U.S. Army South and the Transition to 6th Army: Rising to Face New Challenges in Central and South America and the Caribbean

by Charles Hornbostel

This is an area of the world where it’s extremely unlikely that we’re going to be launching missiles and dropping bombs. This is an area of the world where our engagement is in ideas. And conferences. And working together, creating a global security environment that we can all be part of and draw benefit from.

Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN
Commander, U.S. Southern Command

Introduction

The U.S. Army is in the process of reorganizing its institutional and operational structure around numbered theater armies. Each theater army will serve as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) for its respective regional unified combatant command and will report to both Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and the combatant commander in its area of responsibility (AOR); see figure 1. This reorganization reflects the shift in Army doctrine from threat-based to capabilities-based command structures. In addition to fulfilling their Title 10, U.S. Code, responsibilities to organize, equip and train Army units, theater armies will develop organic, deployable headquarters, giving the Army new capabilities and...
new options to act more effectively across the full spectrum of operations. This National Security Watch discusses U.S. Army South (USARSO), responsible for Army forces in Central and South America and the Caribbean, and its transition to and retitling as USARSO (6th Army).

**U.S. Army South**

U.S. Army South serves as the ASCC within U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), providing forces for operations throughout the region. As part of the Army’s command restructuring, USARSO will report directly to HQDA rather than to Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and in conjunction with its designation as USARSO (6th Army), it will establish a deployable headquarters unit. The transition will take place over three phases, the first of which, Program and Coordination, began 1 October 2006 with the switch from reporting to Army Forces Command to reporting directly to HQDA. Phase 2, scheduled to begin 1 October 2007, involves resourcing USARSO (6th Army); and phase 3, scheduled for 1 October 2008, is the end-state, wherein USARSO (6th Army) will be fully manned, equipped, trained and validated.

Headquarters USARSO includes 24 Soldiers assigned to USSOUTHCOM and 457 Soldiers (420 active component, 37 reserve component) and 297 civilians assigned to these units:

- Headquarters (HQ) and HQ company;
- 470th Military Intelligence Brigade;
- 1-228th Aviation Battalion;
- SKYWATCH;
- 525th Military Police Battalion;
- 56th Signal Battalion;
- Special Operations Support Element; and
- Landing Craft Transportation Detachment.

Under the existing structure, USARSO’s capabilities are limited in the areas of command and control (C2), logistics, intelligence and planning and theater security cooperation/foreign area expertise. The reorganization will address all these limitations by providing new capabilities to existing units and by adding new units (see figure 2):

- Special Troops Battalion (STB), under which the HQ and HQ company will fall;
- 807th Medical Deployment Support Command (MDSC); and
- 167th Theater Support Command (TSC).

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**Figure 2: New USARSO (6th Army) organization**

* Source: www.usarso.mil
The new organization will provide enhanced C2 capabilities in the form of a deployable operational command post that can also serve as a Joint Task Force (JTF) or Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) headquarters with minor augmentation. Additional benefits include improved logistics capability through the TSC, more robust intelligence capabilities in the intelligence brigade, and enhanced planning and regional affairs expertise.

Headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, USARSO has forward operating sites in Colombia and Honduras and supports units in 21 other countries; 1,600 Soldiers are deployed in the AOR at present. Major responsibilities include theater security cooperation, counterterrorism, counternarcotics and disaster relief operations. USARSO also engages in military-to-military cooperation through numerous exercises and through the Conference of American Armies (composed of 20 member armies, five observer armies and two international military organizations, the Conference of Central American Armed Forces and the Inter-American Defense Board).3

Regional Overview

The USSOUTHCOM AOR covers an area of 26 million square miles and 31 countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean.4 The Andes Mountains form the western spine of the continent, giving way to the tropical rain forests of the Amazon River basin in the north and the fertile plains of the pampas region in the south. The population numbers some 432 million, composed primarily of the descendants of indigenous peoples, European settlers and African plantation workers, with peoples of Asian descent also prevalent in some countries. The majority of the population speaks Spanish or Portuguese (spoken in Brazil); French, English, Dutch, indigenous languages and even Hindi are also spoken in some areas.

Proximity to the region has spurred U.S. involvement on a number of issues, some dating back decades. Currently occupying the central position in U.S. foreign policy is international terrorism, and while Central and South America and the Caribbean are not the main stage for counterterrorism, the region is nevertheless important in preserving U.S. national security. On a parallel track, reflecting the prevailing American view that the Americas are the traditional U.S. sphere of influence, the rising influence of extra-regional actors (especially China) also impacts on U.S. foreign policy decisions. Beyond these global security considerations, numerous issues specific to the region occupy the attention of U.S. policymakers and lawmakers. Among the most important issues are drug production and trafficking, immigration (especially to North America), gang activity and deepening democratization vis-à-vis the rise of populism. Each of these issue areas links up with critical components of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. The intersection of these issues—the potential for emerging threats from powerful states and/or non-state actors operating in the Western Hemisphere to harm U.S. security and economic interests—suggests to some that a more assertive regional policy may be in order. Yet the United States must also tread carefully if it is to enjoy success on these fronts.

Terrorism and Regional Security. Five years after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, few issues animate U.S. officials and the American electorate alike as strongly as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Prior to that day, the Bush administration had chosen to focus new attention on Latin America (particularly on Mexico, but also on other countries in the region). After the attacks, attention shifted to Central
Asia and the Greater Middle East; consequently, many leaders in Central and South America felt sidelined. One result of this shift in attention was the lack of Latin American support in the UN Security Council for the Iraq War. However, the recent strain in U.S.-Latin American relations goes beyond disagreements over the Iraq War. It is important to keep this idea in mind, because terrorism is often the most extreme expression of wider popular discontent with the pace of government reforms and the feeling that Western economic doctrines have failed to deliver.

One area of critical concern in the context of the GWOT is the tri-border region, connecting Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (see figure 4). Traffickers in arms and drugs mingle with Islamist terrorist elements in an area where borders are loose and government officials are corrupt. Arabs, including Lebanese, make up a substantial fraction of the population there, and at least some are thought to have connections to Hizbullah and Hamas, particularly for fundraising purposes. Although opinions differ as to whether direct fundraising for terrorist activities actually occurs in this area, the lack of competent authority combined with corruption among border guards and local magistrates makes money-laundering and other activities a low-risk enterprise. The U.S. government recognizes the role played by illegal financing activities in terror operations, and has deployed agents from the Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay to assist in tracking down suspects and shutting down networks through the creation of “Trade Transparency Units (TTUs)” in each country. According to ICE, coordinated efforts are having an effect: in August 2006, for example, the TTU in Brazil helped the Brazilian government, working in parallel with ICE agents in Miami, to dismantle a $200-million trade fraud scheme. In addition, Brazil has taken the initiative in setting up a new South American regional intelligence center, which will focus on security and intelligence sharing in the tri-border region, offering space to officials from Argentina and Paraguay as well. Although not an official sponsor, the United States has expressed enthusiasm about future cooperation with the center.

Other Major Issues: Neopopulism, Drugs, Immigration. Many of the issues confronting U.S. foreign policy in this region stem from general perceptions of stalled reforms and failed institutions. Emblematic of this widespread sentiment is the rise of the “neopopulist” leader. This populism is driven in part by frustration with the status quo regimes in the region, and fanned by anti-American rhetoric (usually aimed more at U.S. policies than the American people) and, for resource-rich countries like Venezuela and Bolivia, a surge in fossil fuel revenues.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in particular has presented headaches to Washington. He has courted Chinese involvement in the petroleum industry and other sectors, he has initiated an arms deal with Russia, and he goads other states in the region to defy the United States. Chávez remains extremely popular in Venezuela, due in part to his generous public-sector spending bolstered by oil revenues. Of late, he has been trying to diversify the oil market away from the United States, traditionally a top purchaser of Venezuelan petroleum, and into newly energy-hungry economies in China and India. He has not, however, reinvested into the oil infrastructure or generated additional capacity, with the result that exports to the United States are dropping. It is far cheaper to ship to North America than to Asia, and with what little petroleum he has chosen to send to more distant markets, Chávez has borne the increased shipping costs through cuts in profits. As long as oil prices have been near record highs, this strategy has worked. With oil prices again on the decline, and announcements of large new oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico, however, Chávez may soon find that he has made promises he can no longer afford to keep. Furthermore, there are signs that his influence may have already peaked. Venezuela decided to defer to Panama for a seat on the UN Security Council after failing to garner enough support for its own bid; the U.S. choice, Guatemala, also lost out in the stalemate, but the upshot is that the United States achieved its aim of
preventing Venezuela from winning a seat. Chávez’s meddling in other Latin American elections has also backfired in some cases, notably in Peru and Ecuador.¹⁶ These events call into question the ability of Chávez to lead Latin America as an anti-American bloc.

The rise of populism in Latin America does not suggest that U.S. security will soon be threatened by a new “Red menace.” The year 2006 has seen the most elections in Central and South America ever, and democracy appears to be working in places as far afield as Costa Rica and Chile.¹⁷ Daniel Ortega, the Sandinista leader once demonized by Washington as a Soviet agent, lost three presidential elections in a row in Nicaragua;¹⁸ his victory in the most recent presidential race stems in part from his new, relatively moderate image and more conciliatory tone toward Washington.¹⁹ Bolivian President Evo Morales, although urged by Chávez to strike a stridently socialist image, is constrained by domestic politics from pursuing a radical course—he does not have the parliamentary numbers to amend the constitution, as Chávez has already done. As The Economist reports, with only 135 of 255 seats in the parliament, Morales’s Movement to Socialism party is “well short of the two-thirds majority needed to rewrite the constitution at will—and less than the 54% of the vote Mr. Morales won in the presidential election last December.”²⁰ The apparent strength of populism, alongside revolutions at the ballot box, does indicate, however, that the United States may want to reassess the effectiveness of its policies.

One of the most contentious of these policies is the “war on drugs,” with particular emphasis on Colombia. History and geography have made Colombia the world’s leading producer of cocaine, supplying 90 percent of the drug reaching the United States every year.²¹ Colombia has also been battling a four-decade-old insurgency. Since the mid-1980s, when the three major insurgent groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army and the Colombian Self-Defense Forces²²—began losing international legitimacy in the face of growing drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other criminal activities, the Colombian government has been more effective in gaining outside support for counterinsurgency assistance, often directly coupled to counternarcotics operations.²³ While the United States has provided some assistance since early in the Cold War, this assistance has increased dramatically in the last 15 years. Ironically, successful U.S. counternarcotics operations in Bolivia and Peru in interdiction, eradication and alternative development have worsened the situation in Colombia. The result was a renewed emphasis on Colombian assistance in the U.S. government in the mid-1990s.²⁴

Under then-President Andrés Pastrana, Colombia launched Plan Colombia in 1999 with U.S. support, intending to provide the capacity to eliminate the drug cartels and the insurgency while spurring development and alternative crop production. The program brought together previously ad hoc programs for combating drug production and trafficking, yet still focused, on paper at least, exclusively on counternarcotics. As Gabriel Marcella, an instructor at the U.S. Army War College, notes, “it was essential that U.S. strategy address the intersection of drugs, insurgency, and terrorism.”²⁵ Nevertheless, U.S. strategy would not change significantly until after 11 September 2001.

Although Latin America was not the central focus of the early phase of the GWOT, the realization that terrorism is a real threat to U.S. national security led to a reevaluation of assistance programs in Colombia. Emphasis shifted from eradicating coca fields to controlling territory and restoring government authority as it was finally accepted by the U.S. Congress that a focus on counternarcotics without a comparable focus on counterinsurgency is doomed to fail.²⁶ It is a lesson with parallels in Iraq and Afghanistan; without a sufficient concentration of personnel to enforce the government’s authority to punish breaches of the peace,²⁷ insurgencies—often assisted by criminal groups—can last seemingly indefinitely. In Colombia’s case, there is hope for optimism: President Álvaro Uribe won reelection in May 2006 by a large margin and has strong support in both houses of government, allowing him to continue the strong reform trajectory of his first term. Yet much work also remains, and Uribe must contend with an increasingly fractured ruling coalition and allegations of corruption to make progress.²⁸

In some areas, notably Bolivia, the production of drugs is a matter of economic survival for poor farmers. Counternarcotics operations may also strengthen the strongest cartels, by eliminating their weaker rivals and driving up the street prices (and hence cartel profits) of cocaine and other drugs. Efforts to develop alternative crops or alternative uses for coca (besides cocaine) would more effectively combat cocaine trafficking then interdiction and eradication alone.²⁹ Making these efforts might also convince the people of Central and South America that Washington respects their sovereignty and is genuinely interested in the region’s economic development.
Immigration is another contentious issue in Central and South America and the Caribbean. These countries see immigration to the United States not as an attempt to infiltrate and eventually dominate America but as a chance to escape economic hardship and raise their children in peace and freedom. The United States is seen as harsh by drastically limiting legal immigration while chasing down fleeing immigrants or allowing them to die in the desert. To be sure, the United States can and must guard its borders against illegal activities. Nevertheless, legal immigrants make important contributions to American society, including serving with distinction in the U.S. armed forces as an avenue to citizenship. The argument from Central and South America and the Caribbean is that the United States, already low on labor, should increase the number of workers authorized entry under temporary visas. How the United States addresses the immigration question is a matter for U.S. citizens alone to decide, but this decision should come only after serious consideration of all the facts and possible consequences.

U.S. Army South as a Progressive Institution in the Region

The reorganization and reinforcement of U.S. Army South through its transformation into USARSO (6th Army) demonstrate the continued importance of Central and South America and the Caribbean to U.S. interests. USSOUTHCOM is often thought of as an “economy of force” command—with minimal investment of personnel and resources, the return for U.S. interests in the region is quite high.

The new command arrangements will facilitate the Army’s contribution to securing vital U.S. interests in the region. By having USARSO (6th Army), as an ASCC, report directly to HQDA, the Army is signaling the importance of theater armies in the new capabilities-focused Army structure. Theater army commanders will be able to voice concerns to and receive guidance from HQDA directly, allowing Army Commands such as FORSCOM to refocus their efforts on fulfilling Title 10 requirements and delivering relevant and ready landpower to the ASCCs. By creating a more robust command-post capability in the region, the Army will be in a stronger position to support USSOUTHCOM activities and ready to lead Joint Task Forces and Joint Forces Land Component Commands.

The Soldiers of USARSO have been active, both in and out of uniform, in promoting cooperation with other regional militaries in the achievement of shared goals. Among recent activities are:

• **Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias** (United Humanitarian Forces) Exercises—Multinational relief operations in conjunction with government offices and private organizations; occurred in Trinidad and Tobago in 2005 and in Honduras in 2006;
• **Nuevos Horizontes** (New Horizons) Exercises—Construction projects including schools, clinics, wells and community centers; occurred in Panama, Nicaragua and Haiti in 2005 and in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Peru in 2006;
• Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETES)—Includes training local medical staff and providing services to civilians; hosted by Paraguay and Honduras in 2006; and
• supply collection drives for the Honduran Orphanage Project, a USARSO community project that supports four orphanages in Honduras.

These types of operations, exercises and community activities are critical for improving both the U.S. image and the U.S. Army’s freedom of maneuver in Central and South America and the Caribbean. By showcasing the Army as a positive, progressive force for change in the Americas, the United States can demonstrate a commitment to regional security and development. Although this is not the traditional role of the Army, the exposure will pay dividends as Soldiers deployed in the Americas gain valuable experience and skills that can be applied elsewhere, including in the context of stability operations.

Implications for the United States

The major U.S. objective in the Western Hemisphere is the “strengthening of the Inter-American community” formed by:

• economic partners that are democratic, stable and prosperous;
• friendly neighbors that help secure the region against terrorism and illegal drugs; and
• nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.
Key aspects of U.S. conduct in the region, in recent as well as more distant memory, have made this objective more challenging to achieve. Countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean often feel that the United States “still considers [the region] to be its own backyard.” Particularly on the issues of counternarcotics, immigration and, most important, respect for democratically elected regimes irrespective of their regard for Washington, the United States would do well to devote some attention and resources to strained relationships in the Western Hemisphere.

The key obstacle to achieving U.S. objectives in the region is the mistrust of American intentions resulting from chronic cycles of neglect and interference. From the Central and South American and Caribbean perspectives, the United States bears responsibility for some of the worst periods in 20th century history: covert operations in Guatemala and Cuba in the 1960s; the overthrow of a democratically elected government in Chile in the 1970s, resulting in a devastating military dictatorship; and CIA activities in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s all have left deep suspicions towards the United States. Notwithstanding the role these events may have played in strengthening U.S. national security, they are remembered differently in other countries.

If the United States intends to commit itself to the objective of strengthening the “Inter-American community,” it must be prepared to use all elements of national power in a concerted way, and in a way that takes not just U.S. interests into account, but also the interests of countries in this region. Respecting the needs and interests of states still struggling with painful political and economic problems will convince these states that the United States bears no malicious intent toward them and is ready to help them prosper. Attempting to combat neopopulist leaders like Chávez and Morales with rhetoric and threats merely plays into their hands as they attempt to convince the rest of the region that U.S. hegemony is a grave security threat. A better course of action would be to use all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement—in a coordinated fashion to help the states of Central and South America and the Caribbean to build their civil societies and economies in a sustainable fashion.

The U.S. military is vital for achieving U.S. policy objectives in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Militaries have a certain prestige in the region, and Hispanic men and women have done well in both the U.S. military and civilian worlds, a fact that may be useful in informational efforts. While U.S. engagement in the region should go beyond purely military activities, these activities are an important aspect of realizing U.S. goals for the region. The Army is well placed to improve the U.S. image in Latin America through joint/combined operations and training exercises and other military-to-military cooperation. Focusing attention on USOUTHCOM and USARSO (6th Army) now will help the United States achieve key objectives in the region, including economic stability and cooperation on multinational security and humanitarian operations.

Endnotes

1 Carol Rosenberg, “New Southcom Chief Stresses Ideas, Not Missiles,” Miami Herald, 19 October 2006 [Lexis/Nexis].
3 The member armies are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The observer armies are Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname. For more, see the Conference of American Armies homepage at http://www.redceaa.org/.
4 Although Mexico is generally considered part of Latin America, it is placed within U.S. Northern Command’s AOR. Throughout this paper, references to Latin America in the context of USARSO operations should be understood to exclude Mexico.
8 Lehman, “Homeland Security focuses on South America’s tri-border area.”

12 China’s involvement in Latin America was one of many topics discussed at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2006 Pacific Symposium entitled “China’s Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests,” 20 June 2006, details available at http://www.ndu.edu/insss/symposia/pacific2006/agenda.htm; Chávez’s purchase of Russian arms has been motivated by the recent termination of U.S. arms sales; see Robert Collier, “Chavez Forging His Own Links,” San Francisco Chronicle, 23 July 2006, p. 3.

13 According to Gustavo Coronel, a founding member of the Board of Directors for Petroleos de Venezuela, oil exports to China remain more rhetorical than real; the United States is still the main market for Venezuelan oil, and the absolute level of Venezuelan oil exports is declining due to lack of investment and maintenance. Email correspondence with author, 2 November 2006.


20 “Bolivia: The Venezuelan connection,” The Economist, 8 July 2006, p. 32.

21 Gabriella Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), 2003, p. 4.

22 The groups are usually identified by their Spanish names and abbreviations: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia); Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN (National Liberation Army); and Fuerzas de Autodefensa de Colombia, or AUC (Colombian Self-Defense Forces). See Marcella, The United States and Colombia, p. 9.

23 In the U.S. case, assistance has been for state defense and counternarcotics; the fallout from Vietnam led the United States to vigorously avoid assisting Colombia in counterinsurgency operations; see Marcella, The United States and Colombia, p. 50.

24 Ibid., pp. 31–32.

25 Ibid., p. 51.

26 Ibid., pp. 53–54.

27 Political scientists refer to this authority as the government’s “monopoly on violence”; in other words, the government alone possesses the coercive force sufficient and necessary to deter or punish criminal behavior.


34 Excerpted from Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State (website), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/.


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