FOREWARD

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces is in the midst of its yearlong project that will shape the U.S. military now and in the future.

The commission, established at the request of Congress, has chosen the issues it intends to study and is beginning the analyses that will lead to its findings and recommendations.

The Association of the United States Army recognizes that this commission's work is of fundamental importance to national security and that such a full, wide-ranging review of the serious questions concerning military operations, missions and structure is both timely and vital.

While our expertise and approach are based on the need for military landpower, we have taken full account of the inherently joint nature of U.S. military operations. At the same time, we have taken account of the political and military imperatives that demand that U.S. forces operate in coalition and alliance frameworks whenever possible. We want to make sure that the United States maintain military forces that are complete in every respect, capable of fighting and winning the nation's wars. That strength can offer the President and the nation a full range of options for operations during peace and war. At the same time, we want to be sure that the imperatives of land power and the importance to be played by the Army in the total equation are fully understood and protected.

The reason for publishing this packet is to provide an overview of what is at stake for America's Army and to outline the major issues affecting the Army as well as AUSA's positions on those issues. The packet also provides background papers and insightful essays relating to questions before the commission.

These issues need to be understood, discussed and brought to the attention of the general public, the news media and public officials. The purpose and structure of America's Army will be scrutinized intensely, and this will have direct bearing on future Army strength and budget resources.

JACK N. MERRITT
General, USA Retired
President
Association of the United States Army
SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS: WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR THE ARMY

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INTRODUCTION

The congressionally-mandated Commission On Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces is in the process of delineating the issues it intends to study in the coming year. Its report is due in April 1995, and while the report does not have the power of law most of the important recommendations will likely be put into the legislative process. The Secretary of Defense is to comment on the report by July 1995.

Some recommendations can be implemented by a policy directive either from the President or the Secretary of Defense.

By ordering the commission in the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994, Congress, in effect, was stating that it did not believe the Department of Defense could reform itself.

The commission’s charter is wide-ranging: from defining “broad mission areas and support requirements for U.S. military” to “recommendations for process to accomplish future changes.”

The Composition of the Commission

The Secretary of Defense appointed:

John White, director of the Center for Business and Government at Harvard University, as chair of the commission. Other members include: Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense; Franklin Raines, vice chairman of the Federal National Home Mortgage Association; Gen. Robert RisCassi, USA (Ret.); Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, USMC (Ret.); Antonia Chayes, former under secretary of the Air Force; Jeffrey Smith, head of the Clinton administration’s defense transition team; Adm. Leon Edney, USN (Ret.); Gen. Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.); and Robert Murray, Center for Naval Analyses.

The commission is located at 1100 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1200F, Arlington, Va. 22209. Its phone number is (703)-696-4250. Its fax number is (703)-696-4255.

Through the fall and into early 1995, the commission will form working groups along the three major divisions identified as operations, infrastructure and process; review the issues; and conduct hearings.

A draft report is due in May 1995.
Definitions:

The terms roles, missions and functions are often used interchangeably. In this packet, USA has adopted the definitions given those terms in the February 1993 report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Roles: The broad and enduring purposes for which the services were established by Congress in law.

Missions: The tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant Commanders In Chief (CINCs).

Functions: The specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles.

The example the report uses is:

"The primary FUNCTION of the services is to provide forces organized, trained and equipped to perform a ROLE — to be employed by a CINC in the accomplishment of a MISSION."

Operations: The capabilities each service brings to accomplishing a mission.

Infrastructure: The physical presence of each service and the Department of Defense as seen in equipment, installations, buildings, organization, personnel and structure.

Process: The relationship among the services, the Department of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the National Command Authority and other governmental agencies in accomplishing a mission.

Background

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 clearly states that the armed forces of the United States must work together to fight and win the nation’s wars. The law underpins “jointness” and makes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President’s principal military adviser. The law also requires the chairman to report every three years on the effectiveness of the armed forces by analyzing the services’ roles and missions.

In making this report, the law directs the JCS chairman to consider:

1. Changes in the nature of the threats faced by the United States;
2. Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare;
3. Unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces.

The first roles and missions report of Adm. William J. Crowe Jr. in 1989 addressed reorganization of intelligence functions within the services, the Department of Defense and federal agencies.

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In a 1992 address by Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee called for “a no-holds-barred, everything-on-the-table review of the current assignments of roles and mission among the military services.” He listed 10 broad areas “where there appears to be substantial duplication and potential opportunity for streamlining.”

Among the areas were contingency or expeditionary ground forces — of direct interest to the Army and Marine Corps; theater air defenses — of interest to all services; and logistics and support activities — central to infrastructure questions for each service and defense agencies and private business.

In February 1993, Gen. Colin L. Powell’s report provided the basis for the Army’s relinquishing of its nuclear mission, the major overhaul of military medicine and the establishment of the United States Atlantic Command.

The directive for an independent commission review was contained in the Fiscal Year 1994 Authorization Act.

In some ways, Powell’s report was a stage-setter for the Bottom-Up Review, ordered by Les Aspin, then the newly-confirmed Secretary of Defense. The review remains as the building block for President Clinton’s military strategy. It has as its underlying principal the commitment to keeping the armed forces strong enough to fight and win two Major Regional Conflicts almost simultaneously.

Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the JCS, will have to file his own roles and missions report in the late summer 1995, subsequent to the commission report.

Other Factors

Some other actions which have a bearing on commission results are:

• A special Readiness Task Force, chaired by Gen. Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.), earlier this year submitted its report to the Secretary of Defense. In this report, the task force found that readiness has not been harmed, but there were troubling signs for the future. This task force had major recommendations concerning reserve readiness and training.

• A revised national security strategy was signed by the President and published. This document accepts the Bottom-Up Review’s assessment of military needs but covers broader social and political issues as well.

• The Future Years Defense Plan now being finalized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense looks at substantial cuts in all services’ spending over the next six years. The gap between the expected defense budget resources and the requirements outlined by the Bottom-Up Review and the National Security Strategy is significant. In response, John Deutch, the deputy secretary of defense, has written each service asking them to cancel or offer options for big ticket modernization programs in order to protect personnel and quality of life accounts. For the Army, this means the Comanche reconnaissance helicopter and the Advanced Field Artillery System programs are threatened.

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• 1995 will see a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission with the task of drawing down unneeded infrastructure throughout DoD. This is the last of a series of such commissions established under current law. To complicate matters, the BRAC Commission deliberations will overlap those of the Commission On Roles and Missions.

What Has Happened to Date

The services and other organizations, such as AUSA, have submitted recommendations and comments on issues proposed for consideration.

The services have all independently made formal presentations to the commission, and AUSA has been invited to discuss its viewpoints in the near future.

In late September, the commission met and selected the categories it will retain for in-depth review. They are:

Close Air Support/Fire Support
Deep Battle/Conventional Strike
Army and Marine Corps Capabilities
Joint Warfighting
Overseas Presence
Airpower Organization
Intelligence Dissemination
Peace Operations
Unified Command Plan
Streamlining Acquisition Organizations
Materiel Supply Management
OSD, Joint Staff and Service Secretariats
Aviation Infrastructure
Theater Air/Missile Defense
Procurement Oversight/Auditing
Central Logistics Support
Depot Maintenance Maintenance
Medical Readiness and Health Benefits
Space
Constabulary Forces
DoD Agencies
C4 and Information Technologies
Nuclear Triad
Combat Search and Rescue
Coalition Interoperability

The commission will operate with three task forces under the functional titles of Operations, Infrastructure and Process.
Issues to be Considered

Of the broad categories the commission identified for study, AUSA has focused on the following issues which have potential for major impact on the Army. Each will be commented on in the attached issue papers.

OPERATIONS

Air and Missile Defense of the United States
Close Air Support
Extended Battle
Protection from Theater Air and Missile Threats
Precision Conventional Strike
Forcible Entry
Overseas Presence
Information and Intelligence Support to Units
Sustained Ground Operations
Strategic Lift
Airpower Management
AC/RC Maneuver Forces
Space Operations

INFRASTRUCTURE

Streamlining Acquisition
Materiel Supply Management
Aviation Infrastructure
Central Logistics Support
Depot Maintenance Management
Medical Readiness and Health

CONCLUSION

As Gen. Jack N. Merritt, USA (Ret.) said in his letter to the commission in September:

"First, the effectiveness — capability if you will — of the U.S. Armed Forces is the principal criterion that should guide all work on the military force posture...

"Second, efficiency demands conservation of resources, avoidance of unnecessary costs, and fully integrated joint military forces. Efficiency involves far more than today’s budget and the immediate future program...

"Third, motivated high-quality servicemen and servicewomen must remain the fundamental building block of our national defense...."
This packet of material is how AUSA looks at some of these crucial issues. They reflect the association’s deep commitment to maintaining the edge America’s Army needs to maintain land dominance on future battlefields.

The packet includes:

1. Secretary of the Army Togo West’s letter to the commission.
3. Issue and talking papers concentrating on operational questions. These papers include AUSA’s Outlook on each issue.
4. Landpower Essays that amplify the issues before the commission.
5. Glossary of terms.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CINC: The commander in chief of a Unified Command.

Close Air Support: Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Aircraft involved include attack helicopters flown by the Army and Marine Corps and fixed-wing aircraft flown by the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. It is also called CAS.

Contingency: An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Because of the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations and equipment.

Deep Fires: The indirect (or non-line-of-sight) fires from artillery, rockets, missiles and aircraft.

Expeditionary Force: An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.

Forward Deployed or Forward Presence: The garrisoning of armed forces of the United States outside of the Continental United States to demonstrate national security interest. Forward presence also includes, but is not limited to, prepositioned stocks ashore and afloat, show of force and military-to-military contacts. United States forces in Europe, Korea and Panama are considered forward deployed.

Crisis: An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political and military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

Functions: The specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles.

Infrastructure: The physical presence of each service and the Department of Defense as seen in equipment, installations, buildings, organization, personnel size and structure.

Joint Force: A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of the Army, Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of the services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control.

Joint Force Commander: A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command, command authority or operational control over a joint force.
**Light Forces:** Land forces that do not possess heavy armor, such as M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks. Marines are light forces. Some Army units — such as the 10th Mountain Division — are also light forces. Light forces can be quickly dispatched to crisis scenes.

**Missions:** The tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant Commanders In Chief (CINCs).

**Operations:** Acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests and achieve strategic aims in a number of ways depending on the nature of the strategic environment. Those ways include war with large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests. Those ways also include actions that focus on deterring war and promoting peace. Examples would be counterterrorism, disaster relief and peacebuilding.

**Operations Other Than War:** Military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace. Other examples include show of force, peacekeeping, disaster relief and drug interdiction.

**Power Projection:** The ability of the United States to move its forces from installations in the Continental United States to an overseas location by airlift and/or sealift in response to a crisis.

**Process:** The relationship among the services, the Department of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the National Command Authority and other governmental agencies in accomplishing a mission.

**Roles:** The broad purposes for which the services were established by Congress in law.

**Strategic Mobility:** The ability of the United States to move its armed forces and their necessary supplies and equipment to any place on the globe by air or by sea. An additional aspect of strategic mobility is necessary rail or road transportation and port facilities in the continental United States to move land forces — primarily — to embarkation points.

**Upper Tier:** The missile defense system which protects large forces or cities. This contrasts with Lower Tier which protects more narrowly defined geographic areas or forces.
The United States today has only minimal air defenses and limited defense against ballistic missiles. A reassessment of the adequacy of our defenses, in view of the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, the ability of regional powers to threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction, along with continuing political instability in the former Soviet Union, may well be in order.

If such a reassessment is made, then current service responsibility, with the Army responsible for land-based missiles, the Air Force for land-based aircraft, the Navy for sea-based systems, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization responsible for developing missile defenses, may also require rethinking.

Before this is done, a study of the future air and ballistic missile threat to the United States, along with an estimate of the minimal defensive levels required to meet these threats, needs to be made. Only then should the appropriate service assignment responsibility be determined.

AUSA fully supports the need to study the adequacy of the air and missile defenses of the United States. The current uncertainties of the maturity of technology to counter this threat, as well as the cost of providing a credible defense, makes it questionable to consolidate responsibility for management of air and missile defense assets into one service. AUSA believes it is important to incorporate the complementary capabilities of each service, particularly since this type of defense will likely require widely spread point defenses.
Talking Points: AIR & MISSILE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States has only minimal air defenses and limited defenses against ballistic missiles.

The question: Should current service responsibility, with the Army being responsible for land-based missiles for example, be rethought?

The problem: The United States has not conducted a thorough study of the future air threat to the United States nor the defensive levels the nation needs to meet that threat.

AUSA believes the need for a study of the adequacy of the air and missile defenses of the United States is obvious, but questions consolidation of responsibility for these defenses under one service.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

ISSUE

When the Key West Agreement of April 1948 was signed, the attack helicopter did not exist, and close air support for land warfare was made a primary function of the newly created Air Force, born as an element of the Army.

Until the early 1980s, fixed-wing close air support was viewed as an essential tool upon which the ground commander could call to exploit successes in offensive operations and prevent defeat in defensive operations during periods in which the volume, precision, or range of surface artillery was inadequate. Recent advances in the precision and range of cannon and missile artillery, along with that of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft to deliver close-in and interdiction fires in support of the ground maneuver forces has clouded this issue.

Especially in early entry, rapid deep maneuver, economy of force operations and air assault, organic ground force artillery and rotary-wing units lack the rapid intratheater mobility needed to meet Army and coalition ground force close fire support requirements.

In 1993, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged the ability of attack helicopters to conduct close air support and recommended making close air support a primary function for all services, with the Secretary of Defense subsequently approving this recommendation.

Currently being recommended is the concept that the Army could, as the Marine Corps has, establish its own multi-capable fixed-wing close air support and interdiction aircraft inventory, thus relieving the Air Force of all but long-range ground attack responsibilities. At issue is whether this would result in efficiencies and monetary savings, while still providing the land commander with the types of fires necessary for him to ensure success.

AUSA POSITION

In addressing this issue, AUSA believes that primary consideration should be given to whether transferring responsibility for close air support of joint forces will result in unacceptable penalties in effectiveness and resources' efficiency. Any transfer of functional responsibility should continue to ensure that the joint force commander is able to count on the full spectrum of offensive and defensive capabilities needed to accomplish his mission. AUSA also believes that having the Army assume this function would neither add to overall force effectiveness nor to resource efficiency and that scarce resources would be needlessly expended making the transfer. AUSA further believes that responsibility for fixed-wing close air support should remain with the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps (as appropriate) who would also lose a significant portion of its ground attack capability and officer corps if such a transfer were effected.
Talking Points: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Advances in helicopters, artillery and missiles have changed the nature of supporting fires for ground maneuver forces.

The question: Should the Air Force retain the function of having to provide fixed-wing close air support for land forces?

The problem: In early entry, rapid deep maneuver and air assault, fixed-wing close air support is vitally needed to support the ground forces.

AUSA believes that the responsibility for fixed-wing close air support should remain with the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps as appropriate.
EXTENDED BATTLE

ISSUE

At the time of the April 1948 Key West Agreement, the definition of close combat was delineated by the weapons capabilities of the individual services. Technological evolution has obviously extended the range and ability of systems to attack targets located far beyond the area of close combat. Documents specifying service roles and functions have not kept pace with this evolution, and each service has continued developing weapons for the extended battlefield.

It is obvious that future battlefields will not be static. Actions throughout the areas of operations will take place simultaneously, synchronized to best exploit enemy vulnerabilities and to take advantage of friendly strengths.

Current extended battlefield systems include advanced artillery systems, helicopters, standoff weapons, fighter and bomber aircraft with precision guided munitions, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The question has been raised that, with each service developing their own systems, is there excessive overlapping? In addition, aside from the potential for spending excess funds in a period of decreasing resources, is there also the problem that overlapping systems may make it potentially difficult to unify their effectiveness?

Nevertheless, making permanent divisions of battle space among service components could constrain joint force commanders and would be the very antithesis of the American way of war, which relies on flexibility, versatility, agility, and aggressive innovativeness—not predetermined, templated moves.

AUSA POSITION

The joint force commander must decide on the uses of all units and weapons on the battlefield. AUSA believes that segmenting the battlefield into areas of service responsibility will significantly hamper commanders in being able to achieve the best effects based on the actual situation. AUSA takes the position that having a choice of units and weapons systems capabilities from the several services provides robustness and not unnecessary redundancy, and also that service capabilities to support the joint force commander must remain in force with the necessary specificity in Department of Defense documentation.

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Talking Points: EXTENDED BATTLE

Technology has extended the range and ability of systems that include aircraft, artillery and missiles to attack targets far beyond the area of close combat.

The question: Is there excessive overlapping in developing systems to fight on future battlefield?

The danger: Permanent divisions of battle space among the services cut joint force commanders’ options.

A USA believes joint force commanders need a choice of units and weapons systems capabilities from the several services.
THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

ISSUE

Our nation’s armed forces are now focused, in support of our national defense security strategy, on rapid power projection for major regional contingencies.

During these contingency operations, United States forces will encounter an increasingly sophisticated array of delivery and weapons systems. One area of increasing sophistication is in the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Over a dozen nations now possess short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles (in addition to aircraft) and most of those nations also possess the capacity to use chemical, biological, and in some cases nuclear weapons. During contingency operations, the joint force commander must have the ability to protect his force from these delivery and weapons systems.

Currently, advanced technologies are being aggressively pursued to counter theater ballistic missiles, with all the services participating. This has been done in the belief that as a part of the larger function of force protection and area defense, theater missile defense builds on the complementary capabilities of each service to detect, track, engage and destroy incoming missiles at any point in their trajectory from launch to terminal phase.

The lack of clear service responsibility in this area, is said by some to hinder the effectiveness of defense systems employment in wartime. Overlap, caused by excessive duplication in capabilities, and compounded by equipment incompatibilities and differences in training are said to hinder the joint force commander's ability to array a leak-proof air and missile defense system against the enemy's threat. One suggested remedy is to concentrate responsibility for point and area air and missile defense management under one service. This solution, it is suggested, would prevent capability duplication and equipment incompatibilities, as well as lead to budgetary economies.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that the defense of ground forces is a proper Army mission and that the integration of ground-based theater missile defense systems into Army maneuver forces is key to providing necessary protection to the ground force. AUSA further believes that the key to theater missile defense is the protection of the force, and that the ground force commander should retain control of the weapons he believes are essential to provide protection of his portion of the joint force. AUSA questions whether consolidation of theater missile defense under one service’s control will lead to greater efficiencies or effectiveness. AUSA supports the concept that the Army retain responsibility for its part of theater missile defense, and that coordination of fires in a theater be exercised by the theater commander.

October, 1994
Talking Points: THEATER AIR & MISSILE DEFENSE

United States armed forces will encounter an increasingly sophisticated array of threats from the air — ballistic and cruise missiles capable of carrying chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons.

The question: Should the services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Office continue to actively pursue technologies to counter this growing threat or should one service have responsibility for this defense?

The problem: The systems now being developed, in large part, are complementary. Furthermore, in the case of the Army, ground-based theater missile defense is integrated with the service’s maneuver forces.

AUSA believes the Army must retain responsibility for its part of theater missile defense, and the theater commanders must exercise the coordination of fires in his area of operations.
PRECISION CONVENTIONAL STRIKE

ISSUE

Precision conventional strike weapons have been developed to achieve United States military objectives with a minimum of cost, risk and loss of American lives. All the services have developed means to perform conventional precision strikes against targets such as command centers, communication facilities, key government centers, bridges or deployed military forces. Most development was geared towards providing the nation with the means to attack a large number of targets in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack. These capabilities proved extremely useful during DESERT STORM, when minimum lives were lost in neutralizing Iraqi resistance.

Because there has been little national guidance on developing precision conventional strike weapons, there has been increasing program overlap. With potential savings to be gained by aligning the responsibilities for developing these weapons and reducing the numbers of duplicative systems, it has been suggested that service responsibilities for precision conventional strike weapon system development be reviewed, with eventual system elimination.

What is at stake if Army systems are eliminated is the potential loss of decision options for ground force commanders in choosing attack options that can minimize risk for soldiers and hasten chances for success on the battlefield.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that the joint force commander should have available a complete range of units and weapons for use in achieving military success at the lowest cost in lives and materiel. Having this choice of units and weapon system capabilities from several services is not redundancy, but actually provides robustness. AUSA supports the concept of developing better guidance for weapon system development and eliminating duplicative systems. However, AUSA believes that any decision must not prevent the joint force commander from having available for employment a complete range of weapons necessary for his success on the battlefield.
Talking Points: PRECISION
CONVENTIONAL STRIKE

The services have developed precision conventional strike weapons to achieve military objectives with a minimum of cost, risk and loss of American lives.

The question: Should the services retain responsibility for developing these weapons systems?

The problem: If Army systems are eliminated, ground force commanders lose options in minimizing risk for soldiers and in achieving rapid success on the battlefield.

AUSA believes that while there should be better guidance for weapon system development and elimination of duplicative systems, the joint force commander must have the complete range of such weapons to provide flexibility and achieve success with minimum risk to soldiers on the ground.

October, 1994
FORCIBLE ENTRY

ISSUE

Forcible entry is the conduct of an assault into an opposed area of operations that is geographically remote from staging bases. Forcible entry, which can be achieved through airborne or amphibious operations, has as its purpose, the seizure and securing of an area for the rapid introduction of follow-on forces. Current United States foreign policy strategy underscores the need for having the capability to conduct forcible entry.

Both the Army and the Marine Corps provide forces for rapid contingency deployment. Of importance, though, is the fact that these forces are not organized, trained or equipped for the same primary missions. The Marine Corps is organized with forces especially designed, organized, trained and equipped to seize and hold lodgments in littoral areas, and cannot conduct sustained or rapid armored warfare without substantial Army augmentation. The Army has a full range of ground forces which can be tailored into packages suitable for all prompt and sustained land combat missions, although it has limited capability, without substantial Marine Corps augmentation, to take part in amphibious operations. Thus, while neither service has all required capabilities, taken together, the complementary capabilities of the Army and Marine Corps are essential in providing for the full range of combined contingency operations.

There is general agreement that both types of forcible entry capabilities are required. Concurrently, it has been suggested that improvements in the closure and rapid integration of early follow-on forces can offset requirements for sizeable forcible entry capabilities. The force levels envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review are the minimum necessary to be able to fight and win two almost simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that power projection and rapid crisis response are major requirements of United States armed forces. When considering the question of whether the United States has adequate forces for conducting and sustaining future forcible entry operations, it should not be an either-or proposition. Instead, AUSA sees Army and Marine Corps capabilities as being complementary rather than redundant. Both are needed to meet the full spectrum of a joint force commander's requirements for responding to diverse crises. Both should be maintained and adequately funded. Of like importance is the need to adequately fund and maintain strategic lift capabilities, and AUSA strongly supports such a policy.
Talking Points: FORCIBLE ENTRY

Forcible entry, either done through airborne or amphibious operations, is necessary to support the national security interests.

The question: Does the United States have adequate forces to conduct and sustain future forcible entry operations?

The problem: The force levels envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review are the minimum necessary to be able to fight and win two almost simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts. These levels cannot be cut any deeper.

AUSA believes power projection and rapid crisis response are major requirements of United States armed forces and that the Army and Marine Corps capabilities are complementary and necessary.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE

ISSUE

American military presence abroad, be it for training exercises, contingency prepositioning, humanitarian assistance or democracy development is an essential element in executing our national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. Overseas presence gives credence to our determination to defend our interests and demonstrate our commitment to bilateral and multilateral defense obligations. It is essential, therefore, that our armed forces continually demonstrate their ability to conduct operations in multiple regions to advance United States interests and to assist allies and other friendly nations in meeting common challenges and threats. Further, access to developed bases and facilities from which our forces may train for or commence joint and combined operations, using equipment that is forward deployed and quickly available, is also essential. The concept of overseas presence is supported by military doctrine, joint commanders (who tend to equate gaps in overseas presence with additional risk) and the Department of State.

Additionally, as a result of recent United States base closures, any withdrawal of forces overseas has the potential of causing a ripple effect on our remaining CONUS bases.

In the period since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the United States has significantly reduced overseas permanently stationed forces, even though the new and highly unpredictable international security environment that has resulted means that potential areas for United States engagement are now more widely dispersed across several regions. As a result, combined with service end strength reductions, these overseas drawdowns have resulted in increased personnel and operating tempos, and associated costs.

Currently at issue is whether there are alternative, lower cost methods for accomplishing the purposes of overseas presence, thus relieving pressure on personnel and budgets, and whether it is essential to maintain a continuously ready worldwide crisis response capability.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA firmly supports the continuing overseas presence of United States forces. AUSA believes that our nation’s international strategy of demonstrating its commitment to world stability is enhanced by the continual overseas presence of our forces. Further, AUSA is firmly convinced that land forces are not only a more visible, but a more viable means of demonstrating this commitment, and that the ability of the United States to field capable forces in sufficient numbers, and on a rapid basis, will be diminished if overseas presence is limited.

October, 1994
Talking Points: OVERSEAS PRESENCE

Overseas presence is tangible proof of the United States’ determination to defend our interests and demonstrate our commitment to meet our obligations to allies and other friendly nations.

The question: Are there other, cheaper ways to meet the purposes of overseas presence?

The problem: Cutbacks overseas already have stretched resources and personnel to meet a growing array of missions, and additional cutbacks overseas would have a dramatic effect on bases in the Continental United States.

AUSA firmly believes that land forces deployed overseas are the most visible and viable means of demonstrating the nation’s commitment to world stability. This presence must be retained.
STRATEGIC LIFT

ISSUE

The United States must be able to project and sustain its forces in order to carry out its national security strategy. Forces that cannot be moved in a timely manner are of questionable value to the nation.

Over the past few years, there have been many studies addressing United States strategic mobility shortfalls. As demonstrated during DESERT STORM, while the United States possessed the personnel and equipment to fight a war, it lacked the strategic lift assets to deploy at rates called for by our strategy. In the period since then, the United States has attempted to establish an integrated mobility plan for achieving a prudent and fiscally responsible strategic lift capability at the moderate risk level. Improvements in our strategic mobility have been made through the acquisition of the C-17, increased sealift assets, afloat prepositioning and infrastructure investments.

It is apparent, though, that planned improvements will still be short of providing the capabilities required of our forces, in particular our land forces, to be successful in fulfilling their assigned roles. It is likely that the strain on strategic lift priorities will increase.

Thus, an important task facing the Department of Defense is how to assign responsibilities to ensure that adequate strategic lift assets are developed, programmed and procured.

AUSA POSITION

Historically, the Army has had limited input to the strategic lift budgets of the Air Force and Navy, even though the Army is the primary user of their assets. In theory, then, it would even make sense to have the Army given budget and programming authority for strategic lift. In reality, though, AUSA believes the Army would be best served by having this authority put at the Department of Defense level, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff could ensure that the proper priority is given to strategic lift, since they are the employer of the Army’s strategic contingency forces. This policy will ensure that budgeting priorities for strategic lift will be as they are merited, and that United States forces, particularly land forces, will be deployable on a timely and effective basis.
Talking Points: STRATEGIC LIFT

The United States must be able to project and sustain its forces by air and sea to carry out its national security strategy.

The question: Has the United States moved fast enough and far enough to provide the necessary lift that its land forces, particularly the Army, will need to fulfill their assigned roles?

The problem: The Army, the prime user of both air- and sealift has limited input to the budgets of the Air Force and Navy, to ensure strategic lift has priority.

AUSA believes that the Army, the primary user of strategic lift assets, needs the assurance that these assets will be available on a timely basis and in sufficient quantities. AUSA supports putting budgeting and programming authority for strategic lift at the Department of Defense level, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff can ensure that proper priority is given to maintaining the required needs.
INFORMATION & INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO UNITS

ISSUE

Information and intelligence are vital ingredients to effective command and control at all echelons. They cut across the spectrum of military activities, and as such must meet command requirements at all levels. They must be responsive to a commander’s needs.

Rather than viewing information and intelligence as a general resource which individual users tailor to their needs, requiring dedicated specialists within those user units, the imperative should be top-down service. None of the United States armed forces’ first line organizations is autonomous—every one relies on continuous support from outside providers.

Tailoring of information and intelligence to specific unit needs is essential in order to prevent information overload and inadequate situational awareness. The products must also be in order to facilitate the most effective and efficient use of the time available to commanders and operators within the units themselves. This is especially true for ground force commanders.

In order to ensure efficiency in tailoring these products to similar units, the providing organizations should have the requisite expertise and procedures in place. They must be thoroughly familiar with the doctrine, capabilities, current situation and current missions of supported units in order to properly tailor the flows of information and intelligence. This may entail intermediate organizations accomplishing the tailoring when the primary provider is a global, national, or theater-level general support organization.

In view of Department of Defense budget constraints, it has been suggested that management control for information and intelligence support to units should be placed under a single executive agent.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes it is vital to ensure that operational units have precisely tailored information and intelligence in order to maximize their operational potential. The burden should be on the higher echelons to ensure that appropriate military expertise is brought to bear to assure the necessary continuous flow of these essential elements to all user units.

Proper command and control depends on adequate and timely information tailored to the commander’s requirements at all levels. This includes joint command as well as service needs. AUSA believes that this principle has such broad application and significance that resource management control of information as a total function should not be placed under a single executive agent.
Talking Points: INFORMATION & INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO UNITS

Information and intelligence cut across the spectrum of military activities and must meet command requirements at all levels.

The question: Should management of information and intelligence support to units be placed under a single executive agent?

The problem: Tailoring of information and intelligence to specific unit needs is essential to prevent overload and poor situational awareness. This is especially true for ground force commanders who must make effective and efficient use of their time.

AUSA believes it is vital to ensure that operational units have precisely tailored information and intelligence to meet the commander's needs at all levels. AUSA further believes that this principle is so important that this function should NOT be placed under a single executive agent.
SUSTAINED GROUND OPERATIONS

ISSUE

Sustained land operations begin once a lodgment is created and secured, and regardless of how that is done. The timing of the transition from forced entry to sustained ground operations is usually gradual.

In order to carry out sustained ground operations, a warfighting structure, built around maneuver units, must be created. Each echelon of maneuver is accompanied by a complex mixture of combat support and combat service support units. Both the Army and the Marine Corps are organized for ground combat operations, with often similar capabilities. The Army is also responsible for the logistical support for all ground forces in sustained land operations.

It has recently been questioned as to whether, in a period of decreasing defense resources, there is unnecessary duplication of capabilities within the Army and Marine Corps for conducting sustained ground operations through the reinforcement of a secured lodgment. Both services have defined their new roles in ways some have said overlaps much more than in the past.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that the fundamental reason for the Army’s being is to provide forces for prompt and sustained ground operations, and that the Army has created an excellent capability to provide task organized tailored forces to meet the needs of any situation or environment. AUSA further believes that combined with enhanced rapid deployment capabilities and prepositioned equipment, the Army can do so more effectively, at lower cost and more promptly than the Marine Corps. AUSA takes the position that having a choice of units and weapons systems available to the joint force commander provides robustness and not unnecessary redundancy, and that this should be retained.
Talking Points: SUSTAINED GROUND OPERATIONS

To carry out sustained ground operations, a warfighting structure, built around maneuver units, must be created.

The question: Because both the Army and the Marine Corps are organized for ground combat operations, is there unnecessary duplication of capabilities?

The problem: The Army is responsible for prompt and sustained ground operations and that the Army has the capability to provide task organized forces to meet the needs of any situation or environment.

AUSA believes the choice of units and weapons systems should be made by the joint force commander, but the fundamental reason for the Army is to provide the forces and structure for sustained ground operations.
AIRPOWER MANAGEMENT

ISSUE

Unlike the boundaries that define land and sea combat forces, there is no similar basis for defining the vertical and in-depth boundaries for the employment of air combat forces. All of the services operate air units and the enhanced capabilities of aviation systems have contributed to the clouding of this issue.

With the enhanced capability of service air systems to perform similar missions, the question has arisen as to who, and at what level should be tasked with the management of these assets in a manner that will enhance their employment effectiveness as well. It seems obvious to some that clearer guidance in the management of air assets in combat will lead to the creation of systems that complement rather than compete with one another, will help reduce command complications and help eliminate unnecessary functional duplication.

During DESERT STORM, the joint force commander controlled the employment of all theater airpower assets through the use of a functional component commander—the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). This commander was responsible for boundary management and was tasked with integrating the array of coalition air assets in order to achieve results that supported the joint force commander’s campaign objectives. This procedure has been suggested as the proper way to manage aviation assets. Others have argued that a service should be tasked with aviation management, particularly along the lines of specialization.

Another suggestion has been to have the Office of the Secretary of Defense assume more responsibility, particularly in acquisition, for balancing aviation programs in order to eliminate duplication.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that the management and coordination of aviation assets is not a service-particular issue. Even though some service roles overlap, the service specific roles require types of aircraft that should be designed to meet the needs of the user, that is to say the joint force commander. AUSA supports the continuation of service control of aviation program development in order to ensure this responsiveness. AUSA further believes that the control of air operations in support of a joint campaign should be done by the joint force commander and that the JFACC system employed during DESERT STORM is a worthy concept for boundary management.
Talking Points: AIRPOWER MANAGEMENT

Each service operates air units, and advances in technology, such as those in attack helicopters, has clouded the issue of who should manage these assets in a way that will enhance their effectiveness when used.

The question: Should a service or the Department of Defense be tasked with aviation management, particularly along specialized lines?

The problem: One of the lessons of DESERT STORM was how well the Joint Force Air Component Commander managed boundaries and integrated coalition air assets to support the joint force commander's campaign objectives.

AUSA believes that the management and coordination of aviation assets is not a service-particular issue. The lesson of managing and coordinating the air campaign in DESERT STORM should be followed.
AC/RC MANEUVER FORCES

ISSUE

The Bottom-Up Review established the new United States defense policy as being one in which the United States needs to maintain forces sufficient to fight and win two Major Regional Conflicts almost simultaneously. The Cold War strategy was one of being prepared for global war.

Army Reserve Component units (both Army Reserve and Army National Guard) are integrated into Army operational plans, and the degree of their readiness will likely impact on whether Army forces are successful in combat. Thus, ensuring the proper mixture of active and reserve force structure to support our national defense security strategy is the key point in reviewing this issue. Both the active and reserve components should remain at a strength that will ensure that this strategy is feasible.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that the new national strategy enunciated in the Bottom-Up Review is key to how Army forces should be organized and trained. Both Active and Reserve Components should be a "matched pair" that supports this policy. AC/RC should be structured to best support the new national military strategy.
Talking Points: AC/RC MANEUVER FORCES

Reserve Component forces are integrated into Army operational plans and would be required to support the policy of being able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.

The question: Is there a lack of balance in Active and Reserve Component forces (number, type and strength) as defined in the Bottom-Up Review, the administration’s defense policy statement?

The problem: There needs to be a “matched pair” between the Active and Reserve Components for organization and training.

AUSA believes that AC/RC should be structured to best support the national military strategy.

October, 1994
SPACE OPERATIONS

ISSUE

Today, the combat, combat support and even combat service support forces of all the services rely heavily on space for a range of vital and continuous functions. In space, modern technology has made available a wealth of systems that transcend the areas of interest of all joint force commanders and their service components. The future potential of space platforms to contribute even more significantly to mission success dictates a direct linkage between them and the joint force users. Joint force commanders must be able to rely on uninterrupted support from and through space for all essential functions at all echelons.

At issue in reviewing the issue of space support and space asset management is whether Department of Defense space assets can be more efficiently managed if one agency is made executive agent for space operations, and also whether this type of management would continue to provide the essential support required by the joint force commanders, service components, defense agencies and other users in fulfilling their respective warfighting and peacetime missions. Proposals to centralize space activities must meet the criteria of both effectiveness and efficiency. While centralized coordination and resource management is indicated because of the large budget resources involved and the complexity of acquisition, it does not mean that a single agency or service should necessarily control the determination of requirements or resource priorities. The CINCs, the services and those doing force development planning need to play a meaningful and continuing role.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that space support is key to the Army's success as a power projection force. The Army's whole concept of the digitized battlefield and the Army for the 21st century is dependent on access to space and space technology that enables the ground commander to see deep and to monitor his own operations as they occur. Space assets must provide essential capabilities for which the Army has assured access and for which it must be able to determine its own requirements. AUSA clearly believes that space is in the joint area of operations and is not a definable function per se. All assets of space must have joint participation, particularly in the areas of establishing requirements, setting priorities and allocating resources.

AUSA believes that, historically, in no area of defense has an executive agent been able to provide assurances of dedicated support within historical resource allocations. Moreover, when resources are scarce, service executive agents have tended to assign their own services higher priority for support than other users.

AUSA firmly supports the concept that, in managing space assets, all services should have a seat at a designated management board.
Talking Points: SPACE OPERATIONS

In space, modern technology has made available a wealth of systems that transcend the areas of interest of all joint force commanders and their service components. The potential of space platforms to contribute even more significantly to mission success dictates a direct linkage between them and the joint force users.

The question: Would Department of Defense space assets be more efficiently managed if one agency is made executive agent for space operations and would this continue to provide the vital support all users need?

The problem: While centralized coordination and resource management is indicated, the CINCs, the services and those doing force development planning need to play a meaningful and continuing role.

AUSA firmly believes that, in managing space assets, all services should have a seat at a designated management board.
STREAMLINING ACQUISITION

ISSUE

Acquisition functions are directly linked to force effectiveness. The present system permits close and continuous interaction between acquisition program activities, the operational user, the force developer, the integrated readiness and logistics supporting base and industry. This expanded acquisition community ensures that achieving the desired outcomes on the battlefield remains the focus of acquisition decisions.

Service acquisition activities also heed the guidance derived from the Secretary of Defense’s acquisition policy and strategy which are based on broad efficiency criteria rather than on current military doctrine and future concepts. The Secretary of Defense’s direction ensures adherence to administration policies but cannot provide the essential military expertise. That expertise comes from the operational user and the service unique development and support organizations who are responsible for fielding and maintaining forces that are trained and ready for combat now and in the future.

Acquisition officers themselves are expert not only in their technical functions, but also in the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures of the operational users. This military expertise is crucial and must be maintained in the acquisition system that provides for future war fighting needs.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that in the current environment of defense reductions, it is important to ask whether consolidating defense acquisition would lead to greater efficiencies. AUSA is convinced that in considering the merits of this proposal, it is important to ensure the maintenance of operational user requirements and military doctrinal and conceptual bases. Proper and necessary civilian political and policy acquisition guidance should not be confused with the equally essential professional military expertise needed to guide acquisition toward recognized military needs. In addition to weighing any projected savings that centralization might bring, there should be an assessment of what such a move would do to the intimate link between military expertise and the operational user. In sum, AUSA believes that the defense acquisition system should be directly linked at every level to the requirements of the operational user. Professional military expertise should define the military requirements that acquisition is intended to meet and ensure that the outputs indeed meet stated requirements.
Talking Points: STREAMLINING ACQUISITION

The present acquisition system permits close and continuous interaction between acquisition program activities, force developers, operational users, the integrated readiness and logistics supporting base and industry.

The question: Should acquisition activities be consolidated under the Secretary of Defense?

The problem: By consolidating acquisition activities under OSD, the link with essential military expertise would be broken.

AUSA is convinced that the link between military need and civilian political and policy guidance must be maintained.
SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT TO UNITS

ISSUE

All operational organizations must have support in order to be effective in performing their missions in combat and non-combat situations.

None of the armed forces' first line organizations is autonomous. Every one relies on continuous support from outside providers. Supply and maintenance services are among the most important items these units need to be effective. Units that are first line operators for combat and non-combat tasks require supply and maintenance packages specially tailored to their missions, materiel systems and readiness requirements. Defense-wide levels of supply and availability of maintenance services must be adapted to meet the specific needs of the units as stipulated by the combatant commands according to Joint Chiefs of Staff priorities. Therefore, the outside organizations providing these vital items must be thoroughly familiar with the doctrine, capabilities, current situation and current missions of the units in order to properly tailor and package the flows of supply and maintenance services. Top-down tailoring, packaging and provision are necessary for units in peacetime readiness postures as well as those actually engaged in combat or operations other than war.

Rather than viewing the supply and maintenance services as a general resource which individual users tap and tailor to their needs, requiring dedicated specialists within those individual using units, these essential services must be provided by top-down automatic service. To ensure efficiency, the providing organizations must have the requisite expertise and procedures in place. This may require intermediate organizations to tailor support to users when the primary provider is a global, national or theater-level general support organization.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that it is vital that operational units have precisely tailored and packaged supply and maintenance services. The burden should be on the higher echelons to ensure provision of the necessary continuous flow of essential support elements to all user units. Top-down tailoring, packaging and provisioning are key to ensuring peacetime readiness and combat sustainability, and AUSA fully supports maintaining this concept in assessing all issues associated with supply and maintenance functions.
Talking Points: SUPPLY & MAINTENANCE SUPPORT TO UNITS

None of the armed forces' first line organizations is autonomous, each relies on continuous support from outside providers.

The question: Are higher echelons ensuring the necessary continuous flow of essential support to all user units?

The problem: Top-down tailoring when the primary provider is a global, national or theater-level general support organization may require intermediate organizations to support all users.

AUSA fully supports top-down tailoring, packaging and provisioning in assessing all issues associated with supply and maintenance.

October, 1994
AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE

ISSUE

The military services operate a variety of aircraft, often for similar missions. These aircraft currently are operated and maintained by service specific units and depots. With force reductions and reshaping under way to adapt to the end of the Cold War, service duplication of missions and fleet over capacities have led some to suggest that consolidation of fleets, particularly of support aircraft, and of depots by aircraft mission type will contribute to budget and manpower savings.

Of crucial importance in reviewing any area for possible consolidation is the impact on unit readiness and mission preparedness. Depots are crucial to readiness. Service unique depots offer the most responsive means of maintaining this readiness. They also serve mobilization functions, provide a bridge to civilian domestic industry between peace and war, and maintain the capacity to provide unique support for contingency or general war that cannot be provided by other sources.

Army support aircraft provide essential and quick mission support to commanders in both peace and war. This support must be responsive and timely. Consolidation under one service may cause scheduling difficulties and even mission degradation if adequate numbers of aircraft are not available and if user priority is not maintained.

The Army is moving toward a smaller, CONUS-based, power projection force that has fewer materiel assets and depends on a smaller sustainment base. With this environment of increasing challenges, in an increasingly wider range of locations, it is essential for Army mission accomplishment to maintain activities that are responsive to changing requirements and are able to quickly solve new problems. This responsiveness is crucial to the Army’s ability to conduct prompt and sustained land combat.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA supports innovative arrangements that will reduce budget pressures on the Army. Consolidation of aircraft fleets by mission type, as well as a similar consolidation of depot support, may be areas for potential savings. However, the guiding principle in reviewing these areas is whether consolidation achieves efficiency while maintaining unit readiness and mobilization capability.

October, 1994
Talking Points: AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE

The military services operate a variety of aircraft, often for similar missions. The services operate and maintain these aircraft at their own depots.

The question: Because of force cuts and reshaping, is now the time to consolidate the fleets, particularly of support aircraft, and of depots by aircraft mission type?

The problem: These aircraft provide essential and quick mission support to commanders in both peace and war, and service unique depots offer the most responsive way to maintain the aircraft readiness.

AUSA believes the guiding principle should be whether consolidation achieves efficiency while maintaining unit readiness and mobilization capability.
CENTRAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT

ISSUE

Suggestions have been made that, in a period of significant force structure drawdowns in the Department of Defense, consolidating the service logistical support structures will lead to greater efficiency and cost savings.

The Army’s current sustainment structure is based on a warfighting doctrine of rapid power projection and responsive logistical support. The Army operates on a “wholesale” logistics concept. These logisticians are integral to the Army’s ability to provide the appropriate force level to meet worldwide operational contingencies. They are key to total weapon system management, combat development, materiel development, fielding, support, deployment and sustainment.

Army logistical units perform the following missions: support unit readiness by using knowledge of customer authorizations and asset visibility to manage the distribution and redistribution of principal items; use their knowledge of weapons systems, force structure and doctrine to develop initial fielding packages for support items, special tools, test equipment and repair parts; assure logistics doctrine is compatible with the needs of the combat developer through coordination with service schools and operational force integrators; and bring supportability and good business practice to the support effort.

Creating a single Department of Defense logistical agency would require it to have the infrastructure to do these missions.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that the segregation of wholesale logistics functions under a single DoD logistical agency will break the synergistic benefits of the Army’s factory to foxhole team. AUSA further believes that the key to logistical support is responsiveness. The Army has streamlined its logistics operations to incorporate efficient business practices and to utilize the benefits of electronic connectivity to maintain the essential linkage between the user and the provider. Creating a super Department of Defense agency to handle the logistics needs of all the services will likely result in an organization that is too large to effectively manage and is likely to be less responsive than now.
Talking Points: CENTRAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Consolidating the service logistical support structures may lead to greater efficiency and cost savings.

The question: Will such a consolidation allow the Army to maintain its ability for rapid power projection with necessary logistical support?

The problem: The Army’s logistics structure is integral to the service’s ability to provide the appropriate forces to meet worldwide operational contingencies.

AUSA believes that the segregation of wholesale logistic functions under a single Department of Defense agency will break the synergistic benefits of the Army’s factory to foxhole team.
DEPOT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT

ISSUE

Depots can serve both unique service as well as joint needs. With force reductions and reshaping underway in adaptation to Cold War realities, workloads are well below depot capacity and overlaps are becoming increasingly evident. In certain cases, it may well be appropriate to ask if depots can be reduced in number and also consolidated to achieve efficiencies.

In meeting unique service needs, depots are crucial to readiness. They are fully integrated into the systems and processes that seek to make optimum use of resources to maintain required unit combat capabilities. Moreover, their theoretical excess capacity is not always interchangeable and is not easily adaptable to other purposes. Depots serve mobilization functions, providing a bridge to civilian domestic industry between peace and war. They also maintain the capacity to provide unique support for contingency or general war circumstances that cannot be provided by other sources. Currently, the Defense Depot Maintenance Council provides a mechanism for identifying options for streamlining and rationalizing overall depot operations as well as for maintaining unique capabilities needed in peace and war.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that, in considering how depots can be better managed and whether they can be reduced or consolidated to achieve efficiency, the focus in deciding should be on maintaining unit readiness and mobilization functions that cannot as readily and effectively be provided by civilian industry. AUSA supports innovative arrangements that fully exploit the promise of American industry to supplement military capabilities while minimizing costs over time, particularly in areas in which the civilian state of the art outpaces the military depots and technology base.

October, 1994
Talking Points: DEPOT MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT

With the size and structure of the armed forces continuing to grow smaller and change, workloads are well below depot capacity.

The question: Should the number of depots be cut and activities consolidated?

The problem: Depots serve mobilization functions, providing a bridge to civilian industry between peace and war. They also maintain the capacity to provide unique support for contingency or war not provided by other sources.

AUSA believes the focus must be on maintaining unit readiness and mobilization needs that cannot be readily or effectively provided by civilian industry.
MEDICAL READINESS AND HEALTH

ISSUE

Military health care supports service men and women in peace and war. It also supports the extended military family to include dependents and retired personnel. Military heathcare professionals provide unique functions with deployed forces, particularly in situations that potentially involve combat.

The technical skills provided by the military health care system are, in most cases, not unique. However, the application of those skills in military environments is unique and calls for specialized training and organizations that have no civilian equivalents. Moreover, the differences in operating environments between the services including training, organization and procedures makes the concept of standardization for all military operations difficult to realize.

Additionally, military health care is an inextricable element of the motivational and compensational base for the volunteer force and the retired community. Options that shift costs to volunteers are inherently unfair and, in the long run, act as detractors that compromise the basis of the volunteer force.

AUSA POSITION

AUSA believes that in assessing military health care, any option for change must protect the unique capabilities needed in contingencies and general war, and meet the legitimate expectations of the extended military family and retiree community. AUSA strongly supports maintaining a military health care system that meets the needs of military organizations in peacetime, war and operations other than war. It also strongly supports living up to the promise of health care service availability that has been an integral element of the nation's commitment to its active and retired soldiers in modern times and especially since the inception of the volunteer force.
Talking Points: MEDICAL READINESS & HEALTH

Military health care supports service men and women in their units in peace and war. But this care also supports the families of the nation's armed forces and military retirees.

The question: Should a separate military health care system be continued?

The problem: While most of the technical skills provided by military health are not unique, the application of those skills — particularly in combat — has no civilian equivalent.

AUSA believes that a separate military health care system is necessary to meet the needs of military organizations in peace and war. It also strongly supports living up to the promise of health care availability that has been an integral element of the nation's commitment to its active and retired soldiers.
THE EXTENDED BATTLE:
THE COMMANDER'S DEEP FIRE OPTIONS

by

General Glenn K. Otis, USA (Ret.)

Combat operations that involve firing weapons at enemy targets encompass two broad categories of fires: (1) direct, line-of-sight; and (2) indirect or non-line-of-sight. Tanks, rifles, machine guns and anti-tank weapons, to name a few, are examples of direct fires. In general, they are aimed by human sighting. Sensors aim indirect or non-line-of-sight fires, and the human operators may never see the target. Artillery, rockets, some air defense weapons and stand-off aircraft, to name a few, are examples of indirect fires. To be successful in combat, achieve decisive results quickly and minimize friendly casualties, commanders at every level will employ both direct and indirect fire to achieve the desired payoff.

The concept of long-range fires applies to both direct and indirect weapons. For example, a tank's direct fire main gun may be used at very close range such as 100 meters. It may also be used at ranges out to 5,000 meters where a ten-power scope is needed to aid the eye in acquiring the target and aiming the gun. For a tank, shooting at targets beyond about 2,000 meters is considered "long-range." Similarly, the Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) can engage targets beyond 100,000 meters, so its reference to short-and long-range takes on an even different meaning. Moreover, aircraft, both helicopters and fixed-wing, can perform air-to-ground firing roles at ranges that run the gamut from directly in front of friendly ground combat troops to literally hundreds of kilometers distant from them.

In all cases, the commander has available a flexible set of highly lethal weapons to orchestrate against an enemy that has little protection regardless of the distance from U.S. ground troops. Since many of these weapons are not affected by weather, nor night considerations, the enemy is almost always vulnerable to fires.
There is another important aspect of the long-range/short-range weapons story. It is often the case that friendly forces are located at considerable distances from each other. For example:

A. U.S. Marines launch an amphibious assault on an enemy seaport area. The Army’s airborne forces parachute into an airport to seize it for future use. The air-and seaports are separated by 50 to 60 kilometers (like BWI and Baltimore port). Mutual support is both desirable and necessary between these enclaves.

B. Enemy air defenses are particularly robust around an air base complex that the U.S. joint force commander wants to attack with precision-guided, air-delivered weapons. The enemy air base is located 250 kilometers from the nearest U.S. ground forces. Suppressing enemy air defenses by using both surface-to-surface fires (ATACMS) and air-to-surface fires (F-16, F-15 aircraft) is much more efficient than using one system alone and risks fewer pilots in high-cost aircraft.

The points here are twofold:

(1) Long-range fires should be orchestrated so that the strengths and vulnerabilities of individual delivery systems are optimized.

(2) While it may be true that a single capability might be able to get the job done, it is equally true that a commander benefits by having a choice of weapons, to include employing a combination of weapons to take advantage of the resulting synergy.

Long-range fires may be used to strike targets that are far away from the direct fire battle. Alternatively, they may be moved further away from the direct fire battle area as a means of protecting the weapons themselves. In either case, the payoff is high. Aircraft have the advantage of both striking distant targets and being far away from the direct fire battle. However, they have the disadvantage of relatively short availability times and of being significantly affected by weather. Ground weapons, artillery, and ATACMS for example, have less range but can be employed around the clock and are not seriously affected by weather.

As is consistently the case among weapons of war, the advantages of some types of weapons systems offset the disadvantages of the other and vice versa. Conclusion: The joint force commander can dominate the enemy, win more quickly and do so with minimum casualties if he can employ a mutually-supporting set of weapons that confront the enemy with fires from all quarters. This represents a desirable robustness.
EMPLOYING THE OPTIONS: 
HOW A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER VIEWS ROLES AND MISSIONS

by

General Glenn K. Otis, USA (Ret.)

Current service roles and missions are the product of the historical evolution of warfare, and technology has driven much of that evolution. Most of the major changes in doctrine and tactics have been pulled along by the art of the possible in the tools of warfare. Since this is true, the boundaries between traditional roles and missions of the individual services have become broader gray areas and jointness at all force levels has become a way of life.

Accordingly, as our total defense force structure draws down and resources become more constrained, it makes sense to approach decisions on roles and missions by prioritizing the functions to be performed and then seek the most cost-effective way to meet the requirements. The service roles and missions debate can profit by examining each of the functions that a joint force commander must be prepared to perform in any reasonable future contingency operation. Then, through an operations effectiveness analysis, the best way to perform those missions can be determined.

As the Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces begins its work, a common framework is needed. The purpose of this paper is to provide that framework by addressing the critical elements which define the functions of a joint force commander.

Given a crisis or a series of incidents in some area of the world that we consider important to our national interests, the president may order the use of military force. In so doing, he will cause a joint force commander to be appointed or designated. The joint task force (JTF) assigned to this commander can include units that are from a single service or — and this will almost always be the case — units that come from the several services. These units come under the command of the JTF commander who has the authority — indeed, the duty — to employ them to optimum effectiveness and efficiency in achieving his assigned mission.
The term mission introduces a second critical element in constructing this reference framework. Missions can refer to generic military capabilities of various services like conduct amphibious operations; achieve air superiority; conduct operations at sea; seize and defend land areas. However, as used in the reference framework that we are describing here, the word mission refers to the formal statement given to the designated JTF commander. For example:

**Mission:**

Deploy to the Orangeland peninsula. Stop the advance of Greyland forces into Orangeland. Eject Greyland forces from Orangeland and restore peace to the region.

There are literally hundreds of tasks and dozens of implied missions stemming from the assigned mission above. They will not be enumerated here. Rather, a selected subset of the more critical tasks will be discussed, and from these some observations can be made.

**Tasks:**

1. **Seize and secure airport near the city of Ota adequate for C-5 cargo aircraft.** This task may well require an airborne assault followed up quickly by air-landed reinforcements. For such a requirement, the JTF commander would want the assault elements of the 82d Airborne Division and its essential support elements — all of whom are trained for this kind of operation. Seizing the airport may be difficult or it could be relatively benign. However, the techniques for ensuring that an enemy cannot use standoff attack weapons — like mortars and artillery — to fire on the seized airfield, nor use shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles — to attack vulnerable aircraft in their last two to three miles of slow landing approach to the seized airfield — requires doctrine, tactics, techniques and training that are the province of professional ground forces. A JTF commander would depend upon his ground component commander to know and execute the steps necessary to achieving a secure airfield simply by assigning the task — “seize and secure the Orangeland airport at Ota”.

2. **Seize and secure the seaport facilities at the city of Nora.** A JTF commander knows that over 95 percent of his capability to sustain his force with supplies and, indeed, to bring into Orangeland the tanks, artillery and other mechanized units that he may need to accomplish his mission must come by sea and be off-loaded in a relatively prepared port. The U.S. Marine Corps has amphibious forces that are trained and equipped for exactly this kind of operation. The JTF commander would then assign the seaport seizure and security task to his Marine element.

3. **Defend Orangeland.** The JTF commander knows that he must use offensive actions to eject the forces of Greyland. However, he also knows that he must go on the defense until he can build up sufficient forces in Orangeland to take the offense. Therefore, the JTF commander’s early planning would envision how best to conduct an Orangeland defense, halt the progress of Greyland forces, while simultaneously building up his own forces through the sea and airports that analysis tells him are sufficient to conduct a successful offensive campaign.

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4. **Achieve air superiority.** To use the air- and seaports for bringing in forces, the ports must be free from enemy air attacks. This means that the JTF commander orders his air component commander to achieve and maintain air superiority. This, in turn, means early deployment of U.S. fighter aircraft, and buildup of planes, supplies and equipment at support bases in the region that are relatively secure from Greyland ground attacks. At the same time, Army surface-to-air missiles to assist in protecting the air- and seaports would be deployed. Note here that the reality of competing requirements for limited sea and air transport capabilities becomes painfully apparent. For every deploying Air Force fighter aircraft into Orangeland — or nearby countries in the region — a C-141 equivalent of cargo and support is required. And Army surface-to-air missile systems (like Patriot and Hawk) also demand a significant amount of airlift. So, the JTF commander has to balance his early need to achieve air superiority with the urgent need for forces to seize and secure airports and seaports. In this connection he is assisted by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine component commanders who are able to provide their specific recommendations on priorities.

5. **Theater missile defense.** The Iran/Iraqi war, Desert Storm and even the recent conflict between North and South Yemen demonstrate the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) and the willingness of belligerents to use them. Our generic scenario could well posit TBM using nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. Air- or seaport attacks by these types of weapons would have devastating impact on the ability of the JTF commanders to bring in forces rapidly and in quantities necessary to achieve the assigned mission. Consequently, another early need is for theater missile defense (TMD) weapons to protect the air- and seaports and arriving forces. Whether it be Patriot or the future Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), these weapons require a significant amount of precious airlift to move even small numbers of weapons. TMD then poses another critical, early demand on the strategic lift capabilities. The JTF commander has to deal with this competition for lift among the systems that are required for early arrival in Orangeland.

6. **Defense vs. enemy infantry forces.** In task three the focus was on the broad category of defense. In practice, the JTF commander would have studied the Greyland force capabilities; and if foot infantry were the enemy’s major force component, the JTF commander’s priority for bringing in U.S. fighting forces would go to light forces first, with the heavier — more mobile — armored forces coming by sea later. The Marine forces seizing the seaport would be well-equipped and supported for operations against Greyland’s predominantly infantry attacking forces. The Army’s airborne and air assault divisions are trained and equipped for enlarging the airhead to keep the airfields secure from both ground attack and mortar and artillery fires.

7. **Defense vs. enemy armored forces.** In the event that Greyland had a significant tank, mechanized infantry and armored artillery force, the JTF commander would put a premium on anti-armor defenses. The airborne and air assault forces seizing the airfield would need to have modern antitank fire capability like the Army’s Javelin shoulder-fired weapon. Also, attack helicopters with Hellfire missiles, and in the future, Longbow, would be given high priority for early airlifted deployment. The JTF commander also would opt for Army heavy divisions with their Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Abrams Tanks, Paladin self-propelled 155mm Amored Field Artillery, and armored-vehicle-equipped support forces such as air defense, engineers, intelligence and resupply elements to quickly load out by ship. To oppose an armored-equipped Greyland enemy without fully armored defense forces can be done, but only at great risk, higher casualties and for a very short period.
Consideration:

The above discussion summarized only a small number of the many tasks and considerations that a JTF commander will factor into his planning process. For each task and for every implied mission he will be assisted by his staff and the expertise of his experienced land, air and sea component commanders. The capabilities of each component are well understood, since that is the science of war. The art of war is what the JTF commander and his component commanders lend to the concept of successful campaigns.

The Air Force can conduct offensive and defensive counter-air operations aimed at achieving air superiority. The Army's surface-to-air capability adds synergy to the air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes of the Air Force. The Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), helicopters and sometimes artillery can assist in suppressing enemy air defenses so that Air Force air assets will take less casualties as they perform their roles. The naval arm can also contribute to this mission both by air-to-air attacks and by surface-to-surface (Tomahawk) and surface-to-air. What this means is that an enemy is faced with a wide range of threats from all U.S. component forces— all orchestrated by a single command structure.

The devil's advocate can allege that the services have redundant capabilities. However, the question that begs answer is: Do we need the redundancy? Do we have unnecessary duplication? The answers can be found in the vulnerabilities and strengths of each kind of system. Where enemy surface-to-air fires are too heavy, fixed wing aircraft flies at a higher altitude for safety, but then suffers a loss in the precision of fires against enemy targets. The helicopter, artillery or Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) can fill in part of the gap— but not all. Artillery and ATACMS are not grounded by weather, as aircraft may be, but their range is much less than the aircraft of the Air Force. The same type paradigm can be constructed in intelligence, infantry and armor. When an enemy is faced by U.S. forces which can hit him by sea, air or land with integrated, 24-hour-a-day capabilities and with detailed knowledge of enemy positions and strengths, then the disadvantages become so great that the enemy cannot cope with the battle space situation nor use forces available with any degree of efficiency.

The inherent capabilities of the sea, air and land forces should always be subject to challenge to prove their cost-effectiveness in their assigned roles and the type and quantity of equipment they are supplied. However, these challenges should be made only in the context of the whole orchestra, not merely in one or two of the instruments. A JTF commander, of course, would prefer to look to his Marine component if an amphibious operation is in the offing. Equally so, he would want his Army component to take on the airborne operation or the mobile operation of a fully armored combined arms force. The Marine Corps does not need to be a fully armored force, nor the Army an amphibious arm. We do, however, want to threaten any future enemy with attack from the sea, by air attack from high performance jet aircraft, and by low-flying, hard-to-detect attack helicopters, while light forces threaten from woods and cities and armored attacks circle enemy flanks.

It is within this framework that the roles and missions debate should take place.
The post-Cold War era with the United States as the world’s sole superpower has placed a new emphasis on our armed forces’ ability to respond to crises rapidly, coherently and effectively. The crises of the last five years have ranged from the Gulf War to threats of a major regional conflict with nuclear overtones in Korea, from embassy evacuations to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, highlighted by our current operations in Haiti. One blinding flash of the obvious is that each and every crisis is unique, and every crisis covers a scope of activities and problems that is broader and more diverse than the relatively predictable issues of the Cold War.

During the Cold War “out of sector” or “contingency” operations were generally viewed as minor, and out of the mainstream of the East-West confrontation. The forces used for contingency operations were usually Army paratroopers, Special Operations Forces and Light Infantry, or many times Marines when Amphibious Groups were in a position to participate. Marines were responsible for the majority of embassy evacuations.

After the Berlin Wall came down (generally recognized as the end of the Cold War), the diversity of operations expanded rapidly. Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the largest American operation since Vietnam and the largest allied operation since World War II, became the defining point for the high end of the spectrum and for the degree of aggression that a single ambitious state can perpetrate. It is difficult to define the other end because operations have so often increased in scope and intensity after initiation. It is probably safe to say, however, that peacekeeping operations in the Sinai with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) represents the most stable and predictable deployment of U.S. forces. Between these extremes we have seen the deployment of forces for almost every conceivable purpose. In many circumstances hostile actions have been a part of the operation; and in all circumstances the capability to employ force has been an important ingredient in the case for deploying forces.
The makeup of forces more clearly demonstrates the complexity of the challenges facing our nation in these operations. Engineers, water purifying units, communications, Army airborne, light infantry, armored and mechanized infantry units, attack and lift helicopters, Joint Special Operations forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, Marine Amphibious Group Task Forces, Navy carrier groups, Seabees and Army port and logistics units, not just for U.S. forces but also to support the U.N. operations. Also AWACS, Air Force and Navy fighters, Army Patriot units and the always necessary Air Force airlift forces have been called upon. Any serious study and analysis of U.S. military deployments and commitments since the fall of the Berlin Wall would deduce that the entire range of our nation’s conventional forces has been necessary and useful in meeting these diverse situations and circumstances. And I am sure any objective study would conclude that all services should retain crisis and rapid response capabilities. Such studies would also say that in the early hours and days of a crisis there is no redundancy of capability and that all forces capable of deploying, whether Army by air or Marines and carrier groups repositioning, are crucial to the deployment, rapid force building and gaining control of the situation quickly. Ask any Commander in Chief or Joint Task Force commander and he will tell you that early in any crisis the issue is not too much but rather not enough, and not which forces but when they are available.

Yet there are those who honestly believe that rapid deployment and crisis response are missions that can be assigned primarily to one service for land operations.

The Army has participated in almost all crisis responses over the past five years and has awarded over 800 Purple Hearts (more than all other services combined) during that period. The Army, charged by Title 10 with conducting land operations, has the full range of combat forces, combat support forces such as engineers, aviation and signal and necessary logistical support forces. The Army provides the greatest rapid response versatility with the Airborne, combined arms forces and Special Operations Forces supported by the full breadth of logistical capabilities to include medical, supply, ordnance, transportation and other units needed to support the contingency operations of all of the services engaged in a land campaign. The Army has the expertise and organizations to mix and match different capabilities into a cohesive task force as well as integrate allied units into that force.

Some argue the Marines can fulfill this role. The Marines, charged by Title 10 with the amphibious role and “seizing naval bases in support of naval campaigns”, offer unique capabilities. The Marines are optimized for amphibious assault and usually have two to three amphibious task forces at sea at any one time and are task-organized for long-term deployments. What they have for immediate response is what was put aboard when they deployed, usually a Marine infantry battalion, four to eight tanks, an artillery battery (155mm towed), armored amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles with 25mm guns, four to six attack helicopters and four to eight AV8 Harrier attack jets. They are excellent for raids, naval expeditionary operations and embassy evacuations which develop slowly and permit positioning of forces. Marines have only limited land combat capability, useful in initiating action but not in sustaining real campaigns or operations. Their limitation is their size, the capabilities for operations other than direct combat, the absence of combat service support on land and the steaming time required for positioning in rapidly-developing situations. Like the Army, the Marines have prepositioned equipment which allows them to respond in days with heavier forces. No serious force planner or commander can rely solely on the Marines for crisis response, but no serious planner or commander would want to exclude Marines from his task force.
Naval and air forces have unique roles to play both by themselves and as the enablers for land operations in combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian or a mix of such operations. Air Force and naval air have enforced no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq and Bosnia for coalitions in support of the U.N. mandate. Airlift is a critical part of any operation. Naval forces are enforcing embargoes in the Caribbean, the Adriatic and Persian Gulf.

Limiting the role of any service in crisis response would limit the nation’s ability to respond to specific crises. Crises may develop overnight, or they may go through relatively long germination periods such as in Bosnia or Haiti. But once the political decision to employ the armed forces of the United States has been made, Americans and the entire world expect a rapid reaction. When we have responded rapidly we have met these expectations. When forces have been slow after the announcement of action, we have been criticized. There are some who assert that when the United States responds with elements from all the services it is just a case of “letting everyone into the act”. Rather, it is a case of bringing complementary capabilities to a Joint Task Force commander to resolve an issue quickly. Just as any 911 call can bring the fire department, police, rescue teams, social workers and psychologists to the enormous range of crises that occur in our society, so the post-Cold War era crises continue to demand a wide range of responses. There are few simple problems and there are even fewer simple solutions.
Background: A key area of controversy as the Presidential Commission considers the allocation of roles and missions of the services is the question of which service or services should be responsible for Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Prior to the Gulf War insufficient attention was given to this threat to our Armed Forces because Cold War threat analysts indicated that Warsaw Pact theater ballistic missiles were inaccurate and of little military significance. Improvements in ballistic missile accuracy supported modest improvements for the Army Patriot system, but the conventional wisdom of the 80’s was that this threat did not present a real problem for air base or fleet assets. The Patriot system could be given some capability to counter Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) that were INF treaty compliant (less than 500 kilometers in range) and threatened critical military targets. While limited funds were allocated to counter these TBM threats, it never became a high priority, must fund program.

The Gulf War changed forever that approach to TMD. There is no question that tactically and operationally speaking, the SCUDs fired at Israel and into Saudi Arabia had little or no effect on the outcome of that conflict. Whether the performance of the Patriot PAC-2, which was rushed to the theater to counter the threat, was outstanding or an adman’s hype is not important. What is important is the fact that TBMs pose a significant psychological, if not real threat, to U.S. and coalition forces involved in future conflicts. Had the Iraqis used chemical or biological warheads on their missiles the effect would have been much greater on allied forces.

What is the situation today? Over a dozen countries possess TBMs. That number will double by the end of the century. Most of these nations possess the capability to use chemical or biological weapons and about half have, or may have, a nuclear capability in the near future. The success of U.S. cruise missiles during the Gulf War has also made them a weapon of choice in the arsenals of some probable adversaries. One needs only to attend arms exhibitions throughout the world to see ballistic
and cruise missiles being offered to potential customers. Why would potential adversaries turn to these weapons rather than aircraft, ships or more tanks? There are a number of reasons, to include:

- A capability to intimidate or deter neighboring nations. The threat of their use against friendly populations increases the costs and risks that even a super power such as the U.S. must consider before initiating military action.

- A cheap way to restrict U.S. entry into a contingency area as the TBMs accuracy and range improve.

- A system cheaper and less vulnerable than manned aircraft to strike the rear areas of forces enjoying air superiority.

- Offensive weapons are available in the near term, while effective defensive systems are not readily available.

The recently published Joint Pub. 3-01.5, "Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense", defines the scope of joint theater missile defense as follows:

"Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) seeks to counter the theater missile (TM) threat. Emphasis is placed on the growing missile threat from developing nations and the U.S. ability to protect its vital interests against this threat. JTMD for contingency, forward-deployed, and reinforcing forces and designated strategic assets located within a theater (e.g., civilian population, seats of government, industrial bases, sea and air facilities) is addressed. The focus is to protect against TM attack through an appropriate integrated and coordinated mix of mutually supporting measures."

The U.S. military’s concept for defense against tactical missiles is based on four mutually supporting pillars:

1. Passive Defense — Actions taken to minimize the effects of a TM attack. Measures include, but are not limited to, reducing the enemy’s target acquisition capability by hiding, camouflaging, deceiving or otherwise confusing him. Vulnerability can be reduced by actions to minimize the effect of conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

2. Active Defense— Measures taken to intercept and destroy in flight tactical missiles and, specifically, their warheads.

3. Attack Operations (Counterforce)— Actions taken to neutralize or destroy an adversary’s ability to produce, deploy and employ TMs.

4. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) — The system required to coordinate and integrate the joint force component’s capabilities to conduct passive defense, active defense and attack operations in an effective manner. This pillar encompasses the total solution from tasking the sensor, to finding the target, to controlling counterfire and active defense, to evaluating the battle damage on enemy systems.

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The Joint Pub. 3-01.5 correctly points out that a TMD consists of an “integrated and coordinated mix of mutually supporting weapons”. It is absurd to believe that any single service has or should have the total TMD mission for all the possible contingency scenarios faced by U.S. armed forces today. It is as ludicrous as believing that airpower, sea power or land power acting alone could have won the Gulf War. Only the carefully integrated and orchestrated use of all forces made that victory possible, quickly and with minimum casualties. The same will be true of a properly designed TMD system.

Management: Management of TMD programs within the Defense Department is unique among programs of its size and complexity. The management of all the research and development programs is centered in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The BMDO develops the overall TMD program plan and budget. Program development is coordinated with the military services who are the executing agents for different elements of the program. The BMDO is charged with responsibility for defending the program within DoD and before Congress. Military services execute research and development programs and are responsible for eventual fielding of the system in terms of force structure, training, doctrine development and operations, and maintenance costs. In spite of criticism of this approach by some, it does reduce to some extent redundant research and forces integration of service-unique or related systems. Another positive effect has been the isolation of TMD funds so that they cannot be diverted to other programs to which the services have assigned a higher priority for funding. This diversion of TMD funds has plagued similar programs in the past. Unfortunately for TMD, a single large line in the DoD budget is a lucrative target for budget cutters, both in DoD and the Congress, who do not understand the complexity of the program. It must be recognized that an effective TMD system involves different components in each service tied together into a flexible system which must be tailored to individual areas of operation.

Concept: A highly-effective system must consist of alternate attack means to assure a low leakage rate. A proper mix of sensors, weapons and C4I results in a layered defense which can counter the variety of threats that may be encountered in a contingency area. Those layers have been named the lower (to defend small areas) and upper tier (to defend cities and large forces). The lower tier/layer engages threat missiles which leak through the upper tier or have the capability to underfly upper tier systems. Some TBMs will be difficult for the lower tier to engage under any circumstance because of their approach velocity or angle of approach, therefore, even a layered defense is difficult to make totally leak-proof. The Air Force has contended that the most effective way of destroying an enemy TBM is during its boost or ascent phase. Attacks upon launch would occur early enough to allow later attack by lower or upper tier systems if required and would cause missile debris, particularly from mass-destruction weapons, to fall in enemy territory, if successful. This far-term concept is not without staggering problems. The threat missile must be detected, identified, tracked and destroyed within approximately 90 seconds from launch. This is not a trivial problem, and the research and development program for this approach will demand an exorbitant share of a DoD budget. Depending upon the boost or ascent phase interceptor platform used, it may be necessary to provide a significant self-defense capability as part of the operational concept.

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Service Roles: Each of the services has a stake in TMD. The U.S. Marine Corps, recognizing the vulnerability of its force when committed to an incursion from the sea, is engaged in a short-term program for a limited defense against short-range TBMs and some cruise missiles. The program consists of modifications to the USMC AN/TPS-59 radar to give it the capability to detect and classify tactical ballistic missiles to ranges approaching 600 kilometers. This data is then passed to a Hawk fire unit through a modified command and control unit for engagement by a modified Hawk missile. The capability, while limited, does provide some point defense capability in the near term. Marine air provides a capability for attack operations if a launcher, missile storage site or command and control center can be pinpointed.

The Army, with its dominant role in land force operations, has a major stake in the proper integration and use of the four pillars of TMD. Few, if any, major contingencies will be brought to a successful conclusion without the use of landpower. In the defense phase and attack phase of a contingency operation, the Army component commander will be responsible not only for defeating the enemy, but with protecting his force. A key element in the protection of his force is an integrated TMD system. The Patriot PAC-2 system deployed to Israel and Saudi Arabia demonstrated a capability to engage Iraqi SCUDs and Al Husseins. Unfortunately, the system was not leak-proof as shown when an enemy missile struck a barracks. The Patriot PAC-2 capability will be upgraded to a much more capable PAC-3 system with hit-to-kill ERINT missiles. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile, currently in demonstrated evaluation phase, coupled with the Ground Based Radar (GBR) will provide U.S. forces with their first capability to engage longer-range threat missiles either endo- or exo-atmospheric, hit-to-kill conditions. The Corps Surface to Air Missile or CORP SAM system is currently in the concept definition phase of the acquisition process. This system will be designed to provide air and missile defense of Army maneuver forces and to protect fixed assets in division and corps areas. Its high mobility and versatility will be especially important during contingency operations. The Army's capability to perform deep fire operations utilizes primarily the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile and attack helicopters, under some conditions. By utilizing the four pillars of TMD, passive, active, attack and C4I, the ground force commander will have the capability to employ a formidable TMD system when the developmental elements described are fielded.

The Air Force plays a key role in any contingency operation by establishing air superiority over the battle area. It possesses the capability of attack operations against enemy missile systems throughout the depth of battle. By integrating its organic sensors with National Systems it can often detect launches in sufficient time to give early warning to other systems and attack their launch site. However, attacking launch sites has proven extremely difficult against mobile platforms. The C4I capabilities of the Air Force when integrated with the ground forces' C4I capabilities should eventually provide a robust command and control system. Unfortunately that architecture does not exist today. The future of the far-term Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) concept is not clear today. Eventually, if operationally feasible and affordable it would provide a strong complementary system.

The Gulf War clearly showed the advantage of Navy assets when providing over-the-shore defense of critical friendly assets and attack of enemy assets. This is particularly true in the littoral areas of the world. The Navy's initial TMD program consists of improvement to the AEGIS and Standard Missile System to provide an offshore antimissile lower tier capability similar to the Patriot
PAC-3. The program consists of improvements to the AEGIS SPY-1 Radar and Weapons Control System Software to enable detection, tracking and engagement by the Standard Missile-2, Block IV. The Navy is continuing to study the feasibility of an upper-tier capability, perhaps a marinized THAAD. Its land attack capability with sea-launched cruise missiles and/or manned aircraft is also a valuable counterforce asset.

Summary: If one examines the number of systems described above in isolation, it appears that many are redundant and should be scrapped. This would be foolhardy if the U.S. is to develop and field a complementary system or systems which is adaptable to a wide range of threats and physical environments. This threat varies from short-range, low-velocity ballistic missiles, to medium- to long-range ballistic missiles, to cruise missiles that fly at either high or low altitudes, to air-to-ground missiles launched by enemy aircraft. It would be advantageous if there were a single point solution to this problem; however, current technology does not provide that capability.

In the final analysis it will be the Joint Task Force commander or theater commander who will determine the proper mix and deployment of TMD systems most appropriate to the threat, the area of operations and the phase of the contingency operation. Each of the components, land, air and sea, will play lesser or greater roles in the contingency operations dependent on the three considerations indicated above. One thing is an absolute, there will be few very limited contingency missions that do not involve land forces, either Marines or Army. The commander of the land force components must have the capability of protecting his force and employing it in the most effective way to accomplish his mission. No one is better qualified to orchestrate the actions of the forces under his command than the individual who has spent his lifetime perfecting the expertise required of a land, air or sea forces commander. Hence, current and evolving systems should remain in the service most familiar with their use and dependent on their capabilities for the success of an assigned mission.

It is far most important to assure that the four pillars of TMD in and among each of the services are complementary. They should be employed by each service in accordance with their role and mission for a particular contingency theater. The services should work closely with BMDO to achieve this goal instead of arguing over who owns and mans a particular asset.
THE ARMY IN SPACE

by

General Frederick J. Kroesen, USA (Ret.)

Fighting wars on the land, where the ultimate determination of winning and losing occurs, does not seem to demand an Army presence in space or the Army’s use of space vehicles. But there are good and sufficient reasons to show that Army requirements particularly in wartime, demand that space be acknowledged as a joint arena, one to be manned by all services, responding to the needs of all components. Space activities cannot be relegated to support status where an outside agency furnishes a product in response to requests from commanders in the field.

Modern technology has made available a wealth of systems that transcend the areas of interest of all unified commands and their components. This is especially true in the fields of intelligence, communications and logistics, and it has a major influence on operations and fire support. The potential of satellites and space stations to contribute directly to mission accomplishment by even the smallest Joint Task Force commander requires a direct linkage between him and the supporting platforms. In practical terms that means that a field commander must be able to task, directly through his own agent, an intelligence collector, a logistics monitor or a communications link. With space technology the commander can “see deeper,” can observe enemy activities as they occur and can monitor the execution of his own operations as they are happening. These are basic needs never best satisfied by an agency directed to support or to cooperate or to allocate among competing demands.

Specifically, a land force commander needs space-based means for the following:

1. Tactical surveillance of enemy dispositions and movements.

2. Communications beyond line-of-sight that can build then modify needed voice and data networks when tactical operations result in force reorganizations.

Landpower Essay Series is published by the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare. The series is designed to provide an outlet for original essays on topics that will stimulate professional discussion and further public understanding of the landpower aspects of national security. The content represents the personal opinions of the author and not necessarily the position of the Association of the United States Army or its members. Candidate essays of 2000 words or less may be submitted: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare (Attn: Landpower Essay Series), 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
3. Monitoring his own forces operations, providing him with more rapid maneuver control and reaction capabilities.

4. Early warning against air, rockets and missiles targeted against his operation.

5. Target acquisition for his own air and long-range missiles.

6. Monitoring logistical operations to provide management information that will assure constant, continuing resupply, avoid bottlenecks and dangerous concentrations of stock piles, and accelerate activities in response to enemy actions.

The alternative to a Joint Space Command is a Defense Space Agency or the assignment of space activities to a single military service, one that would act as an executive agent for the Defense Department. In practice, neither of the alternatives has ever proved satisfactory over a long period. The Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, in the long term, have added a layer of bureaucracy but have not truly improved service to the military departments or, more significantly, to the forces in the field. The services have all retained a large part of the systems that were to have been eliminated or reduced in size, because, in normal priority, Defense agencies serve the Defense Department first, then the services.

On occasion, the assignment of a function to a single service has temporarily satisfied a requirement. For the most part, however, time proves that the services being supported by an executive agent are dissatisfied with the service, object to the priorities extant and make modifications to satisfy their own needs. As one example, formany years the Army maintained engineer construction battalions to provide wartime airfield construction and repair service for the Air Force. Over time, the Air Force perceived that the Army did not prepare properly for the role, would not perform it adequately and was apt to divert these battalions to other missions. The result was USAF activation of their own “Red Horse” engineer battalions, specially equipped for airfield work.

Joint commands have a more impressive record. The Joint Transportation Command, Special Operations Command and the various area Unified Commands, in furtherance of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, enjoy the full support of their components and of Congress. The success of these commands, currently enjoyed by the Joint Space Command as well, argues for the continuation of the status quo. The Army role in space will continue to justify the existence of an Army component of this command.
Dr. John P. White  
Chairman  
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces  
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Dear Dr. White:

As you begin the challenge of refining issues for Commission focus and analysis, I'd like to reinforce a few of the points we discussed in our earlier visits. Your Commission has been charged with pivotally important work to the future of the Nation's Armed Forces. Our overriding concern must be the enhancement of our Nation's warfighting effectiveness. While we all seek positive change, and understand the Nation may have to accept "additional risk" in some areas, we also see many uncertainties in our current and future world. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and their families will bear the full brunt -- both burden and benefit -- of our decisions. Your Army is fully committed to working with you and supporting your efforts.

Before addressing specific issues, let me emphasize two points that will frame the Army's contribution. First, the Army is a member of a team -- a "joint" team that provides a broad range of capabilities in support of our National Security and National Military Strategies. Specifically, we can and do provide ground forces for employment by Joint Force Commanders in "prompt and sustained" operations on land across the entire range of military operations -- and the Army is the only force with that flexibility and capacity. However, we do not see ourselves as operating alone -- it is the overall success of the team that counts in the final analysis. Second, our part in the roles and missions review will be based on a firm doctrinal base -- both Service and joint -- as well as an unchallenged historical record of success. Our rigorous procedures for doctrine development, including extensive simulation and analysis, provide us a framework for the Army of today, as well as a sturdy launch platform for the Army of the future. We have reoriented ourselves to do what the Nation expects of us in the uncertain world of the future.

Now, some thoughts on a few specific issues:

a. Infrastructure and process issues -- This is where the Commission can make its most significant contributions. The Army encourages innovation and decentralization,
and we believe DOD can do so as well. We recognize that large organizations tend to be top heavy, stronger on process than on performance, and less responsive, and for that reason, the most potential for productive change lies in the infrastructure and process areas. We will be a full and productive partner as you deliberate on these critical issues.

b. Strategic mobility -- Our National Military Strategy emphasizes the requirement to deploy and sustain America's Armed Forces in distant, often immature, theaters in both war and operations other than war. This requires robust strategic airlift and sealift capabilities. Recent analyses, such as the DOD Mobility Requirements Study and a similar effort by the Army Science Board, indicate that the Nation's capability is inadequate, in terms of both capacity and speed of closure of deploying forces. This is a recurring, long-term problem that hampered deployment and sustainment in Korea in 1950, as well as in the Persian Gulf in 1990. We ask that the Commission take a close look at our national requirements and the established process and programs for fulfilling those requirements.

c. Overseas presence -- While other Services provide lesser degrees of influence or influence that is more transitory in nature, the "influence" generated by Army forces will continue to be a central element of our national security strategies. Whether in the form of forward stationed forces as we still maintain in Korea and Europe, or those whose deployments are of shorter duration (e.g., hospital in Croatia, and peace keeping exercise with Russian counterparts in September 1994), the soldier remains this Nation's sincerest and ultimate expression of commitment and will.

d. Army and Marine Corps capabilities -- The Army and Marine Corps provide the Nation with unique and complementary capabilities. The Marine Corps provides the Nation with the world's premier naval infantry for "Service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases", and "the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." They have no equal in these areas, although the Army also has a proud heritage of amphibious operations from World War II and Korea, and is able today to provide appropriate forces for joint amphibious operations. The Army provides the Nation with forces for "prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas." Each Service should continue to look to its traditional role for its focus and "raison d'être."

e. Theater missile defense -- Regional air-breathing threats (aircraft) are diminishing, and missile threats are increasing dramatically. The Army foresaw this change and began its own transformation over a decade ago by changing the focus of Army air and missile
defense efforts from aircraft to missiles. Today, all of the Army's air and missile defense structure (our units) is justified through rigorous analysis and charged with protecting forces from the growing missile threat and only those aircraft "leakers" that might survive or bypass our Nation's air superiority blanket. Our Nation's approach to date has been to develop a "layered" defense, with the upper tier destroying incoming missiles in the terminal phase, before submunitions can be released and sufficiently high to minimize any effect from nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads. The complementary lower tier provides near-leak-proof defense in specific areas where the Joint Force Commander has prioritized the protection effort, such as troop concentrations, command and control centers, and supply depots. Future systems must be more mobile and protect against cruise missiles, low-flying aircraft, and very short-range ballistic missiles. Since over 80% of the world's theater ballistic missiles have ranges that limit their targeting to within a typical land force area of operations, land force commanders must be able to synchronize all of the pillars of theater missile defense, including attack and active defense operations. Other Services can supplement our efforts, but we are the foundation of the Nation's capability, as demonstrated during the Gulf War.

f. Deep operations -- Arguments suggesting that the land battle can be partitioned (deep, close, and rear battles), with each Service fighting its particular segment are contrary to the concepts embodied in joint doctrine, and damaging to our Nation's ability to win decisively with minimal casualties. Partitioning the battlefield by Service ignores emerging technologies and diminishes the synergistic effect of the joint team. We should enhance our ability to apply combat power from multiple dimensions in the same area of the battlefield instead of "reserving" various areas for specific Services. As part of the joint team, the Army will continue to enhance its capability through incorporation of integrating technologies to strike the enemy at increasing depths, at greater tempos, and with greater lethality -- functions that are central to the success and protection of America's land forces and joint team. Partitioning of the battlefield denies the Joint Force Commander the ability to control the tempo, timing, location, and character of the joint battle, and ultimately, success.

g. Space -- Space is a place, not a role, function, or mission. All forces must be able to leverage the tremendous potential that free access to space offers. This is a critical element of the "power projection" strategy outlined in our National Military Strategy, and the Army's minimal investment reaps significant benefit for land operations. To ensure continued access in what is still a new frontier, we should look for efficiencies in what we have, rather than centralizing responsibilities.

We should not allow near-term budget challenges to deflect our focus from long-term requirements. To the extent our Armed Forces appear to have unnecessary duplication of
effort in certain areas, hasty change based on our collective desire to realize quickly potential savings inevitably will spell disaster in the long term. America now has the most versatile and effective Army in the world -- whether the assigned mission is armored warfare or humanitarian assistance. It may not be in the Nation's best interests to transfer responsibilities from one agency to another without a thorough understanding of the long-term impact or with the expectation of realizing only marginal benefit.

You are charged with a formidable task. Perhaps the most daunting aspect of your mission is to envision the force this Nation will require during the early part of the 21st Century. This visionary challenge will, I expect, be the most important and demanding element of your team's effort. As a construct for assessing what future changes are necessary and appropriate, I suggest that we focus our attention around 2010 -- and define, as best we can, the capabilities our Nation will likely require to protect our citizens, territory, and interests, and preserve our way of life. Subsequent assessments of current responsibilities and programs should be in terms of how well they support our future vision. Significant changes should be simulated and assessed thoroughly before they are implemented.

Finally, as I feel confident you will experience with all of the Services, we are fully committed to cooperating with, and supporting fully, your excellent team. We expect that there will be ample dialogue and debate over the ensuing months. We very much welcome that. It is not only proper, it is necessary that we periodically scrutinize our azimuths, our priorities, and our plans for securing America's future. We are confident our Army is prepared and capable, and based on sound doctrine supported by an unparalleled history. This is extremely important work. The American people and those who have chosen to serve selflessly in America's Armed Forces will be the true beneficiaries of our collective efforts.

Sincerely,

Togo D. West, Jr.
Dear Dr. White,

I am honored to respond to your invitation for input at this early stage of the commission’s project which is of such importance to our nation. The perspectives contained in our submission are solidly based on our understanding of U.S. military forces needs both now and — more important — in the future to meet national security objectives.

While our expertise and approach are based on the specific need for military landpower, we have taken full account of the inherently joint nature of U.S. military operations as well as the political and military imperatives that demand that U.S. forces operate in coalition and alliance frameworks whenever possible. Similarly, we fully embrace the societal values within which our military forces operate. Those include promoting democratic principles; according respect, equal treatment and equal opportunity to all; and fulfilling the duties and obligations of citizenship and preserving the lives of the servicemen and servicewomen who voluntarily comprise the Armed Forces of the nation.

We urge that the commission keep in mind three bedrock principles as it chooses the issues, conducts the analyses, and ultimately decides on its findings and recommendations.

First, the effectiveness — capability if you will — of the U.S. Armed Forces is the principal criterion that should guide all work on the military force posture. This applies directly to roles and missions. In our view, the United States should maintain military forces that are complete in every respect and can offer the President and the nation a full range of options for operations during peace and war. Such an autonomous force is vital. This is based on the uncertain and challenging contingencies the United States likely will face and the level and unknown capability of any coalition and allied force that may join U.S. forces in the future.

American forces that require other national forces to provide parts of essential military capabilities cannot serve, fully and adequately, the United States’ purposes. Dependency on the armed forces of other nations, even to complete crucial military capabilities, deprives the President of the range of options necessary to meet global uncertainties.
Second, efficiency demands conservation of resources, avoidance of unnecessary costs and fully integrated joint military forces. Efficiency involves far more than today’s budget and the immediate future program. It includes ensuring the best use of resources over the life cycle of the entire force, often a period of decades for certain units and platforms. Overemphasis on near-term efficiency can be counterproductive. Not only will military effectiveness be sacrificed, but past experience tells us that near-term efficiencies often fail to capture expected savings over time. Moreover, redundancy in capability to meet combat needs should not be interpreted as unnecessary duplication.

Third, motivated high-quality servicemen and servicewomen must remain the fundamental building block of our national defense. Particularly with a volunteer force, every effort should be taken to ensure a challenging and personally and professionally motivating environment. That environment attracts the quality young men and women that all services need and also retains the best men and women in uniform as tomorrow’s leaders. Gone are the days when every citizen could expect to bear a part of the burden of defense through conscription, low pay and minimal amenities. Today’s and tomorrow’s volunteer force deserve the quality of life that is the standard for all our citizens. Allowing living and working conditions to decay does not save money, and eroding amenities and promised entitlements are sure paths to turn the premier armed forces of today into the “hollow force” of tomorrow.

With these introductory comments in mind, we are providing you a set of issues that cover the broad process of national security. These discuss the Association of the United States Army’s reasons “why” the commission should examine certain issues. In most cases, they include AUSA’s perspectives and viewpoints on the issues themselves.

The overarching principle that must guide the commission is to keep the nation’s forces trained and equipped so that they can fight and win future wars. No one service brings all the capabilities needed to meet that requirement. Each has special skills and talents that when properly blended give the President an unparalleled range of options in deterring aggressors, defending national interests, securing peace and assisting those in need at home and abroad.

In addition, as president of the Association of the United States Army, I offer to the commission and its staff my willingness to discuss any of the issues before you in greater depth. The Association’s Institute of Land Warfare has in its senior fellows a deep reservoir of talent and expertise on the matters being addressed, and they too are at your service.

Sincerely,

JACK N. MERRITT
General, USA Ret.
President

JNM:sct

Enclosures

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