Establishing Strategic Vectors: Charting a Path for Army Transformation

by Colonel Mark D. Rocke, USA and Lieutenant Colonel David P. Fitchitt, USA

April 2007
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## Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................. v

Introduction .............................................................................................. 1

Original Intent . . Determining Strategic Direction ........................................ 1

Progress . . Transforming While Waging War .................................................... 8

Changing an Army . . Insights on Transformational Leadership ............................ 9

Moving Forward . . Realizing the Army Vision .................................................. 12

Major Focus Area Accomplishments ............................................................ 14

About the Authors ....................................................................................... 19
Foreword

In 2004, America and its Army are at war . . . deployed and supporting contingency operations in staggering numbers and at an unprecedented pace. . . . It is moving toward being lighter, faster and more strategically agile and adaptive. . . . [The] focus areas . . . are, in effect, the engine for change.

The U.S. Army in 2004 and Beyond: Strategically Agile and Adaptive
AUSA Torchbearer National Security Report, February 2004

This paper examines Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker’s Focus Areas—the engine for change of the Army transformation efforts we first highlighted three years ago. It furnishes a concise summary of the enormous change set in motion by the Focus Areas. In many ways, this report serves as a case study in leading and managing change. It describes what the Army has learned from this experience in its quest to remain relevant to America’s security needs in an ever-changing, increasingly complex strategic and political landscape.

Senior Army leaders clearly recognized that transforming an Army at war would be an extraordinarily difficult, potentially dangerous task. Their view, however, was that transformation was not a choice. It was absolutely required to enable the Army to wage a “new kind of war,” and to sustain the full range of its global commitments, for an indefinite period of time. At the same time, they assessed that the lessons learned from war could be rapidly applied to Army Transformation to build a force that would be truly relevant and ready for the challenges of the 21st century.

Wartime urgency and temporarily increased levels of resources created a unique opportunity to prepare the Army to deal with unprecedented operational and strategic challenges. To capitalize on this opportunity, Army senior leaders leveraged many ongoing efforts to retain the campaign qualities of the force while simultaneously developing and institutionalizing a unique joint and expeditionary mindset needed to better meet the nation’s immediate and enduring security requirements.

To meet the needs of the nation, our Army will depend on its leaders to continue building “the bridge to the future” started by the Focus Areas, and new Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey is doing just that. In April, soon after taking over from General Schoomaker, he announced seven CSA Initiatives: accelerating Army growth and readiness improvements to consistently field forces for victory and to sustain a campaign-quality expeditionary Army; enhancing the quality of support to Soldiers and families; maintaining continuity and momentum in the Army’s modernization; completing the transition of the reserve component to an operational force; stepping up changes to leader development programs to grow leaders for future strategic environments; adapting institutional policies, programs and procedures to support the expeditionary Army, especially while at war; and encouraging strategic communications. These CSA Initiatives, like the Focus Areas, will evolve over time.

The Army must be flexible to adapt its path as necessary; yet unrelenting in its determination to accelerate its transformational momentum. Amidst the adversity of war, we have a unique window of opportunity. As an Army and a nation, we must remain on course and accelerate our progress while this window is open—for it can close at a moment’s notice.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army Retired
President, AUSA

April 2007
Establishing Strategic Vectors: Charting a Path for Army Transformation

After watching dozens of major change efforts in the past decade, I’m confident of one cardinal rule: Whenever you let up before the job is done, critical momentum can be lost and regression may follow. Until changed practices attain a new equilibrium and have been driven into the culture, they can be very fragile. Three years of work can come undone with remarkable speed. Once regression begins, rebuilding momentum can be a daunting task, not unlike asking people to throw their bodies in front of a huge boulder that has already begun to roll back down the hill.

John P. Kotter, Leading Change

Introduction

In August 2003, the Army’s senior leadership identified 16 areas for immediate focus; four more were identified over the next two years. The Focus Areas set in motion critical processes required to transform the Army while waging war.

The Focus Areas have produced a great deal of positive change—and started numerous initiatives, now ongoing, that will take many years to fully realize. The Focus Areas were guided by a simple goal: to enable the Army to develop capabilities over time, to prepare it to pass through periods of uncertainty, and to remain relevant (in terms of its design and orientation) and ready (in terms of its ability to field well led, fully trained and properly equipped units) to meet the needs of the nation indefinitely. (See figure 1 on page 2.)

This assessment of the Focus Areas centers on four key questions:

• What was the original intent of the Focus Areas?
• With respect to this intent, what progress has occurred and what remains to be accomplished?
• What can the Army learn from this experience to inform its continuing efforts to drive change?
• What should the Army be thinking about as it moves forward?

Original Intent . . . Determining Strategic Direction

Wartime urgency and temporarily increased levels of resources created a unique opportunity to prepare the Army to deal with unprecedented operational and strategic challenges. To capitalize on this opportunity, Army senior leaders leveraged many “ongoing efforts to retain [the] campaign qualities of [the] Army while simultaneously developing a joint and expeditionary mindset . . . to better meet the Nation’s [immediate and enduring] security requirements.”

Senior leaders carefully assessed “ongoing efforts”—in various stages of development at the time—to identify initiatives that could be either accelerated or adjusted to meet the requirements imposed by the Global War on Terror and an uncertain, unpredictable security environment. These initiatives included revisions to operational doctrine; concepts to adapt joint warfighting capabilities; improvements in training, education and leader development; programs for materiel development; procedures to expedite wartime acquisition; enhancements to quality of life and well-being for Soldiers and families; and many other ideas. Examples include:

• strengthening emphasis on Soldiers as the centerpiece of formations. Soldiers are the Army—and the ultimate expression of the capabilities the Army furnishes to the joint team and the nation. This idea remained at the forefront

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2 For example, full equipping of modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) is not projected to occur, by current estimates, until 2015. Similarly, support brigades are not projected to be fully equipped until 2019. The first BCT fully enabled with Future Combat Systems is not projected to enter the force until 2015. All 15 currently planned BCTs will not achieve full operational capability until 2032.
3 2003 U.S. Army Posture Statement, p. 2. Further discussion on each of these initiatives and more information on their conceptual underpinnings is available in this document as well as in the 2002 Army Posture Statement.
Areas of Immediate Focus

Train and Equip Soldiers and Grow Leaders
- The Soldier
- The Bench
- Army Aviation
- Leader Development
- Combat Training Centers/Battle Command Training Program

Provide Relevant and Ready Landpower Capability to the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Team
- Current to Future Force
- The Network
- Modularity
- Joint and Expeditionary Mindset
- Active Component/Reserve Component Balance
- Force Stabilization
- Actionable Intelligence

Added
- Logistics (January 2004)
- Improve Capabilities for Homeland Defense (January 2005)
- Improve Proficiencies Against Irregular Challenges (January 2005)
- Improve Capabilities for Stability Operations (January 2005)

Enable the Force
- Installations as Flagships
- Resource Processes
- Strategic Communications
- Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability

Figure 1
of Army thinking and established the foundation for each of its transformational initiatives.

- **reinforcing the importance of the Warrior Ethos.** Senior leaders recognized that in today’s operational environment, every Soldier needs to be able to serve as a warrior—armed with the values and combat skills required to deal with the stress, rigor and uncertainty of combat. To achieve this objective, and to prepare the Army to sustain frequent deployments for the foreseeable future, the Warrior Ethos and the Soldier’s Creed received renewed emphasis at training centers, in units and across the Army.

- **implementing many Army Training and Leader Development Panel ideas.** To align the Army’s leaders—officers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers and civilians—and its overall culture with the 21st century security environment, the role of leadership and the importance of leadership development took on special importance. The goal for leaders, reflected in numerous Focus Areas, was established quickly: to develop confident, adaptive military and civilian leaders, able to operate in both operational and institutional settings amidst the challenges and complexity of the 21st century security environment.

- **continuing exploratory work on modular formations.** Modular conversion provided the greatest opportunity in many years to restructure fighting and supporting units to enhance their flexibility and operational capability—while dramatically enhancing the overall deployability, versatility and strategic agility of the Army. Prior analyses and experimentation were revisited with a view to changing from a division-based to a brigade-based force. Four primary goals were established: to increase the number of available brigade combat teams to meet operational demand and better manage stress on the force; to create common, standard organizational designs for brigade-based combat and support “modules”; to improve the ability of Army to provide command and control of joint and combined task forces at lower levels; and, ultimately, to improve the capacity and capability of the Army to meet the needs of the combatant commanders across the range of joint military operations.

- **continuing and accelerating the fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.** Announced in October 1999, the Army responded in less than three years to begin fielding Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). SBCTs were designed to bridge a well-documented capabilities gap between the Army’s lethal, survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its far more deployable, yet vulnerable, light forces, which lacked both mobility and firepower. The lessons learned from the positive experience of the SBCTs—from rapid experimentation and acquisition to network-centered warfare and operational employment—were applied to many Focus Areas.

- **enhancing the importance of Future Combat Systems and the Network.** To ensure the relevance of Army formations to both current and future operating environments, the effort to acquire and field Future Combat Systems (FCS) received enhanced emphasis. Development of FCS was envisioned to produce a system of interconnected weapons, communications and intelligence systems—including sensors and unmanned ground and aerial vehicles—that would enhance the capabilities of Soldiers, leaders and commanders. These technologies would better enable Soldiers and units to deal with the full range of traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges they will face. It was immediately clear that the technologies and systems associated with FCS could, and should, be provided in a way that would benefit current forces, as quickly as feasible.4

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4 When fielded, Future Combat Systems will provide a persistent, ubiquitous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability. In addition, it will create an integrated, distributed network to leverage intelligence and facilitate the employment of all weapons and systems to better enable Soldiers to conduct operations (from support to civil authorities, to stability, to combat involving offense and defense).
maintaining and enhancing understanding of the vital role of Army Installations to sustaining the well-being of Soldiers and families. The likelihood of prolonged conflict, sustained deployment and increased stress on Soldiers and families was immediately identified. To Army senior leaders, it was abundantly clear that to enhance readiness and to sustain the viability of the All-Volunteer Force, the Army must realize its vision to dramatically improve the quality of the services and facilities provided by its installations. Installations serve as homes and communities for Soldiers and families, while providing workplaces for vital Army civilians. Moreover, installations provide the infrastructure to support both training and deployment—foundational prerequisites for building a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. In light of their importance to a wartime Army, the ongoing initiatives to improve installations and care for Soldiers and families, highlighted visibly in the creation of the Installation Management Agency and the establishment of a comprehensive Well-Being Framework, received considerable emphasis by senior leaders.

creating the Army Futures Center. This center, established as a vital component of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was designed to lead the Army’s efforts to accelerate its movement from the current to the future force. Later renamed the Army Capabilities Integration Center, this center was envisioned to lead the Army in developing the concepts, coordinating the experiments and determining the joint and service requirements to facilitate expeditious development of new equipment, technologies and systems (as well as the supporting doctrine, facilities, training and other enablers). A key aspect of the mission envisioned for this new center was the effort to match authorities and responsibilities in one place under one leader. This center emerged as a headquarters that not only identified and understood the challenges inherent to the future operating environment, but also proved uniquely able to integrate the many diverse activities required to field the systems and technologies, such as FCS, designed to enable Soldiers and leaders to be successful in that environment.

Senior Army leaders clearly recognized that transforming an Army at war would be an extraordinarily complex and potentially dangerous task. Their view, however, was that transformation was not a choice; it was absolutely required to enable the Army to wage a “new kind of war,” and to sustain the full range of its global commitments, for an indefinite period of time. At the same time, they assessed that the lessons learned from war could be rapidly applied to Army Transformation and would facilitate building an Army that would be truly relevant and ready for the challenges of the 21st century.

The Army’s senior leaders initiated the Focus Areas—to drive the change required to transform the Army—with five core elements of guidance:

- **Identify where change was required to enable successful combat operations.** Areas for “immediate focus” were selected based upon a determination that an aspect of Army doctrine, organization, process or some other area required major change to create a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities within this decade.
- **Eliminate constraints.** The commands and agencies selected to lead Focus Areas were directed to examine all possible ways to enhance Army capabilities to conduct joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations across the full spectrum of possible scenarios.
- **Develop comprehensive solutions to embed change.** The solutions proposed by responsible commands and agencies, once approved by the senior leadership, were to be integrated into all four sections of The Army Plan to provide required strategic guidance and levels of resourcing.

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5 Additional information on major initiatives, reflecting progress using the Army’s Doctrine-Organization-Training-Materiel-Leader Development and Education-Personnel-Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework will become available on the Army website at www.army.mil.
• **Provide new directions for Army transformation and modernization.** The Army Transformation Roadmap and the Army Modernization Plan were to be updated to incorporate the solutions proposed by the responsible commands and agencies.

• **Reinforce the centrality of the Army Campaign Plan.** The intent and vision of each Focus Area were to be translated into decision points to enable scheduling, managing and tracking progress with respect to the Focus Areas—and to institutionalize change across the force.

The reorientation of Army transformation was enormously (and intentionally) broad in scope, yet centered on three principal and foundational objectives: modularity, rebalancing and stabilization.

The initiatives derived from these objectives would enable the Army to:

- accomplish its mission today and prepare for future challenges;
- improve its capacity to provide the forces and capabilities required by the combatant commanders;
- maximize the capabilities of all components and all skills resident within the Total Force;
- improve readiness, cohesion, predictability, training and leader development;
- address many other requirements, with a view to alleviating current and anticipated stress on the force, associated with sustained high levels of operational deployment; and

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<tr>
<th>Focus Area Proponent</th>
<th>Focus Areas in Execution Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Operations (G-3)</td>
<td>Improve Capabilities for Homeland Defense</td>
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<td>Installation Management (ACSIM)</td>
<td>Installations as Flagships</td>
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<td>Information Operations (CIO/G-6)</td>
<td>The Network</td>
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<td>Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability</td>
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<td>Personnel (G-1)</td>
<td>Force Stabilization</td>
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<td>Improve Capabilities for Stability Operations</td>
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<td>Resource Processes</td>
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<td>Strategic Communications</td>
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<td>Current to Future Force</td>
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Figure 2
Nesting with Strategic Initiatives

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<td>Active Component / Reserve Component Balance</td>
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<td>Army Modular Force</td>
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<td>Joint Expeditionary Capabilities</td>
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<td>Restructure Army Aviation</td>
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<td>Leader Development</td>
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**Army Vision: Relevant and Ready Landpower in Service to the Nation**

**Army Mission:** To provide necessary forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders in support of the national security and defense strategies.

**Ways**

- Provide relevant and ready landpower for the 21st century security environment
- Support current global operations with relevant and ready landpower
- Build a modular force with joint and expeditionary capabilities
- Develop LandWarNet operational capabilities
- Execute major acquisition programs
- Restructure Army Aviation
- Secure financial resources and legislative authorities to meet requirements

**Ends**

- Provide the infrastructure and support to enable the force to fulfill its strategic roles and missions
- Support current global operations with relevant and ready landpower
- Reinforce the centerpiece: Soldiers as warriors
- Care for Soldiers and Army families
- Build a modular force with joint and expeditionary capabilities
- Train Soldiers
- Implement business transformation
- Execute major acquisition programs
- Grow adaptive leaders
- Enhance logistics readiness
- Restructure Army Aviation
- Equip the Soldiers
- Enhance strategic communication
- Secure financial resources and legislative authorities to meet requirements

**Means**

- Restructure Army Aviation
- Secure financial resources and legislative authorities to meet requirements

**Figure 3**
Army Vision: Relevant and Ready Landpower in Service to the Nation

Army Mission: To Provide Necessary Forces and Capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in Support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.

Ways

Ends

Means

- Train and equip Soldiers to serve as warriors and grow adaptive leaders
- Sustain an All-Volunteer Force composed of highly competent Soldiers that are provided an equally high quality of life
- Provide the infrastructure and support to enable the force to fulfill its strategic roles and missions

Reinforce the centerpiece: Soldiers as warriors

Recruit and retain the All-Volunteer Force

Adjust the global footprint to create “Flagships of Readiness”

Train Soldiers

Care for Soldiers and Army families

Implement business transformation

Enhance combat training centers

Improve Soldier and family housing

Develop the LandWarNet institutional infrastructure

Grow adaptive leaders

Enhance logistics readiness

Equip the Soldiers

Enhance Soldier and family housing

Enhance LandWarNet operational capabilities

Enhance strategic communication

Figure 3

National resources and legislative authorities to meet requirements
• fully leverage the enormous amount of transformational activity underway and to strike a proper balance between “change and continuity” (as highlighted earlier).

Progress . . . Transforming While Waging War

The net effect of the Focus Areas has been enormously positive. Over the past four years, 20 of the Focus Areas have moved into Execution status, meaning that their intent has been integrated into formal Army processes for planning and resourcing. The ideas generated by the Focus Areas produced or initiated major changes—of both an intellectual and physical nature—in every aspect of Army activity. The magnitude of these changes is demonstrated by examining some of the more prominent, most visible initiatives now well under way and making clearly discernible progress:

• building a modular Army;
• rebalancing Army capabilities (within active and reserve components and within key skills);
• stabilizing the Army (to enhance readiness, cohesion, and improve quality of life);
• improving quality of life on Army installations (and establishing the basis to fund installations at levels to enable delivery of critical services to Soldiers, families and Army civilians in wartime);
• improving the quality of individual training, equipment and support for Soldiers;
• improving the quality of training and realism at Combat Training Centers (and developing the ability to export this training experience to home stations);
• improving training, leader development and education (for all military and civilian members of the Department of the Army);
• establishing the Network as the foundation of Future Combat Systems;
• restructuring Future Combat Systems (to provide more immediate payoff to current forces);
• restructuring Army Aviation (to field more relevant capabilities, improve survivability and more); and
• aligning the overall culture of the Army—Soldiers, families and Army civilians—with the objective realities of an Army at war (as reflected in the actions and attitudes observable across the force . . . from Soldiers in combat, to families dealing effectively with “single parent” issues and prolonged, recurrent separation, to civilians providing vital services needed to support and sustain all aspects of Army activity).

The magnitude of change is further illustrated by examining the Focus Areas through the lens of the Doctrine–Organization–Training–Materiel–Leader Development and Education–Personnel–Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework. Each Focus Area produced new thinking or improvements in each of the DOTMLPF domains. For example, Focus Area 6, Army Modular Force, clearly produced improvements in organizations, yet it also created corresponding improvements in doctrine to guide the employment of these organizations, systems and facilities to train them, procedures and techniques to develop leaders to lead and command them, etc. Major accomplishments assessed for each Focus Area are identified in the table beginning on page 13, which provides a greater appreciation of the depth and breadth of change the Focus Areas have set in motion across the entire Army.

The Army is monitoring the progress of the Focus Areas per the system described in Maintaining the Momentum of Army Focus Areas, dated 5 July 2005. As Focus Areas mature, the Army is integrating them into all four sections of The Army Plan and maintaining visibility on specific actions and decision points through the management process established for the Army Campaign Plan (Part IV of The Army Plan).

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6 In July 2005, the Director, Army Staff established criteria to assess the status of Focus Areas (i.e., Plan, Prepare and Execution). In simplest terms, a Focus Area is considered to be in an Execution status if the intent is being fully acted on, and this intent is embedded into appropriate processes for strategic planning, concept development, resourcing or requirements determination.

7 The 2007 Army Posture Statement, available online at www.army.mil, provides specific examples of the Army's accomplishments, mapped against each of the four overarching, interrelated strategies, in two periods of time: “Since 9-11” and “In 2006.”
The intent of the Focus Areas is reflected in the strategic initiatives that are the integral components of the Army’s four overarching, interrelated strategies (as depicted in figure 3). The Army is continuing its work to fully implement and deploy the Strategic Management System to provide a critical set of output-oriented metrics to measure Army-wide strategic performance (and to gauge progress in achieving each of the four overarching strategies). The Strategic Management System, now in the final stages of development under the supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Business Transformation), will provide an automated tool to allow the Army to:

- establish visibility, over the long term, of the many initiatives generated by the Focus Areas;
- create a comprehensive system of metrics to support assessment of Army-wide strategic progress;
- support senior leader decisionmaking in areas regarding resources, priorities, strategic communications and legislative engagement; and,
- improve its ability to articulate, advocate and build support for its requirements.

**Changing an Army . . . Insights on Transformational Leadership**

Through their actions, decisions and communications, senior Army leaders have played a decisive role in causing the change now occurring across the Army. They have created intellectual energy, established strategic direction, encouraged initiative and overcome organizational inertia—all needed to establish transformational momentum. The Army will continue to undergo change to meet the needs of the nation in a constantly changing, extraordinarily complex security environment. In “thinking about change,” the actions and example of the Army’s senior leaders regarding the Focus Areas are instructive.

They performed four central functions:

- **Made the transformation meaningful.** Through carefully crafted communications, they established urgency, understanding and consensus on the need to transform. Through a variety of media (print, web, radio, television, conferences, briefings, face-to-face visits to Soldiers and commanders in combat and at home stations, visits to all elements of the Army’s Operating and Generating Forces, meetings and every venue conceivable), they articulated the compelling need to “transform or die.” A few examples of the tools they used to communicate “the transformation story” (by leveraging world, military and American history; personal experiences and battlefield observations; insights from sons and daughters in military service; knowledge of enemies and foreign cultures, etc.) include:

  » Arrival Message, Chief of Staff, Army, August 2003.
  » Army Campaign Plan, April 2004.

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8 In many ways, the Focus Areas have served to “catalyze” other initiatives, all generally focused on building a relevant and ready force and a campaign-quality force with joint and expeditionary capabilities.

9 These references, including *Maintaining the Momentum of Army Focus Areas*, 5 July 2005, will be available on the Army website at www.army.mil. These references provide a sampling of key documents, in chronological sequence, used to promote understanding and create momentum. There are countless other extraordinarily valuable examples.


- Exemplified desired mindsets and behaviors. Army leaders encouraged people to think about transformation as “a journey, not a destination.” This concept required people to escape bureaucratic constraints and conceive new horizons (“stretch goals”) for activities. A sustained leader focus on innovation caused people to think about “why” versus “why not.” Clear examples of efforts to change prevailing mindsets included reinforcing emphasis on “jointness” and “capabilities based” planning across the Army. New interpretations of concepts such as “expeditionary” and “business transformation” were introduced and quickly took hold across the force.

Perhaps the most significant example of efforts to encourage new outlooks involved the range of activities focused on developing leaders. Put simply, senior leaders recognized the need to better prepare all Army leaders and all Army organizations to adapt to the challenges they will face amidst the complexity of the evolving international security environment. Building upon the foundational idea that intellectual change precedes physical change, Army senior leadership is endeavoring to create pentathletes—versatile, mentally agile leaders skilled in many disciplines—who are able to think critically and creatively in dealing with new situations. The Army is now engaged in a “full-court press” to put in place new or revised systems to select, assign, develop, train and educate leaders who are better able to operate in the face of uncertainty. Senior Army leaders have also consistently reinforced the importance of teaching and rewarding “how to think,” not “what to think.”

- Built a unified, committed leadership team with a sustained transformational focus. The Army’s senior leaders have become increasingly unified in their effort to sustain the full range of the Army’s global commitments; transform the Department of the Army (both its operating and generating forces); and improve the quality of support provided to Soldiers, families and Army civilians. Reflecting the civil-military cooperation that has emerged at the department level (and withstood many tests in recent years), this unity of effort has greatly improved Army leaders’ internal and external communications.

Their shared outlook and sustained focus on communicating the urgent need to transform have enhanced the Army’s strategic communications, media relations, legislative engagement and numerous interactions within the Department of Defense and other U.S. government agencies. The net effect of their ability “to tell the story and cause people to listen” has been steadily increasing levels of resources and support for Army transformation.

- Set in motion a process to change Army culture to reflect new realities. Transformation is fundamentally about causing organizations and people to do things in new, different or unique ways—usually by changing or reinforcing certain behaviors. When large, complex organizations pursue genuine transformational change, a true measure of their success is the ability of leaders to properly focus (and to reorient if needed) people’s attitudes, actions and beliefs—which guide behavior and establish the true operating culture of the organization.

Army senior leaders have long recognized that an essential aspect of Soldier and leader preparation depends on the internalization of ideals such as those embraced within the *Warrior Ethos*. These ideals serve as a starting point to develop Soldiers’ confidence in themselves and in their units. These ideals reinforce their belief that they will be fully trained, properly equipped and well led. Moreover, these ideals help to assure them that they are capable of deploying anywhere, against any adversary, and successfully accomplishing their mission.

The *Warrior Ethos* has also proven to be instrumental to promoting a sense of resiliency across the force—a prerequisite for sustaining the will to fight a long war with a volunteer force. In simple terms, resiliency is a measure of Soldier and leader tolerance of, and ability to operate in, ambiguous, adverse
conditions. The net effect of the renewed emphasis on the Warrior Ethos and instilling resiliency in Soldiers and leaders has been the strengthening of the Army's professional, all-volunteer fighting force (whose members more fully embrace the organization's desired ideals and values).

Army senior leaders—military and civilian leaders of all grades across all components of the Army—have proven to be highly effective in modeling and reinforcing desired behaviors. As ever, Soldiers tell this story best, through their actions and through their words. Here are three examples of Soldiers living the values that give the Soldier's Creed its special meaning (extracts of the Creed in parentheses):

» “The Army’s been good to me. It’s given me a chance to be part of something bigger than myself.” Staff Sergeant Andrew S. McMann, a squad leader, while reenlisting in a medical facility in Iraq on 25 March 2007, just 48 hours after being wounded by an improvised explosive device in Ramadi. (I am a warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.)

» “The first time you deploy into combat, you train and train and you can’t wait to fight. Then you conquer and come back a hero. But when you’ve been there, you have to muster new strength . . . and you prepare for the worst.” Sergeant Pedro Loureiro, a team leader, during preparation for deployment at Fort Stewart, Georgia, 20 March 2007. (I am disciplined and physically and mentally tough.)

» “I feel confident and at the same time apprehensive about going to a place where people are trying to shoot at you.” Private First Class Kyler Boline, a rifleman, preparing to deploy for his first tour of duty in Iraq, also at Fort Stewart, 20 March 2007. (I am trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I am an American Soldier.)

In the words of the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, in his final appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “I am very proud of the Warrior Ethos that we have in the Army and how that has emerged in this fight. I just see our young men and women living it every day. I am very, very proud of that.”

Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the Army’s senior leaders—and the most vivid example of transformational progress—has been their success in fostering the development of a culture that embraces the professional values the institution prizes and understands the objective realities of the challenges facing the Army and the nation at this dangerous, pivotal time in history.

Moving Forward . . . Realizing the Army Vision

As the Army continues its work to accomplish its mission and to realize the Army Vision for the future force, its senior leaders must address core questions that will inform how the Army may have to adjust its strategic vectors to remain relevant and ready to meet the needs of the nation:

• What are the strategic requirements of the 21st century?

• What decisions must the Army make now to fulfill its Title 10 obligation to ensure that, as a vital component of America’s armed forces, it is best prepared to defend U.S. interests in the face of traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges?

• Are joint ground forces (Army, Marines and special operations forces) properly sized and structured to provide the capabilities needed to perform the missions the nation will require?

• What additional actions are required to ensure that Army forces are organized, manned, trained and equipped to be relevant to, and ready for, the challenges they will face?

10 The Soldier’s Creed is available at www.army.mil. At this site, readers will also find access to Army Values, the Noncommissioned Officer’s Creed and the Civilian Creed.

11 General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Defense, 14 March 2007.
• How can the Army best prepare its leaders to become multi-skilled pentathletes able to operate with confidence amidst complexity and uncertainty?
• What will be the impact of protracted conflict on the All-Volunteer Force (Soldiers, families and Army civilians)? What combination of quality of life, compensation, incentives, service options, family programs and other tools will be required to recruit, retain and sustain the concept of the All-Volunteer Force for the future?
• How does the Army ensure that its physical infrastructure (of installations, depots, arsenals and the network that connects them) best supports its mission?
• How does the Army balance its resources to provide quality of life to sustain its volunteers; maintain deployment facilities (air, ground, sea, rail, cargo and other facilities) to support combatant commanders’ timelines; and establish a training and education base to prepare Soldiers, leaders and Army civilians for the challenges they will face?
• How does the Army best leverage its human and financial resources to ensure that it remains the world’s preeminent landpower?
• How can the Army ensure that its culture remains aligned with the challenges and complexities it faces?
• How can the Army accelerate the momentum it has established in recent years, in all of these areas, to properly position the force for future?

[All] too often . . . grand declarations about innovation are followed by mediocre execution that produces anemic results, and innovation groups are quietly disbanded. . . . Each generation embarks on the same enthusiastic quest . . . and faces the same challenge of overcoming innovation stiflers.

Rosabeth Moss Kanter, “Innovation: The Classic Traps”

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Number and Title</th>
<th>Proponent</th>
<th>Initial Guidance</th>
<th>Mission Statement</th>
<th>Major Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 The Soldier (Reinforce Centerpiece: Soldiers as Warriors) | Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (ATSH-OTY) | Develop flexible, adaptable and competent Soldiers with a Warrior Ethos. | Conduct holistic review and analysis of individual Soldier, institutional and unit training, equipping and readiness needs. Make recommendations on Warrior Spirit implementation, support of Soldier as a System, individual equipment and training needs. | • Integrated Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills into Initial Military Training.  
• Issued Rapid Fielding Initiative equipment to 800,000 Soldiers.  
• Caused restructure of individual and collective training, improving rigor and relevance. |
| 2 The Bench (part of Grow Adaptive Leaders) | TRADOC (ATWC-SSI) | Prepare future generation of senior leaders. Identify and prepare select Army leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational and service organizations. | Identify, prepare and assign select Army leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational and service organizations. Institutionalize systems required to sustain assignments. | • Developed and fielded Army-wide Leader Development Portfolio.  
• Restructured Senior Executive Service management system.  
• Defined requirements for Pentathlete.  
| 3 The Network (Develop LandWarNet Operational Capabilities; Develop the LandWarNet Institutional Infrastructure) | Information Operations CIO / G-6 (SAIS-ZC) | Leverage and enable interdependent, network-centric warfare. | Task Force Network will analyze the current network from the top-down perspective and develop recommendations to increase Battle Command capability for the current and future force in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) full-spectrum operations. Will also recommend a single Army lead for network development, and reprioritization of network developments that will accelerate fielding capabilities to the current force. | • Designed Warfighter Information Network-Tactical.  
• Introduced Joint Network Node in support of global operations.  
• Initiated analysis of global information infrastructure required for JIIM. |
| 4 Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities (Build a Campaign-Quality Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities) | TRADOC (ATFC-E) | Retain campaign qualities while developing and embedding a mindset into a capabilities-based Army prepared to provide support to the combatant commander. | Develop an action plan to cultivate a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset that embraces requirements for modular, capabilities-based Army forces to achieve joint interdependence in support of combatant commander requirements. | • Established Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC).  
• Established Joint Interdependency Team in TRADOC.  
• Established three Army-other service boards for joint interdependence capability development.  
• Established joint theater logistics command for U.S. Forces-Korea.  
• Published Army white paper “Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign-Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities.” |

Blue text in left column denotes the initiative on the Army Strategy Map (figure 3) which incorporates this Focus Area.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Title</th>
<th>Mission Statement</th>
<th>Initial Guidance</th>
<th>Proprietor</th>
<th>Major Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Active Component (AC) / Reserve Component (RC) Balance (part of Support Global Operations with Relevant and Ready Landpower)</td>
<td><strong>Redesign the force to achieve greater flexibility to respond to contingencies, decreasing the number of involuntary and repeated mobilizations. Focus on early responder</strong> (first 30 days of a rapid response operation) and high-demand units.</td>
<td><strong>Redesign the force to optimize the active and reserve component mix across the Defense Strategy.</strong></td>
<td>TRADOC (AZTL-CTC)</td>
<td>• When complete in Fiscal Year 2013, will have rebalanced more than 110,000 force structure spaces to optimize available manpower.</td>
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<td>6 Army Modular Force (part of Support Global Operations with Relevant and Ready Landpower)</td>
<td><strong>Create modular, capabilities-based unit designs that enable greater capacity for rapid packaging and responsive, sustained employment to provide relevant and ready forces to support combatant commanders.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Create modular, capabilities-based unit designs.</strong></td>
<td>TRADOC (ATZL-CST-OP)</td>
<td>• Converted 185 of the 282 planned brigade formations. • Developed numerous modular forces, interim field manuals, and modular aviation brigades.</td>
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<td>7 Force Stabilization (Stabilize Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability)</td>
<td><strong>Ensure unit stability and continuity and provide predictability to Soldiers and their families.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ensure unit stability and predictability to Soldiers and families by implementing an array of turbulence-reducing manning initiatives that increase unit cohesion, readiness and deployability for an Army at war; reduce moves; stabilize Soldiers and families; and provide the basis for synchronizing the Soldier’s lifecycle management to the unit’s operational cycle in Army Force Generation.</strong></td>
<td>Personnel (G-1)</td>
<td>• Integrated Life Cycle Manning into the Army Campaign Plan. • Created four Life Cycle Management Commands. • Wrote Army Regulation (AR) 600-35 for Force Stabilization.</td>
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<td>8 Combat Training Centers / Battle Command Training Program</td>
<td><strong>Develop a strategy to refocus the roles and missions of the CTCs under conditions of a realistic JIIM/JOE environment to produce decisive, self-aware and adaptive units and leaders.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Develop a strategy to refocus the roles and missions of the CTCs under conditions of a realistic JIIM/JOE environment.</strong></td>
<td>TRADOC (AZTL-CTC)</td>
<td>• Established systems to review and measure CTC transformation and performance. • Revised CTC training strategies to better replicate the contemporary environment. • Created new and enhanced MOOT training sites to better replicate current operational environments and complex terrain. • Developed exportable capability to take training to units.</td>
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<td>9 Leader Development and Education (Grow Adaptive Leaders)</td>
<td><strong>Propose a strategy and implementation plan to develop leaders with the right mix of unit experience, training, education and self-development to meet current and future leadership requirements.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Propose a strategy and implementation plan to develop leaders with the right mix of unit experience, training, education and self-development to meet current and future leadership requirements.</strong></td>
<td>TRADOC (AZTL-SWC)</td>
<td>• Created AL21. • Redesigned Civilian Education System. • Redesigned Warrant Office Level Education. • Implemented Intermediate Level Education to replace Command and General Staff College. • Re-designed and expanded officer leadership training for the Joint Forces Land Component Commander.</td>
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<td>10 Army Aviation (Restructure Army Aviation)</td>
<td>G-3 (DAMO-AV)</td>
<td>Conduct a holistic review of Army Aviation and its role on the joint battlefield.</td>
<td>Army Aviation as capabilities-based maneuver arm optimized for the joint fight; logistics tail shortened.</td>
<td>• Equipped all Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom aircraft with aircraft survivability equipment. • Published more than 100 redesigned Aviation Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment for divisional and corps Aviation Brigades. • Implemented Flight School XXI for Initial Entry Rotary Wing students. • Modular conversion of Combat Aviation Brigades in AC and RC. • Created multifunctional Aviation Brigades. • Expanded Army Special Operations Aviation.</td>
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<td>11 Flagships of Readiness (Adjust Global Footprint to create “Flagships of Readiness”)</td>
<td>Installation Management (ACSIM) (DAIM-ZS)</td>
<td>Enhance installations’ ability to project power and support families.</td>
<td>Create power-projection platforms with robust reach-back capabilities; installations support well-being of deployed Soldiers and their families.</td>
<td>• Created the Installation Master Planning Task Force to integrate combined stationing effects of Base Realignment and Closure, Integrated Global Positioning and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) and Army Modular Force initiatives. • Created the Installation Management Agency. • Standardized installation organizations, installation designs and resource allocations. • Developed the IGPBS.</td>
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<td>12 Current to Future Force (part of Build a Campaign-Quality Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities)</td>
<td>TRADOC (ATFC-DO)</td>
<td>Accelerating fielding of selected future force capabilities to enhance effectiveness of the current force.</td>
<td>Frame Army Transformation within the context of constant change. Provide for the accelerated fielding of select future force capabilities to enable the enhancement of the current force.</td>
<td>• Created ARCIC. • Created the Army Evaluation Task Force under TRADOC to test Future Combat Systems and other new technologies. • Improved quality of capability developments through current force capability gap analysis. • Utilized the Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar initiative to study, capture and document processes to institutionalize rapid capability development. • Created the Rapid Equipping Force program.</td>
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<td>13 Resource Processes (part of Implement Business Transformation initiatives)</td>
<td>Programs G-8 (DAPR-DP)</td>
<td>Redesign resource processes to be flexible, responsive and accelerated to support an Army at war.</td>
<td>Commit “right” resources into stewardship of commanders when needed; seek ways to increase corporate resourcing flexibility; and increase near-term resourcing responsiveness for current operational requirements as part of a process aligned and nested with Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) process, to support combatant commanders and an Army at war—today and in the future.</td>
<td>• Updated AR-11 for PPBE for more responsive and operationally focused decisionmaking. • Aligned resources and requirements with the Army Campaign Plan. • Enhanced the Technical Guidance Memorandum.</td>
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<td>14 Strategic Communications (Enhance Strategic Communication)</td>
<td>Public Affairs (OCPA) (SAPA-ZDA)</td>
<td>Tell the Army story so that the Army’s relevance and direction are clearly understood and supported.</td>
<td>Create a process to convey Army strategic themes and messages to internal and external audiences; engage decisionmakers and opinion leaders; and assess and adjust themes, messages and methods as required in order to have the Army’s relevance and direction clearly understood and supported.</td>
<td>• Established a Collaborative Planning Group to synchronize the Chief, Public Affairs (OCPA), Chief, Legislative Liaison, Executive Strategy Group and Initiatives groups across the Army Staff. • Reorganized OCPA with increased roles and responsibilities. • Created the Soldier Media Center, consolidating Army media resources.</td>
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<td><strong>15 Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability</strong></td>
<td>Director, Army Staff (DAS) (DACS-ZDV-ESG)</td>
<td>Clarify roles and divide authority in effective ways to remain agile and flexible while ensuring accountability for results.</td>
<td>Develop authorities, responsibilities and clarify accountability for transformation command and control, requirements and acquisition processes, and organizational relationships.</td>
<td>Revised General Order 3 (Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA] Responsibilities); AR 10-5 rescinded in December 2005.</td>
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<td><strong>16 Actionable Intelligence</strong> (part of Build a Campaign-Quality Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities)</td>
<td>Intelligence G-2 (DAMI-OP)</td>
<td>Provide commanders and Soldiers with a high level of shared situational understanding, delivered with the speed, accuracy and timeliness necessary to operate at their highest potential and conduct successful operations.</td>
<td>Redefine intelligence, instilling an Army-wide culture and mindset that every Soldier is a sensor while rapidly implementing a virtual enterprise system which provides intelligence to commanders and Soldiers with the speed, accuracy and confidence to impact current and future operations.</td>
<td>Redesigned to a modular military intelligence (MI) force at brigade, division and corps levels. Developed Distributed Common Ground System-Army. Established Joint Intelligence Operations Capability-Iraq. Established Information Dominance Center for Central Command. Growing the MI Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) endstrength by more than 7,000 billets. Created the Every Soldier is a Sensor initiative. Increasing human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities and adding more than 3,000 HUMINT MOS Soldiers to the force.</td>
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<td><strong>17 Logistics</strong> (part of Build a Campaign-Quality Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities)</td>
<td>Logistics G-4 (DALO-SSW)</td>
<td>Create an integrated logistics capability that is singularly responsible, responsive and adaptive for end-to-end sustainment to a joint force commander across the spectrum of conflict.</td>
<td>Develop a joint logistics concept and implementation strategy, nested with interdependent joint logistics structures that support the full range of military operations at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) consistent with the Joint Operations Concept. This includes a responsive logistics infrastructure with simultaneous Deployment, Employment and Sustainment capabilities at the strategic and operational levels, complemented by a single integrated and responsive end-to-end distribution system.</td>
<td>Developed the Theater Sustainment Command/Expeditionary Sustainment Command, a single logistics command and control structure for a theater of operations. Created new modular combat service support (CSS) unit design to support modular organizations. Established the Joint Munitions Command to manage munitions for all services. Developed a CSS automation and communications architecture of four interoperable systems: Combat Service Support Automated Information System Interface/Very Small Aperture Terminal, Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced, Unit Level Logistics System-Aviation Enhanced and Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movement II.</td>
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<td>18 Improve Capabilities for Homeland Defense (part of Build a Campaign-Quality Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities)</td>
<td>G-3 (DAMO-SIF)</td>
<td>Make recommendations for the development and implementation of solutions to improve HQDA oversight of Homeland Defense; develop a recommendation for the appropriate manning of military and nonmilitary Homeland Defense organizations; and analyze the feasibility and implications of a fully functional Army Service Component Command for U.S. Northern Command.</td>
<td>Identify current Army contributions to Homeland Defense, any possible gaps or shortfalls in current Army capabilities and contributions to the joint force in order to improve Army contributions to Homeland Defense.</td>
<td>• Developing options and Army capabilities to respond to civil authorities for a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosives event. • Developing ground-based air defense capabilities to address long-term strategic and immediate tactical threats. • Assisting G-2 with improving counter-intelligence and information-sharing capabilities within Army missions in support of Homeland Defense.</td>
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<td>19 Improve Proficiencies Against Irregular Challenges (part of Train Soldiers; Grow Adaptive Leaders)</td>
<td>G-3 (DAMO-SSO)</td>
<td>Develop a more sophisticated understanding of the implications of the irregular challenge environment at the operational and strategic levels; and, through increased versatility and agility, achieve the same effectiveness in addressing irregular challenges as for traditional operations. Furthermore, outline the intellectual and cultural commitment required to effectively combat irregular challenges.</td>
<td>Determine required changes and additions to Army capacities, and identify emerging issues and policy alternatives that address irregular challenges.</td>
<td>• Established the Asymmetric Warfare Group. • Increased and enhanced language training in resident, nonresident and distance learning courses. • Added cultural awareness training to all Professional Military Education courses. • Created Interagency Cadre. • Increasing conventional Army ability to train foreign security forces.</td>
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<td>20 Improve Capabilities for Stability Operations (part of Build a Campaign-Quality Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities)</td>
<td>G-3 (DAMO-SSO)</td>
<td>Identify and implement initiatives to increase Army capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a JIIM context.</td>
<td>Determine requirements for Army Stability and Reconstruction Operations capabilities and identify gaps in current capabilities in order to identify initiatives to increase the Army’s capability and capacity to plan and conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations in a joint, interagency and multinational environment.</td>
<td>• Created the Army Stability Operations Office (DAMO-SSO). • Integrated Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces into Modular Force structure. • Updating key doctrinal references to better address Stability Operations (example: Field Manual 3-0, Operations). • Developing Information Operations doctrine to more effectively integrate CA and PSYOP. • Improving contracting authorities for field commanders.</td>
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About the authors . . .

Colonel Mark D. Rocke leads the Executive Office of the Headquarters Strategy Group, which supports the Army’s senior leaders by developing such key documents as the Army Posture Statement and the Army Game Plan. He directs numerous strategic initiatives with a view to integrating ideas and communicating on an Army-wide basis. A graduate of the United States Military Academy, he holds Master’s Degrees from Harvard University and the National War College.

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