This issue conference, held at AUSA National Headquarters on May 6, 1991, was the second in a series of such conferences conducted by AUSA during 1991 to explore current problems and issues of importance to the Army. The focus of the conference was Total Force Policy and the role of the Reserve Components (RC) in the Total Force as well as the Army force mix. The presentation outline is attached.

This paper represents a synthesis of the presentations, discussions and conclusions. By the rules of the conference, except for a brief synopsis of the comments by each principal speaker, no direct quotes or attributions are made.

Altogether there were 29 attendees. The conference was chaired by General Jack N. Merritt, USA Ret., President of AUSA, and Lieutenant General Richard L. West, USA Ret., Director, Institute of Land Warfare. The key presenters were: General Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff; Major General Jerome H. Granrud, Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; Honorable Stephen Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Presentations were followed by questions and general discussions.

The Persian Gulf crisis was the biggest test of the use of RC personnel and units since World War II, and lessons from this experience are applicable to current and future planning. The use of Army National Guard (NG) and Army Reserve units, volunteers and Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) was not only necessary for the success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but proved our ability to call up, integrate and effectively employ the RC for critical missions.

While lessons from Desert Shield/Desert Storm are being compiled and digested, the overall concept of the Total Force must be acknowledged a major success. A major issue for discussion, however, was the use of RC combat units as "round-out" for quick-deploying contingency forces. Other
issues which affect the RC over the next five years relate to its size, structure and mix. These are a consequence of the Defense Future Force Structure concept which would reduce Total Army forces from 28 divisions to 20 divisions (12 active and 2 cadre) and a much lower end strength of 535,000 for the Active Component (AC) and 550,000 for the RC by FY 1995. The RC strength question is a major congressional issue in the review of the Army FY 1992 budget. Congressional committees are objecting to the proposed cuts regardless of long-term force structure plans.

The intent of this conference was to define issues, determine the associated problems and suggest future actions. There are unresolved disagreements relating to missions and needs of the AC and RC. Rigid budget caps that are driving the defense program offer little flexibility. This, in turn, forces greater competition for resources and budget share. Finally, there are interests other than purely military considerations that have a direct bearing on the RC. We must be both forthright and understanding about this situation. We need to think about the future and focus particularly on those issues where we can exercise a positive influence. Some of the key questions on the table include:

- The impact on the Army of various decisions with respect to structure, size and mix of the RC. What are the impacts, costs and consequences? What are the "gut" issues with respect to overall RC strength and structure? What are the important (real life) political considerations?

- Desert Shield/Desert Storm call-up procedures and the use of RC units and personnel. What was done right? What mistakes were made?

- The round-out concept and RC readiness standards. Are policy changes needed? Should readiness standards and readiness ratings be more realistic?

WHERE THE ARMY IS HEADING

General Vuono summarized force structure changes, military strategy and budget restrictions over the next five years, and their impacts on the Total Army.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated the U.S. ability to project power for a major contingency. Operation Just Cause in December 1989, while much smaller, also demonstrated this capability under a different scenario. The Army was a major participant with the largest proportion of forces in both contingency operations.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm serves as a useful life cycle model for a major contingency. All contingencies will be different, each with its own scenario, conditions and requirements. Potential diversity in terms of region, size, threat and the nature of conflict dictates the need for future contingency forces to be highly flexible and capable of meeting varied demands on short notice.
General Vuono briefly covered the status of the Persian Gulf situation, which is now in its redeployment and reconstitution phase. In addition to processing, loading and shipping the equipment of eight divisions, we must prepare a division set of POMCUS equipment for on-site storage. This will take until early winter to complete. In the meantime, the withdrawal and reconstitution process is delaying the drawdown of some forces planned for FY 1991; this will shift more of the reductions into FY 1992.

At this point, General Vuono summarized the Army force structure plans as reflected in the current defense program.

The Army must now reshape itself around a new strategy, shifting from one of containment that won the Cold War to one of force projection to meet regional contingency situations.

There will not be nearly as much forward presence for the U.S. Army in the future. We can expect a decrease in Army forces in Europe of about 50 percent, with one corps of two divisions, an armored cavalry regiment and necessary supporting forces remaining. We can expect to keep the 2d Division in Korea, while reducing our overall force levels there. Also, our presence in Latin America will be reduced.

Power projection remains an essential capability. We must be able to project from the United States and from forward-deployed stations with little or no warning time. Prepositioned equipment and supplies are an important part of the equation.

Forces, to include armor, airborne, special operations forces, etc., must be able to operate under a variety of scenarios. Deployability is very important. Adequate airlift and sealift are essential, but we also need a sound prepositioning strategy.

We need to develop good doctrine on deployability. Early decisions are important and the Army must be able to expand and arrive where needed in the right period of time; also, the force must be lethal (i.e., it must be fully effective when it gets there).

The force generation model visualizes the integrated use of the Total Army resources (AC and RC) using an expanded scenario over time. It assumes a future force of four Army corps and 20 Army divisions (12 active, six NG, and two cadre). It is not the Army's choice to go down to 20 divisions, but this is the direction we are going and the sooner we come to grips with it the better. Future resources simply are not there to support a larger force.

The Army force generation model visualizes Army forces that must be able to move rapidly on "C" day. That element, the contingency force, would consist of five active divisions postured to deploy on extremely short notice. It would consist of two fully structured armored divisions (each "rounded up" with an additional RC brigade which could deploy later), an airborne division, an air assault division and a light infantry
division. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) would be built in as needed for immediate deployment and initial support, including support from Europe if appropriate. The bulk of the reinforcing support would come from RC units in-being.

Next in sequence are the reinforcing force packages consisting of major force elements from both the AC and RC. There are two reinforcing increments which include significant CS and CSS elements from the RC:

1. Three active divisions, rounded-out with RC brigades, that are prepared to deploy within 60 days.

2. Six National Guard divisions, prepared to deploy beyond 60 days.

Finally, there are the forces that require longer-term mobilization and training time. First would be the full manning, preparation and training of the two cadre divisions (that would have had only skeleton staffing and equipment). Beyond that, requiring a year and a half or more, would be the mobilization, equipping and training of entirely new divisions.

Reducing the force by more than 25 percent requires some very tough decisions. It must be done logically and balance the relative priority and value of units to be withdrawn from the force over the next three to five years. At the same time, the residual force must remain constantly ready during the transition period.

Because of Desert Storm, the Army will exceed its budgeted active end strength in FY 1991 by approximately 8,000. Budgetary constraints, however, make it necessary to return to the strength reduction ramp by the end of FY 1992.

The challenge now is how to build a smaller Army that remains trained and ready. The risk, if not properly managed and implemented in a balanced fashion, is a smaller force that is not adequately trained and ready. In any case, we are going to do it with less resources.

Discussion Summary

The Army has the ability to redistribute equipment. There are enough Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles for POMCUS and for equipping the 20 division force.

The Persian Gulf proved the value of the RC. We simply could not have deployed, operated and moved the logistics base as we did without them.

Issues centered around the three round-out brigades that were activated and underwent extensive training, but were not deployed to the Persian Gulf. The call-up was delayed and pre-deployment training was longer than most expected. In the end, however, the brigades were ready. Two RC artillery brigades were deployed and participated in Desert Storm.
The force generation model visualizes RC round-out units with the reinforcing forces but not with the initial contingency forces. Selected CS and CSS forces, however, would go with all elements and some would go on very short notice. So far, Congress has not agreed with the strategic base concept on which the force generation model is based or the allocation of RC elements as visualized.

John Murtha, Chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, sent a strong letter to the Secretary of Defense cautioning against any reduction in strength of the RC at this time. This has significant implications with respect to the present budget because it would require the diversion of funds from other programs.

To meet these transition reductions the Army must make cuts in FY 1992. If the process is stalled, and the Army does not reduce RC personnel in FY 1992 and beyond, we are talking of additional costs over budget on the order of $500 million to $600 million in FY 1992. The costs would be much higher by the end of FY 1995; total additional costs could accumulate to as much as $12 billion above program over six years.

Also, if the AC and RC are not fitted into the overall structure in some logical and coordinated fashion, the Army is headed for an unbalanced force.

Senator Glenn has suggested more active personnel in RC units. The problem, however, is that this would strip about 10,000 personnel off the top of a very lean active force that is in the process of being drastically reduced. Otherwise, it would be possible to do.

The stockage scheduled to be removed from Europe is available for other purposes. This opens up the possibility of other prestockage locations, including floating storage. The Army would prefer adequate sealift to the maritime concept, however. Sealift provides the most flexibility because it permits the employment of CONUS-based contingency forces to any target area. This lift, however, must be available rapidly and in adequate quantity.

STRATEGIC ARMY MISSION AND ARMY STRUCTURE FY 1995

MG Granrud covered the changing Army from the pre-Persian Gulf period to the Army of 1995, to include the impact of Desert Storm. He specifically addressed the concept of force generation, tooth-to-tail relationships and the process of laying out major forces in terms of active and reserve content.

Some of the problems of the transition to a smaller Army were aggravated by Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The initial glide path for the active force was intended to be a steady downward slope to reach a strength of 535,000 by the end of FY 1995. Desert Shield created a major distortion by cutting attrition (the result of "stop loss" measures and the activation of a large number of RC personnel). In early May, the Army still had...
843,000 on active status, to include the RC personnel called to active
duty. It is now necessary to get "stop loss" and RC personnel off the
rolls as soon as reasonably possible. A number of RC personnel, however,
will be required for support functions in the close-out and retrograde from
the Persian Gulf. With best efforts, the Army will still miss the FY 1991
active end strength target by about 8,000. This will add an additional

The Army not only must redeploy from the Persian Gulf in good order,
but must concurrently start the process of moving toward smaller active and
reserve forces. It must also maintain an acceptable readiness status at
all times.

A smaller portion of the Army will be forward-deployed and there will
be a significant drawing down of forces in Europe. An imperative for
future readiness will be the deployability of existing forces and the
ability to project up to a corps-sized force from CONUS to any region
within 30 days.

Some of the hard decisions relating to the future Total Army include
the reduction ramp for the AC and RC and decisions relating to force
generation. This also leads to decisions on the stationing of the force,
the use of cadre divisions and the AC/RC mix, to include the planned use of
round-out or round-up reserve units.

The current adjusted Army strength program, exclusive of any changes
which may be directed by Congress, shows an Army decreasing in strength
during the five year period FY 1991 through FY 1995 by 198,000 active
(246,000 cumulative since FY 1988) and 226,000 RC personnel. During the
same period, it is visualized that U.S. Army forces in Europe would
decrease by about 122,000. The planned FY 1995 end state is an Army of
535,000 AC and 550,000 RC (321,000 ARNG and 229,000 USAR). This force
would consist of 12 AC divisions and eight RC divisions, of which two would
be cadre divisions.

In addition to the division structure, the future Army provides for
eight active separate brigades/armed cavalry regiments, six reserve
separate brigades/armed cavalry regiments and four reserve theater air
defense brigades.

The total force slice in the structure for each division or
division-equivalent currently averages about 40,000 personnel, including
the support elements. As the number of divisions goes down, the support
requirements in the structure also decrease. Support units that are no
longer required could be AC- or RC-based depending on factors such as
urgency, relative priorities and stationing. Once the combat elements have
been determined, based on the strategic concept and resulting Army
missions, a detailed piece-by-piece analysis is needed to determine the
nature of other cuts.
Discussion Summary

Fifteen months to flesh out and deploy a cadre division is optimistic if World War II experience is any guide. The plan for the cadre divisions is being worked on by TRADOC. Proposals are due soon.

The strength of the AC and RC cannot be determined independently. It has to be worked out by first defining divisions, division-force equivalents and corps. Other forces are then defined, to include combat support, combat service support, echelons above division and echelons above corps. When a division is removed, the other elements of the division slice (CS, CSS, echelons above division, and echelons above corps) -- active and reserve -- are also removed. It is not simply a matter of taking forces out of the AC and putting them in the RC or vice versa. They are interdependent and have to match.

There is no plan to cut the active and reserve components equally or proportionally. They are interdependent to the degree just described. If major active combat units are removed from the force, the RC supporting elements directly associated with those units are no longer needed for planned contingencies and become surplus to overall force needs. There are other factors controlling RC strength, including congressional direction, but the rationale for the planned numbers is as discussed.

Both round-out and round-up concepts are being considered. The early deploying contingency forces will use the round-up concept with RC units designated as additional forces. The RC units can deploy with or after the divisions with which associated; however, they retain an ongoing relationship, such as the 24th Mechanized Division and the 48th Brigade. Other active divisions with reinforcing missions can use round-out brigades.

Tentative Army planning at this time visualizes five round-out brigades and nine round-out battalions.

Future planning considers the possibility of two contingencies -- not simultaneous, but supported concurrently with overlap.

The stated Army initial lift requirements are for the deployment of two heavy divisions anywhere in the world in 30 days. This requires another level of sealift than now available. Congress has already authorized $1.3 billion for new sealift, but a coordinated defense plan has not yet emerged. DOD is conducting a Defense Mobility Study that is due later in 1991. The options include (1) contracting for new hulls, (2) contracting for or purchasing additional existing ships or (3) a combination.

It would take about 20 standard roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships to move the two heavy divisions. This capability would have to be ready and available immediately for loading in a crisis situation. It would be desirable to have them under direct military control. In addition, more RO/RO ships should be added to the Ready Reserve Fleet. For Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 53 percent of the ships were foreign owned. For
future planning, decisions must be made on the use of (and dependency on) foreign shipping.

RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Duncan discussed the RC in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, other RC issues and congressional concerns.

Desert Shield, starting in August 1990, was a major test for the RC. Only a few weeks after the start of Desert Shield, the president directed an involuntary call-up of selected RC personnel. This was done under the provisions of Title 10, Section 673b. The initial call-up was for 40,000 personnel (25,000 Army). The authority was extended in November to permit call-up of combat units for 180 days with an additional 180-day option. In January, the president signed an executive order increasing the Army's call-up authority to 220,000 for up to 12 months, to include members of the Individual Ready Reserve, under Title 10, Section 673.

This worked exceptionally well. Altogether, about 230,000 RC personnel (all services) were called to active duty and almost half served in the Persian Gulf.

The issue of the Army combat round-out brigades was driven by a series of factors and events as the operation unfolded. Initially, in August, there was urgency in getting the 24th Mechanized Division deployed as rapidly as possible. So the decision was made at that time to send the 197th Infantry Brigade (Separate) from the active force as the third combat brigade of the 24th Division instead of the designated round-out brigade. This was a judgment call by OSD on the basis that RC units could be used as necessary, but they must be ready. At the time this decision was made, there were two apparent handicaps in using the 48th Brigade: (1) time to train and (2) federal law limiting RC call-up to only 180 days (90 + 90). This was later changed to permit a total of 360 days (180 + 180) for combat round-out units. At that time, three National Guard combat brigades (the 48th Infantry, the 155th Armored and 256th Infantry) and two field artillery brigades (the 142d and the 196th) were called to active duty.

In January, authority was granted to activate up to 40,000 members of the IRR. Some 20,000 were notified with more than an 80 percent contact and response rate -- better than had been anticipated. In addition, there were in excess of 10,000 individual reserves who volunteered. Overall, the performance of those called to active service was a huge success.

There were some general misunderstandings on the round-out units that were worsened by the amplification of these misunderstandings in the press. It was always intended that reasonable training time would be provided before deployment. As it happened, initial expectations were too high, resulting in misjudgments and hurt feelings. Clearly, in the case of round-out units, there must be a better system for defining standards, better procedures to accurately measure readiness and a well-thought-out training strategy that integrates pre- and post-mobilization training.
The round-out concept still has merit. It is most difficult at the brigade level where combined arms synchronization is needed. It demands practiced leadership skills. In the training time normally available to RC units, it is difficult to devote sufficient effort to combined arms training. It is far easier to implement round-out at the battalion and company levels than at the brigade level.

There is one very important observation which emerged from Desert Shield/Desert Storm. With almost a quarter-million RC personnel called to active duty, our ability to mobilize and use this significant resource has been validated.

Discussion Summary

Although we have a Total Force in concept, in reality there are differences between the AC and RC that must be understood and reconciled. First, we do not always apply the same rating policies. Consequently, the standards by which we judge the readiness of forces to perform certain missions are often inconsistent. This is the very thing that led to some of the misunderstandings and problems with the combat brigades. Clearly, we need a single standard for all units of the same type and the same readiness categories. Also, we need to be consistent in evaluating units against that standard.

The personnel and the logistics systems are different for the active forces and the reserves. This causes initial problems of integration. An information system is being developed for the reserves (ARNG and USAR), but it is a peacetime and mobilization system. A basic issue, therefore, is the absence AC and RC standardization. We are dealing with too many systems and need to do something about it.

There is an apparent problem of first enlistment attrition in the RC -- too many personnel are not completing their enlistment. In fact, about 20 percent leave for various reasons and then revert on the books to the IRR. This creates excessive turnover and means repetitious training to fill various skills. It also means that a number of individuals in the units who have not completed training are not qualified in their military occupation specialty.

Direct comparison of the Army with the Air Force on the use of the RC is not valid. The Air Force is mainly concerned with crews and crew proficiency; this compares more directly with tank and fighting vehicle crews in the Army. However, it does not compare with larger Army combat maneuver units of battalion and brigade size where the integration of multiple functions must be coordinated.

Combat replacements are a special problem. The Army needs trained crews, not individual replacements. Where do we get them? If we could call up trained crews from the RC like the Air Force it would minimize the problems of integration. But taking trained crews from RC Army units would degrade these units. From the RC standpoint, it is important to recognize
and maintain unit integrity; additionally, the unit structure is needed to provide career progression.

There are too many inflated readiness evaluations during active duty for training (ADT). Also, we are trying to make RC combat units a mirror image of the active. This is not achievable in a practical sense because of the time available for training. We need to rethink readiness standards and post-mobilization training time. Combat maneuver units are the most complex. Combat service and combat service support units are easier to train to standards. We may need to rethink some of the missions for reserve units.

Despite the criticism leveled at the RC brigades because of post-mobilization training requirements, we should note that the 48th Brigade was fully validated in less than 100 days. It was never expected that brigade-sized units would be deployed without substantial training time. Two RC artillery brigades were deployed within two months of call-up and arrived in the Persian Gulf area in time to participate effectively in Desert Storm.

RC special operations forces were a success. Special credit goes to the 322d CA Command in Kuwait and the civil affairs and psychological operations units from Fort Bragg. The RC makes up 97 percent of the Army civil affairs units and 86 percent of psychological operations units.

THE RC PICTURE

Lt. Gen. Conaway, accompanied by MG William F. Ward, Chief of the Army Reserve, reviewed RC participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and made some observations on RC issues and problems. Both had just returned from a visit to Saudi Arabia with up-to-date impressions on the use of RC units and personnel in that theater.

Over 50 percent of the forces in the 22d Theater Army Area Command involved in redeployment activities were RC personnel. It is an example of an integrated Army working well. The reserves have the required skills.

Focusing on the National Guard, the current turnover rate in the aftermath of Desert Storm is only slightly higher than normal. The April 15 Army National Guard strength was 445,500 as compared to a FY 1991 authorization of 457,300 and a budgeted FY 1992 end strength of 410,900. This has become a major congressional issue; Congress is not expected to accept a cut of this magnitude for FY 1992.

One of the immediate concerns with respect to RC personnel is to have a billet for each RC soldier who served during Desert Shield/Desert Storm when he or she comes home.

There may have to be a reduction in force for National Guard and Reserve personnel at some time, but it is going to be difficult to define this or to know how to implement it. It is essentially an Army problem.
The Air Force plans to downsize the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve only incrementally. Also, the Navy cuts are relatively small.

While major base closures and realignments recommended by the Base Closure Commission are being reviewed by Congress, the RC are faced with the potential of multiple closures of armories that would result from strength and structure cuts. Each affects a separate community and, in the aggregate, will have the impact of many small base closures. If carried out, the closures will adversely affect many communities throughout the country; this is generating political pressures to curtail or drastically moderate the cuts.

The call-up of the IRR was a pleasant surprise. The response was good and proved to be quality input. Added to this was a large volunteer group of over 10,000 who served in a variety of roles. While the IRR is currently in healthy condition and is projected to further increase to about 450,000 by FY 1993 due to the extension of the service obligation from six to eight years, it will start dropping as new accessions decrease. By FY 1997, the IRR will be back down to about 200,000. For protracted emergencies in the late 1990s and beyond, we must consider the necessity of a draft for individual replacements.

The overall mobilization of RC units followed a fairly leisurely pace until early November (25,000-personnel limit up to that time). Most were called up between November and January. Had the conflict not come to an early end, additional requirements or replacements for certain specialties drawn from the reserves -- such as postal, water supply, etc. -- would have imposed a real challenge.

The ability to deploy with minimum training time depends to a degree on the type of unit. Functional commands such as artillery and engineers do very well. Multifunctional commands involving combined arms integration are more complex. They require a higher level of staff capability and training, synchronization and coordination, and up-to-date knowledge of combined arms doctrine. More extensive training is needed, including staff exercises, simulations and exercises in a real life environment.

Discussion Summary

The positive impact of public support when RC units are called to active duty is apparent. Because RC units come from locations throughout the U.S., the American public is more aware of the crisis situation and has greater feelings of participation. This is one of the advantages of the Total Force when employed in a national effort of this type. It should be noted that when the RC units were called up in significant numbers for Desert Shield, the public support ratings in the polls shot up from 50 to 80 percent.

The general political sensing prior to Desert Shield had been that the RC would be called only as a last resort and that a call-up would probably not be well received by Congress and the public. It was believed that use
of Section 673b would be considered too escalating and that the president would not use it except as a last recourse. The call-up for Desert Shield helped purge this mind-set for future contingencies.

We need to take a hard look at both premobilization and post-mobilization training for RC units. Training strategies and plans must ensure their compatibility. Post-mobilization training time must be efficiently used. Premobilization training should be geared to complement the post-mobilization readiness improvement process to the maximum.

Leadership training requirements at task force/brigade levels have not been fully appreciated or anticipated. Also, better staff training needs to be incorporated into overall unit training plans.

It may be desirable to try and extend annual training for early deploying units up to three weeks a year. Some things needing emphasis are maintenance training and training to standards on both basic skills and crew skills before call-up.

Crucial to all of this is setting the right standards and properly evaluating performance and readiness against established criteria. There should be a single set of standards for both the AC and RC.

We need to take a hard look at the advisor program for the RC. A strong program was set up in the early 1970s as the result of the Steadfast Reorganization Plan. Since then, the active duty element supporting the reserves has been significantly decreased. Full-time support is fundamental to the RC. As active forces reduce overhead, the RC may well need to increase full-time staffing.

We need to appreciate the political aspects of the RC strength issue. It has emotional and political overtones because it deals with people and jobs; both personal and institutional interests are at stake. Congress will not accept the level of cuts now reflected in the budget. At the same time, failure to make these cuts starting in FY 1992 means additional funding which is currently not in the defense budget or the program. The Army budget cannot absorb the cost of restoral from currently allocated resources, which projected through FY 1995 would total multibillions of dollars.

For both Army active and reserve forces, the planned strength reductions with budget cuts are too much, too fast. It is being forced, however, by a rigid and steadily decreasing budget slope. Changes (i.e., restorals) must be accompanied by additional funding for the Army.

It is too early to predict future recruiting for the RC and especially the impact of the experience in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. A big concern is the future retention of medical personnel and other professional categories, but we do not know the answer yet. So far, overall retention and recruiting look pretty good. A valuable source of input in the future will be an influx of trained soldiers released from active duty (over 50 percent of the current RC input comes from this source). Also, the
Montgomery GI Bill is a big incentive. Countering this, of course, is the future decrease in total population resources in the 18–24 year category.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Persian Gulf crisis was important to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in testing the Total Force concept, i.e., when the Army is committed to a major contingency the RC are an inherent part of the forces that must be committed.

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, not everything was perfect with respect to the mobilization and use of the RC; however, in general, the feedback was positive. With about a quarter of a million RC personnel activated (of which over 60 percent were Army), it proved beyond doubt that we could effectively mobilize and integrate this very significant resource.

Two factors that are independent of Desert Shield/Desert Storm have generated major issues with respect to the RC. One is the change in strategic forces from a "Europe first" priority and forward-deployed forces to an essentially CONUS-based Army with a regional outlook and priority to force projections to meet contingencies. This has raised questions with respect to the feasibility and use of round-out units with early deploying forces. While this issue has generated some controversy, it is one that can be dealt with logically. It is a question of matching forces to needs, assigning missions realistically, setting proper standards and training to those standards.

Second, a far more pressing problem is the forthcoming drop in personnel strength. DOD is in the process of cutting forces 25 percent by FY 1995 under a rigid funding cap. The Army will take a major portion of this cut; programmed strength reductions for both Army active and reserve personnel will be severe from FY 1992 through FY 1995. Relative reductions in the AC and RC are of major concern to Congress.

The big issues relate to the impact on RC strength and structure and the missions and priorities affecting both the AC and RC. The proponent committees in Congress have made it clear that cuts on the order proposed for the ARNG and the USAR will not be accepted regardless of the strategic plan proposed by DOD or budget funding constraints.

On the strength issue alone, it is virtually impossible to develop a consensus at this time which is based purely on military mission requirements or the arithmetic that goes with future force structure plans. The issue is highly dependent on political considerations that are responsive to state and local concerns.

It is important, however, that all concerned are cognizant of the impact of retaining more strength than is currently in the defense program. Funding that is not now in the budget must be provided and the FY 1992 and 1993 Army budgets have no source that can be used without an
unacceptable readiness impact. The Army budget, even if it gets all the funds requested, will be stretched to the limit to meet a very drastic active force cut of over 50,000 in FY 1992 and over 40,000 during FY 1993.

The key observations and recommendations developed during the discussions, particularly from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, are summarized as follows:

- The president should be given a 360-day RC call-up authority instead of the present 90-plus-90-day authority.

- Expectations for units subject to call-up should be realistic and achievable. Also, the standards for measuring readiness should be clear and consistent.

- We need to establish readiness levels that are consistent with deployment schedules and provide resources to meet those requirements. Readiness requirements must be clear and answer the question: ready to do what and when?

- Training requirements and training time must be analyzed in relation to readiness needs and expectations. Within practical limits, training time and training focus should be adjusted accordingly. If this cannot be done, then changes in expectations are in order.

- We need to take a hard look at both pre- and post-mobilization training. They must complement each other. Leadership training is not fully appreciated and time is often insufficient to properly train at task force/brigade level. More leadership and staff training need to be incorporated.

- Given the mission, equipment, resources and an effective premobilization training program, the 60-day standard for post-mobilization training is a good criterion for round-out combat units of brigade size.

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