

# NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY: KEEPING THE CALM



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ROLE OF  AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

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# **Northeast Asian Regional Security: Keeping the Calm**

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## FOREWORD

The Korean Peninsula remains one of the world's few potential theaters for a conventional interstate conflict. Even as North-South rapprochement has gone forward fitfully, American forces have remained ready to defeat a determined enemy and defend a valued ally. But if we are indeed witnessing the pre-unification period in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to articulate a new set of roles and missions to support positive change in the regional security balance, and to prepare for potentially destabilizing events in the reconciliation/reunification process. The U.S. Army has arguably maintained the most specific focus on the peninsula and the Demilitarized Zone, and has maintained that focus with single-minded determination. Alterations in the world situation and the potential for real movement in Northeast Asian security portend an environment that requires the Army and the entire defense establishment to review and revise regional plans and postures.

Although U.S. military plans encompass the eventuality of fielding a prominent, capable force in nearly every theater worldwide, dedicating forces to one theater entails risk management in another. According to a former regional commander in chief from another theater, America needed to be thankful for every day that passed without conflict on the Korean peninsula in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States. Risks persist in Northeast Asia, even while forces and energies are devoted elsewhere. The importance to the United States of the peninsula will not diminish—the DPRK possesses significant military capability, and the prospects for significant violence and long term involvement in the recovery of a unified Korean peninsula are underscored by the campaign against terrorism. We simply cannot afford to let the reunification process destabilize the region, and we will not be able to stand idly by if reunification swamps the Republic of Korea (ROK), or the rapid collapse of the DPRK creates a well-armed vacuum state. Imagine politically porous Afghanistan in possession of the kind of military force that the DPRK now possesses.

Korean reconciliation or reunification, should it occur as anticipated, will free U.S. and Republic of Korea forces from the job of manning the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on a continuous basis, but will assuredly create additional tasks for our forces. Such an historic progression and conclusion will reverberate throughout the region. America has a role in helping Northeast Asia develop a stable security regime in its own right, economically, politically, and militarily. The performance of this role will be key for the U.S. as a vital component of its global security objectives. American pres-

ence will remain central to regional stability, and the U.S. military needs to keep a consistent but adaptive presence in order to support progress and stable security arrangements.

A gradual approach to Korean reunification must be accompanied by a greater emphasis on regional security—one that considers the security needs of China, Russia and Japan. Each of these regional powers possesses—and has articulated—a set of minimum security criteria that, from their perspective, must be met in order for the halting reunification process to proceed. What hurdles will need to be overcome in order for these nations to support or at least acquiesce in Korean reunification? How can the United States posture forces to enable negotiations, reassure allies and potential adversaries, and transition to an end result that still protects our interests? Military initiatives may range from encouraging cooperative multilateral security relations to potentially performing post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian relief, or integration support tasks. As the Koreas come together, adjustments to posture are unavoidable for all the nations in the region. The United States must adapt during the process and after its culmination.

There is an argument that the services conceptualize security in the region in different ways. The Navy possesses the widest regional approach. The Air Force, while performing a vital role in the prevention of, and, if necessary, conduct of warfare on the peninsula, nevertheless retains an important regional component to its basing and deployments. The Army in Northeast Asia arguably has the greatest ground to cover in transition from a peninsular to a more regional focus. This study assists in the transition of this conceptual focus — analysis of the changes in the region and the North-South relationship and security needs will inform the Executive Branch and Congress of the possible alterations to the ways in which the United States can adapt and improve its security contributions to stability in Northeast Asia. This study, conducted by two Army officers with a breadth of perspective and depth of understanding of the region, explains much, provokes debate, and contributes to the analysis of an ever changing, dangerous world.

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## **NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY: KEEPING THE CALM**

[I]f American troops were to leave the rim of Asia, an entirely new and, above all, political situation would arise all over the continent. Were this to happen, even a positive evolution on the Korean peninsula could lead to a quest for autonomous defense policies in Seoul and Tokyo and to a growth of nationalism in Japan, China and Korea.<sup>1</sup>

—*Dr. Henry Kissinger*

If you were to ask any American soldier serving in the Republic of Korea (ROK) why U.S. forces are stationed in South Korea, the soldier's response would be simple and straightforward: American forces are in South Korea to deter North Korean aggression. It is the U.S. military commitment that keeps the peace on the Korean peninsula. If you were to ask the average South Korean the same question about U.S. forces in South Korea, the answer would not be much different. Further, if you asked an American citizen who was aware of the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula, the response would be much the same. However, if the tension on the peninsula were to dissipate and normalization of relations (NOR) between the two Koreas ensued, public opinion in the United States and the ROK would agree that the U.S. military would no longer be necessary and should be withdrawn or significantly reduced. The U.S. military presence in Korea serves to guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula, but that is just one facet of America's military role in Northeast Asia. The region is a potential flashpoint among four of the world's great powers: the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. Possible rapprochement on the Korean peninsula could rekindle old animosities. Therefore, the question of the future of American military presence in Northeast Asia is one of the most critical questions facing American foreign policymakers today.

This paper presents a strategic picture of the current political situation in Northeast Asia in light of the recent reconciliation efforts made between the two Koreas, and it examines the rationale for the continued presence of U.S. forces in the region. The potential for progress first generated by the inter-Korean summit in June 2000 has been fulfilled in fits and starts, influenced by U.S. elections, Bush administration statements, and world events. The issues discussed in this paper support the argument that, in a future environment of reconciliation or even reunification of the two Koreas, the

nations in the region will have security concerns and interests that can be met only in a stable environment predicated on a sizable U.S. military presence in the region.

## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Since the American intervention in the Korean War in July 1950, the United States has served as the guarantor of stability and security on the peninsula. The United States lost over 36,000 service members in the "Forgotten War." There was never a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War, and as such, the 1953 armistice has served to maintain the cease-fire for more than fifty years.

Under the American security umbrella, South Korea has had the opportunity to transform from a ravaged, war-torn country dealing with the dual legacies of Japanese colonialism and fratricidal war into a free-market democracy. For the past fifty years, the mission of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) has been to enforce the armistice and to prevent the reinitiation of hostilities between the two Koreas.

The secondary mission of American forces stationed in Northeast Asia has been to act as a regional stabilizer and balancing force. Currently, the United States maintains approximately 100,000 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific region, most of them in South Korea (37,000) and Japan (47,000).<sup>2</sup> This regional force level is based on an analysis of the present and future strategic environment and on the U.S. military capabilities needed to achieve U.S. foreign and security policy goals. These U.S. forces include the Eighth Army and the Seventh Air Force in Korea, the III Marine Expeditionary Force and the Fifth Air Force in Japan, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet. All are focused and ready.<sup>3</sup> According to former Defense Secretary William Cohen, "Our military presence in Asia serves as an important deterrent to aggression, often lessening the need for a more substantial and costly U.S. response later. Today deterrent capability remains critical in areas such as the Korean Peninsula. A visible U.S. force presence in Asia demonstrates firm determination to defend U.S., allied and friendly interests in this critical region."<sup>4</sup>

American Forces in South Korea fall under the Combined Forces Command (CFC), which was formally established in 1978. Today, the CFC commander, an American four-star general, commands over 600,000 U.S. and Korean soldiers, of which only 37,000 are American.<sup>5</sup> Though the USFK are lethal and combat ready, they play a complementary

role to the ROK army. The ROK military is highly capable and has the primary responsibility for defending South Korea against North Korean aggression. And given the capabilities of the ROK army, the U.S. mission to act as a regional stabilizer has become more critical than the mission to deter North Korean aggression. Beyond their combat power, the USFK represent and serve as a manifestation of American commitment to the defense and security of South Korea. The United States is a full partner with South Korea to ensure security on the peninsula.

### **SOUTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW**

During the past fifty years, South Korea has matured as a democracy. ROK president Kim Dae Jung, who was elected in 1998, is a former political dissident who was imprisoned by the South Korean government for protesting for democratic reform. The election of a president with such a history demonstrates that South Korea is now a full-fledged democratic state.

From an economic standpoint, South Korea has also been a remarkable success. Touted as one of the "Asian Tigers," the South Korean economy enjoyed tremendous growth in the 1970s and 1980s. But like other countries in Asia, South Korea was severely affected by the financial crisis of the mid 1990s. The "Asian Contagion" exposed significant weaknesses in the South Korean economic growth model. These limitations included extremely high debt-to-equity ratios and massive foreign borrowing.<sup>6</sup>

Because of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, the ROK is not in danger of economic collapse. However, the ROK has not yet fully dealt with the structural problems that caused the economic crisis, and signs of economic weakness remain.<sup>7</sup> The recent downturn in U.S. spending on information technology has led to the sharpest decline in Asian exports in twenty years.<sup>8</sup> The ROK's failure to deal with economic reform will continue to retard Korean economic growth. The major Korean conglomerates (*chaebol*) still carry excessive debt, which could precipitate further economic problems in the near future.<sup>9</sup>

In the face of its recent and ongoing economic problems, the ROK's economic growth over the past fifty years has been remarkable. Currently, South Korea enjoys a gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 10 percent and a per-capita GDP of over \$13,000.<sup>10</sup> South Korea's per-capita GDP is thirteen times that of North Korea's GDP and seven times that of India's GDP.<sup>11</sup> Despite its size

(South Korea is only slightly larger than the state of Indiana), South Korea's GDP is ranked the thirteenth largest GDP in the world.<sup>12</sup>

South Korea has achieved this tremendous economic and political progress while maintaining its side of one of the world's most heavily armed borders, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Residents of Seoul are constantly reminded that they live within range of North Korean artillery. The North Korean government has never foresworn reunification of the peninsula through violence, and therefore the ROK army remains ever vigilant to deter any potential North Korean aggression. Because of this clearly defined enemy, the South Korean military has never been viewed as a regional force. The ROK military is postured specifically to combat the North Korean military.

## **NORTH KOREA: AN OVERVIEW**

North Korea, which the United States considers a "state of concern," is arguably the most closed and isolated state in the world today. Its official ideology *Juche* means self-reliance. In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea has proven that it is anything but self-reliant, experiencing negative economic growth every year, except for 1999.<sup>13</sup> With the end of the Cold War, North Korea lost its primary ally and source of support, the Soviet Union. It has also lost the unconditional support of its other long-term ally, China. As a result, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is isolated in the international community.

North Korea has also experienced recurring famine. It is estimated that anywhere between one and three million North Koreans have starved to death in the last five years.<sup>14</sup> North Korea needs international aid to contend with an ongoing food emergency.<sup>15</sup> The DPRK runs an annual food deficit of two million tons.<sup>16</sup>

In the face of these horrifying economic conditions, the North Korean government has demonstrated that its priorities lie in ensuring the survival of the regime, rather than opening the system to outside influences that could improve economic prospects. Despite the country's famine, North Korea is rumored to have purchased \$425 million worth of weapons from Russia<sup>17</sup>

Another serious crisis for North Korea after the Cold War was the death of its Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, in July 1994. Supreme power has transferred from Kim Il Sung to his son, Kim Jong Il, who is commonly referred to as Dear Leader. This transition has given North Korea the dubious honor

of being the world's only dynastic communist state. Although there were significant questions concerning Kim Jong Il's ability to consolidate power in the wake of his father's death, he has apparently done so.

"Kim Jong Il appears to be well protected against a major coup. He has installed the brothers of his sister's husband, Chang Song Taek, in three of the most sensitive positions in the power structure."<sup>18</sup>

While some still question his true level of authority, believing that he has not yet risen to his father's god-like status,<sup>19</sup> Kim Jong Il appears to have established effective control over the government.

Although North Korean rhetoric has softened over the years, Pyongyang has never formally renounced its intention to reunify the peninsula under communism. According to a South Korean Defense White Paper:

"Despite the ROK government's consistent engagement policy toward the North, North Korea, based on its "One Chosun" logic, continues to refuse inter-Korean peaceful, coexistence and pursues the strategy of communizing the South. After forming a united front against the South and stepping up war preparations at home, the North seeks to communize the peninsula by means of a "violent revolution," or "war by using force" when the crucial moment comes. A crucial moment is when a politically and militarily favorable atmosphere is created by social disorder in South Korea, the withdrawal of USFK, etc."<sup>20</sup>

Such threats may seem like nothing more than empty posturing; however, when coupled with the military capabilities of the DPRK, they do give prudent observers pause. Though not technologically sophisticated, North Korea's army is the fifth largest in the world and maintains a constant war footing along the DMZ. North Korea has also been responsible for numerous attempts at aggression and infiltration since the armistice was signed.

In addition to its conventional capabilities, North Korea has an arsenal of biological and chemical weapons. There is also the strong possibility that North Korea has secretly developed nuclear capabilities, or is on the verge of doing so. These capabilities have altered the North Korean threat. Though it is no longer possible for North Korea to invade the South successfully, its missile technology and potential nuclear capabilities afford it military leverage nonetheless.

Over the past decade, North Korea has become adept at exploiting this leverage in the international community. North Korea has been repeatedly successful at extracting concessions, such as food aid and removal of sanctions from the west, in exchange for “good” behavior after some calculatedly moderate “bad” act, such as the 1998 Taepodong missile launch across the Sea of Japan. Professor Victor Cha, a noted Korean scholar, explained the dangers of such a cycle:

“From Pyongyang’s perspective, the objective of such misbehavior is not to win some military advantage, but precisely to initiate a coercive bargaining process that eventuates in an outcome more favorable to the North. This is a dangerous and destabilizing strategy, but it is the sort of high stakes game that Pyongyang plays adeptly. What is more, it is rational, since the anticipated benefits of changing the status quo outweigh the risks and costs.”<sup>21</sup>

The threat of North Korean aggression cannot be taken lightly. While the DPRK cannot unify the peninsula by force, it certainly could set Northeast Asia’s market economies back decades, whether as a result of a miscalculation that leads to a conventional conflict or through the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In either case, the result would be the destruction of a large part of the region’s economic infrastructure and the diversion of resources to prosecute the conflict and the following reconstruction.

## **RECONCILIATION EFFORTS**

The June 2000 summit is now the touchstone for discussion about the future of the peninsula. Indeed, the summit represented a true breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. What is less familiar to most is the long history of international negotiations culminating in the June 2000 summit in Pyongyang.

President Kim Dae Jung’s now familiar Sunshine Policy is by no means the first overture made by the South to North Korea. In fact, there is a long history of inter-Korean dialogue. Since the 1970s, the Koreans have held secret meetings that have led to public breakthroughs.<sup>22</sup>

The first of these secret meetings occurred when the United States and China began discussions to normalize their relations. Both Koreas worried about the implications for their security and began meeting in secret. These meetings led to a joint statement agreeing to peaceful reunification in prin-

ciple and public inter-Korean talks utilizing Red Cross representatives in 1972.<sup>23</sup> Since the early 1970s, the Koreans have used the Red Cross to communicate unofficially.

In the past, many of these meetings have been frustrating endeavors for the South Korean government. Some have described the process of inter-Korean negotiations as nothing more than another form of competition between the two governments that can be best understood as a zero-sum game.<sup>24</sup> Nonetheless, several agreements have been made between the two Koreas.

The most notable of these is the 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation, commonly known as the Basic Agreement. This agreement affirmed the desire for peaceful reconciliation and unification of the peninsula. It also resolved to "avoid armed aggression and hostilities, reduce tension, and ensure peace."<sup>25</sup> It was hoped that the implementation of the Basic Agreement would lead to progress in inter-Korean relations, including visitation for separated families.

However, the euphoria was short lived. In 1993, the United States and South Korea became aware that the North Korean government had begun a program of removing spent fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. This caused significantly heightened tension, which some have said brought the peninsula to the brink of war. The 16-month-long standoff ended in October 1994, when North Korea signed the Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and pledged to give up its quest for nuclear weaponry in exchange for fuel oil, the replacement of its nuclear reactors, and gradually normalized diplomatic relations with the United States.<sup>26</sup>

In addition to allowing North Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Agreed Framework created the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), whose mission was to negotiate the construction of the light water reactors and fuel oil that had been specified in the Agreed Framework. Groundbreaking for the reactors began in 1997, and despite some hostile posturing on the part of North Korea, KEDO provided a solid vehicle for inter-Korean dialogue.<sup>27</sup> Following a frustrating record of reversals in inter-Korean negotiation, some tentative signs of willingness to negotiate on the part of North Korea became visible by 1997, when the North Koreans agreed to participate in Four Power Talks. The goal of these talks was to replace the currently existing state of war on the peninsula with a formal peace treaty. The participants in these talks included South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China. Though there was some forward progress, the parties never achieved a formal peace treaty.<sup>28</sup>

## *Keeping the Calm*

The June 2000 summit was credited largely to the success of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy. This policy, which President Kim announced at his 1998 inauguration, represented a significant departure from previous administrations. It consists of three core principles:

1. The ROK will not seek reunification through absorption of the North.
2. South Korea will not tolerate any provocation from the North.
3. Reconciliation will be pursued through expanded inter-Korean contacts and dialogue.<sup>29</sup>

The Sunshine Policy produced a significant milestone in the June 2000 meeting in Pyongyang. Although some dismiss it as largely a ploy by both leaders to bolster their political power, many argue that it was a tremendous first step toward normalizing relations on the peninsula. Key among the points agreed upon at the summit was the promise by both sides to maintain dialogue. Kim Jong Il promised to meet in Seoul for a second summit. Other evidence indicating a real thaw in relations includes the three sets of family reunions that have already occurred, plans to connect a rail line across the DMZ, and the acceleration in the pace of North-South cultural exchanges.<sup>30</sup>

There is also a history of some economic cooperation between the two Koreas that predates the June 2000 summit. In several instances, the South has already succeeded in helping the North expand its economy by increasing trade and the South Korean government has pledged to help the DPRK rebuild its now defunct infrastructure.<sup>31</sup>

One publicly and psychologically important project that must be mentioned in the context of inter-Korean economic cooperation is the Mount Kumgang tourism project. Hyundai Corporation guaranteed North Korea \$942 million in revenue through March 2005 in exchange for tourist cruises from South Korea to Mount Kumgang in the North.<sup>32</sup> Although this was initially received with great optimism as a model for inter-Korean economic cooperation, the project has fallen on hard times. Currently, Hyundai is in default to North Korea for over \$10 million in fees. Given that the South Korean government has refused to bail out Hyundai, it is likely the tours will be suspended.<sup>33</sup> "The ministry of unification, while acknowledging the importance of the tours, says the government will take a hands-off approach to Hyundai's financial woes."<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, Korean conglomerates still look to North Korea for potential economic opportunity. Currently more than two

hundred South Korean companies have contracts with North Korean manufacturers to produce such things as clothing and small electronics components and appliances.<sup>35</sup>

Despite tangible indications of a thaw in inter-Korean relations, there is still substantial reason to question the DPRK's motives. Recent events notwithstanding, the North Korean government remains an isolated totalitarian state whose leader Kim Jong Il enjoys a cult of personality that rises to the level of a secular religion. Despite some very optimistic signs, North Korea has so far shown little interest in any substantive political or economic reform.

Furthermore, the history between the two Koreas has produced considerable reason for South Korea to be suspicious of the North's intentions. From the North Korean attack on the Blue House in 1968, the bombing in Rangoon in an attempt to assassinate President Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea, the bombing of Korean Airlines flight 858, to the clandestine buildup of nuclear weapons technology in the 1990s, there has been considerable evidence in favor of caution. When looking forward, the past must not be ignored.

## **REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES**

The divided Korean peninsula is a remnant of the Cold War. When discussing reunification, the argument centers on the timeline and the circumstances. It is an issue of when and how, not whether. Agreement that Korea should be reunified does not make the actual process any simpler. Considering the history of violence between the two states, reconciliation would be difficult in a vacuum, but the challenge becomes even more difficult and intense because the peninsula is at the intersection of four of the world's great powers. The reunification of Korea will have far-reaching economic and political repercussions, not just for Korea itself, but for all North-east Asian countries.

Understanding the implications of normalization of relations and, ultimately, reunification requires analyzing the perspectives of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—the major powers in the region. Each has a minimum level below which its feeling of security and stability in the region must not fall. To develop a full appreciation for the complexity of the situation, one must consider the interests of the concerned states and what security arrangements will meet their minimum requirements and gain their acquiescence if not overt support for normalization between the two Koreas.

## CHINA

China recently announced its decision to increase defense spending for 2002 by 17.7 percent. This is the largest increase in more than twenty years. China explained that it is responding to significant changes in the world's political situation. Specifically, "that the United States is now China's main threat and a roadblock on the path to regional supremacy ...."<sup>36</sup> This spending increase will bring China's annual defense budget very close to that of Japan and higher than that of South Korea.<sup>37</sup>

China is modernizing its military by acquiring new weapons systems, restructuring forces, and improving training. Much of China's new military equipment has been purchased from Russia at bargain prices because of Russia's lack of hard currency. China's modernization is driven by several factors, including lessons learned from the Gulf War, the need to protect its vital economic interests and territory, the need to maintain internal stability, and a desire to be the leading power in Asia.<sup>38</sup>

Regionally, China has territorial disputes with many countries. "The most prominent examples are China's claim to the South China Sea and its resolve to use force if Taiwan declares independence from the mainland."<sup>39</sup> Several U.S. and Asian policymakers and scholars believe that as China's military capability increases, so does regional anxiety about its intentions. Though many Asian governments believe that China's threat is limited, they remain concerned that China will eventually have the military capability to challenge their military forces in contested areas.<sup>40</sup> However, "Tempering the potential for aggression is China's economic development, which relies heavily on foreign investment and trade."<sup>41</sup>

Though China's nuclear force is small, relatively primitive, and vulnerable—far smaller than those of the United States or Russia and much less sophisticated<sup>42</sup>—China nonetheless is a nuclear power. China is expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, possibly with Russian assistance, and it is not constrained in its nuclear modernization efforts by any arms control agreements, such as the SALT and START agreements between Russia and the United States.<sup>43</sup> Beijing's assessment of its nuclear force requirements may be driven by such factors as the India-Pakistan dispute, problems with Taiwan, or stability on the Korean peninsula.<sup>44</sup>

Beijing's assessment is also being driven by U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system, which is regarded as a threat to China's security. "Many Chinese insist that the NMD [national missile defense] is aimed at China, despite U.S. statements saying that it is directed at rogue states, such

as North Korea and Iraq.<sup>45</sup> Of course, China's modernization efforts may well stimulate a nuclear modernization race among neighboring countries, including Russia, India, Japan, and a reunified Korea.

## CHINA AND REUNIFICATION

Publicly, Beijing welcomes reunification, provided that the resulting Korean state is not anti-Chinese. But Beijing does not want Pyongyang to undergo a full-scale conversion to capitalism, and China may not support reunification of the Koreas if it is under Seoul's leadership, especially if U.S. forces remain and have access to China's southern border.<sup>46</sup> China accepts a U.S.-South Korean alliance in a divided Korea, but a reunified Korea with a continued Korean-American military alliance would be undesirable.<sup>47</sup>

The desperate economic situation in North Korea is already beginning to affect China. The famine in North Korea has created a growing refugee problem in China. According to recent reports, there are more than 300,000 North Koreans currently hiding out in China. This number represents more than 1 percent of North Korea's population.<sup>48</sup> These refugees left North Korea in search of food, and they are unable to return because they will face criminal charges if they do.<sup>49</sup>

Beyond the appalling humanitarian crisis, the refugee issue also has broader implications for regional stability. The area of China experiencing the refugee influx has a Korean minority population of more than two million. The area also has an unemployment rate that exceeds 40 percent.<sup>50</sup> The continued influx of refugees into Northeast China is potentially destabilizing to the Chinese government.

For China to support Korean NOR, the United States and the two Koreas must include China in the process. Kim Jong Il has made recent trips to Shanghai, possibly to study China's economic processes.<sup>51</sup> If North Korea were to begin the process of economic reform, allowing China an active role in that reform, it might serve to assuage China's reservations about Korean NOR. Another way to include China in the process of reconciliation is to resume the four-party peace talks among the United States, the two Koreas, and China to officially end the state of war on the peninsula. This would afford China another opportunity for a voice in the process of reconciliation.

China's interests coincide with those of the United States and South Korea insofar as all concerned prefer a stable status quo to the uncertain outcome of eventual reunification.<sup>52</sup> Both the United States and South Korea want the Koreas to be reunified as a democratic, free-market economy. If

this occurs, China will no longer have North Korea to serve as a buffer. To accede to NOR and reunification under these conditions, China must have confidence that a reunified Korea will not be an enemy of China.

## **JAPAN**

Currently, the Japanese navy contributes the largest share of Japan's regional military capability. Japanese military policy is restricted by the nation's American-dictated constitution. Under Article Nine of Japan's constitution, the Japanese people forever renounce war or the threat or use of force.<sup>53</sup> But Japanese constitutional restraint is fading as the United States encourages Japan to take on more of the security burden in the region and in the campaign against terrorism. The potential for new conflicts with China, North Korea, and others have led many Japanese to call for a reinterpretation of its constitution or a constitutional amendment, giving more latitude in roles and missions of the Japanese armed forces.<sup>54</sup>

“For all of its constitutional restrictions and historical sentiments, Japan has built its self-defense forces into one of the most powerful Armies in Asia. Its annual military budget of \$45 billion is the second largest in the world after that of the United States. The size of the forces and the sophistication of its weaponry are roughly equivalent to those of Great Britain, which has an annual defense budget of about \$33 billion. Japan has about 236,000 military personnel compared to Britain's 220,000.”<sup>55</sup>

## **JAPAN AND REUNIFICATION**

Improved political and military relations between Japan and South Korea—now arguably the best they have been since normalization of relations in 1965—have been based mostly on the continued viability and hostility of the North Korean regime. Absent a hostile North Korea, the question arises: “Will inter-Korean détente necessarily mean a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment potentially destructive to the painstaking efforts to put these colonial ghosts to bed?”<sup>56</sup>

Memories are long in both North and South Korea. Japanese troops occupied South Korea from 1910 to 1945, setting up a brutal occupation

government. During the last phase of colonization, from 1938 to 1945, all Koreans were forced to take Japanese names, the Korean flag was banned, and the schoolchildren were taught exclusively in Japanese. It is common today for Koreans in their sixties and seventies to know Japanese, but they refuse to speak it, showing their distaste for their former colonial rulers.<sup>57</sup> South of Seoul is a museum dedicated to memorializing the hardships of Japanese rule. It is the most powerful symbol of deep-seated Korean feelings toward their potential eastern rival. In the port of Chinhae, South Korean naval cadets study in the shadow of a museum devoted to the Korean Admiral Yi Sun-shin, who in the late 1500s fought off repeated attempts by the Japanese warlord Hideyoshi Toyotomi.<sup>58</sup>

Friendly relations between the two countries have been threatened over the issue of Japanese junior high school history texts. Many Koreans believe these texts "whitewash Japanese atrocities during its colonial rule of the Korean peninsula from 1910–1945."<sup>59</sup> Specifically, Koreans are upset that these texts omit references to "comfort women," Koreans who were pressed into sexual slavery in during World War II, and cite the Japanese colonization of Korea as "...a favor to Korean development because Japanese built infrastructure such as railways."<sup>60</sup> The South Korean government requested that thirty-five passages in the texts be amended. Japan has refused to comply, stating that the texts were reviewed by an unbiased committee.<sup>61</sup> South Korea protested by canceling a joint ROK-Japanese military exercise.<sup>62</sup> The full impact of the current flap over these texts remains to be seen, but it could lead to significant back-tracking in ROK-Japanese relations.

The future course of Japanese-Korean relations is uncertain. There are those who argue Korean NOR will spark Korean nationalism directed against Japan. Others contend that mutual concerns over Chinese intentions will lead to rapprochement and a weakening of anti-Japanese sentiments in Korea.<sup>63</sup>

Regardless, a reunified Korea could have serious financial implications for Japan. The resolution of North Korea's post-colonial claims against Japan could be the single largest source of funding to rebuild the North Korean economy.<sup>64</sup> Japan paid South Korea \$800 million in compensation for colonial and wartime activities upon normalization of relations in 1965.<sup>65</sup> North Korea will expect similar compensation. Adjusting the South Korean payment for differences in population, accrued interest, inflation, and appreciation of the yen since 1965, the debt that Japan could owe to North Korea is estimated at \$20 billion. Further the claims of comfort women could add another \$5 billion to \$8 billion to that debt.<sup>66</sup>

Japan is in no position to pay a claim this large, given its current economic situation. "Japan's stumbling economy is teetering on the brink of a

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deeper crisis as falling prices eat into corporate profits and with Japan's jobless rate standing at a postwar record."<sup>67</sup> The Japanese stock market has fallen to a 15-year low, prompting the Japanese Finance Minister to state, "The nation's finances are near collapse."<sup>68</sup>

Korean NOR makes Japanese officials nervous on several levels. First, Japan needs to be assured that a reunified Korea will not be hostile to Japan. To build confidence on this point, the United States, South Korea, and Japan need to continue using the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) to maintain dialogue. Japan must be reassured that its present cordial relations with South Korea will not deteriorate as a consequence of Korean NOR.

Second, the United States must reassure Japan that Korean reunification will not affect America's commitment to the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Current U.S. national security strategy regards the U.S.-Japan alliance as the anchor for the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia.<sup>69</sup>

Third, upon normalization of relations, Japan will need time to repay its debt to North Korea. If Japan can structure its repayment over time, in conjunction with aid to North Korea from the IMF and the World Bank, then Japan could meet this financial burden without crippling its own economy.

Normalization of relations with North Korea will inevitably affect Japan's relations with China as well.

"An antagonistic North Korea has enabled Japan to justify a number of security initiatives, such as enhanced military relations with the United States and the exploratory development of a missile-defense system. Even absent a hostile North Korea, Japan will wish to continue these security initiatives, which will then be seen as what they really are: a means to protect Japan from China's military modernization program."<sup>70</sup>

## **RUSSIA**

"Russia's basic policy toward Northeast Asia is to create an environment in which it can exercise its influence over the region."<sup>71</sup> To create such an environment, Russia will need to help establish lasting peace and stability on the peninsula and support direct talks between the two Koreas. "In line with such policies, Russia supports the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas, exchanges and cooperation between the two, and denuclearization and arms reduction throughout the entire peninsula."<sup>72</sup>

Although Russia would like to be a player in Northeast Asia, the Putin regime has little to offer. Russia's economy is in trouble, and its military power is in decline. Russia inherited 60 percent of the Soviet Union's GDP, which has since declined by more than 40 percent.<sup>73</sup> In the wake of the 1998 financial crisis, the predictions for slight economic growth since 1999 have given way to forecasts of further contraction, perhaps a 2- to 4-percent decline.<sup>74</sup> Inadequate economic infrastructure, declining production, and an increase in crime are among the most troubling problems for Russia.<sup>75</sup> The downturn in the Russian economy during the 1990s struck the Russian Far East particularly hard. Average output in this region was lower than that for the country as a whole;<sup>76</sup> its share of the country's economic output fell from 5 percent in 1991 to 3.8 percent in 1995.<sup>77</sup>

Russia's military is also in trouble. The Kursk submarine tragedy, followed by Russia's inability to launch a rescue mission at sea, is but one example of a defense establishment in steep decline. Ground and air units lack regular training, basic maintenance, housing, and social support for their personnel.<sup>78</sup>

“Russia's military technical abilities have become increasingly outdated and are repaired only in a most provisional way. Whole swaths of equipment, which exist on paper, have already been either shut down for a long time or sold off by corrupt officers for their personal enrichment. Thus it proved impossible to find divers in the entire Russian fleet, or the whole country, who could have dived down to the Kursk. When the army leadership steals and is corrupt, the majority of ordinary soldiers and sailors see no sense in their service and are completely demoralised.”<sup>79</sup>

Military problems are even more severe in the Russian Far East. Just weeks after a major military exercise in the European theater, Russian nuclear forces in the east had their power supply terminated because they had not paid their utility bill.<sup>80</sup> The military industrial complex in the region is also in serious trouble. “The end of the Soviet Union meant a decline in military production enterprises and the cities in Siberia and the Far East that relied upon them.”<sup>81</sup>

Moscow understands that the Russian Far East will be economically weak and militarily deficient for some time and worries that this resource-rich region could come under the sway of an increasingly powerful China.<sup>82</sup> “The issue is often discussed in purely demographic terms, with a declining population of seven million Russians in the area, contrasted with one hun-

dred million or more Chinese just across the border.”<sup>83</sup> Moscow recognizes that Russia’s economic and military weaknesses limit its opportunity to influence decisions in Northeast Asia. Thus Russia faces the long-term challenge of managing relations with China, Japan, and the two Koreas from a position of relative isolation.

## **RUSSIA AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE KOREAS**

Russia publicly supports Korean reunification, though not without some private concerns. Compared with China’s concerns over a stronger American presence in the region and Japan’s concern about anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans, Moscow does not have much to lose. Russia sees the following positive aspects of Korean reunification:

- 1) The disappearance of a potential threat near the Russian border;
- 2) a reduction in the size of the two large Korean armies and the possible withdrawal of American troops from a strategically important Far East region;
- 3) the end of Moscow’s diplomatic maneuvering between Pyongyang and Seoul, which has not brought many benefits to Russia;
- 4) the creation of more opportunities to solve regional security problems in cooperation with a reunified Korea, including nuclear security, ecological security, terrorism, and illegal migration; and
- 5) the opportunity to develop economic cooperation with a large Korean economy.<sup>84</sup>

According to a senior Russian expert on Korea, “Russia can accept any scenarios and formulas for Korean unification, provided they rule out foreign intervention and any forms of violence or the use of force; satisfy the people of the North and South; and are based on a democratic, evolutionary, negotiating process that is respectful of national and universal human values.”<sup>85</sup> Although Moscow agrees that the truce agreement signed in 1953 after the Korean War has become obsolete, the Russians insist that efforts to replace it with another treaty should not be rushed. According to Russian analysts, the 1953 agreement is the only internationally recognized docu-

ment that ensures peace on the Korean peninsula. Russia prefers South Korea's approach—whereby a Korean peace treaty would be based on a bilateral agreement between the South and the North—to North Korea's suggestion that such a treaty be signed by North Korea and the United States. Moscow wants to prevent any growth of U.S. influence on the peninsula.<sup>86</sup>

Though Russia has no real leverage, it nonetheless attempts to exert influence over the process of Korean reunification. For example, in July 2001, President Putin became the first Russian leader to visit Pyongyang in more than a decade.<sup>87</sup> In addition, Russia has been using military sales to both North and South Korea as a method to insert itself into the normalization process. Seoul is considering the purchase of more than \$500 million in Russian weapons,<sup>88</sup> while Pyongyang is supposed to have completed a purchase for \$425 million in weapons in August 2001.<sup>89</sup>

## NORTH KOREA

North Korea is concerned with regime survival above all else. Given its nonfunctioning economy, North Korea has had no choice but to turn outward in search of economic support. Despite its *Juche* ideology, North Korea is not at all self-sufficient. Currently there are more than 150 foreign food aid administrators living in Pyongyang, monitoring food distribution in 163 of the country's 210 counties.<sup>90</sup> Through economic necessity, North Korea has been opening itself more and more to the international community. Most recently, North Korea accepted a German donation of 12,000 tons of beef from animals slaughtered in the recent cattle epidemics in Europe.<sup>91</sup>

In addition, the North Korean government has made clear that it wishes to join and benefit from several international financial institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).<sup>92</sup> The top IMF and World Bank officials have agreed to conduct a survey of North Korea's broken economy.<sup>93</sup> Although supported by South Korea, Pyongyang's bid to join the ADB has been strongly opposed both the United States and Japan, the bank's two largest investors. Japan and the United States object on the basis that they still consider North Korea a state sponsor of terrorism.<sup>94</sup>

There have been other signs that North Korea has been trying to shed its pariah status and join the international community. Pyongyang has normalized relations with twelve of the fifteen European Union (EU) nations during 2001, and it is likely that North Korea will normalize relations with two of the remaining three EU nations in the near future.<sup>95</sup>

North Korea's stance on the future of American soldiers on the peninsula is uncertain. Kim Jong Il purportedly agreed to continued American military presence on the peninsula during the reconciliation process. In the wake of the July 2000 summit, Kim Jong Il stated he would "welcome" the continued presence of American soldiers on the peninsula in order to ensure stability.<sup>96</sup> However, Kim Jong Il is reported to have made this statement in private to Kim Dae Jung during the June summit, and Kim Jong Il has never confirmed these sentiments in public. In fact, the statement has since been directly contradicted. In the joint declaration issued by Pyongyang and Moscow at the conclusion of Kim Jong Il's visit in August 2001, Kim Jong Il stated "the withdrawal of American troops from Korea will endure no delay."<sup>97</sup> A Foreign Ministry spokesman from South Korea responded by asserting his belief that this statement was primarily for "domestic consumption."<sup>98</sup>

Despite what appear to be some positive steps, there is still reason to ponder the true meaning behind them. According to intelligence sources, North Korea has actually strengthened its military posture on the DMZ during the same time frame. "Over the past year, U.S. and South Korean military officials say they have observed a substantial buildup in North Korea's offensive firepower near the 38th parallel ...."<sup>99</sup> Whether the buildup is for offensive or defensive reasons remains open to interpretation. General Thomas A. Schwartz, the USFK Commander, testified before the U.S. Congress in March 2001: "When I look North, I can see an enemy that's bigger, better, closer, and deadlier, and I can prove it."<sup>100</sup> However one interprets DPRK motives, the primary requirement for the Pyongyang government is to ensure its survival. Kim Jong Il has shown a willingness to push to the brink of war, as during the nuclear crisis of 1994. He has also accepted the starvation of millions of his own people. North Korea will not engage in any dialogue that it sees as jeopardizing the regime's existence.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

South Korea has effectively taken the lead on reunification with its Sunshine Policy. Through the initiatives of President Kim Dae Jung, real progress has been made. Despite this, the South Korean government has not given into euphoria, and it remains cautious regarding the nature and intentions of the regime to the North.

Regarding reunification, South Korea has adopted a "go slow" strategy. ROK's projected timeline for reunification is still decades away. This strategy is based in large part on economic calculations regarding the cost of

reunification.<sup>101</sup> In 1990 the estimated cost of reunification was \$319 billion. By 1995, the figure had risen to \$754 billion. The cost to reunify the Koreas is currently estimated at more than \$1.7 trillion.<sup>102</sup> The South Korean government studied the process of German reunification quite closely and concluded that sudden economic integration would be a disaster for Korea.

As economically painful as the process of reunification was for Germany, it would be even more so for Korea. There are key differences between Germany and Korea. South Korea does not have West Germany's economic strength. The ratio of East Germans to West Germans was one to three, while the ratio of North Koreans to South Koreans is one to two. The per-capita income ratio between East Germany and West Germany at the time of reunification was one to four; the ratio between North Korea and South Korea was one to seven in 2000<sup>103</sup> and is expected to reach one to twelve by the end of 2001.<sup>104</sup> Thus, it is easy to understand the ROK's preference for a calculated, decades-long process of reunification. Hopefully, it would allow the South the opportunity to revitalize the North's economy and mitigate the economic repercussions that reunification would inevitably have on South Korea.

Military concerns remain paramount for the South Korean government. Not all South Koreans agree with the President Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy. Critics charge that inter-Korean cooperation is a one-sided process: South Korea does all of the giving and receives nothing in return from North Korea.<sup>105</sup> The ROK remains particularly worried about the North Korean People's Army (KPA) conventional war-fighting capabilities and nonnuclear deterrents, namely the long-range artillery, tactical missiles, and chemical warfare capabilities.<sup>106</sup>

The 2000 Defense White Paper, published by the ROK Ministry of Defense, explains South Korea's national defense policy as follows:

“... [T]he ROK government will maintain a firm security posture .... It is prepared to respond strongly to the North's armed provocation .... Further, the ROK must establish a firm security posture, which will deter the North's armed invasion and stimulate reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries.”<sup>107</sup>

The above passage shows that although South Korea remains hopeful that reunification will occur peacefully, it remains vigilant and prepares for other scenarios.

South Korea recognizes that the process of reunification will be long

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and fraught with both economic and military dangers, even if reunification is achieved under its preferred conditions. To help mitigate potential dangers, the ROK must be assured that its defensive capabilities are not being degraded in anyway as a result of the normalization process. The United States needs to reassure South Korea that America's military commitment to defend South Korea remains unambiguous.

The second major challenge faced by South Korea is the economic cost of reunification. It would be overwhelming for South Korea to bear this burden alone. The United States and Korea need to take a multilateral approach to provision of economic aid and reconstruction of infrastructure. Such an approach should spread the burden among interested regional players. Liberal use should be made of international financial institutions, such as the IMF and ADB. Current projections indicate that successful reunification will ultimately result in a Korea that is one of the ten strongest economies in the world.<sup>108</sup>

### UNITED STATES

The U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia has long made important practical and symbolic contributions to regional security. U.S. forces stationed in Japan and Korea, as well as those rotated throughout the region, promote security and stability, deter conflict, give substance to American security commitments, and ensure the continued access of other U.S. forces to the region.<sup>109</sup>

The U.S. national security strategy describes American involvement in Northeast Asia as follows:

The U.S.-Japan security alliance anchors the U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region. Our continuing security role is further reinforced by our bilateral treaty alliances with the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.<sup>110</sup>

The strategy further characterizes its commitment to South Korea and Japan as a "vital interest," meaning that American alliances in Northeast Asia are of "overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation."<sup>111</sup> The protection of these interests could include the use of unilateral and decisive military force if necessary.<sup>112</sup>

The U.S. national military strategy articulates a similar policy. It considers North Korea a "regional danger" and describes the DPRK as a state whose intentions are hostile to those of the United States and its allies and

whose capabilities threaten American citizens and our allies alike.<sup>113</sup> Despite the movement toward normalization of relations between the two Koreas, American policy has not changed. The United States remains committed to the defense of South Korea, as it has since the United States signed the Republic of Korea-United States Mutual Security Agreement of 1954. By signing this agreement, both the United States and South Korea agreed to defend the other if attacked. The DMZ is administered by the United States, as directed by the 1953 U.N. armistice agreement, Article I.

Although the Clinton administration never officially adopted the Sunshine Policy as its own, it did support President Kim Dae Jung's initiatives. The 1994 Agreed Framework put a freeze on North Korea's nuclear program. The Clinton administration also attempted to negotiate a freeze on North Korea's ballistic missile program, "but the agreement wasn't completed because the United States couldn't work out detailed procedures to verify North Korean compliance."<sup>114</sup>

The Bush administration has formed its policy toward North Korea slowly, with both Koreas looking on, anxious over the outcome. It was generally perceived by all involved that the new Republican administration would take a harder line toward North Korea than its democratic predecessor had. During the first several months of the administration, this was very true. The new government focused more on "reciprocity" than the Clinton administration, looking for concrete changes in the North Korean regime before continuing a policy of engagement.

After a lengthy policy review, the Bush administration revalidated the status quo, continuing to support the Sunshine Policy, the Agreed Framework, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG).<sup>115</sup>

"The main difference in approach from the Clinton administration was the U.S. desire for a more comprehensive dialogue. This is quite understandable, given that one of the primary complaints logged against the Clinton administration in its dealings with Pyongyang (by many South Koreans and Americans, regardless of political affiliation) was that it seemed to approach the Peninsula as a non-proliferation problem rather than as a regional security problem with an important proliferation dimension."<sup>116</sup>

An important difference in the Bush administration's approach to the peninsula is that it is intertwined with the administration's position on theater missile defense (TMD). South Korea is lukewarm on TMD primarily

because it does nothing to shield South Korea from North Korean artillery, which constitutes the main threat to Seoul. In a recent poll conducted in South Korea, 55 percent of Koreans believed that deployment of a missile defense would "have an adverse effect on the peninsula."<sup>117</sup> The administration's pursuit of missile defense has also complicated diplomatic relations with Russia and China. The full impact of these changes remains to be seen.

### **POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE U.S. MILITARY IN PROMOTING NOR**

Although normalization of relations between the two Koreas will be a lengthy process with reunification still decades away, the United States must begin planning for the changes that will occur on the peninsula. Even under the best conditions, the process will be difficult and destabilizing. Both regimes are going to have to determine together what path the process of North Korean reunification should take and who should be involved. There are essentially three approaches that the Koreas could take to negotiate reunification: They could decide to manage the process alone, forgoing any outside assistance. Alternatively, they could use the U.S.-ROK alliance as a basis, or finally, they could invite in a multinational commission to assist.<sup>118</sup>

Because of the overwhelming economic costs and manpower requirements, it is doubtful that Seoul and Pyongyang would choose to manage the process of reunification alone. This leaves the options of either a U.S.-led task force based on the U.S.-ROK alliance or a multinational task force. Regardless of which approach the Korean governments decide to take, the United States would most likely take a leading role. The American military is uniquely positioned to provide security and assistance to both Koreas as they undergo normalization and reunification. With U.S. forces already on the ground in conjunction with the U.S.-ROK alliance, the use of U.S. personnel is a foregone conclusion. The USFK could provide an existing framework for command and control of the security aspects of the process.

Although the United States has been primarily concerned with North Korea's WMD program, conventional demilitarization must be dealt with as well. The two Koreas have been locked in an arms race for more than fifty years. In 2001, 70 percent of the DPRK army was deployed within 90 miles of the DMZ.<sup>119</sup> For reunification to take place, the DMZ will have to be drawn down. This will require a level of trust not yet seen between the two Koreas. U.S. forces, probably in conjunction with multinational observers, can play a key role in fostering that trust by providing independent oversight and verification of the demilitarization process.

Confidence-building extends beyond the current substantial military capabilities of both states. Unlike Germany, Korea fought a fratricidal war that remains in living memory. As a result, the North may fear retribution from the South for the Korean War. Using U. S. forces as neutral observers during the early phases of normalization could go far to allay this fear.

The cost of reconciliation is also a significant concern to both states. The legacy of fifty years of bad economic decision making in North Korea will affect the peninsula for at least a generation after reunification has occurred.<sup>120</sup> Neither Korea will be able to maintain its current level of military expenditures during the process of reunification. Demobilization on both sides of the DMZ will be necessary not only to build trust and confidence but to save resources that will be needed for the reconstruction of the shattered North Korean economy.

The cost of maintaining a constant war footing on the peninsula is staggering. The North Korean government currently spends between 25 and 33 percent of its GNP on defense.<sup>121</sup> This percentage translates into \$5 to \$7 billion annually. Although South Korea's military spending is a much smaller percentage of the GNP (around 5 percent), it still approaches \$10 billion annually and accounts for nearly 30 percent of the government's annual budget.<sup>122</sup> A substantial drawdown in defense spending will provide the initial capital necessary to begin the reconstruction process, although international aid will also be required.

During the normalization process, Korea will be required to manage internal and external threats to its security. The U.S. military can also help with both. The U.S. military can help provide stability in the region to prevent any neighboring powers from becoming too adventurous. American forces can also provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support to North Korea during the first phases of NOR. Combat forces can be used to deter any outside power from taking advantage of Korea's weakened position, while logistics, medical, and engineer troops can support the reunification process itself.<sup>123</sup>

During the initial stages of reconciliation, the DPRK is going to resemble a country hit by a natural disaster. The North Korean people are going to be in need of food, temporary shelter, medical attention, communications capabilities, and engineer support. The American military has tremendous experience with humanitarian relief operations. USFK could provide initial command and control for these missions.

The U.S. military is in a position to establish the framework for long-term reconstruction of the North. The DPRK does not have a civil affairs department that will understand the requirements for reform. U.S. armed

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forces can provide civil affairs units to assist with the task of nation building in North Korea.

“These [civil affairs] units are comprised of soldiers with unique skills and experience in all areas of government. They provide a capability for emergency coordination and administration where civilian political economic structures have been incapacitated. They can also assist commanders at all levels of civilian military planning .... In short, civil affairs units would be indispensable in the reconstruction of Korea.”<sup>124</sup>

Although the U.S. military can be effectively used to begin the process of reconstructing North Korea, it should not keep this mission long. After the border between the Koreas has been opened and the United States has helped lay the groundwork for reconstruction, civilian contractors should take over the process of reconstruction. The long-term focus of the American military should be guarding against outside challenges to Korean security.

The United States can also provide forces to train the new Korean military. The job of merging the North and South Korean militaries would not be simple. The history of integrating formerly opposing military forces shows the cost, complexity, and uneven outcomes that may occur. Using American Special Forces to help train and integrate the Korean military will strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance post reunification. If the U.S. military takes an active role to help increase transparency and build confidence between the two Korean military structures, it is much more likely that American forces will be invited to remain on the peninsula in the long term. Continuing the U.S.-ROK alliance beyond NOR and into reunification could provide substantial benefits to both states. The extension of American security guarantees during and beyond reunification of the Koreas will allow the emerging state to focus on its internal development free from unwanted outside influence.

Additionally, a U.S. military presence in a reunifying Korea could remove the temptation of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula. China is a nuclear power, and Koreans view Japan as a “quasi-nuclear” power.<sup>125</sup> A unified Korea will have genuine security concerns, and its historical experience may lead it to seek the nuclear option, unless other security guarantees convince Koreans otherwise.

China and Russia once exercised dominant influence on the Korean peninsula, and Japan colonized Korea for thirty-five years in the previous century. The United States has provided security guarantees for South Korea

for the past half century. Without a strong U.S. presence and continued willingness to underwrite a reunified Korea's security, there is a definite possibility—or so many Koreans believe—that China, Russia, and Japan would again become assertive on the peninsula.<sup>126</sup> To protect itself, a reunified Korea might well combine its nuclear and missile assets and the conventional forces of North and South, thereafter gradually seeking force reductions while providing for military personnel stability and force-structure efficiencies.<sup>127</sup>

In addition to U.S. concern over North Korean efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, there could also be a similar concern over South Korea. During the 1960s, South Korea decided to develop its own nuclear deterrent based on eroding confidence in U.S. security guarantees. Once these efforts were discovered in 1974, the United States threatened suspension of all trade as well as immediate troop withdrawal from the peninsula.<sup>128</sup> These threats effectively ended the ROK's quest for an independent nuclear deterrent.

To continue to assure South Korea of the U.S. commitment to the peninsula, the United States can use its influence to leverage a reunified Korea to move away from the nuclear option and toward the continuation of a robust U.S.-Korea bilateral security pact, which would entail the continued presence of some American forces on the peninsula. The United States would also need to encourage a reunified Korea to sign bilateral security agreements with the other regional powers.<sup>129</sup>

Another option, in addition to a U.S.-Korea agreement, would be to establish a regional collective security regime that could provide a security guarantee similar to that which a unified Germany enjoys in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Of course, a Northeast Asian equivalent of NATO does not exist and could not be created overnight. However, "there already exist several forums for multilateral cooperation, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP)."<sup>130</sup> These organizations arrive at non-binding consensus about matters of common interests and objectives, such as cooperative security.

A combination of bilateral commitments with other regional actors, a multilateral confidence-building forum for security matters, and continued U.S. interest and presence could alleviate the concerns that might otherwise push a reunified Korea to consider the nuclear option.

Another potential problem is the resurgence of nationalism in Northeast Asia. Animosity among different nations in East Asia did not wither away during the Cold War. When the former Soviet Union was the enemy, most East Asian states, eventually including China, looked to America for

protection. "East Asia's two natural rivals, China and Japan, managed to curb their hostility, but never resolved it."<sup>131</sup> The new potential for a unified Korea has rekindled concerns about historical animosities in the region. If the United States does not remain engaged in the region and encourage dialogue between Korea and Japan, the possibility for resurgent anti-Japanese nationalism is great. In this case, the Korean government may decide that it is better to lean toward China and away from the United States and Japan.<sup>132</sup> A clear American commitment to the security of Korea is necessary to ensure that Korea does not look elsewhere for support. A tremendous number of unknowns remain for the reunification of the Koreas. The U.S. military presence during the reunification process will reduce the risk of miscalculation and facilitate the transition process, regardless of what form it takes.

Nonviolent reunification is not the only possible alternative. Although a second Korean war is not the most likely scenario, the possibility of such a war remains, occurring as a result of miscalculation or in desperation on the part of North Korea. Continued U.S. military presence on the peninsula will provide a clear signal to the DPRK that there is no benefit to open conflict and no viable alternative to engagement.

### STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

Nothing is clear about the actual process by which the two Koreas will reunify. Most of the literature surrounding the issue suggests three scenarios: reunification through negotiated settlement, reunification through the collapse of North Korea, and reunification through violence.<sup>133</sup> There is also the unlikely scenario in which reunification fails and the Koreas reconcile as two separate states. The best strategy is to prepare for the first two scenarios while working to encourage peaceful settlement.

Despite great hope for reunification through negotiation, major obstacles remain. By all indicators, North Korea is a failed state whose days are numbered. The economic conditions in the DPRK and the mass starvation lead to the inescapable conclusion that a fundamental system change is required. This leaves the North Korean regime in a Catch-22. The DPRK has no option but to reform, but North Koreans fear that reform will tear apart the current regime.<sup>134</sup> The issue then is how to proceed with the reconciliation process in a slow and nonthreatening manner. While economic incentives can help precipitate change, encouraging Kim Jong Il to reform is definitely no small task. For a reconciliation to occur, there should be no fundamental transformation of either state, at least in the initial period, which may last for

several years. Although this seems implausible, one resolution could be to create a loosely federated but reunified Korea that resembles the Chinese "One State, Two Systems" model currently in effect for Hong Kong and China. This would allow both governments to maintain their respective systems while still being recognized internationally as a single state.

During the initial phases of reconciliation, the border between the two Koreas would remain closed. This would forestall a potential refugee crisis and allow both governments the opportunity to strengthen economic ties without weakening either political system. The logic of this approach is simply to create economic interdependence. As North Korea becomes more interdependent with the South Korean economy, outside influence and ideas will inevitably enter the North. Any substantive economic development in the North will require more openness. This openness could eventually lead to the rise of an opposition and in turn the demise of the Kim regime. Allowing economic development to occur over time in North Korea will decrease the financial burden that the South would no doubt incur if it were to inherit a defunct economy and a starving populace.

### **Scenario 1: Negotiated Reunification**

At the June 15, 2000, summit, leaders of both North and South Korea agreed that they needed to reach an independent resolution on reunification. In the view of some Korea-watchers, there has been a distinct "Koreanization" of the issue,<sup>135</sup> that is, the two governments are increasingly interested in achieving reunification without the interference of foreign powers. This Koreanization may facilitate the formation of a loose federation.<sup>136</sup>

Federation is not a revolutionary idea. Both North and South Korea have proposed it as an interim step to reunification. The DPRK has promoted this idea in the form of the Democratic Confederative Republic of Koryo. Under this plan, both Koreas maintain their respective governments while creating a reunified national government with equal participation of DPRK and ROK representatives. Under the leadership of the reunified national government, the North and South will practice self-government.<sup>137</sup>

South Korea has also proposed confederation. In 1989, the ROK proposed the Korean Commonwealth, which would operate through a common Council of Ministers from the two Koreas. The goal of this confederation was to work out the issues of divided families and to draft a constitution for a unified Korean state.<sup>138</sup> Although these two proposals differ in their intent and scope, there may be room to compromise on a confederation agreeable to both sides.

Several circumstances could lead both governments to look favorably on federation. The North Korean economy is nonfunctional.<sup>139</sup> The South Korean government shrinks from reunification in the near term because of the expense of rebuilding the North after reunification. Unfortunately, the cost of reunification increases the longer it is delayed. Since 1990 the estimated cost of reunification has more than quintupled to reach the current estimate, which exceeds \$1.7 trillion.<sup>140</sup> Given North Korea's desperate economic situation and South Korea's reluctance to take on overwhelming debt, a loose federation that provides potential economic benefits for the two governments without bankrupting the South may offer a satisfactory compromise.

The South has already succeeded in helping the North expand its economy. For example, during the 1990s, South Korea's trade with the North doubled to more than \$330 million. Although increased trade alone does not indicate that North Korea is ready to embrace wholesale economic reform, it does provide revenue in amounts that can encourage the DPRK to seek other economic opportunities.

“Despite this positive news, North Korea remains dependent upon foreign assistance. By entering a federation, it could increase the amount of aid received from South Korea and continue slowly to expand its economy. Some form of federation might also reduce North Korea's current reputation as a pariah in the international community, making the DPRK eligible for a variety of international economic packages, including war reparations from Japan. When South Korea normalized relations with Japan in 1965, it received an immediate reparations and assistance package of \$800 million.”<sup>141</sup>

If a federated Korea were to normalize relations with Japan, it could mean a windfall of several billion dollars for the North. In short, North Korea has substantial incentives to engage Japan and the rest of the international community, and it will be easier to do so, while maintaining internal political control, if it is federated with the South.

Redirecting funding from defense spending to economic restructuring could benefit South Korea substantially. A recent economic study concluded that a reduction in defense spending would boost South Korean exports, as well as spur investment, thus strengthening the ROK economy. In other words, South Korea could experience a “Peace Dividend.”<sup>142</sup> Federation would also increase South Korea's security by ending the state of war that has existed

on the peninsula for the past fifty years, while forestalling the economic disaster that would almost certainly accompany reunification through North Korea's collapse and absorption.

This, then, is the logic for negotiating a settlement for a loose federation. South Korea could provide enough aid to prevent North Korea's collapse and enhance the latter's image in the international community. Federation could also reduce the costs of security for both sides, enabling the North to concentrate on basic development and the South to reclaim its economic prowess.

Under this reunification scenario, the United States should provide assistance to Korea on its internal security issues. A U.S. presence would also serve to discourage unwanted overtures from other states in the region, while helping to coordinate welcome aid from other Northeast Asian states.

### **Scenario 2: Collapse of North Korea**

A second scenario to be considered is the collapse of North Korea and its absorption by the South. Although no one involved in the process wants this outcome, it must nonetheless be considered. Kim Jong Il could simply refuse to engage in or continue the process of reconciliation. It is also possible that the North Korean economy is just too far gone to recover at this point. As intractable as Kim Jong Il is, there is no alternative to dealing with him—there is no one else in the North Korean government capable of taking charge.<sup>143</sup> If Kim Jong Il were to suddenly lose power, the result would be chaos. Given the desperate economic situation and the lack of alternatives to the current government, the collapse of North Korea must be considered a potential scenario even though it is not a desired alternative by any party.

Should the North Korean regime collapse, the role of the U. S. military under these conditions would be enormous. With a collapse could come associated violence, or if the regime simply dissolved, the state would be left in a vacuum. In either situation, the U.S. military would be required to stabilize the situation in North Korea and begin the process of economic transformation of the DPRK.

### **Scenario 3: Reunification Through Violence**

The third scenario to consider is that of reunification through violence. Although one could argue that no rational North Korean leader would start a war he knows he could not win, the possibility of miscalculation remains. If Korea were unified under this scenario, the effects on the peninsula and Northeast Asia as a whole would be devastating. The U.S.-ROK alliance

would win, but it would no doubt be an enormously expensive victory. If another Korean war were to start, North Korea has enough artillery to "sustain a barrage of 500,000 rounds per hour for several hours ...."<sup>144</sup> Beyond the conventional threat, North Korea is estimated to have 5,000 metric tons of nerve agent stored along the DMZ, in addition to its stockpiles of blood, blister, and choking agents.<sup>145</sup> With these capabilities at their disposal, a second Korean war would devastate the peninsula for decades.

Under this scenario, the U.S. military would perform the mission it has trained for in Korea since the armistice was signed. After helping the ROK army to win the war, it is likely that USFK would then begin to aid in rebuilding both sides of the war-torn DMZ. Given the horrific nature of this scenario, it is in everyone's best interest to maintain an open dialogue with the DPRK to reduce the possibility of miscalculation and needless violence.

#### **Scenario 4: Two Korean States**

A final alternative is the Koreans reconciling as two separate states. It is possible that North and South Korea could simply agree to disagree on ideology and regime type and coexist peacefully. Relations between the two Koreas would normalize but with no movement toward reunification. In this scenario, a likely outcome would be a formal peace treaty officially ending the Korean War.

The normalization of relations between the two Koreas and the end of the Korean War would require a restructuring of the American military presence in South Korea. It is likely that American troops remaining on the peninsula would be reconfigured as a regional force. With the signing of the formal peace treaty, the rationale for the United Nations Command (UNC) comes into question. North Korea has actively sought to dismantle the UNC for years; there is little reason to believe that their position would change.<sup>146</sup> Given this, a reconciliation of two independent Koreas would require a redefinition of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the role of the American military within it.

From a regional perspective, China would view the two Korean states scenario as a positive development. One of China's major concerns is the potential loss of a buffer state between Chinese and U.S. forces. Two reconciled Koreas would negate this concern.

Although a failure to reunify is possible, it is unlikely. Discussions of Korean reunification invariably center on when and how, never on if. Both Koreas believe that reunification of the peninsula should and will occur. The disagreement is on the form that reunification will take.

## POTENTIAL ROLES AND MISSIONS FOR U.S. FORCES IN A REUNIFIED KOREA

### The Peninsula

Although there are still myriad variables surrounding the timeline and process of Korean reunification, it is not premature to begin considering what shape the American military presence should take in a confederated or unified Korea. There are fundamental questions to address: Should the U.S. military remain in Korea after normalization of relations? After reunification? If so, how should the military command for the region be structured? It is time to begin considering these questions so that when changes occur on the Korean peninsula, the issues are understood and alternatives have been explored.

“Even without the North Korean menace there are many reasons for American forces to remain in Northeast Asia, chief among them to help foster better ROK-Japan relations, maintain strong mil to mil ties with important allies, keep an eye on China and Russia, and to ensure that American officers gain first hand experience in Asia.”<sup>147</sup>

The U.S. military will no doubt have to alter its footprint in a unified Korea. Land is at a premium, and there are already issues in South Korea concerning U.S. land requirements for basing and training areas. If the North Korean threat abates, it is extremely unlikely that Korean public opinion will support the American military retaining the amount of acreage it now uses.

However, negotiations should center more on strategy rather than simple acreage. A reduced footprint does not mean that American soldiers will have to leave the peninsula, rather U.S. soldiers should be reoriented to handle a broader range of strategic regional missions. These could potentially include such things as humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, as well as military-to-military contacts and counterterrorism operations.<sup>148</sup> American military forces will need to shift their efforts from the defense of South Korea to power projection in Asia. Given this, it makes sense that in the absence of a North Korean threat, the United States should consider moving American soldiers away from the DMZ and closer to major airfields, such as the one at Osan Air Force Base.

Although a unified Korea could initially have reservations about allow-

ing a U.S. regional response force to be based on the peninsula, it is not an impossible idea. "In a recent opinion poll, 82.1 percent of South Korean respondents agreed that one of the objectives of the U.S.-ROK alliance was to maintain security in North East Asia."<sup>149</sup>

Korea's positive consideration of this idea could also be tied to its continued concerns about its role in Northeast Asia. In the words of retired Korean four-star general Kim Jae Chang, "Korea was the bridge connecting Russia, China, and Japan. The Korean peninsula has been a historic avenue of approach. It will remain necessary to keep the bridge safe from both sides. Maintaining an alliance with the United States is the best solution for that problem."<sup>150</sup> There is logic then for a reunified Korea to support continued American military presence in a regional response role.

There is even precedent for Korean participation in this regional force. Although uncommon, especially during periods of high tension on the peninsula, the involvement of Korean soldiers in off-peninsula missions is not unheard of. In the most extreme case, Korean forces could be used to fight alongside U.S. forces as South Korea did in the Vietnam War. Although it may not be desirable to deploy Korean forces in combat missions overseas, it would be possible for them to participate in noncombat missions.<sup>151</sup>

Additionally, Korean participation in a regional response force could enhance Korea's standing in Asia. Korean military involvement in off-peninsula contingencies would allow Korea to move from a position of dependence on the United States to one of a more equal partnership.<sup>152</sup>

Changing the structure of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the wake of reunification would be necessary in any case. Reorienting the alliance to focus on regional stability could also have a positive impact on the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. If the American military is required to leave Korea in the wake of reunification, it will call into question the rationale for United States Forces in Japan (USFJ). Restructuring USFK to become a regional response force could allow for a simultaneous reorientation of USFJ to focus on regional stability as well. Maintaining a presence in Asia after Korean reunification should be the result of a three-way agreement between Korea, Japan, and the United States.<sup>153</sup> Such an agreement could be similar to that of the multilateral relationships established within NATO.

## **The Region**

The United States Pacific Command covers "more than fifty percent of the earth's surface ... from the West Coast of the United States mainland to the East Coast of Africa."<sup>154</sup> This encompasses forty-three countries, sixteen

time zones, five of seven U.S. mutual defense treaties, and the world's six largest armed forces.<sup>155</sup> Countries in this region account for 35 percent of U.S. trade.<sup>156</sup> The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), has the responsibility for monitoring all potential conflict sites in this region, including the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, Indonesia, and the Spratly Islands, as well as patrolling the Indian Ocean.

Given the increasing importance of Asia to the United States and the rising concerns over China,<sup>157</sup> it would be preferable to split CINCPAC into more focused unified commands. CINCPAC would maintain essentially the same area of responsibility (AOR) with the exception of Northeast Asia (including China, Japan, Taiwan, and North and South Korea). Commensurate with its importance, Northeast Asia would comprise a separate AOR with its own CINC of equivalent status to the other four regional CINCs. Northeast Asia is simply too important to the security of the United States to be lumped together under such a large and diverse regional command that includes the Asian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

Division of the current AOR would allow each CINC to devote greater attention to these critical nations in their own regional context. With the creation of a CINC Northeast Asia (CINCNEA), the travel distance and time involved would be much more manageable. The CINCNEA could be "on the ground" in any capital in his AOR within a few hours, "plugged in" to local concerns. The CINCNEA could maintain a narrower focus and develop deeper knowledge and expertise in the region, which would benefit the development of multilateral security arrangements and help further U.S. interests in the region.

After his election, President George W. Bush ordered Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to conduct an array of studies on the U.S. armed forces to "create a new vision of the American military; looking at everything from missile defense and global strategy to the flaws of a Truman vintage personnel system."<sup>158</sup> Circumscribing the area of responsibility to create this new major command would be in keeping with the changes that are taking place in command and control broadly as the Bush Administration seeks to implement suggestions that emerged from these recommendations. The U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Experimentation Directorate in Norfolk, Virginia, is looking at the possibility of deploying Joint command and control capabilities in each of the geographic commands.<sup>159</sup> The objective is to facilitate flexibility and rapidity of response. It has become widely recognized that CINCs in general are too geographically remote from the areas of potential conflict and concern, and reorganizing the Pacific Command would be ideally suited to serve as the first of other such changes. It would also open

avenues for better tailoring of such command tools and processes to the needs of the specific region.

Despite the smaller distances involved, Northeast Asia is in no way too small an area to merit a CINC. The AOR would still include five of six of the world's largest militaries (China, Russia, the United States, North Korea, and South Korea) as well as two of seven of the United States' mutual defense treaties. Northeast Asia also accounts for nearly 25 percent of U.S. trade flows.<sup>160</sup>

As the situation on the Korean peninsula becomes more fluid, Northeast Asia as a whole will become much more volatile. Creating a CINC to manage American forces in the region would provide greater long-term stability and, if necessary, better crisis management.

Presently, bilateral security arrangements characterize the Northeast Asian security landscape. In the wake of Korean reunification, a multilateral approach to security will be required. Although this represents a new approach to security issues in the region, multilateralism is not completely unprecedented. Organizations such as ASEAN and the Asian Regional Forum, which just admitted North Korea into its ranks, could be strengthened to improve cooperative problem solving in Northeast Asia.

## CONCLUSION

During the half-century following the end of the Korean War, South Korea and the United States invested heavily—and successfully—in people and treasure to preserve peace on the Korean peninsula. Both nations sacrificed dearly, losing thousands of young men while fighting North Korean incursions or conducting the rigorous yet perilous training required for effective readiness.

The interim result is a secure environment that enables the hard work of the Korean people to propel their nation to financial prosperity and genuine democracy. Today, despite past political turmoil and economic challenges, South Korea stands as a shining example of popular democracy and free-market capitalism; it is a respected and responsible leading nation in the international community.

Despite South Korea's historically unprecedented accomplishments, however, the investment has not fully matured. Even in this time of North-South rapprochement, continued military tensions have inhibited reconciliation and progress toward normalization of relations. Likewise, the room for misperception by regional players is equally dangerous. To hedge against

undesired outcomes and the possibility of peninsular or regional instability and confrontation, continued American military presence and integration with Korean national defense forces is mandated. The U.S. armed forces need to remain in Northeast Asia, and America should seek to fill the role of neighbor rather than visitor to the region.

The reunification of Korea will usher in a new order in the region, which will have far-reaching military as well as political and economic implications. All of the regional players will be affected. A best-case scenario would envision greater trade, economic integration, and open and stable diplomatic relations. This can only occur if China, Japan, and Korea avoid renewed military competition, including a nuclear arms race.

While most certainly the face and structure of U.S.-ROK military deterrence will transform, as the environment changes, continued American military presence will remain critical to Korean and regional stability and thus prosperity, particularly as regional actors adjust to the changing political milieu. An appropriate, ready, and credible Korean-U.S. military force will remain an essential and underpinning element to achieve Korea's dream and America's objective: peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula and regional stability in Northeast Asia.

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## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**General John H. Tilelli** became President and Chief Operating Officer of Cypress International on January 1, 2002. He was President and CEO of the United Services Organization from March 2000 to December 2001. He retired from the United States Army on January 31, 2000, after 37 years of service.

General Tilelli was raised in Holmdel, New Jersey. A 1963 graduate of Pennsylvania Military College, now Widener University, he received a degree in Economics and was commissioned as an Armor Officer. He attended the Armor Officer Basic and Advance Courses and Airborne School. He was awarded a Master's Degree in Administration from Lehigh University in 1972 and graduated from the U.S. Army War College in 1983. General Tilelli is the recipient of an honorary doctorate in Business Management from Widener University in May 1996, and an honorary doctorate of law from the University of Maryland.

General Tilelli served two tours in Vietnam and four tours in Germany. His combat tours include assignments as a Company Commander and District Senior Advisor in Vietnam and Commanding General of 1st Cavalry Division during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In Germany, he served as a Troop Commander and S-1 in the 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; Chief of Staff, 1st Armored Division in Ansbach; Regimental Commander, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Nuremberg; and Chief of Staff, VII (U.S.) Corps in Stuttgart.

General Tilelli served as Commander, Seventh Army Training Command and Combat Maneuver Training Center from May 4, 1988 to July 10, 1990. His staff assignments include three tours at the Pentagon. He served in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition.

He commanded the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas from July 20, 1990 until July 31, 1992. He deployed with the Division to Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in October 1990. In August 1992, General Tilelli returned to the Pentagon as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. He was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army on March 26, 1993. After his promotion to General on July 19, 1994, General Tilelli served as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS (CONT.)

and on June 16, 1995 he became Commander of United States Army Forces Command

Prior to his retirement, General Tilelli served as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. He served in Korea from July 1996 through December 1999.

General Tilelli is married to the former Valerie Anne Flannigan. They have three daughters: Christine, Margaret, and Jeanne.

**Major Susan F. Bryant** was awarded a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship in April 2001 and currently serves as the Special Assistant to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, US Department of State. She was an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy, West Point from 1998 until 2001. She holds a Bachelor of Sciences in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and an MA in International Relations from Yale. Major Bryant was commissioned in the Ordnance Branch and has served two tours with the United States Army in Korea.

## The Association of the United States Army

The Basic charter of the Association of the United States Army is a document dated 5 July 1950 a portion of which reads: "...That (2) the particular business and objects of the ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY as reincorporated shall be wholly educational, literary, scientific, fostering *esprit de corps*, dissemination of professional knowledge and the promotion of the efficiency of the Army components of the Armed Forces of our Country..."

The national association is exempt from Federal income taxation under Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

At the October 27, 1956 Annual Business Meeting, held in Washington, D.C, the Association accepted a reorganization plan which called for removal of all active duty personnel from the governing body, and launching of the regional organization to bring AUSA to the home communities of its members.

Under the present Bylaws, no military personnel on active duty may serve on the Association's national governing bodies, nor may such personnel be employed by the Association in any permanent or semi-permanent staff capacity.

AUSA is not a part of the United States Government or the United States Army. The Association is not supported financially by the Army or the government.

Besides a permanent staff at its national headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, the Association is organized into 132 chapters located worldwide. Made up entirely of volunteers, they provide recreational and educational opportunities to Soldiers and their families. Most importantly, they support our deployed Soldiers and their families left behind.

The Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) extends the influence of AUSA by informing and educating its members; local, regional and national leaders; and the American public, on the critical nature of land forces and the importance of the United States Army. ILW carries out a broad program of activities including the publication of professional research papers, newsletters, background briefs, essays and special reports. ILW also conducts seminars, produces television programs and sponsors regional defense forums throughout the country and overseas in concert with local AUSA Chapters.

AUSA's Industry Affairs office seeks to strengthen relations between the Army and the defense industry through its corporate membership program and monthly events. Every October, AUSA holds its Annual Business Meeting in Washington that attracts people from all sectors of the defense industry as well as senior Army and Pentagon leaders. Industry Affairs also sponsors an annual Winter Symposium in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida that is similar to the October event and has grown in attendance and popularity in recent years. Besides these events, Industry Affairs holds regular monthly symposia focusing on a variety of fields ranging from intelligence and special operations to logistics and medical affairs.

Periodically, AUSA organizes short-term research projects on pressing issues of the day.

The Program on the Role of American Military Power (RAMP) was started in January 2000 with a three-year mandate to examine the changing international and strategic environment of the United States in order to develop a better understanding of what these changes will mean for the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in particular. RAMP has sponsored a number of events and will produce publications, including a Final Report in 2002, on a variety of topics including principles for the use of force, the future of land warfare, post-conflict reconstruction, security sector reform, interagency coordination, and defense industry transformation.

## PROGRAM ON THE ROLE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

### OVERVIEW

#### INTRODUCTION

What should America's policy be for using its military?

To answer this question, the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) has established the Program on the Role of American Military Power (RAMP). Beginning its substantive work in January 2000 with a three-year mandate, the program will examine the changing international and strategic environment of the United States in order to develop a better understanding of what these changes will mean for the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in particular.

The program seeks to provide original ideas and analysis of important defense issues for the AUSA membership, senior Army leadership, and defense policymakers through an ambitious program of research, consultation, and publication. As part of its approach, the program will serve as a convening forum for the best military and civilian work in the defense and foreign policy communities in Washington, D.C. and beyond.

This program will also establish a linkage among the major centers of Army intellectual activity, including the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, and the National Defense University, in order to encourage contribution to the defense policy dialogue.

These efforts will result in the publication of a number of books and monographs by distinguished authors on topics relevant to the program's central question and conceptual approach.

## THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

To guide its work, the RAMP program will use a three-part conceptual approach that may be summarized as follows:

- I. What does America need from its military at this moment in its history? What role should the American military play in safeguarding and advancing the nation's interests?
- II. What missions fall to the military, particularly the Army, as a result of these needs? In other words, what specific functions must the military be able to perform, in a broader policy context (that is, in conjunction with political, economic, and other measures), in order to meet the needs of the nation?
- III. What capabilities does the military have to fulfill these missions? What more does the military need? That is, what organizational designs, force size, structure, and management approaches, are most promising for the military and what strategies – preventive defense, forward presence, etc. – offer the best complement to various organizational models?

## THE WORK PLAN

To offer some answers to the questions raised above, the program will seek contributions from military professionals, scholars, policymakers, and other experts. The program will also sponsor conferences in the United States and around the world, convene seminars, and actively participate in the work of others that relates to its core agenda.

The following outline elaborates some of the key issues associated with each part of the conceptual framework.

## **I. What does America need from its military?**

### Objectives

- To identify the core, and perhaps enduring, reasons that the United States requires a military of considerable size, geographic reach, and lethal capacity.
- To understand how changes in the post-Cold War world affect the assumptions that underlie the maintenance of a strong American military.

### Issues

- What historical factors contribute to the current view of the need for peerless American military power?
- With the end of the Cold War, in what ways has the American need for a strong military changed?
- How tied is the United States to the needs and capabilities of its friends and allies in determining its own approach to defense and security?
- What strategic changes might radically alter current views of America's role in the world and the military it fields to fulfill that role?
- The post-Cold War period has seen compression of the levels of war. What does this compression imply for decisionmaking, strategy formulation, and force structure?
- It has become increasingly possible to foresee the emergence of potential conventional adversaries, but increasingly difficult to foresee potential unconventional foes. How should the United States respond to so-called "asymmetric" challenges?

## II. What military missions flow from the needs outlined above?

### Objectives

- To identify the general and specific missions that the military must be able to perform in order to meet the current and future needs of the nation.
- To understand where the mission gaps and seams exist and to offer strategies for filling those gaps.

### Issues

- What are the existing service views of their core competencies? How do these views compare with current U.S. policies regarding the use of the military abroad?
- How do new major initiatives such as national missile defense or homeland defense relate to these views of core mission functions?
- How effective are existing approaches to military missions for the new challenges confronting the United States, e.g., peacetime engagement, peace operations, post-conflict peacebuilding, etc.?
- If it is not possible to include these kinds of security and stability operations as “lesser included cases” of warfighting, what alternative approaches exist?
- How should the United States respond to the geostrategic demands for an internationally available rapid reaction capacity? An integrated civil-military approach to disaster response and stability operations? An improved national and international capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies?

### **III. What capacities does the military have – and require – in terms of structures and strategies, to fulfill these missions in order to meet the nation's needs?**

#### Objectives

- To identify the best approaches to closing mission gaps and to identify the conditions under which the various approaches might be most successful.
- To understand how the Title X choices and responsibilities of the various services interact to meet joint operation priorities, warfighting demands, and alliance imperatives.

#### Issues

- Where do current capacities fall short of meeting mission requirements posed by the nation's needs?
- What strategies should be adopted to close the gap between capabilities and requirements?
- What are the resource implications, in terms of both manpower and materiel, of the foregoing?
- How do changes in the roles and missions of the military affect the defense industry? What changes need to occur in order to position the industry to contribute most effectively to the security needs of the United States?
- How should we think about distributing the defense burden between the United States and its friends and allies around the world in order to close our own national gaps?

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