The Yin and Yang of Junior Officer Learning: The Historical Development of the Army’s Institutional Education Program for Captains

Lieutenant Colonel Kelly C. Jordan
The Yin and Yang of Captains’ OES:
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by

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by Kelly C. Jordan

Lieutenant Colonel Kelly C. Jordan, Ph.D., currently serves as the Professor of Military Science and as the battalion commander for the U.S. Army ROTC “Fightin’ Irish” Battalion at the University of Notre Dame, where he holds a concurrent appointment as an Assistant Professor of History. Previously he served as an instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. Prior to that assignment he served in the Republic of Korea as the Chief of Training for the 2d Infantry Division and as the battalion executive officer for 1-9 Infantry. Earlier assignments included teaching Military History at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, serving as an assistant battalion S-3 and rifle company commander in the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. He also served with the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, as an infantry platoon leader, company executive officer, battalion motor officer, headquarters/headquarters company executive officer and battalion adjutant, including participation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the Virginia Military Institute and a master’s degree and doctorate in military history from the Ohio State University. He is a graduate of the Army’s Airborne and Ranger schools and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The author of several articles, he has received numerous teaching and writing awards. He is preparing for publication his Ph.D. dissertation on the combat effectiveness of Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

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Foreword

Since its inception the Army has been developing officers through programs containing elements of both education and training. This approach is desirable because it serves the officer’s practical needs while also allowing for creativity, innovation and additions to the professional soldier’s existing body of knowledge. Current educational theory provides solid support for this methodology, contending that effective learning requires an active interplay between education and training. What has never been determined conclusively, in either theoretical or practical contexts, is the proper balance between education and training for Army officers.

The Army’s general approach has been to structure junior officer development programs around training objectives, embracing goals that are increasingly educational in nature as the officer progresses in rank and experience. This approach was sound, based on the empirical evidence during the Army’s first 228 years of existence; the system derived from this premise worked well.

According to the author, however, recent developments suggest that as the Army requires its junior leaders, especially captains, to perform more complex tasks, the balance should increasingly tilt toward education in the captains’ institutional educational experience to better prepare them for the situations they will face as the Army’s most junior commanders. In an era of increasing tactical and technological complexity, he says, the Army needs to increase its officer education and training, designate a Director of Army Education and develop an Army Education Strategy.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army Retired
President, AUSA

October 2004
The Yin and Yang of Captains’ OES: 
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Institutional Education Program for Captains1

Introduction

Writing in 1897, Captain James S. Pettit observed that officers of his grade needed an 
education that would develop their ability to think and not merely fill their heads with volumes 
of information.2 If one equates Pettit’s filling “heads with volumes of information” to training, 
his observation excellently highlights the relationship between education and training in the 
Army officer education system throughout the ensuing 105 years. Within this context, the 
demands of education and training have been the yin and yang of the Army’s school system 
since 1776. As the Army continues its dramatic transformation of the past half-century, it 
should ensure that its institutional education and training is appropriate to prepare captains 
for the tasks they will face in the interval between their career course and their intermediate-
level education.

The concept of yin and yang is particularly useful when examining the relationship 
between education and training because it reflects both the tension between the two 
components of learning and their complementary natures. Taoist beliefs hold that the natural 
forces of this world are the product of tension between yin and yang and that nothing in the 
world is seen as strictly yin or strictly yang, though one force may be dominant in a given 
place and time. In addition, Taoists observe that things that do not embody both forces 
relatively evenly do not endure; out of their imbalance and lack of flexibility in their 
surroundings, they perish.3 This type of connection between education and training has become 
even more pronounced for captains as they face more complex tasks in an increasingly 
ambiguous environment. Indeed, when considering the Army’s education program for captains 
over the past 50 years, and especially since the end of the Vietnam War, what stands out is 
a constant search for the correct balance between education and training. Past experiences 
illustrate rather conclusively that as the Army requires its junior leaders, especially captains, 
to perform more complex tasks, the balance should increasingly tilt toward education in the 
captains’ institutional experience.

Training versus Education

Before discussing the development of the Army’s training and education system for 
captains, it is important to distinguish between training and education, and to highlight their 
significant differences. Benjamin S. Bloom developed a hierarchical taxonomy of cognitive 
learning levels beginning with knowledge and progressing to comprehension, application, 
analysis, synthesis and evaluation.4 Alfred North Whitehead, an eminent American philosopher,
reinforced the sequential nature of the process of learning and emphasized that adequate time for repetition and reflection are essential to mastering new material at every cognitive level. The ideas developed by Bloom and Whitehead are the fundamental concepts of the learning process, and most organized education systems use them as the basis of their programs.

The difference between training and education can be summed up as follows: a training program seeks to impart a mastery of the known, while an education program provides the student with the tools to deal with the unknown. Though the Army may be aware of this distinction, it has not yet established it in its doctrinal publications.

The Army defines training as “the instruction of personnel to increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and associated individual and collective tasks.” Training involves a student learning to do a concrete task, and the product of such an endeavor is the acquisition of a skill. Learners engaged in training function at the knowledge, comprehension and application cognitive levels (Levels I–III) of Bloom’s taxonomy of learning. The Army has only recently settled upon a definition for education. According to Army Regulation 350-1, education is “instruction with increased knowledge and skill, and/or experience as the desired outcome for the student.” Education involves learning to “know” an abstract concept, the product of which is knowledge (along with skill or experience). Learners engaged in education function at all cognitive levels of Bloom’s taxonomy, especially at the application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation cognitive levels (Levels III–VI). Thus, one can conclude that training takes place mostly at the lower cognitive levels, education occurs primarily at the higher cognitive levels, and the application level serves as a cognitive bridge between training and education. Figure 1 illustrates this description.

![Figure 1. Training, Education and Cognitive Levels](image-url)
This is not to meant to demean either learning at the lower cognitive levels or training, because learning at the higher cognitive levels requires one to have knowledge and comprehension of the essential elements of the topic or subject being studied. Scholars Joseph D. Noval and D. Bob Gowin have determined that effective learning requires an active interplay between training and education. They contend that the processes of training and education begin with an event and/or an object. But training focuses on gathering data, and transforming the data into comprehensible information to produce knowledge that can be applied. Education takes the knowledge and comprehension, analyzes it to develop new concepts, synthesizes it to develop new principles and conceptual systems, and evaluates it to develop new theories and perhaps new philosophies. Figure 2 uses Gowin’s “Knowledge Vee” to illustrate this point.

Figure 2. Gowin’s “Knowledge Vee”}

The distinction between training and education, the necessity for active interplay between the two types of learning for effective education and the importance of time for repetition and reflection are critical points to consider when examining the development of the Army’s officer education system for captains. Ideally, the system reflects these concepts and serves as an example of their validity. Unfortunately, as the following description shows, it has not always been successful in doing so.

1776–1945: Early Development of the Army’s Officer Education System

The Army has been committed to training its junior officers since its inception, but the initial efforts were sporadic and decentralized. The technical branches were the early leaders in officer training and education. The Corps of Engineers established the Army’s first formal school in 1776, with later iterations appearing in 1801 and 1866. The Artillery branch founded
its first school in 1824. Infantry officers obtained a school for post-commissioning study in 1826. Each school focused on a specific branch and did not allow for interaction with officers of other branches. These schools remained in operation during the first half of the 19th century, but they ceased during the Civil War.

Having recognizing the importance of combined-arms operations during the Civil War, the Army’s leadership began establishing schools that trained and educated officers of different branches together. These included the School of Application of Infantry and Cavalry established in 1881, the Infantry and Cavalry School established in 1886, and the Cavalry and Light Artillery School established in 1887. Recognizing advances in medical technology and the importance of effective medical operations in the era of modern war, the Army Medical Service established its first school in 1893. As before the Civil War, attendance at these schools was not mandatory for advancement, and there was little continuity among the various curricula. Most of the schools suspended operations during the war with Spain as the Army’s junior officers demonstrated through their performance that they were relatively well trained.

The performance of officers at the higher echelons during the Spanish-American War was less impressive. As a result, Secretary of War Elihu Root enacted a series of reforms in 1901 designed to correct the deficiencies in senior officer education that had become apparent during the war with Spain. This includes the establishment of the Army War College in Washington, D.C. and the General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Root also developed a progressive program of instruction to better train and educate all Army officers. Thus, the Root reforms provided the impetus for the emergence of a more systematic method of educating junior officers in the 20th century.

In 1901 the Army established the first formal officer advanced courses for Engineer and Ordnance officers. The Infantry quickly followed, establishing the School of Musketry in 1907 and the Infantry School of Arms in 1913. The Quartermaster Branch established its own school in 1910, followed by the Artillery’s School of Fire in 1911. These schools comprised the Army’s education system that prepared junior officers for their duties before and during the First World War.

The demands of World War I demonstrated the necessity for specialization and specialized training on the modern battlefield. After World War I, the Army underwent a significant reorganization beginning in 1920. The Army had made progress in the training and education of its junior officers prior to World War I, and those efforts were evident on the battlefield. As a result, the Army expanded and enhanced its system of educating junior officers to include branch schools of all the technical services, chaplains and finance officers, as well as reorganized versions of the combat-arms schools. These changes included the addition of the Chaplain’s School in 1918, a Signal School in 1919, and Chemical Warfare and Finance Schools in 1920, as well as revisions of the Field Artillery School in 1919, the Quartermaster and Infantry Schools in 1920 and the Ordnance School in 1921. Of particular note during this period was the addition of tank instruction at the Infantry School. This system trained and educated junior officers until the mobilization immediately prior to World War II.
These schools were bastions of innovation between the two world wars. The Field Artillery School developed the method of Time on Target (TOT) fire delivery, which synchronized the effects of indirect fire originating from different locations. That innovation gave American soldiers in World War II a significant advantage over all other combatants.\(^{18}\) As a result of experiences in World War I, the Infantry School developed the “Holding Attack,” which established uniform tactics for an attack from squad through corps level. That allowed the Army to provide standardized tactical instruction to the massive influx of men during World War II.\(^{19}\) Despite these significant contributions, officer attendance at branch-sponsored advanced courses was incidental and did not occur on a systematic basis from 1911 to 1949.

Post-World War II: Boards, Studies, Adaptation and Change

After World War II the Army began paying significant attention to the formal education of its captains. As a result of its experiences in that war, the Army convened a series of boards and conducted a number of studies to examine the training and education of officers. The majority of the Army’s significant decisions regarding its officer education system appeared in the findings and recommendations of those boards and studies, and the resulting
decisions had lasting impacts on the development of the Army’s system of schools and officer education over the past 50 years.

The Army’s initial effort was the Gerow Board, chaired by Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow. Its charter was to study the Army’s education system with the intent of developing a plan for the postwar education of Army officers. The Gerow Board focused on the Army’s higher schools, but it impacted the system of education for captains because it recommended the establishment of a five-tiered system, one tier of which was branch advanced courses of approximately 10 months’ duration. This recommendation was a significant departure from the prewar education system’s terms of duration. The Gerow Board did not address attendance at the branch advanced course specifically, but the intent was to expand the Army’s education system to provide for the complete education of all Regular Army officers and, to a lesser extent, all Army National Guard and Army Reserve officers as well. The Army adopted a modified version of the Gerow Board’s recommendation that included branch basic and advanced courses, but the plan did not specify the timing of attendance for officers, nor did it include a definitive attendance policy.

In 1949, Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy headed another board that examined the adequacy of the Army’s education system, but this board focused more on the training and education of junior officers. Eddy’s board examined the basic and advanced courses and, building on the analysis contained in the Gerow report, the board’s recommendations established the rough framework of the Army’s modern system of junior officer education. The Eddy Board supported the Gerow Board’s recommendation to establish branch basic and advanced courses; however, the Eddy Board went further by proposing the establishment of three schools for junior officer education and training: an orientation course, a branch basic course and a branch advanced course. The specialization of combat tasks recognized during World War I and again during World War II, coupled with the more recent requirement for rapid mobilization, demonstrated the limitations of precommissioning training and the need for specialized branch training immediately after commissioning and prior to serving with troops. That recommendation represented another significant departure from the Army’s prewar practices because leaders assumed that precommissioning sources prepared young officers adequately to succeed in troop assignments and that any deficiencies could be overcome through unit training programs and on-the-job training.

In terms of junior officer education, the Eddy Board recommended the adoption of a policy requiring all second lieutenants of the Regular Army to attend a branch orientation course of four to 14 weeks’ duration after commissioning and before arriving at their first unit. The intent of this course was to familiarize all officers with the basic equipment, tactics and responsibilities of their branch before being placed in charge of soldiers. According to the Eddy Board’s recommendations, all Regular Army officers would attend a branch basic course, called a Company Officers’ Course, after acquiring between two and five years of experience with troops. This course was to equip officers to perform duties at company and battalion levels. Though the course would not exceed 11 months, the Eddy Board recommended an immediate increase in its duration from the wartime expedient of 12 weeks, which allowed for little more than a focus on training, to a more substantial 20
weeks to allow captains to receive both training and education. Between five and 12 years of service, Regular Army officers were to attend branch advanced courses, called Advanced Officers Courses, designed to provide officers with instruction in combined-arms operations and the organization and functions of the division general staff. While the Eddy Board specified time-in-service thresholds for attendance at each of the three junior officer schools, the board’s recommendations did not stipulate that Regular Army captains had to attend their branch advanced courses prior to assuming command of a company. As a result of these recommendations, Regular Army officers enjoyed a significant advantage over their Army National Guard and Army Reserve counterparts in terms of professional education for the next several decades.

The policy of having all Regular Army lieutenants attend an orientation course immediately after commissioning ceased 11 October 1949, but the merits of such a course became obvious in late 1950 during the first year of the Korean War. The Army noticed the inordinately high number of casualties among newly commissioned officers from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) Class of 1950 sent directly to their units and into combat without first completing a branch orientation course. Based in part on those casualty rates, on 29 December 1950 the Army reinstated branch orientation courses, modified to last between four and eight weeks. West Point lore holds that the Class of 1950 suffered the highest percentage of combat casualties; while this claim is difficult to substantiate, it serves to illustrate the value of training and educating officers before they are assigned to lead soldiers.

During the time of the Gerow and Eddy boards, the Army was experimenting with ways to increase its sources of Regular Army officers available for active service. In 1948, just prior to the Korean War, the Army began the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Distinguished Military Graduate program that permitted selected ROTC graduates to obtain Regular Army commissions and serve on active duty. This program allowed officers trained at places other than West Point or through the Officer Candidate School (OCS) to gain access to the training and education afforded to “traditionally trained” Regular Army officers. Prior to this, the peacetime officer corps comprised almost exclusively officers trained at the Academy, private military colleges and OCS. The Army temporarily acquired large numbers of officers trained in other ways (state militias, summer camps, etc.) only during periods of great expansion, such as the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I and World War II, and its education system was focused on providing peacetime training to a fairly homogenous group of officers as opposed to officers coming from a wide variety of backgrounds during periods of crisis.

During the Korean War, however, the Army adopted a policy of assigning ROTC officers to active duty status, a significant change from previous practices. After 1952, this practice survived and the Army adopted a policy of assigning 80 percent or more of graduating ROTC officers to active duty. Together, these changes introduced another level of diversity in precommissioning training and allowed officers from a wide variety of commissioning sources access to the education and training opportunities traditionally reserved for Regular Army officers.
In an effort to continue improving, in 1954 the Army prepared a review of its school system. This review concluded that the existing system accomplished the “training and educational objectives for which it was designed.” The review merely recounted the Army’s past efforts to train and educate its officers and did not make any recommendations for the future.

The next significant study began three years later. Lieutenant General Edward T. Williams chaired the Williams Board, which proved to be the most comprehensive look at the Army’s school system yet conducted. Staffed with 10 other senior officers and provided with unprecedented resources, the members of the Williams Board met at Fort Monroe, Virginia, for six months beginning 7 January 1958 and submitted their completed report on 1 July 1958. The members of the Williams Board visited all Army colleges, most branch schools, the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82d Airborne Division while also holding several conferences at the Pentagon. The purpose of the Williams Board was to determine whether the existing system of education and training for Army officers from the time of commissioning to the completion of senior service college was adequate. While the board determined that the Army’s existing school system was “generally adequate to meet the needs of the Army from 1958 to 1970,” it believed the system could be adjusted and refined. The board felt the existing system had an improper balance between education and training at each level and concluded that the Army school system should “initially emphasize the training of the branch specialist for immediate duty and should progressively broaden each field until, at the highest level, emphasis is placed on educating the generalist for duty in the indefinite time frame.”

The issue of education versus training was extremely important to the members of the Williams Board, who recommended specific definitions for each so the Army could understand and make a distinction between the two. According to the board members, military education meant “individual instruction provided by schools and extension courses, given without regard to the student’s job assignment or membership in a particular unit,” while individual training referred to “instruction given to individuals for the purpose of providing training in a particular military specialty.” The board members believed that making a distinction between education and training was critical, and their report stated that “education implies formal instruction and study leading to intellectual development to include the making of sound decisions,” while “training implies instruction and supervised practice toward acquisition of a skill.”

Addressing the system of educating company-grade officers, the board reinforced the Eddy Board’s recommendation that all newly commissioned officers attend an eight-week orientation course prior to assignment to duty with troops, but the members felt the existence of two courses for company-grade officers was no longer desirable. The board recommended consolidating the two courses into a single comprehensive branch course lasting approximately one academic year and designed to prepare officers to perform duties at company through brigade levels. The board members believed such a course should also include instruction on “the organization of the division, the functions of the division general staff, and sufficient instruction on division operations to provide branch perspective.” The board recommended officers attend this course between their third and eighth years of service, and they did not
specify graduation as a prerequisite for company command. Thus, the recommendations of the Williams Board in 1958, building on the recommendations of the 1949 Eddy Board, established the modern system of company-grade officer education that continues today. This system consists of a basic course focused on branch orientation and an advanced course focused on producing branch experts at the brigade level and below.

The board also believed the policy of educating Regular Army officers more extensively than Army National Guard and Army Reserve officers was no longer desirable, especially in light of the dramatic increase in the number of Reserve officers from ROTC programs serving on active duty. The report recommended that “all career officers, without regard to component, should attend their branch courses in order to attain the requisite professional skills.”37 For officers not serving on active duty, the board recommended developing shorter associate courses comprising a combination of resident and nonresident instruction that could also be used to accommodate exceptional circumstances, such as rapid, large-scale mobilizations.38 Based on the increasing complexity of war and the expanding amount of information Army officers had to master, the Williams Board believed these demands would require officers to spend an increasing portion of their careers in resident schooling.39

The Army’s next examination of its system for educating and training officers came in 1961 as a result of a “continuing disparity between Department of Defense budget analysts and the Army concerning the efficiency with which the Army school system operates.”40 After the Army lost $5.5 million of operating funds for its school system, Under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes directed “a thorough study of [the Army’s] school system with a view to effecting maximum operates.”41 Lieutenant General J. P. Daley chaired the Daley Board, comprising 17 other senior officers. The Daley Board examined Navy and Air Force schools and determined the Army’s schools would benefit from greater centralization, in terms of both chain of command and physical location. Accordingly, the board recommended establishing a direct chain of command from the United States Continental Army Command (CONARC) to each school for which it had jurisdiction and consolidating as many branch schools as possible in central locations.42 The board’s recommendations established the policy of linking temporary-duty (TDY) schools with permanent changes of station and was also the first to raise questions about the quality and qualifications of instructors assigned to the Army’s schools. Perhaps most importantly, the board did not recommend a reorganization of the Army school system. Because the Army was undergoing a significant transformation from its pentomic organization to the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) configuration, the board members felt they could not recommend any reorganization of the Army school system until the implementing instructions for the Army’s reorganization were developed and could be studied to determine the impact and identify necessary changes.43

In 1965, a group more like the Williams Board met to assess the Army’s officer education and training system. Chaired by Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., the Haines Board comprised 11 other senior officers and one civilian consultant who met for seven months.44 The board examined the school systems of other American and foreign military services and the managerial/executive schools of eight large industrial corporations. Board members
also visited more than 70 military installations. The board’s purpose was “to determine the adequacy and appropriateness of the current Army school system and the education and individual school training of Army officers in light of responsibilities which will confront the Military Establishment for the foreseeable future; and to recommend such changes in direction, structure, or operation of the system or in the academic program during the next decade as will make the greatest contribution to the discharge of those responsibilities.”

Examining the career-long training and education of officers within the context of actual and anticipated Department of Defense needs, the board paid particular attention to the missions of the Army’s schools, the curricula of the career courses, the selection, training, qualifications and roles of the faculty, and the possibility of introducing electives into Army schools.

The outcome of this study included a proposed revision to the career courses’ curricula. Based upon their finding that the career course was not meeting the needs of the students, the board determined that the current career course was not a “lasting and satisfying intellectual experience” because students were learning things they already knew, were being “spoon fed,” and were being mostly trained. The Board concluded by stating, “In short, [the career course students] must be educated as well as trained.”

The board members recommended that “each branch school conduct a single type of career course of approximately one academic year for officers of the Active Army,” and that the course be redesignated as the advanced course. The focus of the advanced course should be to “prepare officers for command and staff duties at battalion through brigade or comparable levels in both divisional and non-divisional units, with emphasis on command at battalion level, and for duty as assistant division general staff officers.”

The board members, also believing captains should attend the advanced course earlier, focused on the population of officers with between four and nine years of service. Finally, the Haines Board recommended that instead of numerically ranking all students, Army schools should adopt a policy of identifying the top graduate of each course, designated as the “Honor Graduate,” and placing the top 20 percent of the graduates on the “Commandant’s List,” similar to a Dean’s List in civilian institutions.

The Haines Board also addressed the issue of initial training and education for officers. Owing to the greater number of ROTC-trained officers on active duty, the Board recommended that all newly commissioned Other Than Regular Army (OTRA) officers “attend an officer basic course [of not more than nine weeks’ duration] covering company/battery fundamentals relevant to their first duty assignment and emphasizing practical work and field instruction,” and that “entry training for Regular Army officers [coming from West Point and ROTC] include a shortened basic course six weeks in length (five for Infantry officers)” and an eight-week Ranger course. The Haines Board found, much as the Williams Board members believed, that all officers except those produced through OCS required additional initial training prior to joining their units. This recommendation established a system in which the advanced courses were the first Army educational experience that would train all active duty officers to the same standard and would allow for interaction among officers from the various commissioning sources.
In 1970, Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland tasked Major General Frank W. Norris to conduct a study of the Army’s officer education system. Norris was a good choice for this assignment because he had been a member of the Williams Board in 1957–1958. Westmoreland wanted Norris to help him revise the officer education system by making recommendations for “improved policies for operations of the officer education system,” with special emphasis on the areas of curriculum, instructor and instruction quality and the thrust of the education. After completing his study, Norris recommended an advanced course curriculum that provided a balanced program of reasonable academic effort and a mixture of athletic, recreational, social and family activities. He felt the advanced courses offered the Army the best opportunity to develop its young officers into dedicated, competent professionals and to retain them beyond their required military obligations. He concluded that “a special objective of the Advanced Course should be to assure that the student has a full, rewarding, and ‘happy’ year.” Echoing the Williams Board’s distinction between education and training, Norris recommended that the basic course curriculum should reflect a balance of 75 percent training and 25 percent education, the advanced course curriculum should be a 50-50 mix of education and training, and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum should be weighted so that about 80 percent of its instruction was educational and the remaining 20 percent would be considered training. Norris also recommended that Army schools adopt student-centered pedagogical approaches whenever practicable. He concluded by reiterating the Haines Board recommendation of introducing electives into the advanced course curricula to make them more flexible, adaptable and relevant to each individual student officer.

The Army’s most significant recent efforts to revise its training and education of captains occurred after the end of the Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. As a part of the Army’s efforts to recover in the post-Vietnam War era, it began examining its education system in some detail. The Army did this through a series of studies that laid the foundation for the current captains’ OES.

The Review of Education and Training of Officers Study

By spring 1977, the Army’s leadership generally agreed the existing education system was not producing officers with “the desired level of military competency.” In addition, the Army faced the prospect of losing 75 percent of its resources devoted to officer education and training because, among other reasons, the Army was not justifying its education and training resource requirements convincingly. Against this background, on 31 August 1977 Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers, initiated the Army’s effort to examine its system for educating and training its officers when he ordered the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study. Rogers assigned the RETO study group the following mission:

... to determine officer training and education requirements based on Army missions and individual career development needs. Based on these requirements, develop training and education policies and programs which combine self-development, unit development, and institutional development in a phased schedule from
precommissioning or preappointment training through career completion. Develop these programs with the prospect of implementation in a constrained resource environment; present the programs to the Chief of Staff, Army for approval and coordinate the integration of approved programs into the FY 1980–1981 program.59

Of significant note is the first phrase in the last sentence, which required the study group to develop its program with the prospect of implementation in a “constrained resource environment.” This is the first post-World War II mention of resources as an issue in the officer education system, and the study group could not discount its impact.

This RETO study group’s mission was important, ambitious and necessary, and Rogers selected a talented group of officers to accomplish his objectives. Headed by Major General Benjamin L. Harrison, the 44 members of the RETO study group formed in August and September 1977 at the Pentagon and worked out of Rogers’ office.60 Throughout its 10-month duration, the study team averaged about 30 members, obtained input from at least 100 general officers, made use of several hundred officers in the position analysis and involved more than 14,000 officers in various surveys.

RETO’s self-described purpose was “to examine the Army’s officer education and training as a continuous system rather than merely to look at the existing schools as discrete institutions whose existence was preordained.”61 The group produced a pioneering report, presenting the results of the RETO study group and addressing the education of officers from precommissioning through the general officer ranks.

The RETO study group was a landmark effort in terms of Army officer education. The RETO study group’s final report, submitted to Rogers on 30 June 1978, has been called “the genesis for today’s military school system” in the Army.62 The report’s main thrust recommended the Army establish and implement a system to provide a complete career education and training program that allowed officers to accomplish Army missions. Making numerous recommendations, the report was perhaps the most influential officer education study since the Williams Board Report of 1958.

The RETO study group determined that relatively few totally new skills were introduced in the advanced courses, as most had been introduced at the basic courses and simply taught at a higher or more complex level in the advanced courses.63 This observation led the RETO study group to conclude that officer advanced courses were no longer necessary because many of the skills taught in these courses could be learned more effectively at expanded basic courses, and this instruction would prepare officers better for their first three or four years of service.64 For those highly technical skills requiring resident instruction by qualified officers, the RETO study recommended instituting a series of TDY schools that officers could attend at appropriate times in their careers.

The RETO study group also advised the Army to establish a staff officer course where mid-grade officers could learn requisite staff officer skills. The establishment of what became the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) at Fort Leavenworth was one of the most influential and lasting recommendations of the RETO study group, and its impact over the past 20 years has been substantial.
According to the RETO study group, beyond the basic course captains would receive their training and education at CAS3 and through on-the-job training (OJT) and Military Qualification Standards (MQS) training in units. The group believed this approach would supplement the captains’ institutional training and round out the officers’ education. The RETO study authors summarized their recommendation as follows:

Very simply, the skills taught in the Advanced Course will be split out four ways. Some will be taught earlier in the Basic Course, while some will be taught later in CAS3. The majority, however, will be taught in company command courses and other TDY functional courses or will be learned on-the-job, in the unit, as an integral part of MQS III.65

Figure 4. Army Officer Education System Development, 1973–2001
The authors also addressed how canceling the Advanced Course would result in the loss of time for officers to reflect on and discuss issues and to exchange ideas with their peers. While recognizing the unique value of these aspects of resident military education, the RETO study group believed the recent reduction of the Advanced Course from 35 weeks to 26 weeks had already curtailed these benefits significantly. It believed officers would develop closer relationships with officers assigned to their units as a result of longer tours made possible by canceling the Advanced Course, and that a combination of the benefits of the MQS system and the TDY schools would compensate for the loss.\textsuperscript{66}

The Army began implementing the RETO study’s recommendations over the next several years. RETO’s most visible impact was the creation and implementation of CAS3. Based upon a thorough study of emerging educational theory, CAS3 was, from the beginning, developed in the small-group instruction format using seasoned field grade officers as facilitators and mentors for the students. The initial CAS3 test class occurred in 1981, and the school began normal operations in 1983. “Normal operations” consisted of offering an initial phase that officers completed via correspondence—the famous “box of books”\textsuperscript{1} and a nine-week resident course of instruction. Officer advanced courses continued to offer 26-week curricula, providing captains with 35 weeks of resident military instruction in addition to the correspondence phase of CAS3.

Far from solving the Army’s education problems, the RETO study initiated intense debate over what Army officers should learn, when they should learn it, where this learning should take place and in what kind of forum it should occur. Responding to the RETO study’s radical recommendation to do away with the advanced course in favor of other forms of education, Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, the Inspector General of the Army, argued quite the opposite. Representing the other end of the spectrum of opinion on captains’ education, Trefry sent a memo to Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr. in August 1983 arguing that 26 weeks was insufficient time to teach officers the principles of command, leadership and management at the advanced course.\textsuperscript{67}

As evidenced by Trefry’s comments, the early 1980s was a period of tremendous intellectual activity in the Army. The professional journals of that time are rife with probing articles examining all aspects of the profession of arms. One such article appeared in the December 1984 issue of\textit{Military Review}. Then-Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, who later became the first director of what is now known as the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), argued that an “education training gap” existed within the military education system between where the Army was and where it needed to be.\textsuperscript{68} Echoing many current concerns, Wass de Czege highlighted as contributing factors to this problem the reduced time available for officers to learn on the job, the exponential increase in the technical complexity of modern war, the difficulty of achieving effective combined-arms integration, the need for American officers to do more with less and the rapidly changing technologies.\textsuperscript{69} To address these challenges, Wass de Czege recommended better training and more education plus development of a system of officer education that emphasized “how to think about war in broad terms and not only what to think in terms of functionally defined doctrinal prescriptions” based upon an education in the theories and principles of warfighting.\textsuperscript{70}
believed the military education system must be able to develop officers with better military judgment and that CAS3 should serve as the foundation for this endeavor.71

**Professional Development of Officers Study**

The Army’s expansion and diversification during the Reagan era and the service’s ongoing efforts to develop effective doctrine and acquire appropriate weapon systems to employ that doctrine led the Army senior leadership to direct a study that would help determine the progress and effectiveness of the Army’s officer education system. Lieutenant General Charles W. Bagnal received a tasking to serve as the study director for the Army’s Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS), conducted from May 1984 to February 1985. Bagnal’s mandate was “to reexamine all aspects of the officer professional development system as it has evolved since the 1978 RETO study, and to project the applicability of that system and our recommendations out to 2025.”72 The study “delved into every area of officer professional development with particular concentration on education, training, and roles of the major players in the professional development process.” According to Bagnal, “Perhaps our most significant conclusion is that while the officer professional development system is not in need of major overhaul, it must be transitioned to an education and training strategy which will more effectively meet tomorrow’s challenges.”73

Returning to the theme of training and education first discussed by the Williams Board in 1958, the PDOS study indicated that the Army’s “education and training strategy has evolved to be one with a disproportionate focus on training, reflecting the constant tension between theory and practice, between training and education.”74 Recognizing the existence of this tension, the PDOS study determined, “It is difficult to develop an officer corps characterized by its ability to think—to understand the theory of war, not just the conduct of bits and pieces of it. The key to doing this is creating the proper climate to truly educate the officer.”75 To be effective, the PDOS authors believed, “the ultimate aims of the Education and Training Methods program” should include the opportunity to “maximize each officer’s capability for excellence and contribution to his profession over a series of assignments,” while training goals include the opportunity to “maximize each officer’s capability for excellence in those skills required in current and/or immediately subsequent assignment[s],” and as a way to “provide a means for an officer to acquire factual knowledge.”76 Recognizing the increasingly complex nature of war, the PDOS authors concluded:

> It is no longer realistic to think that a few years of college or graduate school are an adequate educational foundation for a lifetime of service. A thoughtfully created and executed program of on-going continuous training and education is required of every officer for him [or her] to avoid having his [or her] knowledge become obsolete. A lifestyle of life-long education is a must, not an option. An officer must be expected to study, not allowed to.77

While it is certainly true that officers move from the specific to the general in terms of knowledge required during their careers, it is not axiomatic that the specific knowledge they require be obtained by training alone. Indeed, officers learn much from education, and captains are forced to do so during their period of professional education.
To assist captains in acquiring the necessary education, the PDOS study created the concept of “transition points”—identified as commissioning, promotion to captain and promotion to major—and recommended the Army’s officer education system take advantage of the opportunities presented during these unique periods. According to the study, “Transition point education helps officers adjust to their new responsibilities and acquire an appropriately modified frame of reference within which to operate. The ideal education program would exploit these transition points and program in schools at the appropriate places.”

Expounding on promotion to captain as a critical transition point, PDOS determined that officers experienced their greatest period of professional growth as captains because they were responsible for “the command of units, organizations, and soldiers” and engaged “in the full range of responsibilities which span all levels in the Army organization.” Serving as experts in their branch skills at company and battalion levels and performing as staff officers, captains had to not only retain the military knowledge and skills they learned as lieutenants but also expand them from a purely branch orientation to a combined-arms and services orientation. Attesting to the educational nature of captains’ duties, the PDOS study observed:

Captains focus on cementing branch proficiencies and expanding their capabilities into a combined arms and services context by using appropriate elements of professional and self-development programs. . . . Unit and organizational experiences provide the real-world laboratory in which captains apply theory, experiment with innovative solutions to old problems, and develop methods of attacking new and different situations. Service schools provide the environment, which broadens their knowledge and introduces new challenges and education and training technologies. Service schools also provide training support materials to individuals, units, and organizations and keep the computer knowledge base current for all users.

The PDOS authors determined that the aim of this development period is “to develop through a combination of education, training, self-development, and assignments, a captain who is branch qualified, competent to command at company level, prepared to serve on battalion, brigade, and higher level staffs, and prepared for further branch and/or functional area development.”

Owing to the role of captains in the Army, PDOS highlighted the importance of the advanced course because it allowed officers “to put past experience into perspective and enables him [or her] to learn the latest doctrine.” PDOS authors identified the other component of captains’ education, CAS3, as no less important to the officers’ development. According to the study:

The CAS3 course provides a standardized staff training experience that brings all students to an equal level in terms of common staff processes. The course also reinforces a common shared operational language and standardized decision making processes. The 1978 RETO study recommended that CAS3 be designated as a majors course; however, research on when and where officers serve on combined
arms and [Table of Distribution and Allowances] staff suggests that the course needs to be presented not later than the eighth year of service in order for most captains to get training before or while serving on their first combined arms staff. Based on the PDOS authors’ determination that “captains learn from their experiences, whether in service schools, on field exercises, or from simulations of challenging situations,” the report also recommended the Army make small-group instruction the norm in the captains’ officer education system. According to the PDOS authors, small-group instruction “continue[d] to provide an ideal forum for leadership development, peer interaction, and individual assessment.” In 1987, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) resourced small-group instruction for captains by establishing an officer advanced course instructor-to-student ratio of 1-to-16. In 1987 TRADOC directed the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) to adopt this instructional methodology as well.

Following the PDOS study, several events and circumstances brought the captains’ officer education system under intense scrutiny. Having adopted the small-group instructional method at the advanced courses and CGSOC, and with CAS3 operating at maximum capacity, TRADOC began experiencing an extremely high demand for instructors just when the Army’s Cold War expansion began approaching the limits of its available resources. A number of factors created this condition. One was the Cold War expansion as the Army reached its maximum size of 780,000 soldiers spread among 18 divisions. Another was the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act calling for increased joint interaction among the services that required officers to spend more time away from their traditional branch assignments. In addition, in 1988 the Army’s operational tempo began to increase exponentially. As a result, while commanders in the field were delighted with the competency of the captains they received from CAS3, they began complaining that the cost was excessive in terms of the officers’ time away from their units. In 1990, TRADOC commander General John W. Foss directed CAS3 to examine the possibility of combining the advanced courses with CAS3. The resulting study determined that such a combination was feasible, but that it would not produce any appreciable cost savings. The events in Southwest Asia during the latter portion of 1990 and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991 delayed any further study of captains’ education, but the Gulf War had a significant impact on the Army’s ability to continue supporting its robust officer education system.

The combination of two particular outcomes of the Gulf War had an inordinate impact on the Army’s ability to resource its captains’ officer education system. The first was the 1992 congressionally mandated requirement for the Army to provide a significant number of active component officers to assist reserve component units in their training and readiness efforts. The AC/RC Program relied heavily on branch-qualified captains, which meant fewer experienced captains were available to serve as small-group instructors at their respective branch advanced courses. The Army also experienced a significant drawdown after the Gulf War, reducing the strength of its officer corps from a high of 88,000 to 64,000 by the year 2000. These two developments added additional stress to a program already bearing significant burdens.
In an effort to reduce the burden on its educational system and allow captains to spend more time with their units in the field, in 1993 TRADOC took the results of the 1990 CAS3 study and developed a concept for combining the advanced courses and CAS3 into a single entity known as a captain’s career course.\textsuperscript{91} The idea was to maintain the advanced courses to teach captains their branch-specific skills and, upon their graduation, send them directly to Fort Leavenworth to learn the staff process at CAS3. One goal of the TRADOC study was to determine if the Army could develop a system that did not require officers to travel to Fort Leavenworth as part of their career course education and so alleviate some of the turbulence experienced by officers with young families just coming from operations assignments, which likely meant long periods of deployment. After a site survey that included trips to Germany, TRADOC determined that Fort Leavenworth was, in fact, the best place to provide captains instruction in the staff process because of Fort Leavenworth’s emerging status as an Army “university” and center of learning for leaders. Nevertheless, TRADOC developed a four-phased plan that would allow officers to complete their career course education at their respective schools and centers instead of Fort Leavenworth.

This plan originated from the 1993 TRADOC Reengineering Study, directed by then-TRADOC Commander General Frederick M. Franks. Despite determining that the Army’s officer education system was “a healthy system that had steadily evolved and changed to meet the needs of the Army from 1900 through the present,”\textsuperscript{92} Franks developed a four-phase program that revised and shortened officer advanced courses and CAS3, identified branch schools as locations where captains received branch-specific and/or technical training, identified CAS3 as the location where captains received education in the staff process, linked CAS3 attendance to Officer Advanced Course (OAC) graduation and envisioned captains obtaining all instruction at their branch schools.\textsuperscript{93}

The four-phase program for the captains’ officer education system emanated from 1995 guidance, issued by then-TRADOC commander General William W. Hartzog.\textsuperscript{94} Hartzog’s guidance established a goal of creating a program that allowed officers to receive all career course training and education at their branch schools (staff process taught via distributive education), despite the PDOS conclusion that “the pressures to keep up and stay current, coupled with the time pressures of the daily routine, make it difficult, if not impossible, for officers to take time to reflect and draw insights about their profession” when assigned to units and organizations.\textsuperscript{95}

Phase I recognized the status quo of the captains’ officer education at the time—which consisted of a 20-week OAC and a nine-week CAS3 course—and simply linked the two components by recognizing that they constituted officer education for captains. Phase II, initiated on 1 October 1996, directed the implementation of a single, three-phased Captains Career Course merging common core (two weeks) and technical/tactical training (16 weeks) at the centers, and staff process training (six weeks) at Fort Leavenworth (CAS3). During the implementation of Phase II, Army leaders worked to send captains directly from their advanced courses to CAS3, reduced the CAS3 curriculum from nine to six weeks and increased the number of CAS3 classes offered annually from five to seven.\textsuperscript{96} Despite
these accomplishments, TRADOC was not able to realize its goal of creating the Captains Career Course until 1 October 1998, when Phase III began.\textsuperscript{97}

Envisioning a reduced advance course, Phase III created a Captains Career Course (CCC) comprising an advanced course reduced from 20 to 18 weeks of resident attendance at branch schools (CCC Phase I), followed immediately by a six-week CAS3 course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (CCC Phase II). During Phase IV of the effort, the intent was to combine Phase I and Phase II of the CCC so that captains could receive the training and education at one location (i.e., branch schools and centers). Phase IV included a two-week Advanced Distributive Learning (ADL) portion, during which officers learned core competencies during individual learning, followed by 16 weeks of branch-specific training and an additional two weeks of staff process training.\textsuperscript{98} Phase IV was scheduled for implementation on 1 October 2001, but Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer postponed it, citing a desire to retain the “immense benefit of staff group leader mentoring and interaction between branches” at CAS3.\textsuperscript{99} As a result, the Army’s education system remains at the Phase III of the implementation of TRADOC’s plan. Despite declining to implement Phase IV, General Reimer directed TRADOC to examine ways of reducing further the 18-week branch phases of the Career Courses and study the potential of Advance Distributive Learning for portions of Phase I of the CCC while preserving the “hands-on” technical aspects of branch school training.\textsuperscript{100} The Army began addressing this requirement in 1999, and the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study addressed this issue and others regarding officer education directly.

**Office of Personnel Management Systems XXI**

After implementing Phase II of the TRADOC program for captains’ officer education, the Army convened another board from July 1996 to July 1997 to study officer issues within the organization. The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI study addressed a variety of professional issues, one of which was officer education.\textsuperscript{101} The study concluded that the Army’s current officer education system model focused on training (i.e., how to perform a task) and spent too little time focusing on education (i.e., how to think).\textsuperscript{102} The study’s authors recommended the Army “increase the portion of time in institutional training devoted to education.”\textsuperscript{103} In particular, the authors recommended increases in the “time spent on analysis and synthesis, creativity, forms of decision making other than deliberate decision making, and moral reasoning and its relationship to Army values.”\textsuperscript{104} The OPMS XXI authors also recommended that the Army provide all majors with an Intermediate Level Education (ILE), described as a resident educational experience, at the Army’s Command and General Staff College. At the time of the study, only 53 percent of the majors received such an experience.\textsuperscript{105}

**Army Training and Leader Development Panel**

After implementing Phase III of its strategy for captains’ officer education, and in response to many internal and external issues, the Army established the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) from June 2000 to February 2001.\textsuperscript{106} The ATLDP
was the most comprehensive examination of the Army’s officer education system since the PDOS study of 1984–1985. Curiously, while its members conducted extensive research prior to convening the panel, they determined they would only consider officer education studies conducted within the previous 25 years. As a result, while the ATLDP panel members benefited from the works of the RETO, PDOS and OPMS XXI studies, they were never exposed to the results of other significant studies, including those of the Gerow, Eddy, Williams, Daley and Haines boards and the Norris report.

Among its many conclusions, the ATLDP members determined the Army’s current officer education system did “not satisfactorily train officers in combined-arms skills or support the bonding, cohesion and rapid teaming required in full spectrum operations.” The panel’s conclusions also highlighted resources as a significant concern. The panel’s results were critical of the training and education provided majors and lieutenants and included recommendations for significant revisions to the Army’s existing methods for their training and education. In particular, the panel recommended developing a two-phased officer basic course and providing all majors with quality resident ILE.

The report did not contain any direct criticism of the captains’ officer education system. Nevertheless, the panel members recommended the development and implementation of new captains’ career courses that provided combined-arms training to all captains, opportunities for captains to train with lieutenants and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and training on company-level, branch-specific technical and tactical skills. Interestingly, the panel’s recommendations removed all mention of staff skills in the captain’s officer education system, replacing most of those references with the nondoctrinal term “battle captain skills,” appearing to negate one of the major recommendations of the RETO study.

While one may argue the current system accomplishes all of these objectives, this recommendation spurred development of plans for a radical and unprecedented overhaul of the Army’s officer education system for lieutenants, captains and majors. Current efforts are focused on providing officers the “right education at the right time and the right place.” For captains, the emphasis is on creating a career course, similar to the TRADOC Phase IV model that Reimer refused to implement, that combines all training at their branch school or center—including lessons learned from the major campaigns of the Global War on Terrorism—incorporates the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs), and relies heavily on ADL techniques for certain portions of the training.

Four Other Important Events

Most of the important changes in the Army’s officer education system for captains have been reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of the various Army boards and studies conducted over the past 58 years. However, four recent events have also significantly impacted the contemporary development of the Army’s officer education system for captains. The first was Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki’s 1999 readiness decision to fill Army divisions to 100 percent of their authorizations by taking substantial resources from TRADOC. The second event was a retention decision by the Army’s Cadet
Command to reduce significantly and regulate closely the amount of field training required for ROTC cadets. The 2001 resource allocation decision to have TRADOC alter the Army’s officer education system in a “zero-sum gain” resource environment was another important event. Taken together with the decision to provide all majors with ILE, these decisions committed the Army to an officer education strategy requiring a dramatic increase in the resources provided to train lieutenants and majors while reducing the resources provided to TRADOC to accomplish these objectives. These issues reflect the conflicting concerns of contemporary readiness and future preparation common to all organizations, and the decisions indicate an emphasis on contemporary readiness at the expense of future preparation. The 2002 decisions to assign responsibility for initial officer training to the U.S. Army Accessions Command (USAAC) and for TRADOC to assume control of the Army War College on 1 October 2003 are significant as well and potentially could make TRADOC’s officer education responsibilities even more difficult to meet, given the current resource allocations.

The fourth and final event was the October 2003 decision to form a Leader Development and Education Task Force (LDETF) at Fort Leavenworth. Based on the findings and subsequent recommendations of the ATLDP, in 2001 the Army had begun an initiative to redesign its officer education system for captains. While these efforts were ongoing and continuous, they were also suspect to many individuals associated or concerned with the redesign process. In summer 2003, just when the redesign efforts appeared to have reached a point of no return (indeed, many officers connected with the project believed the damage done by the redesign process could not be repaired), Lieutenant General James C. Reilly, the officer responsible for directing the redesign process, retired. Lieutenant General William S. Wallace took Reilly’s place, allowing many individuals involved in the process to express their distress with the direction of the redesign initiative. In August 2003, they convinced Wallace to request a delay in the redesign process based on senior leader concerns that the product of the redesign initiative would not meet the demands of an Army at war. The TRADOC Commanding General concurred with the recommendation and received approval from the Chief of Staff of the Army to reexamine the entire process of redesigning the Army’s officer education system for captains.113

To accomplish this objective, the Army formed the LDETF and tasked it with proposing a strategy and developing a new plan designed to develop Army leaders at all levels with “the right mix of unit experience, training, education, and self-development to meet current and future leadership requirements.”114 The LDETF is charged to ensure that the redesigned curriculums “incorporate lessons learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, five terminal learning objectives from the Combined Arms and Staff Services School curriculum, digitized training, and a six-day Combined Arms Exercise (CAX)” into their programs of instruction.115 In reviewing the Army’s history of developing its education systems, this action is extraordinarily positive and represents a return to the precedents set by the Gerow Board and all subsequent boards and studies up to and including OPMS XXI. While the work of the LDETF is ongoing, its establishment and charter bode well for the future of captains’ education and training.
Analysis

When the 13 officer education studies conducted by the Army over the past 52 years are reviewed, several trends stand out. The first is how the importance of initial officer institutional training has increased disproportionately, metamorphosing from informal orientation courses to leadership laboratories designed to give lieutenants common understanding of basic small-unit combat training, platoon leader and officership skills. While the official justification for this increase in importance cites officer dissatisfaction with lieutenants’ ability to perform, it is more accurately attributed to the continuing disparity of precommissioning preparation among officers coming from OCS, USMA and ROTC since the end of World War II.

A second remarkable trend is the interrelation among officer basic, officer advanced and CGSOC, which has become more pronounced during the past half-century. This interrelation began with the centralization under CONARC in 1964, increased with the establishment of TRADOC in 1973, and progressed to the present, where changes in one course are likely to impact the resources for other courses. The centralization of schools under CONARC and TRADOC and the adoption by 1987 of small-group instructional methods at all TRADOC schools established the conditions for this situation by pooling instructors under one headquarters and using an educational method requiring a large number of instructors. From 1973 to 1987, TRADOC had the resources, desire and inclination to design a system to train and educate a large number of officers utilizing a method that provided a high instructor-to-student ratio. Reduced levels of money and manpower forced TRADOC to make a series of trade-offs in order to continue training and educating a large number of officers with a resource-intensive instructional method during the Army’s drawdown period of 1991–2000.

The intimate interrelationship among officer basic and advanced courses and CGSOC resulted from a unique confluence of recent decisions: to provide all majors with a resident CGSOC education, to fill divisions to their full authorization levels, to reduce the amount of field training ROTC cadets receive, and to require TRADOC to make changes to the Army’s officer education system within a “zero-sum gain” resource environment. In addition, the dramatic increase in the Army’s operational tempo necessitated an emphasis on contemporary readiness at the expense of future preparation, especially in terms of officer education. Between World War I and World War II, the Army had to make similar decisions and chose to emphasize future preparation, especially officer education, over contemporary readiness. However, that interwar period had far less robust operational tempo demands. While the Army obviously needs to make changes to the education provided to lieutenants and majors, it does not follow that the element of the officer education system working the best, the captains’ component, must change as well.

A third important trend concerns the fluctuations in the amount of staff training and education provided officers since World War II. Prior to the establishment of CAS3 in 1981, officers received varying degrees of staff training and education in their advanced courses. In the 30 years following World War II, captains received little formal training as staff
officers under the assumption that few captains served in significant capacities as staff officers and that at least half of the majors would receive substantial staff training at the CGSOC. In addition, the length of the officer advanced courses permitted each branch school to provide as much staff training for their officers as deemed appropriate. As a result of a reduction in the length of officer advanced courses, the Army recognized a need to provide officers with formal training as staff officers. Beginning with the RETO study in 1977–1978, the Army began making a deliberate effort to provide captains with additional staff training and education.

A fourth important trend relates to the direct influence of resource availability on the duration of institutional training and educational experiences provided captains since the end of World War II. During a period of relatively plentiful resources, the Army consistently increased the length of training and education courses for company-grade officers throughout the Cold War, beginning with a 12-week officer advanced course in 1945 and reaching an apex of 35 weeks in the 1980s. Beginning in 1985, as the Army approached the limits of its Cold War expansion in the Reagan era, the necessity of rapidly providing trained officers to field commanders forced a reduction of officer advanced courses to 26 weeks in length. In the wake of the Gulf War, due to a decrease in the number of available instructors and money, the Army further reduced the length to 20 weeks before officer advanced courses finally reached their current duration of 18 weeks in 1998.

This process of reducing the duration of officer advance courses was driven by resource constraints, in terms of manpower and funds. The schools and centers responded to these reductions by removing less critical subjects from their curricula and reducing the students’ opportunities to complete multiple repetitions of the required training events. While students lost some competency because of the reduction in overall course content, they lost far more as a result of the reduced opportunities to train on tasks during multiple iterations in varying conditions. The combination of a need for more officers in field units, the adoption of an instructor-heavy educational method, an increase in the number of deployments, the requirements for more officers to serve away from their traditional branch assignments in joint and AC/RC billets, and a drastic reduction in the strength of the officers corps resulted in a 15-year period, 1987 to 2002, during which a series of choices and trade-offs by leadership have brought the Army to its current state.

According to the charter of the LDETF, the Army appears to have recognized that previous efforts to streamline its captains’ education system may have gone too far and that the increasing complexity of the environment in which company-grade officers operate demands additional time for education and training. The target length of the captains’ career course curriculum redesign processes is set at almost 20 weeks—42 weeks for Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers—which is the first evidence of a swing in the opposite direction in the past 15 years.117

A final trend emerging from the information above is the remarkable consistency in philosophy among the Army’s existing officer education system and the officer education system studies that preceded the ATLDP. Indeed, the ATLDP conclusions and recommendations
stand in stark contrast to the majority of conclusions and recommendations from the Army’s 12 previous studies. From 1950 to 1985, captains received progressively more institutional training at the expense of education as a result of recommendations of the Army’s officer education boards and studies. Since 1985, the Army has consistently recommended increasing the amount of institutional education for captains based largely on the conclusions and recommendations of PDOS and the OPMS XXI study. The dissonance between past philosophies and ATLDP may signal one of three things: a revolutionary change in the needs of the officers trained and educated by the Army; an undue influence of certain factors on the ATLDP’s conclusions and recommendations; or a misinterpretation of the results and the future needs of the Army.

Conclusion

Five constants emerge from a review of the Army’s education program for captains over the past 50 years, and especially since the end of the Vietnam War:

- The demands of training and the requirements for education produced a constant level of tension within the Army’s officer education system among the Army’s senior leaders, faculty members and students, and within the curricula.
- The Army concluded recently that the training and education provided lieutenants and majors is relatively more important than the training and education provided captains.
- The Army has consistently acknowledged that the value of captains’ education is directly related to the Army’s ability and willingness to support it with resources, and the availability of resources have had a direct influence on the training and education provided captains.
- The curricula for captains’ education have remained focused on creating branch experts at the battalion and brigade echelons, but not necessarily trained staff officers.
- A revolutionary change in the needs of officers trained and educated by the Army may have occurred recently.

The past 50 years provide remarkable evidence of the Army’s search for the correct balance between education and training in captains’ education and the impact recent experience and resource availability have had on decisions affecting that balance. These circumstances indicate that, while identifying the correct balance between education and training is difficult, this illusive combination should favor education over training for captains in the institutional educational environment. These generalizations lead to the following conclusions about the Army’s officer education system:

- In an era of increasing tactical and technological complexity, the Army needs to increase officer training and education.
- Given the difficulty of achieving a proper balance between training and education and the interrelationship among basic, intermediate and advanced levels of officer education, the Army needs to create a Director of Army Education and develop an Army education strategy to provide direction to and parameters within which OES will operate.118
Contending successfully with the yin and yang of teaching its junior officers, especially the captains, is vitally important to the Army. Joe Galloway writes that no job holds more responsibility than that of a captain because the Army puts a 24- or 25-year-old man or woman in direct charge of the lives of more than 100 soldiers.¹¹⁹ In its captains the Army trains its first commanders. As Major General F. Carl Ernst said, the advanced courses are the last institutional educational opportunities for the Army to provide its captains and first commanders with branch-specific knowledge.¹²⁰ Furthering the case for appropriate officer education for captains, a retired officer observed, “It was CAS3, not [the School for Advanced Military Studies], that allowed Third Army to deploy and create the staff structure necessary to control the Gulf War.”¹²¹ For these reasons the Army must achieve the optimal balance of yin and yang, of education and training, in its officer education system for captains and all others involved. To do otherwise, as the Taoists caution, risks losing the entire system.

The Army’s officer education system, especially for captains and NCOs, is the envy of the world precisely because senior leadership has recognized the pedagogical synergy between training and education and made great efforts to maintain a correct balance. Indeed, Eliot Cohen, a distinguished scholar and internationally recognized expert on military affairs, wrote recently, when arguing the case for the United States’ unprecedented global influence, that significant among its many advantages is the fact that its military officers have been “groomed by a military schooling system more thorough than any in history.”¹²² As the Army continues its revolutionary transformation, leaders would do well to emulate the actions of their predecessors to ensure that the education system producing the world’s most competent captains remains intact for many years to come.
Endnotes

1 I am indebted to Dr. Roger A. Spiller, George C. Marshall Professor of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Mr. John Rogers of the Combined Arms Research Library Special Collections Section at Fort Leavenworth; Dr. Anne W. Chapman, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Military History Office; and Mr. Mel Hunt at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma for assistance in producing this paper.


6 Ibid., pp. 182–187. Stiehm provides perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the difference between training and education, especially within a military environment.


8 Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives.


10 The “Tell,” “Show” and “Involve” boxes allude to the adage, “Tell me and I’ll forget; show me and I’ll remember; involve me and I’ll learn,” attributed to Confucius.


12 Extracted from Novak and Gowin, Learning How to Learn, p. 3.


14 Ibid. In the fall of 1891, the Army directed each post to establish and maintain lyceums in which all line officers were required to participate by preparing papers on professional topics and delivering them at regularly scheduled meetings. While their establishment was centrally directed, each post commander directed the lyceum according to his own wishes, making them more parochial than institutional educational forums. Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 276–277.

15 Root also directed the development of a “plan of continuing education for officers at all levels of the Army,” beginning with the establishment of a school at each garrison that
provided instruction in “administrative and drill regulations, weapons, tactics, law, field engineering, and care of horses” and progressing to the Army War College. General Order 115 of 27 November 1901 and General Order 102, issued in fall 1902, brought this structure into being. These garrison schools were a milestone, as they represented the Army’s first systematic effort to provide junior officers with postgraduate educations, and they remained part of the Army’s officer education system until World War I. Nevertheless, like the lyceums that preceded them (although to a lesser extent), they were more parochial than institutional educational forums because, while they used somewhat standardized curricula, they lacked a dedicated cadre of trained instructors and instead relied upon experienced officers assigned to the posts to serve as instructors, which did not allow officers to receive a common educational experience. A standardized curriculum, a dedicated cadre of trained instructors and a common educational experience became the essential components of the Army’s institutional education programs of the 20th century. For an overview of the development of the Army’s officer education system in the early 20th century, see Timothy K. Nenninger, “The Army Enters the Twentieth Century, 1904–1917,” in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), esp. pp. 227–228; and Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 176–17. For an excellent treatment of the development of Army institutional officer education program before and after World War I, see Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918 (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, June 1978).

16 A Review of the Army School System, p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
19 Ibid., pp. 14–16.
20 Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 5 February 1946), hereinafter referred to as the Gerow Board Report.
21 Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 15 June 1949), hereinafter referred to as the Eddy Board report.
22 Eddy Board Report, pp. 7–8.
23 Ibid., p. 7.
26 This requirement did not appear until the late 1980s as result of the recommendation of another significant study of officer education (PDOS).
Eddy Board Report, p. 7; “Modifications of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers,” dated 11 October 1949, appearing as Inclosure 1 to “Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers,” Memorandum from the Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, dated 26 October 1949; and “Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers,” Memorandum from the Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, dated 17 January 1951, and supported by a subsequent message from Major General Edward F. Witsell, The Adjutant General, dated 23 January 1951, stating that the board’s recommendation was further modified and citing the Secretary of the Army as the authority for the action.


A Review of the Army School System.

Ibid., p. 1.


Williams Board Report, p. 9.

Ibid., pp. 104–105.

Ibid., pp. 124–125.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 23–24.

Ibid., p. 18.

Ibid., pp. 51–52.

Ibid., pp. 109–110.


Ibid., p. 2-11.

Ibid., p. 2-10.


Ibid., p. 32, emphasis added.


The Senate Armed Services Committee initiated this effort in 1976, and the Office of Management and Budget followed it up by preparing Issue 17, which “proposed minimum education and training resource levels far below seemingly austere current programs.” RETO Study, v, I-2. Five years later, Dr. Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) noted that “the Services have no philosophy for officer education and consequently do a poor job of demonstrating why the kind, amount and cost of this education is necessary.” Obviously, the Army fit this description well in 1977 and 1982. *Professional Development of Officers Study*, 5 vols., Lieutenant General Charles W. Bagnal, director (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1985), vol. I, p. 27, hereinafter referred to as PDOS.


To accomplish its objectives, the study group divided into six teams and an administration section and began collecting information. Team A examined Instruction Techniques and Training/Education Strategies. Team B studied Warrant Officer Training and Education. Team C analyzed Precommissioning, Basic and Advanced Courses. Team D scrutinized the staff colleges, and Team E looked into the War College and General Officer Training and Education Programs. Team M served as a clearinghouse for Major General Harrison and focused on the end product, including the report’s methodology, the group’s analyses and the production of the actual report. Each group acquired detailed descriptions of every current officer duty position and education and training courses within their purview. The study group also conducted a wide-ranging “survey of officer opinions and attitudes, an extensive study of other systems (other services, foreign armies, industry, and academia), numerous interviews, and [a comprehensive] review of literature previously published on the subject.” RETO Study, p. 1.
This observation holds true for secondary education for children as well. Current educational theory holds that children are introduced to the majority of the concepts addressed in secondary education by the third grade and that much of the students’ subsequent education was largely a process of increasing the complexity of the tasks to which students are required to apply the fundamental concepts. RETO Study, vol. II, pp. D-10-2/3.

At a video teleconference (VTC) of the General Officer Steering Committee on Captains’ Professional Military Education at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on 3 June 1997, Major General Carl F. Ernst, then-Commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry School and Center, commented on the importance of Officer Advanced Courses (OACs) by remarking that the Army must preserve the intent of OACs because they are the last place captains are able to learn branch-specific skills. Memorandum for the Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, “Captains’ Professional Military Education (CPT PME) General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) VTC Minutes,” 9 June 1997, p. 7.

As personnel managers have discovered recently, the statutory requirements for officers (especially branch-qualified captains) and the demands of the officer professional development assignment system prevents the Army from increasing tour lengths.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 61.

“Instructor/Student Ratios,” memorandum dated 8 November 1989 from Colonel William A. West, CAS3 Director, to Major General John E. Miller, Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

While CGSOC had been using small-group instructional methodology in some of its classes since 1956, the 1987 decision required CGSC to adopt it across the entire college. I am indebted to Dr. Roger A. Spiller for providing me with this information.

By 1987, CAS3 was offering 10 classes a year and producing more than 4,000 graduates annually. Prior to 1987, CAS3 offered an average of four classes a year and produced a cumulative total of 5,779 graduates. Ralph W. Ekwall, “Historical Summary: Combined Arms and Services Staff School, 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1991,” *U.S. Army Combined Arms Command 1991 Annual Command History* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combined Arms Command History Office, 1991), p. 3.

Army statistics identify 16 deployments during the 74-year period 1914–1988 and 38 deployments during the 14-year period 1988–2002. These figures indicate a deployment rate for the previous 14 years that is 13.5 greater than the 74-year period 1914–1988.


Ibid., p. 10.

Ibid.


“Captains Professional Military Education (CPT PME)” prebrief.


Ibid.


103 Ibid., p. 14-3.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., p. 17-3.
107 I am indebted to Mr. John Rogers of the Combined Arms Research Library Special Collections Section at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for providing me with this information in June 2002.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., pp. OS-12–13.
112 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., p. 2.
116 Although recommended in 1962 by the Daley Board, the consolidation of schools under CONARC did not actually occur until June 1964. I am indebted to Dr. Anne W. Chapman, TRADOC Military History Office, for providing me with this information. USCONARC/ USARSTRIKE Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1963–30 June 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL – information used is UNCLASSIFIED) (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRADOC Military History Office), pp. 21–22.
118 The Army recently took a significant step in this direction with the publication in April 2003 of AR 350-1, Army Training and Education. This document integrated four disparate regulations, updated antiquated guidance, and provided the basic parameters for the establishment of such a system. If the Army follows up with appropriate resources, it would be possible to establish this system rather quickly.
121 Attributed to Steve Caps, Major, USA Retired.
Primary Sources


“Instructor/Student Ratios.” Memorandum from Colonel William A. West, CAS3 Director, to Major General John E. Miller, Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 8 November 1989.


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