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Task Force 165 Military Intelligence Battalion – Building a Capability

F. Patrick Filbert

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Task Force 165 Military Intelligence Battalion —

Building a Capability

by

F. Patrick Filbert

**The Institute of Land Warfare
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Task Force 165 Military Intelligence Battalion – Building a Capability

by F. Patrick Filbert

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Foreword

In early 2004, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) was tasked to furnish a division-level Military Intelligence (MI) battalion/task force to provide intelligence support and combined/joint staff coordination to the Southern European Task Force's 2005–2006 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) VI rotation. USAREUR did not have an available unit of this type and executed rapid planning to use existing units—and support from other major commands—to build the MI unit. This presented numerous challenges specific to the USAREUR Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) planning team.

USAREUR brought together active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve elements from U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and within USAREUR to task organize the divisional support MI battalion/task force known as Task Force (TF) 165. The core unit of TF 165 was V Corps' 165th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation, or TE). TF 165 comprised Soldiers, civilians and equipment from active component divisional, corps and theater-level units, staffs and National Guard elements.

Creation of TF 165 had theater-wide implications for IBOS support to USAREUR. The lessons learned covered all aspects of the Battlefield Operating System (BOS) and required the intelligence planners to become very familiar with requirements not normally associated with the IBOS to ensure that non-IBOS requirements for Soldiers, equipment and architecture was identified. This was due primarily to the aspect of building a completely new unit—something that normally occurs over a two- to five-year period—in so short a timeframe.

Although TF 165 was a provisional unit in makeup, the process is the focus of this paper. Creating something from nothing in less than 11 months was a monumental task by an exceedingly creative and focused team. The results of this team's work were seen during the OEF VI/OEF 04–06 rotation, with lessons learned on how to better build these types of units incorporated into USAREUR's military decisionmaking process and used during USAREUR transformation post-2006. This process can serve not only as a model for transformation and modularity, but also as a way to augment transformed units which may have less capability to meet current requirements.



GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army Retired
President

September 2007

Task Force 165 Military Intelligence Battalion – Building a Capability

Introduction

Task organizing to create battalion/task force configurations is not a new method to provide operational support. Armor, Infantry, Aviation and other maneuver unit battalion/task forces are a standard organizational practice. However, bringing together a divisional-level Military Intelligence (MI) battalion/task force using a corps-level MI tactical exploitation (TE) battalion as the core element for focused, decentralized brigade-level operations support requires a nontraditional approach.

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) was tasked to provide a divisional-level MI battalion/task force to provide intelligence support and combined/joint staff coordination to the Southern European Task Force's (SETAF's) 2005–2006 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) VI rotation. USAREUR did not have an available unit of this type and executed rapid planning to use existing units, and support from other major commands, to build this MI unit.

USAREUR brought together active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve elements from Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and within USAREUR to task organize the divisional support MI battalion/task force known as Task Force (TF) 165.

The core unit of TF 165 was V Corps' 165th MI Battalion (TE). TF 165 comprised Soldiers, civilians and equipment from active component divisional, corps and theater-level units, staffs and National Guard elements. Although TF 165 was a provisional unit in makeup, the process is the focus of this paper. This process can serve not only as a model for transformation and modularity, but also as a way to augment transformed units that may have less capability to meet current requirements.

The Problem

In early 2004, USAREUR learned that it would source the 2005–2006 OEF VI¹ rotation in Afghanistan; specifically, SETAF and its organic brigade, the 173d Infantry Brigade (Airborne) Brigade Combat Team (BCT), would be the core of the USAREUR support (additional support from the XVIII Airborne Corps would attach at a later date). This presented numerous challenges specific to the USAREUR Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) planning team to ensure SETAF and the 173d BCT were provided the best IBOS support required to execute the OEF VI mission. One of those challenges was how to craft IBOS support for SETAF to conduct operations in a country roughly the size of Texas in less than a year.

While necessitating a truncated planning cycle to literally build a functioning division (an “eleventh active division” from the overall Army perspective) in less than a year, the main factor affecting the standup of this task force was a near total lack of IBOS support systems, personnel or units within SETAF. SETAF IBOS consisted of a skeleton G2 (intelligence) staff of 17 Soldiers and contractors. SETAF had neither a divisional MI battalion nor an organic MI company (MICO) for the 173d BCT. Further complicating planning was the heavy operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and multiple engagements USAREUR was supporting during this timeframe. USAREUR had V Corps in Iraq supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) combat operations, one of its two organic divisions (1st Armored Division) with the corps, and its remaining division—1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)—preparing to deploy to Iraq for OIF II. SETAF’s organic 173d BCT had only recently returned from airborne combat operations in Northern Iraq. In addition to these OIF commitments, the SETAF headquarters was redeploying from joint task force operations off the coast of Liberia. Identifying how to provide IBOS support for a pending Afghanistan rotation would be a challenge.

To exacerbate the problem, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) IBOS requirements for OEF actually exceeded the doctrinal requirement for a Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) divisional-level MI battalion. CENTCOM had also increased its OEF Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Team (THT) requirement from 21 to 30 THTs, and the robust combined/joint IBOS staff (CJ2) (which totaled 153 personnel, 102 of them Soldiers) added to the USAREUR planning process. USAREUR IBOS planners would have to address these requirements when developing TF 165 to provide support from the CJ2 level on down to a direct support (DS) MICO for the 173d BCT.

Further, emerging IBOS tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) being executed by the OEF V force—25th Infantry Division (Light), or 25ID(L)—created additional IBOS support structure challenges. Example TTPs included regional interrogation facilities, which dedicated interrogators to the subordinate brigade and battalions, and deployable intelligence support elements (DISEs) at the BCT level. Neither of these two TTPs was documented prior to planning for TF 165 activation; discussion of the DISEs occurs later in this article. Ultimately, 500 Soldiers and civilians would be brought together to comprise TF 165.

As an aside, USAREUR planners also had to contend with “growing” the SETAF G2 staff from 17 to more than 100 total personnel, with an additional 50 other-service and coalition personnel integrated into the CJ2 in Afghanistan. This growth supported the SETAF G2 both to operate as a division-level CJ2 and to enable it to operate the joint interrogation facility (JIF—noted below as the TF 165 provisional Echo Company) and the combined joint intelligence support element (CJISE—noted below as the TF 165 provisional Alpha Company). While the majority of IBOS-specific sourcing for the OEF VI rotation would use units readily available in USAREUR, there was no MI unit that could be used specifically for this OEF rotation. This was due not only to the previously discussed lack of an available divisional MI battalion, but also to a lack of specific MI requirements broken out to the “eaches” to ensure

proper use of scarce IBOS personnel and equipment. As THT construct varied for each theater and there currently exists no Army-wide doctrine for what would be in a THT, identifying the THT structure down to actual Soldier Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) had to occur to ensure the warfighter's requirement was met without confusion.

Truncated Planning

USAREUR battlestaff mission analysis (MA), as part of the Army Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), identified shortfalls between stated requirements and USAREUR's existing capabilities. CENTCOM OEF VI IBOS requirements were stated as follows: 30 THTs, a 430-Soldier divisional MI battalion, a document exploitation (DOCEX) team and three National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) teams,² as well as joint manning document (JMD) requirements for the combined/joint intelligence sections in the CJ2. While the DOCEX and NGA teams were not a USAREUR requirement to source, highlighting them to frame the overall requirement is important as once these teams were on the ground in Afghanistan, fusing them into the overall OEF VI IBOS structure would have to occur.

The main difference between USAREUR's OEF rotation and the two previous rotations—OEF IV, executed by 10th Mountain Division (Light), and OEF V, executed by 25ID(L)—was the number of extra Soldiers each of these units brought above the stated requirement. Each of these divisions brought between 1,000 and 4,000 more Soldiers than required to support emerging but undocumented TTPs. USAREUR did not have the capacity to provide additional personnel, nor did the parent headquarters (EUCOM). USAREUR internal priorities for Fiscal Year 2005 were to support ongoing EUCOM reaction force support requirements while focusing on OEF as the number one priority, followed by OIF, then support to the Korean Peninsula as required, and finally the Balkans (the Stabilization Force, or SFOR, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Kosovo Force, or KFOR).

This provided the USAREUR IBOS planners with a distinct challenge. SETAF headquarters was minimally manned to support modular joint task force (JTF) support operations. The sourcing, equipping, training and integration of the elements of TF 165 would have to occur in less than 11 months. All these elements would require support through the development of command and control elements, sustainers and maintainers, and low-density/high-demand IBOS equipment that were scarce to nonexistent in USAREUR. The only IBOS collection assets organic to SETAF, specifically in the 173d BCT, were an AN-PPS 5B/Ground Surveillance Radar Squad and the 74th Infantry (Long-Range Surveillance) Brigade Reconnaissance Troop.³

Time management dictated that USAREUR G2 planners, in concert with SETAF, V Corps, 205th MI Brigade and 66th MI Group planners, would have no more than three months to develop the concept for TF 165 for the Commanding General (CG) USAREUR's approval. Planning included identifying impacts on USAREUR IBOS support not just to Germany but to the overall EUCOM 93-country area of responsibility (AOR).⁴ The TF 165 concept

development would focus on creating provisional units to bolster existing companies in the 165th MI Battalion, using individual augmentation (IA) fills for these units and the JMD, identifying specific equipment and architecture challenges, and continuously incorporating emerging needs from Combined/Joint Task Force-180 (renamed CJTF-76 in May 2004) in Afghanistan, CENTCOM/Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Department of the Army/Joint Staff levels. Equipment was a particular challenge as more of the implied and emerging TTPs for support occurred. Equipment issues were compounded by a lack of key IBOS equipment in USAREUR and no specific IBOS equipment designated as stay-behind equipment (SBE) for OEF.

Another challenge that arose early in planning occurred with the extension of the 1st Armored Division (1AD) for 120 days past its March 2004 projected return date to Germany. This complicated the equipment problem, as several items of equipment from the 1AD's MI battalion, the 501st MI, had been considered during planning for use by TF 165 for train-up and/or deployment in support of SETAF (several items of 501 MI equipment eventually did deploy). Further exacerbating the equipment challenges were the continuously increasing numbers of IBOS MTOE systems being designated as SBE in Iraq, most notably THT-related equipment, making that equipment unavailable for the preparation, training, and deployment of TF 165 and the IBOS elements of SETAF G2.

Initial planning guidance was to use the stated requirements to identify the capability gap and then fill that gap as well as possible. This guidance was a subset of CG USAREUR intent to attempt to fill 100 percent of the needs of the pending OEF rotation. As IBOS planning progressed, the capabilities gap continued to grow and eventually proved to be far larger than originally anticipated. IBOS priority of effort was to create a DS MICO for the 173d BCT, an MI command and control (C2) element to support this MICO and as many of the THTs as were identified for Army fills,⁵ and then focus on filling the JMD. MDMP also identified another DS MICO required to support the FORSCOM-supplied BCT that would be attached to SETAF. After identification of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (1/82) as the other BCT, it fell to that division's supporting MI battalion, the 313th MI, to supply that DS MICO to be attached to TF 165 upon 1/82 BCT deployment to Afghanistan.

IBOS planning began by developing a DS MICO concept, determining how many of the 30 THTs USAREURs would source, and identifying the number of JMD slots USAREUR could fill. Use of the OEF V CJTF-180 (later CJTF-76) JMD as the manning source document provided the initial requirements for planning. As figure 1 depicts, initial MDMP broke out the IBOS requirements by echelon as understood by USAREUR IBOS planners early in MA. USAREUR internally developed the THT model depicted (eventually decreased by one contract linguist to match the CENTCOM THT model). Evolving requirements, coupled with continuously emerging TTPs, occurred over the next eight months, further confounding the USAREUR IBOS MDMP and ability to source stated requirements.

U.S. Army Europe Preplanning - Capabilities

Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Echelonment

Southern European Task Force
(Combined Joint Task Force 180)
G2 (-) Intelligence Section (organic)
Military Intelligence Command and Control Element

Joint Intelligence Support Element/ACE
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Team
Staff Weather Office
Target Exploitation Team
Terrain Team
Document Exploitation (DOCEX)/Document and
Media Exploitation (DOMEX) Team
Contract Linguists (CAT II)
Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams - 30 EAD

173d Airborne Brigade (-)
Brigade S2 Section (organic)

Military Intelligence Commanding Officer/TM (Direct Support)
Commanding Officer Headquarters
Analysis Control Team
Electronic Maintenance Section
Collection & Jamming Section
Interrogation of Prisoner of War Section
Ground Surveillance System (GSS) (GSR/REMBASS)
Trojan Team/Deployable Intelligence Support Elements
Trojan Spirit II/JMICS
Long-Range Surveillance Detachment?

Tactical HUMINT Team Model

2 x Soldiers (Military Occupational Specialty 97E/97B)
and 2 Contract Linguists
2 x Soldiers (MOS NS) drivers/security
2 x AN/PRC-117F UHF radios
2 x Counterintelligence HUMINT Management Systems
4 x Individual Tactical Reporting Tools
2 x Night Vision Goggles
2 x Binoculars
2 x Non-Tactical Vehicles

↑

Priority Laydown

Figure 1 - Initial Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Placement by Echelon

Unit Structure Building

Once planning identified that USAREUR could support sourcing only 10 of the 30 THTs, a DS MICO and a yet to be quantified C2 element, several models emerged of what the overall unit encompassing these elements would look like. By June 2004, a significantly more robust unit than the initial MI C2 element—specifically, an MI task force (provisional)—began to emerge.

USAREUR initially used the heavy division MI battalion MTOE, in this case that of the 501st MI Battalion, as a basis for both the provisional MI task force and the DS MICO. Based on further refinement of available IBOS forces in USAREUR, the 165th MI Battalion (TE) was identified as the core of the provisional MI task force. Planners then looked at all other available IBOS Soldiers in V Corps, the 66th MI Group (INSCOM) and the USAREUR G2 staff to augment the 165th MI (TE), now identified as TF 165. Last, attachment of a DS MICO from the 313th MI Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, would round out the task force. Figure 2 graphically depicts the unit “fusion” process to build the initial TF 165.

Based upon further analysis of the JMD, the USAREUR planning staff also identified several units that were initially viewed as IA fills but were, in reality, actual company-level units assigned to the then downrange MI battalion (125th MI). These were the JIF and the CJISE (actually the CJ2 staff in the form of a headquarters and headquarters detachment). Both these units required company command C2 elements, adding to an ever-increasing requirements list.

To better detail the growth the 165th MI Battalion (TE) would have to go through, figure 3 shows the battalion prior to and after augmentation to the final construct as TF 165. The 165th Long-Range Surveillance (LRS) Company—C/165 MI (LRS)—did not deploy due to the lack of a validated OEF LRS requirement and remained behind as a portion of the 165th MI rear detachment. C/165 MI (LRS) would later deploy as a separate company supporting the V Corps 2005–2007 rotation.

TF 165 MI Augmentation

One of the more significant augmentations to TF 165 to occur, addressing the 165 MI Battalion (TE) lack of sustainment, maintenance and analytical capabilities, was the augmentation of the 165 MI’s headquarters and headquarters service company (HHSC) by V Corps. HHSC’s lack of support assets was offset through use of Soldiers from V Corps’ 205th MI Brigade headquarters detachment and the 205th’s 302d MI Battalion to provide robust maintainer/sustainer, analytical, connectivity—by way of an attached common ground station (CGS) section—and planning support to the MICOs, the CJTF-76 CJ2 staff, the JIF and the 30 THTs. An issue of how to source the A/313th MI Battalion’s DISE arose due to the lack of a validated DISE requirement. Identification of a validated DISE requirement by CENTCOM did not occur until summer 2004 and did not become an official requirement until January 2005, at which point FORSCOM provided the DISE with Soldiers and equipment with




Figure 2 - Consolidation of U.S. Army Europe Units to Form the Initial Task Force 165




Figure 3 - 165th Military Intelligence Battalion to Final Task Force 165 Comparison

USAREUR providing additional equipment ensuring the A/313th MI DISE reflected the 165th MI's DISE makeup .

USAREUR had previously recognized that the 173d BCT would require robust IBOS support for its Afghanistan rotation and made the decision to source the 173d BCT's MICO's DISE without a validated requirement. FORSCOM DISE sourcing for 1/82d BCT's MICO occurred after the CJTF-76 requirement was validated (January 2005) and prior to the deployment of the 1/82d BCT in the May/June 2005 timeframe. USAREUR provided equipment to the 1/82d BCT DISE in the form of a Trojan Spirit-Lite (TS-L) digital communications system from the 66th MI Group. The DISEs provide augmented support to each BCT, given the decentralized nature of operations in Afghanistan. This emerged as a TTP identified by the 25ID(L) to provide robust IBOS support.

Mission analysis by USAREUR planners of TF 165 requirements to properly support SETAF resulted in an expansion of TF 165 from the 430 personnel the initial requirement identified to just over 500 Soldiers and civilians. The TF 165 concept brief to CG USAREUR, including the impacts on USAREUR IBOS support to the EUCOM AOR, occurred in June 2004. The CG approved the concept, accepted the risks and directed immediate activation of TF 165, which occurred several weeks later, on 1 July. The activation of two of TF 165's three provisional companies, Alpha (CJISE) and Bravo (173d DS MICO), occurred on 1 August. The further sourcing and stand-up of Echo Company (JIF) occurred by late fall 2004 to execute JIF C2.

Standing up the provisional companies added issues to the overall planning mission. Identifying where the Soldiers and civilians would come from, how to equip the companies and integrate them for training, and when—not to mention where—the companies would come together and consolidate, were additional major challenges, especially as the final provisional construct, would bring the Soldiers and civilians together from several different countries (e.g., Germany, Italy and the continental United States, or CONUS).

After identifying and sourcing the THTs, 173d BCT DS MICO and TF 165, the next challenge was to identify the IA fills to grow the SETAF G2 to meet the requirements for the CJ2 portion of the OEF VI JMD. Formal documentation of emerging personnel and equipment needs from the current CJTF-76 unit also had to be coordinated. The USAREUR planning staff worked closely with EUCOM planners to ensure identification of the JMD's other-service IA sourcing requirements. Figure 4 is a USAREUR-developed line-and-block chart to coherently break out the CJ2 JMD. The complexity of the structure is outlined as follows: dashed boxes indicate sections/organizations that existed under two separate requirements; specifically, the JIF and CJISE were staff elements for individual fill/replacement of personnel under the JMD as well as being company-level units requiring a command and support structure. This meant not only would USAREUR have to fill positions on a JMD, USAREUR now had to build two additional company headquarters support elements (e.g., company commanders, first sergeants, supply sections, etc.) in TF 165 that were not previously identified. This had to




Figure 4 - Combined/Joint Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Staff Organization

occur to ensure TF 165 could replace the departing 25ID(L) MI companies on a one-for-one basis.


Finding Equipment

The IBOS equipment architecture was another significant challenge to tackle. CENTCOM J2 supports a robust OEF Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) architecture using Soldiers and contracted technicians, but the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) architecture was built around divisional systems and 25ID(L) TTPs. Neither the systems nor TTPs could be easily duplicated by SETAF because they did not have the luxury of having available “extra” divisional systems to source the 25ID(L)-developed TTPs.

A key capability that the SETAF G2 identified early as a must-have was WebTAS (Web-enabled Timeline Analysis System). WebTAS is a government off-the-shelf (GOTS) software application built originally for the Special Operations community, now managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York. WebTAS is an excellent fusion tool, but its key feature is that it allows users to simultaneously query any number of disparate databases and display the results as a fused picture—a common operating intelligence picture, so to speak. This capability meant the USAREUR Planning Staff didn’t have to figure out how to combine all the 25ID(L) OEF databases (about 14) into one homogenous database or develop TTPs to feed all the data into one scheme. Rather, the various sections and “INTs”—e.g., human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT)—could continue to maintain their single-source and purpose-built data repositories, while the CJISE’s fusion cell could roll all the data up into a fused picture using real-time queries of all the data. Figure 5 gives a visual of how this works.

In addition to building the SIPR data flow around WebTAS, the USAREUR planning staff applied a lesson learned from OIF to implement web-based reporting to “reports portals” as opposed to the “bubble-up” sorting procedures built into existing Army IBOS systems such as the Counterintelligence HUMINT Management System/Counterintelligence HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHIMS/CHATS) and the All-Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L). Use of web portals not only eases handling of local reporting requirements, speeding up access to all reporting by the various data consumers, but also eases database maintenance. To ensure the data is available for ASAS-L users to use all their other tools, the reports portal data (referred to as the Digital Battle Captain) is also exported to the ASAS-L server and further identified as the Intelligence Fusion System. From there the data is synchronized with all the ASAS-Ls. Figure 5 expands upon this concept, and figure 6 graphically portrays how the objective IBOS architecture was expected to look, as envisioned during the overall architecture development process.

The 66th MI Group’s Chief, S6 Futures initially implemented a variation of the Digital Battle Captain scheme with the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) in early 2004. The USAREUR planning staff capitalized on his experience and intended to implement the same



... air gap as is/target as of 13 October 2005

Figure 5 - Expanded Operation Enduring Freedom VI Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Data Flow Architecture




Figure 6 - Operation Enduring Freedom VI Concept and Objective Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Architecture

process for HUMINT data—i.e., reports go into the J2X (joint level staff Counterintelligence and HUMINT element) portal, as directed by CENTCOM, and are replicated to the Human Domain Workstation (HDWS). This was a work in progress and originally had an implementation goal of summer 2005; however, the implementation of HDWS portion of the IBOS architecture for the SETAF Afghanistan rotation was never realized. HDWS is a system that fills roughly the same role for the CHIMS systems that the ASAS-L server fills for the ASAS-L. That work was ongoing in late 2005/early 2006, and fielding of both the HDWS and the OEF J2X portal is just now beginning.

The overall equipment shortfalls, and lack of documented equipment needs, required the USAREUR planning staff to utilize the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) process for procurement of equipment and creative sourcing efforts. Within USAREUR, units moved IBOS equipment internally to other units (known as cross-leveling), built systems, submitted ONS and/or bought systems as follows:

- Blue Force Tracking (BFT) systems. Resolution of a BFT shortfall occurred with a mixture of cross-leveled Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) BFT systems from USAREUR units plus some initial Commander's Digital Assistant (CDA) fieldings.
- Counterintelligence and Interrogation Operations (CI+I Ops) workstation and HDWS (see above). USAREUR G2 purchased both of these systems for the HUMINT cell in the CJISE through Project Manager (PM) CHIMS based on an ONS for system quantities above the Army Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP).
- AN-PRC 148/MultiBand Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) handheld radios. To provide THTs specific communications between the teams and their security elements, and due to a severe Army wide shortage of MBITRs, USAREUR purchased 78 Icom F43GS radios—the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G6 (Information)-approved substitute in-lieu-of (ILO) system until MBITR is fully fielded. USAREUR bought these ILO radios from the vendor based on an approved ONS. V Corps later purchased 50 more of the Icom radios to provide internal convoy communications.
- Secure radios. The THTs also were augmented with cross-leveled AN/PRC-117F and AN/PSC-5 tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios to enable them to report data securely from remote sites and to provide an all-informed command net.
- ASAS-L distribution. The BCTs and the CJISE received additional ASAS-Ls with Analysts Notebook licenses/dongles—above BOIP based on an approved ONS—in addition to ASAS-L servers. Some of the ASAS-Ls came from TF Eagle in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶ With PM Intelligence and Electronics help, the USAREUR Planning Staff also created ASAS-Single Source (ASAS-SS) servers for the CJISE and each BCT from de-fielded ASAS-Remote Workstations (RWS).
- Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). CENTCOM and CFLCC have done a great job providing fixed-site JWICS communications for the BCT bases at

Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Salerno, Italy, but the SETAF concept of operations (CONOPS) also called for JWICS in support of mobile missions. The 173d BCT DISE already had a TS-L that USAREUR had recently procured, but in order for the 1/82d BCT DISE to have mobile JWICS communications, the USAREUR Planning Staff received HQDA G3 (Operations) approval to buy a TS-L for this BCT. Unfortunately, the authorization to purchase the system did not come with the requisite “procurement flavored” funds to do so, so the USAREUR planning staff cross-levveled a TS-L out of 66th MI Group.

- Server support. Some local initiatives included buying a new imagery server to replace the large storage capacity that 25ID(L) brought with them (and planned to take back to Hawaii), map servers for each BCT site, and upgraded SIPR data servers to include a server to run WebTAS and the Digital Battle Captain.
- SIGINT equipment. A great deal of effort was required to equip and train the SIGINT collectors (e.g., Prophets, AN/PRD-13s, the new NSA Remote Collection Facility capability) that exceeds the classification of this paper. However, one interesting capability added for SETAF’s rotation is the ability to send and receive Scalable Coherent Interface (SCI) traffic from the SIGINT collectors at the Battalion Forward Operating Bases using deployable module (DM) boxes. The DM boxes consist of Tactical Local Area Network Encryption (TACLANE) Internet Protocol encryptors and other hardware to tunnel SCI through SIPR communications lines.
- IMINT equipment. IMINT efforts included cross-leveling CGSs from the 205th MI Brigade and buying MilCAM handheld infrared viewers under USAREUR G2’s rapid-prototyping initiative. The USAREUR planning staff also provided high-end IMINT workstations with Remote View licenses at the BCT level using recently de-fielded Sun SPARC (Scalable Processor Architecture) workstations from TF Eagle in Bosnia.

The result can appropriately be called a hybrid architecture, although the ASAS-L and CHIMS products are available for all their designed functions *except* reporting. Key to making this architecture work were ILEX technicians at the CJISE and at each BCT. The ILEX technicians not only provided software support—in many cases they were experienced or retired MI noncommissioned officers and warrant officers who assisted with “over-the-shoulder” training and TTP development—but also figured out how to develop business processes that worked for the new architecture. They brought a broad range of talented consultants to integrate ASAS-L with all the other new technologies required to support this operation.

Also in place were a contractor database manager in the CJISE and contracted technicians to assist in maintaining the plethora of systems in TF 165. With great cooperation from the CENTCOM J2, especially the Information Management and Systems Branches, the USAREUR Planning Staff stood up the CENTCOM JWICS domain both at 66th MI Group in Darmstadt, Germany, and at SETAF headquarters in Vicenza, Italy. All this hard work built

upon the initial mission analysis identifying what equipment was available and who had it, as depicted in figure 7. This greatly facilitated training development, situational awareness and team building as CJISE train-up was split between Germany and Italy.

Training the Force

Training of TF 165 occurred at all levels and used existing exercises to “shake out” the unit. The DS MICO conducted field training alongside the 173d BCT during their Exercise Immediate Response at the Grafenwoehr Training Area; TF 165 conducted an intelligence exchange (INTELEX) prior to the SETAF Command Post Exercises Lion Challenge and Unified Endeavor (both these SETAF-level exercises validated the numerous units under SETAF as CJTF-76). In addition, the 66th MI Group’s SIGINT Soldiers received training via Mobile Training Team instruction in USAREUR to operate the Prophet SIGINT collection systems cross-leveled from 501st MI Battalion for use in the 173d BCT DS MICO.

Further, with the geographic dispersion of units (Germany, Italy, CONUS) and the challenges of mobilizing various elements from the National Guard (THTs, JIF interrogation teams), training at the major subordinate command level expanded rapidly. Training of THTs in the USAREUR-developed and -funded IBOS Seminar—which conducts training several times yearly, covering topics to include THT and staff counterintelligence and HUMINT element (S2X) training—was not problematic; however, the yet to be mobilized FORSCOM-sourced THTs would receive Initial Entry Training at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and be certified by FORSCOM.⁷ Due to continuous MDMP, FORSCOM determined in January 2005 that the Army National Guard-sourced THTs would also require training by USAREUR counterintelligence (CI) and HUMINT subject matter experts via the USAREUR-developed IBOS Seminar. This training was conducted in early 2005 at Fort Hood, Texas, by members of the USAREUR G2 Counterintelligence and HUMINT Branch.

Deployment Challenges

Identification of the unit deployment windows added to the overall challenge of executing support for this OEF rotation. The unit movement window into Afghanistan was between five and six months (January to May 2005 in the case of OEF VI). The majority of TF 165 elements came together in Germany only to split apart for deployment and then support a different divisional headquarters—25ID(L)—for about three months before SETAF deployed. Given the short amount of time the majority of TF 165 was together in Germany (not counting the FORSCOM elements), consideration of a tighter, more focused window of future OEF deployments must occur. A tighter rotation window will decrease the negative effects on C2 and unit cohesion incurred by splitting units apart to the company-level for movement to Afghanistan. Further, having to operate under two different headquarters with different operational requirements can add to support issues.

For the OEF VI deployment, transshipment of equipment from CONUS, Germany and Italy through Pakistan and onward to Afghanistan by truck—and coordinating when the numerous

U.S. Army Europe Preplanning - Systems

Supporting Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Equipment

SETAF (CJTF-180)
Communications

TS II (Current)

JMICS (Current)

TS-Lite (Future)

Commercialized fixed site (Future)

173d Airborne Brigade (-)
Communications

TS II

JMICS/CJWICS

Sourcing
66th MI Group?

Systems

ASASL (ACESETAF is short)

CHATS (SETAF is short)

CI+I

ITRT (?)

GBS

DTSS

CGS (?)

TES/DTES (?)

Systems

ASASL

CHATS

CI+I

ITRT

GBS

Shortages now;
ID unit requirements
over next year

Collectors (work at . . .)

Collectors (live at . . .)

Prophet Hammer

GSR

REMBASS

IMETS/MCS (?)

UAV (?)

Note: CJSOTF has three Trojan Spirit-Lites

(?) – no existing validated requirement

Figure 7 - Initial Equipment Availability Analysis

company- to brigade-level units would arrive to meet their equipment for final dispersal within Afghanistan—only increased the deployment challenge.

Highlighting this is a vignette on planning for shipment loss. Portions of both the TS-L and Containerized-JWICS disappeared en route between Germany and Afghanistan and never arrived. The USAREUR staff had to quickly replace those components and could not have done so without the swift response and cooperation of USAREUR and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) representatives.

Also, the overarching effects of the long deployment/redeployment window of five–six months added unnecessary stress to the deployment process. This was a direct result of tying unit rotations to “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) dates instead of considering unit integrity. When SETAF began deployment operations, portions of SETAF units arrived in Afghanistan to begin building towards cohesive units. During this time these SETAF units were absorbed into the existing unit—25ID(L)—until the official OEF V to OEF VI relief in place (RIP) occurred months later. Upon arrival of SETAF, and after the 25ID(L) division headquarters departed, remaining 25ID(L) units operated under SETAF control until their BOG date was reached, also about three months after their parent brigade and higher units had redeployed out of Afghanistan. This required SETAF to conduct ground operations and redeployment operations simultaneously to move remaining elements of the previous unit—25ID(L)—back to Hawaii and other FORSCOM units back to the United States. This all occurred again at the end of the SETAF rotation in spring 2006 as the 10th Mountain Division (Light) deployed in as the follow-on OEF VII (OEF 2005–2007) CJTF-76 unit.

Lessons Observed and Learned

Creation of this TF 165 had theater-wide impacts on IBOS support to USAREUR. Some of them, specifically lessons learned (discussed later in this paper), had positive aspects. Other impacts occurred on aspects of USAREUR IBOS support to CG USAREUR, which was far-ranging. However, while decrementing USAREUR’s IBOS support to mid-term contingency and expeditionary operational capabilities, the development of TF 165 ultimately received the CG’s “stamp of approval” for activation.

The lessons learned covered all aspects of the BOS and required the intelligence planners to become very familiar with requirements not normally associated within the IBOS to ensure non-IBOS requirements for Soldiers, equipment and architecture were identified. This was mainly due to the aspect of building a completely new unit in so short a timeframe, something that normally occurs over a two- to five-year time period.

Assisting in the development and training of TF 165 was use of DA G2’s Automated Systems Integration Management (SIM) Intelligence Database (ASID). One of several available databases that track SBE, ASID provided a capability to monitor, at the systems level, equipping of the force to provide appropriate deployed IBOS support. The earlier deploying/deployed units inputted their SBE information into available Information Management/Information

Technology (IM/IT) resources. This included as much of the architecture and potential SBE as possible, which increases the ability of the decisionmakers to better source future forces. Had previous units used ASID upon deployment to Afghanistan, USAREUR planners could have had finite resolution on the existing architecture and “on-hand” equipment. This could have cut the time required to identify SBE by at least two months—an exponential improvement, considering total time from plan to execution was 11 months. DA G2 recommends use of ASID by all units receiving intelligence funding under its purview, and INSCOM has directed use of ASID by all subordinate units.⁸

Finally, one of the most important lessons learned in standing up TF 165 MI was establishment of the Provisional Table of Organization and Equipment (PTOE) for TF 165 in September 2004 and a related message detailing the personnel side of the equation—the requirement for TF 165 laid out for sourcing. V Corps G2 and USAREUR G3 Force Management Division provided the finishing touches to this 165 MI Battalion S3-developed and -coordinated PTOE in concert with the 205th MI Brigade. PTOE validation occurred through a V Corps-led “Council of Colonels,” with approval by CG V Corps for forwarding to USAREUR. Likewise, the message detailing the personnel requirement was coordinated in as much detail. While the PTOE ultimately did not receive approval from DA G3 for implementation as an MTOE-like document (there was already an MTOE for 165 MI Battalion), the establishment of the PTOE allowed all command and staff elements at DA, FORSCOM, USAREUR, XVIII Airborne and V Corps to “work off the same sheet of music.” The distribution of the personnel message provided the official USAREUR requirement for TF 165 manning to all affected commands. The development of both documents provided an outstanding set of structure documents and would benefit any organization attempting to develop ILO units similar to TF 165. Construction of a PTOE should begin as early as possible in the planning cycle to preclude “mission creep” or emerging TTPs to subsume the planning process. Further, the personnel requirement development should directly follow the PTOE development to ensure all required systems have Soldiers to operate them.

Conclusion

Creating something from nothing in less than 11 months was a monumental task by an exceedingly creative and focused team; especially in light of the lack of specific details in receiving the mission. USAREUR General Staff (to include G1, G2, G3, G4, G6, G8), V Corps, 205th MI Brigade, 165 MI Battalion, 66th MI Group, SETAF G2, FORSCOM, INSCOM and CENTCOM staffs all came together to build this unit and deploy it downrange in an unprecedented amount of time. The results of this team’s work were seen during the OEF VI/OEF 2004–2006 rotation, with lessons learned on how to better build these types of units incorporated into USAREUR MDMP and used during USAREUR transformation post-2006.

Endnotes

- ¹ Renaming of the OEF and OIF rotations would occur later in 2004. The new naming convention changed from numbered rotational designations (i.e., OIF III, OEF VI) to designations encompassing the overall rotation timeframe (e.g., OEF 04–06 identifying the calendar years of a rotation). For continuity’s sake, use of the term OEF VI will occur throughout this article.
- ² NGA is the new name for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, renamed in late 2003.
- ³ Due to the lack of a Light, Airborne Brigade Reconnaissance Team Modified Table of Organization (MTOE), the MTOE of a Long-Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD) was used, resulting in the activation of the 74th Infantry (LRS)— an “in name only” LRSD—for the 173d Brigade.
- ⁴ A 2004 change in the global Unified Command Plan Combat Command areas of responsibility moved two countries from the EUCOM to the CENTCOM AOR, decreasing EUCOM’s responsibility to a 91-country AOR.
- ⁵ The initial THT fill requirement was not clear as to whether just the Army or other services would provide sourcing for the 30 THTs. Conflicting responses to queries and the fact that other service THTs were operating in Afghanistan caused confusion. It was not announced until May 2004 that the Army would be filling all 30 THTs. USAREUR identified the ability to man and equip 10 of the overall 30 THTs required. Further clarification from CENTCOM for the THT requirement identified that five of the 30 THTs were actually joint interrogation facility (JIF) interrogation teams. FORSCOM would source 15 THTs and the five JIF Teams; all but two of these THTs (those two organic to the FORSCOM 1/82d BCT’s DS MICO) would be from Army National Guard units.
- ⁶ The ASAS-Ls became available in November 2005 as the USAREUR-supported Task Force Eagle mission, operating under the NATO SFOR, ended on 1 December 2004.
- ⁷ In late December 2004, DA determined that the USAREUR requirement for THT training was not an MSC-specific requirement. USAREUR provided THT training to the FORSCOM Army National Guard THTs in January 2005 at Fort Hood, Texas, while also continuing KFOR-related THT training.
- ⁸ More information on ASID can be found on the ASID homepage at <http://asid.dami.army.smil.mil/>.

Glossary

1/82	1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division	C/165 MI (LRS)	165th Long-Range Surveillance (LRS) Company
1AD	1st Armored Division	C2	Command and Control
25ID(L)	25th Infantry Division (Light)	C2PC/ANB	Command & Control Personal Computer/Analyst Note Book
ACE	Analysis Control Element	C&J	Collection & Jamming
ACT	Analysis Control Team	CCS	Communications Control Set
AD	Armored Division	CDA	Commander's Digital Assistant
AOR	Area of Responsibility	CENTCOM	(U.S.) Central Command
ASAS-L	All-Source Analysis System-Light	CENTRIXS	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (formerly CENTCOM Region Information Exchange System)
ASAS-SS	All Source Analysis System-Single Source	CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Component Command
ASAS-SSE	All Source Analysis System-Single Source Enclave	CFC-A	Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan
ASCC	Army Service Component Commander	CG	Commanding General
ASID	Automated Systems Integration Management (SIM) Intelligence Database	CGS	Common Ground Station
BATS	Biometric Automated Tool Set	CHATS	Counterintelligence HUMINT Management System
BCT	Brigade Combat Team	CHIMS	Counterintelligence HUMINT Automated Tool Set
BFT	Blue Force Tracking	CI	Counterintelligence
BOG	"Boots on the Ground"	CI&I Ops	Counterintelligence and Interrogation Operations
BOIP	Basis of Issue Plan	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
BOS	Battlefield Operating System		
Buster	Name of a small unmanned aerial vehicle; not an acronym		
BVI	Battlefield Visualization Initiative		

CJ2	Combined/Joint IBOS Staff	DS	Direct Support
CJ2X	Combined/Joint-level Counterintelligence and HUMINT Element	DTSS	Digital Topographic Support System
CJISE	Combined /Joint Intelligence Support Element	DUIC	Derivative Unit Identification Code
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force	EAD	Echelon Above Division
CJTf	Combined Joint Task Force	ECDR	Enemy Combatant Detainee Report
CM&D	Collection Management & Dissemination	EMS	Electronic Maintenance Section
CMWS	Collection Management Work Station	EUCOM	(U.S.) European Command
CONOPS	Concept of Operations	FBCB2	Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
CONUS	Continental United States	FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
CSG	Cryptologic Support Group	FOB	Forward Operating Base
DA	Department of the Army	FORSCOM	(U.S. Army) Forces Command
DACS	Department of the Army Civil Service	G1	Personnel
DHS	Department of Homeland Security	G2	Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency	G3	Operations
DISE	Deployable Intelligence Support Element	G4	Logistics
DM	Deployable Module	G6	Communications and Information
DOCEX	Document Exploitation	G8	Programmatics and Budget
DODAAC	Department of Defense Activity Address Code	GALE-L	Generic Area limitation Environment-Lite
DOMEX	Document and Media Exploitation	GBS	Global Broadcast System
DOS	Department of State	GCCS	Global Command and Control System
DRT/LLVI	Deployable Remote Terminal/Low Level Voice Intercept	GOTS	Government Off-the-Shelf
		GSR	Ground Surveillance Radar

GSS	Ground Surveillance System	IN	Infantry
Guardrail	Airborne SIGINT collection and precision targeting location system; not an acronym	INSCOM	(U.S. Army) Intelligence and Security Command
HAC	HUMINT Analysis Cell	INTELEX	Intelligence Exercise
HARC	HUMINT Analysis Reporting Cell	IPL	Integrated Priority List
HDS/HDWS	Human Domain Workstation	IPS	Intelligence Processing Section
HHSC	Headquarters and Headquarters Service Company	IPW	Interrogation of Prisoner of War
HOC	HUMINT Operations Center	ITRT	Individual Tactical Reporting Tool
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army	J2	Joint-level Intelligence
HUMINT	Human Intelligence	J2X	Joint-level Staff Counter-intelligence and HUMINT Element
I3-ISDS	Integrated Imagery and Intelligence-Intelligence Support Database System (the GCCS-I3 database)	JDISS	JWICS Deployable Intelligence Support System
IA	Individual Augmentation	JIF	Joint Interrogation Facility
IBOS	Intelligence Battlefield Operating System	JISE	Joint Intelligence Support Element
ID	Infantry Division	JMD	Joint Manning Document
IDC	Information Dominance Center	JMICS	JWICS Mobile Intelligence Communications System
IDC-E	Information Dominance Center-Extension	JMICS/C	JWICS Mobile Intelligence Communications System/ Containerized
ILO	In Lieu Of	JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance System
IMETS-L	Integrated Meteorological and Environmental Terrain System-Lite	JTF	Joint Task Force
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence	JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
IM/IT	Information Management/Information Technology	KFOR	Kosovo Peace Stabilization Force

LEP	Law Enforcement Personnel	NS	Non-Specific
LRS	Long-Range Surveillance	NTV	Non-Tactical Vehicle
LRS D	Long-Range Surveillance Detachment	NVG	Night Vision Goggles
M3	Multimedia Message Manager (automated message processing services)	OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
MA	Mission Analysis	OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence	OMT	Operational Maneuver Team
MBITR	MultiBand Inter/Intra Team Radio	ONS	Operational Needs Statement
MCS	Maneuver Control System	Ops	Operations
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process	OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
MI	Military Intelligence	OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
MICO	MI Company	P3C-AIP	U.S. Navy Reconnaissance Aircraft (P-3C/ORION) with Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program
MIDB	Modernized Intelligence Database	PAX	Personnel
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty	PM	Project Manager
MSC	Major Subordinate Command	Predator	A type of unmanned aerial vehicle
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment	Prophet	Battlefield Electronic Surveillance System
NARCR	Narcotics Report	PROV	Provisional
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency	PRT-ISC	Provisional Reconstruction Team-Intelligence Support Cell
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency (old name for NGA)	PTOE	Provisional Table of Organization and Equipment
NIPRNET	Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network	Raven	A type of unmanned aerial vehicle
		REMBASS	Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System
		RWS	Remote Workstation
		S2	Staff-level Intelligence

S2X	Staff Counterintelligence and HUMINT Element	TAREX	Target Exploitation
SBE	Stay-Behind Equipment	TE	Tactical Exploitation
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information	TES/DTES	Tactical Exploitation System/Deployable Tactical Exploitation System
SETAF	Southern European Task Force	TF	Task Force
SFOR	Stabilization Force	TFCICA	Task Force Counter-intelligence Control Authority
SIGACT	Significant Activity	THT	Tactical HUMINT Team
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence	TM	Team
SIM	Automated Systems Integration Management	Trojan Spirit-Lite	Intelligence communications network; not an acronym
SIPR	Secret Internet Protocol Router	TS-L	Trojan Spirit-Lite
S-JISE	Secret Joint Intelligence Support Element; name used for the Secret Internet Protocol file server used in CJ2 Joint Intelligence Support Element	TTPs	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
SOMDB	Source Operations Management Database	TUAV	Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
SPARC	Scalable Processor Architecture (Sun Micro Systems Sun SPARC computer)	U2	Type of intelligence-gathering aircraft
Steamroller	Name of a U.S. signals intelligence collection system; not an acronym	UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
StoneGhost	Name of a U.S./United Kingdom bilateral top-secret network; not an acronym	UIC	Unit Identification Code
SWO	Staff Weather Office	USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
SYSCON	System Control	VoIP	Voice Over Internet Protocol
TACLANE	Tactical Local Area Network Encryptor	VTC	Video Teleconference
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite	WebTAS	Web-enabled Timeline Analysis System
		WNDA	Example of a Unit Identification Code; not an acronym

