

GREATER GUNS FOR GREATER GOODS



BY JANE HOLL LUTE



ROLE OF **★** AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

A PROGRAM OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

**Greater Guns
for
Greater Goods**

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FOREWORD

In the days immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, there was a rush to judgment that the world had been fundamentally altered and that nothing would be the same after September 11, 2001. In the weeks that followed, we came to realize that there were some things that were truly new, some that were only new to us, and that a campaign to eradicate terrorism would not replace, but broaden our perspective and add to our responsibilities with respect to the American use of force.

While our national priorities may have been reordered, (or, perhaps, rediscovered), the environment in which the nation makes decisions about the deployment and the employment of the American military establishment is still conditioned by what we have done in the past and what we expect in the future. Our ideas about how force can contribute to a solution, and under what conditions force should be limited, retain much of their customary and familiar ring. Americans know that their military possesses great destructive capacity. But we also know that destruction is only one part, and in many cases may be the easiest policy component, of a solution to international problems. Terrorism may be the most immediate challenge in time, space, and priority, but it exists alongside other thorny problems that existed on September 10th and will confront us in the future. In many ways, the events of September 11th have thrown into stark relief the relationship between American military force and our security challenges. American force is a necessary, but not always sufficient, instrument of power in protecting and promoting American interests.

Americans demand two qualities from their military establishment. They demand, and will continue to support, efforts to retain our pre-eminence. The United States is recognized around the world as the leading force for security and stability, serving as a foundation for global economic growth, the rule of law, and the consequent expansion of governance practices in accord with dignity, human rights, and freedom of political expression. Our pre-eminence redounds to our benefit in ways tangible and immediate, and

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unseen and removed. Americans also expect their military to work as a reliable partner. When we clearly state our goals, responsibilities, and intentions, we can welcome the cooperation and assistance of like-minded nations. When the civilian and military leaders of our uniformed services work with the rest of government to articulate objectives, requirements and plans, we achieve synergy with our interagency partners to increase effectiveness and efficiency. When our citizens understand our goals and willingness to sacrifice, we gain the support of an innovative, resilient, and unselfish society.

There will be few hard and fast rules for the use of force in the 21st century. But there will exist a uniquely American approach to using force and employing forces. There is immeasurable value in thinking about the conditions and criteria beforehand and constructing a useable framework around which we can build our decision-making processes and considerations. This study moves that effort forward in a timely and thorough fashion.

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INTRODUCTION¹

In some places in France there are more dead Americans buried than there are living French voters. In fact, American graves are scattered throughout Europe and the Pacific. In Germany, Turkey, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Low Countries, Korea, and elsewhere, soldiers from the United States—and many other countries—lost their lives in two world wars. What brought these soldiers so far from home, willing to pay the highest price? Through two protracted and bloody wars, European interests collided, drawing into the killing vortex many whose homeland and fellow citizens had not been attacked, but who were determined to fight to the death; they did so to stop the violence and restore global order.

This essay considers international order and examines why and how threats to that order can motivate states to fight. From a post-Cold War and plainly American perspective, it tries to explain the special challenge that Americans confront when they contemplate solving complex international problems with the use of force. It examines some of the factors that combine to shape the U.S. view of using force to respond to world events—including the historical trajectory of its late twentieth-century military experiences—and offers a view on how those factors might set the course for U.S. policy in the near future.

The essay examines the post-Cold War record of U.S. uses of force—and forces—in order to dispel a myth: that the United States fights only for narrowly defined and “vital” national interests. It argues that in fact U.S. foreign policy in general, and U.S. military policy in particular, has pursued *broader* goals across the full spectrum of political, military, social, humanitarian, and security interests than might be expected from a single nation-state without empire. Indeed, U.S. policy has for decades reflected a broad reliance on multilateral institutions and collective processes—processes that have come to characterize international relations in the second half of the twentieth century, when the burden of state governance has become irreversibly internationalized.

U.S. policymakers have increasingly relied on multilateral solutions in the 1990s—a time perhaps less remarkable as the dawn of a new era than as a coda to the old, inasmuch as the tailing winds of the Cold War continue to sweep the international political landscape. During these years, the United States has emerged as the world’s sole remaining superpower, though one with special burdens that it finds difficult to bear on its own. The task of

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governance has become overwhelming for other states as well, making them increasingly dependent on the special capacities of the United States to help solve problems—especially when solutions require the threat or use of force. Moreover, on these issues in particular, and despite its rhetoric, the United States has risen to the challenge, its actions demonstrating an important change: a marked shift in its own operating presumption from one of unilateralism to one of multilateralism. Perhaps surprisingly, Americans support their country in this role; indeed, in many important areas, they believe the United States should do more.

The shift toward multilateralism has had two noticeable effects on issues regarding the use of force. First, the United States now uses force more frequently to deal with circumstances that fit more comfortably within the wide ambit of global governance than the tighter one of core national interests; and second, U.S. force is subjected, by Washington's choice, to greater international oversight than ever before.

Thus, from Somalia to Bosnia to Kosovo and elsewhere, the United States has engaged, with others, in using force for a wide range of circumstances clearly not "vital" to U.S. interests. Moreover, the record shows that the United States has done so largely by taking the necessary steps to ensure that its actions are in accord with a broad international consensus, are consistent with the norms and principles underlying the U.N. Charter, and generally comply with Charter procedures.

Do these developments reflect a new American awareness that responsible states at times must be willing to use assertive measures to preserve certain standards of conduct for the greater good irrespective of the national mood, or are U.S. actions still best understood as reflecting traditional approaches to state interests and international relations? In attempting to answer these questions, this essay turns first to examining U.S. experience with the use of force over the past fifty years—as the United States accustomed itself to its emerging and changing status as a world superpower.

AMERICA'S EVOLVING POLICY ON THE USE OF FORCE²

In the decades following the decisive World War II victory that it won jointly with the Allies, the United States learned hard lessons—in Korea, Vietnam, Beirut—about the limitations of force when trying to solve complicated international problems. If today some observers decry what they perceive as a knee-jerk instinct in Washington to throw military forces at every problem, they would not find much comfort in the aftermath of World War II, when the clear global superiority of the United States, the Truman Doctrine, and U.S. military action in Korea combined to position the United States to take a very assertive role in world affairs.³

With the Soviet threat clarified and the experience of recent world war so fresh, the average American needed little convincing that U.S. help was needed to keep the hostile world at bay. Yet with the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that, from 1945 to 1965, the power of the United States was most visibly measured, and its developing global interests most securely guarded, by the breathtaking reach of its nuclear power rather than by the still considerable size of its conventional military force.⁴

By the mid-1960s, Vietnam had begun to loom large, and for the next ten years, the United States fought communism and the North Vietnamese to little productive end. By 1975, from the streets of Washington to the roofs of Saigon, the message was clear: not only had this great state lost this small war, the war was itself a disastrously misguided effort by any American measure.⁵ Communism was not defeated, lives were not saved, South Vietnam disappeared, and the United States was defeated, with its military bitter.

For civilian and soldier alike, the experience of Vietnam was particularly important in refining U.S. views on the use of force. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger gave these views concrete form in 1984, when, following the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon, he prominently announced six conditions that had to be met before any future decision to send American troops into harm's way.⁶ In essence, these conditions demanded that force be used only in defense of U.S. vital interests, only as a last resort, and only with clear public support. The statement was noteworthy for its clarity, timing, and decisiveness.

The response to Secretary Weinberger's pronouncement quickly divided into two camps: those who strongly supported these guidelines, and

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those who opposed taking a “black letter” approach to such enormously complex and ultimately political issues.⁷ George Shultz, then serving as Secretary of State, openly took issue with Secretary Weinberger. He argued that diplomacy and force could not be separated, and that the formula outlined by the Secretary of Defense unacceptably tied the president’s hands. In one major audience, however—the American military—the principles set out by Secretary Weinberger found resonance and solid support. The U.S. military leadership promoted these principles as ironclad rules governing the use of force—although, even at the height of their influence, these rules were never matched by reality. As the debate matured, the view grew that the doctrine suffered from moral blindness, as it was unacceptably silent on the question of whether doing the “right” thing should not also be considered a part of the decision to exert force and the international responsibility of the United States.⁸

Whether or not one agrees with the principles embodied in the Weinberger doctrine, the lasting value of Weinberger’s pronouncement may reside not in its specifics, but in what it says about fundamental elements of the United States’ national security policymaking and approach to international affairs. These principles say something about national interests, about the use of force to pursue those interests, and about the way the United States should connect ends and means. The underlying framework of the Weinberger doctrine represents an important way to understand the current American approach to the use of force. “Vital” interests are worth the use of force, but force is best applied only as a last resort, and only in ways that will ensure successful results. Moreover, there must be a certain level of transparency in decisions to use force—that is, the rationale for using force must be made sufficiently clear to the American people to secure their support.

Indeed, given the sweeping global changes since the end of the Cold War, the Weinberger framework may be more important than the Weinberger principles. It already seems more durable, and when examined in detail, reveals a great irony: this tool, designed to ensure that the United States uses force only reluctantly and only for purposes tightly linked to clear national interests, shows that precisely the opposite has occurred. America has used its forces and its force not infrequently, and most often for the primary benefit of others (although its interests, too, have been involved). Moreover, no hard-and-fast rules regarding timing or clear popular support have ever been observed. An examination of U.S. interests and judgments regarding the relative utility of force in the post-Cold War period points up these conclusions.

U.S. INTERESTS

Scholars and policymakers have struggled for years to define and differentiate national interests in decisive ways. The general view is that core national interests comprise a state's fundamental safety, political sovereignty, and territorial integrity. One recent authoritative study identifies four levels of U.S. national security interests: vital, extremely important, "just" important, and less important (or secondary).⁹

Vital national interests, essential to the continued existence and well-being of the United States as a free and prosperous nation, include the needs to: prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of weapons-of-mass-destruction attacks on the United States; prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia; prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in control of the seas; prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems (for trade, financial markets, energy supplies, and the environment); and guarantee the survival of U.S. allies.¹⁰ The implication of this definition of course is that the United States should be willing to go to war to defend these interests.

Extremely important national interests include many of the foregoing imperatives *applied to other regions of the world*: promoting the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes; maintaining a global lead in military and other strategic techniques; suppressing trans-border problems of terrorism, crime, and narcotics trafficking; and promoting strong U.S. alliances. Threats to these interests warrant diplomatic and economic engagement backed up by the threat or use of force under certain circumstances.

"Just" important and *secondary* interests include: political stability and economic development throughout the rest of the world, humanitarian concerns, the protection of human rights, democratization, and preservation of the environment. Protection of these interests normally would not require military intervention (U.S. operations in Grenada in 1984 and in Panama in 1989 might be seen as exceptions that prove the rule). Instead, political, diplomatic, economic, and other means are more likely to be appropriate for dealing with such problems.

Many of the interests identified above, in all categories, call to mind an old saying that might be recast as, "What's good for the United States is good for the world, and vice versa."¹¹ To many Americans, such a view is, frankly, about right.¹² Much foreign commentary that argues in favor of an internationally engaged United States seems imbued with this view as well,

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although it is usually expressed more guardedly. During the Cold War, the principal national security interest of the United States and other like-minded states—to contain the threat of communism—was seen broadly as an agenda that spoke to the interests of many countries. The general expectation in the 1990s was that Washington would articulate a simple approach to world affairs to benefit the nations of the industrialized West, not only itself.¹³

Yet U.S. interests did not emerge with great clarity during this period. Since 1990, successive iterations of the National Security Strategy (NSS) have read more like a menu of choices than like an agenda of priorities. In the NSS, the categories of vital, important, and humanitarian and other interests are preserved and highlight the need to safeguard the security of the United States and its allies, to promote democracy, to ensure economic well-being, to prevent humanitarian disasters, and to cope with transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking. But as a “strategy,” the NSS lacks specificity, prioritization, and measurable goals.¹⁴

U.S. policymakers might be forgiven this comparatively less precise approach to national interests, given the scope and magnitude of changes in the international system over the past decade. Nowhere have these changes been more striking than in the trans-Atlantic community, the bedrock of U.S. foreign relations. Since 1989, twenty-three new states have emerged in Europe and the former Soviet space alone. The major regional organizations in Europe, such as the European Union and NATO, have voted to accept new members and to intensify existing ties, and many more states are lining up to expand further the ranks of these organizations. With every region of the globe undergoing similar changes—changes demanding swift responses from Washington as they have unfolded and often involving issues of first impression—it is little wonder that the United States has yet to announce a compelling theme to guide its actions abroad.¹⁵

Yet during this same period, the United States deployed forces forty times. Between Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) most recently, U.S. forces undertook active operations in over thirty countries in every region of the world.¹⁶ This record may tell us more than any recent speech or public document about what the United States believes is worth the lives of its sons and daughters. The purposes of those actions (coercion, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, saber-rattling, and even war-fighting) and the places where force has been applied (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, among others) reveal that the United States has used force most often not solely in

defense of its own vital self-interests but, rather, to address problems that have crossed some invisible threshold to become threats to international peace and security.

This record shows, moreover, that traditional understandings of narrow self-interest do not serve as a reliable basis for explaining U.S. use-of-force decisions in the post-Cold War period. If the national interest fails to guide us, perhaps an examination of American perceptions and judgments of the utility of force for solving complex international problems will provide better clues.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FORCE

During the Reagan and the Bush administrations, an important corollary emerged to U.S. strategic thinking: the doctrine of overwhelming force, known as the Powell doctrine.¹⁷ According to this doctrine, if it became necessary to use force, the only sensible approach would be to apply disproportionately superior force. Especially in combat, the importance of overmatching one's opponent could not be overstated. Commanders on the ground would get the forces and other resources they needed to do the job, and the United States thus could have greater certainty of success. For senior military leaders of the time, the lessons of Vietnam and Lebanon had made this view necessary, and the military buildup of the 1980s made it possible.¹⁸ As a result of this mindset and buildup, the United States developed an unmatched conventional capacity that it retains to this day, with no serious challenger even remotely in sight.¹⁹

To many Americans, Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War demonstrated U.S. military might at its most impressive.²⁰ Yet a review of events in the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia tells us little about the actual effectiveness of force in achieving U.S. policy objectives. There is no question that the decisive use of force played a role in these events, but the precise role played by force is harder to identify.

To begin, the 1991 Gulf War is generally seen as a success: Saddam Hussein was forcibly ejected from Kuwait, the conventional military balance in the region was restored, and Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors or others with weapons of mass destruction was thought contained. The twenty-nine-nation coalition that opposed Saddam mobilized relatively quickly and suffered relatively few casualties. But war is a ground reality, and this war was no exception. Thus, even after forty days and nights of intense bombing, when the smoke cleared, Saddam Hussein was still in Kuwait, and it took forces on the ground to throw him out. Militarily, therefore, the mission was accomplished. By nearly every meaningful operational measure, this use of force was successful and decisive. It was well designed, well prepared, well conducted.

But if the aim was to prevent Saddam Hussein from again posing a threat to his neighbors and the world's oil supply, one must conclude that the war was, despite its massive character, inadequate to the task. Today, ten years later, Saddam remains in power; he continues to repress Iraqis, to threaten Kurds, to menace the region, and to defy global opinion. Thus the

Gulf War was not unique but typical of the use and role of force. Even when resorted to on a grand scale and applied decisively, force remains a limited and blunt instrument.

Since the Gulf War, the United States has deployed forces and used force many times. In 1992, the U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia introduced some 28,000 troops to that war-torn country at a time when a thousand people were dying every day from the protracted conflict, war-induced deprivation, and famine. This particular use of U.S. force (or, more accurately, U.S. forces) to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid was broadly seen as a success—although some observers predicted an interminable stay, or worse, if the Somali warring factions were not disarmed. When the Clinton administration made an unsuccessful effort to capture warlord Mohamed Farah Aideded that resulted in eighteen soldiers dead, these fears proved prescient, and the president withdrew the troops. Today, Somalia is still in chaos, although reports of massive starvation on the scale witnessed in 1992 have ceased.

Yet this episode of post-Cold War American use of force has yet to be fully analyzed. For example, although many policymakers assumed that the public would demand the immediate withdrawal of forces after the eighteen soldiers were killed and a U.S. soldier's body was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the public instead continued to support the U.S. intervention. Only 28 percent of the public favored immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops; 43 percent favored a withdrawal within six months, and 27 percent favored continued U.S. involvement until the country reached some level of stability. Similar polls sponsored by ABC News, CNN, *USA Today*, and *Time* showed that an average of only 40.8 percent favored immediate withdrawal of troops.²¹ A majority of Americans favored *increased* involvement after the firefight, at least in the short run.²²

The Bush administration used American troops in Somalia in part because the U.S. military was the only organization with the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance rapidly in a dangerous environment on a massive scale. Perhaps more remarkably, the United States used force in Somalia because, given the obvious U.S. capacity to act, a struggle resulting in a thousand more deaths every day (seen daily in the media) had become intolerable—not because vital U.S. interests were threatened by the fighting and famine.²³

In Haiti, while no actual hostilities were initiated by the United States against the Cedras regime, the Clinton administration was prepared to take that step—indeed, the invasion force was in the air at a decisive moment in the effort to secure a negotiated end to the crisis. This credible threat of

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force provided a stark backdrop to the intensive discussions under way by former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell. At the end of the day, Cedras fled, in part persuaded that the promise of considerable cash and safe passage to Panama was preferable to fighting a losing battle against a clearly superior force. When they landed, U.S. forces engaged in no active combat, but, rather, undertook a multiyear program to begin to rebuild Haitian society and its political institutions—a job for which, arguably, military forces are not ideally suited.²⁴ Indeed, the little progress that has been made in Haiti in four years—and after the expenditure of billions of dollars—offers strong evidence of this ill fit.²⁵

In former Yugoslavia, well before the United States deployed 20,000 troops as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) to help enforce the Dayton Accords, the United States and other nations threatened to use or actually used force for a range of purposes: to open Sarajevo airport for humanitarian deliveries, to establish and enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia, to deliver humanitarian assistance to isolated enclaves in Serb-held territories, and to force the Serbs to sign the Dayton Accords in 1995. Moreover, the United States joined with the international community to establish and participate in the first-ever preventive deployment of U.N. peacekeeping troops in Macedonia. This entire spectrum of operations was designed to respond to the unfolding nightmare in former Yugoslavia not because the stability of the Balkans was vital to U.S. interests but because here, at the throat of Europe, was an example of unchecked violence with genocidal overtones that presented an enormous security burden to the European members of NATO—and leadership of NATO was, and is, a burden of the United States.

In addition to these episodes of ground engagement, the United States has also several times relied on air power: against Iraq in 1993, to retaliate for Iraqi threats against the life of President Bush; against suspected terrorist strongholds in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, to retaliate for bombings at the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and, perhaps most dramatically, in Yugoslavia in 1999, to compel Serbia to acquiesce to NATO demands regarding the treatment of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.

Yet in all of these cases it is difficult to measure the precise role that the use of force or the presence of forces played in the unfolding events. In Bosnia, for example, it is simply not clear whether one should credit NATO's 1995 bombing for Milosevic's decision to get serious at Dayton—or, rather, credit the successful Croatian ground offensive at the time, the emergence of serious political challenges in Belgrade, the growing discontent of the Serb population laboring for a fourth year under sanctions, or the prospect of other

inducements, such as normalized relations with the West. Similarly, in Haiti, did Cedras leave Port-au-Prince without a fight only because he feared a U.S. attack, or were economic and other inducements at least as responsible for his timely departure? And in Kosovo, did the aerial bombardment persuade Milosevic to capitulate? or was it the prospect of a NATO ground offensive? or Russian pressure? The answer in these cases, as in others, is that many factors matter, and the role of force surely takes a place in these stories. But it is not the only factor, or even the most prominent one. In fact, these cases do not reveal a clear or consistent view of either the conditions or the tasks that most favor the use of force.

Thus neither national interest nor efficacy necessarily dominates Washington's decision-making calculus on the use of force. Indeed, no hard-and-fast rules seem to apply: the United States has repeatedly deployed forces and used forceful means in a variety of ways. Were vital interests at stake? Not always. The Gulf War did address important national interests, and NATO activities in Bosnia and later in Kosovo have been justified by fear of the destabilizing effects of protracted warfare on our European allies. But, from Somalia to Haiti to Rwanda, operations were motivated almost exclusively by humanitarian concerns. In these cases, the U.S. interests at stake were not vital national interests—although, because these circumstances were seen as threats to international peace and security, broad issues of global governance were relevant. These interventions thus suggest a clear U.S. willingness to see national interests in international terms and to act when the need arises.

THE U.S. DOMESTIC CONTEXT

The fact that the United States has deployed forces and used forceful measures so frequently since the end of the Cold War would not pass muster under a strict interpretation of the Weinberger principles: objectives have not always been clear; interests were not always vital; resources were not always adequate; and popular support in Congress and among the American people was not always apparent. In fact, over the past ten years, presidents have at times bypassed Congress and even acted without significant prior efforts to secure public support before committing U.S. troops abroad. What does this record reveal about American attitudes toward the use of force?

The use of force is a dramatic gesture. It raises the ante and incurs considerable risks. In an open society like the United States, most politicians and foreign policy experts would agree that these decisions are best taken after full discussion and wide-ranging debate. Time out for debate is not, however, what policymakers have on their hands in times of crisis. Deadlines loom; tensions rise; decision windows close. Yet even in crisis, U.S. policymaking in fact results from a complex interaction of multiple actors: the president and the executive branch, Congress, interest groups, the media, the public.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to offer a detailed analysis of the various roles that these actors, especially the media, play in shaping U.S. policy on the use of force.²⁶ Indeed, any version of the story would be a complicated one. But a brief look at the role of public opinion and Congress reveals no clear or consistent pattern save one: presidents seek the path of least resistance to secure support for decisions to use force, and that path seldom lies through Congress.

For example, when President Bush in August 1990 declared the day after Iraq invaded Kuwait that the illegal Iraqi occupation of Kuwait “would not stand,” his administration immediately began the process of mobilizing public support for more assertive actions to undo the Iraqi invasion and restore the basic security of the world’s oil supply. The Bush administration experimented with a number of messages before coming to rest on one that essentially characterized Saddam Hussein as a latter-day Hitler with nuclear weapons.²⁷ The campaign for winning the hearts and minds of the American public ran parallel with the campaign for support in Congress, where things went less well.

To bolster its case for decisive action, and in what many consider to

be an unusual move, the Bush administration engineered passage of an assertive U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing member states to use "all measures necessary" to remove the threat to international peace and security posed by Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. The vote in the U.N. Security Council passed decisively, but President Bush had a close call in the U.S. Senate, where the vote was 52 to 47. The lesson learned—bypass Congress if possible—would be an enduring one.

It quickly became clear, however, that the U.S. forces deploying to the region had the overwhelming support of the American public. On January 12, 1991, Congress approved the use of force in the Persian Gulf. By January 16, a Gallup poll reported that 79 percent of the U.S. public approved of the decision to go to war with Iraq.²⁸ That the American public and its elected representatives in Congress would differ so markedly on such an important issue can no longer be seen as unusual. In fact, several major opinion studies of foreign affairs document such divergence.²⁹

In the various other military actions following the Gulf War, presidents have tried a number of strategies to secure public support for the use of force. President Bush justified the 1992 Somalia intervention on humanitarian grounds and appealed directly to the American people for their support and understanding. In his address to the nation on December 4, 1992, Bush called the military intervention in Somalia "a mission that can ease suffering and save lives" and referred to the work of the troops as "God's work." Americans responded supportively: 76 percent of those polled approved of President Bush's decision to send U.S. troops to Somalia; 62 percent believed that U.S. involvement would end quickly; 70 percent agreed that, given the possible loss of American lives, the financial costs, and other risks involved, sending U.S. troops to make sure food gets through to the people of Somalia was worth the cost; and 73 percent approved of the way President Bush had been handling the situation.³⁰

President Clinton made a similarly direct public appeal when he justified U.S. participation in the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment to Bosnia in 1996—and again when presenting the case for the NATO bombardment of Serbia in 1999.³¹ Immediately following Clinton's appeal for support for airstrikes in Yugoslavia, a majority of Americans (68 percent) approved of the use of force.³²

Perhaps it is because of the close call in the U.S. Senate over the Gulf War vote that presidents have since that time increasingly taken their cases directly to the American public for their support and have essentially bypassed Congress. Presidents do consult with Congress, but frequently only

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the leadership is briefed, and in the decade following the Gulf War, Congress did not vote on a single use of U.S. military power before the public announcement of a commitment of U.S. forces. Perhaps most striking, however, is the fact that both President Bush and President Clinton have either actively sought or used the international authority of the U.N. Charter's Chapter VII provisions to justify every instance in which U.S. use of force was contemplated—except when the United States was directly attacked, as in the 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa.³³

Decisions to use force are not arrived at through closed processes within the confines of the Oval Office. Elaborate processes exist to develop options and to vet the various choices throughout the foreign policy establishment. These debates are often fierce and expose deep philosophical divisions within the executive branch regarding the interests at stake and the wisdom or sense of using force. Some of these debates have even been played out in public view. In 1977, for example, the Commander of U.S. ground forces in Korea, General John Singlaub, openly criticized President Carter's announcement to cut troop numbers. And in 1990, Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan was abruptly fired by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney for openly disagreeing with U.S. policy toward Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.³⁴

It is interesting that, as requirements for U.S. forces to operate in hostile circumstances have increased, U.S. military leaders have cut increasingly prominent profiles in the policymaking process. The armed forces have been clear about their reluctance to wade into difficult military campaigns for questionable objectives and with what they perceive as weak—need political cover. Citing the alleged unwillingness of Americans to incur casualties for these less-than-vital-interest endeavors as a defense against such operations, military leaders have been accused of, in effect, precluding the responsible formulation of timely or usable military options. This has prompted some to argue that the military leadership has acquired a veto power over policy that, in turn, has led to a perceptible erosion of civilian authority.³⁵

But this is unnecessary drama. The sheer number of voices in the policy process and the complex interaction of the actors raising those voices defy neat categorization. To be sure, the end of the Cold War has brought a certain amount of untidiness to U.S. policymaking—with a predictable increase in bureaucratic and executive-congressional frictions.³⁶ Nevertheless, despite what is at times a messy and perhaps unnecessarily politicized policymaking process, Americans have not lost their global idealism or their willingness to lend a hand to others in need.³⁷

No longer isolationist (if it ever really was), the American public might be more accurately characterized as “insulationist.”³⁸ That is, it generally does not feel affected by world events. But when that insulation wears thin, as it often does with the prospect of sizable numbers of U.S. forces deployed abroad in crisis, Americans notice, and policymakers react. Pressure mounts to “do something,” but that “something” is left to U.S. leaders to discern and then sell—often abroad as well as at home. The expectations are enormous.

Thus the record shows that American public opinion does not really reveal much about why the United States intervenes when or where it does. On these questions, Americans demonstrate a considerable capacity to be led. Administrations have intervened when public opinion was virtually nonexistent (as in Panama), when it was mildly negative (as in Bosnia), and when it was apparently positive (in Iraq).³⁹

Americans are clearly willing to do their fair share to help solve complex international problems, even when it comes to using force, and it appears that only three criteria need be met. *First*, the interests at stake need not be vital, but they must be seen as important enough to justify the use of force. We might call this the “compelling interest” standard. *Second*, coercive measures must not only have a clear purpose for which they are well suited, but they must also, and importantly, be appropriate measures for the interests at stake. This might be thought of as the “dual-use” criterion. *Third*, holding aside circumstances in which speed or secrecy is essential, the issues surrounding the use of force must be made sufficiently clear to the American people and must secure their initial support. If decisions are not always ready to wait for the public to give a clear “green light,” they are not ever likely to act when a clear “red light” is apparent. Here, Washington lawmakers too often manifest the odd habit of using polls to determine the direction of policy—that is, what policy is best. Instead, as one advisor to President Reagan observed, they should use polls to help determine how to persuade the public that a chosen policy is best.⁴⁰

When force is used, sustaining public support overtime will be largely a function of how events progress. Americans will accept casualties as long as they see a clear connection between such losses and U.S. interests and aims prompting the use of force.⁴¹

The post-Cold War record regarding the U.S. use of force abroad thus suggests that Americans understand, accept, and often openly support the internationalization of U.S. interests. Moreover, since the United States began the practice of securing international authorization for its use of force

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and has reinforced that pattern with remarkable if not perfect consistency, future administrations are likely to face the question of whether to use force for broad purposes that support global governance, and they will be subjected to the same constraints of global oversight.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: LOOKING AHEAD

Global Governance as a Greater Good?

Ten years into the post-Cold War era, the state remains the dominant political actor whose properties of sovereignty and independence distinguish its status. Yet each state's sovereignty has always existed in a reality of co-sovereignty and its independence in a reality of mutual reliance. Indeed, over the past three hundred years, governments have banded together in various ways to pool their strengths and share their burdens.

The degree to which states do so today, however, is unprecedented. Governments have truly "gone global" in setting priorities, marshalling resources, and solving problems. This internationalization of the burden of governance, born of necessity in the aftermath of World War II, represents a distinctive characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century. Government collaboration to manage transnational issues of common concern is now the stuff of mainstream politics. Moreover, this global governance has a distinctively Western hue: the norms and values undergirding international institutions reflect the shared heritage and common purposes of Western political systems—a fact that may make the so-called "democratic peace" theorists more right than they know.⁴²

The necessity for such intergovernmental collaboration will only grow and intensify. The pace of change in world events has accelerated markedly, and governments—that is, states—face challenges on a wholly different scale than has been the case heretofore. This is so largely because two deeply fundamental forces beyond their control now shape global developments: relentless growth of the world's population and stunning advances in modern technology.

The world's population is expected to almost double by 2050, with 90 percent of the growth coming in the world's poorest sectors.⁴³ For a complex set of reasons, the populations of the world's North are aging, with declining growth rates, while the more youthful populations of the South continue to expand in number. In the coming decade, energy demand in the developing countries will more than double, and the ability of these nations to feed their populations will come under serious strain.⁴⁴ The global environment is manifesting fatigue. There has been an abrupt rise in urbanization. As cities become more crowded, urban housing conditions deteriorate, crime rates increase, and serious public health problems emerge. The gov-

ements least able to absorb the demands of their growing populations are likely to be the ones hardest pressed.

New technology already has led to the growth and integration of the global economy and generated immense new wealth, in turn driving global interconnectedness in many other dimensions.⁴⁵ People are generally more informed, more skilled, and more mobile, and one can now more clearly identify the “hot links” that connect events on opposite sides of the globe.

These advances have also made it possible for many more persons and organizations to control large sums of capital while limiting the ability of governments and their financial institutions to regulate financial flows and global markets. In addition, technological advances in modern weaponry enable more lethal and less costly destructive capacities to migrate easily into many hands—again, beyond the control of governments.

Government-promulgated rules and procedures for social interaction of all kinds are under enormous pressure to keep up with the incredible changes, and it is clear that the maintenance of rules-based order is vital to the interests of all states and their governments. And from the perspective of governments, when law and order break down, the greatest danger is not from chaos, but from the emergence of well-armed criminal order. In some countries around the world, this reality has already taken hold.

The Expanding Burden of Governance

Perhaps the most glaring implication of these developments is growing, worldwide change in the tasks of governance. In key areas historically conceded to their competence—the control of lethal force, the control of capital, and the control of information—governments have moved from the role of dominant player to that of simple participant.

The diffusion of lethality means that in some countries, private armies can outgun the organized militaries, and in many places private hands control greater sums of capital than do governments.⁴⁶ Moreover, with the marked increase in social mobility worldwide and the explosion of the Internet, people are ever more self-reliant in validating the information they receive.

Over the past fifty years, governments have increasingly looked to each other for help in solving complex transnational issues and putting in place rules-based regimes. Their efforts might be grouped into three broad categories: global housekeeping, global safety, and (an altogether different kind of problem) managing the expansion of individual rights.⁴⁷

Global housekeeping involves such issues as the environment, energy resources, and international economic activity. Global safety includes

efforts to devise effective arms control regimes and other arrangements for mutual security. Managing the emergence of individual rights can be seen in the development of the global human rights agenda, which has at its core the clear message that governments have obligations to their citizens and not simply to each other.⁴⁸ Since the end of the Cold War, catastrophes such as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo have generated growing claims that members of the international community have an affirmative obligation to act in behalf of the defenseless. Furthermore, governments increasingly are being held accountable not only for their own actions but also for tolerating the actions of other governments.⁴⁹

States have responded by creating a vast network of regimes, and these regimes have been pressed by states to take on ever more complex problems. The regimes have proven quite durable. Many were formed and persist despite strong opposition from powerful states and even whole blocs. Moreover, some of them, notably certain international economic regimes, have grown stronger over the years, becoming powerful forces in international life, which makes them attractive even to states that differ sharply from the community of Western democracies.⁵⁰

The United States in particular has played a leading role in establishing and promoting a number of these regimes. From the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions to the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the Partnership for Peace, these institutions and regimes in many cases have come to strongly shape states' policies both at home and abroad.⁵¹

International Law, Global Governance, and the Use of Force

Nevertheless, the perception prevails that—in the anarchy of the international system, where states are said to act predominantly on a self-interested, self-help basis—international law, the basis for all international regimes, is essentially meaningless *because it is not backed up by force*. It is true that the vast network of interlocking international regimes that constitutes modern global governance has no forceful backstop. Not one of the literally hundreds of regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and other mechanisms for managing the seas, air, or resource base, and not one of the literally thousands of economic or trade agreements, is backed up by an enforcement mechanism that relies on the use of force.⁵²

This evolution in international relations is worthy of comment, inasmuch as it was not so long ago that states did go to war over many of the issues now covered by these regimes. Wars between states over issues such

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as trade or rights of economic access—issues that historically drove armies to confrontation—have now become largely unthinkable.⁵³ Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that none of the major multilateral regimes to ensure global safety—that is, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and others—is backed up by force.⁵⁴ States usually use these regimes with relative success. This is particularly true of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is in fact a “complex edifice of formal and informal arrangements.” Besides the treaty itself, in force since 1970, the non-proliferation regime includes as well the statute of the IAEA, regional instruments like the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, safeguards agreements between non-nuclear-weapon states and the IAEA, and the informal guidelines drawn up by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee of nuclear supplier states. “Taken together, these instruments constitute an international regulatory regime that even its detractors admit has had a distinct measure of success.”⁵⁵ In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Finland, Germany, Norway, Russia, and the United States all conduct various training and inspection programs on CWC verification. In the case of the United States and Russia, these programs focus on and advance already existing bilateral chemical and biological weapons agreements. The German, Norwegian, and Finnish programs are made available to outside parties, especially specialists from developing countries.⁵⁶ It should be noted, however, that coercive measures occasionally are taken. The emergence and exercise of these regimes can rightfully claim some credit for what is an unmistakable modern-day development: the fact that the post-Cold War period is noteworthy for its comparatively few instances of formal violent interstate conflict.

Issues and Dilemmas for the United States

The United States has emerged from the Cold War with important, singular attributes that bear on its current position and near-term role in world affairs. But special challenges confront Washington in this period, which has already been characterized (unflatteringly, but not inaccurately) as a “unipolar moment.”⁵⁷

In the peculiar physics of international politics, the United States manifests properties of a country and properties of an international organization. On the one hand, the United States has a truly worldwide vocation and construes the full spectrum of its political, economic, social, and military interests globally. Moreover, it is viewed both at home and abroad as doing

so with a surprisingly high degree of legitimacy. The United States also has a full-spectrum global effect through its political, economic, and defense agreements or understandings with countries in every region of the globe, and its cultural influence is felt everywhere. Indeed, the influence of the United States is such that even bilateral or multilateral deliberations in which it does not participate take account of their impact on and likely reaction from Washington. No other country and few international organizations can claim this reach and clout.

In addition, U.S. military forces are active in over seventy countries around the world, and the United States has the conventional military capacity to get anywhere in the world, engage an enemy with decisive force, and marshal other countries to support its efforts. Only NATO—and NATO only with the active participation of the United States—can match or exceed this capacity. One measure of the global impact of U.S. military influence (expressed bilaterally and through its defense and security commitments) is the clear emergence over the past ten years of a transnational military community—a community every bit as robust as the international scientific community. Indeed, a military ethic modeled on the professional Western military model is increasingly taking hold around the globe, and this development is clearly being led by the United States military and its allies. Soldiers now easily talk across national lines to other soldiers on more issues and in greater depth than ever before. In fact, at times the military-to-military communications between states represent the only, or the most reliable means of transmitting extremely important messages.

In short, the United States is today unparalleled in its global reach, effect, and ability to act decisively on its interests.

On the other hand, however, the United States' singular position of power saddles it with a twin burden of expectations and performance. Because the United States has legitimate global interests, even events in remote parts of the world can create expectations and pressures for it to take action. And because the United States has such an overwhelmingly superior military capacity, the expectation both at home and abroad is that when it acts, it will do so decisively and with success. No other country carries this burden, and the United States is, after all, only one of 185 states.

U.S. administrations have attempted to respond to the pressure created by these burdens of expectations and performance by exerting enormous efforts to control unfolding events, or, more precisely, to control the international response to these events. But because the United States has over many years exercised such a dominant hand in creating many of the

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international mechanisms that deal with these problems, and because today it possesses such a distinctive and overwhelming capacity to respond, *it has lost important flexibility in determining the terms of its own engagement.* This loss of flexibility is most obvious on questions that have at their root a strong moral imperative. How can a world champion of human rights fail to respond to so many circumstances that demand action?

Thus the United States confronts a world in which the burdens of governance—and, in train, the habits of governments—have become internationalized. This is perhaps most visibly true for political and economic matters, but it is no less true for military and security matters. National governance has become, perhaps irreversibly, internationalized—and with it the rules for using force.

Although states may now seldom go to war with each other, many of them are persistently at war with themselves—that is, within their own borders. Furthermore, because of the intensifying ties of mutual reliance, such internal wars have effects well beyond the borders of the countries in which they occur. Managing a way out of the violence often lies beyond the ability of many overburdened governments. In response, the international community has had to step in, and in the process has established and exercised the rules for doing so. Today, the United Nations generally, and the Security Council specifically, has become overwhelmingly preoccupied with the internal affairs of states. In fact, since 1989, U.N. Security Council resolutions on states' internal matters have outnumbered resolutions on traditional interstate issues by a margin of nearly three to one.⁵⁸ The United States has been at the forefront of this development.

The U.N. Charter is the one international creation that does contemplate the need for the use of force in certain circumstances. A kind of *lex superior* for all other international regimes as well as for the extensive number of regional arrangements formed by states (including the NATO alliance), the Charter is in general a war-prohibiting document. It does, however, permit the use of force in two circumstances: in self-defense, and when authorized by the U.N. Security Council under the Charter's Chapter VII provisions.⁵⁹

Many Security Council resolutions represent individual steps in an extended effort to resolve complex situations of intrastate violence. Many of them have authorized the use of all measures necessary, including the use of force, to deal with troubled circumstances. Moreover, with few exceptions (notably the Gulf War in 1991, which was an interstate confrontation that threatened global security), the cases in which the member

states have voted to authorize the use of force—most notably Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo—have been internal conflicts at the heart of which human rights issues have predominated. The United States has led the international charge on many of these votes.⁶⁰ Such a prominent U.S. role is remarkable, since few if any of these circumstances can be said to have been vital or (with the possible exception of Haiti) even very important to U.S. interests.

Thus, although no clear national doctrine or single strategy has emerged to replace the Weinberger principles to guide U.S. use of force decisions, an *international* doctrine of sorts has emerged and is likely to guide U.S. action for the foreseeable future. The United States' record of forceful engagement in post-Cold War affairs reflects a case-by-case approach operating (it appears, for lack of a better guide) on the theory that there is no ideal therapy independent of the patient—or, it seems, independent of the expertise of the doctors on hand. It should, however, be noted that two factors appear consistently across the range of post-Cold War cases and decisions regarding the use of force: the increasing intervention of the United Nations (and of regional arrangements, for example, NATO) in the internal affairs of states, and an increasing U.S. reliance on the Chapter VII mechanism to justify and oversee the use of force by itself and others. These developments are likely to have already become a permanent feature of the way in which the United States and other states will manage difficult issues. But can the Charter withstand this pressure?

As noted earlier, Article 2 (4) of the Charter prohibits states from using force against the territorial integrity of other states—even for humanitarian purposes, according to some commentators.⁶¹ Moreover, the opening provisions of Article 2 (7) sternly warn that the United Nations may not intervene in a state's domestic matters. Strongly held notions of sovereignty influenced the drafting of these provisions, and questions of sovereignty remain extremely sensitive in many countries. Indeed, the language of Article 2 (7) that restricts U.N. intervention in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" was one of the features of the Charter that made it possible for a wide range of governments to endorse it in 1945.⁶² However, Article 2 (7) also provides for enforcement measures by U.N. members when taken under the provisions of Chapter VII. Thus, while the sovereignty of states is acknowledged, the right of the member states collectively to take enforcement action, if necessary, is paramount. In addition, further reading shows that Article 24 (1) can be read to *require* the Security Council to assume priority responsibility to maintain international peace and

security on behalf of member states in ways that are consistent with the principles of the Charter—certainly the record of the post-Cold War period gives added weight to this interpretation—and Article 25 requires member states to comply with Security Council decisions.⁶³ By its terms and usage, then, the Charter seems equal to the changing circumstances. The question remains how consistent states will be in activating its provisions.

Much will depend on the United States. Locating its actions firmly within the construct of international legal norms has provided the United States important legitimacy as it has pursued its at times controversial policies. But in 1999, U.S. leaders claimed that NATO would assert its “right” of “unilateral” action in Kosovo irrespective of U.N. norms, or, indeed, the North Atlantic Charter’s own Article I. This rhetorical excess struck many observers as dangerous (if not unlawful) and oddly inconsistent with recent U.S. practice.⁶⁴ More recently, there is uncertainty about whether the United States will chart a go-it-alone course,⁶⁵ or whether it will continue to integrate its efforts to help solve global problems within the international structures it has worked so hard to help establish.

No international system of rules can long withstand blatant violations by the dominant states. Should the United States—with or without its allies—exercise its considerable strengths outside the parameters of common understandings of legitimate uses of force, greater damage to the rule of law as the foundation for international security and stability could result than if some rogue state were to do so.

But can America indefinitely carry the enormous burdens that have come to rest on its capacious shoulders? This remains to be seen. Clearly the United States plays a pivotal role on these issues. Today, no state can go it alone. And while no state can shirk the responsibility to do all it can, no state can do all that needs doing. All nations now confront the tension that exists between pursuing traditional national interests and the emerging moral imperative to ensure that basic human rights are respected and the future of humanity is secured.

In a world so capable of enormous destruction, the moral dimension of international affairs is inescapable. As peoples and states are thrust into ever-tighter associations in space and ideas, narrow interests are giving way to greater goods. Safeguarding the planet and ensuring the welfare of all of its citizens demands a rules-based approach to managing the differences and disputes that can lead to violence, and this will require the constructive actions of every capable state. No international agenda can succeed without the active participation of the world’s major players—especially, at this

moment, the United States. In contemplating the international landscape of the near future, one hears the (perhaps apocryphal) echo of Abba Eban: With the United States, anything is possible; without it, nothing is possible.

Endnotes

¹ I would like to thank Daniel J. Kaufman, Thomas J. Leney, and Douglas E. Lute for their comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. I would also like to thank Anita Sharma for her invaluable research assistance.

² This section draws heavily on Jane E. Holl, "Grounding the Use of Force: How to Use the U.S. Army," forthcoming.

³ The willingness of Americans to remain engaged and not retreat into isolationism is illustrated in several public opinion polls taken after World War II. Sixty-eight percent of the Americans polled in a 1947 Gallup poll said the United States should take an active role internationally. Similar polls by the American Institute of Public Opinion, the Gallup Organization, and the National Opinion Research Center from 1949 through 1956 show that the percentage supporting U.S. engagement ranged from 73 percent in February 1953 to 64 percent in November 1950, while the percentage of those who believed the United States should stay out of world affairs was 25 percent in September 1949, November and December 1950, April 1954, and November 1956—and 21 percent in September 1953 and March 1955. See John Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), p. 110. However, from September 1953 to February 1969, the same respondents overwhelmingly believed that the United States should work closely with other nations. For example, in October 1964, 82 percent of those polled said the United States should work closely with other nations, while 10 percent said the United States should retain its independence.

⁴ For an understanding of the rise of U.S. nuclear power, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1989).

⁵ For examinations of the impact of domestic politics on the Vietnam War, see Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley, 1973); and Robert S. McNamara, with Brian VandeMark, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Vintage, 1996).

⁶ As much a legacy of the generation of officers who had served in Vietnam ten years earlier as a policy statement of its day, the Weinberger doctrine, as it came to

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be known, is worth recalling in its original form (emphasis original):

1) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . . .

2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. . . .

3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. . . . If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job—and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peace-keeping.

4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: “Is this conflict in our national interest?” “Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?” If the answers are “yes,” then we must win. If the answers are “no,” then we should not be in combat.

5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. . . .

6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

⁶“The Uses of Power,” Speech by Caspar Weinberger to the National Press Club,

Washington, D.C., November 28, 1984. Released the same day as Department of Defense News Release No. 609-84.

⁷ The “All-or-Nothing School,” or “Never-Again School,” is a repudiation of the “Limited War” framework that developed after World War II and upon which the Vietnam War strategy was based. For a discussion of these schools of intervention, see Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenges to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981); Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985); and Christopher M. Gacek, *The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

⁸ William Safire, “Only the Fun Wars,” *New York Times*, December 3, 1984, Sec. A, p. 23.

⁹ The Commission on America's National Interests, *America's National Interests* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 1996). The Council on Foreign Relations Project on U.S. National Interests After the Cold War, 1994-1995, also considered these issues.

¹⁰ The Commission on America's National Interests, *America's National Interests*, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Charles Wilson, former head of General Motors, is credited with telling a U.S. Senate committee that “what is good for General Motors is good for the country.” Wilson, President Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, actually said, “For years, I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist.” This view is commonly seen as a “global commons” issue—in that individuals who promote growth are motivated by the recognition that growth is good for them and believe that, as a result, such growth is also good for society.

¹² Since World War II, Americans have clearly favored an active role for the United States in world affairs. According to the public opinion survey regularly conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 61 percent of Americans believe that the United States should play an active role in world affairs, with only 28 percent responding that it would be better to “stay out” of this arena. For more information on American public opinion concerning the role of the United States in world affairs, see John E. Rielly, ed., Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,

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American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 (Waukegan, IL, Lake Country Press, 1999), pp. 4-5, 10-17; and Lydia Saad, "Americans Support Active Role for U.S. in World Affairs" (www.gallup.com Poll Releases, The Gallup Organization, 1999). Americans do not, however, believe that being the world's hegemon means you must be the world's policeman. Only 21 percent of those surveyed said the United States should act alone if it does not have the support of its allies. Rielly, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999*, p. 25. In another poll taken by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press in 1993, less than 10 percent wanted the United States to be the world's single leader; but almost 60 percent wanted it to be the most assertive nation, while sharing the leadership. Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, *America's Place in the World: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public About International Affairs* (Washington: Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, 1993), p. 28.

¹³ See, for example, Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5 (September/October 1997), pp. 13-27; and Abba Eban, *Diplomacy for the Next Century* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).

¹⁴ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, December 1999, pp. iii, 5-6.

¹⁵ Not that administration officials have not tried. Since the Weinberger Doctrine, there have been new proposals and criteria for undertaking military actions. See, for example, George Shultz, Address to the Trilateral Commission, April 3, 1984, *Department of State Bulletin*: May 1984; George Bush, "When Force Makes Sense." Address to the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, January 5, 1993; Colin Powell. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), 32-45; Les Aspin, "The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces in the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World," Speech to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1992; Madeleine Albright, "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World," Address at the National War College, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1993, reprinted in the U.S. Department of State *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (September 27, 1993), p. 667; Bill Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World," Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 27, 1993, reprinted in U.S. Department of State *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 39 (September 27, 1993), p. 652; The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (May 1994); Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World," Address to George Washington University, March 6, 1996, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 7, 1996; The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (May 1997); and Bill

Clinton, Address to business and community members in San Francisco, February 26, 1999, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, February 26, 1999.

¹⁶ The Center for Defense Information, *1999 CDI Military Almanac* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 1999).

¹⁷ Named for Colin Powell, former senior military assistant to Caspar Weinberger and later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Bush and Clinton, the doctrine of overwhelming force is credited to Powell because of his decisive hand in drafting and expanding upon the Weinberger principles. Powell spoke on numerous occasions about the necessity of "decisive means and results." See Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 32-45. See also Bernard Trainor, "Vietnam Experience Has Made the Joint Chief Cautious about Using Military Force," *New York Times*, August 17, 1989, Sec. A, p. 13.

¹⁸ In his first year of office in 1981, President Reagan boosted defense spending to \$316.538 billion—an increase of about 11 percent from the year before. Military spending continued to rise dramatically during his tenure, to a high of \$418.352 billion in 1985. Over the decade, the National Defense Budget rose from \$281.575 billion in 1980 to \$365.397 billion in 1990, for a net increase of 23 percent in total constant 1997 dollars. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1999* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998), pp. 97-98.

¹⁹ See Charles Krauthammer, "America Rules: Thank God," *Time*, August 4, 1997. For comparative data on conventional force structure, see International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1998/99* (London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1998).

²⁰ In polls taken between July 17 and 21, 1991, a majority of Americans (60 percent) rated the U.S. military effort in the Persian Gulf as either mostly or completely successful. American approval ratings of President Bush showed overwhelming support for his handling of the Gulf War. This number climbed to 89 percent following the allied ground attack of February 23, 1991. See John Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 277, table 189; and p. 180, table 1. *The New York Times* reported on January 19, 1990, that George Bush, "helped by overwhelming support for his invasion of Panama, stands higher in the public's approval than any President has at an equivalent point in his administration since John F. Kennedy." See Michael Oreskes, "Approval of Bush, Bolstered by Panama, Soars in Poll." *New York Times*, January 19, 1990, Sec. A, p. 20. Both Reagan's invasion of Grenada in 1983 and

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Bush's invasion of Panama in 1989 are characterized by "quick success with light casualties." John M. Goshko, "Clinton's Haiti Course is Seen as Irreversible," *Washington Post*, September 12, 1994.

²¹ See Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, The Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), *U.S. Public Attitudes on Involvement in Somalia* (College Park, Md.: Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, October 26, 1993).

²² The October 26, 1993 Program on International Policy Attitudes study reported that, "based on numerous polls, only a minority of Americans reacted to the deaths in Mogadishu by wanting to withdraw US troops immediately." In the polls taken by CNN/USA Today, ABC, and NBC, respectively, 55 percent, 56 percent, and 61 percent supported sending more U.S. troops. Steven Kull and I. M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 106.

²³ In his address to the American public on December 5, 1992, President Bush reiterated that this mission was to aid starving Somalis. He said: "And let me be very clear. Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation." Address by the President on Somalia, December 4, 1992, reprinted in *New York Times*, December 5, 1992, Sec. 1, p. 4, col. 4. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger echoed the call for humanitarian action on *CNN*: "It's got to stop. Too many people are starving to death. Something must be done." See Gary Strieker, "U.S. May Commit Troops to UN Coalition in Somalia," *CNN*, November 26, 1992. Colin Powell has recalled telling the NSC: "Why can't the civilized world do something about it? If these were not poor black folks in Africa, you guys would have done something by now." Interview with Colin Powell, April 17, 1995, reprinted in Herbert S. Parmet, *George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 509.

²⁴ U.S. military forces have conducted operations in multiple complex humanitarian emergencies, including Northern Iraq, Somalia, Goma in Zaire, Haiti, and Bosnia. None of these interventions required a conventional or even unconventional war on the battlefield. Many within as well as outside the military are uncomfortable with this new role and unsure why the military has been given duties it was never created or trained to perform. See Andrew S. Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," *Parameters*, Summer 1996, pp. 50-66; and Andrew S. Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), pp. 112-14. Additionally, not only may other actors be more suited for performing non-combat tasks due to the military's lack of comparative advantage in the area, but participation in peace operation efforts may lead to the degradation of unit

readiness for combat operations—an area in which the military does have a comparative advantage. See Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness*, Special Study, February 1996. CALL has released several reports detailing “lessons learned” from the U.S. Army’s participation in complex humanitarian emergencies. For more information, see CALL’s web site (<http://call.army.mil/call/homepage>).

²⁵ Nonetheless, most Haitians and the international community do not want the remaining 480 soldiers—out of some 20,000 initially sent to the island—to leave. See, for example, “The U.S. Will Replace its Permanent Military Contingent in Haiti with Rotating Teams of Troops,” *The Boston Herald*, August 30, 1999.

²⁶ For one treatment, see Nik Gowing, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).

²⁷ The first reported invocations of the Munich analogy are attributed to Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who called Saddam Hussein “the Hitler of the Middle East” and criticized President Bush for not having moved earlier to forestall an invasion. *New York Times* columnists Flora Lewis and A.M. Rosenthal also drew analogies to Hitler in columns on August 4, 1990. In a speech to the nation on August 8, 1990, President Bush “drew a line in the sand” and described President Hussein as “an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors”; he also made indirect comments comparing Hussein with Hitler. This metaphor continued for the duration of the conflict.

²⁸ On January 12, 1991, Congress approved the use of force in the Persian Gulf. By January 16, a Gallup poll reported that 79 percent of the U.S. public approved of the decision to go to war with Iraq. John Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 219.

²⁹ See, for example, Steven Kull, I.M. Destler, and Clay Ramsay, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public* (College Park, Md.: Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, 1997); James M. Lindsay, “Congress and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era,” *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era: An Aspen Strategy Group Report* (Queenstown, Md.: Aspen Institute, 1995), pp. 71-110; and John Rielly, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, op cit., pp. 37-40.

³⁰ From the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online, December 1992; and Address from the Oval Office by President Bush to the American People Regarding the Situation in Somalia, Federal News Service, December

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4, 1992.

³¹ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Statement by the President to the Nation*, November 21, 1996; and White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Statement by the President to the Nation*, March 24, 1999.

³² ABC/*Washington Post* survey from April 5, 1999.

³³ The debate regarding the legitimacy of Operation Allied Force under the U.N. Charter exposed the importance that many states now place on U.N. Security Council authorization for any use of force not clearly in self-defense. On September 23, 1998, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII in Resolution 1199, stating that the situation in Kosovo constituted a "threat to peace and security in the region." Resolution 1199 went on to state that, should the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanians neglect to work toward a political solution as stipulated in Resolution 1160, the Security Council would "consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region." Resolution 1199 invoked Chapter VII, but did not expressly authorize forceful intervention in Kosovo. As a result, scholars and policymakers argue about whether the use of force was in fact authorized, as well as about the ramifications of what such an interpretation might mean in the context of international law. For more on this subject, see Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects," *European Journal of International Law* 1999, Vol.10, No. 1. (available on <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/ab1-1.html>); Ivo H. Daalder, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force," Paper given at the United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA) Policy Roundtable, March 1999; Michael F. Glennon, "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law," *Foreign Affairs*, May, 1999 / June, 1999, pp. 2-8; Frederic L. Kirgis, "The Kosovo Situation and NATO Military Action," *American Society of International Law Insight*, March 1999 (available on <http://www.asil.org>); and Julie Mertus, "Back to the Drawing Board: Human Rights Should Know No Boundaries," *The Washington Post*, April 11, 1999, Sec. B, p.1.

³⁴ Rick Atkinson, "The Chief Who Said Too Much: General Dugan's Firing Might Bring a Halt to Military Candor," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1990, Sec. B, p.1. John K. Singlaub with Malcolm McConnell, *Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Summit Books, 1991). The debate over when and how to employ force continued through the Clinton presidency. In his memoir, General Colin Powell recalls a discussion with then U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright on Bosnia in 1993. "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" she asked him. "I thought I would have an aneurysm," he wrote. "American G.I.s were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board." In a *New York*

Times article, Albright said she likes to tell people that NATO conducted its first serious air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs the week Powell's book came out. "I felt some vindication," she said. "It wasn't easy being a civilian woman having a disagreement with the hero of the Western world. But maybe he'd want to rewrite that page now." See Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 575-77; and Elaine Sciolino, "The Foreign Policy Race: Madeleine Albright's Audition," *New York Times*, September 22, 1996, Sec. 6, p. 63.

³⁵ For example, according to a paper published by the Refugee Policy Group, prior to the final decision to intervene in Somalia, the administration feared that if they "appeared too enthusiastic," the military would immediately object. "Indeed Central Command and the Pentagon leadership initially opposed a U.S. operation." Refugee Policy Group, *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994* (November 1994), p. 30.

³⁶ See Jane E. Holl, "We the People Here Don't Want No War: Executive Branch Perspectives on the Use of Force, in Aspen Strategy Group, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era* (Queenstown, Md.: Aspen Institute, 1995), pp. 111-32; and Douglas Foyle, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable," *International Studies Quarterly*, March 1997, pp. 141-70.

³⁷ A recent study by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 61 percent of the public supported an active role for the United States in the world and 57 percent agreed that the United States should take part in U.N. peacekeeping forces, with only 20 percent preferring to leave the job to other countries. See John Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999*, pp. 4, 25. A study by the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and its Program on International Policy Attitudes reached similar conclusions. This study found that 66 percent of Americans preferred the United States to "take an active part" in world affairs, while only 28 percent felt the U.S. should "stay out" of this arena. See Steven Kull, I. M. Destler, and Clay Ramsey, The Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, Program on International Policy Attitudes, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public* (College Park, Md.: Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, 1997), pp. 23-25.

³⁸ Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro make a similar argument. Their long-range study of public opinion and world events shows that while Americans generally remain disconnected from international events, once a significant event occurs, they will become engaged and will have a rational reaction to the event. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Ameri-*

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cans' Policy Preferences (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

³⁹ According to the *New York Times*, a few days before the invasion, at least half of those polled said they had not heard or read much about the elections in Panama. Those who said they were informed divided about evenly on whether troops should be sent to restore order if violence occurred, with 53 percent of that group supporting a dispatch of troops and 34 percent opposing such deployment. Adam Clymer, "Survey Finds Support for Dispatch of Troops," *New York Times*, May 13, 1989, Sec. 1, p. 5. In Operation Just Cause, the public strongly supported the invasion after the successful arrest of Manuel Noriega; 74 percent said it was justified. The intervention in Bosnia was less popular. Shortly after U.S. troops were deployed, just 36 percent of the people polled said they approved of "the presence of US troops in Bosnia." The Center for International and Security Studies, Program on International Policy Attitudes, *Seeking a New Balance: A Study of American and European Public Attitudes on Transatlantic Issues* (College Park, Md.: Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, 1998), p. 40. In the case of Iraq, 77 percent of the American public said that the United States had made the right decision in using military force against Iraq, according to a *Times Mirror* poll taken in January 1991.

⁴⁰ Michael Deaver, "The Elusive Ronald Reagan," *The New York Times*, September 29, 1999, Sec. A, p. 27. See also Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "The People, the Press and the Use of Force," in *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era* (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, 1995).

⁴¹ More recently, a Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) study showed the importance of clearly defined goals in a military operation to the American public by discussing the possibility of the introduction of ground troops to Kosovo. A full 60 percent of participants stated that they would support the use of ground troops in Kosovo if NATO commanders felt that this was the only way to halt ethnic cleansing. See Program on International Policy Attitudes, *Americans on Kosovo: A Study of US Public Attitudes* (College Park, Md.: The Center for International Strategic Studies, Program on International Policy Attitudes, May 27, 1999), pp. 2-3. For a discussion of the effect of casualties on American public opinion, see Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Harrisonburg, Virginia: R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 1999), pp. 81-112.

⁴² The democratic peace theorists' central contention that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states not only provides a compelling account of the historical interaction between democracies, but, as international events unfold, continues to be a robust predictor. For an introduction to the democratic peace thesis and the flavor of the debate, see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Secu-*

riety Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review*, March 1992, pp. 24-37; James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

⁴³ United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), *The State of the World Population 1998* (New York: UNFPA, 1998), p. 2; and The World Bank, *World Development Indicators 1998* (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank), p. 45.

⁴⁴ The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that by 2010, developing countries will have to import more than 160 million metric tons of cereals—up from 90 million metric tons in the late 1980s. William F. Martin, Ryukichi Imai, and Helga Steeg, "Maintaining Energy Security in a Global Context," *The Triangle Papers* 48 (New York: The Trilateral Commission, September 1996), p. 50; Energy and Atmosphere Program, Sustaining Energy and Environment Division, Bureau for Policy and Program Support, United Nations Development Programme, *UNDP Initiative for Sustainable Energy 1996* (New York: UNDP, 1996), p. 1; Nikos Alexandratos, ed., *World Agriculture: Towards 2010, An FAO Study* (Chichester, England: FAO and John Wiley, 1996), p. 86.

⁴⁵ John D Steinbruner, "Reluctant Strategic Realignment: The Need for a New View of National Security," *The Brookings Review* (Winter 1995), p. 6.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, "Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," October 6, 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991006_pickering_colombia.html; Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, eds., *Peace, Profit or Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies* (London: Halfway House, Institute for Security Studies, 1999).

⁴⁷ The Commission on Global Governance—formed in 1991 and led by Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister of Sweden, and Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth—recounts the extent to which the world has been transformed since 1945. Among the issues they raise as forming the basis for institutionalized global governance are values for the global neighborhood, promoting security, managing economic interdependence, reforming the United Nations, and strengthening the rule of law. The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995).

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⁴⁸ Indeed, at no other time in history have so many rights been so well defined for so many individual persons and classes of peoples while at the same time so many people remain imperiled by the very authorities designated to preserve those rights. Today, more people die at the hands of their own governments and of their fellow citizens than from the invasions and attacks of foreigners. No longer do many people turn to their governments for protection from foreigners. Increasingly, they must turn to foreigners for protection from their own governments. The plight of the Kurds at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 provides a poignant illustration of this dilemma. With Saddam bearing down on the Kurd population in the north of Iraq as part of Baghdad's effort to quell an incipient rebellion in the aftermath of hostilities in Kuwait, Kurds fled to the mountains and into neighboring Turkey. The Turkish military responded forcefully, stationing troops at critical points to prevent Kurds from coming into the country. Thus, the world witnessed bizarre images of Kurd peasant women and children confronting Turkish soldiers brandishing Western weapons—and fleeing back into Iraq. Western countries had to cope with the fact that defenseless refugees had just fled a NATO ally for the relative safety of a pariah state.

⁴⁹ Public outcries over events in China during the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, in Rwanda, in Yugoslavia, in Kosovo, and elsewhere have become increasingly strident over the subsequent decade. The public pressure generated combines with other international developments to constrain the ability of some Western governments to turn a blind eye. For one call to account, see Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., "International Obligations to Search for and Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?," *Duke Journal of Comparative International Law*, Vol. 7 (1997), pp. 411-61.

⁵⁰ For example, China and Myanmar were both willing to make considerable concessions to join the World Trade Organization and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), respectively. See Annie Huang, "Taiwan, China Both Seek to Join WTO," April 29, 1999, AP Online; Richard Fisher, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Testimony, June 8, 1999, U.S. Congress, 106th, 1st Sess., Committee on Ways and Means, House, Subcommittee on Trade, Hearings on Trade Relations with China (Federal Document Clearing House, Congressional Testimony, June 9, 1999); and "ASEAN Sets Rules to Admit Myanmar," December 1, 1996, *Los Angeles Times*, Sec. A, p. 30. For more information on ASEAN and Myanmar, see <http://www.aseansec.org/asc/r9697/asc96r3.htm>.

⁵¹ In addition, the United States has helped to create such fundamental building blocks as the establishment of the United Nations through the Charter of the United Nations, the World Bank Group (including the IMF and IBRD), NATO, and the OECD. It also has been at the forefront of establishing regimes for the protection of human rights, such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which was the

first international statement to use the term "human rights" and has been adopted by the Human Rights movement as a charter), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Torture, the Convention Against Genocide, and the Geneva Conventions. In recent years, the United States has continued to strengthen existing multilateral regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Environmental Security Initiative.

⁵² For these documents, see Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, eds., *International Law: Selected Documents* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995). For treaties regarding the law of the sea, the law of the air, and international environmental law, see pp. 534-857. For economic and trade agreements, see pp. 151-208. The original legal text of the Final Act that established the World Trade Organization and a summary of the Uruguay Round agreements can also be found at the WTO Web site (<http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/finalact.htm> and <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/uround.htm>, respectively). For a discussion of these issues, see Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994).

⁵³ See John Weltman, *World Politics and the Evolution of War* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); or Edward Mansfield, *Power, Trade, and War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁵⁴ For example, Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 calls for the signatories to make "good faith progress" toward complete disarmament, but provisions for enforcing compliance are absent. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention includes no verification measures, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention has yet to be ratified by a number of the major producers, including Russia.

⁵⁵ See Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, "Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles," in Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 65-112.

⁵⁶ See Janne E. Nolan et al., "The Imperatives for Cooperation," in Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994).

⁵⁷ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New Order* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), pp. 295-306.

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⁵⁸ As a crude but nevertheless persuasive indicator of this migration of international responsibility and broader trend in international relations, a simple count of UN Security Council Resolutions since 1989—some 639 in all—can be broken down as follows: 158 dealing with traditional interstate issues or classical international affairs (for example, global warming); 16 mixed (dealing with a combination of interstate and intrastate issues, such as Western Sahara; and 465 dealing with exclusively intrastate situations. Remarkably, the ratio is approximately 3:1 in favor of intrastate matters. See Jane E. Holl, “From Whence Cometh Our Help: Toward an International Duty to Rescue,” unpublished manuscript.

⁵⁹ Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Article 39 states that the Security Council “may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” The Security Council is authorized under Article 42 to take action by “air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (San Francisco, Cal.: United Nations, 1945).

⁶⁰ The U.N. Security Council has *invoked Chapter VII* no less than 130 times since 1989. The United States was the driving force or strong supporter in approximately 79 of those 130 cases. *The use of force* has been authorized under Chapter VII in six situations: Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Haiti, and Kosovo. The U.N. Security Council resolutions that first authorized the use of force in these situations are: (1) Iraq, SCR 678; (2) Somalia, SCR 794, (3) Bosnia and Herzegovina, SCR 836; (4) Rwanda, SCR 929; (5) Haiti, SCR 940; and (6) Kosovo, SCR 1199. The United States led the way and served as the principal sponsor for three of these six Security Council resolutions that authorized member states to use force (Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti).

⁶¹ As noted earlier, however, opinions are divided. The full text of Article 2 (4) reads as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner *inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations*” (emphasis added). Those who believe that unilateral forceful measures for humanitarian purposes are not prohibited under Article 2 (4) emphasize the highlighted phrase. United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (San Francisco, Cal.: United Nations, 1945).

⁶² The idea that sovereignty constitutes an impermeable barrier to international action—never true in reality—has come under increasing public attack from a new

quarter: the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. See, for example, the statements by Javier Perez de Cuellar in *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, U.N. Doc. No. A/46/I, at 10-11 (September 6, 1991); Secretary-General's Address at the University of Bordeaux, UNDP Press Release SG/SM/4560 (April 24, 1991); Boutros Boutros-Ghali in "Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping," U.N. Doc. No. S/24111 (June 14, 1992); Kofi Annan in speeches made to the Non-Aligned Summit, SG/SM/668 (September 2, 1998); and "The U.N. Should Intervene "Before Force is Needed," *International Herald Tribune*, June 29, 1998. See also Kurt Mills, *Sovereignty Eclipsed? The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and Intervention* (reposted Jul. 4, 1997), <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a012.htm>

⁶³ Article 24 (1) reads: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its *Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security*, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf" (emphasis added). Article 25 reads: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

⁶⁴ At the NATO Summit in April 1999 in Washington, D.C., France and the United States disputed the role of NATO in humanitarian interventions: "France wanted to require U.N. approval in every case. The United States wanted to give the alliance the option of acting without Security Council authorization." Norman Kempster and Tyler Marshall, "Crisis in Yugoslavia," *Los Angeles Times*, April 25, 1999. In a previous address delivered in Bonn on February 4, 1999, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott delineated the U.S. position: "We must be careful not to subordinate NATO to any other international body or compromise the integrity of its command structure. We will try to act in concert with other organizations, and with respect for their principles and purposes. But the Alliance must reserve the right and the freedom to act when its members, by consensus, deem it necessary." Address by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, delivered to the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn, Germany, February 4, 1999. For comparison, the language of Article 1 of the NATO charter is: "The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty* (Washington, D.C., 1949).

⁶⁵ Dita Smith ("What on Earth" column), "Going It Alone," *Washington Post*, Sec. A, p. 15.

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Program on The Role of American Military Power

Overview

Introduction

What should America's policy be for using its military?

To answer this question, the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) has established the Program on the Role of American Military Power (RAMP). Beginning its substantive work in January 2000 with a three-year mandate, the program will examine the changing international and strategic environment of the United States in order to develop a better understanding of what these changes will mean for the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in particular.

The program seeks to provide original ideas and analysis of important defense issues for the AUSA membership, senior Army leadership, and defense policymakers through an ambitious program of research, consultation, and publication. As part of its approach, the program will serve as a convening forum for the best military and civilian work in the defense and foreign policy communities in Washington, D.C. and beyond.

This program will also establish a linkage among the major centers of Army intellectual activity, including the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, and the National Defense University, in order to encourage contribution to the defense policy dialogue.

These efforts will result in the publication of a number of books and monographs by distinguished authors on topics relevant to the program's central question and conceptual approach.

The Conceptual Approach

To guide its work, the RAMP program will use a three-part conceptual approach that may be summarized as follows:

- I. What does America need from its military at this moment in its history? What role should the American military play in safeguarding and advancing the nation's interests?
- II. What missions fall to the military, particularly the Army, as a result of these needs? In other words, what specific functions must the military be able to perform, in a broader policy context (that is, in conjunction with political, economic, and other measures), in order to meet the needs of the nation?
- III. What capabilities does the military have to fulfill these missions? What more does the military need? That is, what organizational designs, force size, structure, and management approaches, are most promising for the military and what strategies – preventive defense, forward presence, etc. – offer the best complement to various organizational models?

The Work Plan

To offer some answers to the questions raised above, the program will seek contributions from military professionals, scholars, policymakers, and other experts. The program will also sponsor conferences in the United States and around the world, convene seminars, and actively participate in the work of others that relates to its core agenda.

The following outline elaborates some of the key issues associated with each part of the conceptual framework.

Greater Guns for Greater Goods

I. What does America need from its military?

Objectives

- To identify the core, and perhaps enduring, reasons that the United States requires a military of considerable size, geographic reach, and lethal capacity.
- To understand how changes in the post-Cold War world affect the assumptions that underlie the maintenance of a strong American military.

Issues

- What historical factors contribute to the current view of the need for peerless American military power?
- With the end of the Cold War, in what ways has the American need for a strong military changed?
- How tied is the United States to the needs and capabilities of its friends and allies in determining its own approach to defense and security?
- What strategic changes might radically alter current views of America's role in the world and the military it fields to fulfill that role?
- The post-Cold War period has seen compression of the levels of war. What does this compression imply for decisionmaking, strategy formulation, and force structure?
- It has become increasingly possible to foresee the emergence of potential conventional adversaries, but increasingly difficult to foresee potential unconventional foes. How should the United States respond to so-called "asymmetric" challenges?

II. What military missions flow from the needs outlined above?

Objectives

- To identify the general and specific missions that the military must be able to perform in order to meet the current and future needs of the nation.
- To understand where the mission gaps and seams exist and to offer strategies for filling those gaps.

Issues

- What are the existing service views of their core competencies? How do these views compare with current U.S. policies regarding the use of the military abroad?
- How do new major initiatives such as national missile defense or homeland defense relate to these views of core mission functions?
- How effective are existing approaches to military missions for the new challenges confronting the United States, e.g., peacetime engagement, peace operations, post-conflict peacebuilding, etc.?
- If it is not possible to include these kinds of security and stability operations as “lesser included cases” of warfighting, what alternative approaches exist?
- How should the United States respond to the geostrategic demands for an internationally available rapid reaction capacity? An integrated civil-military approach to disaster response and stability operations? An improved national and international capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies?

III. What capacities does the military have – and require – in terms of structures and strategies, to fulfill these missions in order to meet the nation’s needs?

Objectives

- To identify the best approaches to closing mission gaps and to identify the conditions under which the various approaches might be most successful.
- To understand how the Title X choices and responsibilities of the various services interact to meet joint operation priorities, warfighting demands, and alliance imperatives.

Issues

- Where do current capacities fall short of meeting mission requirements posed by the nation’s needs?
- What strategies should be adopted to close the gap between capabilities and requirements?
- What are the resource implications, in terms of both manpower and materiel, of the foregoing?
- How do changes in the roles and missions of the military affect the defense industry? What changes need to occur in order to position the industry to contribute most effectively to the security needs of the United States?
- How should we think about distributing the defense burden between the United States and its friends and allies around the world in order to close our own national gaps?

The Association of the United States Army

The Basic charter of the Association of the United States Army is a document dated 5 July 1950 a portion of which reads: "...That (2) the particular business and objects of the ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY as reincorporated shall be wholly educational, literary, scientific, fostering *esprit de corps*, dissemination of professional knowledge and the promotion of the efficiency of the Army components of the Armed Forces of our Country..."

The national association is exempt from Federal income taxation under Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

At the October 27, 1956 Annual Business Meeting, held in Washington, D.C, the Association accepted a reorganization plan which called for removal of all active duty personnel from the governing body, and launching of the regional organization to bring AUSA to the home communities of its members.

Under the present Bylaws, no military personnel on active duty may serve on the Association's national governing bodies, nor may such personnel be employed by the Association in any permanent or semi-permanent staff capacity.

AUSA is not a part of the United States Government or the United States Army. The Association is not supported financially by the Army or the government.

Besides a permanent staff at its national headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, the Association is organized into 132 chapters located worldwide. Made up entirely of volunteers, they provide recreational and educational opportunities to Soldiers and their families. Most importantly, they support our deployed Soldiers and their families left behind.

The Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) extends the influence of AUSA by informing and educating its members; local, regional and national leaders; and the American public, on the critical nature of land forces and the importance of the United States Army. ILW carries out a broad program of activities including the publication of professional research papers, newsletters, background briefs, essays and special reports. ILW also conducts seminars, produces television programs and sponsors regional defense forums throughout the country and overseas in concert with local AUSA Chapters.

AUSA's Industry Affairs office seeks to strengthen relations between the Army and the defense industry through its corporate membership program and monthly events. Every October, AUSA holds its Annual Business Meeting in Washington that attracts people from all sectors of the defense industry as well as senior Army

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and Pentagon leaders. Industry Affairs also sponsors an annual Winter Symposium in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida that is similar to the October event and has grown in attendance and popularity in recent years. Besides these events, Industry Affairs holds regular monthly symposia focusing on a variety of fields ranging from intelligence and special operations to logistics and medical affairs.

Periodically, AUSA organizes short-term research projects on pressing issues of the day. The Program on the Role of American Military Power (RAMP) was started in January 2000 with a three-year mandate to examine the changing international and strategic environment of the United States in order to develop a better understanding of what these changes will mean for the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in particular. RAMP has sponsored a number of events and will produce publications, including a Final Report in 2002, on a variety of topics including principles for the use of force, the future of land warfare, post-conflict reconstruction, security sector reform, interagency coordination, and defense industry transformation.

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