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Continuous Concentric Pressure

John A. Bonin

and

Mark H. Gerner

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**The Institute of Land Warfare
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LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 43, SEPTEMBER 2003

Continuous Concentric Pressure

by John A. Bonin and Mark H. Gerner

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Contents

Foreword	v
Strategy	1
Historic Use of Continuous Concentric Pressure	4
The Army’s Theater Operational Concept	7
Army Command and Control.....	9
Conclusion.....	12
Endnotes.....	13
Figures	
1. Grand Strategy	3
2. Continuous Concentric Pressure (Through Lines of Operation).....	8
3. Army Operational Force Categories	10
4. Capabilities and Force Categories.....	11

Foreword

If we are to have a successful strategy for victory in the Global War on Terrorism and for meeting the other unique security challenges that still lie ahead of our nation in the 21st century, we must have new thinking and a willingness to consider creative strategic concepts. Critical to any strategic planning is the careful alignment by the United States and its allies of global and national strategies to match capabilities. The connection between strategy and capabilities has always been important. As we face an ongoing global challenge by fanatical enemies, it is now imperative.

The authors of this paper have taken just such a fresh approach. They propose a strategic concept of “continuous concentric pressure,” blending the lessons of history with the complexities of today’s world. They offer a concept of strategic theater operations in which the theater joint commander applies pressure against an adversary through multiple lines of operation conducted simultaneously and/or sequentially by joint multiservice forces. Each line of operation contributes to either an action or a threat of action against enemy centers of gravity. The authors focus on the role of landpower as a critical element that provides a direct and decisive means to defeat the enemy, reassure allies and establish post-hostility security.

With this paper the authors have added a thought-provoking proposal to the professional dialogue on strategy which addresses key issues facing the Army of today and tomorrow. It is well worth the time to consider.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
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September 2003

Continuous Concentric Pressure

Successful strategy for war combines theory, practice and vision, a sometimes elusive quality in complex scenarios. As the United States prosecutes the Global War on Terrorism there is a growing need to develop a “grand” strategy, clear in purpose and concepts, complete with balanced risks, and informed by the best that our history can offer. Today, the United States and its allies need to align global and national strategies and to translate strategic objectives into theater-strategic plans complete with service-provided capabilities. The connection between strategy and capabilities has always been important. It is now compelling.

We propose a strategic concept called “Continuous Concentric Pressure,” a blend of history’s lessons and today’s complexities to recognize the crucial place of theater strategic plans. This concept can contribute to an overall discussion of national strategic requirements by illustrating a method to assess force capabilities, with a focus on command and control and ground forces. Pressure is applied by economic, political, informational, and military means, each of which acts in space and in time to shape the security environment and, when required, to isolate and defeat an enemy. The joint force commander achieves continuous concentric pressure through multiple lines of operation conducted simultaneously and/or sequentially by air, land, sea, space or special operations forces. While this paper primarily addresses this concept in a context of overseas theaters, the ideas are applicable to homeland defense with suitable modifications.

Each line of operation contributes to either an action or a threat of action. Each can be measured by how it achieves one or both of two conditions: (a) enemy forces, intentions and vulnerabilities are exposed, and future enemy freedom of action is progressively limited, or (b) friendly forces are sequenced in space and tempo to apply pressures on enemy centers of gravity. The extent to which an element of a theater plan achieves either condition influences Army force structure decisions.

Strategy

Historically, strategies have been described by a hierarchy; they are written about and debated as grand, national or military.¹ Whereas grand and national strategies include higher-level wielders of power, military strategy has traditionally been the purview of the field or theater commander. One of the most influential strategic theorists from the U.S. Army War College, Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., described military strategy as consisting of “military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources to implement the concepts.”² He argued that if any of the three elements (ends, ways and means) is out of balance, then the strategy is at risk.

Although debates abide over what ought to go into them, the potential value and power of our national security and national military strategies is that we can debate their content. In the best traditions of our nation, differing opinions on our security strategies are aired in public. Indeed, joint doctrine on how we operate is also openly discussed with “global” and “theater or regional” strategies as subsets of the National Military Strategy.³ Today, that doctrine reflects contemporary operations and must include strategies for multinational (coalition) partners. The joint combatant commander, usually also the theater commander, develops the theater strategy, which includes all elements of power. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Dictionary of Military Terms*, defines theater strategy as:

The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, the threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater.⁴

According to the *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, “Theater strategy interprets US national policy and interests, assesses the area of responsibility, conducts threat analyses, and applies a vision, and states theater missions and objectives.”⁵ The vision necessary in theater strategy “provides direction to both the formulation and execution of strategy. It makes strategy proactive, rather than reactive, about the future.”⁶ Figure 1 places theater strategy within the context of the parallel planning systems of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a combatant commander.

In a recent paper, “Strategic Theory—State of the Art or Great Strategies I Have Known,” Colonel Mike Matheny describes the major theorists and practitioners as well as schools of strategic thought.⁷ In addition to a hierarchical view, he discusses strategies that can be categorized by type, of which the most seductive has been the strategy of “annihilation.” The German historian Hans Delbruck first described two types of strategy: annihilation and exhaustion. The strategy of annihilation, which seeks to destroy an opponent through decisive battle with massed forces, is normally preferred by the stronger adversary who desires quick and complete victory to compel an enemy. Delbruck pointed to Alexander the Great, Caesar and Napoleon as the foremost practitioners of this strategy.⁸

In *The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Russell F. Weigley argues that since the American Civil War the U.S. Army has preferred the strategy of annihilation using unlimited force. Robert E. Lee can be faulted for advocating this strategy with inferior forces. The Germans (in the 20th century) and the Israelis (from the latter half of the 20th century into the early years of the 21st) have also preferred the strategy of annihilation, and while they have proved capable of winning battles, they have been less successful at winning wars. The current concepts calling for Rapid Decisive Operations and for “coups de main” as the United States accomplished in Panama and Iraq are recent American examples.

With a strategy of exhaustion, battle is not the only method. Exhaustion calls for wearing away the opponent’s strength over time by attacking his forces, resources and/or political will. Battles are employed as opportunities present themselves. The strategy can be both cumulative and sequential. The weaker adversary, who seeks to convince rather than compel his enemy to his will, has often adopted it. Delbruck pointed to Pericles,

Hannibal, Fabius and (controversially) Frederick the Great as advocates of this strategy. George Washington, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and Ronald Reagan could also be added to the list of successful war-winning practitioners.




Figure 1

The preferred operational environment can also distinguish schools of strategies. Most strategic airpower and seapower strategies are based on a strategy of exhaustion (despite the statements of their advocates that emphasize rapid decision) with emphasis on different methods. In contrast to the currently popular “aerospace” and the emerging “informational” schools of strategy, the “continental” or “landpower” school insists on the central role of ground forces to accomplish strategic aims.

Today, it is almost an axiom that choice of the best strategy may be clearer when viewed through the lens of experience as opposed to rigid commitment to a strategic theory at the beginning of a conflict. One problem with a unipolar strategy of annihilation is that adaptive opponents do not readily submit.⁹ Additionally, as most of our prospective opponents are land-centric, ground forces are required in our theater force mix to complete their defeat. The more relevant concept for today may be flexible employment of the strategy of exhaustion. A series of efforts over time depletes an

enemy's strength and options, while providing allied political and military leadership time and flexible options to set conditions for success. This strategy may be defensive overall while employing operational offensive operations. When employing a theater strategy of continuous concentric pressure, a nation can successfully conduct a national strategy of exhaustion.

Historic Use of Continuous Concentric Pressure

In the opening stages of the American Civil War, General Winfield Scott, commanding general of the Union Army, proposed his plan to defeat the Confederacy. He wanted to employ Union naval power to blockade the South economically, then build up superior land armies to attack on multiple approaches using rivers. Political pundits of his day dubbed his proposal the "Anaconda policy."¹⁰ As Professor Weigley writes, "President Abraham Lincoln, thinking in strategic terms not unlike Scott's, soon developed the view that the Union armies ought to apply simultaneous pressure against the Confederate frontiers at many places throughout their length, across the area of war, on the theory that because total Confederate strength was inferior to that of the Union, Union pressure applied everywhere would force the Confederates to stretch themselves too thin somewhere, and their defenses would rupture."¹¹ Major General Henry W. Halleck, a student of Jomini who later himself became commanding general, dismissed Lincoln's concept as "hopeless amateurism" because it did not concentrate mass at decisive points.¹²

After being placed in command of all the Union armies, General Ulysses S. Grant developed a campaign plan for 1864 that was an updated version of Scott's concept. "All Union armies should advance nearly simultaneously, at the beginning of May, to apply pressure against the Confederacy everywhere. The Army of the Potomac would move against Lee. William Tecumseh Sherman's armies would move against Joseph Johnson. The lesser Union armies would advance also," Grant wrote.¹³ Despite the perceived advantage of interior lines and Lee's tactical genius, the South could not stave off in 1865 the combination of superior Union resources applied by Grant using continuous concentric pressure from the forces under Sherman, Philip H. Sheridan, John M. Schofield, Edward R. S. Canby, George G. Meade, James Wilson and Benjamin F. Butler as well as the Union Navy.

In World War I both sides advocated strategies of annihilation, but neither proved capable of delivering the "coup de main" to win the war.¹⁴ Consequently, the war became a contest of endurance with the Allies wearing down the Central Powers by conducting major operations on multiple fronts (Western, Italian, Balkan, Palestinian, Mesopotamian) to tie down the exhausted German, Austrian and Turkish forces. With the arrival of hundreds of thousands of fresh U.S. Army troops, the Allied Powers could then apply continuous, unrelenting pressure on a broad front in the west from July 1918 until the Germans requested an armistice.

In the early stages of World War II, the British advocated a peripheral strategy, initially discredited by the more tactically oriented Americans. Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted a direct attack on Germany in 1943 with a cross-channel invasion on the shortest path to the Reich. President Franklin D. Roosevelt

“believed American troops must fight Germans on the ground in 1942, for political reasons as well as to open direct American military pressure.”¹⁵ Compromise produced an Allied grand strategy that placed the Axis powers on the receiving end of continuous concentric pressures. Winston Churchill eloquently argued for the Allies’ first major campaign in North Africa to “close the ring.” The Allies also productively employed special operations forces, the Combined Bomber Offensive, and economic power in the form of lend-lease to Russia to apply pressure. Invasions of Sicily, Italy and ultimately France forced Germany to fight on multiple fronts as well as knocking Italy out of the war. Eisenhower’s broad-front concept for the attack across France into Germany was also designed to put continuous pressure on the Wehrmacht creating more opportunities than a riskier narrow thrust (Operation Market Garden). Weigley writes, “Once the Allies were securely ashore in France, however, the principle of mass or concentration hardly required them to stage only single-thrust offensives on narrow fronts. The principle is applied most effectively by commanders who vary their own concentrations enough to cause the enemy not to concentrate, so that concentrated strength can oppose itself to relative weakness.”¹⁶

Similarly, the theater strategic concept in the Pacific was to keep China in the war. The United States expended enormous resources to supply aid, advisors and airpower to operate from China before we could generate cross-Pacific offensives. “If continuous pressure were to bear against Japan, it would have to come not from China but from the United States,” says Weigley.¹⁷ Through the efforts of leaders such as Jonathan Wainwright, Jimmy Doolittle and William “Bull” Halsey, the Japanese were kept off balance until the twin drives from General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific and Admiral Chester Nimitz’s Central Pacific theaters could begin. Some historians have argued that there should have been only one commander for the Pacific theater of war, but due to distance and the need for continuous pressure along multiple lines of operations, one commander may not have been ideal.

Perhaps the most comprehensive yet concise descriptions of the “Cold War Grand Strategy” of continuous concentric pressure are George Kennan’s “Mr. X” article published in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947 and *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment* of 7 April 1950. One key characteristic of this strategy was patience. The military would continually contain and contest communism wherever it threatened. When combined with diplomatic, economic and cultural pressures, military pressure contributed to the decline and then to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Theories and points of view today may argue that the Soviet empire was predestined for collapse due to its own inherent vulnerabilities, but U.S. actions, guided by a strategy of concentric pressure, certainly contributed to that result. One of the aims specified in *NSC-68* required the United States “to place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power.”¹⁸

At the theater level, the U.S. conduct of wars in Korea and Vietnam attempted to substitute technology and firepower for strategy. In both cases, we did not try to apply continuous concentric pressure on our foes, because we feared that such action might draw in the Soviet Union or China. Consequently, the United States allowed the Chinese and North Vietnamese geographic sanctuaries and the secure knowledge that we would not invade their homelands. Trying to apply superior technology to tactically annihilate

the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese without the use of superior strategy was not effective. Andrew Krepinevich has critiqued the U.S. concept for Vietnam by stating that U.S. planners believed that “strategy was not necessary. All that was needed was efficient application of firepower.”¹⁹ The fallacy of that is pointed out by Weigley in *The American Way of War*: “When a belligerent possesses strength as superior to the adversary’s, as the Allies did in Europe and the Pacific, the whole history of American strategy since U.S. Grant confirmed that the enemy can be hit with advantage at several places and thus forced to accentuate his weakness through dissipation—as long as strategy aims at decisive objectives and does not waste itself in sideshows.”²⁰

During the Reagan administration, the United States applied a form of continuous concentric pressure, largely without combat engagements, to win the Cold War. By reemphasizing all elements of power, to include idealism and a massive military buildup for “negotiation from strength,” Reagan redefined containment. He believed that steady pressure systematically applied would eventually bring down an overextended and economically fragile Soviet Union.²¹ Operations against Grenada and Nicaragua and support for insurgents in Afghanistan applied pressure on the Soviet Union from many directions. Theater military strategies emphasizing new high-technology weapons, robust exercise programs, and realistic training open to Soviet inspection contributed to the loss of morale within the Soviet military.

In 1990, with the nation recently freed from the constraints of Cold War rules, the American military rediscovered how to apply continuous concentric pressure in an active theater conflict as well. Iraq was isolated diplomatically from everyone but Jordan and Yemen, and then hit by a variety of creatively applied military air, land, sea and psychological operations. Blinded and pummeled from the air, fixed by coalition ground forces attacking Kuwait, and concerned that the United States might also conduct an amphibious assault to free Kuwait, the Iraqis were unprepared for the ground envelopment conducted by coalition forces from the west.

An even more compelling example of continuous concentric pressure is the on-going Operation Enduring Freedom. In early October 2001, before the start of operations in Afghanistan, one journalist referred to the emerging system of alliances that the United States built for the global war on terrorism as a concentric alliance that resembled four concentric rings.²² As the commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks, stated on ABC’s “This Week” in early November 2001, the U.S. objective in Afghanistan was not the occupation of strategic points or other territory but the application of constant pressure on the Taliban and the al Qaeda network. He said the United States was coordinating its attacks with the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban rebels, “and the purpose is pressure.”²³ Later that month, Franks described how he would use ground forces: “It could well be that Marines could be positioned in any place inside the country, or Army forces could be positioned at other forward operating bases at some point. We are going to continue to apply pressure.”²⁴ In January 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz outlined a strategy to destroy terrorist networks elsewhere and stated that unless state sponsors of terrorism stopped harboring terrorists they would face increased diplomatic, financial and, if necessary, military pressure from the United States.²⁵ Even the concept of Operation Anaconda, conducted in March 2002, was to form a “concentric

circle around the objective area and then squeeze it, just like the anaconda snake does.”²⁶ In April, during a visit to U.S. and international troops in Kyrgyzstan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reiterated, “The task is to put pressure on terrorists wherever they are, and you folks are certainly helping to do that in good style.”²⁷

Central Command’s campaign plan was to set several conditions through lines of operation. As a first step, political-military interaction within the U.S. government, development of staging/basing and over flight rights, and the intelligence preparation of the battle space using all national and coalition means occurred. The campaign concept envisioned continuous concentric pressure through nine lines of operation, all targeting al Qaeda and any regimes harboring it, with the Taliban in Afghanistan as the initial focus:

- political-military actions to isolate the Taliban;
- support to the Afghani opposition groups;
- direct attack on al Qaeda and Taliban leadership;
- direct action and reconnaissance;
- operational (predominately air) fires;
- attack on cave/tunnel complexes;
- humanitarian assistance;
- information operations; and
- operational maneuver with ground forces.

All operations would be interagency, multinational and joint to the extent possible. This would be a flexible “coalition of the willing.” The theater-strategic level enemy center of gravity was judged to be Islamic radicalism fomented by al Qaeda leadership. Operational-level centers of gravity were al Qaeda finances and support from the Afghan Taliban regime. Tactical centers of gravity were cave complexes along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

The Army’s Theater Operational Concept

In an article in *ARMY* magazine in June 2001, Colonel David Fastabend wrote that since the presentation of AirLand Battle in 1982 the Army has lacked a clear articulation of an operational concept subordinated to a joint operational concept.²⁸ The Army’s draft doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations*, offers an operational concept to answer such a need: “The Army prepares to conduct full spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability, and support) as part of unified (joint, multinational, and interagency) power projection actions aimed at achieving prompt and sustained land dominance by contributing to the continuous concentric pressure against an adversary until the strategic, theater strategic, and operational objectives have been achieved.”²⁹

The combatant commander shapes the security environment and sets the conditions for military operations through a series of lines of operation. These may be geospatial or informational. Air, land, sea, space or special operations forces can conduct these

operations simultaneously and/or sequentially. The Army generates concentric pressures by a variety of means:

- defensive positioning of forces to protect land, people and resources;
- the conduct of conventional or special offensive actions to include forcible entry and maneuvering of land forces to close with and destroy the adversary; and
- the conduct of stability and support operations to assist U.S. and friendly civil authorities.

Figure 2 illustrates examples of lines of operation. Within each line of operation, the senior Army commander tailors the force to contribute a collection of capabilities not provided by other services or multinational partners. The complexity of missions and conditions will frequently cause the Army to array its force capabilities in unanticipated ways. For example, the Army’s part of preparing for forcible entry operations could cause the command to tailor organizations around criteria that do not resemble doctrinal “rules of allocation” for combat support units of the Army.

Continuous Concentric Pressure (Through Lines of Operation)




Figure 2

To obtain maximum benefit from multinational partners, the Army will frequently be required to provide Mobile Liaison Teams, logistical support elements, and specialized signal and military intelligence teams as well as other units that will likely exceed doctrinal rules. Sensitive site exploitation and diplomatic or political lines of operation may also require significant headquarters elements unanticipated by force structure rules.

The system to build the force structure now follows a set of disciplines that can be adjusted to account for combatant commander requirements normally through a series of illustrative planning scenarios. Programmers and planners have applied various methods, such as sets of “Mission Task Organized Forces” or “MTOFs,” whose purpose is to offer a set of baseline forces for likely scenarios. Taken individually, an MTOF can quickly identify the force structure needed for a given case. Taken collectively, they inform the force building and requirements generation systems that eventually build the force in Total Army Analysis. They can also be applied to newly developed service and joint concepts. “Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances,” a concept espoused by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, USA Retired, and Colonel Richard H. Sinnreich, USA Retired, explains how joint operations will be mounted and sustained from the United States, its territories and those of allies. The concept calls for preclusion of enemy actions through rapid positioning.³⁰ In a similar manner, the principles of multidimensional operations and adaptive force dominance—the ability to reconfigure to defeat changing enemy patterns—are also in need of a force-tailoring system.³¹

In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States has also employed continuous concentric pressure. Initially, the United States isolated the Iraqi regime diplomatically and economically through the United Nations. As General Richard C. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an interview on 27 February 2003, the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf region has been in part “to help enforce the diplomacy” by putting pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with United Nations resolutions.³² The United States also began an informational effort to dissuade Iraqi military leaders from using weapons of mass destruction and conducted preventive defensive deployments to assure and protect friendly countries around Iraq. Finally, U.S. Central Command planned and conducted an offensive with multiple geospatial and informational lines of operation using flexible combinations of land, sea, air, space, special, interagency and coalition forces.

Army Command and Control

The Army senior headquarters is responsible for integrating and orchestrating the ground elements of the joint force. The Army’s theater command architecture and capabilities are placed under the command of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC). The force is integrated into a set of capabilities, usually expressed as “force packages,” to reduce operational risk.³³ The terms “combat,” “combat support” and “combat service support” are appropriate for tactical tailoring and adequately describe tactical forces. At the theater level, an Army force (ARFOR) may be better envisioned as combinations of Army elements as illustrated in figure 3. Each of these force categories includes both active and reserve components.³⁴

Army Operational Force Categories




Figure 3

From an interpretation of the theater strategic concept, the Army Service Component commander and his staff tailor the headquarters and forces for each line of operation. The ASCC commander's roles are always to be the senior Army commander in the area of

operations (AOR), at times as the force provider and sustainer and, when designated, as the coalition or joint functional land component commander (C/JFLCC).³⁵

The complexity of the operation drives the command structure more than does the number of subordinate commands. Theater strategic lines of operation are aimed in two directions: one toward the enemy centers of gravity, and the other toward influencing the Army force structure. From the formulation of the theater strategic concept, the Army commander translates the capabilities into types of forces. A line of operation that requires special operations forces will normally require the Army to provide conventional forces for logistical support and base protection as seen in its support of Special Operations Command Central during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.³⁶ The art and science of command and control is no longer driven mainly by the span of control of subordinates, but rather by the span of complexities of the operations.

The strategy for this war calls for answers to at least two long-standing force management issues. The first is an expression of total force requirements that the Army must provide for combatant commanders to perform their day-to-day missions. These requirements can be programmed with a variety of management techniques, and then placed in the Integrated Priority Lists and the Theater Security Cooperation Plans, as well as the requirements of the Contingency Planning Guidance. The second is how to transition from today's force into the force envisioned by the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan and the Objective Force White Paper. The categories of operational forces offered in this paper can begin to offer a method to array and then to balance Army forces. Theater strategic concepts can be translated into force capabilities. The essential task is to compare existing forces with required forces through the lens of operational force categories. Figure 4 represents the factors for comparison.




Figure 4

Conclusion

The war on terror will take on changing characteristics. To determine force requirements and consider how to best meet them will not be readily apparent but will require adaptations of processes now in use. The application of a theater strategic concept of continuous concentric pressure through multiple lines of operation as evaluated through the operational force categories is a method to consider.

As part of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Security Strategy development, the Army adopted a new logic to size and shape forces. Different from the earlier “two theaters of war” method, efforts are now ongoing to analytically shape the components of the Army to meet requirements framed around how to “Swiftly Defeat Enemy Efforts” in two areas and for forces necessary and then to “Win Decisively” in one of the two areas, with discretion provided to the President for how to do so. It also includes force requirements for deterrence in four critical forward areas as well as other requirements such as homeland defense. Within this newly designed construct, it is possible to begin with the operational requirements of the combatant commanders, review all forces and formations through lenses of the operational force categories, balance the force, then relate back to the strategic aims of each theater and rebalance the force.

Theater strategic concepts, as expressed through lines of operation, can reveal much about what can constitute a force and the complexities of command and control of that force. The Army delivers to foreign policy the power of sustained land dominance and to the power of statecraft the ability to achieve a lasting decision through continued presence. In many respects, these attributes are growing, not diminishing in either scope or in importance. Shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001, *American Heritage* magazine published a collection of concise writings about our nation’s concepts of freedom and war. Roger J. Spiller’s look at *The History of the Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides reminds us that the account was written so that lessons would “last forever”:

[T]he search for historical understanding can be as important as the knowing, and revisiting friends centuries old can help you see history in new and different ways. These are not the applications of history. They are the applications of the historian in all of us.³⁷

Landpower is a fundamental expression of military might and provides direct and decisive means to reassure allies, to compel enemies to our national will, and to secure a stable post-hostilities environment.³⁸ The relationships among theater, national and grand strategies are crucial to the success of any war. Theater strategies of “continuous concentric pressure” have been successfully employed for many years. How we use this construct for force preparation to support multiple lines of operation will be with us for some time to come, hopefully in contribution to “happier endings” sought by ancient and modern strategists alike.

Endnotes

¹ See B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2d Revised edition (London: Praeger, 1967), p. 322; and John Collins, “Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices” in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, edited by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U. S. Army War College, 1993), pp. 20–28. According to Hart, the role of “Grand strategy . . . is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.”

² Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, edited by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U. S. Army War College, 1993), p. 7.

³ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001), pp. I-4 thru I-6 and III-1 thru III-4; and JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 January 2002), pp. I-4 thru II-2.

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001), p. 430.

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, 16 July 1997, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/>, p. 701.

⁶ Bruce B. G. Clarke, “Strategic Vision,” *Capstone Exercise* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1994), p. A-2. See also Jane E. Gibish, compiler, *Strategic Vision: A Selected Bibliography* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Library, April 2001).

⁷ Mike Matheny, “Strategic Theory—State of the Art or Great Strategies I Have Known,” unpublished paper, U.S. Army War College, 2001, p. 3. Matheny describes three basic approaches to strategy: sequential and cumulative strategies, direct and indirect strategies, and deterrent and combative strategies. He groups these into four schools of thought: The Continental School (largely influenced by Clausewitz wherein “land power provides the most direct and decisive means to compel the enemy to our will. Ultimately, this can be achieved by destroying the opponent’s army and occupying his territory . . .”); the Maritime School (“ . . . followers of Mahan and Corbett, control of the seas determines decisions ashore . . .”); the Aerospace School (Douhet, “. . . airpower alone can be decisive . . .”); and the Revolutionary School (Mao, Ho Chi Min, Che Guevara and Giap, “. . . emphasizes the political, ideological, and social rather than the military components of strategy . . . exploits indirect and cumulative approaches to exhaust the enemy’s will to resist or to weaken him politically or militarily . . .”).

⁸ See Gordon A. Craig, “Delbruck: The Military Historian,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, edited by Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 260–283, and Hans Delbruck in his classic four-volume study, *History of the Art of War [Within the Framework of Political History]*, Translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., Vol. I, *Warfare in Antiquity* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 140, 362–3. Whereas Craig translates *Ermattungsstrategie* from German as “exhaustion,” Renfroe translates it as the more pejorative term “attrition.” One can argue that attrition is a distinct variant of exhaustion that focuses only on “attrititing”

enemy military forces, whereas exhaustion may include attrition of enemy forces as one of its techniques.

⁹ One of the problems with the U.S. strategy for Vietnam was the attempt to achieve a rapid defeat of the Viet Cong through large unit operations rather than a more patient pacification strategy. While frequently described as a strategy of attrition, it was an attempt to employ tactics of annihilation using massive firepower and superior technology in lieu of superior strategy. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) and more recently Michael Lind, *Vietnam: The Necessary War, A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1999).

¹⁰ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 93.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Russell F. Weigley, *A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861–1865* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 326–7.

¹⁴ For a critique of the German misuse of the strategy of annihilation, see Yehuda L. Wallach, *The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clauswitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars*, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 45 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986).

¹⁵ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, p. 321.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

¹⁸ *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment*, with analyses by Paul H. Nitze, edited by S. Drew Nelson (Washington D.C: Fort Leslie J. McNair, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 95.

¹⁹ Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, p. 165.

²⁰ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, p. 352.

²¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 62; see also Peter Schweizer, *Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

²² Paul Hofheinz, "U.S. Anchors a Concentric Alliance Targeting International Terrorism," *Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 2001.

²³ Edward Walsh, "U.S. Campaign on Schedule, Generals Say," *The Washington Post*, November 5, 2001, p. 14.

²⁴ Eric Schmitt with Thom Shanker, "U.S. Might Establish More Afghan Bases to Intensify Pressure on the Taliban," *The New York Times*, November 29, 2001, p. 1.

²⁵ James Dao and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Sees Battles after Afghan War in Lawless Areas," *The New York Times*, January 8, 2002, p. 1.

²⁶ Ilene R. Prusher, "U.S. Enters Mopping-up Phase," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 14, 2002, 6. The quote is attributed to the officer who planned the operation, LTC David Gray.

²⁷ Michael Hedges, "Rumsfeld Reiterates U.S. Mission," *Houston Chronicle*, April 27, 2002.

²⁸ David A. Fastabend, "That Elusive Operational Concept," *ARMY*, June 2001, pp. 37–44.

²⁹ See Field Manual (FM) 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations*, 3d Draft, October 2001, Chapter 1, pp. I-25–26.

³⁰ Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Hart Sinnreich, *Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed Army*, Land Warfare Paper No. 40 (Arlington, Va.: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, March 2002), pp. 14–15.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Interview, Matt Laurer with General Richard C. Myers, NBC "Today Show," February 27, 2003.

³³ Capabilities are defined for this purpose as the ability of a properly organized, trained and equipped force to accomplish a particular mission or function. See United States Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, 24 May 1995, p. I-1.

³⁴ See FM 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations*, 3d Draft, October 2001, Chapter 1, pp. I-19–I-25.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. I-4.

³⁶ Colonel John Mulholland, commander of the 5th Special Forces Group and Task Force Dagger, stated in a briefing that some 60 percent of his task force were conventional, primarily Army forces.

³⁷ Roger J. Spiller, "Our Chances of a Happier Ending," *American Heritage*, December 2001, p. 31.

³⁸ See FM 1, *The Army* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 2001), pp. 19–20. Landpower is defined as "The application of the nation's ground forces to exert decisive and lasting influence on land in support of national interests" in FM 3-93, *The Army in Theater Operations*, 3d Draft, October 2001, Chapter 1, p. I-2.