The Rationale for a Robust U.S. Army Presence in the Pacific Basin

by Nicholas R. Krueger

Introduction

The contest of wills between the United States and the Soviet bloc that defined international relations for much of the previous century has given way to a far less rigid strategic competition among many more actors. American armed forces have been continuously engaged in active combat operations in the Middle East for more than a decade and are likely to remain so for several more years. However, the Middle East is not the only place where bold actors challenge American interests, nor is it likely that the armed services will confront only one type of conflict in the near future. Indeed, every global trend—including such diverse dynamics as America’s uneasy withdrawal from Iraq and uneasy persistence in Afghanistan, rapid weapons proliferation, international economic challenges, widespread internal political upheaval, demographic shift, natural disaster and numerous others—indicates increasing complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability.

Precisely because of this complexity and the diversity of American interests, the United States is heavily invested strategically in numerous geographic regions and is fully committed to international security partnerships around the world. However, new guidance for the Department of Defense (DoD) in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (January 2012) recognizes that the United States “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia–Pacific region.”¹ In particular, primary missions of U.S. armed forces include the deterrence of aggressive states; the projection of American power in the face of anti-access/area denial efforts by competitors; the provision of a sustained stabilizing presence via the strengthening of partner capacity and alliances; and ongoing stability, counterinsurgency and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It is therefore useful to evaluate the security tools that can be employed in pursuit of American goals there. The real significance of the Pacific theater is not the territory itself but its people, its impact on the global economy and the potential for competition over the power to control people and resources.

American ground forces offer flexible and often unique capabilities to prevent conflict via their ready posture, shape the international environment through strong relationships with partners and win decisively if necessary in the Pacific theater. Specifically, certain characteristics of American ground forces prove to be well-matched to the security issues caused by the trends of complexity, uncertainty and rapid change—issues confronted by the primary missions identified in the January 2012 defense guidance. Capable ground forces are therefore ideal for development as a strategic hedge against whatever unforeseeable issues may arise. In particular, investment in adaptable ground forces is an efficient means of preserving options for American responses to foreseeable but undefined emergencies. American ground forces also continue to be invaluable components of existing plans to overcome particular, known security challenges. Essentially, this moment of transition demands an American strategy of continued engagement with emphasis on building allied partner capacity to reinforce deterrence and...
increase U.S. influence—a task well-suited to the capability set of the American Soldier—and will test the United States’ excellence at conducting truly joint military operations.

Following are four observations about America’s strategic interests in the Asia–Pacific region, beginning with more general observations and narrowing to the more specific. Each implies that ready U.S. landpower continues to be a cornerstone underlying the pursuit of a broad range of American interests as well as wider interests shared by many allies and partners.

**Achieving the United States’ global strategic goals requires military coordination with Asian partners. The U.S. Army is an ideal security asset for pursuing mutual interests and developing a strategic hedge against future uncertainty.**

In the broadest sense, the strategic goals outlined in the January 2012 defense guidance cited above and in the President’s 2010 *National Security Strategy* and 2011 *National Military Strategy (NMS)* drive some global initiatives and reinforce security trends that call for the U.S. military to further deepen its historic engagement with Pacific partners. The U.S. Army therefore has explicit mandates to expand its existing involvement in Asian security initiatives to help resolve security problems with not only regional but global reach.

In the *NMS*, U.S. forces are charged with achieving four National Military Objectives of wide scope:

- counter violent extremism;
- deter and defeat aggression;
- strengthen international and regional security; and
- shape the future force.2

All four of these objectives are long-term goals. By exploring the *NMS* explanation of the roles to be played by U.S. forces in pursuing each one and the description in the January 2012 defense guidance of U.S. forces’ primary missions, it becomes clearer that U.S. Army engagement with Pacific states is an integral component of each of the four distinct campaigns and that the Army’s unique capability to be the nation’s long-term mechanism of strategic influence is vital to the campaigns’ success.

The January 2012 defense guidance states that a core military goal is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda,3 and the *NMS* emphasizes that while the main al Qaeda and extremist threat resides largely in the Afghanistan–Pakistan subregion of South Central Asia, U.S. forces must be prepared to eradicate extremists “wherever they reside.”4 The Pacific Basin has been a haven for al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist organizations for some time; since 9/11, American counterterrorism forces have contributed to the hunt in such locations as the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore. However, U.S. Army forces have been doing more than that to combat extremism in Asia. Since the earliest days of Operation Enduring Freedom, Army forces have been conducting some of the very missions described in the previous section as likely but unpredictable contingencies: advising and assisting friendly governments in their fights against extremist adversaries, conducting enabling operations that help America’s partners succeed in their counterterrorist and counterinsurgency campaigns and using reinforced military-to-military relationships to build partners’ capacity to hold the gains achieved and interdict future extremist threats. These long-term efforts are cornerstones of a world absent al Qaeda and its allies.

Ground forces’ readiness throughout the Pacific Basin is directly relevant to readiness in other distant theaters as well. For example, Guam is a key Army sustainment base; because U.S. ground operations as far away as the Middle East depend heavily on the equipment prepositioned there, its vitality and security are crucial. Alaska, economically and strategically valuable in its own right, is another key Army staging ground because its proximity to three continents makes it crucial for projecting power. Hawaii, the stepping stone to the Pacific, is central to overall American military readiness for similar reasons. American strategy demands the resilience of a flexible joint force based solidly in the Pacific Basin.

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The January 2012 defense guidance recognizes that American “relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region,” and the Northeast Asia section of the NMS states that, to strengthen international and regional security, the United States expects “to maintain a strong military presence in Northeast Asia for decades” and that an active military presence there is “the key to preserving stability.” In addition to the many already-identified operational capabilities that American Soldiers provide, the NMS adds that the deepening of military-to-military relationships and the increased trust and understanding that results from active interpersonal engagement yield further security synergies. The Army has been building these synergies with partners in the Pacific for decades via U.S. Pacific Command’s Theater Security Cooperation Program and other mechanisms. The expansion of such cooperation and the identification of mutual military interests set the stage for international successes such as the Proliferation Security Initiative that would be impossible to execute without the coordination of regional ground forces and the leadership of American ground personnel.

Persistent U.S. Army engagement in Asia even helps to shape the joint force of 2020 and beyond in important ways. Of particular strategic importance for American forces are the operational and tactical experience gained and the technological innovations driven by security problems that are presently unique to the Asian theater but which will probably become widespread eventually. For example, the asymmetric challenges presently posed by the United States’ competitors include attempts to degrade American access to space and cyberspace, limit freedom of action in the event of war and threaten the security of the U.S. homeland with long-range strike systems. Active U.S. Army engagement in the region not only helps educate U.S. forces about emerging issues but also offers opportunities for allies to cooperate and combine resources on issues such as ballistic missile defense.

Therefore, continued engagement by the Army in the Pacific Basin contributes directly to the pursuit of global strategic interests and national military goals by eroding the environments that permit the growth and spread of violent extremism, maintaining key capabilities required to deter and defeat aggression, enabling unprecedented 21st century cooperative military initiatives and driving innovation and learning that the Army needs to preserve strategic advantages in such areas as technological superiority, doctrine and training.

Global trends toward increased uncertainty and complexity yield a wide range of foreseeable but undefined challenges in Asia. The U.S. Army stands ready to conduct full-spectrum operations.

There are countless possible security-related contingencies of varying degrees of likelihood that could arise in the Pacific Basin, many of which are counted among the “Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces” found in the January 2012 defense guidance. Many of these possibilities are relatively straightforward missions in and of themselves, but because of Asia’s strategic significance to the United States and the numerous interwoven goals and initiatives that define America’s relationships there, even the most local issues can assume strategic meaning all their own.

Security dilemmas at any point on the spectrum of possible contingencies in Asia can have important strategic ramifications partly because a substantial percentage of the world’s military and economic power (and therefore political power) is located there. Seven of the ten largest armies in the world reside in U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. The northeast sector of the Pacific Basin alone is home to four of the world’s six largest militaries—China, North Korea, Russia and South Korea—all of which have histories of heavy reliance on the mobilization of conventional ground forces in turbulent times. Between a quarter and a third of the entire world’s population lives in Northeast Asia. The region accounts for a fifth of world economic output and about the same share of world trade. There is $742 billion in annual trade between Northeast Asia and the United States—which totals 25 percent of all U.S. trade—and a further $221 billion in U.S. direct investment. The region is the fastest growing segment of the global economy.

The only real certainty yielded by these statistics and a host of other trends is that strategic uncertainty is compounded. On one hand, rapid economic development in the region (such as competition for access to natural resources in the South China Sea, for example) has driven rapid military investment by several Asian states, and the

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high-dollar stakes of new economic investment have increased tensions somewhat among regional powers. Some theories suggest that such rapid change ought to increase the likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, development and globalization have actually created incentive, rather than disincentive, for improved military, diplomatic and economic ties and interstate cooperation toward achieving increasingly shared objectives. Some theories thus point to recent decades of prosperity and relative calm and suggest that evolutionary change has decreased the likelihood of conflict—perhaps permanently.

What is clear is that the persistent engagement of U.S. ground forces in the Pacific region has long been a stabilizing influence. For many decades, they have deterred, prevented and sometimes actively resisted forces that sought to exacerbate tensions and have established security guarantees and restored order that created the permissive environment for the growth of long-term diplomatic and economic development. They have enlarged allies’ military capacity to erode security vulnerabilities and developed contingency response capabilities for humanitarian missions and disaster relief. More recently, they have partnered against such international security problems as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the networked threat of transnational terrorism. Essentially, U.S. ground forces have been helpful throughout recent history both in keeping the lid on potential outbreaks of Asian conflict and in fostering much-needed interstate development that ultimately reduces the likelihood of violent conflict.

A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies identified a list of 14 distinct types of missions—all relevant in the Pacific theater in the 21st century—that U.S. ground forces might be called upon to execute in the near future. These illustrate well the full spectrum of possible security contingencies and suggest how ground forces will execute the January 2012 defense guidance regarding the American military’s primary missions:

• show of force;
• humanitarian assistance and consequence management;
• foreign internal defense;
• support to foreign unconventional forces (against American adversaries);
• enabling operation (underwriting partner-led operations via support capabilities);
• noncombatant evacuation operation;
• peacekeeping (separating warring factions and implementing peace agreements);
• seize-and-secure operations (critical infrastructure, equipment or terrain);
• human security (protecting civilian populations from harm);
• opposed stabilization (imposing order when a state fails to control its territory);
• sanctuary denial (precluding terrorist or insurgent reorganization);
• small-scale raids against specific, limited objectives;
• counter-network campaign (systematically dismantling hostile nonstate organizations); and
• major combat campaign.10

The Pacific Basin is not only densely populated, militarily capable and economically critical, it is also diverse. In some Asian countries, active al Qaeda-linked extremist groups survive, key territory and infrastructure are contested, or internal political turmoil and civil conflict are rampant despite the overall state of stability that generally dominates much of the region. Lingering security issues permeate the region—primarily issues in the “messy middle”11 of the contingency spectrum between the relative extremes of purely humanitarian aid and major ground war. However, the activity of U.S. ground forces in support of partner states in several of these countries addresses numerous challenges and has strategic significance. For example, U.S. Army personnel have supported the government of the Philippines in a counterterrorism role since the aftermath of 9/11; by enabling a partner state’s operations against al Qaeda ally Abu Sayyaf, eroding its sanctuary and destroying its network, the Army has advanced the strategic global campaign against transnational terrorism. This example is a good demonstration of ways in which U.S. ground forces, playing an active role in response to undefined contingencies among the list of intermediate scenarios, have additional value in pursuit of grander strategic aims.
The United States’ strategic interests in Asia are likely to demand ongoing U.S. intervention and engagement to resolve a broad range of lingering and emerging security issues—as has been the case for decades. The list of ground force capability requirements above represents a set of specialties at which U.S. ground forces are already expert and for which the U.S. Army routinely trains. Even if it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty which of these operational requirements will arise in Asia next (or when or where), all are foreseeable possibilities rooted in long experience. The U.S. Army, the nation’s flexible and multirole force, is ideally suited for executing a large number of foreseeable but undefined missions in the murky center of the contingency spectrum—capability likely to be required irregularly but frequently as the United States pursues its strategic interests in Asia.

The United States is in a state of strategic military competition with regional powers. The U.S. Army can help the United States realize advantages in these contests.

Since the early 1970s, the Secretary of Defense has been assisted with long-term planning by a small, independent branch in the Department of Defense known as the Office of Net Assessment. Conceived at a moment in the Cold War when the Soviet Union had achieved near-parity with the United States in some strategically important respects, a major purpose of net assessment was to help American strategists frame their thinking about prospective challenges. The utility of such introspection remains highly applicable to current strategic problems.

Net assessment began with the linked presumptions that (1) the United States found itself in a state of strategic competition with the Soviet Union; (2) factors such as geopolitics and ideological differences made the military dimension of strategic competition inevitable and unavoidable; but (3) the nature of the military competition was partly controllable by the United States. Net assessment compared such qualitative factors as strategies and tactics, technological capacities, doctrines, training and any number of other factors with an eye toward identifying asymmetries—relative strengths and weaknesses—vis-à-vis the Soviets. The ultimate aim was to identify emerging opportunities that might affect relative American strength in the future.

The moral of the story is that Cold War developments in subsequent years effectively validated the net assessment framework. The United States challenged the Soviet Union during the 1980s by developing and mastering asymmetric, revolutionary capabilities. In areas of relative American military advantage, the United States exploited its greatest competencies and effectively forced the Soviets to attempt to match its efforts and expenditures. The Soviet Union collapsed before the two sides’ conventional forces met in battle to test the effects of the competition. However, in the Gulf War, Americans and their allies repeatedly surprised, outsmarted, outflanked and outgunned an Iraqi ground force modeled closely on modern Soviet methods and achieved a thorough rout. By intentionally pressing their competitive military advantages during the 15 years prior to that engagement, the American force created overmatch—decisive new capabilities for which their opponents found no answer.

The parallels between this historical example and the present are many. The presumptions underlying net assessment of U.S.–Soviet competition largely remain valid to describe some elements of regional competition in the Pacific today. It seems clear that China is competing broadly to approach or match conventional U.S. military capability over time, and though it too is heavily invested in a peaceful and prosperous East Asia, such peace demands greater clarity of its intentions. Separately, North Korea is competing to realize asymmetric military advantages that offset conventional U.S. advantages, and the United States is competing to overcome these efforts by achieving new capabilities of its own. There are further similarities. Though no state yet approaches overall military parity with the United States, the emerging perception is that there exists an increasingly urgent American need to slow or reverse some states’ relative strategic military gains. At the same time, the United States faces a rather austere budget environment and needs to develop cost-effective efficiencies where possible and where advantageous.

The ready presence of American Soldiers in the Pacific region advances the U.S. position in ongoing military competitions with regional powers in two senses. On one hand, the 21st century American Soldier is objectively an extremely capable battlefield asset—a highly versatile weapon, capable of transitioning very rapidly among widely varied roles as conditions dictate across the entire spectrum of possible military contingencies. War is fundamentally a human endeavor, a test of wills, and the usefulness of highly trained, disciplined, creative yet principled Americans has been proved in numerous recent conflicts and crises.

In a second sense, U.S. ground forces are relatively highly capable when compared to their competitors’ ground forces. Preserving a widely capable and available American ground force presence in the Pacific Basin causes
America’s competitors strategic and operational challenges and forces them to try to keep up in areas in which U.S. forces are likely to maintain existing relative advantages. The United States’ ability to deploy and sustain the world’s best-manned, best-trained and best-equipped land forces is an extremely important asymmetry that its adversaries are not likely to match directly. By maintaining a ready ground presence even in the face of adversaries’ asymmetric attempts to deny such a presence, the United States compels its competitors to expend resources trying to defend against operational possibilities that they would not have otherwise considered. Competitors are thus unable to ignore their deficiencies vis-à-vis American proficiencies in potentially decisive areas such as combined-arms maneuver, junior leadership, technology, industrial capacity and others. Such pressure can even have secondary effects on the competitors’ economic base and internal political stability (as the competition of the 1980s had on the Soviet Union) and might help bring about desired political and behavioral change short of war.

In broader terms, highly ready U.S. Soldiers in Asia create other more indirect effects on the state of these competitions. Deepened military cooperation in Asia since the 1990s has proved inseparable from simultaneous economic cooperation and mutual investment among the United States and a host of partner states. The bolstering of ties via increased engagement of American ground forces with such states as Australia (notable especially because it will soon host U.S. ground forces on its territory), India, Japan and others is itself a form of asymmetry that most potential American adversaries cannot match. For example, annual Army exercises in Indonesia (which in recent years have also included such other partners as the Philippines and Thailand) develop international peacekeeping forces that deploy worldwide and relieve demands on U.S. personnel elsewhere. Such activity develops American diplomatic influence and increases overall security cooperation on the fringes of competitors’ regional influence. Close, extensive cooperation with partner states does much to squeeze, if not necessarily contain, military ambitions of U.S. forces’ strategic competitors. The best and most efficient way to achieve primary American missions such as deterrence of aggression and the establishment of a stable presence is to preserve the conditions of peace. Building partners’ military and economic capacity reinforces strategic competitive advantages.

Beyond the U.S. Army’s broad strategic value in shaping potential mission sets and readying for possible contingencies, the United States faces discrete strategic military challenges from emerging regional powers in the Pacific Basin. Because there are no simple or easy solutions, the distinct and often unique capabilities of the U.S. Army—especially its full-spectrum capability and its ability to press competitors with asymmetric capacity of its own—provide good reason to maximize its role in ongoing strategic military competitions in the region.

The United States must be ready to fight and win in Korea—tonight if necessary.

The rogue state of North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) presents a highly unique set of security challenges for the United States and its allies. The state’s combination of considerable conventional military capability, advanced asymmetric capability and a foreign policy decisionmaking process that is (at best) only vaguely understood by its neighbors and (at worst) virulently anti-American and narcissistic in its intentions is a recipe for disaster. This combination of capability and hostility makes North Korea the most likely place in Asia in which U.S. forces might have to conduct a major offensive maneuver on extremely short notice.

Though it is difficult to imagine what sequence of events would lead to the outbreak of full-scale war on the Korean peninsula, current circumstances are serious. North Korea possesses the fourth-largest military in the world, 70 percent of which is forward-deployed against a close U.S. ally. It boasts 1.1 million ground troops, approximately 4,000 tanks and 2,000 armored personnel carriers. (By way of comparison, the U.S.-led coalition that confronted Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 was about half that size.) It aims the world’s largest artillery force (approximately 13,000 systems) at its southern neighbor and deploys the world’s largest special operations force, which numbers at least 60,000 men. In its 11,000+ underground facilities, the DPRK is believed to keep nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Its ballistic missiles can now nearly reach the U.S. mainland. In sum, it has capabilities that threaten the vital interests of the United States.

The sudden death of DPRK premier Kim Jong Il in December 2011 does not automatically mean that military confrontation between North Korea and American allies will ensue. However, Kim’s son and heir-apparent, Kim Jong Un, apparently solidified his leadership credentials in 2010, when DPRK forces twice engaged in serious unprovoked military attacks, sinking a South Korean warship without warning and shelling a South Korean position. Kim Jong Il’s death almost certainly made the DPRK internal political struggle more, not less, contentious; thus, the
likelihood of further such incidents has probably increased. For its part, South Korea seems to have lost all patience for such unacceptable provocations; popular outrage caused the new defense minister to promise that future DPRK attacks would “definitely” lead to retaliatory strikes.\(^{14}\)

The nature of the Korean threat demands a powerful U.S. ground capability. Though South Korean defenses are strong, the United States is obligated to fulfill the Mutual Defense Treaty that has long defined its relationship with South Korea and fight alongside its ally if necessary. Major conflict would be multifaceted and would require U.S. forces to assume roles throughout the possible spectrum of conflict.\(^{14}\) It is not hard to imagine simultaneous operational requirements to destroy enemy armored formations, seize and hold enemy artillery launch sites, raid and destroy asymmetric weapons facilities, protect civilian populations, evacuate noncombatants and deliver humanitarian assistance. Naval and air assets alone would clearly be insufficient to achieve all of these objectives.

In Korea, strong and flexible American ground forces must remain ready to conduct full-spectrum operations in the foreseeable, if presently unlikely, event of major conventional war or more unconventional war. Their high state of readiness today provides a strong deterrent against DPRK aggression both because of their actual capability to resist invasion and because of the full security guarantee from the United States that their presence represents. They have long influenced DPRK behavior and reinforced a tentative peace even though they have not participated in offensive maneuvers against that state for many years. The presence of major, ready U.S. ground combat units in Korea in particular and in Asia in general is an essential part of longstanding security commitments to protect Americans and allies against dangerous and unpredictable adversaries.

**Conclusion**

There are thus at least four major components that, when taken together, build a strong strategic rationale for robust U.S. landpower in the Asia–Pacific region. First, U.S. Army activity in Asia directly contributes to the achievement of grand national goals with global ramifications. Its engagement erodes the support necessary for transnational terrorism to thrive, maintains the capability to deter and defeat aggression in places other than the Pacific region, builds cooperative synergies with partners that are achieving global goals not achievable by any one force and drives innovation that has widespread strategic utility.

Second, consistent U.S. military engagement in Asia has helped both to keep the peace and to develop the peace over the years, but the volatility that results from complexity and uncertainty will continue to generate demand for the specialties at which U.S. Army forces excel.

Third, the United States is engaged in strategic military competition with states whose interests do not entirely align with U.S. interests. It must seek to maintain key advantages in the competitions so as to maximize the realization of American goals and minimize the negative impacts on American security and prosperity. The U.S. Army is key to these competitions and can not only help realize American goals but also force the competitors to make uncomfortable choices as the competition continues.

Fourth, North Korea is a true outlier in the international system and a serious threat—highly capable conventionally, threatening asymmetrically, erratic internally and skillful at concealing its intentions from Western analysts. The U.S. Army must continue to be highly ready to meet whatever combination of operational challenges might arise in Korea because (1) the United States is obligated by treaty to defend several regional allies; (2) it is strategically important for Northeast Asia to be peaceful, democratic and prosperous; and (3) numerous likely contingencies in that location could best be confronted by flexible U.S. ground forces.

Although the United States currently has few peer competitors in the air or at sea, regional competitors challenge American dominance on land. It is therefore imperative that the considerable strategic value of U.S. Army forces in Asia not be overlooked at a time when national military strategy and national defense resources are being reevaluated.

Endnotes


12 Thurman, “Sustaining a Strong Alliance in the Morning Calm.”


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