The Inevitable Partnership:  
The Franco-German Security Relationship

By Thomas-Durell Young and Samuel Newland
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THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE

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LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 4, SEPTEMBER 1990

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Drs. Thomas-Durell Young and Samuel Newland originally prepared this paper as a project at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

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FOREWORD

The treaty signed by the four victorious World War II powers on September 12, 1990, terminated their rights and responsibilities over Germany and restored its full sovereignty. This will be followed by the full unification of East and West Germany on October 3, 1990, thus forming the largest power bloc in Western Europe and marking the end of a divided Europe.

While uniting the two Germanys is accepted as a proper and inevitable move for reconciliation in Europe, it raises some serious concerns as to the future security role to be filled by Germany within Western Europe. Along with this concern there is uncertainty as to the future roles to be played by NATO, to include the United States, and the Western European Union.

The authors of this paper suggest that bilateral security relationships between France and Germany will be the key. Given the current fundamental political changes taking place in Eastern and Central Europe, and the important role these two countries play in European security affairs, a fresh look at this bilateral security relationship is warranted.

The authors suggest that the recent drive to achieve closer bilateral defense relations was the result of Germany’s unease over U.S. guarantees toward European security and France’s objective of keeping Bonn firmly entrenched in the Western Alliance. In view of the monumental political and security changes ongoing in Eastern and Central Europe, the authors argue that one possible solution is to encourage the development of a stronger, independent European Pillar, thereby keeping Germany oriented toward the West. In this respect, the key to a viable European Pillar is an expansion in the Paris-Bonn security and political dialogue.

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September 1990
SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

Recent events in Central Europe and the Soviet Union have had the effect of bringing to the fore once again in European diplomacy the need to address what has traditionally been called the “German Question,” and what is fast becoming known as the “German Problem.” The generally widespread perception in the Federal Republic of Germany that the Soviet Union no longer presents an immediate threat to that country’s security, and the current disintegration of the German Democratic Republic as a legal entity, have combined to present the conditions which are leading to first an economic, and ultimately a political unification of the German nation. Indeed, West German political parties and government bureaus actively cooperated with their East German counterparts prior to the March 1990 free elections in East Germany, which resulted in a conservative coalition victory.1 In light of the violent European experience with a unified German nation, leaders of the Western democracies and the Soviet Union have expressed their reservations over the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, first proposed by Chancellor Kohl on 29 November 1989. These concerns resulted in the convening of a meeting of Ambassadors from the Four Powers on Berlin to discuss recent developments and have subsequently been the subject of high level talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.2 But, as recognized by President George Bush, it is hardly consistent for the Western democracies to support national self-determination in Eastern Europe, and then oppose it for one of the strongest supporters of the Western Alliance.3

The difficulty facing the Western nations is not so much opposing the unification of West and East Germany; for if history and current events are any guide, this political force is clearly one that ultimately defies suppression, unless foreign military formations remain in country to oppose any such move. Rather, the challenge for the Western Alliance is how does it deal with this extremely delicate issue, given the fact that the Federal Republic is a democracy and is active in its support of the Western security alliance and European economic and political integration? It is, therefore, not surprising that while Western leaders have expressed their uneasiness about the proposition of a unified Germany, they have also stated that such a process is inevitable. The Western democracies are faced with the complication of both having to decide at which point in the current ongoing unification process are their interests threatened, and once that particular point has been achieved, how are they to arrest it. Thus, it would appear that the difficulty facing the Western Alliance concerning the “German Question/Problem” is how to influence it so that: 1) European security is not threatened, 2) the Western allies encourage the Federal Republic not to act precipitately, while reminding it of the many political, economic and security advantages which accrue to it by remaining in the Western fold, and 3) Western attempts to influence the terms of unification do not alienate Bonn and thus encourage the very independent actions they seek to avoid. There would appear to be no serious disagreement with the fact that a neutralized, unified Germany, as suggested by Stalin in 1952, a Germany outside of NATO, or a Federal Republic infatuated with an extreme form of Ostpolitik at the expense of its Western orientation and responsibilities, would clearly not be in Western Europe’s, and particularly U.S. interests.4
In brief, the last thing the West wants the Federal Republic to do is to reconsider its position in the Western alliance. In order to prevent this eventuality, a convincing case must be made to Bonn of the continuing utility of some form of Western security alignment to its defense needs. For instance, while the immediacy of the Soviet threat has diminished, it is, and is likely to remain, present in some form. Additionally, in spite of the tumultuous positive changes which took place in Eastern Europe in 1989, the potential for instability remains very high indeed. When considered with the constructive worldwide role NATO can play in both an active and passive sense, an altered NATO structure reflecting the changes taking place in Europe, may remain relevant to its members. Regrettably, the credibility of the principal member of NATO, the United States, has suffered in recent years in the eyes of many in the Federal Republic. Indeed, the image of the United States has gone from one of being suspect to one that is felt by many West Germans as becoming increasingly irrelevant to Bonn's security requirements as Gorbachev's concept of a “common European home” gains currency.

The Reykjavik summit in fall 1986, where the United States seriously considered the Soviet proposal to dismantle their respective inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces without first consulting with its NATO allies, and the 8 December 1987 Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), were widely perceived by many officials in the Federal Republic as having constituted concrete moves by Washington to decouple its nuclear guarantee to the Federal Republic. Bonn, in particular of America's West European allies, took umbrage of the fact that it apparently had very little influence over American decision-making concerning European security issues and consequently began a new eastward diplomatic initiative. The decision by the superpowers to remove their respective short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe (the heretofore best nuclear deterrent forces located in Europe in the view of the Federal Republic), which were placed there at Helmut Schmidt's instigation, caused the ruling conservative coalition to reassess its own national security situation in light of this change to the U.S. commitment to German security. Complicating this situation, of course, has been the subsequent perceived diminution in the Soviet threat in West Germany. This has had the additional effect of making the U.S. security commitment to the Federal Republic less relevant to the West German security debate than in previous years. This has also been further aggravated by U.S. complaints made in public over such politically sensitive issues as burden sharing and potential limitations being placed on routine military operations and large-scale allied exercises in Germany. Thus, while Bonn for good reason can remain uncertain as to its security, especially as the European members of the Warsaw Pact continue their efforts at reform, the previously strong attractions of NATO have strongly diminished from the perspective of the Federal Republic.

Two principal results have emanated from the anxieties manifested by the Federal Republic concerning its reservations over Washington's leadership in alliance diplomacy. The first is the fall from favor since 1987 in Bonn of the previous strict adherence to a diplomacy dominated by its support for the Western Alliance, even when this was at the expense of national goals. Instead of the conservative ruling coalition allowing the "Atlanticist" school to continue to direct Bonn's foreign policy objectives, what has clearly been observable since 1987 has been a Federal Republic flirting with the East in an attempt to effect some new modus vivendi which would enable it to achieve its foreign policy aspirations to improve relations with the German Democratic Republic. That the Federal Republic would make such a fundamental change in its diplomatic activities has not gone unnoticed by Bonn's fellow European allies.
One means by which Bonn’s European Community (EC) allies have responded to West Germany’s security unease has been through reviving (at France’s insistence) the defense aspects of the Western European Union (WEU). Following a two-day meeting in October 1987, held in The Hague, foreign and defense ministers from WEU countries issued the communique, “Platform on European Security Interests,” which expressed the aim of creating a common European defense policy. While it is evident that a more formalized Western European defense community, or the “European Pillar” as it is often called, must overcome numerous political obstacles before it becomes a reality, trends point toward greater European defense cooperation, exclusive of NATO. For instance, there is already a precedent for joint operations carried out under the auspices of WEU and outside of NATO. This was the deployment of Western European naval forces to the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988. Should the ambitious EC 92 proposal to form a unified market come to fruition, the European Pillar could gain greater relevance. While not widely recognized, the Single European Act, which was initially envisioned to be completed by the end of 1992, has provisions for defense cooperation among the EC Twelve. Moreover, as argued by French President Francois Mitterrand,

If we succeed in realizing the internal European market by 1992/93...then present conditions will change entirely, including those for the joint defense of Europe. It will then be understood that Europe cannot exist (as a unified body) without ensuring its own defense.

Despite the evident future potential of the European Pillar to ameliorate Bonn’s security concerns (and those of its allies) as well as to “anchor” the Federal Republic in Western Europe, a short term solution to both Germany’s and its allies’ concerns, and indeed the key to its eventual viability as an independent actor in European security affairs, is the continued success in effecting a closer Franco-German defense relationship. While initiated in the early 1960s, only to become dormant quickly thereafter, Franco-German defense cooperation experienced a period of revitalization during the early 1980s. Considerable progress has since been achieved, to include the establishment of the Franco-German Defense and Security Council in December 1988, the holding of the major bilateral field exercise *Kecker Spatz/Moineau hardi* or “Bold Sparrow” in September 1987 and the creation of the joint Franco-German Brigade to be stationed near Boeblingen, West Germany.

One can ponder how it was that a country, which since 1967 has claimed to base its national security on the strict adherence to nuclear deterrence and rejection of the NATO strategy of flexible response as codified in MC 14/3, would allow itself to become progressively “entangled” in the conventional defense of the Federal Republic of Germany. The simple answer to this question is that given the fundamental import France places on the Federal Republic remaining aligned to the West (and a bulwark between it and Eastern Europe), Paris has had no other choice than to move to assuage Bonn’s anxieties. This even includes making public announcements as to the use, or better yet, the “non-use” of French tactical nuclear forces on German territory, West and East. When assessed in light of the recent dramatic transformation of the Warsaw Pact and the move toward the creation of a European pillar, Franco-German defense takes on significance to the Federal Republic on the one hand and even more so for France and its other EC partners on the other.

In consequence, given the fundamental changes which have transpired in Central Europe, the future vitality of the Paris-Bonn security concordat has become one of the crucial elements in maintaining Germany’s alignment to the West. This should not be
implied to assume that the role of the United States has perforce been depreciated. As a European continental nuclear power, France is singularly well-suited for a number of reasons to provide the security incentives to keep the Federal Republic oriented toward the Western fold, particularly at a time when Bonn is attempting to come to terms with the issue of unification and its place in post-cold war Europe. If U.S. forward deployed forces in central Europe were reduced to 195,000, as announced by President Bush in January 1990 under the terms of a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) accord between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and if U.S. strategic forces were significantly reduced through a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement with the Soviet Union, France's defense commitment to the Federal Republic, particularly in a less threatening European theater, becomes more important in relative terms to Bonn. Under such a scenario the possibility could develop that France may be willing to change its long-standing nuclear policy and publicly commit its nuclear deterrence force to the defense of the Federal Republic as part of the European Pillar, particularly if this were the price that has to be paid for a Western-aligned German nation.

In essence, the objective of the United States and its principal European allies should be to make it increasingly attractive to the Federal Republic to remain within some form of the Western Alliance. The European Commission under the leadership of Jacques Delors is close to accomplishing the goal with the Single European Act. As a result of the sheer size of the Federal Republic's economy, Bonn economically will dominate this grouping of states; not an inconsequential inducement to Bonn. Apropos security consideration, the facts concerning this issue, which will be analyzed in this study, make clear that the key to achieving the same degree of European cooperation through the WEU and the creation of a European Pillar rests upon the continued success of the Paris-Bonn security concordat.

The purpose of this work is to analyze and assess the Franco-German defense cooperative relationship, focusing on the reasons behind its creation, particularly from 1982 onward. It will be argued that this bilateral defense cooperation has been the dual product of Bonn's unease over Washington's security commitment to the Federal Republic, and equally important, France's goal of not permitting West Germany to go neutral or drift Eastwards diplomatically. Finally, it will be argued that in addition to the need for an effective European Pillar to ensure Western Europe's security in the future, it is very much in Washington's interest to foster this development. While the case could be made that in the past it was not in America's diplomatic interest to encourage such an eventuality, nor to acquiesce to reductions in its forward deployed military presence in the region, the altered security landscape in Europe now dictates such a development. By taking a proactive approach and encouraging interallied cooperation, particularly the Franco-German linchpin of a future European Security Community, U.S. policy will ensure that it retains its credibility as a constructive and positive influence in West Europe affairs.
SECTION II: THE FRENCH APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY

To appreciate the magnitude of change which has occurred in French defense policy caused by France’s growing desire to effect a strong security relationship with Bonn, it is necessary to understand the basic tenets of Gaullist strategy which dominated that country’s strategic direction following its implementation in the 1960s until 1986. In brief, the traumatic national experience of three major wars against Prussia/Germany during a span of 70 years and France’s bloody postwar decolonialization process forced French officials in the 1950s and 1960s to question the utility of conventional forces and collective security within NATO. American opposition to the Anglo-French intervention in Suez in 1956 and French perceptions of U.S. betrayal during the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 strongly reinforced these concerns. In Europe, France was disconcerted by what it perceived to be a lack of will on the part of the United States to continue to defend West Berlin and the Kennedy administration’s new strategy of flexible response. To Paris, flexible response was a clear manifestation of the lack of U.S. commitment to deter with nuclear weapons a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, as well as France’s realization that the United States would not maintain forces forever in Europe. 13

President de Gaulle opted, therefore, to pursue a defense policy based on national independence. Consequently, Paris continued the development of a national nuclear capability, and in 1967, withdrew French forces from the integrated military command structure of NATO. Concurrently, however, France remained a member of NATO and has continued to participate selectively in many NATO military programs as governed by the 1967 Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements. 14 French military forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany have remained, but under the provisions of a bilateral agreement with Bonn. Yet, conditioning this continuation of France’s participation in some of NATO’s activities has been the principle of the nonautomaticity of Paris’s commitment to participate with NATO in the planning for the defense of Western Europe. At the same time, no French government, Gaullist or Socialist, has ever ruled out the possibility that France would act to defend its Western European allies. 15

While irritating to its NATO allies, the French principle of defense independence was justified by successive French governments until 1986 on two grounds. First, the option of nonbelligerency in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation was essential for France if it were to adhere to its principle of defense independence and its strategy of “national deterrent maneuver.” French strategy dictated that any automatic or a priori commitment of forces to a NATO contingency would depreciate freedom of national action, as well as diminish the full, potential value of France’s nuclear deterrent. Second, French officials argued that the principle of nonbelligerency reinforces deterrence since uncertainty of response complicates an aggressor’s calculation to attack. For these reasons, ambiguity in France’s possible military contribution to the Western Alliance permeated French defense policy from 1967 to 1986. 16 To assuage its Western European allies and reinforce its bona fides, particularly to Bonn, Paris argued that as the sole operational reserve of the alliance on the continent, it would make little military sense to commit its forces, a priori of a conflict, to a predetermined area or contingency. 17
The obvious *sine qua non* that permitted the pursuit of an independent defense policy was France's nuclear forces. The majority of the French political parties (including the French Communist Party) and the nation as a whole support the continued possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, it is argued, give France the most effective means of deterring an attack on its "vital interests" (which are defined as the protection of the "national sanctuary"), as well as providing Paris with the status of a major world power. Indeed, arguably more so than any other country which possesses nuclear weapons, France has adopted, *in toto*, the concept of defense independence through nuclear retaliation, and has structured its defense forces accordingly.

To ensure the survivability and credibility of its nuclear force, France has developed an impressive range of nuclear delivery systems: intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and nuclear armed air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). French nuclear forces are currently undergoing a substantial modernization program, including the introduction of M-4 SLBMs, approximately 50 *Hades* SRBMs (scheduled for deployment in 1992), and the *Air-Sol, Moyenne-Portee* ASM system first deployed in 1986 (which in turn is scheduled for replacement at the turn of the century by a longer range version of this weapon, the *Air-Sol, Longue Portee* ASM, which may be co-developed with the United Kingdom). These programs will significantly increase the number, range and accuracy of warheads in the French nuclear arsenal by the mid-1990s.

Although the initial independent strategic targeting doctrine as claimed by General Charles Ailleret was to protect France from all directions ("tous azimuts"), this was publicly changed under President Pompidou to focus on the Soviet Union. This targeting doctrine has remained largely unchanged, and the Socialist government in its 1984-88 *Loi de Programmation* (Defense Program Law) declared that the Soviet Union represented the principal threat to France.

Yet, in keeping with the principle of defense independence, French governments have continued to pay lip service to their long-standing position that France's relatively small nuclear capability does not, and cannot, extend to provide for a defense of its Western European allies. French nuclear strategy has stressed the tenet that nuclear weapons can only serve national interests. It will be recalled that President de Gaulle opted out of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over this very point and pursued the development of an independent national nuclear force. Given the current relatively small size of the French strategic nuclear arsenal (292 warheads in 1988), it has been argued that its extension to an ally would be of limited credibility in terms of deterrence. Nevertheless, this situation will change dramatically by the mid-1990s when the French strategic nuclear force will grow to over 576 warheads, two-thirds of which will be deployed on its SSBN force. Finally, the French strategic nuclear force will increase in relative size and significance in terms of deterrence to Western security if a START agreement is reached between the superpowers where their warheads inventory could fall to 6,000 apiece.

The pursuit of a strategy based on nuclear deterrence, however, has not been without its negative effect on the state of French conventional forces. Although nuclear forces only comprise approximately 20 percent of the French defense budget, they are still judged to be a very good return on the investment, given the benefits which accrue to France by being a nuclear power. Yet, the strong emphasis on nuclear weapons has had, until recently, the effect of depreciating the role of conventional forces in French strategy. Gaullist military doctrine was long reticent to envision, let alone adequately plan for, prolonged conventional warfare in Europe. This concept is still evidenced by
the lack of sufficient and modern heavy armor and logistic support capability for French conventional forces; the latter of which, according to Diego Ruiz Palmer, would only last for approximately two weeks in a high-intensity conflict.28

Notwithstanding the existence of the French nuclear force, the foundation for current French security is based on the condition that the Federal Republic of Germany remains a strong and acquiescing buffer state against the Warsaw Pact. This requires that Bonn continues to host sizeable NATO conventional and, until recently, large numbers of nuclear forces in West Germany, in addition to maintaining a large and modern conventional force.29 France’s “religious” commitment to the strategy of nuclear deterrence would be seriously challenged if the West German shield were degraded in any way. Hence, Gaullist strategy has been predicated upon: 1) NATO (read: the United States) maintaining its military presence in the Federal Republic; and, 2) Bonn remaining satisfied with this arrangement. Therefore, in addition to the periodic U.S. threat that it will withdraw its forces from Europe for financial and political reasons, Paris also has to monitor very attentively the three disquieting German “isms” which could significantly alter Bonn’s status in the Western Alliance: neutralism, nationalism and pacifism:30 all three of which are currently observable, to varying degrees, in the current domestic political debate in the Federal Republic.

France’s concern over the changing security environment in Europe during the latter 1970s and early 1980s resulted in a number of trends which changed significantly the orientation of French defense policy by the mid-1980s. First, as a result of a perceived diminution of the U.S. commitment to European, and indeed global, security interests following the end of the Vietnam War, Paris moved to modernize its conventional forces for European and out-of-region contingencies.31 This was an important development since Paris was loath to give the perception that it would seriously contemplate engaging in a conventional conflict in Europe, which would greatly depreciate the value of its nuclear deterrence strategy. Nonetheless, Paris had little choice, despite severe financial constraints, because of its continuing engagement in the Third World and because of developments in the Eastern bloc. The emergence of the Soviet concept of “operational maneuver groups,” which have the potential for exploiting breaches made in NATO’s linear defense in West Germany, was assessed as being particularly threatening to France. As poignantly observed by Francois Heisbourg, “In the era of ‘smart weapons’ capable of striking in depth and the age of ‘operational maneuver groups,’ the notions of ‘first’ and ‘second’ line states lose a good part of their justification.”32 Surely if Soviet forces could defeat NATO conventional forward deployed forces in Germany, a late, unilateral French conventional response could be handled by the Warsaw Pact, thereby increasing the need to use nuclear forces; this is an option strongly opposed in the Federal Republic where French nuclear warheads would likely be targeted. In essence, in the French mind, “their” German shield was beginning to show signs of weakening.

Paris was not alone in its perceptions of the motives of the two superpowers. Officials in Bonn were also attempting to formulate new strategies to ameliorate their position vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact, which included urging their French ally to increase its public commitment to the conventional defense of the Federal Republic. In breaking with long-standing Gaullist defense policy, President Mitterrand responded to Bonn’s anxieties in February 1982 at a Franco-German summit meeting by agreeing to intensify bilateral defense cooperation. In the short term, two important changes in French defense policy were effected which have had the result of enlarging France’s “national sanctuary” to all but encompass the Federal Republic of Germany. First, at the conventional level, in the 1984-88 Defense Program Law, Paris established in 1983 the Force d’Action
Rapide, or “Rapid Action Force” (FAR).\(^{33}\) This formation of 47,000 troops is envisioned to provide Paris with a capability to deploy quickly a hard hitting, air-transportable conventional force 250 kilometers forward along the central front in the Federal Republic as an important supplement to the I French Army, or to project military power into the Third World.\(^{34}\) The FAR consists of the 4th Airmobile, 6th Light Armored, 9th Naval Infantry, 11th Paratroop, and 27th Alpine divisions. Parenthetically, with the exception of the 4th and 27th divisions, the remainder of this force represents the successor to the Forces d’Actions Extérieures which had been created specifically for overseas missions. Thus, the FAR is very much a formation designed for either the European theater or for missions in the Third World. Despite the political importance attributed by the West Germans to the creation of this formation, very little new equipment was added to the French Army’s order of battle. Indeed, according to one analyst, the FAR was created at the expense of demobilizing two divisions and denuding the three French Army Corps of some of their modern weapons (principally their anti-tank weapons and helicopters) to equip the five existing divisions which make up the FAR.\(^{35}\)

While overall force improvements involved in the creation of the FAR are modest at best, its creation manifested a significant attitudinal shift in French defense thinking. In the view of David Yost, the FAR has four long-term implications for French defense: 1) the strongest public commitment since 1966 to French participation in the forward battle, 2) a more evident coordination of efforts with NATO allies in the Federal Republic, 3) a potential for a larger commitment of conventional forces to the forward battle, and 4) a heightened concern over the Soviet non-nuclear threat to France.\(^{36}\) There are, nevertheless, formidable challenges (e.g., interoperability) which would confront the FAR should it ever be deployed in Germany and which were made clear during the “Bold Sparrow” exercise of September 1987.\(^{37}\) Moreover, some of the FAR’s equipment for the armor-heavy Central European Front (e.g., the AMX-10RC light armored vehicles) was shown to be unsuitable, although the FAR’s Force d’Helicopteres Anti-Chars (anti-tank helicopter force) did prove that the French are capable of delivering an effective counterattack during the early phases of a conflict on the Central Front.\(^{38}\) Finally, the French armed forces are not well-endowed in the area of logistics and some areas of combat support. Indeed, despite the shift of modern equipment to the FAR from the three French Army Corps, if deployed in the Federal Republic alongside its NATO allies, to be effective, the FAR would still require allied logistic and combat support (particularly tactical air).\(^{39}\) While not depreciating the important value to NATO of establishing a closer commitment to the Central Front by Western Europe’s second largest army, the fact remains that French conventional forces do have significant operational limitations.

The second French response to its increased apprehension over the Soviet threat to Europe during the early to mid-1980s was the modernization of its force of armement nucleaire tactique, or tactical nuclear weapons (ANT). One of the most important programs in ANT modernization is the current move to replace the Pluton SRBM force with the Hades system. Originally configured to have a range of 350 kilometers, the 1988 French defense white paper announced that the Hades system’s range was being increased to 500 kilometers.\(^{40}\) This was obviously done out of consideration for German sensitivity to the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on its and the German Democratic Republic’s soil. Moreover, unlike the Pluton system, which is controlled by battlefield commanders, the Hades system will be controlled by political authorities in Paris, thereby strengthening political control over their use.\(^{41}\) The role of the ANT in French nuclear strategy is to provide Paris with the capability to launch a tactical nuclear warning shot to demonstrate to an opponent France’s willingness to move a conflict to
the strategic plane. In late 1984 the French Government publicly strengthened its position regarding its commitment to use nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack by hinting at the early first use of the ANT. Thus, the nomenclature of this force was changed at that time to *armes prestratégique*, or "prestrategic weapons," to emphasize the strong link between a tactical and strategic nuclear response. At the same time, however, French officials have gone to great pains to stress that this does not imply a move by France toward adopting a flexible response strategy. Moreover, Mitterrand has stated that prestrategic forces, the "ultime avertissement" (final warning) would not be used on German soil. The previous relevance of the prestrategic systems' modernization to this new doctrine is that the range of the *Hades* is such that it can be launched from French territory to strike targets in Eastern Europe rather than being limited to targets throughout the Federal Republic or the German Democratic Republic. Not surprisingly, *Hades* has come under strong criticism in 1990 for not being relevant to French security requirements, given the declining justification for needing to target Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, its development continues.

In essence, these developments in French defense policy under the Socialist government of Francois Mitterrand were clearly calculated to assuage anxieties in Bonn. While the question of German security has not been in itself the principal motivating factor, it is important to understand that German security concerns have become an important priority in French defense thinking and have changed long-standing precepts in French strategic thought. In effect, the previous Gaullist policy of defense independence and nonautomaticity have given way to a stronger *de facto* commitment to defend the Federal Republic. As Robert Grant writes, French defense thinking is manifesting "a greater willingness to consider the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany a vital interest to France." As the political landscape of Central Europe continues to evolve and the Federal Republic expands its diplomatic overtures to the East, one can predict a continuation of the evolution of French defense policy toward establishing closer links to Germany. However, in the future, the rationales for France's own *Ostpolitik* across the Rhine will not primarily be to assuage German security anxieties in a new era of decreased threat perceptions, but rather to tie the Federal Republic firmly to Western Europe and thereby continue to provide a shield against the East.
SECTION III: GERMAN SECURITY POLICY

From the founding of a unified German nation in 1871, much of German security policy could be characterized as unilateral and too often in the pursuit of nationalistic goals. These policies, which predominated from 1871 until 1945, resulted in the total defeat and occupation of Germany in 1945 and its subsequent division. Considering the impact of the defeat and destruction of Germany in 1945 and its reputation as a pariah among peaceful, civilized nations, the postwar West Germans chose to reassess completely national priorities and their security policies. To understand the Germans and their security perspectives, it is important to remember the nature of their geographic location. Germany has traditionally served as a bridge of Eastern to Western Europe, because in some respects, Germans are both Eastern and Western Europeans, and at the same time, neither one. Their unique geographical and cultural perspective has been clearly articulated in their postwar security policy.

The Federal Republic of Germany, founded in 1949, has maintained a remarkably consistent security policy. This policy can be understood by using David Calleo’s analogy. According to Calleo, the Federal Republic has constructed its security policy around three broad circles, the Atlantic, Western Europe, and Central Europe. The first two circles represent Germany’s involvement in the NATO Alliance and with the WEU and other European economic and political initiatives. The third circle represents detente and Ostpolitik, which have become increasingly visible since Willy Brandt’s Chancellorship (1969-74).

The postwar Federal Republic has firmly anchored its security policy in the first two circles, with Germany pursuing a multilateral security policy based on close cooperation with the United States and membership in NATO. Perhaps realizing the folly of its unilateral/nationalistic policies of the past, Bonn had been willing to relinquish a portion of its national sovereignty and has permitted alliance policies to dominate its postwar security and diplomacy. This path was chosen by the first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who sought to anchor Germany solidly in the West and, by so doing, avoid in the future either the excesses of rampant nationalism, or the threat of the Communist takeover.

It is important to recognize, however, that the other circle, the connection with East Europe, has always been present and currently is reasserting itself in a major way given the developments in Central Europe. Even when Adenauer chose strong ties with the United States and the Atlantic powers, some recognized that this course would result in the harsh division between the two Germanies, a postponement of German unification, and the final political settlement of the Eastern occupied territories (in Poland and the Soviet Union), which formerly belonged to Germany. In order to avoid such a stark division, as early as 1949 the Social Democratic Party (SPD), among others, sought a Germany that was not remilitarized, not strongly tied to a western alliance, and was more focused on rebuilding the country, both economically and politically. Despite the immediate postwar desires of the SPD, the German people chose to place the major promoters of the Atlantic and West European circles, the right-of-center Christian
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), in power and consequently the “western” orientation of German security policy has predominated. This is manifested in Bonn’s strong commitment to NATO and, until recently, in a diplomatic sense by the predominance of the “Atlanticist” school in the formulation of West German foreign policy.

A variation (or perhaps a different emphasis) on the three broad circles concept emerged in 1969 following the election of the first SPD-led coalition government. This coalition, led by SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt, sought to promote East-West detente and Ostpolitik, not as an alternative to the Western Alliance, but simply as a method of advancing additional German national interests. This initiative was based on a strong Germany, firmly anchored in the Western Alliance and under an extended U.S. nuclear umbrella, seeking from a position of strength an improvement in relations with the East. This blending of the three broad circles was the basis of the security policy pursued by the SPD from the beginning of Brandt’s chancellorship until Helmut Schmidt’s defeat in 1982.

During the latter phases of Schmidt’s chancellorship (roughly 1979-80), strains began to show in an important part of Bonn’s link to the NATO Alliance and its close relationship to the United States. While Calleo’s broad circles are an excellent framework for understanding West German postwar security policy, they fail to underscore an important part of the NATO connection, and the bond between the Federal Republic and the United States. Since the close relationship to the West was initially forged, an essential link in the German security equation has been the bond with the major western superpower—as the only power that could conceivably serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. An additional, indeed an essential, part of this equation is dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrence (extended to cover Germany) as a necessary element for the security of the Federal Republic.

In recent years the importance to the Germans of this close U.S. tie and the value of an extended umbrella of nuclear deterrence has not been fully appreciated by many U.S. policymakers. Equally misunderstood are German perspectives on the use of nuclear weapons. For the Germans, the extended U.S. umbrella has served as a political weapon. Its value is in deterrence, not its warfighting capabilities. If in its defense doctrine, the United States appears to emphasize short-range nuclear weapons, or battlefield nuclear devices, the Germans become extremely uneasy (e.g., the recent dispute between Bonn and Washington over Lance SRBM modernization). For them this can only mean one thing—dead Germans, be they East or West, should deterrence fail.

Consequently, one of the first major disconnects in U.S.-German security policies occurred in the early 1960s when the Kennedy administration first initiated the flexible response doctrine. To German political elites, flexible response did two things. First, it implied a slight decoupling of the United States from its policy of extended nuclear deterrence; and second, it appeared to be a move which could permit Germany to become a battleground for a conventional war (or a war with battlefield tactical nuclear weapons). Ultimately the Federal Republic grudgingly accepted this change, but the belief has always lingered that flexible response would result in full scale nuclear war and nuclear weapons would be valued for their warfighting use rather than their deterrent value. Despite the philosophical difference on the actual application of nuclear weapons and the usual irritants that develop within a multilateral alliance, no major crises ever shook the foundations of NATO’s security policy—NATO and the United States with its umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence—until the last ten years.
During the latter part of the Carter era, U.S. administrations began to take positions which threatened the three security circles. Since the beginning of detente, the Germans had proceeded consistently to improve relations with the East Bloc, and by the late 1970s, this concept had achieved broad consensus, even within the CDU/CSU. The Carter administration ultimately perceived the Soviets as gross violators of human rights, took an increasingly cool approach to the Soviet Union, and was only interested in detente if accompanied by an improved Soviet record on human rights. The Carter approach was followed by the first term of the Reagan administration, which in its earlier years characterized itself as a strong opponent of the “Evil Empire” and like its predecessor sought to use (and encourage among its allies) various types of commercial and cultural embargoes to restrict contacts with the Soviets. Through such actions the United States was placing itself squarely against detente and Ostpolitik, policies which have broad acceptance in most German political parties.

The Reagan administration further shook German confidence by three initiatives which, in German eyes, weakened a key element of German security. This key element is its strong dependence on the United States, a prime provider of its security umbrella (through NATO). First, at the Reykjavik summit, without consultation or any advance warning, the President seemed willing to dissolve the U.S. ICBM force which provided the Germans with a large part of their strategic nuclear umbrella. An extended U.S. nuclear umbrella, however delivered, has given the Germans a security blanket since 1949. Reykjavik was preceded by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was also perceived by many Germans either as an attempt by Washington to develop an alternative to extended nuclear deterrence or, if nothing else, as an acceleration of the arms race. Third, the INF agreement of December 1987 caused another wave of uncertainty in the Federal Republic because it seemed like yet another attempt by the United States to decouple its strategic nuclear forces from Europe. This particular part of the U.S. umbrella had been established in 1983/84 at great political cost by the major German political parties, only to be removed in 1987. Thus, the activities of two successive U.S. administrations contributed to a climate which resulted in changes in the foreign policy orientation of the Federal Republic and its perceived need for additional security guarantees from its European allies, especially France.

Evidence of a split between Germany and the United States is clearly supported in current polling data. Since the early 1980s the German belief (as well as that of other European nations) in the danger of war and the threat of Soviet aggression has steadily decreased. Accompanying these decreases is the perception that superpower rivalries are responsible for world tensions and that Mikhail Gorbachev is more of an advocate of peace than is the President of the United States. Even worse from the U.S. perspective, since 1986 there has been a gradual decline in German public opinion in support for NATO and the presence of foreign troops on German soil. An added variable in Bonn’s national security calculus is the growing perception of a reduced threat emanating from a chaotic Warsaw Pact. Underscoring this shift in German attitudes was the Federal Republic’s December 1989 announcement to cut the Bundeswehr by twenty percent (from 495,000 to 400,000) by the mid-1990s. In short, how important will the U.S. security commitment to the Federal Republic be as the Soviet Union slowly disengages itself militarily from Central Europe, particularly at a time when some of the European members of the Warsaw Pact undergo a phase of defense reorganization and possibly even security reorientation? Thus, the United States faces the dilemma of a Germany which doubts its security commitment, while this very commitment is increasingly being seen by Bonn as less relevant to its needs. Yet, given the Germans’ historical fear of the Slavic “hordes” of the East, it can be expected that a Western-aligned Federal Republic will continue to seek security guarantees from its allies in the West.
That the Germans would, in a sense, begin to reassess their security options may sound almost disloyal to many Americans. Conversely, it should be remembered that since 1949 Germany has chosen to "import" security from both the United States and NATO rather than to depend on its former unilateral path. Since the early 1980s the Federal Republic has begun to question both the long-term dependability of the United States and the defense monopoly which the United States has held so long in the Western world, as well as its true relevance in a post-cold war Europe. Considering both of these factors, it seems logical that the Germans would at least explore new sources of imported security, whether it be France, a European Pillar, or what is becoming an increasingly likely possibility, both.

While postwar Franco-German defense cooperation traces its antecedents back to the 1963 "stillborn" Elysee Treaty, the current phase of intensified Franco-German defense cooperation received strong impetus in February 1982 when French President Francois Mitterrand and then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed to conduct "thorough exchanges of views on security problems." This decision came in the wake of Schmidt's dissatisfaction with the security policies and foreign policy priorities of both the Carter and Reagan administrations and the overall desire of the Germans to find some degree of berechenbarkeit (predictability) that, in their opinion, had been lacking in U.S. policy. Admittedly, the overall German effort, however, has been to draw France into a stronger role in the cooperative defense of Western Europe where possible in NATO, rather than to totally supplant the United States. The response to these German initiatives by Paris to date has been, according to Schmidt, to find a new compatibility between French and NATO strategies. The 1982 agreements between Mitterrand and Schmidt have since been augmented by additional agreements between Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, including their October 1982 decision to implement the defense clauses of the 1963 Elysee Treaty, especially the provisions which led both countries to reach "Common Conceptions" in defense issues.

These agreements between France and two separate German political leaders have not been simply relegated to an occasional meeting based on the whim of the political leadership. Rather, the interchange has been institutionalized. Beginning in December 1982, the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs from both countries have met three to four times per year to discuss issues such as political-military affairs, arms control, military threats to Europe and actual military cooperation. The efforts of this Franco-German commission have been strengthened by three working groups (and four subgroups) which have met even more frequently than the parent commission. These bipartite groups are charged with studying topics related to arms collaboration, military cooperation and politico-strategic issues. The institutionalization of a mechanism to promote continual dialogue between the French and German defense ministries has strengthened consensus on some security issues between France and Germany. The breadth of this bilateral defense cooperation was widened in an accord signed between President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl in March 1986. This agreement included "provision for joint maneuvers and training programs and plans for the employment of
the French FAR in Germany if the latter country should be attacked.” In addition to signifying a clear reconciliation between the two countries, the agreement provided for Bundeswehr forces to operate with French forces outside of the operational structure of NATO.67

Finally apropos security discussions, following the completion of the “Bold Sparrow” exercise, it was announced by President Mitterrand that both countries intended to create the “Franco-German Defense and Security Council,” whose protocol was signed in early 1988. The council is made up of the heads of government, foreign and defense ministers, and supported by a committee comprising the foreign and defense ministers, as well as a permanent secretary and deputy secretary. In going beyond the provision of the Elysee Treaty, the council deals with “drafting mutual concepts in the area of security and defense,” coordinating national policies regarding European security, and overseeing improvements in military cooperation at all levels. A small permanent secretariat has been established in Paris to aid in the council’s mission.68

A second area of cooperation can be seen in the armament industry. As early as the 1950s the two nations showed interest in joint weapons development and, in 1958, the Franco-German Institute of St. Louis was established in Alsace for the purpose of fostering scientific research and actual weapons development. Indeed, the French see defense industrial collaboration as a primary area of security cooperation with the Federal Republic. Despite the interest of both countries, Franco-German projects have met with mixed success. For example, President Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt announced, in February 1980, the intent of the two nations to build a Franco-German tank.69 While both nations had substantial enthusiasm for the project at the onset, by 1982 this project has been virtually abandoned.70 Furthermore, the Germans have recently hesitated to commit themselves and the necessary resources to the French Helios military satellite, a project in which they initially showed interest.

Although several important joint projects have failed, an overall trend has been for continued, though not increased, bilateral cooperation in armament development. The antitank helicopter project, which began in 1975, has continued to the present, despite innumerable delays and national differences on design. This particular project continues to be the showpiece of Franco-German armament cooperation.71 Furthermore, in early 1983 France and the Federal Republic (together with Britain) agreed to develop a new antitank missile and, since that commitment, the three nations have agreed to produce antitank ammunition for the multiple launch rocket system. Finally, in 1984, a Franco-German agreement was reached to develop an antiship missile to succeed the current Anglo-French Exocet System.72

It is noteworthy that these European/Franco-German joint ventures are normally more expensive and more delay-prone than individual national projects, but both nations value them and seem intent on continuing cooperative ventures. Of added value is the fact that these joint efforts have also contributed to standardization and interoperability within NATO. In some respects France is the driving force with its desire to build and maintain a strong national (and European) arms industry.73

A third area of cooperation, and perhaps the best reported, is in conventional force planning. In the early 1980s, as Europeans, particularly the French and Germans, were expressing concerns about the dependability of the U.S. commitment to Europe, Defense Minister Charles Hernu announced French plans to reorganize a portion of the French Army and create the FAR. An important reason for developing the FAR, whose creation
was strongly supported by Mitterrand, was to reassure the West Germans of the French commitment to assist in West Germany's defense, even though French troops continue to remain outside of NATO's military structure. Ever mindful of maintaining national freedom of action, the creation of the FAR was explained to the French public more as an effort to reassure anxious Germans, rather than to acknowledge any national concern about French security.

The creation of the FAR in 1983 was followed by the 1987 "Bold Sparrow" exercise. While the French held the "Fartel 85" field exercise in southern France in 1985 to assess the ability of the FAR to intervene in the European theater, the "Bold Sparrow" exercise was the first test of the FAR's capability to deploy to the Federal Republic. This field exercise brought together 55,000 Bundeswehr soldiers from the 2nd West German Army and 20,000 troops belonging to the FAR based in France.

The purpose of the exercise was to evaluate the long-range mobility of the FAR and determine the level of interoperability existing between French and Bundeswehr troops. The "Bold Sparrow" exercise saw a number of important firsts, to include the deployment of French forces outside of their usual geographic boundaries in the Federal Republic, as far as Bavaria and Baden-Wuertttemberg. Moreover, French forces were placed under the operational control of a German commander. As the first large joint French-German maneuver to test the FAR in Germany, and one to which the NATO military committee and SACEUR were not invited, "Bold Sparrow" remains a successful political manifestation of France's conventional commitment to the defense of the Federal Republic, although, at the military level, severe interoperability problems were encountered and apparently remain unresolved.

A final initiative in the conventional arms arena has been the creation of the Franco-German brigade which is to be in place by October 1990. First suggested as a symbol of cooperation by Helmut Kohl in June 1987, the concept was enthusiastically received by the French. As structured, the brigade will consist of some 3,000-4,000 soldiers whose first commander is to be a French brigadier, who will in turn be replaced by a German commander on a two-year rotational scheme. The brigade has two French battalions, two German battalions and mixed support units. As the Bundeswehr is committed to the NATO force structure, German troops for the Franco-German brigade are drawn from the German 55th Territorial Brigade, which is to be disbanded. As to the brigade's actual wartime mission, it apparently will be assigned to rear area security operations, vis-a-vis a frontline role. Perhaps more importantly, the brigade is envisioned to serve as a "testing ground" for military integration between France and Germany.

While these efforts in conventional force planning and armament research and production indicate a Franco-German desire to cooperate in defense planning, in two related areas cooperative policies remain elusive. They are short-range, tactical nuclear weapons and the question of whether the French strategic nuclear force will cover Germany automatically in the event of an attack by an aggressor.

This problem directly relates to the perception of nuclear weapons by the citizens of each country. For the French, the possession of an independent nuclear force outside NATO is a positive factor for Western security. Their status as an independent nuclear force is a symbol of independence (outside the control of any other nation or compact) and national accomplishment, and is jealously guarded. The Germans, however, have a decidedly schizophrenic view of nuclear weapons. They value nuclear weapons for their
deterrent value, but do not want them used for warfighting. The reasons for German reticence are obvious and were best articulated by former Chancellor Schmidt when he stated: "I am not a coward; I'm willing to fight. But I am not willing to annihilate my nation." Since the Germans do not have nuclear weapons and have no current plans to acquire a nuclear weapons capacity, they must import a foreign nuclear umbrella. Although tensions between the two blocs in Europe are decreasing, it can be expected that while there will be depreciation in the value of conventional forces to the Federal Republic, the utility of nuclear deterrence will remain high as long as Bonn remains aligned with the Western Alliance.

Thus, what the Germans have been wanting from the French is some type of guarantee that the French nuclear umbrella will be extended to cover them. This issue has taken on added importance because of the perception by some Germans that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is slowly decaying. One former French Ministry of Defense official using the pseudonym Andre Adrets has written that the Franco-German security dialogue will surely "collapse" if it does not effectively deal with the central question of nuclear weapons. In the conventional realm such guarantees have already been provided on several different occasions. But in the nuclear arena the formal guarantees have been elusive. President Mitterrand did publicly commit France, in February 1986, to "consult" (circumstances allowing) with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic before employing prestrategic weapons on German territory. He also suggested, in December 1987, that France would not use its Pluton missiles, with their 120-kilometer range, against enemy forces on West German territory. In other words, the "ultime avertissement" of France's intention to use its strategic nuclear forces would not be demonstrated in the Federal Republic. Despite these significant, if not carefully worded statements, the French have hesitated to share their nuclear prerogatives with the Germans. Conversely, the French have clearly stated their intent to aid their allies in the event of an attack. Former French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac noted in a December 1987 speech: "France would never consider its neighbor's territory a glacis. ...The engagement of France would be immediate and without reserve. There cannot be a battle of Germany and a battle of France (emphasis added)."

Clearly, the French want to assure the Germans they will come to their aid in the event of an attack but, as noted by President Mitterrand, "[Franco-German security cooperation] cannot go as far as sharing the decision and use of nuclear forces. Everything else can be shared." Notwithstanding Mitterrand's and other French officials' views of the inability of France publicly to provide assured nuclear coverage to its allies, Paris is not insensitive to the problems its nuclear forces pose to greater security cooperation with Bonn. Robbin Laird writes that this very issue of security relations with Germany has made President Mitterrand increasingly uncomfortable with the role of French battlefield nuclear weapons and the problems these weapons pose for Franco-German defense cooperation. Given the rapid changes taking place in the East-West military balance in Europe and France's objective of cementing Bonn in the West, it would not be out of character to see a major review of the French tactical nuclear modernization program and its publicly-declared use.

Despite the problems imposed by France on sharing its nuclear arsenal, or the decision to use it, Franco-German defense cooperation can be expected to grow in scope during the 1990s, and it will become the driving force behind any attempt to create a viable European Pillar. It will continue because it offers benefits to both nations plus it calms some of the fears that both nations have in the rapidly changing European defense arena. For France, such cooperation offers a chance to push for the development of a
large European defense industry, as a counterweight to the Asian and U.S. industries. Fundamentally, however, it provides an opportunity for France to encourage the Germans to remain firmly in the Western Alliance, rather than to watch the Federal Republic drift toward a united Germany outside of NATO, or Western European alliances. Moreover, in view of the dramatic changes taking place in the Democratic Republic and the contemporary attention given to "reunification," Paris will certainly perceive defense cooperation with Bonn as increasingly vital to its national security. For the Germans, cooperation with France offers the hope of formally returning the French to some type of European defensive system and, most importantly, provides them a link to an independent nuclear force for deterring war and one that could conceivably become more important to Bonn in a post-CFE Europe should U.S. force levels fall dramatically.
SECTION V: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY

That France and Germany have slowly come to a new understanding concerning a growing commonality in their security interests and objectives, there can be little doubt. Conversely, fundamental impediments remain (e.g., the final outcome of German unification and German involvement in French nuclear planning), which militate against the emergence of a solidified Paris-Bonn defense axis. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that these impediments to closer bilateral defense cooperation could well be overcome in the very near future. What is more, it will be in Washington’s interest to encourage it. While perhaps not the most optimal or efficient means of doing so, a more intimate and expanded Franco-German security condominium, even if it leads (which is likely) to the establishment of an independent European Pillar, will nevertheless provide one means of ensuring that the Federal Republic does not drift eastward and toward a form of unification, inimical to Western objectives.

In the early 1960s at the time of the negotiation of the Elysee Treaty, the United States opposed the creation of a Franco-German security axis. Washington and many of its NATO allies saw Germany’s association with a growingly independent France as an unwanted form of “particularism,” and therefore argued against it. Over time, however, as France reconciled its differences with NATO and created its own modus vivendi with the alliance, Washington came to assess this, and other forms of interallied defense cooperation, in a favorable light. After all, there has long been the belief held in Washington that any efforts on the part of allies to strengthen inter-allied security ties would in general be a positive development because it could produce conditions whereby a decreased U.S. forward deployed security commitment would be possible. Indeed, Franco-German defense cooperation and coordination was seen as particularly welcome, because it has the desirous effect of drawing France back into NATO by its expression of a greater military commitment to the Central Front. That such cooperation might inevitably challenge American objectives through a loss in U.S. influence in the Federal Republic was either not recognized, or judged less important to the aim of drawing France closer into the Western Alliance.

In view of the recent earth-shaking events which have taken place in Central Europe, two fundamentally important variables (which already have affected the Western Alliance’s position in Europe) have been introduced into the European security calculus: 1) the growing acceptance in the Federal Republic of a diminishing Soviet threat, and 2) the reemergence of the specter of a united Germany. There is a very strong fear among many in NATO that this combination of events will lead Bonn to leave the Western fold and adopt neutrality if that is the price it must pay for unification with the German Democratic Republic. Fortunately for the Western Alliance, there are many factors mitigating against this eventuality, such as the dominant economic and political roles Bonn will play in the EC after 1992, assuming that act of integration comes to fruition. While these aspects of European integration are not without their perhaps less obvious and institutionalized security considerations, the emergence of a strengthened European Pillar with which the Federal Republic is firmly attached is clearly in the West’s best interest. The best means of initiating this process, from the perspective of
the United States, is to encourage a closer Bonn-Paris security axis to include additional areas of cooperation, perhaps even including the extension of France's nuclear umbrella to encompass the Federal Republic. The idea of a French nuclear deterrent in the form of a force of neutron weapons, stationed in the Federal Republic under joint French-German control, has been publicly advocated by two former high French defense officials, to the obvious dissatisfaction of the Soviet military. The nuclear option should have considerable attraction to Bonn in view of the depreciation in importance of conventional forces that could well have in Europe with a less threatening Warsaw Pact conventional order of battle. Moreover, the immediacy of this matter should be accepted by Washington even if it does result in a relative decline in America's prestige and position in Western Europe as that grouping of states' security independence grows. Thus, there is a new commonality in U.S.-French security relations (which apparently have been more intimate than previously known and recently acknowledged by the U.S. government, e.g., nuclear R&D cooperation)\textsuperscript{92}, and Washington should actively reiterate to both Paris and Bonn the many attractions of a heightened degree of bilateral security cooperation.

From the perspective of the Federal Republic, increased security cooperation with France holds the attraction that, since France is a European power and a country which strongly values nuclear deterrence, it perforce will remain intimately involved in European regional security, even if, diplomatically speaking, from a "distance." Besides being a European power with nuclear weapons, France also has consistently adhered to a strategic policy which stresses, in extremis, nuclear deterrence. President Mitterrand's public support of the Lance SRBM modernization program, in the face of hostile European and particularly German opposition, is a case in point. Yet, the fear of possibly alienating Bonn on nuclear issues led Paris to take a less forceful position on alliance nuclear modernization in early 1989, yet another manifestation of the increasingly important position Germany plays in French external policy.\textsuperscript{93}

The French strategy of stressing nuclear (and increasingly conventional) deterrence, as opposed to warfighting, is and will likely remain, highly attractive to officials in Bonn for some time to come. The long-standing hindrance to closer Franco-German security cooperation (the role of French nuclear weapons in defense of the Federal Republic), was addressed in part by President Mitterrand in his February 1986 statement. If we are to believe Georges-Henri Soutou, this growing "understanding" regarding nuclear weapons has extended to include German suggestions (made in private) that the French should not build the $2.4 billion Hades SRBM system in its currently planned configuration, but rather as an intermediate-range nuclear missile capable of striking deep into Soviet territory.\textsuperscript{94} Such an option makes very good sense for Bonn as it could be done without the political controversy NATO has recently experienced concerning the SRBM modernization proposal.\textsuperscript{95} Moreover, in view of the decreasing perception of a Warsaw Pact threat to the Federal Republic, and should a START agreement between the superpowers come to pass, the relatively small size of the French nuclear force holds the potential for providing declaratory extended deterrence to the Federal Republic should bilateral cooperation extend that far.

The key, however, to making expanded Franco-German defense cooperation a success in particular, and ensuring the continuation of stability in Central Europe in general during this period of early post-cold war adjustment, is that of the independent European Pillar. What is important to understand is that the conundrum facing the Western Alliance relates not only to the perennial "German Question/Problem," but rather it is essential for the United States to influence in a positive sense the evolution of
the new security balance emerging in Central Europe. Thus, the Franco-German security concordat is but a part, albeit an important one, of the solution to the new security calculus now governing the European continent. Given the strong trends for integration among the EC members in economic, political, and, increasingly among the WEU countries, security cooperation, it is clear that the European Pillar will gain further credibility as a solution to parts of Europe’s security problem.

Moreover, given the historical animosities between even Western European countries which continue to plague European diplomacy, European regional security problems can probably only be adequately addressed within a multilateral body, like the WEU, as opposed to being limited to largely the prerogative of the two principal continental Western powers. Indeed, the encouragement of France and the Federal Republic to direct their cooperative security endeavors to complement the efforts of the WEU has its own particular and important attractions for both France and Germany, if not the rest of Western Europe. For instance, long-standing French diplomacy has striven to depreciate the position of the United States in Europe, with the objective of creating a stronger European security position in which France would at least be the orchestrator, if not the actual leader of Western Europe.96 The attractions for Germany, which has the largest military establishment in the bloc,97 would be to assuage possible European concerns, East and West, of Bonn’s motives in a region that it will dominate economically and increasingly so politically after 1992. Moreover, Franco-German security cooperation within the overarching auspices of the WEU would also provide a solution to the nettlesome problem raised by the existence of Article 24 of the Federal Republic’s Basic Law which stipulates the command and control over Bundeswehr units can only be exercised by a multinational organization.98 In view of the WEU’s insistence that its security objectives are complementary, vice supplementary, to NATO, the proposition that a WEU sponsored higher command authority would be inimical to the U.S. interests cannot be accepted.99 While it can be expected that the idea of a Western Europe directed by adroit French diplomacy and financed by an increasingly affluent Bonn would raise predictable diplomatic problems among some of the members of the WEU, this should not present an unsurmountable impediment to security cooperation, particularly given the alternatives, e.g., an Eastern “answer” to the “German Question/Problem.”

At the same time, it is recognized that the concept of an independent European Pillar is not cost-free to the United States. As the principal security guarantor to Western Europe during the postwar era, the United States has been able to command a considerable amount of diplomatic influence and prestige in a region that continues to be judged as essential to U.S. defense and political interests. The challenge Washington now faces is how to maintain its influence and prestige in a Western Europe which is adapting to a new security environment. In light of the publicly-acknowledged trends in arms control negotiations between the superpowers, in both strategic and conventional armaments (not to mention congressional pressures for reduced U.S. defense spending), it is evident that reductions are likely in the U.S. conventional presence in Europe and its nuclear arsenal in general. At the same time, Washington needs to adopt a forward-thinking vision for European security which will fulfill both its and its allies’ vital interests which are being defined as including: 1) continued stability in Europe, 2) the peaceful unification of Germany on terms acceptable to the members of the Western Alliance (which by definition proscribes a neutralized or Eastern-aligned unified German state) and 3) a reduction in the Soviet Union’s diplomatic influence in the region. Given these objectives and constraints, U.S. options would appear to be very limited indeed.
In the era of "Gorbymania" in Western Europe, the growing democratization of most of the Central European members of the Warsaw Pact and serious discussions concerning confederation, unity and even unification of Germany within its 1937 borders by some Germans in both the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic, all point to the evident conclusion that the alleged "victory" of the West over Soviet-inspired communism has created both opportunities and not inconsequential challenges which now face the Western Alliance. A more intimate Franco-German security relationship for the purpose of assuaging any lingering West German anxieties over an Eastern threat, as well as European fears of a resurgent unified Germany, will not in itself provide the major solution to Western Europe's new security considerations. Notwithstanding its limitation, if the Western Alliance is to survive the new phase of peace following its "victory" in the cold war against the Soviet bloc, the Paris-Bonn axis will be the heart of a successful Western concept establishing a new security regime in Europe.
1. Despite the fact that U.S. Government policy, as stated by President Bush, is supportive of the concept of German unification, there is no question that the United States has the objective of continued political stability in Europe. One essential U.S. condition must surely be that the Federal Republic remains aligned to the West and a member of NATO, even if it takes on a different character and mission to reflect changes in the European security calculus.

2. As the two Germanys work to effect closer relations, the United States needs to pursue a policy that will encourage the Federal Republic of Germany to remain inclined to the existing political, security and economic institutions in Western Europe and the North Atlantic. The obvious key in this respect is the need for greater Western European political, economic and especially security integration. Thus, the United States should promote the constructive evolution of European defense cooperation. Given the realities that the Franco-German defense relationship is fundamental to the success of the European Pillar, U.S. policy should strongly encourage its two allies to effect closer bilateral defense ties, with the ultimate aim of creating a viable Western European defense community under the aegis of the WEU.

3. That there would emerge a new and independent actor in Western European security, i.e., the WEU, does not necessarily imply that U.S. interests would suffer by definition. The ultimate long term U.S. security objective in Europe has been, and remains, maintaining a balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and thereby averting conflict. The political conditions in Central and Eastern Europe are now changing to such a degree that new U.S. policy initiatives are required if political stability is to continue in Europe. It is evident that a new Western European security institution, with active French participation, will be needed to complement the economic integration which is slowly taking place within the EC, both in order to maintain stability, as well as to further political integration in Western Europe.

4. Postwar U.S. policy toward Western Europe has been a success. The Soviet Union is attempting to achieve fundamental economic and political reform. Moscow’s European satellites are also in the midst of internal reform and also exploring new diplomatic initiatives toward the Western democracies. Western Europe has attained a degree of economic and political integration which surely would have surprised (and pleased) its early visionary advocate, Jean Monet. U.S. policy now must be oriented toward constructing the final and essential supporting institution for a stable postwar and post-cold war Europe, a Western European defense community.

5. Assuming U.S. policy exerts a constructive and visionary influence on Western Europe policymakers, Washington’s influence and prestige in this important region will remain high, and may improve. There is no reason to expect that an active WEU defense community, in association with an altered NATO reflecting the security changes underway in Europe, would be inherently inimical to America’s position in Europe. It is becoming abundantly evident that there will remain a need for the continuation of
stationing of U.S. Army forces in Western Europe for a number of years to come. If the U.S. military presence in Western Europe is now framed within the context of both contributing to stability in an uncertain Europe, as well as assisting in the development of Western European defense integration, there is every reason to believe that the U.S. Army will continue to play a significant role in the maintenance of security in Europe.
ENDNOTES


5. For extensive documentation of this subject see Survival Volume 29 (2) (March-April 1987), pp. 166-188.


15. Ibid., pp. 7; 15-20.


46. Even Germany's participation in the Emperors' League, the Triple Alliance, or the Reinsurance Treaty in the late 19th century, did not negate her unilateral role. These alliances were not in pursuit of a multilateral goal but rather devices to protect the new German empire from French revanche.

47. The concept of Central Europe and Germany's role in Central Europe is discussed in the *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), 6 March 1987.


49. In fact, to date Germany has chosen to import her security rather than to depend on her own national forces. By so doing, Germany was able to place greater emphasis on rebuilding the war-ravaged country and also was able to soothe the fears of some nations that feared a resurgent and militarily strong German nation.
50. John A. Reed, *Germany and NATO*, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987), pp. 27-30. Some would question whether Germany, totally defeated, had the ability to choose any course of action, but she did in fact have choices. The SPD, for example, promoted a Germany that was not rearmed and focused on reconstruction. Stalin offered Germany reunification in exchange for a nonaligned status, but the Germans chose Adenauer and the CDU/CSU with emphasis on a strong tie to the West.


52. It is often forgotten that the CDU/CSU has dominated the postwar election results by leading the vast majority of the postwar coalitions. Only during the Brandt and Schmidt years did the SPD lead coalitions.


54. A good resource for the thinking of German political elites is included in Helga Haftendor, *Security and Detente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy*, (New York: Praeger, 1985).

55. An excellent discussion of the effect of the Carter years is contained in Alex Vardamis, “German-American Military Fissures,” *Foreign Policy* (34) (Spring 1979), pp. 86-89.

56. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations sought to use embargoes or sanctions against the Soviets without adequately considering European interests. It was the Reagan policies, however, that so polarized the SPD. See Ron Asmus, “West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization,” *Survival* Volume 30 (6) (November-December 1988), pp. 500-503.


59. The deployment of INF in Germany was a highly contentious issue which cost Helmut Schmidt, among others, dearly. The subsequent INF treaty, coupled with U.S. diplomacy at Reykjavik, caused Europeans to ask if INF was worth it. Howard, “A European Perspective on the Reagan Years,” pp. 480-482.


61. Innumerable surveys exist on this issue. See “Angst von den Russen,” *Stern*, 16 March 1987, pp. 36-38; and, Hans Rattinger, “Development and Structure of West


70. Ibid. Wallace cites the bickering of German and French representatives on concept and design and the unwillingness of the French to accept German technological leadership as major problems.

71. Within the work, Partners and Rivals in Western Europe, there is an excellent essay by Christopher Layton entitled “The High Tech Triangle.” It provides details on Franco-German-British industrial cooperation. See pp. 184-204.


73. Peter Ruge, “French Toy with an Idea... If the Americans One Day Go Home,” The German Tribune, 22 February 1987, p. 4.


81. Current German thought is against nuclear weapons for warfighting and against chemical weapons in that both would devastate one or both Germanies. Thus the French have had to be extremely cautious due to their multi-delivery capacity for all types of nuclear weapons. Any short range delivery systems have been opposed by sizeable elements in the Federal Republic and some elements of NATO strategy have not been well accepted in Germany. See Eckhard Luebkemeier, "Akzeptanzprobleme Der NATO-Strategie" Kurzpapier (Bonn: Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 1988).


91. See the article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanrou in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), 24 September 1987.


97. Despite the December 1989 announced cuts in the Bundeswehr, because of its size and sophistication, it will continue to play a key role in the security of Europe. The Washington Post, 7 December 1989.


99. Western European military defense cooperation is not without its critics in the Soviet Union and the European political far left. See the article by Colonel S. Leonidou concerning the threat posed to the Warsaw Pact by the FAR and other Western rapid deployment forces in Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow) Second Edition, 19 May 1988; and, the French Communist Party's view on European defense integration by Yves Choliere, "Europe: Military Integration or Cooperation in Disarmament?" World Marxist Review Volume 32 (11) (November 1989), pp. 34-36.