



THE LAND WARFARE PAPERS

No. 57 SEPTEMBER 2006

SysAdmin: Toward Barnett's Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

James B. Ellsworth

A National Security Affairs Paper
Published on Occasion by

**THE INSTITUTE OF
LAND WARFARE**

ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY
Arlington, Virginia

**SysAdmin:
Toward Barnett's Stabilization
and Reconstruction Force**

by

James B. Ellsworth

**The Institute of Land Warfare
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY**

AN AUSA INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER

The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper, but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues.

LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 57, SEPTEMBER 2006

SysAdmin:

Toward Barnett's Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

by James B. Ellsworth

Dr. James B. Ellsworth joined the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College in the summer of 2000, following a variety of assignments in Armor and Intelligence education and training. He completed cadet training with the Civil Air Patrol (USAF Auxiliary), earning the rank of cadet colonel, and he is a distinguished graduate of the Army's Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course and the Navy's College of Naval Warfare. He holds a bachelor's degree from Clarkson University, a master's from the Naval War College, and master's and doctoral degrees from Syracuse University. His specialties include Military Intelligence, Information Operations and Defense Transformation, and he teaches the resident elective on the Future of Armed Conflict.

This paper represents the opinions of the author and should not be taken to represent the views of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States government, the Institute of Land Warfare, or the Association of the United States Army or its members.

© Copyright 2006 by
The Association of the United States Army
All rights reserved.

Inquiries regarding this and future Land Warfare Papers should be directed to: Director, ILW Programs, AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare, e-mail sdaugherty@ausa.org or telephone: (direct dial) 703-907-2627 or (toll free) 1-800-336-4570, ext. 226.

**Institute of Land Warfare
Association of the United States Army
2425 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22201**

Contents

| | |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| Foreword | v |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Background | 1 |
| Why SSTR? | 3 |
| Why a Force-Structure Solution? | 4 |
| Force-Structure Options | 8 |
| Recommendation | 9 |
| Endnotes | 11 |

Foreword

While current operations have brought new emphasis to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, missions focused on these operations *in their own right* have likely received *less* attention than they did before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland—overpowered by immediate lessons and imperatives from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Yet as Thomas P. M. Barnett makes clear in his books *The Pentagon's New Map* and *Blueprint for Action*, power projection for humanitarian purposes is a potent extension of a time-honored military principle into the realm of grand strategy. To be effective, however, the forces engaged in these missions cannot merely be assembled *ad hoc* from units designed, equipped and trained for major combat.

This paper explores these issues, concluding that a force structure approach to this challenge is called for and—drawing on the example of USSOCOM—recommending creation of an independent joint command for SSTR.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gordon R. Sullivan', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army Retired
President

September 2006

SysAdmin: Toward Barnett's Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

Introduction

Current operations have brought new emphasis to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in U.S. military thought and doctrine, yet for obvious reasons, this attention has tended to focus on the post-hostilities phase of a combat operation. If anything, overpowered by the immediate lessons and imperatives from Afghanistan and Iraq, conceptual examination of missions *focused on SSTR operations in their own right* has received *less* attention from those actually engaged in the profession of arms than it did before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the American homeland.¹

A conspicuous exception to this is Thomas P. M. Barnett's distinction between "Leviathan" (combat) and "SysAdmin" (SSTR) forces in his books *The Pentagon's New Map*² and *Blueprint for Action*.³ Barnett's discussion is especially salient because his is among the most compelling strategic characterizations of the global conflict in which America and her coalition partners are now engaged—making the prominent role he gives SSTR operations (and his argument for forces dedicated to them) worth careful consideration.

Nevertheless, Barnett's focus on grand strategy naturally leaves many details of the road toward his SysAdmin force somewhat vague. What follows seeks to fill in some key blanks, where Barnett leaves them, and to explore certain of his answers that might prove problematic. In doing so, contemporary discussions of SSTR operations are examined alongside selected older works that raised enduring issues before the war on terrorism became the major focus. Conclusions are identified from this analysis, and a path forward is suggested.

Background

Barnett is not the first to identify SSTR as a core strategic capability for the United States in the years since the Cold War ended. In *Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*,⁴ the bipartisan U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century recommended a strategy incorporating five types of military capabilities. The last of these, "humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities," was perhaps the most controversial.

The objections to formally defining these activities as part of the military mission were not without merit. After studying the issue between 1994 and 1997, the House Committee on National Security concluded,

The expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations . . . are placing at risk the decisive military edge that the nation enjoyed at the end of the Cold War.⁵

This assertion was also echoed by military leaders: the same committee quoted Brigadier General Robert Richard, then commander of the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, as testifying that

The second breakpoint for combat training is . . . unavailability of units due to commitments other than combat to train for combat. Warfighting is a perishable skill.⁶

Equally significant was the claim by some experts that “even if the U.S. military could sustain the increased tempo of operations, the forces are ill-suited for crisis relief.”⁷ This argument generally noted that

thousands of years of experience in countless bloody battles have taught the modern army leader that a certain aggressiveness . . . is required just to survive. . . . Unfortunately, this aggressive predisposition, so useful in combat, is counter-productive in a humanitarian crisis.⁸

This is, of course, a double-edged sword—especially in light of the issue preceding it. If modern forces operate more frequently in SSTR operations than in traditional warfighting missions, the demands of those environments might reinforce those *opposite* predispositions suited to humanitarian operations—and counterproductive in combat.⁹ In essence, both these criticisms reflected a similar underlying concern: a belief that the use of military forces for SSTR degrades their ability to fight and win the nation’s wars.

Still, reflecting on the nature of current and recent U.S. military interventions, there can be little doubt that most bear more resemblance to SSTR than to the traditional warfighting for which half a century of Cold War so thoroughly prepared American armed forces. Particularly after the last large, conventional force to confront U.S. military power head-to-head met decisive defeat on its own chosen battlefield—only to remain an enduring danger a decade later through weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and crimes against humanity—most states (and an increasing variety of non-state actors) inclined to challenge the rule of law are unlikely to do so in any recognizable force-on-force scenario. Yet precisely because SSTR and warfighting exist at different points along the same spectrum of conflict, it is all too easy for such operations to degenerate into armed combat—and just as possible for armed combat to settle into peacekeeping—making it virtually impossible to draw a clear line between what is and is not “a job for the military.”

The challenge, then, is to reconcile these apparently conflicting factors. How can the United States shape its power projection to be decisive in the operations most critical in the war on terrorism while retaining and honing the “sharp edge of the sword” that will be decisive in the next conventional conflict, which history reminds us is lurking down the road? Transformation efforts to date have largely represented “tinkering around the edges” in efforts to mix and match existing forces to requirements for which they were not designed. The lessons of America’s current operations suggest, however—as Barnett notes—that a more productive answer might be found in transforming U.S. force structure to better align it with the distinctly separate missions—SSTR and warfighting—at which the United States must excel if it is to achieve its national security objectives and remain a global power.

Why SSTR?

Before addressing why a force structure solution might be appropriate, and what forms it might take, it is important to articulate the national security interests that SSTR operations—*per se*—can legitimately serve. The realization that such interests exist is nothing new; in fact, the special operations community has a long history of viewing humanitarian operations as an instrument for reducing the appeal of insurgencies,¹⁰ and recorded use of such operations for strategic military purposes dates back to Napoleon and even Alexander the Great.¹¹

Barnett’s vision of power projection for humanitarian purposes as a strategic tool in its own right—a more expansive goal than what the United States has attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan—is merely an extension of this time-honored principle into the realm of grand strategy. As the Cold War ended, President George H. W. Bush noted this in calling for a “new world order”:

What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing—without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests in today’s world as in the time of conflict and Cold War.¹²

Today, this shift is made explicit in Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, released at the end of November 2005, which states in part that:

It is DoD policy that . . . [s]tability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.¹³

The message is clear: if humanitarian assistance rendered *during* armed conflict can facilitate the accomplishment of strategic objectives by mitigating factors that encourage continued popular resistance, it would seem reasonable to expect that *preemptive* assistance rendered in the midst of conditions that often *lead to* armed conflict might kill it at the root before it can blossom.¹⁴

This philosophy has great appeal, from the cost-effectiveness of “an ounce of prevention” to the myriad U.S. interests throughout Barnett’s “Functioning Core” that depend on peace and security. It should be obvious that the direct costs of a purely stability or support operation (in dollars alone, to say nothing of blood) would be dwarfed by those of even a small war—which Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated will ultimately require extensive SSTR efforts regardless. Even those costs are only part of the picture: the indirect costs of a failure to act that led to wider conflict or greater loss of life—costs to the American economy, to U.S. strategic leadership in the world and to America’s moral legitimacy on the world stage—can be equally significant,¹⁵ as U.S. post-Somalia hesitancy in Bosnia and Rwanda (and arguably now the Sudan) has shown.

A final category of U.S. interests served by SSTR begins as an outgrowth of the global interests discussed above but has important implications for that most fundamental of strategic imperatives—the defense of the homeland. At the lowest level, this involves *natural* disaster management and relief operations, where forces are used to restore essential services in the wake of environmental devastation on a scale that has knocked out most indigenous capabilities and overwhelmed those that remain—for example, the 2004 Asian tsunami, or Hurricane Katrina in 2005. More complex levels exist when the disaster is manmade—either the aftermath of “ethnic cleansing” such as that in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda or the Sudan, or following an incident of “catastrophic terrorism” employing WMD. Internationally, these types of efforts follow the same rationales used above; domestically, they could be called upon—in a declared state of emergency—to surge U.S. capacity to respond to the comparable incidents at home, when the logistical capabilities or command and control structures of the civilian agencies normally responsible for these missions might be overwhelmed or incapacitated.

Why a Force-Structure Solution?

After acknowledging SSTR as a strategic imperative—as the new DoD Directive clearly does—America must identify the most appropriate way to develop and maintain the associated capabilities. Up to now, planners and policymakers simply looked for a “best fit.” They asked, “Where can we find large numbers of disciplined and well-trained professionals with the logistical wherewithal to move critical supplies and rebuild essential facilities and services, able to operate in environments lacking indigenous infrastructure, and to defend themselves against those who stand to benefit from chaos?” And invariably, the answer came back “Call the Pentagon!” Yet these arguments do not directly explain why SSTR *should* be a military (i.e., DoD) mission—and Barnett essentially argues

they should *not*, favoring instead the creation of a separate, peer-level agency outside the Departments of Defense and State on the grounds that those organizations' cultures predispose them to focus their priorities (and resources) on the extremes: war and peace, respectively.¹⁶ In theory, the types of interventions described above could be conducted by one or more civilian agencies, appropriately funded and equipped with an equivalent logistical capability—some would even argue at a significantly lower cost.¹⁷ Furthermore, the presence of the U.S. military in a country on the cusp between peacemaking and peacekeeping may actually *inhibit* the parties from reaching terms “under the gun,” or worse, may weaken their perceived need to keep honoring those terms once that gun is removed.¹⁸

Unfortunately, these arguments overlook the fact that motion along the spectrum of conflict is neither unidirectional nor predictable. The notion that the combat troops necessary to coerce opposing sides to the bargaining table should be replaced by nonmilitary peace forces once they're seated at it glosses over the opportunity—to tip the balance back toward war—that such transitions offer those who would never have bargained of their own accord. Perhaps more disturbing, having a civilian force—*maybe* lightly defended by attached military units—to oversee humanitarian missions risks a bloodbath (like that seen recently with United Nations relief workers in Africa) should that balance tip back too far in that direction, too quickly.

As for cost, it seems unlikely that significant savings would result from building new organizations that *look like* military combat support or combat service support units—instead of simply using those units that already exist. This is especially true for a force like that suggested by the Center for Defense Information (CDI)—which would get most of its personnel and infrastructure from servicemembers, civil service employees and surplus bases dropped from the military rolls.¹⁹ It is also worth noting that the CDI proposal drew its most explicit claims of cost savings from a comparison of annual costs per member between the armed services and the *Coast Guard*,²⁰ a notoriously underfunded organization whose primary missions do not involve transoceanic deployments, extended supply lines, or long-term operations away from its home ports—all of which are, by definition, required for the operations for which that force is proposed.

Barnett's “pistol packin' Peace Corps”²¹ faces the same obstacles to its realization and effectiveness—obstacles including the fact that the joint culture and interoperable command and control structure SSTR operations demand currently exist only within DoD—where they required two decades of evolution under the transformative mandates of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Elsewhere across the federal government, “jointness” is far less advanced: the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)—likely the most ambitious and advanced effort to build a thoroughly interoperable capability—exists in a barely embryonic form today²² and has drawn its only significant funding via a special, congressionally-authorized transfer *from DoD*.²³ Barnett himself acknowledges that “the SysAdmin force must grow within . . . the confines

of the Defense Department,” even while advocating its divestiture “in the not-too-distant future.”²⁴ His “Department of Everything Else” may in fact represent the desired end state—but the United States, and the world, require SysAdmin capabilities *today*.

Unfortunately, even the U.S. military—while possessing the *capabilities* for such operations—is generally *not* structured for them. Needing a brigade for SSTR, one could get part of what is required with an Army engineer battalion or a Navy construction battalion; but this force might require another unit to purify water, plus a couple of medical units, a military police unit or two, some civil affairs troops to help the populace reestablish civil governance—and maybe a few Marines in case things get ugly. Yet no such standing force exists. Most often, planners have taken that Marine unit or some Army infantry, bolstered it with a few of the other assets identified, and sent it out.

Sometimes, something has been forgotten—like some armor in Somalia—with disastrous results. Usually, planners have muddled through, underutilizing the combat portions of the force for lack of actual *combat* and overworking the rest, to the point of having to regularly call on reservists—who then exit the ranks in droves because they, their families and their employers didn’t anticipate their being gone so much when they signed up. When these units return, senior leaders, policymakers and the public are distressed to learn that they are not as proficient at their “real mission” anymore—and that extended operations in an environment where normal military rules of engagement might create an international incident have conditioned them to a degree of caution and second-guessing that is getting them killed in force-on-force exercises.²⁵

Such anecdotal reports are widely familiar and suggest that a structural transformation is necessary. The rationale is simple: the *ad hoc* approach of the past made sense when uniquely humanitarian missions were uncommon and SSTR was an emerging concept of uncertain relevance—but that concept is now proven and enshrined in doctrine. Even before 9/11, the military understood it held unique capabilities for such operations,²⁶ and even critics of these missions saw that they would likely become more common²⁷ and require specialized units.²⁸

This recognition led to a number of studies and papers, both in the United States and under the auspices of the United Nations, examining the appropriate composition of units supporting SSTR. Together with more recent experiences in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom—in particular, the success (and limitations) of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept²⁹—they offer a compelling argument for the creation of military forces explicitly designed for achievement of the national strategic objectives of peace and stability (and defense of the homeland) through these means.

Some of this research critiqued past practice through the examination of prior U.S. operations—for example, in Somalia. Army Brigadier General Raymond Bell used the oft-cited mismatch of forces there to argue for a standing joint task force (JTF) containing the capabilities—and *only* the capabilities—required for what he termed “peace

enforcement [emphasis added].”³⁰ Others argued for a similar approach to avoid “dulling the edge of the sword” as described earlier.³¹ Marine Lieutenant Colonel David Walter—an experienced warfighting battalion commander—noted the destructive tension between humanitarian and warfighting missions, while acknowledging, “It is not that the military does [these] operations poorly, that we are entirely ill-suited, or that someone else can do these more efficiently. But instead it is the continuous competition for time, resources, and intellectual preparation these divergent missions create—a competition that always has a winner.”³² To resolve this issue, he recommended creating a “humanitarian assistance response force” dedicated to and designed for these missions—a force which, interestingly, he referred to as a “new Service.”³³

Further support for a force structure approach comes from a rare formal study of the issue, which surveyed active duty Soldiers from the Army’s 10th Mountain Division and reserve component (predominately Army National Guard) Soldiers from a specially constituted “experimental unit sent to the Sinai Desert by the United States in 1995 . . . to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in support of the Camp David Accords.”³⁴

Among the significant findings of this study were majority or plurality views across both subpopulations that professional Soldiers, *not civilians* or unarmed forces, should bear primary responsibility for peacekeeping missions.³⁵ Both groups also agreed that Soldiers proficient in basic military skills require additional training to be effective peacekeepers.³⁶

At the same time, views in these groups diverged when they were asked whether peacekeeping missions were appropriate for their unit, or whether such missions were more appropriate for military police, with majorities in the active duty infantry unit either believing that their unit was a poor match for the mission or being undecided, while majorities in the specialized reserve component unit either felt that the missions *were* appropriate for them or were undecided.³⁷ These data strongly suggest that while Soldiers seem to agree that peacekeeping is a military mission, members of a unit *designed* for that purpose are more likely to feel that it is *their* mission and (having received the additional training they feel is necessary) to have confidence that they are ready for it.

A final, indirect argument supporting a force structure solution comes from the need for military forces participating in SSTR to interface reliably and effectively with the variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) likely to be on the scene when they arrive³⁸ . . . and long after they’ve redeployed.³⁹ Opponents of military involvement in these missions often cite NGO issues in calling for such operations to be civilianized,⁴⁰ but such factors are more accurately seen as limitations on the effectiveness of traditional *combatant* units drawn from the current force structure—and as requirements for the type of combined training and decisionmaking frameworks which would be likely to be problematic for such units.

For example, the first NATO commander of the Bosnia mission, now-retired General George Joulwan, “believes that NGOs are willing to come on board as long as they are included in upper-level decisionmaking.”⁴¹ This in itself may be a fairly disturbing thought when the “upper-level decisionmaking” involved is that of major U.S. combat units. As NGOs almost by definition claim to adopt a neutral stand toward all parties in a crisis—and since many of these groups have philosophical roots conflicting with the traditional mission of military forces⁴²—their presence inside, say, a corps headquarters could be regarded with dysfunctional (albeit perhaps understandable) suspicion by the military staff. In contrast, the integration of NGO leaders within the structure and processes of a military force whose mission, organization and composition clearly speak to creating the secure, permissive environment that NGOs require to operate effectively and augmenting their efforts with other capabilities that most of them lack (e.g., heavy transport, engineering and construction) would likely be far less problematic for both NGOs and military forces alike.⁴³

Force-Structure Options

A range of force-structure options is implied in the above arguments. At one extreme is merely identifying in advance the forces that would be called upon first to support a scenario involving SSTR.⁴⁴ This amounts to a “systematization” of current practice that would create a matrix of preplanned forces to be deployed under specified circumstances. At the opposite extreme is Barnett’s ultimate recommendation, “a new cabinet-level department . . . that bridges the gap between our current Department of War (Defense) and our de facto Department of Peace (State),”⁴⁵ or slightly more modestly the creation of what would amount to a separate military service, complete with a peacetime chain of command more closely tied to the Department of State than to the Department of Defense.⁴⁶ (This latter option draws an analogy to the Coast Guard’s peacetime tie, when it was written, to the Department of Transportation; it is essentially the force recommended by the Center for Defense Information⁴⁷—strengthened by recognition that such a force belongs within the military during conflict for the reasons already discussed.) Somewhere in between, we have the “standing JTF” approach⁴⁸ or perhaps more ambitiously the creation of a new joint command, similar to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—including manning with veteran troops who, once qualified, rarely leave “the community”—but dedicated to SSTR and free from the explicit combat roles commonly associated with special operations forces.

At the low end, designation of “first-to-respond” forces alone would likely achieve little. After a decade and a half of expanding involvement in SSTR, planners and decision-makers (and the units themselves) already *know* which forces these are with some reliability, yet this has not resolved the underlying issues discussed here. Furthermore, this approach does not address the delay in availability or the initial reduced effectiveness associated with “assembling” a JTF from component units that do not normally work or train together.

At the high end, creation of a new cabinet-level department or separate service dedicated to SSTR potentially addresses all the issues raised, by ensuring that the organizations conducting these operations are specially designed for them, that their units are not subject to the distraction of having to simultaneously be ready for major combat, and that the warfighters in the existing services are similarly free to concentrate on readiness to fight and win the nation's wars without "dulling their edge" on humanitarian operations with frequently incompatible demands. But like any extreme response, this option carries a high price—in this case, a resource-intensive, politically vulnerable decision to create a large new, independent organization . . . and to do so without empirical evidence of its effectiveness. However strong the arguments favoring a force-structure solution to the dilemmas of SSTR may be, it should nevertheless be noted that any particular solution America might adopt at this stage should be viewed as *experimental*, and its effects indeterminate; extreme solutions, given this uncertainty of outcome, are rarely advisable.

This leaves the two intermediate options, which are in many ways interchangeable, differing primarily in the echelon at which the new organization is placed. Both the standing JTF model⁴⁹ and the independent joint command model would create a permanent headquarters element dedicated to SSTR and fenced from other requirements, and (done properly, as Bell suggests) able to operate in any region of the world. Both would involve the fundamental change that this discussion suggests is necessary to address the paradoxes of SSTR in today's world, and just as important, both would have relatively little direct impact on the remainder of the force structure while the model was fine-tuned in light of future lessons learned.

In theory, the independent joint command approach could have greater budgetary flexibility (and more responsiveness to Congress) as it could be given its own Program Objective Memorandum (POM) authority, again following the USSOCOM model. However, if Bell's standing JTF were made a major task force *under* USSOCOM, virtually the same flexibility and responsiveness would be achievable. Essentially, the distinguishing factor between these options is the degree of importance they explicitly attach to SSTR, and the confidence they reflect that SSTR will remain a key mission best addressed by an organization designed for and dedicated to that purpose. In that context, the standing JTF model might be described as a "cautious" move and the independent joint command model as an "aggressive" move toward the same goal.

Recommendation

While both options have merit, the strongest arguments appear to favor creation of an independent joint command for SSTR (for simplicity, henceforth referred to herein as "USPEACECOM."). The arguments supporting the establishment of a specialized organization in the first place—namely, the heavy personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO)⁵⁰ requirements of SSTR operations today and in the recent past, and the virtual certainty that the frequency of such operations will remain at least constant in the future,⁵¹ plus the

importance illustrated here of recognizing the inherent conflicts between the demands of warfighting and the demands of SSTR on the same unit—tip the balance toward a more aggressive response.

As Operation Iraqi Freedom has clearly reinforced, no proposal for contemporary U.S. military forces would be complete without considering the role of the reserve component. For USPEACECOM, three mission-based requirements make this especially critical. First, linguistic and cultural fluency are key factors in the success of SSTR efforts,⁵² and the requisite numbers of specialists to support large or extended operations in any conceivable area of the world simply cannot be maintained on active duty.⁵³ Second, many of the skills demanded by SSTR operations are effectively—perhaps *most* effectively—maintained and honed in directly comparable civilian occupations that find only infrequent use in active duty units (a fact implicitly recognized, for example, in the proportion of the Army’s civil affairs strength housed in the reserves). Finally, a large and ready—if infrequently deployed—reserve presence is essential if USPEACECOM is to be capable of supplying the desired surge capacity for consequence management following disasters (natural or otherwise) striking the homeland.

It is no less crucial, however, that USPEACECOM resist overreliance on the reserve components. Its modest size and the nature of the operations it would support guarantee that its units would be among the most frequently deployed in the force. Thus it must be built around a robust, active-duty core adequate to these deployments if the adverse impacts on reserve component readiness and retention discussed earlier are to be avoided.

The specific details of what should go into a “USPEACECOM” are outside the scope of this discussion, but limited guidance is available in several of the publications cited herein.⁵⁴ It should be noted that these documents focus heavily, for obvious reasons, on ground forces; further consideration of necessary air and sea component contributions—especially strategic lift—to the proposed independent joint command is urgently needed. Likewise, detailed discussion of how such an organization should be paid for in a relatively zero-sum game is deferred to other publications. In some cases (e.g., medical, engineer or military police units) these requirements could be met by reallocating existing forces from elsewhere in the services; in others, new units or capabilities may have to be “bought” with modest reductions in the numbers of (or the degree of technological overmatch possessed by) traditional forces designed for a Cold War threat that now exists only on a smaller scale.

For a force that largely remains structured for great-power war, Barnett’s challenge may appear daunting. But three years after the “shock and awe” of the major combat phase gave way to post-hostilities chaos in Iraq, and to an insurgency fueled by the difficulties that conventional U.S. forces had in dealing with that chaos, this seems a small price (and a wise investment) for the *present*—to say nothing of the future.

Endnotes

- ¹ Hereafter referred to as “9/11.”
- ² Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Putnam, 2004).
- ³ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating* (New York: Putnam, 2005).
- ⁴ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), p. 14.
- ⁵ U.S. Congress, House. Committee on National Security, *Military Readiness 1997: Rhetoric and Reality*, report prepared by Floyd D. Spence, 105th Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 1.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ⁷ Center for Defense Information, “Getting the Military Out of Humanitarian Relief,” *The Defense Monitor*, 26, no. 6 (October 1997), available online at <http://www.cdi.org/dm/1997/issue6/index.html>, accessed 20 January 2006.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰ Rudolph C. Barnes, “Civic Action, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Disaster Relief: Military Priorities in Low-intensity Conflict,” *Special Warfare*, 2, no. 4 (1989): pp. 36–37.
- ¹¹ Mark T. Doel, “Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations: Impossible Paradox or Inevitable Development?” *RUSI Journal*, 140, no. 5 (1995): p. 26.
- ¹² George H. W. Bush, remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute symposium, Aspen, Colo., 2 August 1990, quoted in T. L. Rice, “Forging Security Through Peace,” *Military Review*, 72, no. 4 (1992): p. 14.
- ¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 November 2005), p. 2.
- ¹⁴ Rice, “Forging Security Through Peace,” pp. 17–18.
- ¹⁵ Henry C. Stackpole III and Eric L. Chase, “Humanitarian Intervention and Disaster Relief: Projecting Military Strength Abroad to Save Lives,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, 77, no. 2 (1993): p. 17.
- ¹⁶ Barnett, *Blueprint for Action*, pp. 30, 39–41.
- ¹⁷ Center for Defense Information, “Getting the Military Out of Humanitarian Relief.”
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ Barnett, *Blueprint for Action*, p. 39.

- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 23 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, *Fact Sheet: Transformational Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), p. 3.
- 24 Barnett, *Blueprint for Action*, pp. 40–41.
- 25 U.S. Congress, *Military Readiness 1997*, pp. 9–10.
- 26 John M. Shalikhshvili, “The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection,” prepared remarks for the CARE 50th anniversary symposium (Washington, D.C., 10 May 1996); *Defense Issues*, 11, no. 39 (1996), available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1996/s19960510-shali.html>, accessed 20 January 2006; Arthur M. Smith and Craig H. Llewellyn, “Humanitarian Medical Assistance in U.S. Foreign Policy: Is There a Constructive Role for Military Medical Services?” *The DISAM Journal*, 14, no. 4 (1992): p. 71.
- 27 U.S. Congress, *Military Readiness 1997*, p. 23.
- 28 Center for Defense Information, “Getting the Military Out of Humanitarian Relief.”
- 29 Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” *Parameters*, 35, no. 4 (2005): pp. 32–46.
- 30 Raymond E. Bell, “Somalia Revisited: Creating the Proper Force Structure for Peace-Enforcement Missions,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, 134, no. 8 (1997): p. 43.
- 31 David L. Walter, “Warfighters Fight, Humanitarians Assist—Time to Match the Right Force to Humanitarian Assistance,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, 82, no. 4 (1998): pp. 40–42.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- 34 David R. Segal, Brian J. Reed and David E. Rohall, “Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the U.S. Army,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 24, no. 4 (1998): p. 539.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 545.
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 543–544.
- 37 *Ibid.*, pp. 542–545.
- 38 Shalikhshvili, “The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection.”
- 39 Doel, “Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations,” p. 28.
- 40 Center for Defense Information, “Getting the Military Out of Humanitarian Relief.”
- 41 John A. Nagl and Elizabeth O. Young, “Si Vis Pacem, Para Pacem: Training for Humanitarian Emergencies,” *Military Review*, 80, no. 2 (2000): p. 36.
- 42 Doel, “Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations,” pp. 26, 28.
- 43 *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 32; Shalikhshvili, “The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection.”
- 44 Robert M. Algermissen, *Humanitarian Assistance Response Ready Forces* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 47.

- ⁴⁵ Barnett, *Blueprint for Action*, p. 30.
- ⁴⁶ Walter, “Warfighters Fight, Humanitarians Assist,” p. 41.
- ⁴⁷ Center for Defense Information, “Getting the Military Out of Humanitarian Relief.”
- ⁴⁸ Bell, “Somalia Revisited,” p. 43.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁰ Army Regulation 220–1, *Field Organizations: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 May 2003), p. 87. PERSTEMPO measures individual deployment rates and military occupational specialty (MOS) deployment rates. The congressional and Army definition of deployment is: “A member of the armed forces is considered to be deployed or in a deployment on any day on which, pursuant to orders that do not establish a permanent change of station, the member is performing active service in a training exercise or operation at a location or under circumstances which make it impossible or infeasible for the member to spend off-duty time in the housing (which may include the member’s residence) that the member occupies for use during off-duty time when on garrison duty at the member’s permanent duty station.”
- ⁵¹ U.S. Department of Defense 2005; Patrick M. Hughes, “A DIA Global Security Assessment,” prepared remarks before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington, D.C., 6 February 1997); *Defense Issues*, 12, no. 17 (1997), available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1997/di1217.html>, accessed 20 January 2006.
- ⁵² Doel, “Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations,” p. 32; Harold Kennedy, “Elite Fighters Turn to Peacekeeping,” *National Defense*, 84, no. 555 (2000): pp. 19–21; Smith and Llewellyn, “Humanitarian Medical Assistance in U.S. Foreign Policy,” p. 75.
- ⁵³ Bell, “Somalia Revisited,” p. 43.
- ⁵⁴ Algermissen, *Humanitarian Assistance Response Ready Forces*, pp. 47–48; Center for Defense Information “Getting the Military Out of Humanitarian Relief”; Walter, “Warfighters Fight, Humanitarians Assist,” pp. 41–42.

