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Manning Reserve Component Units for Mobilization: Army and Air Force Practice

Dennis P. Chapman

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Army and Air Force Practice**

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The Institute of Land Warfare
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

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LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 74, SEPTEMBER 2009

Manning Reserve Component Units for Mobilization:

Army and Air Force Practice

by Dennis P. Chapman

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
Foreword

The extended combat operations that began following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and expanded with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 have had a far-reaching impact on the U.S. military in many ways, and nowhere is this more true than with the reserve components.

The military services have been forced to improvise and adapt considerably in many areas since 9/11. One area where such adaptation has in some cases taken the services far from the doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures in place prior to 9/11 is unit manning. Each of the services has developed its own service-specific approach to manning mobilizing and deployed reserve component units; in the case of the Army, at least, such innovation constitutes a major break from pre-9/11 doctrine. Having been adopted in an ad hoc fashion over time, however, the Army's reforms in this area have not been codified or documented in any systematic way.

This paper attempts to shed light on the considerable evolution in manning practices that has occurred in the last eight years by reviewing the mobilization manning processes of two services in detail—those of the reserve components of the Army and Air Force—along with a brief look at certain aspects of the Marine Corps Reserve process as well.

Major topics examined include Army and Air Force processes for selecting units for mobilization; cross-leveling to bring mobilized units to full deployment strength; replacement operations aimed at keeping already-deployed reserve component units fully manned; and procedures for bringing reserve component volunteers onto active duty for contingency service.



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September 2009

Manning Reserve Component Units for Mobilization: Army and Air Force Practice

Introduction

Reserve component (RC) Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines of the U.S. armed forces have mobilized and deployed in vast numbers since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). Most of these servicemen and women have been ordered to active duty under Partial Mobilization¹ authority provided under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code Section 12302 (10 USC 12302), *Ready Reserve*, which provides at paragraph (a) that

In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, *order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit*, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months [emphasis added].²

The law further seeks to ensure equitable distribution of the mobilization burden by providing that “consideration shall be given to—

- (1) the length and nature of previous service, to assure such sharing of exposure to hazards as the national security and military requirements will reasonably allow;
- (2) family responsibilities; and
- (3) employment necessary to maintain the national health, safety, or interest.”³

Additionally, many reserve component members have served voluntarily under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code Section 12301 (10 USC 12301), *Reserve Components Generally*, Section (d), which provides that

At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may order a member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction to active duty, or retain him on active duty, with the consent of that member. However, a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.⁴

The specific language employed in 10 USC 12302 is illuminating: the statute does not empower the President to summon reserve members to duty in any manner that he prescribes but rather, when it comes to involuntary call-ups, constrains the President to calling up “*any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit*”:⁵ in other words, the

law provides for calling up reserve component members with their units, or where individuals are required, calling them up from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). These stated constraints reflect the basic operating assumption underpinning U.S. mobilization concepts, particularly for the reserve components of the Army: Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve units will be called up as units, and the ARNG and Army Reserve Soldiers serving in units will be called up with and will serve with the units to which they are assigned.

In theory, the reserve components mobilize *units*, but for a number of reasons, reality has departed from this ideal in several respects—there has consistently been a need to call up portions of units or even individual Soldiers apart from their parent units. Factors driving this reality include:

- operational requirements in the field;
- personnel shortages within mobilizing RC units;
- manning policies, including policies related to time at home between deployments and successive mobilizations of the same unit or individual;
- policy choices such as emphasizing volunteerism vice involuntary mobilizations;
- aversion to calling up servicemembers from the IRR.

These and other factors have driven the services to develop a variety of policies and mechanisms for bringing servicemembers onto active duty apart from their home units, often as fillers to bring other RC units up to full strength for deployment or to keep them at strength during deployment, but often to man other requirements not tied to specific RC units as well. Most of these practices have been developed on an ad hoc basis over time; often the policies that direct them have been promulgated only by memorandum or even verbal orders of the Secretary of Defense or others, and have frequently not been codified or compiled in a single, comprehensive volume readily available to the public.⁶ The processes for mobilizing RC units are arcane, opaque and generally poorly understood except by the specialists who work with them—particularly with regard to the mobilization of individual Soldiers. Understanding is limited even among these technical specialists, however, as persons working in the mobilization field rarely understand the system in a comprehensive way, being experts on the particular matter to which they are assigned but often unaware of how their particular process or policy fits with and impacts other parts of the system.

This study will examine the ad hoc reserve component mobilization policies and procedures that have evolved since 9/11, focusing on the reserve components of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force (USAF), with a special emphasis on the policies and practices pertaining to the mobilization and employment of individual servicemembers apart from their home units. For purposes of context this study will begin with an examination of how the Army and the Air Force identify reserve component *units* for mobilization and deployment; it will then examine filler operations—those steps taken to cross-level servicemembers from one unit into another to bring the receiving unit to deployment strength prior to departure for the theater of operations; replacement operations—those steps taken to keep already-deployed units manned while in the theater of operations; and procedures for bringing RC volunteers onto active duty under the provisions of 10 USC 12301.

Army Mobilization Requirements⁷

Although the aim of this study is to document policies related to the manning of mobilized RC units and the mobilization of individual RC members, familiarity with the process of identifying RC units for mobilization will be helpful to the reader—particularly as, in the case of the Army, large numbers of Soldiers called to duty individually as fillers and replacements are processed through the administrative-bureaucratic system developed to process unit mobilizations. An understanding of the Air Force process will be useful as well, as the Air Force effectively defines a “unit” in such a way that many mobilization requirements are filled either by individual or small groups of Airmen deploying separately from their home units, even if not deemed fillers or replacements.

The Army Process

Mobilization of an RC unit begins with the identification of an operational requirement in theater. The combatant command (COCOM) articulates these requirements as requests for forces (RFFs) generated either as part of the annual planned bulk rotation of troops or as separate, stand-alone requirements. The Joint Staff validates these COCOM requests and transmits them to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) for apportionment to one of the services for fulfillment. USJFCOM transmits those COCOM requirements apportioned to the Army to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which develops a preliminary apportionment of these requirements among the three components (active, ARNG and Army Reserve). This preliminary apportionment is refined, modified and finalized with input from the three components at periodic sourcing conferences hosted by FORSCOM. Additionally, occasional stand-alone requests for forces (“pop-up” requirements) are apportioned among the three components through negotiations among battlefield operating system managers and the components. For requirements apportioned to ARNG or Army Reserve, the component G3 (operations staff), in cooperation with the respective State Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) or Regional Readiness Commands (RRC), identifies the specific units to fill the requirement and transmits the nomination to FORSCOM, who in turn transmits it through Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

For ARNG requirements especially, unit sourcing is a consensus-based process in which state Adjutants General exercise considerable influence over the timing of mobilization as well as the deployment missions of their units. Pre-9/11 WARTRACE and Force Support Package (FSP)⁸ designations have become irrelevant; identification of particular units for mobilization has reverted almost entirely to the reserve components themselves. FORSCOM’s main contribution to this process is articulating any constraints on unit selection and rejecting or recommending approval of the unit nomination provided by the reserve component. In the great majority of cases, the component’s recommendation is approved at all levels and implemented.

Army Force Generation

An important feature of the unit selection process is the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) program. Under ARFORGEN, unit readiness is managed on a cyclical basis, with units ready for deployment one year out of five as a planning target. ARFORGEN reduces the problem of “haves” and “have-nots” inherent in the previous system, which designated

some RC units as “priority” units with a higher claim on resources than other, “traditional” units. Rather than permanently designating certain units as having “priority” over others and expecting these units to sustain elevated readiness over the long term, the ARFORGEN model assigns unit priority on a rotating basis, with all units rotating through three resource pools: a “reset/training pool” for units recently returned from deployments or major commitments; a “ready pool” consisting of units that have completed the reset process and would be available for deployment if needed; and an “available pool” consisting of units ready to deploy and pre-designated to deploy during the current year should a contingency arise. Note that assignment of a unit to the “available pool” does not guarantee that the unit will deploy—it simply means that the unit is available for deployment should a contingency arise during the period that the unit remains in the “available pool.”

Under the ARFORGEN model, all units will find themselves at the top of the priority list on a rotating basis. This approach is a significant improvement over past practice, providing predictability to unit commanders, facilitating a deliberate ramping up to peak readiness and requiring sustainment of peak readiness for a reasonable and defined period rather than indefinitely. ARFORGEN does not allocate units by specific contingency as under WARTRACE. Units are expected to be ready for full spectrum operations when in the “available pool.”

Both ARNG and the Army Reserve use the ARFORGEN model as a planning tool for future mobilizations, but the Army Reserve approach is particularly well developed. The Army Reserve has packaged its force on the basis of an assumed one year deployed for each four years stabilized at home station. Accordingly, they have organized most of their force into ten Army Reserve Expeditionary Forces (AREFs) organized into pairs or “packages” as shown in figure 1 (page 29).

Each AREF Package pair is slated as the priority pair available for deployment one year out of every five, aligned by fiscal year, on a rotating basis. Army Reserve organizes its AREFs into ten packages paired together into five one-year rotations instead of simply organizing their force into five larger AREF Packages to facilitate support for two separate contingencies in any given year or to support rotation of forces through a single contingency.⁹ Each AREF contains a proportional share of type of unit (capability) in the Army Reserve—put another way, for any given type of unit, the inventory of available units is divided among the ten AREFs and five AREF Packages.¹⁰

Some types of capabilities do not fit neatly into the ARFORGEN five-year cyclical model, due to their unique characteristics, to the low density of such types of units in the force, or to programmed force structure actions such as unit deactivations. These capabilities are grouped into three nonstandard AREF Packages as follows:¹¹

- Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC) and Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Army Reserve Units. Deployment schedules for these units are managed by their respective Major Commands (MACOMs).
- Inactivating units—used primarily as a manpower pool for individual fillers.
- Low-density, high-demand units—deployment rotation managed on a case-by-case basis.

Allocating units into ARFORGEN AREF Packages is only the first step, however. Once U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) receives a mobilization requirement, actual unit selection occurs as follows:¹³

- Upon receipt of the requirement, USARC G3 turns first to the appropriate AREF Package according to the latest arrival date (LAD) of the requirement. In other words, the USARC G3 will first attempt to source a unit from the AREF Package aligned with the fiscal year during which the LAD of the requirement falls.
- USARC G3 identifies candidate units from among the units of the appropriate type allocated to that AREF Package.
- Candidate units are categorized by dwell-time—the length of time elapsed since the last mobilization or deployment. The unit with most dwell-time that meets Department of Defense minimum dwell-time guidelines will be identified as the preliminary unit nominee to fill the mobilization requirement.
- Candidate units identified through this process are staffed with the owning Regional Readiness Command (RRC) or other MACOM as appropriate for staffing. This process will continue until a final unit selection is made.

Mobilization Requirements – The Air Force Model

The Air Force deployment planning model is similar to that described for the Army Reserve above. The Air Force plans and executes operational deployments on a 36-month cycle. During the first 12 months, projections of the future deployment demands are developed; during the second 12 months, specific units are placed against anticipated deployment requirements; during the final 12 months, the planned operational deployments are executed. These 12-month windows are organized on a fiscal-year basis.¹³ The details of this process are outlined below.

Each deployment cycle is divided into five four-month windows; all capabilities in the USAF are distributed among these five windows. Capabilities within each window are subdivided into two Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs), for a total of 10 numbered AEFs. Units within each window and AEF are arranged in a predetermined priority that will drive the order in which units are tasked with deployment requirements. Each deployment window contains the full spectrum of USAF capabilities. Unit priority within each window is based on senior leader guidance, with input from the units themselves. Each component—active Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard (ANG)—is allocated as above.¹⁴

Deployment requirements flow from the COCOM through JFCOM to Air Combat Command (ACC), and then to one of four functional Major Commands (MAJCOMS):¹⁵

- Air Expeditionary Forces: Requests for Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) forces, traditionally known as “Base Operations Support.”
- Air Mobility Command (AMC): Requests for air mobility assets.
- Air Combat Command (ACC): Requests for air combat capabilities.
- Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC): Requests for special operations capabilities.¹⁶

These MAJCOMs will task units in the current deployment window for the required capability until exhausted, and then will move on to the next deployment window, and so forth.¹⁷ If a given capability within the current mobilization window is exhausted without filling the COCOM requirement, the MAJCOM can either bring active component (AC) capabilities forward from the next deployment window or draw the required capabilities from the reserve components (RC).

A decision to draw capabilities from the RC requires justification demonstrating that the requirement could not be filled from the AC.¹⁸ Air Force policy requires exhausting AC resources prior to calling up RC units, as shown in figure 2 (page 30).¹⁹ Before resorting to RC forces, the Air Force will consider pulling AC units forward from a future deployment window or extending the deployment of a currently deployed AC unit.²⁰

All Air Force units are organized into “tempo bands” based upon their anticipated dwell-time between deployments. Tempo Band A units are those that rotate at the planned rate of four deployment windows at home for every one 120-day window deployed; Tempo Band B units retain the 1:4 deployment ratio but deploy for windows of 179 days or more vice 120 days; Tempo Band C units are those expected to deploy on a 1:3 ratio; Tempo Band D units are those that deploy at rate of two deployment windows at home for each 120-day window deployed; and Tempo Band E consists of units that rotate on a 1:1 basis, spending as much time deployed as they spend at home.²¹

The tempo bands outlined above consist of AC units. RC units are grouped into two tempo bands of their own—Band M and Band N. Generally, the RC units in these bands are employed when no equivalent AC capability could be employed without that unit exceeding a deployment ratio of 1:3.²²

When AC options have been exhausted, the MAJCOM requests RC capabilities from its Air Force Reserve counterpart headquarters (the process proceeds differently for Air National Guard units). Upon receipt of the request, the RC MAJCOM meets as much of the requirement as possible via volunteers. That portion of the requirement remaining after volunteers are exhausted will be filled by Partial Mobilization.²³

Unlike ARNG and the Army Reserve, the Air Force does not deploy organic units. COCOM requirements are filled by assembling portions of units called Unit Type Codes (UTCs) and individuals into provisional units. These provisional units conduct no pre-deployment collective training. The personnel that will comprise these units assemble directly at the mission location, whether in the continental United States (CONUS) or in theater.²⁴

The Air Force Mobilization and Deployment Process at the Service and Component Levels

Deployment requirements do not begin as component-specific requirements, but rather as generic capability requirements identified in theater by the COCOM; requirements appropriate for fill by Air Force capabilities are routed through the COCOM Air component command to USJFCOM, where the requirement is validated. Once validated, the requirement is sent to the appropriate force provider—usually Air Combat Command.²⁵ Requirements allocated to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve proceed differently by component-specific processes, which are outlined below.

The Air Force Reserve Mobilization Process²⁶

Deployment requirements allocated to the Air Force Reserve begin as a force request referred by ACC to one of the four MAJCOMs identified above (Air Expeditionary Forces Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Combat Command or Air Force Special Operations Command). The MAJCOM initially refers the request to the appropriate active component command for fill; the AC command fills that portion of the requirement that it can and passes the rest back to the MAJCOM. After exhausting all options for AC fill as illustrated in figure 2, the MAJCOM will route the remainder of the requirement to the Air Force Reserve MAJCOM to fill the residue. The receiving MAJCOM initially seeks to fill the requirement via volunteers. Deployment of volunteers is funded via Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) Authorizations transmitted to the volunteers' units, who publish active duty orders under the provisions of 10 USC 12301(d). (See figure 3, page 31.)

Where volunteers cannot be found to meet the requirement, the Reserve MAJCOM identifies the wing that will be tasked to provide the necessary remaining personnel under Partial Mobilization authority, and routes a mobilization request through the appropriate AC MAJCOM to the Air Staff at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, who submits the mobilization request to the Secretary of the Air Force and, if appropriate, the Secretary of Defense. Once the request is approved at these levels, the Air Staff publishes a Partial Mobilization Order which is routed through channels to the donor Reserve wing, which in turn publishes the servicemembers' active duty orders under the authority of 10 USC 12302(a) (Partial Mobilization).

The Air National Guard Mobilization Process²⁷

The process for filling the COCOM requirement from Air National Guard assets proceeds differently. Like the Air Force Reserve process, it begins with the identification of a requirement by the COCOM, and is routed through USJFCOM to ACC. It is at this stage, however, that the process diverges. (See figure 4, page 32.)

Deployment requirements identified for possible fill by Air National Guard assets are routed by ACC to the Air National Guard Readiness Center at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, where Air National Guard functional managers analyze the requirement to identify potential UTCs available to fill it. The functional managers then submit these UTC nominations to the Air National Guard wings in which the capabilities reside. Upon receipt of the nominations, the wing identifies the servicemembers to fill the requirement and submits the roster to the Air National Guard Readiness Center.

After reviewing the roster to verify eligibility in terms of dwell-time since last deployment (or if dwell-time limits are exceeded, to confirm that the servicemembers are volunteers), Air National Guard routes the list to ACC, where it is input into Aerospace Planning and Execution Network (ASPEN)²⁸ for electronic transmittal to the Air Staff. The Air Staff processes the mobilization request through the Secretary of the Air Force and, if necessary, the Secretary of Defense (if dwell-time or other waivers are required). Once the mobilization is approved at the secretariat level, ACC publishes a unit mobilization order, from which the Air National Guard wing will publish the individual mobilization orders.

Manning Deploying Units

Identification of units that will mobilize is only the first step in the process: Before a unit can *deploy*, it must be *manned*. In theory a mobilized RC unit should deploy with a full complement of personnel already assigned to the unit prior to mobilization, but things rarely work out this way in practice. Few RC units are fully manned in peacetime, and even among those assigned to any given unit, a significant number will invariably be found to be unable to deploy for any number of reasons, ranging from not having completed mandatory training to disqualifying medical issues. Before the unit can deploy, these shortages must be made good. Additional losses—both combat casualties and others—will further attrit the unit in theater; these losses too must be made good if the unit is to retain maximum combat effectiveness.

These shortages are filled by *cross-leveling*—transferring personnel from one organization (a donor unit) to another (a gaining unit) to make the latter organization ready for deployment. Broadly speaking, cross-leveling can be classified into two major categories: *Fillers* are those Soldiers cross-leveled into a unit during the pre-deployment phase either at home station or at the unit mobilization station, prior to departure for the mission location or theater of operations. *Replacements* are Soldiers assigned (usually by cross-leveling but also from among Soldiers completing training) to a unit after the unit has deployed to its mission location or theater of operations to make good losses incurred in theater.

A complex array of administrative policies and procedures, supported by dedicated web-based software applications, has sprung up to service and implement the cross-leveling process. These policies and procedures bear little resemblance to any doctrinal manning concepts that might have existed prior to the 9/11 attacks, having often been formed from whole cloth in the intervening years. Nor have they usually been formalized in any law or regulation, being documented instead (if at all) only in relatively vague policy memoranda, PowerPoint briefings, software applications and a collection of tactics, techniques and procedures that have evolved over time and become authoritative but have never been properly codified or captured in a single source. This study will examine a portion of this ad hoc bureaucratic system.

Cross-Leveling

Cross-leveling, broadly defined, consists of all measures taken to fully man a deploying unit with personnel not previously members of that unit prior to deployment.

Army National Guard Cross-Leveling

The Army National Guard cross-leveling process, encapsulated in figure 5 (page 33), consists of four main steps: identification of fillers within the mobilizing unit's home state; identification of volunteers from other ARNG units nationwide; requisitioning of fillers from the Individual Ready Reserve; and requisition of fillers from the active component.

As shown in the table below,²⁹ the lion's share of cross-leveling occurs at the first step—within the unit's home state.

The next two steps—canvassing for ARNG volunteers nationwide and requisitioning IRR fillers—make a smaller but still important contribution to manning deploying ARNG units.³⁰ The final step—requesting AC fillers—is generally used only for very specialized skills and occasionally for second lieutenants. In total numbers the AC contribution can be considered

negligible and will not be addressed again here; we also leave aside the IRR process, focusing instead on cross-leveling within ARNG and Army Reserve.

In-State Cross-Leveling: For one example of cross-leveling at the state level, we will review the procedures outlined by the staff of Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ)³¹ Michigan Army National Guard (MIARNG).³² The MIARNG cross-leveling process is illustrated at figure 6 (page 34).

The process begins with the receipt of a Headquarters, Department of the Army unit alert order by the JFHQ, notifying the state of a potential future mobilization of the alerted unit. At this point the alerted unit reviews its unit manning roster (UMR) to identify vacant positions and positions held by Soldiers not eligible to deploy, including those who have not met minimum dwell-time requirements (time stabilized at home station since their last deployment). The unit chain of command will first solicit deployment volunteers from among those disqualified from deployment solely due to dwell-time. Those who volunteer will be retained for deployment; those who do not volunteer, together with other non-deployable Soldiers, will be transferred to the unit's rear detachment. The unit passes the resulting deployment vacancies to their MACOM, the first colonel (O-6)-level command in their chain of command.

The MACOM then solicits volunteers locally within the MACOM to fill the vacancies identified by the deploying unit; any volunteers found are transferred to the deploying unit, and the MACOM passes the remaining deployment shortages to JFHQ for fill. Upon receipt of the

Cross-Leveling — Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams										
2003–2006										
Brigade Combat Team	Available Strength, Pre-Alert	Final Boots on Ground	Fillers from Unit's Home State		Fillers from other States		Individual Ready Reserve Fillers		Active Component Fillers	
30th BCT	4,608	4,700	5	0%	87	2%	0	0%	0	0%
39th BCT	2,527	4,114	1,541	37%	46	1%	0	0%	0	0%
81st BCT	2,622	4,143	1,433	35%	70	2%	0	0%	18	0%
256th BCT	3,134	4,330	1,062	25%	103	2%	22	1%	9	0%
278th BCT	3,705	4,261	435	10%	87	2%	14	0%	20	0%
116th BCT	3,274	4,461	881	20%	169	4%	92	2%	45	1%
155th BCT	2,545	3,292	573	17%	44	1%	63	2%	67	2%
56th BCT	1,747	2,941	1,161	39%	33	1%	0	0%	0	0%
29th BCT	2,641	2,906	42	1%	76	3%	147	5%	0	0%
2/28th BCT	2,473	4,058	1,288	32%	255	6%	24	1%	18	0%
48th BCT	2,954	4,057	857	21%	147	4%	89	2%	10	0%
1/34th BCT	2,215	4,073	1,626	40%	3	0%	228	6%	1	0%
Total	34,445	47,336	10,904	23%	1,120	2%	679	1%	188	0%

Percentage of final "boots on the ground"
Source: Army National Guard Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division, Spring 2006

residual shortages from the MACOM, the JFHQ begins the process of filling those vacancies from other units within the state. The first step in this process is the solicitation of qualified volunteers, who when identified are transferred to the deploying unit. Upon exhausting the pool of volunteers, JFHQ will identify qualified Soldiers carried as excess (double-slotted) in other units throughout the state. Any such Soldiers identified will be *involuntarily* transferred to the deploying unit.

Having exhausted the pool of excess personnel, JFHQ then identifies qualified non-excess personnel in non-deploying units—chiefly units not currently in the ARFORGEN available pool—who will also be involuntarily transferred to the deploying unit. Finally, after exhausting the pool of qualified and available personnel in the state, JFHQ will identify otherwise qualified Soldiers who can be retrained in time to deploy with the unit, involuntarily transfer them to the deploying unit, retrain them and deploy them with the unit. Any residual shortages remaining in the deploying unit will be passed to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for fill.

When Soldiers are cross-leveled from their home unit into another unit by command direction, the Soldier's slot or position in his or her home unit is frozen pending the Soldier's return. Upon redeployment, the Soldier has 90 days to decide whether he or she wishes to return to the original unit or to remain permanently with the unit with whom he/she served in theater. If the Soldier elects to return to the original unit, JFHQ executes the unit transfer. If the Soldier elects to remain with the unit whom he/she served in theater, then the Soldier's original position will be unfrozen and the donor unit will be authorized to recruit against it.³³ At the time of my interview with JFHQ mobilization personnel, Michigan was examining their procedures for Soldiers who sought out deployment opportunities on their own. These Soldiers may not be guaranteed return to their original billet upon the end of their deployment.³⁴

Cross-Leveling Between States: Cross-leveling between states commences upon receipt by NGB of the residual shortages (passbacks) remaining after cross-leveling efforts by the unit, MACOM and JFHQ.

Cross-leveling between states is managed by NGB and consists of identifying *volunteers* from other states willing to deploy with the mobilizing unit.³⁵ It is important to emphasize that all such cross-state individual fillers are strictly volunteers. Neither NGB nor the respective Adjutants General will countenance separating a Soldier from his or her unit to be *involuntarily* deployed with another unit from a different state.

The principle source of these volunteers is the “Volunteer Database” maintained by NGB. This database is a web-based forum where ARNG Soldiers interested in volunteering upload their pertinent identifying information and qualifications via Guard Knowledge Online (GKO). Passbacks received from the states are uploaded into a dedicated database and automatically cross-referenced against the data found in the “Volunteer Database.”

When a qualified potential volunteer is identified, a message—an Individual Volunteer Inquiry (IVI)—is sent to the potential volunteer's home state JFHQ requesting his or her release for deployment. Once the volunteer is approved for deployment by his or her home state, a provisional or derivative unit (DUIC) is created as a mobilization vehicle for the Soldier. This DUIC is processed through FORSCOM and HQDA as if it were a separate unit, and a unit mobilization order issued for it. (See figure 7, page 35.)

Once this unit mobilization order is issued, the volunteer's home state publishes—under provisions of 10 USC 12302(a)—an individual mobilization order for the Soldier, who then departs to join the gaining unit, usually at the mobilization station.

Release of a volunteer by his or her Adjutant General is hardly automatic. As few as 25 percent of such requests are ultimately approved by potential volunteers' home states. Adjutants General, very mindful of their own future mobilization requirements, weigh such requests carefully. Some states review these requests in a formalized manner; the Michigan Army National Guard process is depicted at figure 8 (page 36).

In Michigan the first step upon receipt of the IVI is comparison of the request against upcoming mobilization requirements for Michigan units; if it appears likely that the Soldier will be able to fill a position in such a future mission, the request will be denied. If it does not appear that the Soldier will be needed for deployment of a Michigan unit, then his or her request will be coordinated at the JFHQ and with the Soldier's chain of command. If the Soldier still wishes to volunteer and if his or her local chain of command agrees, then the Soldier will be processed for mobilization and deploy with the out-state gaining unit.

Recent Developments: The In-Theater COADOS Extension Program

Another very effective cross-leveling mechanism now in use is the In-Theater Contingency Active Duty for Operational Support (COADOS) Extension Program. Under this program, Soldiers currently serving with units slated to soon rotate home who wish to continue serving in theater are matched against vacancies reported by units in the United States preparing to deploy to theater. Approved applicants will have their tours in theater extended under the provisions of 10 USC 12301(d) and will serve with the incoming unit when it arrives. Nearly 1,100 Soldiers have extended their tours in theater under this program during Fiscal Year 2009 alone.³⁶

Cross-Leveling in the Army Reserve³⁷

Cross-leveling in the Army Reserve begins with the Regional Readiness Command (RRC) or MACOM to which the mobilizing unit belongs. Commanders at this level have the authority to cross-level within their commands, subject to the following guidelines:

- Cross-leveling must stay within the same Standard Requirements Code (SRC—the specific type of unit) and Package Pair.
- Volunteers are to be used before involuntary cross-leveling.
- Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Soldiers are to be used before troop program unit (TPU—drilling) Soldiers.
- Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)-qualified Soldiers will be used before non-Duty MOS-qualified Soldiers.
- A unit plug may be formed by collapsing a subordinate element of the mobilizing unit and replacing it with a unit plug from another unit of the same SRC and Deployment Package. (It should be noted that the ARNG also makes extensive use of unit plugs to reduce the need for excessive numbers of individual fillers.)

Requirements that the owning RRC/MACOM cannot fill within the guidelines above are passed back to the USARC G3 for fill. USARC G3 will seek fillers from throughout the Army Reserve, looking first to donor units of the same SRC in the same Deployment Package as the mobilizing unit in other RRC/MACOMs.

Soldiers identified for cross-leveling are transferred from their home (donor) unit to the mobilizing (gaining) unit. Mandatory reassignment is executed 90 days prior to mobilization date (M-90), although Soldiers may transfer voluntarily sooner. Upon completion of the mobilization mission, *it is the responsibility of the Soldier* to request reassignment back to his or her home unit, if the Soldier desires to return. The mobilized unit has 90 days from the Soldier's request to execute the transfer of the Soldier back to his or her home unit.

Deployment Manning in the Air Force Reserve Components

The Air Force approaches the task of manning theater capability requests in a manner completely different from that of the Army; because of this, the concept of cross-leveling as understood in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve is not applicable to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. What follows is a brief overview of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve deployment practices, generally.

Relatively few mobilization requirements filled with RC personnel are filled with persons serving under Partial Mobilization. The Air Force places a heavy emphasis on volunteerism, filling slots with volunteers serving under the provisions of 10 USC 12301(d) before resorting to 10 USC 12302(a) involuntary mobilization authority. According to readiness personnel at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, as of 2007 the great bulk of deployments to theater were voluntary deployments executed under 10 USC 12301(d), with these deployments outnumbering Partial Mobilization deployments by a factor of four to one; nearly all deployments through Selfridge at that time were of one or two Airmen at a time.³⁸ The largest then-recent group comprised eight Airmen.

Unlike Army practice, when a Partial Mobilization order is published ordering Airmen to duty for a given requirement, that order reflects only that portion of the requirement not previously filled by volunteers under 10 USC 12301(d).³⁹ For activations that do occur under 12302(a), the mobilization order contains the following information:⁴⁰

- the RRF or requirement;
- the period of the mobilization;
- the Unit Identification Codes (UIC—an alphanumeric designator unique to a particular unit) that will contribute capabilities under 12302(a); and
- the specific UTCs that each UIC will contribute, and the number of persons in each UTC, to be contributed under 12302(a).

Mobilization orders for Air Force RC entities differ from those of their Army counterparts. The Air Force order is specific to a particular capability request from the COCOM, while an Army mobilization order may contain capabilities mobilized for one or many theater requests; the Air Force order identifies the specific capabilities (UTCs) required and the number of personnel comprising the capability and directs a given specified unit to provide them,⁴¹ while

an Army mobilization order simply calls for a specific organic unit (UIC) or unit fragment (DUIC). Like its Air Force counterpart, the Army order specifies the number of personnel to be activated as members of the unit.

Unlike the Army Reserve and ARNG, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard mobilization packages are scrutinized at the individual level. Although the partial mobilization order reflects only UIC, UTC and number of personnel, the packet submitted to the Air Staff must include a by-name roster listing all servicemembers who will be mobilized and their mobilization history, to ensure compliance with dwell-time requirements.⁴²

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard do not transfer servicemembers from the donor unit to the recipient unit when assembling a capability for mobilization. Deploying servicemembers, whether on duty under 12301(d) or 12302(a), remain assigned to their home unit throughout the duration of the deployment mission, being merely detailed to the receiving unit for the duration of the mission. Unlike the Army process, 12301(d) orders are published locally by the servicemember's home unit.⁴³

The basic mobilization unit in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard is the Unit Type Code (UTC). UTCs are standardized capabilities within Air Force units—in effect, they are sub-capabilities of UICs. UTCs vary in size; a UTC might consist of one, 10, 20 or any number of Airmen, depending upon the specific capability or function. UTCs are the building blocks from which the Air Force develops capabilities to fill COCOM requirements. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve pull UTCs from various wings and states and assemble them into the capability requested by the COCOM.⁴⁴ A UTC is roughly analogous to a paragraph in an Army unit's Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). The Air Force does not use Derivative Unit Identification Codes (DUICs) to mobilize portions of units. They simply specify which UTCs a given unit will contribute and the number of personnel in each. Translated to Army terms, this would be as if instead of creating a DUIC to mobilize a sub-element of a unit, the Army simply identified a given unit and ordered specified paragraph and line numbers (PARA/LINs) from their MTOE/TDA to active duty.⁴⁵

The Air Force does not track dwell-time between mobilizations by unit as the Army does. Instead, the active Air Force tracks dwell time by UTC—each subordinate UTC within a UIC has its own mobilization dwell-time “clock.” The Air National Guard differs from the active Air Force in that they track dwell-time down to the individual level and will send a portion of a UTC or even an individual Airman who meets dwell-time criteria, leaving behind that part of the UTC that does not. However, a UTC is considered to have been mobilized if a single member of the UTC is mobilized, even if the UTC consists of more than one Airman. Therefore, the Air National Guard tries to use UTCs in their entirety where possible.⁴⁶

The state Adjutant General plays a much smaller role in Air National Guard mobilization actions than he or she does for ARNG units. In an Air National Guard mobilization, Air National Guard headquarters coordinates directly with wings in each state, with the Adjutants General being provided only an information copy of the mobilization order.⁴⁷ With limited exceptions, such direct coordination does not occur in the ARNG process, wherein all communication between ARNG headquarters and mobilizing units flows through the JFHQ.

Deployment Process at the Unit Level⁴⁸

Readiness personnel in a Michigan Air National Guard (MIANG) unit outlined the separate processes for voluntary and involuntary deployments, as described below.

Voluntary Deployments: The voluntary process begins when the wing (equivalent to an Army brigade) is notified of a deployment requirement; the wing responds by soliciting volunteers from among its assigned personnel. Once a subordinate unit identifies a volunteer, the unit submits a deployment request to the wing (or, in the case of the particular unit I visited, to the support flight within the wing), where the servicemember's deployment eligibility is verified.

Once eligibility has been verified, the wing submits the Airman's application for deployment to Air Combat Command (ACC) via the Command Manday Allocation System (CMAS), an Air Force component system of the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System (JOPES). Once the appropriate functional area managers have validated the servicemember's eligibility and qualifications for the deployment requirement, ACC funds the servicemember for deployment by issuing a Military Personnel Appropriation Authorization to the wing, which in turn forwards it to the Airman's home unit. The unit (lieutenant colonel command level) publishes the Airman's active duty orders.

Involuntary Deployments: As noted above, involuntary deployments are comparatively rare in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, but they do occur. The process begins at unit level when the Wing receives a mobilization message via the SIPRNET (SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network), specifying the UIC, the UTC, the number of personnel required, the date of mobilization and the anticipated duration of mobilization. The wing initiates contact with the unit-level readiness manager, upon which the unit begins to compile a by-name roster of the personnel who will be mobilized to fill the requirement and submits this to the Wing readiness manager, who confirms eligibility of all the personnel on the list, examining matters such as medical fitness, dwell-time since last mobilization, qualifications, etc.

Once eligibility is confirmed, personnel are entered into the Air National Guard Orders Writing System (AROWS)⁴⁹ or the Air Force Reserve Orders Writing System (AROWS-R) as appropriate, from which the servicemembers' mobilization orders are generated. The mobilized personnel report for duty on the date specified in their orders; their active duty pay is started by wing readiness personnel and entitlements by installation finance personnel; they receive mandatory briefings, etc.; and then they report to their units for completion of processing. While the deploying Airmen complete final preparations at their unit, wing readiness personnel plan their movement to theater via the Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning and Execution Segments Program (DCAPES),⁵⁰ another Air Force component of JOPES, and coordinate their flights. After a final briefing by wing readiness personnel, the mobilized Airmen deploy to their duty location.⁵¹

Pre-deployment Training and Processing

Pre-deployment training and processing are executed at the wing and unit levels. The applicable doctrinal references for preparing Airmen for deployment are Air Force Handbook (AFH) 10-416, *Personnel Readiness and Mobilization* (22 December 1994) and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-403, *Deployment Planning and Execution* (5 August 2005).⁵²

Unlike Army practice, most mandatory training and deployment preparation for Air Force RC personnel are conducted by the individual's unit.⁵³ Readiness personnel at the 127th Mission Support Flight described their unit's process for me in December 2007. For involuntary mobilizations, servicemembers report to 127th Mission Support Flight on their mobilization date, receiving orders, mandatory briefings and medical screening at that time, and are then released back to their units for remaining processing and mandatory training. This process generally takes about two weeks.

For voluntary deployments, servicemembers complete all preparation at their home units prior to the date set for their reporting to active duty specified in their orders, reporting to the 127th Mission Support Flight about two days prior to deployment for medical screening and mandatory briefs.⁵⁴ Pre-deployment processing is covered in two checklists—an in-processing checklist specific to the 127th Mission Support Flight that covers requirements for bringing Airmen on active duty, and an out-processing checklist specific to theater that covers deployment requirements. The 127th Mission Support Flight uses a unique version of the out-processing checklist, as the U.S. Air Forces Central (AFCENT) allowed Selfridge Air National Guard Base to modify the AFCENT checklist. Airmen deploying on voluntary tours do not complete the in-processing checklist, only the out-processing checklist. Involuntary deployers complete both checklists on active duty after their mobilization date; voluntary deployers complete most of the checklist requirements on inactive duty status during drill prior to their activation date.⁵⁵

Replacement Operations

Background

For purposes of this study, replacements are those Soldiers transferred into a mobilized unit to keep that unit fully manned during the course of its deployment. Although pre-existing references to replacement operations existed in doctrinal and policy documents, no replacement system was implemented for the Reserve Components for a substantial period after the 9/11 attacks—this despite that fact that attrition began to adversely effect mobilized ARNG units as early as November 2001.⁵⁶ A year elapsed before any measure was put in place to offset the deleterious effects of attrition upon the readiness of mobilized units. The action initially taken—in fall 2002—was not implementation of a replacement system, but rather the imposition of stop-loss on alerted and mobilized RC units, with discharges and retirements suspended for the first 90 days following alert, and then from the date of mobilization until 90 days after release from active duty.⁵⁷ Stop-loss cut off a significant portion of personnel losses—specifically, the loss of Soldiers released from the service upon completion of their enlistment contracts or eligibility for retirement. It did not cure the problem, however, as many other causes—e.g., medical problems, injuries, family crises—contributed to attrition.

Despite this, the issue lay dormant for more than two years, until the announcement in mid- to late 2004 that three ARNG maneuver brigades—the 30th (North Carolina), the 39th (Arkansas) and the 81st (Washington)—would mobilize and deploy to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II). The pending deployment of these major combat formations finally awakened G1 personnel at the Department of the Army to the need for measures to keep RC units fully manned throughout their mobilization and deployment.⁵⁸

Two initiatives came from this renewed interest. The first was implementation of a policy authorizing mobilizing RC units to mobilize and deploy to the mobilization station with 110 percent of their required deployment strength, with the intent that the 10 percent overage would offset attrition during training at the mobilization station and losses during the first two months in theater. Coupled with this “110 percent overage policy” was the first true individual replacement system for mobilized RC units during the global war on terrorism, a “Pull” system under which commanders in the field would requisition replacements for personnel losses of all types while deployed.

The Pull system had a shortcoming, however, in the form of a substantial gap of several weeks between the commander’s replacement request and the arrival of the replacement Soldier at the unit—a gap the Army later attempted to fill by implementing a parallel system wherein the reserve components would preemptively dispatch replacements to theater in anticipation of future attrition based upon historical data during the preceding months—the “Push” system.⁵⁹

The Pull Replacement System – Army National Guard

Of the two replacement processes noted above, the principal system used has been the Pull system, depicted in figure 9 (page 37).

As its name implies, the Pull replacement process begins with a vacancy in a deployed unit. The unit commander submits a replacement requisition through channels to the theater personnel command (PERSCOM), where the requisition is validated prior to being forwarded to the Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC) in Alexandria, Virginia (the theater PERSCOM has no replacement assets of its own).

HRC assigns the requisition a control number and forwards it to ARNG or the Army Reserve as appropriate. When the request reaches ARNG, it is forwarded to the requesting unit’s home state for fill. The home state either fills the request and dispatches the replacement Soldier to the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) at Fort Benning, Georgia (or, in the case of replacements bound for brigade combat teams, through Camp Shelby, Mississippi), and from there to the gaining unit. If the home state cannot fill the request, it is returned to NGB, who canvasses nationwide for volunteers to fill the requirement (as discussed above in the cross-leveling section). If a volunteer is found and released by his or her state, the Soldier reports to the CRC for training and from there to the gaining unit. Pull replacement requisitions are handled on a fill-or-kill basis: If the appropriate component cannot source a replacement Soldier, the request will go unfilled.

Michigan Army National Guard gave me a glimpse of how replacement operations are conducted at the JFHQ level in that state, as shown in figure 10 (page 38).

As the reader will note, the process is virtually identical to that used to screen Soldiers for cross-leveling into deploying Michigan units.

The Push Replacement System – Army National Guard⁶⁰

The Push replacement system, illustrated in figure 11 (page 39), was developed to offset the lengthy delay inherent in the Pull system by having a flow of replacement Soldiers in

the pipeline at all times, with the hope that the replacements would arrive at their units more contemporaneously with the losses they backfilled than under the Pull system.

In the Push system, HRC would estimate the number of replacements required using a predictive model that analyzed unit attrition within selected types of units (typically major combat units such as brigade combat teams) during the period immediately preceding the push. HRC would use the resulting data to form “replacement packages,” assigning a control number for each individual replacement position in the package. HRC would then send the package to HQDA for approval; upon receipt of such approval, HRC would transmit the push package requirements to ARNG and the Army Reserve.

Upon receipt of the Push Package, ARNG would staff the requirements with the home states of the units for whom the replacements were destined, with a suspense of 48 hours to fill or decline the request. Requests declined by the home states would be staffed nationwide for volunteer fill as with other cross-leveling and replacement actions. HRC would be notified of those positions successfully filled; positions not filled would be killed.⁶¹

Replacement Operations in the Army Reserve⁶²

The Push and Pull replacement processes have also been used by the Army Reserve’s USARC G1 Mobilization Branch.

Pull replacements: As with ARNG, the Pull replacement process begins with a replacement request from a deployed unit commander routed through the theater PERSCOM and HRC to USARC. The HRC replacement message, which is the same for both ARNG and Army Reserve requests, includes among other things, the following information for each replacement requirement:

- control number;
- component;
- unit requiring a replacement;
- grade/MOS required;
- name/MOS/status of the servicemember who must be replaced; and
- tentative CRC report date for the replacement Soldier.

USARC G1 tasks the home RRC or MACOM of the unit requiring fill to provide a replacement; the RRC/MACOM either fills the requirement or passes it back to USARC G1. If the requirement is passed back, USARC G1 will seek fill from another RRC/MACOM and will continue to do so until 90 days prior to redeployment of the unit requiring fill. Once a replacement is identified, the replacement Soldier is transferred to the recipient unit. USARC G1 coordinates mobilization of the replacement Soldier. If the tentative CRC date provided by HRC proves infeasible, USARC G1 HRC coordinates for a new date. Unlike Push replacement Soldiers (discussed below), Pull replacement Soldiers report to the CRC individually and USARC G1 does not provide a liaison officer to facilitate mobilization of Pull replacements.

Push replacements: As with ARNG, the Army Reserve Push replacement process begins with receipt of the monthly Push replacement message from HRC. USARC G1 begins by

filtering those requirements in the message that it will not attempt to fill, specifically MOS/rank combinations that are in high demand for Army Reserve units currently preparing for deployment. USARC G1 then breaks out the remaining requirements in the Push message among the respective RRCs and MACOMS for fill. RRCs/MACOMS are given ten to 14 days to reply. Negative replies may or may not be tasked out to other RRCs/MACOMS for fill, subject to time constraints. Eventually, USARC G1 notifies HRC of what portion of the Push request that the Army Reserve will fill. This report is also copied to USARC G3.

As with ARNG, Push replacements are handled on a fill-or-kill basis: Those requirements not filled by the 14th of the month are killed. Soldiers identified to fill Push requirements are transferred to the USARC Augmentation Unit (UAU). USARC G1 coordinates with USARC G3 for the mobilization of the Soldiers in each Push package in a UAU Derivative UIC (DUIC). Unlike ARNG Push replacement packages, Army Reserve Push replacement Soldiers report to the CRC as a group and USARC G1 sends a liaison noncommissioned officer to the CRC to assist in the mobilization of the Push replacement package.

Replacement Operations in the Air Force Reserve Components⁶³

The Readiness Manager of 127th Support Flight, MIANG, explained the personnel replacement process for deployed RC Air Force units. All Air Force replacements in deployed units are executed on a Pull basis; the decision to backfill a redeploying Airman or not depends upon whether sufficient time remains on the deployment to warrant replacing the servicemember.

The Air National Guard system is fundamentally different from the Army process. Pull replacement requests do not flow through the theater command through HQ USAF and back down to the unit as is done in the Army system. Rather, the home unit of the Airman departing theater coordinates directly with the commander in theater and provides a backfill if required without seeking any further authorization from Air Combat Command, HQ USAF, or otherwise. Once the departing Airman's home unit ascertains that a backfill in theater is required, it canvasses its own command for a replacement and deploys the replacement on its own authority, processing the servicemember for deployment as described above. If the unit cannot find a replacement locally, it passes the requirement to the appropriate functional manager (FAM) at the Air National Guard Readiness Center. The FAM canvasses the Air National Guard nationally for a backfill; if one is not found, the FAM passes the requirement to ACC or another appropriate MAJCOM for fill from another component. Bottom line: Authority to push replacements into theater to fill existing requirements is delegated to the unit level.

Volunteers: Active Duty for Operational Support

The Army Process

Most ARNG and Army Reserve Soldiers who have served on active duty since 9/11 have done so under the involuntary mobilization authority of 10 USC 12302(a), Partial Mobilization—even many Soldiers who were actually volunteers.⁶⁴ Another statutory authority—Title 10, United States Code Section 12301(d)—has also been used to bring many volunteers on duty. In the Army, service under this provision of law is known as Active

Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) or, if in conjunction with the global war on terrorism, Contingency Active Duty for Operational Support (COADOS).⁶⁵ This authority has been used for a number of purposes, including bringing Soldiers on duty to augment operational staffs both in the United States and in theater; to extend mobilized Soldiers wishing to stay on in theater on active duty after their home units redeploy; bringing volunteers on active duty who, under previous policy, had already served 24 cumulative months of active duty under Partial Mobilization authority;⁶⁶ and staffing CONUS-based support requirements such as First Army's Operation Warrior Trainer, under which training support personnel at mobilization stations are augmented with RC Soldiers.

The COADOS process, depicted in figure 12 (page 40), begins with the identification of a support requirement by a MACOM (such as HQDA, First Army or a deployed headquarters) and the recruitment of a volunteer to fill the requirement. The Soldier identified to fill the requirement assembles an application packet which is routed through his or her chain of command to the state JFHQ, who submits the packet to the gaining headquarters, which enters the packet into the Department of the Army Mobilization Processing System (DAMPS) (an Army component of JOPES) for transmission through FORSCOM to HQDA G3 for approval (for requests by mobilized Soldiers wishing to extend in theater, FORSCOM is not included in the processing). HQDA G3 transmits the approved request to HRC, who publishes an active duty order for the individual Soldier. NGB activates the Soldier's active duty pay, his or her home state JFHQ prepares the Soldier for movement, and the Soldier reports to the requesting headquarters for duty.

It is interesting to note that this is the only type of active duty order published at service level for Army RC personnel. All other active duty orders, to include those published under Partial Mobilization authority, are issued by the JFHQ or, for Army Reserve Soldiers, by the RRC or equivalent headquarters.

The Marine Corps Process⁶⁷

The Air Force approach to processing activations for active duty under 10 USC 12301(d) has already been discussed above in the section on deployment manning, but an interesting comparison may be drawn by examining the process as executed in a third service—the U.S. Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps employs reserve component units for overseas warfighting missions but does little if anything in the way of cross-leveling or replacement operations, relying upon the short duration of most of their tours (usually seven months) and other manning policies to obviate the need for those activities. However, they do use volunteers serving under the provisions of 10 USC 12301(d) to augment staffs and units. Their administrative process for handling such applications is shown in figure 13 (page 41).

In its essential points the Marine Corps process is similar to that of the Army: Both processes are heavily centralized with augmentation requests being approved at service level, and under both processes the unit requesting augmentation is largely responsible for identifying its own candidates to fill the requirements.

As with the Army process, the Marine Corps Reserve process begins with the identification of a need for augmentation. The requesting unit submits this request through command channels

to the office of Marine Reserve Affairs via the Marine Corps Manpower Processing System (MCMPS), where the request will be vetted and either approved or disapproved. If the request is approved, the requesting unit submits the name of its candidate to fill the requirement, again via MCMPS, to Marine Reserve Affairs where the candidates' qualifications are vetted. If approved, the candidate's application is routed for approval to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; when the application is approved, the office of Marine Reserve Affairs notifies the candidate's unit, where the Marine's 12301(d) active duty order is published.

Conclusion

Comparing RC mobilization manning processes of the Army and Air Force, as well as the 12301(d) (volunteer) processes of the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, can be instructive and reveal much about the relative efficiency of the respective organizations.

The processes employed by the various services to vet 12301(d) active duty tours are illustrative. Historically the Army's process has been the most paper-intensive, with applicants required to assemble a paper application packet which had to be physically scanned into the Department of the Army Mobilization Processing System (DAMPS)⁶⁸ for processing;⁶⁹ by contrast the Marine Corps requires supporting documentation only where a waiver is required, and the Air Force requires no supporting documentation.⁷⁰ Of the three processes, the Air Force process is by far the fastest, with the lag between submission of the candidate's application and issuance of orders being as little as two weeks.⁷¹ The Army process has historically taken eight weeks or more.⁷² Despite requiring no paperwork in many cases, the Marine Corps process is little better, with a typical processing time of 60 days.⁷² All three process applications electronically, and the Marine Corps, like the Air Force, often requires no supporting documents, so the source of the superior efficiency of the Air Force process must lie elsewhere.

One source of that efficiency is the fact that Air Force 12301(d) requirements have generally been approved *before* the applicant submits his or her application to fill the slot; under the Army process the requirement and the Soldier's application to fill it are processed simultaneously, in the same action, so that time spent validating the requesting unit's need for augmentation is perceived as waiting time by the Soldier; it is likely that the same phenomenon occurs in the Marine Corps process. However, the real secret of the efficiency of the Air Force process is *delegation*. Both the Army and Marine Corps processes require review and approval of tours of duty under 12301(d) authority at nearly the highest level possible, the service headquarters. The Air Force, by contrast, has delegated this authority far down the chain of command, with servicemembers' applications vetted at Air Combat Command (the Air Force equivalent of FORSCOM), and orders published by the servicemember's home unit. This delegation results in much more rapid processing of servicemembers onto active duty to fill validated augmentation, mobilization and replacement requirements.

Such efficiency by the Air Force is not limited to volunteer actions under 10 USC 12301(d). Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve commanders are unencumbered by the requirement of high-level review and approval in the execution of replacement operations that burdens Army RC commanders and, in bringing together personnel and capabilities from multiple

units to meet a deployment requirement, they are not saddled with anything like the Army's cumbersome process of creating and mobilizing provisional or derivative units (DUICs) as administrative vehicles to bring Soldiers on duty.

This is not to say that the Air Force process is superior in every respect. Local ARNG and Army Reserve commanders have much more latitude in reassigning personnel within their commands throughout the pre-deployment phase of mobilization than do their Air Force counterparts, and Adjutants General and RRC commanders have a much greater opportunity to influence the employment of Army RC units than Adjutants General and their Reserve counterparts have over the employment of Air Force RC units and personnel. Nonetheless, the Air Force has achieved an admirable degree of administrative efficiency in the employment of its reserve components in support of mobilization requirements—efficiency that should be acknowledged and, in many respects, emulated by the Army.

Endnotes

- ¹ Most mobilizations since 9/11 have been under the President's Partial Mobilization authority, with a smaller number under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up authority. U.S. law and Army mobilization doctrine together provide for a "mobilization spectrum" consisting of five levels: Selective Mobilization, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PRC); Partial Mobilization (PM); Full Mobilization; and Total Mobilization. Each of the first four categories has a statutory basis in law, although Full Mobilization requires separate enabling legislation by Congress to implement. The final category, Total Mobilization, is a doctrinal concept only, having no specific statutory basis—like Full Mobilization, it would require special enabling legislation. Of these five levels, only two really matter for purposes of this discussion: the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, provided for under 10 USC 12304, which empowers the President to activate up to 200,000 reserve component members for not more than 270 days; and Partial Mobilization, provided for under 10 USC 12302(a), which empowers the President to mobilize up to 1,000,000 members of the reserve component for up to 24 consecutive months. The remaining categories are of little importance for purposes of this paper. Selective Mobilization provides for call-up of reserve component members for certain domestic matters including securing federal property and activities, quelling insurrections against federal or state governments, etc. Full Mobilization entails call-up of the full complement of existing reserve component forces—both units and individuals—and necessary supporting material resources; Total Mobilization would entail calling up all existing reserve personnel and force structure, as well as creating new units (Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook (RCUCH), FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, 15 July 1999, <http://www.transchool.eustis.army.mil/LIC/DISS1/Documents/fr500-3-31.pdf> (accessed 29 August 2009). Although not technically about mobilization, 10 USC 12301(d) is nonetheless important for purposes of this discussion, as it provides for reserve component members to augment the active forces on a voluntary basis, and has been used extensively since 9/11.

- ² Title 10, United States Code Section 12302, *Ready Reserve*, Section (a), <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/12302.html> (accessed 2 March 2009).
- ³ *Ibid.*, Section (b), <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/12302.html> (accessed 2 March 2009).
- ⁴ Title 10, United States Code Section 12301, *Reserve Components Generally*, Section (d), <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/12301.html> (accessed 2 March 2009).
- ⁵ Title 10, UCS 12302 Section (a), <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/12302.html> (accessed 2 March 2009).
- ⁶ One place where many of these policies have been compiled is the U.S. Army Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG), compiled and maintained by the Army G1 (deputy chief of staff for personnel) and available at <http://www.armyg1.army.mil/MILITARYPERSONNEL/PPG.ASP> (accessed 2 March 2009). However, even this excellent reference is far from complete.
- ⁷ Much of the two following sections—“Mobilization Requirements – The Army Process” and “Army Force Generation”—appeared previously in Dennis P. Chapman, *Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components: Army Practice, Past and Present*, Land Warfare Paper 69 (Arlington, Va.: Association of the United States Army, September 2008), pp. 6–7, 11, <http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP69.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2009). The language is reproduced here by permission of the Association of the United States Army.
- ⁸ WARTRACE (not an acronym) was a program that sought to improve the peacetime preparation of Army units—including RC units—for wartime service by designating ahead of time the unit’s wartime theater of operations, mission and higher headquarters, all of which might or might not coincide with the unit’s peacetime command arrangements, with the intention of allowing units to tailor their peacetime training to their expected wartime mission. Force Support Packages (FSP) were selected RC units deemed critical to the nation’s warfighting capability that were formed into packages structured to support five and one-third divisions and supporting corps headquarters elements. These packages were expected to deploy within the first 30 days of any conflict. For more information on the WARTRACE and FSP programs, see Dennis P. Chapman, *Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components: Army Practice, Past and Present*, Land Warfare Paper No. 69 (Arlington, Va.: Association of the United States Army, September 2008), <http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP69.pdf>. See also, Army Regulation 11-30, *The Army WARTRACE Program*, 28 July 1995; U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 11-30, *The Army WARTRACE Program: Program Guidance*, 1 October 2001; and FORSCOM Regulation 11-41, *Force Support Package Policies and Procedures*, 1 September 2000.
- ⁹ United States Army Reserve Command G3 (operations) personnel, interview by author, 30 January 2008.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹³ Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, telephone interviews by author, August 2009.
- ¹⁴ Previously the execution phase of this cycle was operated on a 20-month cycle. In fall 2009, however, the Air Force changed to a 12-month execution phase, similar to Army Reserve practice. Although the Air Force shifted from a 20-month deployment execution cycle to 12 months, it retained a model of 10 Air Expeditionary Forces rotating in 120-day increments. Accordingly, three AEFs can expect to deploy in any given fiscal year, with the remaining two AEFs being first in

line to deploy during the next fiscal year. In other words, the shift from a 20-month to a 12-month deployment execution cycle is transparent to units and Airmen. According to one Air Force Reserve official, the decision to retain the 10-AEF structure was driven by the fact that other aspects of Air Force policy and practice, including budgetary planning and programming, procurement and recapitalization, all assume a structure of 10 AEFs (per telephone interviews with Air Force Reserve Command officials, August 2009).

- ¹⁵ Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, telephone interview by author, 6 November 2007.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ Mobilization Officer, Headquarters U.S. Air Force A3 – Mobilization, interview by author, 26 November 2007.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ The 1:4 deployment ratio is driven by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’ policy directive of 19 January 2007, “Utilization of the Total Force.” In this memorandum, Secretary Gates established as policy the goal of deploying AC forces at a ratio of 1:2, that is, two years at home for every one year deployed, and of 1:5 for reserve component units, with exceptions requiring his approval. Subsequent policy delegated approval authority for deployments with dwell-time ratio of 1:4 and better to the respective service secretaries, with rotation ratios of less than 1:4 requiring Secretary Gates’ approval (Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates policy memorandum, subj: “Force Allocation and Reserve Component Alert/Mobilization Decision Process,” 13 May 2007).
- ²² Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, telephone interviews by author, August 2009.
- ²³ Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, interview by author, 6 November 2007.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ Mobilization personnel, Air National Guard Readiness Center, interview by author, 2 November 2007; Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, interview by author, 6 November 2007.
- ²⁶ Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, interview by author, 6 November 2007.
- ²⁷ Mobilization personnel, Air National Guard Readiness Center, interview by author, 2 November 2007.
- ²⁸ ASPEN is an Air Force-specific component of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The Army equivalent is the Mobilization and Deployment Information System (MDIS).
- ²⁹ This table provides only an approximation of the extent of cross-leveling that occurred in these brigades. While good data on IRR, AC and fillers between states were on hand, direct statistics on cross-leveling within states were not available and could not feasibly be derived from personnel databases such as the Army Personnel Database–Guard (TAPDB-G). The approximation presented here was derived from data available in Unit Status Reports (USRs). To approximate in-state cross-leveling, the USR Available Strength (with adjustments to account for unit plugs and task organization) prior to the unit’s receipt of its alert order (available strength, pre-alert) was subtracted from the final unit deployed strength upon arrival in theater (boots on the ground, or Final BOG); fillers from the IRR, AC and other states were then deducted as well. The resulting

total provides an approximation of the number of Soldiers cross-leveled into the brigade from other units within the brigade's home state or states. This approximation is hardly perfect: Some Soldiers counted as "available" prior to alert would certainly have later become non-deployable, while some listed as "not available" prior to alert would, of course, have had their problems resolved and subsequently deployed with the unit. It is the best approximation currently available, however.

³⁰ According to Army Reserve G1 (personnel) officials, the Army Reserve makes comparatively little use of IRR fillers.

³¹ Formerly known as State Area Command (STARC).

³² Michigan Army National Guard Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel G1 mobilization action officer, interview by author, 11 December 2007.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ The process described here is that for finding *individual fillers* from other states for deploying units. Some unit vacancies are filled not by individuals but by unit plugs—usually platoons or companies—brought from a donor state and inserted intact into the deploying unit. These plugs are more properly thought of as unit mobilizations in and of themselves and are handled under a different procedure not discussed here. Unlike individual fillers brought in from other states, Soldiers serving in unit plugs may or may not be volunteers.

³⁶ ARNG personnel official, August 2009.

³⁷ United States Army Reserve Command G1 personnel, interview by author, 30 January 2008.

³⁸ Readiness Manager, 127th Mission Support Flight, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, interview by author, 20 December 2007.

³⁹ Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, interview by author, 6 November 2007.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Mobilization personnel, Air National Guard Readiness Center, interview by author, 2 November 2007.

⁴² Air Force Reserve Command Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell personnel, interview by author, 6 November 2007.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Mobilization personnel, Air National Guard Readiness Center, interview by author, 2 November 2007.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Readiness Manager, 127th Mission Support Flight, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, interview by author, 20 December 2007.

⁴⁹ For a brief history of AROWS, see http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/08_Apr/PDF/AROWS.pdf (accessed 3 March 2009).

⁵⁰ For a brief overview of DCAPEs, see <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/quickwins/USAF%20DCAPES.ppt#389> (accessed 3 March 2009).

⁵¹ Readiness Manager, 127th Mission Support Flight, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, interview by author, 20 December 2007.

52 *Ibid.*

53 *Ibid.*

54 *Ibid.*

55 *Ibid.*

56 Army National Guard Personnel Policy official, interview by author, 4 March 2009.

57 *Ibid.*

58 *Ibid.*

59 *Ibid.*

60 From discussions and PowerPoint presentations, NGB Personnel Policy and Readiness Division, April 2008.

61 As of February 2009, replacement operations in the ARNG have been minimal. The Push process was formally suspended in the ARNG that month, having encountered considerable resistance from the various states due to the inability of the ARNG to guarantee that the predictive fillers provided under the Push process would ultimately be assigned to the donor states' own units in theater, for whom they were intended. Volunteers previously used to meet Push replacement requirements are now directed to ARNG units at their mobilization stations preparing to deploy. The ARNG continues to participate in the Pull process, but replacements through that route have dwindled to a trickle. There are three reasons for this: First, ARNG commanders are availing themselves of the opportunity to man their units at the mobilization station at 110 percent of requirements, thus reducing the need for replacements later; and second, it is likely that many states, already in contact with their commanders in the field, are bypassing the formal Pull replacement process and shipping replacements "under the radar" through the CRCs to their units in the field, thus implementing a de facto program mirroring official Air Force practice described below. (It should be noted that evidence of this phenomenon is anecdotal.) Third, the In-Theater COADOS Extension Program has generated a large number of volunteers in theater willing to extend with other units, reducing the need for replacements.

62 United States Army Reserve Command G1 personnel, interview by author, 30 January 2008.

63 Readiness Manager, 127th Support Flight, telephone interview by author, March 2007.

64 Although it is an involuntary mobilization authority, many Soldiers called to duty under the provisions of 10 USC 12302(a) are actually volunteers who have either sought the opportunity to deploy or willingly did so when asked, with involuntary orders used instead of voluntary orders for various reasons of policy and expedience. This includes practically all the of the individual filler and replacement actions in the ARNG between states.

65 Previously known as Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) and Contingency Temporary Tour of Active Duty (COTTAD), respectively.

66 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chose to interpret 10 USC 12302(a) as limiting any one servicemember to a cumulative total of 24 months' active duty under that provision of law, despite the fact that the law itself uses the word "consecutive." Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reversed the policy, allowing for the restarting of a given Soldier's Partial Mobilization "clock" after providing the Soldier with a set minimum amount of dwell-time between mobilizations—usually 48 months.

67 Telephone interviews by author with U.S. Marine Corps Reserve officers, Quantico, Virginia, 2008.


68 For an overview of DAMPS, see [http://www.defenselink.mil/RA/documents/quickwins/Army%20G-3%20Mobilization%20Processing%20System%20\(DAMPS\).ppt#314,1](http://www.defenselink.mil/RA/documents/quickwins/Army%20G-3%20Mobilization%20Processing%20System%20(DAMPS).ppt#314,1), Slide 1 (accessed 5 March 2009).

- ⁶⁹ The Army is working on a streamlined process wherein the applicant would submit the required information via Army Knowledge Online using an application called “DAMPS-A” rather than filling out, scanning and submitting paper forms. The electronically submitted data would be transferred to DAMPS—a system resident in the SIPR domain—via a high assurance guard node.
- ⁷⁰ Readiness Manager, 127th Mission Support Flight, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan, interview by author, 20 December 2007; telephone interviews by author with U.S. Marine Corps Reserve officers, Quantico, Virginia, 2008.
- ⁷¹ Readiness Manager, 127th Mission Support Flight, Selfridge ANGB, Michigan, interview by author, 20 December 2007.
- ⁷² HQDA officials dispute this figure, attributing the long processing time to delays at the unit level; their counterparts at NGB say otherwise, pointing to a lengthy review process—requiring approval by as many as a score of functionaries at multiple command echelons *after* the unit has submitted the application—as the real culprit. In any case, it should be noted that considerable improvement in the process has been reported recently.
- ⁷³ Telephone interviews by author with U.S. Marine Corps Reserve officers, Quantico, Virginia, 2008.

Appendix A

Figures

Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Deployment Organization



U.S. Air Force Decision Process – Sourcing Active Component vs Reserve Component Units





Figure 3

Glossary available at appendix B


Overview of U.S. Air Force Reserve Mobilization Process



Source: Interviews by author with mobilization staff at U.S. Air Force Reserve Command and Space Expeditionary Forces Cell, 6 November 2007

Figure 4


Glossary available at appendix B




* Forces Providers are Air Combat Command (ACC), U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Source: Interview by author with mobilization personnel at Air National Guard Readiness Center, 2 November 2007.


Cross-Leveling Process – Army National Guard




In-State Cross-Leveling – Michigan Army National Guard




Army National Guard Cross-Leveling Between States




Processing Individual Volunteer Inquiries – Michigan Army National Guard






Source: Interview by author with Michigan Army National Guard DSCPER G1 mobilization action officer, 11 December 2007

Army National Guard Push Replacements Process




* If Soldier is a volunteer from outside the tasked state, National Guard Bureau must submit Derivative Unit Identification Code and mobilization packet to Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Army National Guard Contingency Active Duty for Operational Support



* The requirement to assemble and scan paper packets will soon cease with the implementation of the Department of the Army Mobilization Processing System-AKO (DAMPS-A). DAMPS-A will allow for submission of most information electronically in a manner similar to that used by the Marine Corps and the Air Force, as discussed in the respective sections of this paper pertaining to their systems. The Army has made exclusive use of this paperless system mandatory effective 1 October 2009, as announced in All Army Activity (ALARACT) messages 189/2009 (1 July 2009) and 223/2009 (10 August 2009). In August 2009 the ARNG began a pilot program to test the effectiveness of the new system by processing all In-Theater COADOS Extension Program applications via DAMPS-A commencing 15 September 2009 (ARNG personnel official, 19 August 2009).

United States Marine Corps 12301(d) Orders Process*



* Processing time runs 40–60 days from submission of applicant's name to orders production.

** Processing candidate applications requires no supporting documentation unless a waiver is required.

*** Orders for Individual Ready Reserve Marines are handled by USMC Mobilization Command at Kansas City, MO.

Appendix B

Glossary

Glossary

9/11	The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001	CMAS	Command Manday Allocation System
AC	Active component	COADOS	Contingency Active Duty for Operational Support
ACC	Air Combat Command	COCOM	Combatant command or combatant commander
ADOS	Active Duty for Operational Support	CONUS	Continental United States
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force	COTTAD	Contingency Temporary Tour of Active Duty
AFCENT	U.S. Air Forces Central (formerly CENTAF)	CRC	CONUS Replacement Center
AFH	Air Force Handbook	DAMPS	Department of the Army Mobilization Processing System
AFI	Air Force Instruction	DAMPS-A	AKO portal for uploading ADOS/COADOS application to DAMPS
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command	DCAPES	Deliberate and Crisis and Action Planning and Execution Segments Program
AGR	Active Guard/Reserve	DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G1)
AKO	Army Knowledge Online	DUIC	Derivative Unit Identification Code
ALARACT	All Army Activity Message	ECS	Expeditionary Combat Support
AMC	Air Mobility Command	FAM	Functional Area Manager
ANG	Air National Guard	FORSCOM	Army Forces Command
ANGB	Air National Guard Base	FSP	Force Support Package
AREF	Army Reserve Expeditionary Force	G1	Personnel staff
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation	G3	Operations staff
ARNG	Army National Guard	GKO	Guard Knowledge Online
AROWS	Air National Guard Orders Writing System	HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
AROWS-R	Air Force Reserve Orders Writing System	HQUSAF	Headquarters, Department of the Air Force
ASPEN	Aerospace Planning and Execution Network	HRC	Human Resources Command
BOG	Boots on the ground		
CENTAF	U.S. Air Forces Central (now AFCENT)		
CID	Criminal Investigation Division		

IRR	Individual Ready Reserve	RRC	Regional Readiness Command
IVI	Individual Volunteer Inquiry		
JFHQ	Joint Forces Headquarters	SDDC	Surface Deployment Distribution Command
JOPES	Joint Operational Planning and Execution System	SECAF	Secretary of the Air Force
LAD	Latest Arrival Date	SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
M-90	90 days prior to mobilization date	SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Network
MACOM	Major Command (Army)	SRC	Standard Requirements Code
MAJCOM	Major Command (Air Force)	STARC	State Area Command
MCMPS	Marine Corps Manpower Processing System	TAPDB-G	Total Army Personnel Database–Guard
MDIS	Mobilization and Deployment Information System	TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
MIARNG	Michigan Army National Guard	TPU	Troop Program Unit
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty	TTAD	Temporary Tour of Active Duty
MPA	Military Personnel Appropriation	UAU	USARC Augmentation Unit
MRO	Mobilization Readiness Officer	UIC	Unit Identification Code
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment	UMR	Unit manning roster
NGB	National Guard Bureau	USAF	United States Air Force
NGB-ARF-C	Army National Guard Financial Services Center	USAR	United States Army Reserve
NGB-ARR	National Guard Bureau Army Plans, Readiness and Mobilization Division	USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom	USC	United States Code
PARA/LIN	Paragraph and line number	USJFCOM	U.S. Joint Forces Command
PERSCOM	Personnel command	USR	Unit Status Report
PPG	Personnel Policy Guidance	USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
RC	Reserve component(s)	UTC	Unit Type Code
RFF	Request for Forces	WARTRACE	Not an acronym—Army name for prior program or aligning units with pre-designated wartime missions and chains of command