One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Mission Command versus the Army Personnel System

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The Institute of Land Warfare
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER

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LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 84, August 2011

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Foreword

In this paper, the author makes his case for evolving the military culture and personnel system toward Mission Command. The paper discusses how Mission Command would operate in contrast to the environment the U.S. Army has known since the Industrial Age. The author suggests that centralized governance within the Army—that is, top-to-bottom control—is outdated, while a system such as Mission Command, which gives more freedom for creativity, adaptability and innovation, would better prepare the Army for future demands and also retain Soldiers who desire such freedom in uniform. Additionally, Mission Command would inevitably see a reduction in undue competition between officers and noncommissioned officers; with this shift, trust and flexibility would become more widespread throughout the institution.

The author posits that the centralized personnel system currently engrained in the Army can be applied effectively in a stable environment. However, because war is turbulent and unpredictable—particularly the type of war the U.S. has been fighting—a centralized personnel system inadequately manages talent and is therefore less able to counter the often fast and unpredictable changes in the environment. This paper addresses the cultural ramifications that make the U.S. Army personnel system perfectly suited to support Mission Command because its members are managed as professionals. In his support of Mission Command, the author poses many questions that must be addressed in order to develop a feasible and efficient personnel system to support the U.S. Army in the 21st century.

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15 August 2011
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Introduction

How does the Army create strategic corporals, strategic lieutenants, strategic majors and strategic colonels? The trick is to instill a culture like the one embodied in the Army’s new Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability; Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict.¹ The emphasis is on evolving toward the practice and culture of Mission Command. The essence of this approach is to ensure that the Army leads through Auftragstaktik, a German word that implies that once everyone understands the commanders’ intent (two levels up), then people are free to and indeed duty-bound to use their creativity and initiative to accomplish their missions within the intent, adapting to changing circumstances. Within such an environment, teams will largely self-organize within the doctrinal framework to accomplish the mission. A military culture that supports Mission Command takes time to develop and must be embraced across the entire spectrum of the Army and practiced in every institution—operational and generating forces—while decrees from above cannot magically decentralize operations conducted by adaptive leaders.²

A personnel system that would evolve out of Mission Command should encourage tomorrow’s Soldiers and leaders to impart creative freedom and authority upon their juniors—an unprecedented and largely underdeveloped step. And those juniors—officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and civilians—require relentless schooling, training and encouragement in preparing to wisely use that freedom under Mission Command. The uncompromising goal of a new personnel system is to make each individual member of the Army a person who—in character, capability and knowledge—is self-reliant, self-confident and dedicated to taking responsibility as a leader.

The adaptation of Mission Command increases demands for responsibility and innovation at the NCO and junior officer levels and will force civilians to step up as well. It advocates a true meritocracy based on esotericism.³ These demands place a greater premium on (1) adaptability to emergent situations, (2) operating with and within joint, interagency and multinational organizations, (3) rapid responsiveness and (4) the mental and physical agility to capitalize on opportunities in the field. Key to the Army’s adjustment is the ability of personnel systems to support developing and empowering adaptability in individuals for operations in the future complex environment. Additionally, these personnel systems must sustain the all-volunteer force over persistant conflict and beyond. The increasing demands of lifelong service in the profession of arms will strain individuals and the personnel systems that support them.

Systems and procedures that empower individuals under Mission Command are essential to encouraging continued service and professional development. Successfully encouraging such development will require innovative and flexible ways of using personnel, and Soldiers
must expect to have careers different from those experienced by previous and current Army senior leaders. An evolution in the way Soldiers are promoted, assigned and educated will bring about changes in the Army culture that will sustain the all-volunteer force in the future complex operational environment.

“Adaptability” is a somewhat elusive term, and its meaning can vary between two extremes. Adaptation can be dynamic or passive: it can either shape or be shaped by the situation, as necessary to maximize the advantage. Innovation and being able to “think on one’s feet” and improvise are prerequisites for dynamic, not passive, adaptability. Therefore, to develop dynamically adaptive leaders, the Army must develop innovative ones first, which is a very tall order and suggests why the “journey” to adapting a new personnel system will be time-consuming and less than straightforward. Developing innovative, adaptive leaders forces two very basis questions: What leader attributes should Army development efforts address, and how is the Army going to grow them?

In short, supporting the adaptive and agile force envisioned for Mission Command suggests reassessment of the existing personnel management systems, which were created for linear warfare during the Industrial Age. This paper examines key processes of Army personnel management, which include promotions, assignments and education, to considerations for improving Human Capital management and, more important, entertains questions that must be addressed before evolving today’s personnel system to one that can support Mission Command.

**Stuck in the Industrial Age**

First it is important to describe briefly the culture for which the current personnel system is the foundation. Understanding how the current culture operates is necessary to a discussion of how a culture that embraces Mission Command might operate. The U.S. Army has developed the most proficient training doctrine in the world. The Army is very good at skills training. It has also established a personnel system very good at supporting a mobilization-based strategy for fighting a linear war. But how does this system translate to Mission Command? “History teaches us that centralized planning and control can’t be made to work (think Politburo⁴). Things in isolation don’t work the way they do in context. Yet, this is how the majority of our personnel management are conducted.”⁵

Today’s personnel system is a descendent of the Industrial Revolution (a descendant of the Cartesian worldview), and the corresponding machine metaphor is still the prevailing mindset. In this approach, Soldiers are not craftsmen who master their art but instead are considered mere technicians who perform rote tasks. The objective is not to invest them with any real abstract knowledge or skills that make them too valuable; therefore, they can be more easily replaced. While at peace the Army has thrived on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), checklists and compliance. However, the Army at war is a craft organization. Upon the onset of conflict, the organization becomes one where outcomes matter more than procedures, where initiative and creativity trumps doctrine and where the ability to apply abstract knowledge to unforeseen circumstances trumps checklists and processes.⁶

In peacetime, the military can afford to treat machine parts and drones (or conscripts) shabbily but not craftsmen who possess the ability to apply their art. If treated badly, they are likely to leave and take their talents elsewhere. In a machine, the parts are interchangeable, but the craftsmen are not. It is in the interest of the current culture in the Army personnel system to have its members be as interchangeable as possible—it makes the work easier for those who
manage the process. How many times has a member of the military heard, “Any major will do, and the preferences of the officer are not important. Don’t like it? Retire or resign.” The notion of tailoring a career path to the talents, much less the interests, of the officer corps is terrifying to today’s culture. That looks like a load of nonstandard work. Machines do not like that.7

The United States will likely remain in an era of persistent conflict, according to The Army Capstone Concept.8 This explains the call for change from so many levels. Leaders at all levels recognize that while the Army is very good at process, recipes, format and application of skills, it must improve at adaptability. The Army has discovered over the past 10 years of war that the emphasis on skills is for naught if the leaders lack the power of decision. This latter factor, in turn, must be ascribed to three aspects of our emerging learning doctrine—the cult of decisiveness, the coup d’oeil9 and the habit of leading from the front—for Mission Command to succeed. The Army Capstone Concept describes the shift in the institution’s culture that is necessary in order for Mission Command to be fully embraced:

Network-enabled mission command will require an institutional culture that fosters trust among commanders, encourages initiative and expects leaders to take prudent risk and make decisions based on incomplete information. Network-enabled mission command will also require commanders, staffs and logisticians who understand the complexities of the emerging operational environment, as well as the highly integrated joint, multinational and interagency characteristics of full-spectrum operations.10

Consequently, resolute action is of first importance in war. Every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest-ranking Soldier, as well those in the U.S. civilian work force, must remember that supine inaction and neglect of opportunities entails more severe censure than an error in conception of the decision. All leaders must acknowledge that absence or delay in making a decision is generally considered worse than acting decisively and immediately, even if that decision is later deemed erroneous. This understanding is key to Mission Command as called for in The Army Capstone Concept, 525-3-0, because it expresses the emerging belief that imperfect action at the right moment is far better than more deliberate activity after the opportunity has been lost.

Sometimes not making a decision, however, is preferable to making a decision that is likely to be a poor one. The outcomes of the decisions made by future leaders operating under Mission Command will be partially ascribed to their relentless development as well as to identifying the opportunities given to them by the enemy. Leaders must be prepared to respond immediately to local opportunities. Leaders grown up under Mission Command will show a degree of tactical judgment that is not present in leadership developed under Industrial Age or linear learning models. Credit for this development will be placed squarely at the feet of the emerging learning doctrine of army leaders. In particular, the soundness of future decisions made by Army leaders will be considered the result of applicatory method, the emerging learning concept.11

Generally associated with the late 19th century Prussian general Julius von Verdy du Vernois, the applicatory method sought to teach tactics by means of problems. In other words, teachers encouraged students to apply different problem-solving techniques and in the course of this process, learn through their mistakes. Some of the problems were simple: the tactical decision game Planspiel, or Planübung, was based on a sketch map and a one- or two-page scenario. Larger wargames were more complicated: the rigid wargame contained enough charts and tables to gladden the heart of any present-day board wargamer, and the staff ride could last
for days. Whatever particular techniques were used—and in most cases there was a mixture of many—the applicatory method was based on a solid consensus about the teaching of tactics. Tactics was not a science to be taught by means of theory or by a simple task explained by lists of rules and acronyms. Rather, it was an art to be learned by doing.12

Ideally, the highest function in conducting Mission Command is taught through the applicatory method, which Frederick the Great called the coup d’oiel—the ability to size up a tactical situation at a glance and, within seconds, begin to give the necessary orders. Warfare against hybrid opponents is creating circumstances never seen before. As a result, innovation cannot be a step or series of steps that leads to a static outcome. Rather, it is part of a continuous and ceaseless process of change and adaptation compelled not merely by technology but also by the nature of the battlefield and of the enemy. Today’s combat offers fleeting opportunities that disappear quickly if leaders—from generals to riflemen—fail to grasp them. But this condition must also be bred in the generating force.13

Mission Command demands that when necessary, all arms—combat or maneuver support—and civilians should coordinate and act together even without receiving direction from above. The result will be an evolving command style that forces leaders and commanders to focus their attention downward and outward onto the battlefield. The limited flow of information up the chain of command will compel them to see for themselves and subsequently to lead from the front.

Today’s personnel system is entirely a highly centralized model—control from the top down. All levels of the Army culture—from army to battalion, company/team, platoon and Soldier levels—are touched by the centralized ability to manage everything through information technology laid over an Industrial Age force structure in the operating and generating forces. This schematism is a culture that inevitably forces commanders at every level to focus not on what is happening on the battlefield but rather on providing information to those above them in the chain of command.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has evolved its force structure to support current operations and the National Security Strategy. As the world situation changed, the Army evolved its readiness strategy through unit stabilization policies and its force structure through modularity, but it has not fully addressed how these new demands affect its human capital—the Soldiers.

While current personnel systems have served the Army and its Soldiers well, it is unclear whether these systems will hold up under the strain of the “long war” and the transformation of the force. Since the creation of the all-volunteer force, systems to promote, assign and educate Soldiers have succeeded in attracting and retaining the quantity and quality of personnel required. These systems ensured Soldiers had incentives to perform well, seek challenging, personally and professionally rewarding positions and have the education and training required for leading Soldiers.

Despite this success, the Army does not have objective information on whether personnel policies are adequate to support the current and future vision of a brigade-based Army focused on practicing Mission Command. A 2010 study sponsored by the Office of Economics and Manpower (and noted in Kent W. Park’s “Assembly Line to Custom Design: Reforming the Officer Development System”) indicates that the Army’s retaining, recruiting and increasing the all-volunteer force are in question.14 Additionally, operational lessons learned
and wargaming of future operations clearly show need for innovative leaders and adaptable individuals throughout the force. The dual challenges of new force structure and continual deployments to multidimensional battlefields indicate the possible need to shift the Army to more decentralized personnel systems that are equipped to embrace creativity, risk-taking and flexibility while encouraging professional service in the Army.

Wrong Personnel System for Mission Command?

In the Army today, a tension exists between those who support a mobilization-based system and those who want to institute Mission Command. Under a mobilization-based system, the Army manages individuals by moving them from place to place in accordance with a defined need for trained individuals and to support the jobs desired of a “successful” career. While in some cases this pattern is changing, there is not enough evidence to determine if changes in personnel management systems have adequately addressed the tensions of managing individuals and units. There are a number of concerns with the existing methodology and the value of retaining this approach while promoting adaptability, encouraging innovation and preparing Soldiers for the ever-changing nature of protracted conflict.

The Army is unable to resolve this core conflict because there are a number of out-of-date assumptions from the Industrial Age that drive Army personnel policies, practices and measures. Below are two of the long-perpetrated assumptions.

The first assumption is that individuals must be managed by a centralized personnel system. This assumption was built into the Army personnel management system in the early 1900s when the War Department modeled its personnel management system on that of the Pennsylvania Railroad. It was strengthened during World War I and World War II when the size of the military increased dramatically and centralized control seemed essential for success. It was further reinforced in the 1950s when American corporations espoused the virtues of centralized control. This trend continued into the 1970s and 1980s with the centralization of promotions of most officers and NCOs and of command selection.

The second assumption is that the personnel system must provide a surplus of qualified Army officers in the middle grades to support a future total mobilization similar to that experienced in World War II. At the end of World War II, the Army, having participated in total mobilization for World War I and World War II, concluded that it was necessary to maintain a surplus of qualified officers to support a total mobilization that would create entirely new units to meet the needs of a future, multiyear war with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Army designed a personnel management system that would provide a surplus of qualified middle-level officers. Key to maintaining this surplus was an up-or-out requirement and a 20-year retirement that would create a large number of middle-level officers but would get them out of the Army before they became too old.

These assumptions have been “hard wired” into the current system, and most officers—and even most personnel experts—do not fully know what the assumptions are based on. For example the Army has mountains of studies pointing to the superiority of unit manning or unit cohesion over the individual replacement system. Although the evidence would indicate awareness that individual replacement is a bad approach, the Army continues to do work-arounds, promoting temporary rather than permanent fixes to a complex problem. The new Army personnel policy calls for some officers to become specialists, in contrast to its longstanding emphasis on producing “generalists.” This new policy can be seen as a way of finding equitable solutions
for excess officers and has the added benefit of reducing the number of more senior officers, all
generalists, who must become “command qualified.” These changes can be seen as an implicit
effort to mitigate the impact of the mobilization assumption.

The generalist assumption, which arises out of the previous two assumptions, has been a
part of American military culture since the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the United
States rejected Emory Upton’s efforts to create a professional Army and general staff whose
officers were rigidly selected and trained in technical areas.\(^\text{15}\) This generalist concept was en-
hanced at the end of World War II with the reforms instituted by the Officer Personnel Act of
1947 (OPA 47). OPA 47 enshrined this thinking; it was institutionalized during the Cold War
with the passing of the Defense Officer Personnel Act (DOPMA) of 1980, which arose out of
the need to support mobilization.

**How It Works Today**

The personnel management systems designed during the Industrial Age and still enforced
today are designed to promote, assign and educate personnel for initial and continued service.
The following sections offer details of how the personnel system currently works for officers,
enlisted Soldiers and civilians.\(^\text{16}\)

The accessions system lays out the standards, based on systematic and tangible criteria, to
become an enlisted Soldier or commissioned officer. This system has been likened to “mass-
produced” or “assembly-line” personnel systems. The dominant criterion for initial Soldier
entry is a high school diploma; for an officer, it is a college degree. The promotion system
clearly defines the rank structure and describes the responsibilities attending each rank. The
criteria for promotion are explicit, detailed and well-known among members competing for
promotion. In the lower ranks, the use of explicit criteria that depend on objectively mea-
sured elements—such as written and hands-on tests of skill and knowledge, physical fitness,
marksmanship, successful completion of training, awards and decorations and additional edu-
cation—help to promote openness and fairness.

The assignment system for enlisted personnel operates centrally and matches available,
qualified personnel to position openings (“faces to spaces”). Although at times Soldiers are
allowed to choose the location of their next assignment as a retention incentive, assignments
typically occur independently of individual preferences and therefore offer no significant op-
portunity for individuals to influence their own professional development. Officer assignments
are also made centrally, but recommendations from senior officers are often taken into account.
Such recommendations also impact senior NCO assignments.

Finally, education and training help “round out” the human capital. Military training helps
the individual build an identity with the organization while increasing unit cohesion and an
understanding of the command and control system and the importance of following orders.
Advanced training and military professional education contribute to the development of lead-
ership and communication skills and provide a thorough understanding of the roles, missions,
equipment, tactics and decisions required by those in positions of authority.

**Officers**

**Promotions**

For officers, the promotion system rests on two principles: first, there are more officers
qualified for promotion than there are vacancies available, supporting a concept of “best
qualified.” Second, the system is designed to expose officers to a number of different and varied jobs throughout their careers to prepare them for senior leadership positions.

To support the notion of having more qualified officers than vacancies, the officer promotion system centers on “up-or-out” promotion concepts first introduced by law in 1916. The current Defense Officer Personnel Management Act supports this notion and leads to the discharge or retirement of officers twice rejected for promotion within a single grade. This policy (1) provides incentives for good performance, (2) creates advancement opportunities for officers in lower grades, (3) ensures the average age of the officer corps is fairly young and (4) forces out nonperformers. The result of this policy is that promotion is seen within the Army’s culture as the singular measure of success. Critics of this system believe this policy often moves officers out of positions before they become proficient, breaks unit cohesion and sacrifices depth of experience for breadth of experience.

For the past 30 years, officer assignments have been centrally managed by the Department of the Army (DA). While individual officers may request specific assignments, the ultimate determining factors are “the needs of the Army” and a template (though this is expanding) that guides assignment officers in determining what position, location and unit is “best” for an officer. While the Army is moving away from a template for career tracks, it is not moving to change the length of time an officer spends at a particular grade and in some cases has actually decreased the time an officer serves as a lieutenant from 48 months to 36 months or less. With the pressures of the Army’s current operations, joint requirements set in public law and the continued belief that officers benefit more from a broad range of job experiences, officers will continue to deal with the stress of constant movements, resulting in limited time in individual positions. This requires officers to learn new jobs, units and skills very quickly. Critics of this system see this as short-changing individual officers and creating unnecessary unit turbulence. Just as leaders become most competent and ready to make maximum contribution, they are moved to new positions. Complicating the assignment process is the requirement to educate officers at institutions throughout their careers. Coupled with today’s and tomorrow’s operational tempo (OPTEMPO), officers are on a very “fast track” regardless of potential.

**Personnel Management**

The primary basis for officer personnel actions is centralized selection. Strength management, career development and evaluation of individual contribution occur in the series of centralized DA and Human Resource Command (HRC) selection boards for retention, career status, schooling, promotion, field-grade command designation and selective early retirement. These boards employ evaluation reports, life-cycle development models and strength requirements to advance individuals to the next stage of career development. Officers generally flow through the centralized selection subsystem in groupings based on date of rank (DOR). Company and field-grade officer groupings are termed “cohort year groups.” Each board is preceded by a zone announcement that specifies the makeup of the cohort or inclusive zone. Centralized selection has evolved over time to account for the impact of law, policy, budget, Army and officer needs and proponent vision. Of note, officers not selected for promotion, command or school are not provided specific reasons for non-selection by the board. One major criticism of the centralized system is that detached centralized boards make selections based solely on the files presented. Therefore, in essence, Army boards select the best documented file but not necessarily the best individual officer.
**Education and Training**

Education for officers is planned throughout a career. The objective of the Officer Education System (OES) is to provide an education and training program operationally relevant to the current force but structured to support the future force. For junior officers, the current system is the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). BOLC begins with a precommissioning phase to educate and train cadets and officer candidates, assess their readiness and potential for commissioning and prepare them for progressive and continuing development. This training includes common core skills, knowledge and attributes desired in all newly commissioned officers.

After commissioning, officers attend Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)-specific BOLC III (BOLC II ended in November 2009). These courses provide a common block of instruction to further develop all new officers into competent small-unit leaders with a common warfighting focus, development of adaptability and emphasis on the Warrior Ethos. BOLC III consists of branch-specific technical and tactical training to prepare officers to lead small units upon arrival at first assignments.

Training and education at the captain level for most officers revolves around the Captain’s Career Course (CCC). These courses are conducted at the individual branch schools and emphasize the warfighting tasks expected of captains. CCC prepares officers for company command and for assignment as junior staff officers at the battalion level and above. New courses are under development to key on assignment-tailored training (focused on specific primary staff positions) and realistic scenario-driven command training. In contrast to the current six-month CCC, these new courses will be less than six months in length and linked to the next duty assignment.

For majors, the Army has transitioned from the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) to Intermediate Level Education (ILE). All captains and majors with eight and 12 years of service, respectively, attend ILE. This course provides a common core of operational instruction and additional tailored education opportunities tied to the officer’s specific career field or branch. ILE is designed to provide a quality, tailored education to prepare officers for their next 10 years of service. This program of instruction is designed to produce field-grade officers grounded in warfighting doctrine with the technical, tactical and leadership competencies and skills to be successful in their respective career fields.

At the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels, officers selected by a central board attend a senior service college (SSC). The SSC is the final major military educational program available to prepare officers for the positions of greatest responsibility in the Department of Defense. Most officers attend the Army War College (AWC), which (1) educates students on employment of the U.S. Army as part of a unified, joint or multinational force in support of the National Military Strategy; (2) researches operational and strategic issues and (3) conducts outreach programs that benefit the nation. Additionally, each year several officers are selected by the central board to attend the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), the National War College (NWC), other service colleges and resident fellowships at governmental agencies and academic institutions instead of AWC.

As recent generating force structure drawdown plans demonstrated, many of first officers at the middle grades to be “cut” were instructors at the service schools. In most Western armies, the top officers are assigned as instructors at their service schools. This occurred in the U.S. Army in the 1920s and 1930s with Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the War College. The current trend shows fewer officers serving as instructors in Army schools because they perceive that such duties are not promotion-enhancing.
Enlisted Soldiers and Noncommissioned Officers

Promotions

The systems for the Army’s enlisted NCOs differ from the officer system in a number of respects. For example, promotions up to specialist (E-4) are decentralized to battalion level and are automatic based on time in grade and battalion commander approval. Promotions to sergeant (E-5) and staff sergeant (E-6) are semi-centralized, with lieutenant colonel or higher commanders holding promotion authority to the grades of sergeant and staff sergeant. The promotions to sergeant and staff sergeant are “semi-centralized” in that DA sets cutoff scores by MOS, with the battalion conducting a board for all eligible NCOs.

Promotions for sergeant first class (E-7), master sergeant (E-8) and sergeant major (E-9) are centralized at the DA level, and Soldiers are selected by annual boards for promotion. These promotion boards recommend NCOs by MOS based on set zones of consideration and the needs of the Army. Of note, NCOs not selected for promotion are not provided specific reasons for their non-selection by the board. As with the officer system, this promotion system is basically a review and selection of files.

NCO promotions are also tied to education. This measure tries to ensure that Soldiers are trained for the key assignments required of the rank. Educational training gates are required for eligibility for a promotion board. The current pace of operational deployments, however, has caused the Army to make some exceptions to this rule. NCOs have not been able to attend required schooling because they are preparing for, conducting or recovering from deployment. A group of NCOs recently recommended the Army change its education requirement by implementing a “train-ahead” policy. This type of policy would send Soldiers to school before their promotions so they can implement what they learned in school immediately upon their arrival to a new assignment or position. The problem is that this policy is another work-around and does not address what is at the core of the problem—management by cohorts and gates.

Another feature of the NCO promotion system is the Retention Control Point (RCP) policy, which governs the length of time a Soldier can serve at each grade (rank). NCOs not selected for promotion are forced to leave the Army when they reach their RCP. This “up-or-out” policy causes the Army to lose NCOs who have valuable skills. However, current operational demands and actions to grow the active force have frozen the policy in many instances.

Personnel Management

NCO assignments are also centrally managed—movement from one unit or installation to another is controlled at the DA level. One recent change to Army assignment policy, particularly to brigade combat teams (BCTs), is the initiation of stabilization policies. These policies are designed to reduce turbulence, increase stabilization and provide predictability for Soldiers and their families. Additionally, stabilization attempts to synchronize individual assignments to unit operational cycles. There are two basic types of force stabilization to ensure the critical factor of keeping Soldiers together who train and prepare together. The first type is life-cycle management, during which units are formed, trained and deployed together for three years. The life-cycle system is designed primarily for the Army’s BCTs. The second type is cyclic management, which limits replacement turbulence to specific time frames, typically every 12–14 months. The cyclic management system is geared primarily toward non-BCT units. In addition, the Army retains the individual replacement system to ensure flexibility by assigning Soldiers to the generating force.


**Education and Training**

The NCO Education System (NCOES) is based on the concept of “select, train and promote.” However, operational tempo has forced many NCOs to bypass key educational courses before promotion, thus arriving at new assignments without the benefit of training for the new rank and position. The issue with this aspect is exacerbated by the operational pace, which prevents Soldiers from leaving their units to attend school, educational courses or training sessions. Recent studies have called for the Army to alter this concept to the follow the motto “train, select, promote,” thereby encouraging the notion that NCOs should be trained before promotion and better prepared for increased responsibilities.

NCOES consists of the Warrior Leader Course (WLC), the Advanced Leader Course (ALC), the Senior Leader Course (SLC), functional courses for selected NCOs with specific duties and the Sergeants Major Course. WLC is required for promotion to staff sergeant. The next level of NCOES is ALC, which is required for promotion to sergeant first class and trains Soldiers to perform as squad leaders and team chiefs. SLC is the third phase of NCOES and is required for promotion to master sergeant. This course trains and prepares NCOs for leadership positions at the platoon sergeant level. The Sergeants Major Course stands at the peak of NCOES and trains selected NCOs for service as the senior enlisted leader at battalion levels and above.

**Civilians**

**Promotions**

The Army’s human capital is not limited to those who wear the uniform. The Department of the Army’s civilians play an increasingly vital role in support of operations and activities of the generating force. The Army exists to provide capabilities for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land. The Army provides these capabilities using two functionally discrete but organizationally integrated entities known as the operating force and the generating force. Most of the Army’s operational capability resides in the modular units and headquarters of the operating force, which in turn are generated and sustained by the generating force. The generating force, which mainly comprises DA civilians, can also provide operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in support of joint force commanders.

One program designed to develop a broader-based civilian core is the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP). DLAMP is centrally managed and funded for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) by the Civilian Personnel Management Service. It provides upwardly mobile senior civilians with the opportunity for advanced civilian degrees in management arenas, cross-discipline developmental assignments and exposure to military strategic thinking and planning through a senior service college experience. OSD is currently revamping the DLAMP structure to better meet the goals cited in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Although DLAMP is structured around the qualification requirements for the Senior Executive Service (SES), senior civilians below the SES level who develop these skills and understand strategic thought processes will serve the Army well. However, the 2006 DLAMP class comprised only 113 civilians from the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community and other DoD institutions. These DLAMP participants were board-selected from among those who applied.

In addition to limited development programs, the civilian workforce already has examples of certifications that impact duty assignments and promotions. One example is the acquisition,
technology and logistics workforce certifications created to adhere to the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). These certifications provide career roadmaps similar to those for officers found in DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management. However, a significant number of career fields within the civilian workforce do not have this level of standardization.

**Personnel Management**

The Army must have professionally developed civilian leaders to successfully take on increasingly important responsibilities in the future. The Civilian Corps will comprise most of what is known as the institutional Army. They will be expected to perform vital leadership roles as key players across the Army’s jurisdiction. They will deploy in greater numbers as part of units or in support of operating forces.

The Review of Education, Training and Assignments for Leaders (REtal) theme that surfaced in studies on the civilian workforce is that the Army needs to “manage civilian development in a more centralized manner in order to provide multiskilled leaders with the desired leader attributes needed now and in the future.” The report goes on to state that the “current system produces, through functional proponency in specific formal career programs, occupational specialists who are highly skilled in technical and occupational specialties.” But the report concludes that “these programs have a narrow occupational focus and little emphasis on developing career employees to lead multifunctional organizations.”

**Education and Training**

According to the May 2006 RETAL report, “the Army’s civilian leader development programs are fragmented and unfocused.” Numerous initiatives and programs are developed and implemented at local, Army Command, Army Service Component Command, Direct Reporting Unit, Field Operating Agency or Staff Supporting levels rather than as an integrated part of a larger system designed to meet the strategic needs of the Army. The RETAL report finds that “Army headquarters has not, to date, been able to identify how much money is being spent on civilian leadership development across the Army.”

For the past 25 years, the Army Civilian Training, Education Development System (ACTEDS) career intern programs have been a primary and effective source for bringing mostly young college graduates into a variety of important occupational fields. These interns undergo rigorous, prescribed programs of development through assignments, education and training and other experiences. These programs, usually lasting two to three years, are centrally funded and develop individuals to replace departing functional specialists. The interns are then assigned to locally funded authorizations and further developed, primarily through on-the-job experiences, to become seasoned specialists in their career field.

The Army’s primary source of recruiting young college graduates, the civilian equivalent to accessions of newly commissioned officers, is through these Army intern programs. The programs focus on administrative skills and are not intended to impart an understanding of Army unit operations, tactics or strategy. Since the repeal in October 1999 of the Dual Compensation Act, which had placed restrictions on employment of retired military personnel, many high-level positions (GS-13 and higher) have been filled by retired military officers. Harvesting this prior service experience base limits positions available for those moving up a purely civilian track and limits “fresh blood” from entering the workforce.
A Personnel System for Mission Command

War is a hard way of forcing armies to examine themselves. As a result of 10 years of war, the Army has implemented Mission Command, a new doctrine that emphasizes increased responsibility for lower ranks. At the same time, the Army is going to struggle with embracing and integrating Mission Command within a culture that evolved from the Industrial Age. The Army, therefore, has no choice but to be bold and evolve into a new institutional culture. This new culture will create, nurture and promote leaders who thrive on change in general. This culture is different from the one the Army has now. Its leaders cannot continue to write glowing documents advocating adaptability while also subtly supporting peacetime, politically correct practices that shore up bureaucratic qualities instead of combat leadership qualities.

Unfortunately, when leaders come up for promotion and selection, the out-of-date system too often bypasses the most creative and dynamic of leaders and subordinates. To prepare leaders for the 21st century, the Army must:

• continue to replace the individual personnel system with a unit personnel system; revolve all personnel policies around a modular, unit-based system; and move to an Army force structure that can be supported by a unit replacement system;

• eliminate the up-or-out promotion system and replace it with an up-or-stay promotion system using tougher accessions;

• replace specific branches, such as Armor, Field Artillery, Infantry, Aviation, Quartermaster, Transportation, with maneuver, fires, logistics and technical branches; place officers on a track or category system at the captain (O-3) or major (O-4) level; retain NCOs in their branches until they reach master sergeant or first sergeant; and make personnel management more flexible by setting up a database system that lists a person’s attributes and traits in order to put that person in place to best serve the Army and the nation;

• revise the officer evaluation system to involve a narrative evaluation report (ER) on character, with an examination to enter the officer corps and then another examination to attend the Command and General Staff College; add the 360-degree evaluation system with the ER as one part of that system; and

• adapt Outcomes-Based Training and Education (OBT&E) as the new training doctrine to support Mission Command; this move will also provide the core for the leader development for officers, NCOs and civilians at all levels.

The purpose of these reforms is to change the incentive system. It is time for the personnel system to usher in leadership. Leaders must seek to reward strength of character, especially as manifested in their willingness to set priorities, make decisions and take action—and penalize those who simply get by while doing nothing but passionately embracing risk avoidance.

It does no good to call for promoting the risk-takers when the incentives all work the other way. Once strength of character is rewarded, then loyalty to the nation, the Army and the unit can be established over loyalty to self, which is the centerpiece of today’s personnel management system. The reasoning behind the personnel system’s advocacy of the individualist focus—“be all you can be”—is the belief that people must be constantly moved and promoted and gives the appearance of it-happened-on-my-watch promotion points.
Tough Questions

Promotion and selection systems are potent social control mechanisms. In “The Impact of Policies on Organizational Values and Culture,” Lieutenant Colonel William Bell writes that promotion and selection laws and policies, as well as widely espoused criteria for success, “have the greatest impact on demonstrating and teaching the values of the organization.” In the Army, promotion and selection, as well as evaluation tools, provide the primary “power levers for changing or maintaining culture.” These critical tools, presented as inherently fair, determine rewards and control access to positions of influence and control. To ensure leaders are prepared and ready for current and future conflicts, a number of areas require assessment—or reassessment. Below are a series of questions intended to guide studies to assess and recommend changes to human capital management that will support Mission Command. These questions will lead the Army to the reforms listed in the following sections.

Officer Recommendations

Promotions

- Do existing studies of officer promotions indicate that the “up-or-out” process best supports Mission Command, or might the “up-or-stay” system work better with more flexibility?
- How would expanded promotion zones affect time-in-grade milestones?
- What are the impacts of expanded promotion zones on current career and promotion timelines?
- How would spending a longer amount of time in each grade affect readiness of brigades, the responsiveness of the generating force and retention?
- What incentives could the Army develop to address officer concerns on remaining in grade longer?
- What impact is there on pay scales for longer time in grade?
- Are some specialties in the Army branches more conducive to longer time in grade?
- Are some branches more conducive to shorter times in grade?
- Could multiple career tracks for officers expand the Army’s existing efforts to take advantage of gains from specialization and allow a better match for career track, individual skills and preferences?
- What are the effects of a leadership career track on the possibility of faster grade progression and achievement of a higher grade at the end of one’s career?
- What is the effect of a technical track reflecting civilian education more slowly throughout the grades?
- How would changes in the promotion system affect geographic stability?
- What changes, if any, are required in the Army Officer Evaluation Reporting (OER) system to support changes in the promotion system?
- How would longer careers enhance the readiness of brigades?
- What aspects of longer careers impact the generating force?
• How many officers should serve in generating force duties (e.g., instructors)?
• How would longer careers and longer time in grade affect officer retention?
• When in the course of a career should the Army target monetary incentives for retention and mitigate the effects of longer time in grade for officers?
• How should payment be linked to desired behaviors, such as creativity? An approach to explore is to pay members based on an assessment of their performance with respect to creativity, innovation and adaptability.
• Would a decentralized promotion system that gives more influence to local commanders who actually see individual officers in action be an option?

**Personnel Management**

• How do assignment policies affect readiness, career timelines and retention of officers with the various skill sets required?
• How do education cycles impact assignment cycles?
• What is the driving force behind assignment philosophy, and is it combat readiness or is it development of individual officers?
• What is the optimal ratio of officer specialists in the functional areas and in branches?
• Are all of the functional areas and branches relevant for the “long war”?
• What is the value of officers trained and designated to a rotation between command and staff assignments at the divisional or higher levels and back to the Army or Joint Staff?
• Should the Army implement mandatory joint, interagency, intergovernmental or multinational assignments for officers in grades of major and above? How would this implementation affect the ability to man units with officers with the required grade and training?
• What are the options for assignment policies for officers in specialties that require graduate-level, civilian-related education or technical training such as acquisition corps, academic instructors, operations research system analysis, comptrollers, computer programmers, communications specialists and facilities managers?
• Should officers in the above categories remain in grade longer, with pro-rated pay, while continually demonstrating their proficiency?

**Education and Training**

• Does the Army need a flexible range of personal extended-leave programs?
• What options could the Army offer to enhance professional development and encourage retention?
• Should the Army manage developmental assignments in a centralized or decentralized manner?

*With the return of Soldiers from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has an opportunity to reform its education and training (professional development) programs with the purpose of challenging its veteran force with the most innovative teaching and learning approaches.*
• How much influence should local commanders have over developmental assignments?
• At what grade or command level should developmental assignments be managed?
• Could development include educational sabbaticals with promotion timelines adjusted to remain competitive for promotion?
• How can the Army best develop training based on innovation, adaptability and flexibility?
• Does the Army need all officers to attain an advanced educational degree by a particular grade?
• Should the Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) program become an advanced degree-granting experience?
• What educational disciplines should the Army encourage or require officers to study?
• As officers advance in grade and position assignment, should educational opportunities be reconsidered based on performance and potential?
• Should officers have to prepare and compete for high-level educational opportunities?
• What educational opportunities best prepare officers for higher-level leadership and management?
• How should the Army assign faculty to its school system?
• How is service as faculty viewed by the officer corps in general and senior leadership in particular?

**Enlisted Soldier Recommendations**

**Promotions**
• How should the promotion system and compensation system change for Soldiers whose grade progression is slower and who spend more time in a given grade?
• What are the impacts of compensating Soldiers based on an assessment of their performance with respect to creativity, innovation and adaptability coupled with technical and tactical proficiency?
• Regardless of grade, how would additional pay for higher level civilian education affect retention, morale and readiness?
• Would a bonus for language proficiency for any MOS improve the Army’s cultural understanding and mission accomplishment?

**Personnel Management**
• Should the Army adjust the compensation system to more accurately account for increased deployment?
• Could enlistment and reenlistment bonuses offset today’s higher risk of future deployment?
• What impacts are there in increasing the rate of deployment pay to those who reenlist with units that are heavily deployed?
• What are the professional, readiness, family and emotional impacts of rewarding volunteers for extensive combat assignments?
**Education and Training**

- What revisions to existing training are required to include more training for nontraditional, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations?
- How can training programs become flexible and responsive, so that changes in enemy tactics can quickly be incorporated into predeployment preparation?
- What changes in assignment policies are required to have training shaped and delivered by NCOs who have recently returned from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan?
- What changes in training are required to determine existing knowledge and enhanced curricula for those NCOs with demonstrated proficiency in the skills?
- How best can the Army ensure that it does not make Soldiers learn the same skills twice, and how can it continue to challenge them with more advanced training?
- How does implementation of the “train, select and promote” concept ensure NCOs are ready when reassigned and promoted?

**Civilian Recommendations**

**Promotions**

- What options could the Army offer to enhance professional development and encourage retention?
- Could development include educational sabbaticals with promotion timelines adjusted to remain competitive for promotion?

**Personnel Management**

- What is the optimal ratio of specialized (in the functional areas) and more general skills?
- What is the value of civilians trained and designated to rotate between assignments within the generating force?
- Should the Army implement mandatory joint, interagency, intergovernmental or multinational assignments for civilians? If so, at what grades? How would this implementation affect the Army’s ability to fill duty positions with the required grade and training?
- What are the assignment cycles needed for civilians?
- What are the options for assignment policies for civilians?
- How much influence should agency leadership and local managers have over developmental assignments?

Although existing training is extensive, the Army should continue to revise and update training programs to address the changing nature of combat and the requirements of irregular operations, examples exist in the latest application of Outcomes Based Training and Education at the United States Military Academy’s Department of Military Instruction and at the Maneuver Center of Excellence’s Army Reconnaissance Course.

The Army should conduct a top-to-bottom review of civilian workforce management, promotions, education and training to determine whether the current system best supports a brigade-based expeditionary force.
• Should the Army link pay and promotions to more prescriptive civilian developmental assignments?
• Does the Army need a flexible range of personal extended leave programs?
• Should the Army manage civilian developmental assignments in a centralized or decentralized manner?
• At what grade level should developmental assignments be managed?
• Should there a civilian version of the trainees, transients, holdees and students (TTHS) account?

**Education and Training**

• What are the education cycles needed for civilians?
• How can the Army best develop civilian training based on innovation, adaptability and flexibility?
• As civilians advance in grade and position assignment, should educational opportunities be reconsidered based on performance and potential?
• Should the civilian education selection process adhere more closely to the processes of officer education selection (e.g., senior service college)?
• What educational opportunities best prepare civilians for higher-level leadership and management?
• Should all resourcing for civilian education and training be centrally funded?
• How should the Army Civilian Training, Education Development System (ACTEDS) career intern program adapt?
• Should DLAMP expand in scale and breadth to provide similar military oriented professional development experiences for mid-career civilians?

**Conclusion**

In forcing implementation of a personnel system to support Mission Command, the Army needs to follow the lead of Army Chief of Staff and World War II and Korean War hero General Matthew Ridgway, who said, “My greatest contribution as chief of staff was to nourish the mavericks.” While not always popular, especially during peacetime, they often lead with courage, creativity, boldness and, at times, irreverence. The Army and the other services must adapt an organizational model and personnel system that will nourish the innovators and keep them from leaving. No utopian, brave new, politically correct, gender neutral, nonlethal, high-tech, clean-war generation is stepping forward to replace the hard chargers who are now abandoning the Army, and none are going to.

In support of Mission Command, the Army culture must become more accepting of change, including creativity and independence. Human resource leaders know that embracing change does not mean seizing upon every idea or opportunity. As Colonel Michael Wyly (U.S. Marine Corps Retired) said:

Civilization didn’t get this far by embracing every idea that came along; it got this far by accepting certain changes that were inevitable and certain others that were
demonstrably beneficial, and by opposing, sometimes violently, changes that would have imperiled the species. Interesting, some think a good leader has to be a change killer as well as a change agent.22

In deciding what to keep and what to replace or reform, the Army leadership must focus on the probability that in the future, wars may be very short and intense, requiring rapid, important decisions made by different levels of command. Much depends on proper planning and preparation to ensure that leaders and their units can perform in the best way possible during the critical initial days of combat. The Army, or any service for that matter, may not have sufficient time to organize, so the Army (and DoD) must be ready beyond what technology can provide. Such complex change requires leadership by extraordinary civilian and military leaders possessing vision. The Army’s leaders must provide the beginnings to a revolution of change that is even more dramatic than the ones conducted by Elihu Root and George Marshall.23

Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Colonel Wyly make strong cases for the need for mavericks within the Army and recognize the brilliance of one of DoD’s most stellar examples, the late Colonel John Boyd. Wyly wrote in the July 2008 issue of Armed Forces Journal that Gates called upon a gathering of young, uniformed officers to emulate the irreverent “Genghis John” Boyd. Using Boyd’s words, Gates challenged these young officers to be principled, creative and reform-minded leaders who “want to do something, not be somebody.”24 Wyly notes what a bold, risky step it was for a defense secretary to quote Boyd, who left the Air Force as a pariah in the minds of some. Nevertheless, Wyly lays bare that today the Army needs brilliant Soldiers throughout all the services with the abilities “to overcome bureaucratic resistance and institutional hostility.”25
Endnotes


2 The author is indebted to Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, USMC Training and Education Command (interview, 21 October 2010) and Dr. Steven Stewart, former adaptability professor at the Army War College, for their insights regarding adaptive leaders.

3 Meritocracy is a system of governing that uses intellectual and personality competence as the primary measure for determining one’s merit (and therefore social standing). This system suggests that those who are most intelligent in their social and professional dealings have the right to stand with greater authority within society. In some sense, this view of meritocracy is rooted in the Darwinian model of evolution. It applies the motto of the “survival of the fittest” in a social and political context. This is meritocracy but not the form that esotericism advocates. An esoterically structured meritocracy uses spiritual values and wisdom, rather than intellect and personal ambition, as the measure of merit. While it still supports the idea that social influence must be earned, wisdom and one’s commitment to the greater good are the cornerstones that define an individual’s place and authority within society. At the same time, a spiritually defined meritocracy acknowledges that at the deepest level, all people are equal. Given this, such a society must demonstrate a profound respect for the unique qualities of every citizen. Yet it also recognizes that there are vast differences in people when it comes to spiritual maturity and the development of consciousness. When examined this way, human consciousness appears hierarchical, as is everything else in nature. In other words, any society will find people at varying stages in the development of their consciousness. As such, a meritocracy offers greater influence to those who have demonstrated the broadest and wisest consciousness in support of humanity’s betterment.

4 Politburo, from the German word *Politbüro* and short for *Politisches Büro des Zentralkomitees* (literally, the Central Committee’s Political Bureau), is the executive committee for a number of communist political parties. As a metaphor it refers to extreme centralization: all decisions are made from the top down; there is little or no adaptability allowed; personnel in such a system are required to follow rules and not deviate.

5 Interview with Colonel Casey Haskins, Director, Department of Military Instruction, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, 10 March 2010. COL Haskins has also contributed greatly to the author’s approach to solving complex problems through Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBT&E).

6 Interviews with Dr. Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, and Dr. George E. Reed, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired (both interviewed on 9 August 2010 and again on 13 November 2010). Dr. Paparone is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College’s Department of Logistics and Resource Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a B.A. from the University of South Florida; master’s degrees from the Florida Institute of Technology, the U.S. Naval War College and the Army War College; and a Ph.D. in public administration from Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Reed is an associate professor at the University of San Diego’s School of Leadership and Education Sciences. He holds a B.S. from Central Missouri State University, an M.F.S. from George Washington University and a Ph.D. from Saint Louis University. See also: Donald E. Vandergriff, *Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 2002), pp. 1–21.
Unified Quest 10 Leader Development Seminar Papers, https://wiki.kc.us.army.mil/wiki/Leader_Development_Event_Integration (requires AKO/DKO account). This issue was raised several times during the three Unified Quest Workshops from January through March 2010.


Pronounced so as to rhyme with “new boy,” coup d’oie is French for “strike of the eye.” The Germans later referred to this term as Fingerspitzengefühl—the faculty or the act of comprehending at a glance the weakness or strength of a military position, of a certain arrangement of troops, the most advantageous position for a battlefield, etc. Fingerspitzengefühl is a German term, literally meaning “finger tips feeling” and suggesting a intuitive flair or instinct, which has been appropriated by the English language as a loanword. In military terminology it is used for the stated ability of some military commanders, such as Field-Marshall Erwin Rommel, to maintain with great accuracy in attention to detail in an ever-changing operational and tactical situation by maintaining a mental map of the battlefield. The term is synonymous with the English expression of “keeping one’s finger on the pulse.” The mental image given is of a military commander who is in such intimate communication with the battlefield that it is as though he has a fingertip on each critical point, expressed in the 18th and 19th centuries as “having a feel for combat.”

Ibid., p. 29.


Interview with Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, 21 May 2010. Dr. Gudmundsson is currently evolving how the Marines are conducting education through the use of case studies (problem solving through lessons).


Emory Upton (1839–1881), a U.S. Army general and military strategist, is known for his role in successfully leading infantry to attack entrenched positions at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House during the Civil War, but he also excelled at artillery and cavalry assignments. His work The Military Policy of the United States analyzed American military policies and practices and presented the first systematic examination of the nation’s military history; it had a tremendous effect on the U.S. Army when it was published, posthumously, in 1904. Brevet Major General Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, War Department Document 290 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), http://www.archive.org/details/militarypolicyu00uptogoog.

Indebted to Colonel (Ret.) Rickey Smith, Director of Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Forward, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James Beirwirth and Major (Ret.) James “Brad” Baldwin for their input to this section.


Thanks for the input and work of the Human Dimension Task Force of Brigadier General (Ret.) Volney J. Warner and Lieutenant Colonel Scott Hatler.

Based on the work of Colonel Casey Haskins, who has made substantial progress in the past four years in reforming the way the USMA develops adaptability and problem solving in its cadets.


Discussions with Colonel (Ret.) Michael D. Wyly, USMC, April 2008.

Elihu Root led the Army out of its frontier age into its preparation for modern warfare as Secretary of War, 1899–1905. General George C. Marshall oversaw the largest expansion of the U.S. Army in its history and prepared it for war with Germany and Japan during World War II.


Wyly, “In Praise of Mavericks.”