining an ongoing ability to dominate battlefields and win wars.

Millions of soldiers have served during those years—mostly volunteers but also as draftees when manpower requirements demanded—with few exceptions, serving honorably and often with distinction. Thousands of monuments, memorials and tableaux across the country are a testament to that excellence of service and the gratitude of the nation for the sacrifices of its soldiers.

Also during these years we explored and mapped the landmass into which we grew. We guarded our settlers as they moved west, we secured our borders, expanding them when directed to do so, and we met and resolved our greatest threat when we prevented the dissolution of the nation only “fourscore and seven years” after its founding. We have gone to the aid of others around the world who were threatened by tyranny and whose interests in freedom and justice for all people matched our own.

In every crisis, the largesse of the American people on our farms and in our factories has supported the Army in the field; the geniuses of our industries have invented and produced new weaponry, equipment and the means to deliver them to the battlefield. Among these people are the families of soldiers, those who keep home and hearth functioning, who suffer loneliness, losses and the agony of separations, and who provide respite when a crisis is resolved and the Army returns to train and prepare for its next calling.

They are all part of the administrative system involved in establishing us as unique. No other army can do what we do, on short notice, most any place in the world because the greatest Navy and Air Force can take us there and keep us supplied and maintained. It takes the whole system to enhance the power that can be brought to bear to win wars.

We haven't always looked the same. Every half century or so, someone, for reasons unknown, decides that we need a new uniform. Colors change, blouses become jackets become coats, new hats are designed (we could dominate any Easter parade with only the authorized variety), boots come and go, scarves are favored or frowned upon, yet the rank and file of the Army are always identifiable in public. Our insignia remain quite constant, suffering change only when branches of the service are added and shoulder patches proliferate.

We are a polyglot collection of American humanity, the most advanced social conglomerate because we care not about race, color, religion or historic nationality, only that our neighbor is a soldier with whom we may have to go to war. We promise each other our lives and our sacred honor. (Our fortunes are our own business.)

Our stated and well understood purpose is to support and defend our Constitution. In servicing that purpose, we are the guarantors of liberty, freedom for the people of our nation, particularly the younger generations to whom we offer a legacy of success along with a burden of guaranteeing the future of their children. That purpose is sacred and terribly unforgiving of even thoughts of failure. After a lifetime of being dedicated to that purpose, it is satisfying to realize that "once a soldier always a soldier" makes a great epitaph.

The Military and the Media

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, March 2005]

Three things triggered this column: the negative reaction of the major news networks to the Iraqi election; a television news panel on embedded reporters; and a newspaper reporter's query concerning my reaction to the "grim milestone" of the 1,000th death of soldiers in Iraq. After some 60 years of observation I don't mind offering some thoughts on the sometimes rocky road of military-media relations.

Way back in World War II we had a terrible failure of our intelligence system, and Pearl Harbor happened. We suffered an almost criminal lack of preparation, and the Bataan Death March and two years of lost battles, the disastrous destruction of our merchant marine fleet, and the bankrupting, physical degradation or even outright loss of some of our allies was the result. It was a long time before we began to win, but in that interim the nation had gone to war. Nearly everybody rose to the challenge, whether in the service or on the home front. Almost nobody worried about who was to blame or what faults caused our predicament—we could sort that out later, after we'd won.

In that situation, the news media went to war; together with us, they were part of the solution. They buoyed home-front morale, lauded the successes we did have, encouraged our progress and discouraged our enemies. They were a very significant element of the total team effort that defeated the aims of Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo, and no one wrote or spoke demanding the return of our troops after we conquered Sicily or invested Rome.

We had embedded reporters—Ernie Pyle being the most famous. They, Pyle in particular, reported the bad news with the good, but the presentation was positive; the country was proud of what was happening and the enemy got no encouragement from our public revelations. We had military censors, not to suppress bad news but to keep damaging news from the enemy. It did not always work, wasn't always done right, but the Axis Powers never made propaganda over the fact that we executed more than a hundred of our soldiers for war crimes in Europe alone, while the war was being fought.

Contrast that with today's coverage of our war in Iraq. Three years after our commitment to the war with Iraq, newsmen are demanding explanations of why we went and who lied and giving daily coverage to the antiwar "bring the boys home" and the "we never should have gone" sentiments. The incident at Abu Ghraib, admittedly disgusting but certainly not a capital crime demanding the execution of the perpetrators, remains a *cause célèbre*, exploited by world outlets to the benefit of our enemies. The negative coverage of our daily operations, limited almost to the reporting of casualties, is in sharp contrast to the e-mails, letters and occasional interviews of soldiers on the ground and doing the fighting.

Somewhere between World War II and Iraq our news media transformed from partnership in the war effort to adversarial criticism of every why, what and how. The concern for denying the enemy useful information is of little media concern, and the exposition of the views of our critics is now common in the radio and television broadcasts of the unfriendly and “neutral” nations.

The transition from partner to adversary began during the stalemate period of the Korean War and came full cycle after the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968. Thereafter, following a prominent anchorman’s announcement that the war could not be won, seemingly all media effort was directed to proving him right. The most famous photos of that war are the crying naked child burned by napalm and the summary execution of a Viet Cong suspect by a pistol-wielding South Vietnamese general. Distorted views of columnists became sore points for commanders in the field. (I wrote two unanswered letters to the editor of *The New York Times* that complained about scurrilous portrayals of our troops and their activities.)

The war in Iraq began well and the embedded reporter was resurrected and large numbers accompanied our troops as they smashed their way to Baghdad. The country read and saw an excellent firsthand portrayal of the war, but criticism started early as the media profession began to question the objectivity of reporters who seemed to “join their units” and succumb to passing on only good news. The fact that there wasn’t much but good news at the time went unremarked.

A few months later, the embeds were home writing books, appearing on television and giving speeches about their experiences, waxing expert on all things about “my outfit.” Many embeds remain, and their reports are excellent, but most of our news coverage now has returned to what has gone wrong and who’s at fault, and antiwar activists again dominate “breaking news.” Bipartisanship is nonexistent for the effort needed to fight a war every bit as dangerous to our future as World War II.

Right, we didn’t find WMD (weapons of mass destruction). Right, our plans did not provide adequately for the post-operations phase. Right, our total Army force is inadequate for the long-term war in which we are engaged. Right, we are wearing out people and equipment. But more important, that is where we are, and we still have to win lest we be faced with “Adopt

Islam or die!” If that task is vital, mustering a total effort is as much a media responsibility as anyone’s and having them back as partners in the effort would be a real plus.

More on the Military and the Media

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, April 2005]

It took only one rereading of last month’s column to realize that there is more to say on the subject, the military and the media, probably a lot more. But one glaring omission from what was written is concern over classified information divulged to the world by zealous investigative reporters who believe they know best what the American public “has a right to know.”

Going back again to World War II, we had policies that charged military censors with the responsibility of preventing the publication of information that would or could be helpful to the enemy. We had news media people who fretted about overcontrol, unreasonable restrictions and improperly applied limitations, much of the time justifiable, as the censors chose always to err on the side of caution. But we had also the practice of informing reporters in advance of pending major events—the D-Day landings in Normandy, Operation Market-Garden in the Netherlands—thus allowing them to prepare their advance coverage in return for their promise not to attempt to reveal such plans prematurely.

A general appraisal of that system would report that it worked quite well; the American public was well enough informed by Edward R. Murrow, the “March of Time” and other news programs while the sensitive news was denied the enemy until it was too late to be useful. But the news media were not in agreement, insisting that First Amendment rights of a free press were violated and that they, after all, professionals in the field, were as trustworthy with sensitive information as any group of military censors. So, over time, with Congress and the courts involved, things changed.

Twenty years later we fought in Vietnam under the watchful television cameras and with reporters who found all the negative news necessary to afford North Vietnam with what some of us claim was the incentive to continue the war until we would quit. And 20 years after that war ended, the professionals met the assault landing across a beach in Somalia with klieg lights and cameras that betrayed the operation long before its execution. (Scuttlebutt has it that disappointment over not having scheduled an air and naval gunfire preparation

was a mistake that would not be repeated in the future.) In Iraq, after an encouraging spate of good news dispatched by the embedded reporters, the professionals have once again reverted to providing only bad news from Baghdad as the major news outlets find suicide bombings, numbers of casualties and a disgruntled man on the street as the only newsworthy subjects.

Just as important, however, perhaps even more so, has been the erosion of the sanctity of classified information. After years of complaining but adhering to the laws, rules and customs concerning classified material, the public exposure of The Pentagon Papers in the late 1960s was a watershed event. Countless numbers of articles, columns and commentaries discussed the content and meaning of the classified material found therein. The principal theme became ridicule over whether such material should have been classified in the first place. In a while, interest in the issue died off, but the notable outcome was that no one paid, no one was punished and a precedent was set that is today impeding operations and probably costing lives.

For 20 or more years after World War II, very few Americans had heard of NSA, the National Security Agency. Now it is not only routinely referred to in news stories but its mission, its activities and its successes are of prime interest. As a result, a lucrative source of intelligence information, al Qaeda cell phone traffic, which was used as their primary communications linkage, has almost completely dried up. Articles deplored our HUMINT (human intelligence) failings have alerted the terrorists to our need to penetrate their organizations. And now books are being written about operations over Iran and the tactics and techniques of our special operations forces. CIA personnel have been identified in foreign assignments, their missions compromised and their lives threatened or forfeited.

These are just a few examples of what has been transpiring since we decided, apparently, not to prosecute the culprits responsible for breaches of security, most of whom are adventurous and ambitious members of our investigative media. The current situation is yet another facet of the adversarial role now played by the media. While I can again wish they would rejoin the teams fighting today's wars, I also wish our attorney general would take up the cause of prosecuting people guilty of security violations. We don't have an official secrets act, but we do have laws sufficient to punish the most serious violators.

Veterans Day

[Reprinted from ARMY, November 2005]

Veterans Day is our annual acknowledgment of the respect and honor we pay to those who have served in our armed forces over the centuries that we have existed as a nation. We laud not only those who gave their lives in battle or only those who served in our wars, but also those who manned our ramparts, trained and ready through periods of peace when their existence alone deterred overt actions and countered covert actions by a potential enemy.

Many veterans earned individual honors and recognition, and were rewarded with medals, promotions and auspicious assignments that brought fame and, perhaps for some, fortune. But the reward for most has been the legacy of freedom they bequeathed to their progeny, today's Americans. Not all found the opportunity to be heroes, not all served during a crisis or a crucial campaign, but throughout our history, a core of our citizenry has provided determined service, dedicated to defeating the threat of the moment and to the enduring heritage of the nation. Many served in troubled times when they lacked resources, even public support, and suffered doubts among their own, but remained devoted to the protection of the nation.

The "sunshine soldiers" of the Revolution, the draft rioters on both sides in the 1860s, and the draft dodgers who ran to Canada in the 1960s are more prominent examples of an element of our society willing to desert a cause. Today's and yesterday's politicians who abhor decisions to employ force, who predict quagmires, and pundits and reporters who complain about ongoing operations or a lack of progress or seek only to find fault and lay blame, all work to undermine confidence among military personnel. But never thus far have those kinds of negative influences affected that core of veterans who ultimately accomplished successfully every task assigned. Only once did they succeed in affecting governmental policy, and our failure to complete the job in Vietnam was the result.

Today's armed forces are a glittering segment of the heritage, the legacy left by yesterday's veterans. Without peer in the world, the soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen of today typify the qualities and spirit of their ancestors. Their belief in themselves and in their mission, well founded considering the excellence of their current performance, will yet again allow them to ignore

or defy the naysayers, chicken-littles and the weak-kneed while they accomplish the tasks assigned. Without question, they will, in their own time, be honored and respected veterans.

A new book, *Soldiering*, by Henry Gole, provides a fitting tribute that all veterans might savor. An eight- or nine-year-old in 1942, the author watched as an older family member, a draftee, arrived home on leave, in uniform. The young boy's reaction was, "He was somebody. He was a soldier."

The Memorial

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, July 2004]

In recent weeks we have celebrated Memorial Day and the dedication of the World War II Memorial. When I have been asked, as a World War II veteran, for my thoughts of that war and the memorial, I have responded in two different ways. As a member of "the greatest generation," which I don't claim but am proud that others proclaim, I think we earned that sobriquet because we all went to war, whether in the service, in government, in industry, in myriad volunteer efforts which brought children and grandparents along in one great cause, to preserve our liberty, our form of government, the legacy that had been left in our hands.

We looked forward to the job to be done, not backward at who was at fault for Pearl Harbor or for the Bataan Death March. As the war went on, mistakes were made in uncomfortable numbers, losses were inflicted, some self-inflicted; defeats happened, particularly in the early years, but the nation never lost sight of the goals to be achieved and never stopped to lay blame. And we never entertained thoughts of "a hopeless cause" or the hand-wringing associated with whether our cause was just. Yes, we had slackers, draft dodgers and antiwar advocates, but they got short shrift, little attention and almost no press. Today we are engaged in another war, one that may well evolve into a life or death struggle to protect that same legacy. The temper and fortitude and capacities for sacrifice of another generation will be tested in the months, perhaps years, to come. And the final report card on my generation will depend upon whether or not we prepared today's citizenry, our children and grandchildren, for the task ahead.

My second response, usually in answer to a query about whether the memorial is a fitting tribute, refers

to the monument itself. I think it is splendid, worth a visit by every citizen, a portrayal that will remind our future generations of the scope and magnitude of World War II.

Personally, I think of the memorial as a tribute to those who gave their lives for our cause. Those of us who lived through that war have been rewarded in countless other ways.

We have lived through a golden age of this nation, enjoyed progress and prosperity unmatched in other times or by other peoples. We have raised families in a more secure and more promising environment.


Our memorial is the legacy that is today's generation, and so far we are proud and confident of what we have achieved. But we are ever conscious of those friends and comrades for whom this memorial is a last link with the world they departed. We hope as they look down on our tribute to them that they are pleased that our nation remains worthy of their sacrifice.

V-E Day 2005

[Reprinted from *ARMY*, June 2005]

The following speech was delivered by General Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired, at the V-E Day Ceremony at the World War II Memorial, May 8, 2005.

It is an honor and distinct privilege to be asked to represent the World War II generation on this occasion, the 60th anniversary of our victory in Europe.



General Kroesen speaks at the V-E Day Ceremony at the World War II Memorial, 8 May 2005. (Photo by Kevin Hymel for ARMY)

It is a daunting assignment, but one wonderful pleasure when growing older is still being invited to participate in what is going on. I am pleased to be here to talk about this monument, about our World War II generation and about the significance of V-E Day.

The World War II Monument was dedicated last year, officially to recognize the contributions of the 16 million men and women who served in our armed forces during that war. I believe, in contrast and unofficially, that it recognizes something more, the fact that our nation was attacked and our response was total. We all went to war, all 130 million of us.

Almost from scratch we created the world's most powerful military force. It was a product not of the military alone, but also of our industrial might which produced and delivered the wherewithal we needed, by our scientific community that designed and developed our technology, our medical system that protected, cared for and restored the health of the nation, and by the families who gave up fathers and sons, mothers and daughters and volunteered for every drive contributing to the war effort, then persevered through months, sometimes years of separation and uncertainty, anxious years when the future was anything but clear. And for many, every Mother's Day is a poignant reminder of an unforgettable sacrifice.

It was our nation that was attacked, but it was our generation, the World War II generation, that responded with the heavy lifting, the positive commitment to the demanding and grisly task of fighting a war. We looked forward to the task, not backward to who was at fault for Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March.

We needed leaders and we were served magnificently by an earlier generation. The names Roosevelt, Churchill, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Doolittle, King, Halsey, Patton, Marshall and many other members of the World War II generation are famous today because they directed and managed a Herculean task that far exceeded the scope of any previous human endeavor. But it was our generation that carried the fight and won the war—not alone, not without recognizing the contributions and sacrifices of our allies, but certainly we were constituents without whom that war could not have been won.

Now, having suggested that all who participated in the noble venture of World War II are deserving of

recognition, I reserve my principal homage for those who gave their lives for the cause. It truly is their monument. We are here today and all who lived through World War II, and indeed through the wars that followed, have lived through a golden age of this nation. We have been richly rewarded by our opportunity to live in freedom to pursue our own interests, to enjoy the largesse of this nation, and most important, to see our children, our grandchildren and now our great-grandchildren thriving and enjoying the blessings of liberty.

It is a legacy of which each of us can be proud and to which we can claim, in some small way, that we made a contribution. We can be proud to have passed the torch of freedom to the generation now responsible for continuing that legacy. Their challenge today is as dire as was ours, but it is also their opportunity to succeed us to take over the mantle of the greatest generation.


V-E Day, in military jargon, was a culminating point, a significant event that proved the achievement of the prime objective: the defeat of Nazi Germany. The Allies, early in the war, determined that defeat of the German *Werhmacht* would be the main effort, and the success of that effort portended V-J Day and the final success of World War II.

We didn't know then when it would happen, but we were very sure that it would. V-E Day provided that emotional surge that inspired a refreshed willingness and determination to finish the job.

In the Book of Ecclesiasticus, that great philosopher advises us to "honor and praise your famous men," those who have led and ruled wisely. They are deserving and have left names that their praises may be reported. But remember also those who have no memorial, who are perished as though never born, righteous men whose labors and sacrifices made possible the fame of their leaders.

This magnificent memorial—and you must return to see it by moonlight or in the rain, or covered with snow or just to see if Kilroy was here—this memorial is now our guarantee that those who gave their lives to bring about V-E Day will never be among those who perished as though they had never been born.

As they look down upon us today, we can hope that they are pleased that our nation remains worthy of their sacrifice.



Retrospective

Retrospective

Our latest war is still in full swing as these final paragraphs are reviewed. Today, weeks into the combat operations of the "surge" that are now clearing Baghdad and finding success at any location in Iraq that is chosen to attack, I contemplate the same two things that troubled me in 2003.

First, I wonder if anything in this book is rendered immaterial, inadvisable or incorrect by what is transpiring on today's battlefield. I confess that I am perhaps not the most objective judge, but I have found nothing I wish I hadn't said, nothing I want to change before it all goes to the publisher.

But second, as I have absorbed the comments and consultations of that element of our retired military community who have chosen to become television experts and occasional columnists on why and how to fight this war, I have to ask myself whether my first conclusion is valid. Is it likely that modern war has made some of my beliefs obsolete?

That thought has reoccurred to me any number of times as I've watched our retired Air Force spokesmen observe that the progress of the ground forces is entirely due to the employment of new weapons, new techniques and new concepts by pilots providing modern close air support. In other words, the airpower advocates have continued to maintain that airpower is the deciding element. I cite the recent Israeli effort in Southern Lebanon as another occasion when airpower alone failed to win and the delayed employment of a ground offensive was just too late.


Coincidentally, the landpower experts have continued learned discussions of the dangers of urban warfare and the avoidance thereof, the vulnerability of lines of communications, and the proper methods of employing tanks or artillery or a cavalry squadron or an airborne force. Invariably, when these discussions

precede operations they are wrong; when they were in explanation of what had happened, they are either mundane or a regurgitation of the obvious.

If so many selected experts can be so wrong about so much, it is quite possible that I am in the same category. However, I said earlier that I am not an objective judge, so I will stick to my first conclusion, not change anything, and hope my readers will discern the abiding truths. The conclusions I reached in 2003 are unrevised and therefore happily reiterated in 2007.



General and Mrs. Kroesen at the AUSA Pavilion at the Eurosatory defense exhibition in Paris, June 1996. (Photo by Mary Blake French for ARMY)



Appendices

Biographical Information

Frederick James Kroesen, Jr. General, U.S. Army, Retired

Personal Data

Date and place of birth: 11 February 1923, Phillipsburg, New Jersey
Father: Frederick James Kroesen
Mother: Jean Ursula Shillinger
Wife: Rowene Wilder McCray
Children: Karen McCray Kroesen Klare and Stephen Warren Klare
Frederick James Kroesen III and Adriana Goedbloet
Gretchen McCray Kroesen Tackaberry and Kief Sanford Tackaberry

Military Education

ROTC, Rutgers University, 1940–1943
Officer Candidate School, 1944
The Armor School, Advanced Course, 1951
The Infantry School, Airborne Course, 1951
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1956
Armed Forces Staff College, 1959
U.S. Army War College, 1962
U.S. Army Management School, Operations Research, System Analysis Executive Course, 1968

Educational Degrees

Rutgers University: BS – Agriculture, 1944
George Washington University: BA – International Affairs, 1962
George Washington University: MA – International Affairs, 1966
Rutgers University: L.H.D. (Hon) – Humane Letters, 1983

Promotions

	Temporary	Permanent
Second Lieutenant	8 August 1944	7 August 1947
First Lieutenant	1 March 1945	8 September 1947
Captain	1 May 1945	14 May 1951
Major	3 July 1951	29 August 1958
Lieutenant Colonel	18 March 1959	8 August 1965
Colonel	26 October 1965	8 August 1969
Brigadier General	1 October 1969	21 October 1971
Major General	1 August 1971	12 July 1973
Lieutenant General	1 July 1975	
General	1 October 1976	

Assignments

Aug 44	Jul 45	Platoon Leader and Commander, Company E, 254th Infantry, 63d Division, Europe
Jul 45	Oct 45	Commander, Company K, 397th Infantry, 100th Division, Europe
Oct 45	Aug 47	Intelligence Staff Officer, 7748 Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), Europe
Sep 47	Apr 50	ORC Instructor, 1128th ASU, Portland, Maine
Apr 50	Sep 50	Operations Officer, 1128th ASU, Fort Williams, Maine
Sep 50	Apr 51	Student, Armor Officer Advance Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Apr 51	May 51	Student, Airborne Course, Fort Benning, Georgia
Jun 51	Apr 53	S4 (Logistics Officer), 504th Airborne-Infantry, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

(continued)

Assignments (continued)

Jun 53 Oct 53 Executive Officer & Commander, 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, Korea

Nov 53 Dec 54 Commander, 2d Battalion, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, Japan

Jan 55 Jul 55 Commander, Advance Party (Gyroscope), 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Aug 55 Jun 56 Student, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Jul 56 Jan 57 Plans Officer, G3 Division, U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA), Arlington, Virginia

Jan 57 Dec 58 Chief, Combat Doctrine Division, USASA Board, USASA, Arlington, Virginia

Jan 59 Jul 59 Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia

Jul 59 Jun 61 Advisor, Royal Thai Army Logistics College, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), Thailand

Jun 61 Jun 62 Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Jun 62 Jul 65 Faculty Member, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Jul 65 May 68 Chief, Troop Programming Division, Plans & Programs, Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development (OACSFOR), Washington, DC

May 68 May 69 Commander, 196th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division (Americus), Vietnam

Jun 69 Oct 69 Chief, Information and Data Systems, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development (OACSFOR), Washington, DC

Oct 69 May 71 Director of Manpower and Forces, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Washington, DC

Jun 71 Jul 71 Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, HQ Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Jul 71 Nov 71 Commanding General, 23d Infantry Division (Americus), Vietnam

Nov 71 Mar 72 Deputy Commanding General, XXIV Corps, Vietnam

Mar 72 May 72 Commanding General, First Regional Assistance Command, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)

Jul 72 Oct 74 Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Oct 74 Jul 75 Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, U.S. Army Europe

Jul 75 Sep 76 Commanding General, VII Corps, U.S. Army Europe

Sep 76 Jul 78 Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

Jul 78 May 79 Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington DC

May 79 Apr 83 Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe & Seventh Army and Commanding General, Central Army Group, NATO

U.S. Decorations and Badges

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal (With Oak Leaf Cluster)

Silver Star (With Oak Leaf Cluster)

Legion of Merit (With 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Distinguished Flying Cross

Bronze Star Medal with V Device (With 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Air Medal (With 29 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Army Commendation Medal (With 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Purple Heart (With 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Combat Infantryman Badge (3d Award)

Master Parachutist Badge

Army Staff Identification Badge

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Identification Badge

Glossary

ACSFOR	Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development	CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
ADC	assistant division commander	DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
ADDO/MA	associate deputy director for operations/military affairs	DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
ADM	atomic demolition munitions	DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
AIT	advanced individual training	DCSRDA	Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition
ALO	authorized level of organization	DISCOM	division support command
AMC	U.S. Army Materiel Command	DoD	Department of Defense
AO	area of operations	EDRE	Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
APC	armored personnel carrier	EEI	essential elements of information
ARMIS	Army Man in Space	EER	Enlisted Evaluation Report
ARSTAFF	Army Staff	FIAT	Field Information Agency, Technical
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program	FIST	fire support team
ARVN	Army of Vietnam	FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
ASA	Army Security Agency	FRAC	First Regional Assistance Command
ATF	advanced tactical fighter	FWD	forward
ATM	antitactical missile	GPALS	global protection against limited strikes
AUSA	Association of the United States Army	GSR	ground surveillance radar
AWOL	absent without leave	HASC	House Armed Services Committee
Bn	battalion	HMMWV	high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle ("humvee")
BUR	Bottom-Up Review	HUMINT	human intelligence
CCC	Civilian Conservation Corps	ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency	ISC	International Security Council
CINC	commander in chief	KP	kitchen police
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe	KT	kiloton
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	LAW	light antitank weapon
CONARC	Continental Army Command		
COSTAR	Combat Support to the Army		
COTR	contract officer's technical representative		
CP	command post		

LGOIS	little group of infantry soldiers	R and R	rest and recuperation
LGOM	little group of marines	RCT	regimental combat team
LGOP	little group of paratroopers	RDA	research, development and acquisition
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	RDT&E	research, development, test and evaluation
MAGTF	marine air ground task force	RF	Regional Forces
MBT	main battle tank	RMA	revolution in military affairs
MILPERCEN	Military Personnel Center	ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty	RPG	rocket propelled grenade
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment	RPV	remotely piloted vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
NBC	nuclear/biological/chemical	SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
NCO	noncommissioned officer	SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
NCOES	noncommissioned officer education system	SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
NDS	National Defense Strategy	SINCGARS	single channel ground-to-air radio system
NMS	National Military Strategy	SQT	Skill Qualification Test
NSS	National Security Strategy	TAC	tactical
NVA	North Vietnamese Army	TACMS	tactical missile system
O & M	operation and maintenance	TD	table of distribution
OCS	Officer Candidate School	TOC	tactical command post
OER	Officer Evaluation Report	TOE	table of organization and equipment
OMA	Office of Military Affairs	TOW	tube-launched, optically-sighted, wire-guided antitank missile
OMB	Office of Management and Budget	TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
ORTT	Operational Readiness Training Test	TTHS	trainees, transients, holdees and students
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation	UMT	universal military training
PF	Popular Forces	UN	United Nations
PFC	private first class	USAREUR	U.S. Army Europe
POM	Program Objective Memorandum	USARV	U.S. Army Vietnam
PSYOP	psychological operations	USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
PX	post exchange	VOLAR	Volunteer Army
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review	WMD	weapons of mass destruction
R&D	research and development		

"Extensive combat experience has shaped
in large part my perspective of war and how
the Army must prepare for its future challenges."

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