The Issue Conference held at AUSA National Headquarters on February 25, 1991, was the first of a series of such conferences to be conducted by AUSA during 1991 to explore issues and problems of importance to the Army in the post-Persian Gulf crisis environment.

The purpose of this particular conference was to set a framework by addressing both the environment and the issues facing the Army over the next several years in its transition to the end-state Army of the mid to late 1990s. The specific objective was to identify and define the key issues that must or should be addressed during the transition period. Subsequent conferences will focus more narrowly on selected issues or problems.

There were 27 attendees, all experienced and representing a cross section of interests. The conference was chaired by GEN Jack N. Merritt, president of AUSA. Four distinguished presenters were: GEN Gordon Sullivan, Army Vice Chief of Staff; MG Tom Carney, Army Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation; Representative Dave McCurdy, (D-OK), chairman of the Army Caucus; and GEN Maxwell Thurman, formerly CINC SOUTHCOM. Presentations were followed by questions and answers and general discussion.

This paper represents a synthesis of the presentations, discussions, questions posed and conclusions. By the rules of the conference, no direct quotes or attributions are made.

FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE

The first step in setting the framework was the visualization of tomorrow's Army and the shaping of this Army. Coming off Desert Storm, it is essential that the Army maintain its readiness while transitioning to a smaller force. The dilemma for the present and the future is how to stay within the required envelope of readiness while coping with the outside pressures and influences.

The future strategic model on which forces and potential deployments are based is still evolving. While the Secretary of Defense has defined the general framework, rapidly changing world events preclude a clear definition of the threat. As we look at Army force structure, mix and capabilities, we need to ask a number of questions. Forces for what, where, and how fast? Since the definition of the threat is murky and
subject to change, we must structure U.S. Army forces that are able to respond to different requirements ranging from a no-notice contingency to long-term deterrence. Also, we must be able to tailor force packages ranging from small task force to corps-size to meet all kinds of contingencies, and they must be trained, ready and deployable. In all of these, it is assumed that the Army would provide forces to operate in a joint environment under the CINC of a combatant command. Flexibility is the key. This was illustrated clearly by the Army's requirements to tailor forces, deploy rapidly and fight in two distinctly different scenarios (Just Cause and Desert Storm) over the span of the last 14 months.

The FY 92-97 program, approved by the Secretary of Defense, provides for the active Army to decrease in size from a force of 732,000 in FY 90 to 536,000 by FY 95. The Army reserve components would be reduced from 776,000 in FY 90 to 550,000 by FY 95. Concurrently, the projected Army structure would be reduced from its present 28 divisions (18 active and 10 National Guard) to 20 divisions (12 active, 6 National Guard and 2 cadre) by FY 95. While tied to the stated national military strategy, domestic fiscal constraints are key drivers in these reductions.

The concept of the future force is explained in the Army's Force Generation Model, i.e., the 20-division Total Force of which two would be cadre divisions. This is summarized as follows: four AC divisions forward deployed (fully structured); five rapidly deployable AC divisions (fully structured); three AC divisions, each with one RC roundout combat brigade, as early reinforcement combat forces; six RC divisions as follow-on reinforcement combat forces; and two cadre divisions as partially structured major combat forces. In addition, under total mobilization, wholly new major combat forces would be formed.

THE CHALLENGE

Looking at issues facing the Army as it moves through the FY 92-93 congressional budget cycle and positions itself for the FY 92-97 draw-down, it is clear that three things must balance, and they are not all mutually compatible. These are (1) the conclusion of the mission in the Persian Gulf and redeployment of Army forces; (2) the maintenance of a ready, trained force (in being) that can respond quickly to meet any new contingency missions worldwide; and (3) managing the glide path for a smaller but effective Army in the future without compromising the second mission. This must be accomplished without jeopardizing quality while at the same time insuring that all Army personnel and their families are treated in a fair and equitable manner. And if it cannot, it must be made known in a clear and unequivocal manner.

The size of the Total Army and its modernization are both major concerns. Neither strength nor modernization funding achieves optimum (or even desirable) levels in the budget and, therefore, carries inherent risks. Since they are driven by the fiscal top line, they represent significant compromises. The decision to go for a smaller force than desired (or considered prudent by many) in the Army Plan permitted some modernization; otherwise, modernization (particularly procurement) would be virtually eliminated during the FY 92-97 program years. These decisions
carry a concurrent commitment to maintain quality above all, and to maintain the current high standards of training and readiness — the qualities that ensured success in Desert Storm.

The Army plan, as stated through the program period, opens up an overall discussion on the Total Force concept, including the use of the roundout units and the best AC/RC mix. This is a congressional issue as well as a defense issue and will be hotly debated this year. With more than 120,000 Army reservists and national guardsmen on active duty at the height of Desert Storm, the Total Force policy proved its worth; but serious questions exist on the use of RC combat units of battalion/brigade size to round out early deploying active forces. Despite political sensitivities, this question demands rational analysis and sound judgement. With smaller budgets and smaller forces, we must do all we can to insure the best Total Force to perform Army missions.

THE IMPACT OF DESERT STORM

We will learn much from Desert Shield/Desert Storm experiences. We must be cautious, however, not to fix prematurely on lessons before proper assessments have been made. But we do know that a quality force and trained leaders made it happen and we must not let this erode. It is now obvious that the programmed Army end strength for FY 91 cannot be met without causing damage to the Army's ability to accomplish its missions. The strength reduction curve will probably need to be shifted by at least a year.

In Desert Storm, the application of AirLand Battle doctrine proved to be sound and the Army's weapon systems worked. At the same time, the need for more (and improved) airlift and sealift was recognized. The Persian Gulf crisis pointed to some structure deficiencies in meeting major contingencies, particularly no-notice contingencies. This applies to both active and reserves.

Desert Storm provided a handsome payoff for the investment of the past 10 years as well as proving the value of our all-volunteer force. There is a new generation of veterans coming back who feel good about themselves; one of the overall results could be an infusion of confidence, not only within the Army itself but also across a broad spectrum of the American people. The real challenge now is the post-war scenario. We need to capitalize on the sense of public support and use it to the advantage of the Army and the nation.

Desert Storm provided experiences and observations that can be exploited. While the collection of technical information on weapons performance and the preparation of operational reports will take time, a number of observations can be made now. A more formal list of lessons learned will be forthcoming later when the information has been analyzed. Some significant observations:

- Trained and ready forces with good leadership are the keys to success. A quality force is the most important thing. This is why it is
critically important that readiness and quality be maintained during the transition period of the next five years.

- Army weapon systems performed exceptionally well, proving the value of the past decade of modernization. Desert Storm proved the value of deep strike weapons to complement AirLand Battle doctrine. In this respect, the new Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) performed with flying colors and the Army is a strong backer of both.

- The Total Force concept worked. RC contributions were essential, although reevaluation and revalidation of certain aspects must be made.

- Modernization is essential. The U.S. technological edge facilitated an early victory and saved countless lives.

- A superb logistics effort made it all possible.

OTHER OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES

Deployability of the force -- particularly airlift and sealift -- remains an issue of major concern. Deployability is provided by a combination of airlift, sealift and prepositioned materiel. Consequently, the Army is a strong proponent of strategic lift and should continue to push hard for the C-17 airlifter program. The Army also supports enough additional fast sealift capability to permit the simultaneous movement of two heavy divisions from CONUS. The question of prepositioning equipment needs to be fully evaluated, to include how much and where; also, the potential use of floating storage for one or more sets of equipment. A congressionally-directed Strategic Mobility Study by OSD is currently in process and should be forthcoming by November 1991.

Modernization continues as a major concern as we look to the out-years. The Army has placed its emphasis on R&D, accepting the goal of future overmatch versus mid-term risk. Priority is being given to the Light Helicopter (LH) and Armored Systems Modernization (ASM). The potential erosion of the industrial base is evident. No single Army procurement program makes the defense top 10 for FY 92, and unless the Army gets some budget turnaround (better than zero real growth in the out-years), investment could virtually dry up by the end of the century. Simply stated, the Army needs a larger share of defense procurement dollars.

Despite pressures for both downsizing the force and reducing costs, the Army cannot afford to reduce its emphasis on training or education. In fact, it becomes even more important. There are two aspects which merit special attention:

1. A well trained and professionally educated officer and NCO corps is the bedrock of the future. Leaders with intellectual capacity and a broad professional underpinning along with technical knowledge and competence are more important than numbers.
Tough, realistic and challenging training proved its worth in Desert Storm. The combat training centers, especially the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, provided a superb training environment as well as a testing ground for tactics. The Army should seek ways to effectively use the NTC as a proving ground for new hardware, tactics and techniques.

Another issue related to Desert Storm is the replacement of equipment and war reserve stockage. Fortunately, only a small number of major items of equipment was lost, although there will be a need for increased depot maintenance in the near term. Replacement of war reserves is another story. Large amounts of U.S. war reserves were moved to the desert. What we must replace depends on what we used and what the Army's future force structure will require. Also, decisions have to be made on pre-stockage for future contingencies. This is not covered in the current budget and is not fully addressed in the Desert Storm supplemental. As we replenish, we should also get the newest and best items.

Before the Persian Gulf crisis, there was much discussion on the controversial topic of overlapping roles and missions between the Army and the Marine Corps. This issue was overshadowed by Desert Storm, but could easily resurface when manpower and budget resources are at stake. This means Army requirements and missions, based on realistic threat scenarios, must be well defined so they can be clearly articulated and easily understood.

One important observation: The command and control system at the national level -- as visualized by Goldwater-Nichols -- works well. The roles of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS are enhanced with clear lines to the CINCs of the war-fighting commands. War fighting is a joint proposition, with the CINCs doing the planning and calling the shots in the field.

Looking to the legislative side and the current defense budget, some likely congressional issues with respect to Army forces are:

- Size of the Total Force;
- AC/RC mix and the future status of roundout;
- forces in Europe;
- civilian personnel reductions;
- stationing (base closures).

**SUMMARY**

Discussion developed the following key issues and initiatives as the most critical to the Army over the next few years. These would be suitable topics for future issue conferences:

- Validation of the Total Force concept along with RC structure and the AC/RC mix. How can we best argue for increased procurement dollars above the budgeted amounts for FY 92 and FY 93 while retaining, into FY 95 and beyond, the OSD-announced force structure of 12 active and 6 RC divisions?
o Modernization and the need to reverse the negative funding trends.

o Erosion of the industrial base and how to keep defense industry sound. How will industry adapt its production facilities for smaller quantities while preserving surge capacity? Is there a government-industry RDA process that will provide an R&D capability and procurement responsiveness, as well as a profitable defense industry?

o Replenishment of shelf stockage and war reserves without absorbing it from the current funding program. What should be the investment strategy for replacing war expenditures?

o Strategic mobility (airlift and sealift) along with a relook at prepositioning policy.

o Managing the Army drawdown on a controlled glide path, with priority to quality, readiness and excellence of leadership, but with fairness and equity to all concerned.

o Consideration of such personnel policy issues as:

  oo Single parents/deployment of mothers;
  oo dual service marriages with children;
  oo demographic mix of the future force;
  oo and what changes, if any, are merited?

END OF SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

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