

Reviews

Man of War: Britain's 'Greatest Briton'

Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874–1945. Carlo D'Este. HarperCollins Publishers. 864 pages; maps; black-and-white photographs; index; \$39.95.


By Col. Cole C. Kingseed
U.S. Army retired

Voted “the greatest Briton” in 2002 by viewers of the BBC, Winston Spencer Churchill continues to loom larger than life. In his own words, Churchill viewed his life as “an endless moving picture in which one was an actor. On the whole, great fun!” While numerous biographers have addressed Churchill's private and political life, few have viewed the enigmatic leader from a purely military perspective. Noted military historian Carlo D'Este fills the gap with *Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874–1945*.

The author of six books, D'Este first achieved critical acclaim with *Decision in Normandy*, published on the 40th anniversary of D-Day. His subsequent biographies, *Patton: A Genius for War* and *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*, have placed him in the forefront of military historians. In undertaking his study of Churchill, D'Este did so with a degree of trepidation. He need not have worried.

What differentiates *Warlord* from previous biographies of Churchill is D'Este's appraisal of Churchill's extraordinary life through the prism of a soldier. D'Este's Churchill is a man “born for war,” as Napoleon once described himself. D'Este makes a convincing case that “politics may have dominated [Churchill's] life, but soldiering was a passion he never lost during his political rise.” While political office and its myriad powers were Churchill's ultimate goal, he “never strayed far from his military roots.” Indeed, D'Este posits that it was the “military Churchill who made possible the political Churchill.”

Winston Churchill viewed war as “the greatest of all stimulants.” From his graduation from Sandhurst in 1894 to his appointment as British prime minister in 1940, military action colored Churchill's life. His initial test of combat occurred on colonial India's northwest frontier in the last decade of the 19th century. He later participated in one of history's final cavalry charges at Omdurman, in present day Sudan, during the Mahdist War in 1898. More than once he miraculously escaped death and serious injury.



Later, Churchill served as one of England's most recognized war correspondents during the Second Boer War. His escape from a Boer prisoner of war camp catapulted Churchill to the status of a military hero. Following his dismissal as First Lord of the Admiralty in the wake of the Gallipoli disaster in 1915, Churchill commanded a battalion with distinction on the Western Front during World War I.

In the period between the world wars, Churchill lived in political obscurity. Haunted by the memory of a disapproving father and the ghosts of Gallipoli, Churchill was considered by many “a hopelessly obsolete, old-fash-

ioned warrior.” The rise of Adolf Hitler and Germany's inexorable march toward war changed all that and resurrected Churchill's career. Bending to political pressure, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned Churchill to his former position as head of the Admiralty when Germany invaded Poland in 1939. Within a year, Churchill replaced Chamberlain as prime minister and rallied a beleaguered nation for war.

The responsibility that Churchill assumed as prime minister in his country's darkest hour was unlike any other faced by a British leader in its history. Through his unparalleled rhetoric and his iron tenacity, he rallied Great Britain. Nor would Churchill tolerate any pretenders to his position as British warlord. As he remarked to Lord Boothby, “It took Armageddon to make me prime minister. But now that I am there, I am determined that power shall be in no other hands but mine.”

Churchill's initial years as prime minister and minister of defense were characterized by as many failures as successes. The Battle of France, the fall of Dunkirk, the Norwegian fiasco, the fall of Singapore and his Mediterranean misadventures were balanced by the Battle of Britain, El Alamein and his selection of military commanders. In his quest for generalship, Churchill was more often right than wrong. His appointments of Generals Alan Brooke and Bernard Montgomery as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and commander of Eighth Army, respectively, were inspired.

No aspect of military policy escaped his attention. Though Churchill remained “hopelessly naïve when it came to logistics,” D'Este makes a compelling case that Churchill was quick to fully embrace Bletchley Park's code-breaking success, and Churchill also played a major role in developing a single intelligence service. The prime minister served as a strong proponent

of the development of new weapons to be used in special operations behind enemy lines. In addition, Churchill's unwavering support of the scientific community was vital for the creation of artificial harbors, radar and other devices that paved the way for the successful return to the Continent in 1944.

The years 1944–45 witnessed a downward spiral of Churchill's fortunes, his influence and powers of persuasion greatly diminished. After D-Day, Churchill's role as a warlord remained inconsequential, as the prime minister understood that the postwar world would largely be in the firm grasp of Britain's wartime allies. More

than ever, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower seized the strategic reins for the final defeat of Nazi Germany. Churchill's rejection by British voters in July 1945 in the aftermath of V-E Day was a political defeat from which he never fully recovered.

To his credit, D'Este has portrayed his subject warts and all. The finished portrait is not altogether flattering. At best, Churchill represented the indomitable spirit of a defiant nation at war. At his worst, the future prime minister was an "ego-driven, self-assured man, secure in his beliefs, and unmoved by dissent," a shameless self-promoter with driving ambition.

In short, *Warlord* is D'Este's finest bi-

ography to date. By focusing on the military Churchill, D'Este exposes a hitherto less-known persona. Churchill may have felt that he had failed to meet his own exceptional high standards of greatness, but history has judged differently. As Clementine Churchill telegraphed her husband on V-E Day at the conclusion of the European war, "My thoughts are with you on this supreme day. It could not have happened without you." D'Este adds, "Indeed not."

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Comprehensive Chronicle of OIF

On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–January 2005. Dr. Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese, with the Contemporary Operations Study Team. Combat Studies Institute Press. 696 pages; black-and-white photographs; maps; figures; index; \$35.

By Col. Gregory Fontenot
U.S. Army retired

On Point II is the consequence of decisions made first by Gen. Eric Shinseki and subsequently by Generals Kevin Byrnes and William (Scott) Wallace to chronicle Army operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. What has emerged is a breathtaking effort to write an account of ongoing Army operations both in Iraq and Afghanistan in the tradition of the Center of Military History's World War II "green books." In telling the story of World War II, Hugh Cole (one of the best green book historians), Kent Roberts Greenfield, Charles McDonald, Martin Blumenson and a host of other brilliant young historians set a high standard for those who are willing to write history soon after the moment rather than waiting for the dust to settle. The *On Point* effort seeks to meet that high standard.

On Point II is the second in a series; the first effort, *On Point*, covered the preparation for and liberation of Iraq. Ultimately, the series will include volumes examining both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the subject of the next



undertaking. The purpose of the *On Point* effort is exactly that which Cole claimed for the green books—to tell the story while the generation whose story it is will be able to read it and the Army in which they served can benefit from it. It is this legacy that Dr. Donald Wright, Col. Timothy Reese and their Contemporary Operations

Study Team have taken on at the direction of Gen. Wallace, who tasked them to produce "an analyzed, researched chronicle of the events that says, 'Here's what happened and here are the implications thereof.'"

This is heady and not without risks. Cole laid out the risks in a number of forums, perhaps best for an audience of his peers—other Army officers—at the Armor School in 1949. In eight short pages, which he must have delivered in about half an hour, he made the case for military history—a case that remains a brilliant argument today. Chiefly, he argued for writing and studying history in the Army while admitting that the business of learning lessons from history is a "very ticklish thing indeed." Cole believed that history enables context both for understanding wars just fought and those which might yet be fought. History, then, was the "one solid bridge ... between the hard facts found on the battlefields and the theory of what the battlefield of the future may be like." In Cole's mind, armed with this understanding, soldiers might better prepare for the future, perhaps avoiding mistaken doctrine and uninformed choices in combat development.

On Point II is part of the structure that will enable the Army to "bridge"

events on the contemporary battlefield to other combat operations that almost certainly lie ahead. Wright and Col. Reese are also not unwitting of the “ticklish” nature of using history—let alone writing history—while the guns are still smoking. In a carefully crafted introduction, they cite a number of problems that have plagued authors of contemporarily written history “since the era of Herodotus and Thucydides.” These include, they say, a “lack of perspective,” classification of many of the sources and the sheer volume of information measured in terabytes which, when printed, no doubt will amount to tons of documents, images and other data. What they do not say is to what extent some of their sources may have attempted to influence their inquiries.


Their central theme—indeed, their thesis—is that the U.S. Army made “an astonishing number of transitions between May 2003 and January 2005.” *On Point II* is a narrative of these many transitions, which are presented the-

matically. Accordingly, the book is organized in four parts: “Setting the Stage,” “Transition to a New Campaign,” “Toward the Objective” and “Sustaining the Campaign.” The book concludes with a chapter assessing the implications of the authors’ work and a brief epilogue which, in the main, underscores the reality that the U.S. Army and its colleagues in the other services and the Coalition could not achieve the objectives for Iraq.

Wright and Col. Reese make their case well and with integrity. They are not loath to criticize the Army, instead letting the story go where it will. For example, in discussing the failure to prepare adequately for the transition, which is the core of their narrative, they make it clear that the general officers in charge cannot be absolved of responsibility for the failure of the transition on a number of counts, but they do so adroitly. They point no fingers; rather they let the leadership implicate themselves. Lt. Gen. William Webster, then-deputy commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command

(CFLCC), observed in an interview that “there was seriously not anything but a skeleton of Phase IV until very late.” Not only is this absolutely right and an indictment of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his staff, who were in large part responsible for that problem, but also of the Army’s leadership—including those who served in CFLCC.

The authors do set the context clearly. The Army and CFLCC got a lot of “help” from Central Command and the Department of Defense. CFLCC planners recommended a force of 300,000 for the post-major combat operations phase or “Phase IV.” Obviously, CFLCC was not resourced at that level. Equally important, the tasks of planning for Phase IV may well have been beyond either Central Command or CFLCC. While it is true that CFLCC had the burden, it does not follow necessarily that they should have had that burden. Planning, mounting and sustaining the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein legitimately assumed the lion’s share



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of time available. This stemmed from the debate over how to get it done and how many troops would be required. Central Command also had OEF to manage. CFLCC had only one planning team to plan both the invasion and transition. Both headquarters were tired to the point of exhaustion before the invasion of Iraq and not well-situated to affect either the planning or execution of the inevitable transition.

A second planning team focused on transition would have made sense. That approach worked effectively in World War II and might have done so here, presuming the Secretary of Defense could have been convinced that more troops—let alone a second planning team—would prove necessary. Still, no one thought of it during 2002–03. Nor is Rumsfeld the only man who got it wrong.

Gen. John Keane, then the acting Chief of Staff of the Army, told Rumsfeld that he thought “we were going to be there ... 8 to 10 years minimum with some measure of force,” but noted in a 2006 interview that he “did not anticipate the emergence of an armed opposition in Iraq.”

Wright and Col. Reese remain strong throughout their account of the various factors associated with the transition, including the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They are particularly solid in discussion of the unseemly departure of both Central Command and CFLCC, which left Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez holding the bag along with V Corps Headquarters. Although awarded the honorific of Combined Joint Task Force 7, V Corps had neither the resources nor a Joint staff to assume the vast task of waging counterinsurgency while developing the means to rebuild Iraq’s decrepit infrastructure, made more so by Coalition bombs.

On Point II goes well beyond dealing with the command and control of the transition. The authors also address the Army rapidly adapting to conditions on the ground, reporting both good and bad news. Abu Ghraib

in all of its ugliness is not avoided, nor do they ignore the bumps the Army and the Coalition encountered on the road to developing the means to train Iraqi security forces. At 696 pages, *On Point II* is compendious, to say the least. But the thematic approach enables the authors to deliver a lucid account that addresses everything from tactical innovation (on both sides) to activities designed to sustain troop welfare and morale.

On Point II does suffer from being unable to account fully for the “other side of the hill.” The very good work done by Kevin Woods and coauthors in *The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report* bridges part of



that gap but is useful mostly in understanding what the Iraqi leadership thought in the months before the invasion and what they did that produced the conditions that later enabled the counterinsurgency. What the various insurgents and/or terrorists thought and are thinking remains unknown or classified; Wright and Col. Reese have done what they are able to do with what they know or can use.

On Point II contains a number of useful appendices amounting to 100 pages of information, including a timeline and an order of battles, all of which contribute to understanding the narrative and placing it in context. *On Point II* is richly documented and tantalizing in what it suggests for further study. More can be done—and hopefully will be done—on sustainment operations and rapid fielding, both of which merit discrete accounts.

The Army, too, would be wise to undertake in detail a discussion of how it redesigned and, to a large extent, reorganized and reequipped itself for counterinsurgency operations. The implication of the transition of the reserve component from a strategic reserve, as traditionally envisioned, to an operational reserve also requires further study. The consequences of this transition have been far-reaching for the states and for reserve component soldiers. All of these areas and others, the authors have suggested, deserve further study.

The only disappointing chapter in the book is the one on implications. Wright and Col. Reese do not go as far as they might have in considering implications of what they learned for the Army in the future. They redeem themselves, however, in three sentences:

The oft-stated goal of *regime change* implied some degree of postwar steps to build a new Iraqi Government in place of the Saddam regime. *Regime removal* might have been a more accurate description of the goal that the design of OIF was best suited to accomplish. The military means employed were sufficient to destroy the Saddam regime; they were not sufficient to replace it with the type of nation-state the United States wished to see in its place.

On Point II establishes the brand for the long-term effort Gen. Wallace intended. It is also clearly a point of departure for other work and will be widely quoted as authoritative, an honor the authors and the Contemporary Operations Study Team have earned. Finally, it keeps faith with the vision of Hugh Cole—the generation that fought in Iraq can read the tale of their effort.

COL. GREGORY FONTENOT, USA Ret., is the director of the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He is a coauthor of *On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*.

Military Must-Reads

By Col. Cole C. Kingseed

U.S. Army retired

In his *New York Times* best-selling memoir, *Beyond Band of Brothers*, Maj. Dick Winters states, "War brings out the worst and the best in people. Wars do not make men great, but they do bring out the greatness in good men." If your New Year's resolution is to learn more about military history and combat leadership, here are two areas and several books that might be of interest.

Civil War Must-Reads

Freeman, Douglas S., *Lee's Lieutenants*, 3 vols (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942–44)

Written by the foremost Southern historian, *Lee's Lieutenants* is a study in command of the principal leaders of the Army of Northern Virginia who fought under Gen. Robert E. Lee. Freeman describes the rise and fall of the early commanders and officers whose reputations were made or lost during the period of the great Confederate victories of 1862 and 1863. He concludes his study with the fortunes of Lee's commanders at Gettysburg through the eventual defeat of the Confederacy.

Grant, Ulysses S., *Personal Memoirs*, 2 vols (New York: Charles L. Webster and Company, 1885–86)

Often described as a classic in military literature, *Personal Memoirs* is Gen. U.S. Grant's own account of his military service. Mark Twain considered Grant's memoirs the best written memoirs since Caesar's *Commentaries*. If one wants to know why the North won the Civil War, he or she need only read these volumes.

McPherson, James M., *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)

McPherson's Pulitzer Prize-winning study is the standard one-volume history of the Civil War by America's finest Civil War historian. McPherson provides fresh interpretations to the political, social and military events that shaped this nation's history from

the outbreak of the war with Mexico to Gen. Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

Sears, Stephen W., *Gettysburg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003)

Written by a historian whom the *New York Times Book Review* called "arguably the preeminent living historian of the war's eastern theater," Sears' *Gettysburg* has replaced Edwin B. Coddington's *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* as the definitive study of the war's greatest and most costly battle. Sears masterfully relates the campaign from its conceptual stage to Lincoln's delivery of the "Gettysburg Address."

Shaara, Michael, *The Killer Angels* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974)

This Pulitzer Prize-winning novel chronicles the Battle of Gettysburg and the events leading to it through the eyes of the senior Confederate generals of the Army of Northern Virginia and the mid-level leaders of the Union Army of the Potomac. Shaara manages to capture the essence of war, leadership under fire and the human drama that characterized the Battle of Gettysburg.

World War II Must-Reads

Ambrose, Stephen E., *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992)

Published on the 50th anniversary of World War II, *Band of Brothers* follows Easy Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, from basic training at Camp Toccoa, Ga., through D-Day, Operation Market-Garden, the Bulge and on to Hitler's Eagle's Nest at Berchtesgaden. Later the basis for the Emmy Award-winning HBO miniseries of the same title, *Band of Brothers* is a tribute to America's citizen-soldiers who waged World War II in the European theater.

Blumenson, Martin, *The Patton Papers, 1940–1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974)

Blending biography and autobiog-

raphy, Blumenson reveals the full tapestry of a combat commander whom another biographer claimed was the most famous and controversial American soldier of the 20th century. As Gen. George S. Patton's official biographer, Blumenson chronicles his subject's extraordinary career in World War II in a masterpiece of superb editing and flowing narrative.

Linderman, Gerald F., *The World Within War* (New York: The Free Press, 1997)

Subtitled *America's Combat Experience in World War II*, *The World Within War* is social history at its best. As he did with his previous books on the Spanish-American War and the Civil War, Linderman introduces another amazing cast of characters who served on the front lines and who experienced extended combat. This study is an attempt to see the war through the eyes of those American combat soldiers—Army infantrymen and Marine riflemen—who fought in what Linderman calls the vanguard of military power.

Millett, Allan R. and Murray, Williamson, *A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000)

A compelling one-volume history of World War II, *A War To Be Won* concentrates on the conduct of operations by the military organizations that waged the war. At the heart of the narrative is the superb operational analysis of the military effectiveness of all belligerents by two of the war's foremost military historians.

Sledge, E.B., *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981)

In his first-person account of the fighting at Peleliu and Okinawa through the eyes of a 20-year-old marine, Sledge captures the indelible mark combat leaves on its survivors. To Sledge, war is "brutish, inglorious and a terrible waste." If I would choose a single book to see war as it actually is, it would be this one.

Varied Fare

The Training Ground: Grant, Lee, Sherman, and Davis in the Mexican War, 1846–1848. *Martin Dugard.* Little, Brown and Company. 464 pages; black-and-white photographs; maps; index; \$29.99.


“This is not a history of the Mexican War,” Martin Dugard announces in the author’s note of his new book, *The Training Ground*. Indeed, while thoroughly researched and augmented with liberal quotations from the memoirs of the men whose stories it relates, *The Training Ground* is truly an action-adventure narrative that barrels forward as it recounts the roles of several young West Point graduates—men like Ulysses (Sam) Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, Jefferson Davis, Thomas (Stonewall) Jackson and Robert E. Lee—in the mid-19th century war with Mexico.

Written in a colloquial style without footnotes or endnotes (though Dugard provides a lengthy appendix of selected notes and biographies, as well as a 10-page selective bibliography), the tale of this extraordinary group of young officers who would later face each other across enemy lines is broken into tightly focused chapters, each of which addresses a single aspect of America’s involvement in the Mexican War.

Organized around the chronology of the offensive, each chapter begins with a date before picking up the narrative strand of a particular soldier or unit, keeping the reader grounded in the midst of so many interwoven threads. In addition, maps accompany sections describing battles. *The Training Ground* also stays abreast of the Washington political developments that arise as the war progresses; sometimes the jump from Washington to Mexico and back is not the smoothest, but overall, Dugard’s writing moves forward quickly and fluently.

The battle scenes, especially, sweep the reader into the action with clear, vivid descriptions augmented by frequent contributions from the soldiers themselves, via personal anecdotes and excerpts from letters home. The

reader’s sense of familiarity with the young officers serving as the main characters, whom Dugard sketches with detailed strokes, makes the events of the war all the more intense. When Grant grumbles at being appointed quartermaster (unaware that this shows his superiors’ trust in him), the reader balks at the decision as well. When Gen. Winfield Scott calls on Lee—still a captain almost a decade and a half after graduating from West Point—to reconnoiter enemy territory, tension builds in the hope that Lee will finally prove himself worthy of advancement. While



the foreshadowing is heavy at times—especially at the ends of chapters, in the cliffhanger style of action novels—Dugard generally shows restraint; still, the substantial prologue and reliance on his audience’s awareness of the future greatness of his subjects would suffice. (A short epilogue and Gen. George Meade’s list of soldiers who fought in the Mexican War and also with distinction in the Civil War satisfy any lingering curiosity at the end of *The Training Ground*.)

One of the surprising elements of *The Training Ground* is the depiction of the untested Sam Grant as a moody youth unsure of his commitment to

the military. Grant seems most preoccupied with his separation from his fiancée to whom he writes at the beginning of the war: “As soon as this is over, I will write to you again. That is, if I am one of the fortunate individuals who escape. You don’t know how anxious I am to see you again, Julia.” Dugard provides many excerpts from Grant’s love letters—some impatient, some tender—that belie his later reputation as a hard-drinking, hard-fisted leader. The quotations pulled from Grant’s memoirs are so eloquent that some readers will want to seek them out for further reading.

Also unexpected is the depth of the inclusion of the Mexicans’ perspective of the war. Though the Mexican generals play second fiddle to their neighbors to the north in the course of history, Dugard fleshes out their personalities with equal care: When the Americans raise the Stars and Stripes at Chapultepec, Gen. Antonio López de Santa Anna cries, “If we were to plant our batteries in hell, the damned Yankees would take them from us,” to which Gen. Pedro de Ampudia answers, “God is a Yankee.”

There are numerous such moments that draw the reader in close. Trivia lovers will not be disappointed: Dugard seamlessly weaves many quirks into *The Training Ground*, from Gen. David E. Twiggs’ strange digestive rituals before battle and the use of British mortars left behind from the Revolutionary War to the sobering aside that so many death marches were played for men who died from disease at Camargo that the mockingbirds there learned to mimic the refrain.

The tight-knit connections among so many of the soldiers, especially the West Point graduates, are revealed with a frequency that causes Dugard’s message to resonate deeply. As the reader comes to understand how well these men knew each other and the great military skills they possessed, their alignment against each other in the Civil War is even more remarkable.

—Sara Hov

Bill Mauldin: A Life Up Front. Todd DePastino. W.W. Norton & Company. 320 pages; black-and-white photographs and illustrations; index; \$27.95. **Willie & Joe: The WWII Years.** Bill Mauldin. Fantagraphics Books. 600 pages; two-volume slipcased hardcover set; \$65.

At 5 feet, 10 inches tall and weighing barely 110 pounds, Bill Mauldin was an unlikely war hero, but he gave a voice to and buoyed the morale of frontline infantrymen as few could.

He was able to do in cartoons what Ernie Pyle did in prose, and even though Mauldin joined the National Guard in 1940 more out of desperation than anything else, by the time World War II ended, he was one of the most well-known and celebrated soldiers in the Army.



Nevertheless, it wasn't until this year that a biographer finally chose to chronicle Mauldin's illustrious and often turbulent life. In *Bill Mauldin: A Life Up Front*, historian Todd DePastino fills this gap in the story of World War II.

Until now, Mauldin's own autobiography and memoirs were the only accounts of his life.

Balanced, informative and interesting throughout, *A Life Up Front* is a quick read. DePastino is an excellent storyteller and manages to weave direct quotes and specific recollections into a sweeping narrative of the cartoonist's life.

DePastino gives a thorough retelling of Mauldin's childhood and years in the Army. Unfortunately, he doesn't pay the same level of attention to Mauldin's 60 years as a civilian after the war. This disparity is all the more

pronounced since there are decades left untouched by Mauldin himself in his memoirs.



Despite this obvious oversight, the inclusion of dozens of Mauldin's cartoons highlight important moments in his life and career, as well as changes in his artistic style. The old adage "a picture is worth a thousand words" is certainly true in this case, and Mauldin's artwork is an excellent complement to DePastino's prose.

Worth mentioning is another DePastino project that will be of interest to any fan of Bill Mauldin or student of World War II: *Willie & Joe: The WWII Years*.

In addition to writing a biography of the cartoonist, DePastino served as editor of the most thorough compilation of Mauldin's cartoons yet published.

While focusing almost exclusively on the war years, he included in this collection of more than 600 cartoons many early works that have not been published in more than 60 years—and never to so large an audience. Of special interest are many early drafts and cartoon sketches that have never been published. This deluxe, two-volume set is an excellent supplement to the biography.

Like many of his generation, Mauldin was a child born of hardship in the Depression and came of age during the turmoil of World War II. And like so many others, he not only met these challenges but excelled.

DePastino's biography of Bill Mauldin does justice to a fascinating life story, and this compilation of his cartoons helps bring Mauldin's talent and his life at the front lines both to historians and a new generation.

—Samuel M. Baker