Constructing a Cohesive and Strategic International Response

Introduction

In many post-conflict environments, the chaos on the ground is paralleled only by the chaos of the international response. Various governmental agencies, international organizations, international financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations come from all parts of the globe to help. They bring much needed resources, expertise, and energy, but they also bring very different assumptions, working styles, and goals. Sometimes, making the international response cohere seems almost as challenging as rebuilding the country itself. And yet, if the international community is to maximize the likelihood of successful assistance and minimize the chance of exacerbating problems on the ground, it must take on that challenge.

Cooperation among international actors, while important, is not sufficient. Rather, a strategic approach that ensures unity of effort is essential to success. While creating a perfectly cohesive effort in any post-conflict country is not possible, there are a number of straightforward actions that can be taken to maximize the unity of international effort. Below are nine essential principles for unifying efforts and operational guidelines that should be followed to help realize them.

1. **The people of the country in question must own the reconstruction process and be its prime movers.**

Following conflict, indigenous governance structures are often very weak or non-existent. At the same time, the local human resource base is greatly diminished through war-induced deaths, brain drain, displacement, and forgone investment in human capital (due to destroyed or under-funded education and health systems as well as closed private enterprise). This bleak starting point often forces outside actors to play, at least initially, a disproportionately large role in the rebuilding process. While this reality cannot be denied, all efforts must be taken to ensure that the external presence dedicates itself to building indigenous capacity and governance structures as quickly as possible. A number of steps can and should be taken to ensure that the affected population does not come to depend on external actors for their basic goods and services, and makes good use of the presence of outside experts by receiving training and coaching.

In the end, mobilizing the country’s population is the only way that key goods and services will be delivered over time. This should include ensuring return of refugees and displaced persons who desire to return home as well as participation of the diaspora both economically, and in some cases, politically.

Host-country control and ownership are also central to building momentum for internal cohesion, forcing external collaboration (the more unified and autonomous the government, the more unified the external actors need to be), and creating a long-term sustainable political and economic balance.

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For more information on the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, visit the project’s website at www.pcrproject.org.
In keeping with this principle, the international community should follow the following operational guidelines:

- Leadership roles in the reconstruction effort must be given to host country nationals at the earliest possible stage of the process. Even if capacity is limited, host country representatives should chair or co-chair pledging conferences, priority-setting meetings, joint assessments of needs, and all other relevant processes. In ideal circumstances the representatives should be elected or otherwise legitimated representatives. In other situations, peace accords may designate which civil society actors beyond the parties to conflict should participate in specified aspects of the rebuilding process. Where these initial avenues do not exist, the international community must help create mechanisms for legitimate host country leaders to be elected or appointed. In such processes, the international community should try to avoid rigid ethnic formulas for political representation, even as it may use them for determining employment or distributing other economic goods. The Afghanistan process outlined in Bonn is just one recent example of a successful type of immediate leader identification with phased participatory, legitimizing processes.

- All international actors should seek out host country counterparts from day one. If they do not exist, international actors should help to create them and impart the knowledge and skills necessary to succeed in the job. For all tasks that will eventually need to be performed by the host country population, international organizations should pair their functionaries with indigenous actors (either through election, appointment, or competitive hiring mechanisms). Creating or developing effective host country counterparts should be one of the criteria on which the various external organizations and individuals are judged, including in their performance reports.

2. A coherent international strategy based on internal and external parties' interests is crucial.

While major international actors have called for strategic coordination in post-conflict settings, and the UN has attempted to create and implement "strategic frameworks" for coordinating the UN system, the simple fact is that no general model of, or processes for, strategy development and coordination exists.

For any strategy development exercise in these difficult environments to succeed, it must be based on at least four key assumptions. First, all involved must recognize that post-conflict reconstruction is not a technical or "normal" developmental process, but rather a fundamentally political one. While the United Nations has accurately acknowledged that, "the overriding criterion for the selection and establishment of [aid] priorities is political," in fact neither the UN nor other international organizations have conducted their assistance programs in a manner that conforms to the primacy of politics in these settings.

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2 The author would like to thank Radha Kumar for recalling the importance of this distinction.
3 See for example the formulation agreed by all the worlds major aid donors in OECD/DAC Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation (March 1997), p. 33 and p. 48 <www.jha.ac/Ref/017.pdf> and April2001 supplement.
4 The first UN attempt in Afghanistan in the 1990s fizzled over time as bureaucratic resistance and difficulties on the ground doomed the UN's first major effort. See "Strategic Framework for Afghanistan Towards a Principled Approach to Peace and Reconstruction" (Sept 1998). In 1999 the UN planned to develop a strategic framework for Sierra Leone, which never materialized. <www.epasg.org/Programme/strategic_framework/Strategic_Framework.shtml> and the "Generic Guidelines for a Strategic Framework Approach for Response to and Recovery from Crisis" (April 1999) <http://dadb.org.uk/Programme/strategic_framework/Strategic_Framework.shtml>. On the other hand, the UN has been more successful coordinating development activities in various countries through UN Common Country Assessment/Development Assistance Frameworks (CCA/UNDAFs).
5 For a good volume that makes this case clearly based on multiple case studies, see Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, eds. Peacebuilding as Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
Second, any outside intervention must be designed with the interests of all the key actors involved, both within the country and outside. Just as the fundamental interests of the parties to conflict must be evaluated and influenced to create a stable peace, so too must the interests of other key actors in the society, as well as those of neighbors, regional actors, and international powers. If a realistic interest calculation is not done with and for the indigenous players, then any intervention may unwittingly empower spoilers or disempower legitimate, peace-seeking actors. At the same time, interest calculations of key international actors similarly protect against underestimating or overestimating their interest in helping or harming the peace process.

Third, needs must be rigorously prioritized and activities sequenced accordingly. Dire post-conflict environments rife with needs often lead indigenous actors and international interveners to determine that “everything is a priority.” Yet if everything is a priority, then nothing is. As difficult as such discipline is in the face of extreme want, a strategic approach demands that host country leaders and outside actors agree on top priorities. While every case is different, certain issues—security, for one—need urgent attention in virtually all cases. Safety is often followed closely by meeting food security needs—not just immediate humanitarian assistance, but also the revival of agriculture and functional market and distribution mechanisms. Another top priority is putting people back to work. While new economic activity that spurs employment is preferable, temporary work programs are often required to get people off the streets and spur economic activity and hope.

Fourth, while a coordinated strategic plan may exist on paper, only a small team of key external actors working in-country will be able to effectively leverage international resources and influence the interest calculations of key actors. Major international support, if delivered ad hoc through myriad agencies, may meet some immediate needs within the country, but will be unlikely to constructively address the needs of those who could reignite the conflict. Thus senior-level international actors, whether envoys or special representatives, must be resourced to make the in-country financial, security, and operational decisions that make or break the reconstruction process.

Accordingly, the international community should adopt the following operational guidelines:

- In order to ensure strategic coherence throughout the process, international organizations and countries should designate top international and national leadership—experienced, operationally-minded, and culturally savvy—and deploy them to the field as soon as possible. Where the United Nations is integrally involved, Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) should be given additional authority to coordinate UN actors and shape the strategic direction of the overall international response. In addition, major donors like the United States should field senior, operationally-oriented “Directors of Reconstruction” to ensure a coherent national response.6

- Representatives of the international community in partnership with host country representatives should conduct joint assessments of needs so that all players have a common frame of reference. The host country should be a leader in the process of assessing local and regional actors and estimating the capacity of factions to advance or undermine the peace process. Local leaders will best be able to identify security risks, assess priority infrastructure needs, point out quick-impact opportunities for international actors who need to gain credibility, and identify local resources that could be channeled towards reconstruction.

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6 For more information on leadership of the coordinated U.S. response, see PCR project discussion paper: “Meeting the Challenges of Governance and Participation In Post-Conflict Settings” and the corresponding article “Governancing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2002.
• Based on this joint assessment, international and indigenous representatives on the ground should develop a strategy for addressing priority needs and objectives and provide strategy suggestions to help shape any pledging conference. Whether an indigenous or intervening actor, those working in the field will be the most able to realistically evaluate and prioritize needs.

• In order to maximize impact, the international community must not only prioritize needs, but it must also pay serious attention to the sequencing of the various aspects of its intervention. If top priorities are addressed in the wrong order, there can be perverse side affects. Therefore, the UN SRSG or other senior official coordinating the international response with the host government should have the authority and responsibility to accelerate or slow certain agencies' programs based on prioritization and sequencing requirements. Because not all tasks can be a priority, and sequencing cannot happen as it would in a laboratory, risks and trade-offs must be communicated to members of the host country who may be affected.

3. **Security is the *sine qua non* of post-conflict reconstruction.**

Though every case is different, there is one constant – if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail. Unless security needs are addressed up front, spoilers will have undue leverage to affect the political outcomes, vitiating the peace. In an insecure environment, elevated risk will impede the mobilization of pro-peace constituencies. In addition, if the international community gets significantly involved without sufficient security and the blood of those providing assistance is spilled, there will be a risk of an abrupt pull out – leaving the country and those involved in the operation significantly worse off than before.

While security is essential, it will never be one hundred percent guaranteed. Crucial initial efforts in justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation must not be sacrificed for vain attempts to establish a completely stable and secure environment. The perfect must not become the enemy of the good.

Some operational guidelines that the international community should follow are:

• “Coalitions of the willing” and UN peacekeeping operations need coherent military leadership and core troops that provide the backbone of the operation. This is most easily ensured when both are provided by a “lead nation” (or the equivalent) as the United States and then Canada did in Haiti, NATO did in Bosnia and Kosovo, and Australia did in East Timor. However, no single, fail-proof model exists. Various other configurations have worked in other instances such as Sierra Leone (where the British have provided core capabilities and South Asian and African troops have provided leadership and the bulk of the forces).

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7 In Bosnia, for example, the position of spoilers was unintentionally strengthened when economic privatization programs were pursued before rule of law and anti-corruption mechanisms were in place. See “Leaders in Bosnia Are Said to Steal Up to $1 Billion.” C. Hedges, *New York Times.* (August 17, 1999) and “Better Luck Next Time” *The Economist.* (29 April 1999).

8 In Afghanistan in 2002, hundreds of thousands of refugees have repatriated to Kabul before public health needs could be sufficiently met, e.g. lack of sanitation, damaged infrastructure, or uncleared mine fields. UNHCR has argued that the decision on repatriation belongs to the refugees, while responsibility for communicating risks remains with the overseeing international organization. “Let Afghans themselves decide if they are ready to go home, says UNHCR.” Relief Web (June 26, 2002).
Because personal security and internal order are essential and often in scarce supply in a post-conflict environment, policing is a major need. The international community must enhance its ability to deploy civilian police to address temporary needs.

Efforts to design and reconstruct or reform local security institutions, including both military and police, must begin early in the peace process. International actors must have a agreed plan that shares the burden for these efforts in a coherent manner, otherwise competing efforts can create tensions or rival institutions that can fundamentally threaten security. To implement this vision, the international community must build additional training and organizing capacity to help develop indigenous police forces in a timely manner.

4. Success is made in the field.

While the distant headquarters of various international actors can facilitate or impede success, the key to effective international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction efforts is empowering and organizing representatives in the field. Strategy in a post-conflict environment must be closely tailored to the particular characteristics of the country, and as such, should be heavily informed by those closest to the situation. To operate strategically and effectively, the key international actors must be close to key host country actors, both because they must know what their interest calculations are and how to influence them, and because they must be able to flexibly respond to difficult situations on short notice.

Because actors with various—sometimes even contradictory—mandates are in the field at any given time, they must be left to devise an appropriate division of labor at the country level. Adhering too closely to the interests of distant capitals, headquarters and mandates is a recipe for failure. Redundancy, overlap, and unhealthy competition are the likely results. Those who are looking at the same situation every day are much more likely to find areas of agreement on how to proceed than those who follow guidance based on abstract authorities and bureaucratic politics generated in distant places.

Therefore, the following operational guidelines should be considered:

- Donors and international organizations should structure their post-conflict authorities to devolve maximum power, money and authority to their representatives in the field.

- “Country teams” should include representatives not only from the UN system and/or the lead nation, but also the International Financial Institutions, Multilateral Development Banks, key NGOs, and any military or security personnel operating in theatre. They should jointly conduct assessments, provide input to strategic planning, and coordinate all activities throughout their stay in country.

- Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) or Civil-Military Cooperation Centers (CIMICs) should be a standard part of the package where military or peacekeeping operations operate alongside other reconstruction efforts. In order to succeed, the coordination of civilian and military strategies must come together to form a common culture and site for information sharing.

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and operational coordination. Both military and humanitarian groups must dedicate staff and
time to the communication of their activities, assets, and limitations in order to build credibility,
manage expectations, and build trusting dependable relationships across organizational lines.
CMOCs or CIMICS must be readily available to the civilian community—that is, they should be
located “outside the wire” of a military compound, and should have joint military and civilian
leadership. They must also have immediate access to the force commander, military logistics,
and operations.

- “Friends Groups,” which formally bring together governments with means and interests in
supporting the peace and reconstruction process, should be cultivated and formed at early stages
of the process.11

5. **International interventions are extraordinary and should aspire to leave a minimal “footprint”
behind.**

A significant international presence is often needed in a post-conflict situation in order to provide
security, reassure the indigenous population of international financial and moral support, deliver needed
services, and build lasting internal capacity. While a large international presence may be both necessary
and appropriate in initial phases, a dominating presence can be damaging. A large international presence,
if not managed properly, can have such negative consequences as: 1) encouraging dependency, both
physical and psychological; 2) distorting the local economy, including markets for goods, labor, real
estate, and currency; 3) distorting local norms, values, and practices, especially those relating to age and
gender; and 4) damaging the health and well being of the population due to increased sexual contact and
the transmission of HIV/AIDS and other STDs.

Some operational guidelines that the international community should follow are:

- Hire locals to do as many jobs as possible. If it can be done by a local, it should be. Provide
  incentives, such as good publicity and additional resources, to international and non-
governmental organizations that do this well. Employing locals both helps boost long-term
  economic and social well-being and morale, and reduces the size of the international presence
  with its negative economic side effects such as inflation, parallel economies, and housing
  shortages. Increasing local employment can also improve buy-in for peace—people with jobs
  are more likely to support a stable political order. On a cautionary note, employing locals
  must be done in such a way that jobs are distributed in a manner that is perceived to be “fair”
  by most people (e.g., by ethnicity, geography or political persuasion) – otherwise a delicate
  political balance can be disrupted.

- Establish salary structures for local hires that are competitive, but not exorbitant. Donor
  agencies must compete for the highest skilled workers without drawing them all away from
government and indigenous private sector opportunities. Where necessary, donors may even

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10 Since Operations “Provide Comfort” and “Provide Relief,” the coordinating mechanism of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) has
been incorporated into U.S. military doctrine. Meanwhile, humanitarian organizations have begun to build internal frameworks for collaboration,
e.g. Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC) in Kosovo, or OCHA’s Structured Humanitarian Assistance Reporting (SHARE).
Military Sharing,” 2001 Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference <http://www.usip.org/civil/cas/11.html>. For more information on OCHA’s
mechanism SHARE, see <http://www.preventionconsortium.org/files/disasterdb/02050201/recaldekingdavis.pdf>.
11 According to one study that reviewed 16 different cases, “Friends Groups” were a part of virtually all cases of successful strategic coordination.
See Bruce D. Jones, “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in
provide temporary supplements to the fledgling host government in order to make key government and private sector positions more attractive.

- Balance the "light footprint" with critical backing for key groups and individuals. Reformers within the host country can often author the strategy and organize broad support, but certain groups may require particularly visible outside support. That said, outside support must be provided in such a way as to not compromise the independence and legitimacy of the parties receiving such support.

6. **Mechanisms are needed to rapidly mobilize and coordinate needed resources and sustain them for appropriate periods of time.**

Given the great diversity of actors, agendas, funding sources, authorities, and methods of disbursement involved, it is little wonder that funding post-conflict operations is complex and that current methodologies have proven quite resistant to change.

Bilateral donors, UN agencies and international financial institutions are generally more eager to script their own role in post-conflict reconstruction than to coordinate with other international or local actors. The World Bank was established with a mandate of post-conflict reconstruction, and over the course of the last decade has again become by far the largest funder of activities in post-conflict situations. Individual OECD donor countries have also provide large amounts of funding, as have regional development banks. And the UN, while its monies are much smaller, sometimes plays an important role in managing the politics of a post-conflict reconstruction process, thereby becoming involved in the coordination of resources.

To date, virtually all these major actors have examined current funding mechanisms and found them wanting. Yet attempts to mobilize funding for these types of operations more rapidly have failed. To bridge the gap some have proposed innovative solutions, but donors have jealously guarded their

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12 For example in post-Taliban reconstruction, SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi selected Fatiha Serour as his gender advisor, an Afghan woman without international experience, in order to build support that fit within Afghan mores. The Security Council expressed support for human rights reform, declaring "it was 'essential" for the future government to respect the human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender, ethnicity and religion, and welcomed the Interim Authority's 'bold steps' to promote the rights of women - including appointing female Cabinet Ministers - and control illegal narcotics, such as opium and heroin, in particular by banning the production of poppy." [http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue1/02p7.htm]

13 The best work on international funding coordination has been done by Forman and Patrick. The analysis here draws on their work, though some of the conclusions presented here may differ. Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, eds. Good Intentions Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000).

14 Between 1989 and 1998, for example, the Bank disbursed over 6.2 billion in loans for eighteen countries experiencing or emerging from conflict. By 1999 a full one-quarter of its concessional lending to countries other than China and India. Cited in Forman and Patrick, eds. Good Intentions Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 45.

15 Forman and Patrick note that global mechanisms for reporting aid flows do not provide a means to verify aid delivery. They note that the best sources available for obtaining aid flow statistics are through the Quarterly Report on Individual Aid Commitments and the Geographical Distribution of Aid Flows, now the Creditor Reporting System on Aid Activities published by the DAC. The 22 DAC members are responsible ultimately for approximately 99% of global ODA.

16 For example, the UN Strategic Framework model proved a failure in its Afghanistan pilot; despite a commitment in 1999 to develop a strategic framework for Sierra Leone, none was fully developed. In an attempt to mobilize funds more effectively, the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CAP) was modified into an Expanded Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (ECAP), both of which have marginally improved coordination to meet priority needs. As previously noted, the DAC developed basic Guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation. The World Bank continues to appeal for a trust fund that would house post-conflict funds committed by all reconstruction participants.

Programmatically, the World Bank developed a Post-Conflict Reconstruction program (now the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit) and is seeking to build upon a limited, if dedicated Post Conflict Fund. The US has developed the modestly-resourced Office of Transitional Initiatives within USAID and Canada has developed a similarly limited Peacebuilding Fund within CIDA.

17 Two innovative proposals have come out of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. The first proposal was for a financial facility called a Global Recovery Fund (GRF), whose key multilateral stakeholders would include the World Bank, the leading international finance organization, UNDP and UNHCR. However, as the authors anticipated, DAC members sought "to avoid regular budgetary
somef regard to their assistance in politically charged environments,” and in January 1999 rejected the GRF proposal as unrealistic. UNHCR and World Bank, “Roundtable on the Gap,” cited in Fonnan and Patrick, p. 24. The second proposal, for an even more ambitious “Strategic Recovery Facility” that would go beyond the GRF to include both an institutional and a financial facility, is still under consideration by international actors, spearheaded by the British and Norwegian governments. For an overview of the proposal, please see “Strategic Recovery Facility,” a proposal by the Center on International Cooperation, New York University.18 Working from a similar model to GRF, the World Bank continues to push for development of a post-conflict trust fund. This financial mechanism would similarly be a single monetary account designed to fill the gap in funding for various types of activities between the phases of emergency relief normal financing mechanisms. Rather than fund specific reconstruction programs and activities, the trust would have specific eligibility criteria for expenditures, unified disbursement procedures, and oversight by an accountable, broad-based governing body. Currently, the Bank is piloting a Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) housed within the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit that “supports planning, piloting and analysis of reconstruction activities by funding governments and partner organizations in the forefront of this work. The emphasis is on speed and flexibility without sacrificing quality.” 19

Some operational guidelines that the international community should follow are:

- Based on various funders’ acknowledgements that efforts to help post-conflict countries have been severely hindered by current funding mechanisms, they should agree to craft a new resource-mobilizing infrastructure for post-conflict situations. A joint effort should be undertaken by the World Bank, the UN, the regional development banks, and the OECD bilateral donors to create a new funding mechanism to address the needs of countries in crisis or emerging from it. At the more ambitious end of the spectrum it could look something like the proposed Strategic Recovery Facility, or it could be a more modest financial facility like that currently being considered at the World Bank. 18 In addition, flexible, case specific models for rapid mobilization of funds such as the P.E.A.C.E. Facility in the West Bank and Gaza (the successor to the Holst Fund) should be explored for broader applicability.

- Individual contributing governments will also need to improve their ability to commit to flexible reconstruction assistance and move money quickly. 10

- Pledging conferences, in which donor nations tend to extend promises far beyond what they will truly deliver, require mechanisms for monitoring and accountability. Afghanistan is only the most recent example of the damage done by slow-disbursing aid. 20 What is needed is a comprehensive set of agreements and mechanisms to track aid disbursements against targets and goals set out at pledging conferences. In addition, procedures for disbursing the funds must be harmonized among donors so as to ensure transparent, smooth flows that reduce the burden on recipients.

- Provide disbursement authorities to operation-level strategists, e.g. SRSGs or Directors of Reconstruction, rather than retaining them in New York or foreign capitals. As a result of working on the field, these senior representatives on the ground will have better knowledge

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assessments and to maintain sovereign control of their assistance in politically charged environments,” and in January 1999 rejected the GRF proposal as unrealistic. UNHCR and World Bank, “Roundtable on the Gap,” cited in Fonnan and Patrick, p. 24. The second proposal, for an even more ambitious “Strategic Recovery Facility” that would go beyond the GRF to include both an institutional and a financial facility, is still under consideration by international actors, spearheaded by the British and Norwegian governments. For an overview of the proposal, please see “Strategic Recovery Facility,” a proposal by the Center on International Cooperation, New York University.18 Working from a similar model to GRF, the World Bank continues to push for development of a post-conflict trust fund. This financial mechanism would similarly be a single monetary account designed to fill the gap in funding for various types of activities between the phases of emergency relief normal financing mechanisms. Rather than fund specific reconstruction programs and activities, the trust would have specific eligibility criteria for expenditures, unified disbursement procedures, and oversight by an accountable, broad-based governing body. Currently, the Bank is piloting a Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) housed within the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit that “supports planning, piloting and analysis of reconstruction activities by funding governments and partner organizations in the forefront of this work. The emphasis is on speed and flexibility without sacrificing quality.” 19

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19 Report on UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CAP) and the Expanded Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (ECAP), p 39 Fonnan. For one proposal to improve United States government capacity along these lines, see the accompanying PCR Project paper on funding changes needed within the United States.

20 On August 15, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld stated in a Pentagon briefing that Afghan reconstruction “money has not been coming in as fast as it needs to come in. I’m told that less than a third of the aid pledged for this year, at the Tokyo conference, has arrived thus far, and it’s September almost. In many cases the promised contributions are spread out over several years, and in still other instances, they are in kind as opposed to in cash, and that means that managing it is more difficult than it would be with cash, although all of it’s helpful and all of it’s needed and all of it’s appreciated. Others of the donations are saddled with various prohibitions… It all helps, but it does need to be increased.”

For the impact of slow funding on prospects of success, see also Susan B. Glasser “Reconstruction of Afghan Roads Stalls, Despite Promises; New government Sees Donors Leave.” Washington Post, (August 11, 2002); Ahmed Rashid, “Foreign-Aid Shortage Hinders Karzai’s Efforts Against Warlords.” Wall Street Journal, (July 18, 2002); and Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, “Miles to Go Before Kabul Can Be Left Behind.” Washington Post. (June 09, 2002). “During a Tokyo reconstruction conference in January, international donors pledged $4.5 billion. Only a fraction of that—an estimated $100 million—has been given. That will continue to be the case as long as Afghanistan is seen as an unstable nation.” Tini Tran, “Groups Seek Afghan Peace Expansion.” Associated Press. (June 22, 2002).
of genuine priorities, credible mechanisms for resource transfer, and suspected or known spoilers than they possibly could from their home cities.

- Donor governments, international financial institutions, and international organizations such as the United Nations need to establish and fund accounts that can be used to cover recurrent costs for civil administration and other key budget expenditures that enable a new government to function. Without external support in the initial phase of recovery, incipient institutions have no way of developing quickly enough to assume basic responsibilities in a realistic time frame. Thus, such expenditures are an essential part if both a success strategy and an exit strategy.

7. Accountability is essential for both host country and international actors.

Holding both host country and international actors accountable in post-conflict settings is as important as it is difficult. Chaos exists after a conflict because no legal or institutional framework has the authority to hold people accountable in economic, political, and personal affairs. All too often force or the threat of force mediates justice, while actors seeking to build the legitimacy of civic recourses lack the clout and structure to deter dishonorable conduct. At the same time, the influx of foreign resources into a resource-scarce environment not only raises the potential for corruption but also tests the accountability of both local and international actors.

- Conditionality can and should be used to ensure accountability, but it must be carefully designed, focused on specific high value issues (corruption, key parts of the peace accords, etc), and rigorously coordinated so as not to pull the incipient government apart.21

- Before being dispatched to a post-conflict site, international staff members should be required by their sponsoring organization to receive appropriate training and indoctrination on codes of conduct and accountability systems.22 In addition to imparting basic human rights covenants and principles, training should teach a) internal legal aspects of a mission such as standing operating procedures, codes of conduct and clearly delineated disciplinary procedures, as well as b) external legal requirements such as the laws and norms of the host country, the requirements of their home country and policies of the sponsoring organization. If indigenous or generic procedures and penal codes have been set up, staff must be trained in these legal frameworks and the legal implications of abridging these laws.23

- Design and rigidly enforce codes of conduct for international actors. While a host country may not yet have acculturated to robust norms, and may lack mechanisms for enforcement and punishment, intervening organizations retain the authority over their staff to require adherence to a strict code of conduct. In addition to observing all local laws (and being imprisoned or immediately expelled if they do not), international staff should be penalized in job evaluations and public information campaigns if they behave inappropriately. Civil and military professionals remain accountable to the sovereign law of their home countries.

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21 For a further discussion of the importance of choosing the right kind of conditionality, harmonizing economic and “peace” conditionality, and rigorously coordinating it among various actors, please see Robert Orr, “Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2002.

22 UN DPKO and OHCHR already require basic UN Human Rights Courses for Peacekeepers and Police Commanders, but recent evidence of sexual exploitation by UN staff suggests that current curricula and enforcement measures are tragically insufficient. The Brahimi Report notes, “…the importance of training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law” (No. 41) and commends the Secretary-General’s bulletin of 6 August 1999 entitled “Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law” (ST/SGB/1999/13).

23 These topics for training are among those proposed in a fall 2001 UN meeting developing “Seminar on Management Training for Civilian Police for Peacekeeping Missions.”

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8. The timing of an operation must be driven by circumstances on the ground, not by artificial deadlines or by externally driven bureaucratic imperatives.

Timing of international actions can be a crucial determinant of success or failure. Unfortunately, the international community is neither nimble nor prompt when either getting into the field or transitioning from one phase of an operation to another. Likewise, international actors are often indecisive on the indicators for handing off authorities and departing at the appropriate time.

Fielding appropriate resources quickly enables international actors to maximize their leverage when the peace is both most fragile and most malleable. Timing is no less a concern, however, once actors are in the field. Phasing actors in and out (i.e., peacekeepers, police, etc.) and designing in hand-offs to host country actors from the beginning is crucial to addressing needs appropriately, maintaining momentum, and ultimately, to making an intervention sustainable.

- **Getting in:** The effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction is often a race against time, while the opportunity for establishing rule of law is greatest. Thus in order to achieve maximum leverage of finite resources, the United States must improve the pace at which our civilian capacity responds to international complex contingencies. Our ability to react rapidly—and with appropriate breadth of engagement—will require significant structural and cultural reform in the areas of anticipatory planning, rate of deployment, and funding mechanisms. 24

- **Transitioning:** To sustain political support and enable smoother transitions from one phase of an operation to the next, establish measures of success at the beginning of a mission and evaluate progress constantly. 25 This is a key to managing expectations both of the local population and the international community.

- **Getting out:** A realistic time horizon is essential to achieving a mission’s goals and calibrating expectations accordingly. Different actors may be central in different time periods, but the major actors must make an overall commitment to stay engaged over time. Any artificial deadlines for withdrawal, like those set by the United States in Bosnia, simply enable spoilers to wait the international community out. Achieving success is the only true exit strategy. Anything less risks forcing return involvement at a later date.

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24 For recommendations to meet this challenge of rapid reaction see PCR project discussion paper: “Post-Conflict Rapid Civilian Response.” See also the Brahimi Report, which notes, “The first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. Deployment timelines should thus be tailored accordingly.” (No. 87).

25 For example, the World Bank established 9-month objectives in Afghanistan, in order to assess its progress and hold itself accountable to its shareholders. Its objectives included the areas of governance and civil service, fund management, employment and education, infrastructure, agriculture, and business development, as well as the organization of donors led by Afghan authorities, and enhanced knowledge by the Bank and international community of Afghanistan’s needs for longer-term development <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/03/29/000094846_02032004020914/Rendered/PDF/multiOpage.pdf>. Any such effort to create measures of success must allow for the possibility that spoilers might try to use them to design a strategy for waiting out the international community. As such, they must be used carefully, with enforcement mechanisms in place every step of the way.
Conclusion

Given the immense social, financial, military and political expense of assisting a nation in its recovery from conflict, and the grim consensus that so-called failed states will continue to demand international attention, lead nations and organizations in reconstruction have every incentive to build disciplined, effective methods for getting the job done well and quickly. With the lessons of 1990s, we now have sufficient knowledge of the pitfalls and opportunities of post-conflict reconstruction to become more sophisticated and systematic in our approach. The numerous donor agencies, international organizations and NGOs must not be allowed to pursue their mandates in such a way that compromises long-term local sustainability. Countries emerging from conflict succeed to the extent that they achieve a united vision, accountability, and well-organized capacity—and international actors must remain committed to these goals for themselves as well as the country they assist.