


Justice

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The Commission on
Post-Conflict Reconstruction



Governance

Security

Well-Being

PLAY TO WIN

*Final Report of the bi-partisan
Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction*

JANUARY 2003

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

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Executive Summary

One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter – for national security as well as for humanitarian reasons. If left to their own devices, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks, organized crime and drug traffickers as well as posing grave humanitarian challenges and threats to regional stability.

While the United States has great interests at stake, however, U.S. institutions and ways of doing business have not kept pace with the rapidly changing environment since the end of the Cold War. Despite over a decade of recent experience in trying to address the challenges of failed states and rebuilding countries following conflict, U.S. capacity for addressing these challenges remains woefully inadequate.

The United States cannot get involved in all failed states or try to rebuild all countries following conflict, nor should it try to do so. The appropriate role for the United States will depend on the interests and values at stake, as well as the role that other international actors can and should play. Although the U.S. contribution will vary from operation to operation, decision makers will nevertheless have to make judgments about what kind of assistance options they want to be able to make available for future U.S. engagement. The notion of comparative advantage should be central to determining the portfolio of long-term capabilities and mechanisms in which the U.S. government should invest to create those options.

Some in the United States might argue that enhancing U.S. capacity to work in post-conflict environments is a recipe for automatically dragging the United States into “other people’s messes.” In fact, as a superpower with a global presence and global interests, the United States does have a large stake in remedying failed states. Far from being a recipe to force us to do more in this area, having a clear vision of our comparative advantages, objectives and strategy, as well as corresponding capacities, will give us more, not less, flexibility and leverage to determine what role we should play and what roles other international and indigenous actors should play.

This bi-partisan Commission on Post Conflict Reconstruction was convened by the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies to make recommendations on what the United States will have to do to enable itself to help countries successfully rebuild themselves following conflict. The commissioners – 27 distinguished individuals with extensive experience in the U.S. Congress, military, various executive branch agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations – met throughout 2002 to consider recommendations that surfaced over two years of research, expert working groups, and vetting with current policy-makers and practitioners.

This report represents the Commission’s final assessment of the top priority issues that the United States needs to address. It makes 17 specific recommendations broken out by the substantive pillars of post-conflict reconstruction – security, justice and reconciliation, economic and social well-being, and governance and participation – as well as by the four crucial “enablers” that facilitate successful engagement: strategy and planning, implementation infrastructure, training and education, and funding.

It is our firm belief that if policy-makers take steps to implement these recommendations, the United States will dramatically improve its ability to protect itself, promote its interests and values, enhance its standing, and improve the lot of people around the globe.

The Challenge of Failed States

September 11 provided an undeniable impetus to revisit the question of post-conflict reconstruction by forcing the United States to reevaluate its approach to dealing with failed states. For national security as well as for humanitarian reasons, failed states – if left to their own devices – can provide safe haven for a diverse array of transnational threats, including terrorist networks, global organized crime, and narcotics traffickers who also exploit the dysfunctional environment. As such, failed states can pose a direct threat to the national interests of the United States and to the stability of entire regions. President Bush has recognized the gravity of the threat in his recently released National Security Strategy, which goes so far as to argue that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”¹

Afghanistan – torn by decades of war, internal strife, and repression – exemplifies some of the dangers posed by failed states. Although Afghanistan provides the first major reconstruction test of the war on terrorism, it will not be the last. Similar challenges exist elsewhere, in locations ranging from the Middle East and South Asia to the Horn of Africa, where terrorist groups have already exploited the vacuum of state authority and are likely to seek further advantage as Afghanistan ceases to provide them sanctuary. As much as some in the United States would like to avoid involvement in nation building, failed states are a reality that cannot be wished away. Indeed, some of the possible candidates for failure in coming years are countries in which the United States already has a defined national security interest—from Iraq and the Occupied Territories in the Middle East to North Korea and Cuba. As the situation in Afghanistan has demonstrated, the United States and the international community ignore collapsed or weak states at their peril.

However, not all failed states are created equal. Not all will be equally important to the United States and the international community. Each stable country must gauge its involvement in failed or failing states according to its own interests. Nor can a “one size fits all” approach be used to address the broad diversity of cases. Although conceptual threads link these situations, the approach to dealing with failed and dangerously weak states must be tailored to each case.

At the outset of the twenty-first century, there are many ongoing conflicts rooted in state failure in addition to a number of other causes. It is in the interest of the United States and the international community to bring conflict to a lasting and sustainable close. This is a daunting task. The record of success in assisting failed states emerging from violent conflict is mixed, with fifty percent of nations emerging from conditions of violent conflict slipping back into violence within five years.² Certainly, in an interconnected world, with the resources available and the consequences so dire, the international community can and must break this dangerous cycle of conflict.

Unfortunately, U.S. security and development agencies still reflect their Cold War heritage. The kinds of complex crises and the challenge of failed states encountered in recent years do not line up with these outdated governmental mechanisms. In short, post-conflict reconstruction is an orphan of the post-Cold War world and the United States needs to revamp its governmental structures to reflect present-day realities.

If regional stability is to be maintained³, economic development advanced, lives saved, and transnational threats reduced, the United States and the international community must develop a strategy and enhance capacity for pursuing post-conflict reconstruction. Significant international interventions to help rebuild countries are certainly not the answer for every failed or failing state; nevertheless, international involvement will be essential in many cases. Even when other options are pursued – such as quarantining failed states, carving them up, absorbing them into larger entities,

establishing a transitional authority, or backing a party in the hopes it can win a war and re-establish order – they will most often succeed when reconstruction capabilities exist and can be used to supplement whatever other measures are undertaken. In essence, the question is not whether the United States and the international community will have to help reconstruct states, but rather when and how they will do so.

The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Over the last year a distinguished bi-partisan group of members of Congress, military leaders, and senior policy experts who have served in the U.S. government, international organizations and the not-for-profit sector have convened to consider a range of possible U.S. responses to the major challenge posed by failed states. This report reflects the conclusions of the Commission.

The Commission was charged with making recommendations to improve U.S. capabilities to undertake post-conflict reconstruction. All its deliberations, however, were undertaken with the explicit assumption that the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction are an international problem and responsibility, and that the design of U.S. capacity should take into account the international context and a broad range of international actors. The next section of this report, therefore lays out a general framework for creating a cohesive international response to post-conflict reconstruction. That section is followed by a discussion of the specific role of the United States in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

The heart of the report that follows focuses on the challenge of enhancing U.S. response capabilities. It is divided into eight areas that require attention, each with a corresponding set of specific recommendations. Four of the areas requiring attention are the substantive “pillars” of post-conflict reconstruction efforts: security; justice and reconciliation; economic and social well-being; and governance and participation. Creating an effective U.S. response capacity also requires improvements in four key capacity “enablers”: strategy and planning; implementation infrastructure; training and education; and funding.

It is hoped by this Commission that the recommendations made in these eight areas comprise a realistic, achievable plan to create a more coherent and effective U.S. post-conflict reconstruction capacity, and in so doing, offer current and future U.S. leaders the tools necessary to advance U.S. interests and to reduce the amount of conflict around the world.

Framework for a Cohesive and Strategic International Response

In many post-conflict environments, the chaos on the ground is paralleled only by the chaos of the international response. Various governmental agencies, international organizations, international financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations come from all parts of the globe to help. They bring much needed resources, expertise, and energy, but they also bring very different assumptions, working styles, and goals.

While creating a perfectly cohesive effort in any post-conflict country is not possible, there are a number of straightforward principles that, if followed, can maximize the unity of the international effort.

The people of the country in question must own the reconstruction process and be its prime movers. Following conflict, indigenous governance structures are often very weak or non-existent and the local human resource base is greatly diminished through war-induced deaths, brain drain, displacement, removal of previously empowered individuals and groups, and forgone investment in human capital. Though this bleak starting point often forces outside actors to play a disproportionately large role in the early stages of the rebuilding process, every effort must be taken to build (or rebuild) indigenous capacity and governance structures as quickly as possible. Leadership roles in the reconstruction effort must be given to host country nationals at the earliest possible stage of the process. Even if capacity is limited, host country representatives should chair or co-chair pledging conferences, priority-setting meetings, joint assessments of needs, and all other relevant processes. Representatives should be elected, or may be designated by a peace process. Where these avenues do not exist, the international community must help create mechanisms for legitimate host country leaders to be elected or appointed. In addition, all international actors should seek out host country partners from day one. If they do not exist, international actors should help to develop them and impart the knowledge and skills necessary to succeed in the job.

A coherent international strategy based on internal and external parties' interests is crucial. While major international actors have called for strategic coordination in post-conflict settings, the simple fact is that no general model of, or processes for, strategy development and coordination exists. For any strategy development exercise in these difficult environments to succeed, it must be based on four key tenets. First, all involved must recognize that post-conflict reconstruction is not a technical or “normal” developmental process, but rather a fundamentally political one. Second, any outside intervention must be designed with the interests of all the key actors involved, both within the country and outside, with an eye to blocking spoilers and empowering legitimate peace-seeking actors. Third, host country leaders and outside actors must agree on top priorities and sequence their interventions accordingly. Fourth, while a coordinated strategic plan may exist on paper, only a small team of key external actors working in-country will be able to effectively leverage international resources and influence the interest calculations of key actors. Senior representatives of the international community in partnership with host country representatives should conduct joint assessments of needs, prioritize them, and design a strategy to help shape pledging conferences and other major decision-making fora.

The international community must address the problem of post-conflict reconstruction holistically, building and deploying capacity to address a broad range of interrelated tasks. As United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan has noted, “All [the] tasks – humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic – are interconnected, and the people engaged in them need to work closely together. We cannot expect lasting success in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a single coherent strategy. If the resources are lacking for any one of them, all the others may turn out to have been pursued in vain.”⁴ The range of tasks that should be considered in any given post-conflict reconstruction operation are easily identified, and fall into four main areas: security; justice and reconciliation, economic and social well-being, and governance and participation.⁵

Security is the sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction. Though every case is different, there is one constant—if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail. Unless comprehensive security needs are addressed up front, spoilers will find the weak areas and retain leverage to affect the political outcomes, vitiating the peace. While security is essential, it will never be one hundred percent guaranteed and the perfect must not become the enemy of the good. In order to achieve acceptable levels of security, “coalitions of the willing” and UN peacekeeping operations need coherent military leadership and core troops from a lead nation that provide the backbone of the operation. The

international community must also enhance its ability to deploy civilian police to address temporary needs. In addition, efforts to design and reconstruct or reform local security institutions, including both military and police, must begin early in the peace process.

Success is made on the ground. Another key to effective international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction efforts is empowering and organizing representatives in the field. Strategy in a post-conflict environment must be closely tailored to the particular characteristics of the country, and as such, should be heavily informed by those closest to the situation. Because actors with various mandates are in the field at any given time, they must be left to devise an appropriate division of labor at the country level. Donors and international organizations should therefore structure their post-conflict authorities to devolve maximum power, money and authority to their representatives in the field. “Country teams” which meet regularly inside the country (but which are not necessarily co-located physically) should include representatives not only from the UN system and/or the lead nation, but also the International Financial Institutions, Multilateral Development Banks, key NGOs, and any military or security personnel operating in theater. Civil-Military Cooperation Centers (CIMICs) should be a standard part of the package where military or peacekeeping operations operate alongside other reconstruction efforts. “Friends Groups,” which formally bring together governments with means and interests in supporting the peace and reconstruction process, should be cultivated and formed at early stages of the process.

International interventions are extraordinary and should take all necessary measures to avoid undermining local leaders, institutions and processes. A significant international presence is often needed in a post-conflict situation in order to provide security, reassure the indigenous population of international financial and moral support, deliver needed services, and build lasting internal capacity. While a large international presence may be both necessary and appropriate in initial phases, a dominating presence can be damaging over the longer term. Therefore, the international community should hire local residents to do as many jobs as possible and should establish salary structures for local hires that are competitive, but that do not distort the local economy. And when outside support is necessary for key groups or individuals, it must be provided in such a way as to not compromise the independence and legitimacy of the parties receiving such support.

Mechanisms are needed to rapidly mobilize and coordinate needed resources and sustain them for appropriate periods of time. Bilateral donors, UN agencies and international financial institutions are generally more eager to script their own role in post-conflict reconstruction than to coordinate with other international or local actors. To date, virtually all these major actors have examined current funding mechanisms and found them wanting. Pledging conferences tend to extend promises far beyond what they will truly deliver and lack mechanisms for ensuring appropriate follow-up. Therefore, the international community, including the United States, should agree to craft a new resource-mobilizing infrastructure for post-conflict situations. In addition, more authority over how the money is spent should be provided to operation-level strategists, e.g. U.S. Directors of Reconstruction, Special Representatives of the Secretary General, or World Bank mission heads, while retaining appropriate budgetary oversight in New York and foreign capitals.

Accountability is essential for both host country and international actors. Holding both host country and international actors accountable in post-conflict settings is as important as it is difficult. Chaos exists after a conflict because no legal or institutional framework has the authority to hold people accountable in economic, political, and personal affairs. The influx of foreign resources into a resource-scarce environment not only raises the potential for corruption but also tests the accountability of both local and international actors. With respect to indigenous actors, conditionality can and should be used to ensure accountability, but it must be carefully designed, focused on specific high value issues such as corruption and key parts of the peace accords, and

rigorously coordinated so as not to pull the incipient government apart. Before being dispatched to a post-conflict site, international staff members should be required by their sponsoring organization to receive appropriate training and indoctrination on codes of conduct, local and international law, and accountability systems.

The timing of an operation must be driven by circumstances on the ground, not by artificial deadlines or externally driven bureaucratic imperatives. Timing of international actions can be a crucial determinant of success or failure. Unfortunately, the international community is not sufficiently nimble at getting into the field when its leverage is greatest and most needed. Nor is it effective at transitioning from one phase of an operation to another. Nor does it have a particularly strong record of executing sustainable hand-offs to indigenous actors before exiting. Therefore, the international community must dramatically enhance its ability to field civilian as well as military expertise promptly. It must also establish measures of success at the beginning of a mission and evaluate progress constantly in order to manage expectations and facilitate transitions from one phase of an operation to the next (sometimes including outside pressure to achieve those transitions). And most importantly, major actors must make an overall commitment to stay engaged over time. Any artificial deadlines for withdrawal, like those set by the United States in Bosnia, simply enable spoilers to wait the international community out. Achieving success is the only true exit strategy. Anything less risks forcing return involvement at a later date.

The Role of the United States

The United States will often have a critical role to play in international post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Obviously, the appropriate U.S. role will vary on a case-by-case basis, depending in large part on the U.S. interests at stake and the role that other international actors choose to play. When vital interests are at stake, the United States may choose to assume a leadership role, whereas when such interests are absent, the government may choose to make a more limited contribution.

In any case, experience suggests that U.S. leadership is often a critical determinant of an operation's success or failure, given both the unique standing of the United States in the world and the comparatively vast military, political, and economic resources Washington can bring to bear. Bosnia and Kosovo are recent examples of how significant U.S. diplomatic and military involvement turned the tide and created the conditions for success. In East Timor the United States provided targeted support that helped the Australian-led intervention succeed. In yet other cases, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, U.S. engagement as a principal political and financial supporter of a UN-led process helped to deliver the desired results.

Because the United States cannot afford to address every shortfall in the international community's capabilities to assist in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, effective U.S. participation also requires identifying areas where the United States holds a comparative advantage – those capabilities or assets that this country is uniquely or particularly able to bring to the table. U.S. power, for example, gives U.S. negotiators particular leverage in some cases, just as the size of the U.S. market makes enhanced trade opportunities for post-conflict countries particularly attractive. Likewise, the global presence and unique logistical and technical capacity of the United States give it a comparative advantage in quick response.

Although the U.S. contribution will vary from operation to operation, decision makers will nevertheless have to make judgments about what kind of assistance options they want to be able to

make available for future U.S. engagement. This notion of comparative advantage should be central to determining the portfolio of long-term capabilities and mechanisms in which the U.S. government should invest to create those options.

Some in the United States might argue that enhancing U.S. capacity to work in post-conflict environments is a recipe for automatically dragging the United States into “other people’s messes.” In fact, as a superpower with a global presence and global interests, the United States does have a stake in remedying failed states. Enhancing our own capacities to deal with them effectively is in our interests. Far from being a recipe to force us to do more in this area, having a clear vision of our comparative advantages, objectives and strategy, as well as corresponding capacities, will give us more, not less, flexibility and leverage to determine what role we should play and what roles other international and indigenous actors should play.

In order to succeed in the future, the United States must act now. Especially in the post-September 11 environment, the United States cannot wait for the next crisis to build its post-conflict reconstruction capabilities. Indeed, U.S. leadership internationally will only be credible if the United States gets its own house in order.

With a concerted, coherent, bipartisan push, the United States can position itself to succeed in the challenging new world that confronts it. Enabling itself to catalyze indigenous and international reconstruction efforts will help to protect U.S. interests. Doing so will also help others to pursue that which U.S. citizens hold most dear—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Enhancing U.S. Response Capabilities

Luckily, the United States will not have to build its post-conflict reconstruction capacity from scratch. It already has some key institutions and a wealth of human, organizational, and material resources on which to draw.

Unfortunately, the United States has tended to depend, in many instances, on the U.S. military to do the bulk of the work. As former CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni has stated, the U.S. military has often become the “stuckee,” the force that gets stuck with all the clean up because no other alternative exists to fill a number of the emergency gaps. This reality has concerned a number of people, including National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who has argued that “There’s nothing wrong with nation building, but not when it’s done by the American military.”⁶

In truth, the American military has long been involved in nation building and will likely continue to be. It should not, however, be the sole or even the principal participant in reconstruction efforts. Although the military may play a crucial role when it comes to security needs in certain cases, a host of civilian actors has a comparative advantage in addressing many of post-conflict reconstruction’s wide range of needs. Non-governmental organizations, the private sector, international organizations, multilateral development banks, and civilian agencies of multiple donor governments all have a crucial role to play in addressing governance and participation, justice and reconciliation, and economic and social needs. Some of these groups even have an important role to play on security issues.

The real challenge, therefore, is three-fold: first, we must identify the key response capabilities needed by the United States in the context of international operations; second, we must weave together the many existing actors and capabilities into a coherent response capacity within the United States, and integrate them into international capacities; and third, we must identify and fill top priority gaps in our capabilities.

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction project has conducted extensive research on the needs and key gaps in each of the four substantive pillars of post-conflict reconstruction: security; justice and reconciliation; economic and social well-being; and governance and participation. In addition, the project has reviewed needs and priority gaps in four crucial areas that are “enablers” for creating a coherent and effective response capacity: strategy and planning; implementation infrastructure; training and education; and funding. We offer concrete recommendations in each of these eight areas.

Strategy and Planning

Given the sheer complexity of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, developing a clear strategic plan of action at the outset is critical to success. Such a plan should articulate the U.S. interests at stake, define U.S. objectives for the intervention, and lay out the strategy for achieving these policy objectives and a clear division of labor delineating who is responsible for what aspects of the plan’s implementation. Perhaps even more important than the plan itself is the strategy development and planning process, which allows key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles.

Following the disaster in Somalia in 1993, the Clinton administration produced a first-ever interagency political-military plan for an intervention in Haiti. The relative success of this process led in May 1997 to promulgation of Presidential Decision Directive 56 on Managing Complex Contingency Operations (PDD-56), which called for: establishing an interagency Executive Committee to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations; developing a political-military plan; rehearsing or reviewing the plan’s main elements prior to execution; conducting an after-action review of each operation; and conducting interagency training to support this process. Although PDD-56 was never fully implemented, it did produce a number of innovations in use today.

After coming into office, the Bush administration’s National Security Council staff drafted a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) which built on PDD-56, but which is broader in scope in that it provides guidance on providing warning, advanced planning, prevention, and response options for complex contingency operations. Unfortunately, this NSPD has yet to be signed by the President, and the administration has pursued an ad hoc response in Afghanistan that displays weaknesses that could have been corrected based on lessons learned from experience over the last decade.

RECOMMENDATION

1. Replace the current ad hoc USG strategy and planning process for addressing post-conflict reconstruction situations with a standing comprehensive interagency process.

- The President should sign and fully implement the draft National Security Presidential Directive on complex contingencies (NSPD-XX) that has been written by his NSC staff, and develop a companion NSPD specifically designed to organize U.S. government participation in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
- The National Security Advisor should designate and appropriately resource a directorate at the NSC to be in charge of interagency strategy development and planning for post-conflict reconstruction operations.

Implementation Infrastructure

Even if a perfect strategy and accompanying set of plans is designed in Washington, the United States cannot succeed unless it has the appropriate mechanisms to implement them. Currently the

U.S. government has a number of implementing agencies that perform key tasks in post-conflict environments. However, there are three key gaps when it comes to implementation: lack of civilian leadership in the field that can ensure operational coherence; lack of a mechanism to rapidly mobilize existing civilian human resources inside and outside the U.S. government; and inadequate development and use of mechanisms for coordinating civilian and military efforts in the field.

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. *Establish new Director of Reconstruction posts to lead U.S. post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the field.*

- The President should work with Congress to create a new authority for “Director of Reconstruction” (DR) posts, responsible for directing U.S. efforts in the field in specific countries in which the United States has intervened. The President would appoint said Directors of Reconstruction when the circumstances in a given country or region require it. Unlike traditional special envoys who negotiate or shepherd political agreements, these DRs would be responsible for implementing large, multidisciplinary U.S. government programs after an agreement has been reached.
- The National Security Advisor should chair an interagency process to determine the criteria to be used for selecting Directors of Reconstruction. These should include extensive operational experience, with exposure to various agencies of the U.S. government.
- The National Security Advisor should task the Secretary of Defense and the USAID Administrator to negotiate memoranda of understanding with the Secretary of State (in whose Department the support structure for the DRs will be housed) for operationalizing stand-by support for DRs needs.
- The Secretary of State should create a core support unit within the State Department to support all DRs (and Special Envoys prior to the reconstruction phase).

3. *Create a robust civilian rapid response capacity modeled on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that could mobilize U.S. experts from federal, state and local levels as well as from the private and non-profit sectors.*

- The President should create a quasi-autonomous FEMA-like International Emergency Management Office (IEMO) within USAID to support Directors of Reconstruction in the field. Such an office would provide the Directors with immediate access to U.S. government capacity and the pre-agreed means to call upon those agencies that could help in the rebuilding process. This office would build and maintain “on-call” lists of post-conflict reconstruction experts as well as provide support for mobilizing these experts whether they are inside or outside the federal government. These should include judicial specialists, police, penal officers, planners, human rights monitors, settlement negotiators, constitution writers, former Peace Corps volunteers, and related on-call civilians in critical early response areas.

4. *Refine and standardize the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) guidelines, building on successful experiences with Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CIMIC) operations and in the Joint Forces Command series of experiments. Standardize and institutionalize support for such centers both when U.S. forces run a military operation and when other friendly forces do so.*

- The Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State, along with representatives of USAID and the NGO sector, should further hone and institutionalize a JIACG model. These centers should be the central node for information sharing and operational coordination. They should be located “outside the wire” of a military

compound, should be subject to the paramount civilian leadership in theater (a Director of Reconstruction, a Special Representative of the Secretary General, or High Rep), and should have immediate access to the force commander, military logistics, security support and consultations on operational planning and execution. Technology may facilitate a “virtual” teaming concept, which eliminates or reduces the need for physical co-location and associated impact on some actors.

Security

Post-conflict situations, almost by definition, have at their core a security vacuum that is often the proximate cause for external intervention. Indigenous security institutions are either unable to provide security or are operating outside generally accepted norms. Security, which encompasses the provision of collective and individual security to the citizenry and to the assistors, is the foundation on which progress in the other issue areas rests. Refugees and internally displaced persons will wait until they feel safe to go home; former combatants will wait until they feel safe to lay down their arms and reintegrate into civilian life or a legitimate, restructured military organization; farmers and merchants will wait until they feel that fields, roads, and markets are safe before engaging in food production and business activity; and parents will wait until they feel safe to send their children to school, tend to their families, and seek economic opportunities.

“Security” addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions. Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security to the citizenry and to the assistors. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of citizens from immediate and large-scale violence and restoring the state’s ability to maintain territorial integrity. The security situation also calls for diverse capabilities – including border patrol; customs support; weapons collection; large-scale (belligerent groups) and targeted (indicted persons) apprehension conducted in coordination with police; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) – that do not fall directly within the purview of a military force focused on high-intensity conventional combat.

As conditions change, the overall security situation no longer warrants the large presence of military forces prepared to engage in high-intensity combat with belligerents. This, however, often occurs well before legitimate indigenous security institutions are organized, trained, and equipped to assume local security responsibilities. The strains within the intervening military forces as they adapt their roles and force levels to the changing security situation, coupled with the inability of the indigenous security forces to assume increased responsibility, can create a security gap.

A second major gap in U.S. and international capabilities is in the area of demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating combatants—the DDR process. Dealing with combatants, whether they are organized in formal national security forces, paramilitary units, or private militias, is one of the most pressing and recurring challenges of any post-conflict situation. Failure to respond to this problem adequately and to promote combatants’ incorporation into a legitimate security organization, or more frequently a return to civilian life, leads to long-term difficulties across all areas of reconstruction. DDR is not a clean three-step process, and a viable strategy must dismantle command and control structures; relocate soldiers to communities; limit the circulation and individual possession of weapons and small arms; and provide employment, educational opportunities, and community reintegration programs. While the U.S. government and various international organizations have recognized that DDR is key to securing peace, in case after case a weak DDR process is responsible for reversals by the peace process. This is true, at least in part, because both at the international level and within the U.S. government no single organization or agency “owns” the problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. *The United States government should take the lead in creating and supporting a multi-national Integrated Security Support Component (ISSC), providing units specially organized, equipped, trained, and manned to execute post-conflict security tasks.*

- The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should present to the North Atlantic Council a proposal for an Integrated Security Support Component that would structure, train and equip selected units within the NATO Response Force for execution of security tasks in a post-conflict reconstruction environment. This proposal would complement and enhance the Bush Administration's current proposal to NATO for a 20,000-25,000 person Response Force with rapidly deployable "high end" war-fighting capabilities. This ISSC should also be designed to complement and reinforce European efforts to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).
- To demonstrate U.S. leadership and commitment, Congress should enact legislation establishing and funding a reserve unit of between 1000 and 1500 personnel, (potentially with dual authorities modeled on the US Coast Guard's role with the Department of Transportation and the Department of Defense). This unit should be earmarked for the ISSC and capable of integrated operations with Multinational Special Units of the type employed in the Balkans and capable of executing security tasks such as control of belligerent groups, crowd control, apprehension of targeted persons and groups, and support to police investigations and anti-corruption tasks. The legislation should direct the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, and Secretary of the Treasury, under DoS lead, to establish the organization, equipment, training, personnel, and employment parameters for this unit.

6. *In order to ensure a more holistic and effective response to the problems of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the United States should designate a lead agency to coordinate and execute DDR efforts.*

- The President should designate USAID the lead agency for DDR affairs, and the Director of OMB, working with the Congress, should move budget and oversight responsibility from various agencies to reflect this shift. The President should instruct USAID and DoD to sign a memorandum of understanding that would enumerate the responsibilities that would be assigned to DoD with respect to disarming personnel and units, as well as decommissioning and controlling weapons in those cases where the U.S. has deployed military personnel to the theater in question.
- The USAID Administrator should create a DDR unit within USAID that would possess lead responsibility for developing a coherent strategy for DDR, coordinating it, and managing it financially. The office would include staff from all the relevant agencies – including State and DoD – in order to strengthen planning capacity and the ability to respond to urgent DDR needs.

Justice and Reconciliation

As violent conflict ends, societies often confront a lack of the mechanisms and institutions for upholding the rule of law and dealing with past abuses—processes that are crucial to rebuilding. Although efforts to achieve justice and reconciliation can differ greatly in nature, they both establish processes to address grievances, both past and present, in hope of forging a more peaceful future. If such grievances are not addressed, the explosion of lawlessness, corruption, and crime that often

accompany post-conflict vacuums can undermine all gains that international assistance makes. Assistance to establish justice must, therefore, be timely in order to be effective.

Unfortunately, the international community and the United States have performed poorly in this area, indeed failed, in many interventions. One of the key reasons is that there is a shortage of qualified international civilian police available for short-notice deployments to exercise temporary executive police authority in some cases and to train and monitor indigenous police forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. *Design and organize a civilian reserve police system to support both national homeland security needs and post-conflict reconstruction.* Units from such a volunteer force could be mobilized and deployed abroad on order of the President to serve U.S. national interests in post-conflict reconstruction operations. These individuals would have rights and protections similar to military reserve forces.

- The President should establish a Task Force of federal, state and local police representatives to design a police reserve system.
- The Congress should authorize the creation of such a reserve based on the Task Force's recommendations.

8. *Expand the U.S. government's legal authority and capacity to train indigenous police forces.*

- The Congress should replace Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, with new legislation outlining available authorities. Until then, U.S. agency lawyers should better utilize the often ignored 1996 "post-conflict waiver" in Section 660 to allow U.S. assistance to be used for training indigenous police. The replacement act should maintain appropriate conditions on funding to protect human rights objectives and ensure accountability, while rationalizing and consolidating the numerous amendments and simplifying the mechanisms for applying resources to legitimate requirements.
- The President should move the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) from the Department of Justice to the Department of State's INL Bureau to enable more effective integration of U.S. support for training of indigenous police forces and support for community policing. Community policing programs should be developed in close coordination with USAID, and the Department of Justice should remain involved in helping to identify and recruit U.S. national expertise in justice administration and policing. The President should request, and the Congress should fund, a robust increase in funding for police training.

Social and Economic Well-being

It is no coincidence that states emerging from conflict are also among the world's poorest. Fifteen of the world's twenty poorest countries have experienced internal conflicts in the last 15 years.⁷ The spill-over of violence, arms, and refugees often destabilizes neighboring states. Any visitor to these war-torn states recognizes that without economic hope there can never be peace. But reconstruction creates the competing demands of securing a politically sustainable peace and economic stabilization. Although poverty is seldom a direct cause of violence or civil war, it is often a symptom of the decline of a state's capacity to protect and provide for its citizens.

Despite more than a decade of experience in post-conflict reconstruction, the US government has yet to form a coherent vision of dealing with these tasks. It lacks a deliberate program for linking

immediate post-conflict needs with medium and long-term development. Until recently, socio-economic tasks were considered part of long-term development assistance programs that could only begin once peace was at hand. We now know that development can and should take place even when parts of a nation are at war. Research also shows that at the end of conflict, a small window of opportunity exists to restore economic hope and social well-being.

Among the most challenging issues in post-conflict reconstruction is how to re-establish people's livelihoods. Unfortunately, a gap exists in the U.S. government's ability to address livelihood creation for crucial parts of the affected population in a cohesive and effective manner. Standard types of economic stimulus programming are a beginning, but may be less effective if other types of programming are not also in place. For example, creating an agriculture restoration program will not be as useful as it should when there is no concurrent effort to repair roads that allows producers get their crops to market. The types of issues encompassed under this general "livelihood creation" rubric, include any number of situation-specific programs that address unemployed youth, micro finance programs, food for work or food for school, restoration of basic infrastructure, and specifically focus on the role of women in livelihood creation after war. Employment and training for demobilized soldiers also falls into this basket of immediate concern in light of what recent research supports on the role of employed young men as a high risk factor in returning to war. Currently USAID is the principal U.S. government agency tasked with the job of restoring livelihood both in the immediate post-conflict recovery period and in long-term development, yet their programs are neither consistent nor coordinated in a sensibly sequenced way, at least in part because of very different funding mechanisms.

A second gap in the economic and social arena is in addressing the central role that natural resources often play in fueling violence. Civil wars have created great opportunities for profits through underground economies that are often not available during peace. Weakened states, no longer able to manage economic policies and the institutions that govern them, are targets for rent-seeking groups. Criminals engaged in illicit economic transactions pay no taxes, and armed groups that can exact cash or resources through extralegal activities act as spoilers to peaceful resolution of conflict. In countries where a natural resource is a primary export commodity (where export income accounts for more than 25 percent of GDP), the chances of these resources becoming a means to fuel instability and conflict are greatly increased. In spite of the evidence that reducing the profits of war is one way to restore stability, the US government has yet to develop a coherent strategy that addresses this issue.

A third gap in U.S. government capacity in the economic and social area is in constructively engaging the diaspora of a country in the rebuilding process. Citizens of affected nations who reside in the United States are often among the most important contributors to the overall process of rebuilding, both in terms of monetary remittances and in terms of expertise willing to return home. Through a variety of legal, but unregulated means, they provide some of the most basic support to families left behind. Since September 11, the U.S. government has focused on money transfers intended for nefarious purposes. Indeed, the United States needs to find a way to block money transfers intended for illicit armed groups or in contravention of sanctions, even as it ensures that legitimate money transfers continue to be able to reach family members. In addition, the U.S. needs to find a way to facilitate the return of those foreign nationals or permanent residents who desire to go home temporarily to help rebuild their home country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. Develop a coherent strategy and accompanying capability to create livelihoods in immediate post-conflict environments.

- The USAID Administrator should establish a specific office for livelihood creation within the new Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Congress should support this with appropriate long-term flexible funding. This office would incorporate technical specialists from the agency's office of micro-credit, Food for Peace, and other offices that support both NGOs and indigenous groups to create a strategy for livelihood creation with adequate funding to address the broad range of needs that this type of effort entails.

10. Create a mechanism for ensuring that natural resources are tapped to rebuild the country.

- The Secretary of the Treasury should work with the World Bank to create a public-private trust fund program, as part of a natural resources revenue strategy. This trust fund would capture income from international extractive industries operating in post-conflict states so that it could be used to supplement development programs, such as meeting recurrent costs for essential services and government administration.

11. Create a strategy and mechanisms for tapping into the human and financial resources of the diaspora of the country in question.

- The Immigration and Naturalization service should review its immigration rules for U.S. permanent residents who would like to participate in "return of talent" programs to countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction. A simple regulatory fix could provide waivers for permanent residents to return home for extended stays by creating a release from their necessary time-in-class requirements for U.S. citizenship. Lists of willing participants could be centralized in an electronic database.
- The Department of the Treasury should set up a regulatory mechanism to oversee the international distribution network for remittances. Such an office would provide citizens of foreign countries with a more reliable and secure means of receiving funds from accredited agencies while also preventing money from going into the hands of illegal organizations from the outset.

Governance and Participation

In many cases after a conflict, a country has neither a legitimate government in place nor agreement on how to arrive at a process to determine what constitutes a legitimate government. Even if a government is in place and many of the country's citizens deem it legitimate, war and the attendant chaos often render its ability to deliver services to the population virtually nonexistent. At the same time, many citizens are hesitant to become overly involved in the political rebuilding process, having been conditioned by wartime realities to defer to individuals who exercised authority through the barrel of a gun.

Ultimately, it is the extent to which a coherent, legitimate government exists – or can be created – that determines the success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction. Having such a government is key to providing essential security, justice, economic, and social functions and to channeling the will, energies, and resources of both the indigenous population and the international community. Because little in the way of legitimate, capable government often exists in the wake of conflict, however, the international community must find ways to support this indigenous self-governing capability. The effort involves at least three sets of activities: (1) helping to support a process for constituting a legitimate government; (2) enhancing the government's capacities; and (3) helping to ensure broad participation in the government and the reconstruction process. All these steps are crucial to the political process of maintaining peace by identifying and progressively isolating potential spoilers and their independent bases of power.

The international community's existing instruments for undertaking activities to enhance governance and citizens' participation, however, are poorly adapted to the special requirements of post-conflict environments. U.S. and international programs to promote democracy have grown and become increasingly sophisticated over the last decade, but they have continued to be oriented to transitions from formerly communist or authoritarian regimes with relatively greater institutional capacity (as in Latin America).

All too often, governance efforts in post-conflict settings have boiled down to supporting formal election processes (allowing the international community to leave after a legitimate government has been elected), complemented by inchoate attempts to build civil society by funding a wide range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). From Cambodia to Angola to Haiti, this minimalist approach to governance as an exit strategy has led to crucial reversals of peace processes, costing thousands of additional lives and wasting millions of international dollars, major effort, and credibility. Establishing a comprehensive approach to governance and participation, one that addresses the full range of institutions and tasks and presupposes support that will last beyond the first election, is necessary.

In the wake of conflict, states, if they exist at all, tend to have very little ability to deliver goods of any kind to the bulk of their population. And yet, legitimacy in the eyes of citizens of fragile, transitional states often has as much to do with ending the violence and delivering concrete goods as it does with the formalities of democratic process. Any new government must earn the support of its people – enabling it to marginalize spoilers and supplant parallel power structures – by building sufficient state capacity to begin delivering basic security, justice, economic, social, and political goods to the population. Although security and justice are essential for establishing fundamental order, they are not sufficient. The state's legitimacy and effectiveness also depend on its ability to provide a simple set of rules and structures that help to organize basic political, economic, and social life. No institution is more central to providing this structure than plain civil administration at the district, provincial, and national levels.

U.S. democracy and governance programs have four principal objectives: (1) to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights; (2) to develop more genuine and competitive political processes; (3) to foster the development of a politically active civil society; and (4) to promote more transparent and accountable government institutions.⁸ Even though these goals are laudable, consideration of the more fundamental question facing post-conflict societies – building basic state capacity to deliver essential public goods – is largely absent. Programs intending to strengthen local government exist, but they are quite limited and are not complemented by any similar focus on enhancing the capabilities of the executive branch of central government.

The other major players in this arena – the multilateral development banks – do have programs dealing with civil administration; these tend to concentrate on reforming public administration, however, with a focus on cutting bloated bureaucracies to save on government costs. UNDP is engaged in civil administration capacity building, but cannot bear this burden alone.

RECOMMENDATION

12. Create a mechanism for fielding U.S. civil administration experts, both through contracting and through seconding federal government employees, and recruiting and paying state and local officials. The United States should also build a mechanism for assembling interagency, interdisciplinary teams that specialize in building civil administration capacity.

- The USAID Administrator should establish and the Congress should support a line item for these activities, and USAID should develop a core of specialists both within and outside the

government to lead the U.S. government's civil administration efforts. The USAID civil administration unit should also work with other donor governments whose civil administration systems and capacities may be different than our own. In some cases, working with another government whose system is more like the one of the country in question may be more productive.

- The Secretary of the Treasury and the U.S. executive director to the World Bank should urge the Bank to enhance the capacity-building elements of its civil service reform programs and to develop a strategy for reforming tax systems and building them from scratch in post-conflict countries.

Training and Education

Training and education are critical to the success of a post-conflict reconstruction operation in two very different ways: they can significantly enhance the performance of the outsiders providing assistance, and they can help develop indigenous human resources and capacity in areas central to enabling the society's transition to durable peace and stability.

To date, the training of U.S. government personnel to assist in post-conflict operations has been uneven, at best. Some organizations – like AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the National Defense University, the Naval Post Graduate School, and the National and individual service war colleges – have developed excellent training programs for personnel being sent into the field. Others, however, routinely deploy people to reconstruction operations with little or no specialized training for the post-conflict environment. Even when U.S. personnel receive solid training in their particular task or skill area, they rarely have an opportunity to train with the representatives of the other U.S. agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the international actors with whom they will have to work in the field. The same is true at the strategic or headquarters level.

In addition, training and education programs for indigenous organizations and individuals can be a vital form of assistance in helping a post-conflict society transition to sustainable peace. The primary objectives of such programs are to develop the human resources and build the institutional capacities of the host country. Such efforts are essential in all four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction: security, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, and social and economic well-being. While the United States and the international community have developed particularly strong programs in areas such as training indigenous military and police forces, there are a number of critical areas in which effective training and education programs are sorely lacking.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. The administration, working with Congress, should establish a U.S. Training Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations.

- The U.S. Training Center would have five key missions: 1) training key interagency personnel in assessment, strategy development, planning and coordination for post-conflict reconstruction; 2) developing and certifying a cadre of post-conflict reconstruction experts who could be called to participate in future operations at both the headquarters and field levels; 3) providing pre-deployment training to interagency personnel tapped for specific operations; 4) developing a cadre of rapidly deployable training packages for use in the field; and, 5) conducting after action reviews of real-world operations to capture lessons learned, best practices and tools and designing mechanisms to feed them back into training and

education programs. The President should task a study to analyze options for housing the center at an existing facility, creating a new one, or contracting out pieces such as pre-deployment training to a private, or quasi-governmental entity such as the U.S. Institute of Peace. It would need to provide training for both civilian and military personnel, and would need to work closely with existing training entities in the Departments of Defense and State as well as other U.S. government agencies to promote maximum “jointness.”

14. Design and develop rapidly deployable training assistance programs for post-conflict societies in each of the following key areas: civilian control of the military (DoD civilian lead); training of legal, judicial, penal and human rights personnel (USAID lead); training of local entrepreneurs (Treasury lead); training of civil servants and administrators (OPM lead); and anti-corruption measures (Treasury lead). In addition, fund increased enrollment of students from post-conflict societies in existing U.S. post-conflict reconstruction training and education programs.

15. Increase funding support for the best of existing U.S. PCR training and education programs, including those offered by the National Defense University, the Naval Post-Graduate School, and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Funding

In the wake of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration, and indeed the American people, have recognized the need to adequately support a broad range of international programs to address the threatening new environment Americans face. As the President has said, “We have a great opportunity to extend a just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the world with hope of a better day...In our development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.”⁹ Delivering on this inclusive vision costs money. And as Secretary Colin Powell has noted: “we cannot do any of this – we cannot conduct an effective foreign policy or fight terrorism – without the necessary resources.”¹⁰

And yet even though there is a large public constituency that supports increasing foreign aid,¹¹ the challenge is not only, or even principally, a question of increasing resources to foreign affairs budgets. It is even more about *how* we fund foreign affairs.

Both the previous Bush and Clinton administrations, to varying degrees, attempted to substantially rework the Cold War relic Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, but they met with little success. The current President Bush has also begun the process of re-evaluating and retooling our foreign affairs funding machinery, this time by proposing an important initiative with respect to development funding. In March, the President proposed the creation of a new Millennium Challenge Account that will increase U.S. core development assistance by 50 percent over the next three years, resulting in a \$5 billion annual increase over current levels.¹²

While the proposal for a Millennium Challenge Account promises to help introduce an important element of competition into development assistance, it is unlikely to address the needs of the conflict ridden failed states cited by the president. The problem is that these same weak and failed states emerging from war have myriad problems and little or no institutional capacity that might enable them to meet the prerequisite benchmark criteria for receiving funding.

Just as the newly proposed Millennium Challenge Account is no magic bullet for the problems of failed states, nor are current U.S. funding mechanisms for post-conflict reconstruction up to the task.

They lack coherence, speed, balance among accounts, flexibility, and an effective ability to do contracting and procurement. An additional range of gaps exists as well. In the security realm disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts (DDR) are underfunded, as is short-term support for non-American troops or police who might be deployed in lieu of American troops or police (as with Turkey's deployment in Afghanistan). In the area of justice and reconciliation, little money is available to field an emergency justice package, deploy human rights monitors, or support reconciliation efforts at the national or local level. In the economic and social arena, little fast and flexible funding is available to jumpstart economies, provide temporary employment, reverse brain drain, or address pressing social needs. In the area of governance and participation, no money is available to support national "constituting processes" (such as the *loya jirga* in Afghanistan) and civil administration needs (including funding recurrent costs during the transition period).

When the President decides that a mission is in the interests of the United States, he must have the ability to bring the full force of wide-ranging U.S. capabilities to bear on the situation in a timely manner, while at the same time enabling U.S. programs to respond to needs as they evolve on the ground. Unfortunately, no such mechanism currently exists.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. *The President and Congress should work together to craft legislation that would create a new Marshall Security Development Account (MSDA) that would be structured along the lines of the highly successful Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account. The MSDA would not meet all post-conflict reconstruction needs itself, but instead would round out the existing account structure by addressing immediate post-conflict needs that are not authorized for in existing emergency accounts (surge capacity), by supplying bridge money between current emergency funds and long-term development funds (both U.S. and international), and by providing for necessary activities that are not presently covered in existent account.*

- The Office of Management and Budget, along with the National Security Council, should co-chair an interagency process to review all existing accounts that provide funding in post-conflict reconstruction related areas. This process should identify those functions and those monies that should be taken from existing accounts to provide a base funding level. In addition, this process should cost out the likely needs for activities not funded by current existing accounts, such as in the area of building civil administration capacity. Based on the outcome of that study, the Administration should submit a proposal to the Congress for the new account, the required funding level, and recommendations on the sources of financing it. Notionally, this account will probably need to have between \$350 and \$450 million available annually.¹³

17. *The U.S. government should fund effective existing accounts at levels that would allow the U.S. government to meet pressing reconstruction needs.*

- OMB should do a complete review of existing post-conflict related accounts and submit an enhanced request to Congress. The Congress should in turn review and act expeditiously upon requests for additional funding. The overtaxed accounts that deserve particular attention include: Transition Initiatives (TI); International Disaster Assistance (IDA); Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA); and Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR).¹⁴

The Road Ahead

How do we bring to life the post conflict reconstruction changes that have been described in this report? How do we make the United States a more constructive partner internationally? How do we best leverage U.S. capacity to improve international action? The effectiveness of our answers should be the measure of our Commission's success.

It is our belief that there are follow-on activities that will invigorate our recommendations.

First, we must educate the public and policymakers about the value of and need for Congressional and administration commitment and action. Events conspire to make the case, but attention drifts. Of the policy priorities highlighted in the final report, some will require considerable outreach efforts to government officials before their value is realized.

In addition to planned interaction with Congress and the administration, we believe that engaging the broader American public is critical to growing a sense of commitment to post conflict reconstruction. The expanding consensus among policy elites is no guarantee that desired changes will gather the necessary momentum to produce results.

Securing the passage of proposed legislation and institutionalizing best practices will be the first tests.

Second, we must expand the reach of the recommendations into the international community. Throughout the past decade, the United States has played a central role in resolving conflicts around the world, though never alone. In every case where the U.S. has intervened militarily, it has partnered with other countries, been part of a coalition or worked from within an international alliance or organization. This approach has increased the likelihood of public support at home and abroad and has brought fresh resources and skills to these complex challenges.

As the United States makes the changes that are recommended in this report, it will become a better and more successful international partner in post conflict reconstruction. At the same time, a number of other countries and multilateral institutions have proven their commitment. Yet much remains to be done.

Numerous studies have highlighted the shortcomings of international efforts in post-conflict reconstruction. The next phase is to capture the priority lessons of our work and other reports in order to mobilize and implement change. Some will address the way we go about our work, from strategic focus and funding to leadership selection. Other changes will bring forth challenges that are not being met, such as near-term security and rule of law, or promising new approaches such as decentralization and the development of native resources for maximum local benefit.

Implementing best practices in more upcoming situations will be one measure of progress. In some cases, applying the post-conflict reconstruction framework to an imminent post conflict operation through an "action strategy" will be desirable. In others, taking a particularly difficult issue, such as establishing public safety, and finding a practical result will be the desired achievement.

The past decade has confirmed the centrality of the post-conflict period to achieving a more peaceful world. We know that this difficult work can be done better. If the recommendations that have been made are followed, a worthy start will result.

Notes

¹ For a more in-depth discussion of failed states, see Gordon R. Sullivan and John J. Hamre, "Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2002.

² Jean-Paul Azam, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, "International Policies on Civil Conflict: an Economic Perspective," December 14, 2001, p. 2, cited at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/azam_coll_hoe.pdf (accessed July 3, 2002).

³ If reconstruction is not effective, failed states often slide back into patterns of instability which seep across borders and drag down fragile regions. In recent years, this dynamic has been all too evident from West and Central Africa, to Central and South Asia, to Southeastern Europe.

⁴ UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, speech to the UN General Assembly, New York, February 2002.

⁵ For a full listing of tasks in these four areas, please see the "Post-conflict Reconstruction Task Framework," AUSA and CSIS, at www.pcrproject.org.

⁶ Condoleezza Rice, "Foundation for a Nation," *Washington Post*, October 29, 2001, p. A17.

⁷ There are 78 countries considered to be the poorest in the world, representing about 2.4 billion people. Thus, approximately one-fourth of this group has also been conflict-ridden since the end of the Cold War. The World Bank. *Post Conflict Reconstruction: the Role of the World Bank*, Washington, D.C. 1998, p.2.

⁸ USAID, "Program, Performance and Prospects," *Budget Justification FY 2002*, http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/prog_pref2002.html (accessed July 10, 2002) (Democracy and Governance section).

⁹ Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy. West Point, New York, 1 June 2002.

¹⁰ Testimony of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing. Washington, DC. April 24, 2002.

¹¹ According to a recent survey conducted by The Pew Research Center for The People and The Press, in conjunction with the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Herald Tribune, 53% of Americans approve of an increase in the U.S. foreign aid budget. See "Bush Ratings Improve But He's Still Seen as Unilateralist: Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues," The Pew Research Center for The People and The Press, Council on Foreign Relations, and International Herald Tribune, April 17, 2002.

¹² Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. "Fact Sheet: A new compact for development," 22 March 2002.

¹³ The MSDA monies can be thought of in two parts. The first is a "surge capacity" that covers immediate, though not all emergency humanitarian, unanticipated costs that cannot be taken from existing, already disbursed accounts and before supplemental appropriations are available. A notional estimate of need in this area is between \$150-200 million annually. The second batch of monies are those to cover U.S. contributions to necessary tasks of post-conflict reconstruction that are not fully authorized for in existing accounts, the largest of these tasks include reintegration of ex-combatants (and DDR more generally), funding of recurrent civil administration expenditures, and policing. A preliminary estimate of U.S. contributions (at 25% of total cost) for these three areas is \$17 million, \$70 million, and \$135 million, respectively, per year. These figures assume 1-2 contingencies per year and are drawn from a baseline established in recent post-conflict operations. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Critical Factors in Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration," February 2002.; Kees Kingma. "Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-war Transition Countries," Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn, 2001.); United Nations Development Program. "Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghan People 2002," January 2002.; Ministry of Planning and Finance, East Timor Public Administration. "The Democratic Republic of East Timor Combined Sources Budget 2002-2003," June 2002).

¹⁴ Initial Post-Conflict Reconstruction project staff estimates additional funding needs of approximately \$320 million annually, broken out as follows: \$50 million for Transition Initiatives (TI); \$90 million for International Disaster Assistance (IDA); \$60 million for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); \$35 million for Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA); \$50 million for Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). For details on these accounts and the basis for these increases, see Johanna Mendelson-Forman and Robert Orr, "Funding Post-Conflict Reconstruction" at www.pcrproject.org.

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



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