



# THE LAND WARFARE PAPERS

No. 37 AUGUST 2001

## Crossroads in U.S. Military Capability: The 21st Century U.S. Army and the Abrams Doctrine

John R. Groves

A National Security Affairs Paper  
published on occasion by

**THE INSTITUTE OF  
LAND WARFARE**

ASSOCIATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
Arlington, Virginia

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### **LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 37, AUGUST 2001**

#### **Crossroads in U.S. Military Capability: The 21<sup>st</sup> Century U.S. Army and the Abrams Doctrine**

**by John R. Groves**

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## Foreword

The downsized Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> century faces a level of global commitment not experienced since the days of the Korean War. In consonance with the post-Vietnam “Abrams Doctrine” which calls for the employment of U.S. reserve component forces as full partners in Army operations, the active Army is using the citizen soldiers of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve to help share the burden.

Over the past year, two ARNG division headquarters deployed to the Balkans to command both active and reserve units operating there, and the deployment of other reserve component units is a certainty in the future. This increased peacetime commitment has come as a surprise to many Guard and Reserve men and women, their families and employers. It also raises important questions concerning the adequacy of active Army force levels, and the appropriate role for the Army’s reserve components in other-than-war missions overseas.

In this paper the author provides the historical backdrop and examines the issues concerning the Army’s future active–reserve structure. He discusses in detail the difficulties in the creation and retention of a balanced active–reserve force. This is a complex task, yet one that is vital to the Army and to the security of the nation. The 21<sup>st</sup> century promises to be one of increasing challenges to American security and position in the world, and America’s citizen soldiers will continue to have a central role in answering those challenges.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN  
General, U.S. Army Retired  
President

August 2001

## **Crossroads in U.S. Military Capability: The 21<sup>st</sup> Century U.S. Army and the Abrams Doctrine**

*If we look at how we have used our reserve components in the last five to eight years, on the one hand you will see an increase in our use . . . for the operational missions that we traditionally look to the active component to handle. . . . [M]ission profiles . . . have gone up, perhaps 200 percent, at the same time the active component force structure is coming down . . . by about 40 percent.*

Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki  
to House Armed Services Committee, 18 July 2001

### **Introduction**

In his book *Citizen Soldiers*,<sup>1</sup> Stephen Ambrose writes of the courageous and unrelenting sacrifices made by regular GIs in World War II in Europe and Japan. Implied in this portrayal of the citizen soldier, however, is the notion that American soldiers had no desire to serve in the military any longer than was necessary. While a small, professional and career-oriented standing force remained after World War II, a large standing military was not what Americans wanted. They wanted instead to direct their energies to the pursuit of economic prosperity that was, for most, the foundation for democratic civic life. If the fate of the nation were threatened, Americans would interrupt their business, civic and personal interests and go to war. But in the big picture, military service was only a temporary, albeit necessary, interruption in the peacetime life of the nation.

Prolonged peace in the United States in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries has been clouded by an absence of peace in other areas of the world. Try as it may, the United States has been unable to remain disengaged. As the peacetime U.S. military finds itself with no letup in sight, military and civilian leaders are voicing concerns about the lack of resources and people to carry out the missions of the new century. However, a more systemic challenge may lie ahead. Aside from the issue of numbers, the question of mix arises. "Mix" refers to the balance of active and reserve forces, including the National Guard, that will be employed across the spectrum of future military missions. Central to this discussion is a contemporary application of the Abrams Doctrine in a global environment that finds the U.S. military called upon frequently to do nonwartime yet militarily compatible missions worldwide.

## **The Abrams Doctrine**

Although long in duration and costly to the United States in many ways, Vietnam did not result in a broad mobilization of U.S. National Guard and Reserve forces. President Lyndon Johnson was unwilling to use U.S. military reserves in large numbers. In 1965, he refused to accept a proposal by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for a reserve call-up of up to 100,000 troops. By his actions, President Johnson set a course that would cause the United States to “tiptoe” into the war and would in the process make the U.S. military “fight not as past wars had been fought with the public fully aware of the commitment and behind the fighting man.”<sup>2</sup>

As the war proceeded, the American people became less sympathetic to the conflict continuation policy followed by U.S. policymakers. This growing gap led to strident debate, civic unrest and ultimately a decision to disengage U.S. military forces from Vietnam. The involvement of reserve forces in large numbers might have hastened the debate on the efficacy of the war and caused public sentiment to more quickly coalesce. Instead, the inevitable outcome was delayed at enormous cost.

Following Vietnam, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams sought to embed a lesson learned from Vietnam into Army doctrine for the future. Henceforth, U.S. military commitments with the potential for large-scale and prolonged deployments would be “total force” propositions in which the Guard and Reserve would be full partners with the active components.<sup>3</sup> Based on lessons learned from Vietnam, General Abrams believed that the liberal use of reserve forces in future conflicts would cause the American people to more quickly validate long-term and large-scale use of military forces. If validation was not forthcoming, one outcome would be fewer casualties and lower overall cost, with emphasis on the former.<sup>4</sup> The “Abrams Doctrine” became a critical element in the planning for size and use of both the U.S. active and reserve forces.

Following Vietnam, implementation of the Abrams Doctrine began. It was based on the expectation that if the U.S. active military were committed to a prolonged intervention, the reserve forces would go as well. At the same time, while U.S. military planners developed scenarios for innumerable hypothetical conflicts around the world, the post-Vietnam focus remained on a land war in Europe with many World War II characteristics.

## **The Cold War Context**

During the Cold War, the U.S. National Security Strategy transitioned through a series of policies differing mainly in the manner in which nuclear force would be arrayed and used against the Soviet Union. At the heart were concepts and policies designed both to deter the Soviet Union from a nuclear first strike and to contain the geographical and ideological expansion of communism. U.S. Cold War policy, consistently based on the theme of Soviet containment, provided for a generally stable relationship between U.S. active and reserve military components. Debates between the two components focused primarily on issues related to modernization and readiness. However, for international deployments in the main, the Abrams Doctrine remained the basic tenet—U.S. reserve component forces were to be utilized only for the “big one.” This was confirmed by the very low number of reserve forces

deployed in the post-Vietnam period. Cold War roles and missions for reserve forces were developed accordingly.

A Cold War maxim was that a conventional conflict of any magnitude between the United States and the Soviet Union and respective surrogates could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. However, preparedness for conventional warfare was always part of the picture. The Vietnam War and U.S. forward presence in Europe as part of NATO demonstrated a U.S. capability for that dimension of conflict, as did events in Panama, Grenada and Haiti.

Vietnam was the genesis for the Abrams Doctrine. However, in the years since, including Operation Desert Storm, the United States has not entered conflicts with the duration or level of commitment to cause that doctrine to be tested. Because the doctrine remained in the abstract, the American body politic saw no need to test its validity, leaving in place a presumption of continued applicability. The Abrams Doctrine has remained for the most part an unchallenged and guiding principle. However, times have changed. Ongoing U.S. military deployments are requiring reserve component participation in conflicts short of total war, raising ambiguities and issues not seen in the Cold War but indicative of what can be expected in the post-Cold War 21<sup>st</sup> century. The end of the Cold War brought an end to the global bipolar division such as it was, but also coincided with a series of global events that are causing the Abrams Doctrine to become more than an untested abstraction.

### **The Landscape Today**

The United States finds itself today in a position envied by much of the rest of the world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and a long period of relative peace and domestic prosperity in the United States have created a sense of internal optimism and security not experienced since the end of World War II. At the same time, however, the international landscape has seen the rise of new and changing threats to U.S. interests, increasing the potential for deployments of active and reserve components. There has been no corresponding redefinition of the Abrams Doctrine to accommodate the changing international environment and to chart a new course for the military. Both policymakers and military leaders have struggled unsuccessfully to find clear, predictable and consistent deployment policies comparable to those of the Cold War. The bedrock policy for the use of U.S. military forces in defense against threats to the survival of the nation has not changed. However, the process of calibrating threats to the military force structure and capabilities required to meet those threats has been less than precise.<sup>5</sup> This, along with the frequent use of U.S. military force along a continuum of intervention from humanitarian assistance to low-intensity warfare, has made reaching consensus on the makeup of early 21<sup>st</sup> century U.S. military forces difficult.

U.S. military deployments today are numerous and diverse, many with the potential for violent conflict. Under all conditions, the need to respond quickly and decisively is a basic premise. By extension, one result of the Abrams Doctrine has been to assure that included within the meaning of “decisively” is the unambiguous support of the American people.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a euphoric mood was evident in the U.S. Congress with the anticipation of a U.S. budgetary “peace dividend.” Deep



cuts in defense spending were anticipated that would make available large sums for other domestic programs and tax cuts. No longer would a large standing military be required, and certainly the modernization and technological “stay-ahead” costs could be greatly reduced. Unspoken but implied, and consistent with Cold War doctrines, was that the reserve forces could be called upon to make up numerical differences if a threat of large-scale conventional war arose.

In the early 1990s, the U.S. military began to reduce personnel. That trend continued through the decade. At the same time, until recently, defense spending declined or remained flat. The year 1998 marked the eighth straight year of reductions in strength and the thirteenth straight year of reductions in resources, with modest increases for defense spending in 2000.

The military and civilian defense leadership struggled through a series of painful self- and external examinations. Through the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP), the military sought a new azimuth. “Globalism” seemed to be the term most descriptive of the new age, but it was a concept that left the military without the focus of the Cold War. In its place was a confounding combination of new and old missions that raised new questions concerning the role of reserve forces.

Not surprisingly, as missions increased but resources did not, the ground rules began to change, and new internal fault lines appeared among the active and reserve components as each sought to protect its interests. By itself, a reduction in defense spending might not have brought as much tension to the relationships; however, budget cuts combined with a belief by National Guard adjutants general that the new global environment required a more aggressive application of the Abrams Doctrine stirred the debate. Intense discussions took place between National Guard and senior (primarily) Army leaders, especially when it appeared that the Guard was not emerging as part of the first team—meaning it was not realistically missioned for combat. A number of factors contributed to the intensity of these colloquies. Three will be mentioned here:

The first was the belief by National Guard leaders that the Army unfairly excluded Guard maneuver forces from ground involvement in the Gulf War. The central issue was the Army’s apparent unwillingness to form a full partnership with the Guard in the early stages of mobilization for Desert Storm, which was anticipated to be a large-scale and possibly prolonged ground war. The backdrop for this was the legitimacy of the Abrams Doctrine.<sup>6</sup>

Second, as the decade progressed, U.S. military force structure continued to be reduced, but the utilization of U.S. forces to respond to global contingencies increased. From the end of the Cold War through the 1990s, missions in which U.S. forces were deployed away from U.S. bases for extended periods increased by approximately 300 percent. The result is an active military force that is largely deployed for much of the time. Under these conditions, many military members and potential recruits are hesitant to embrace the military lifestyle. When missions place a wartime-like stress on families and individuals but lack a convincing linkage to the defense of the nation, it raises the question, “Why are we doing this?”<sup>7</sup>

Third, public opinion has thus far not had a limiting impact on the use of military forces for deployments in the “humanitarian” or “operations other than war” categories (i.e., interventions short of war). Over the past decade, the size of the active military force has continued to decline.<sup>8</sup> Budget cuts, recruiting deficits and lower retention rates have been factors. One outcome has been a gradual increase in the use of reserve forces in support of active component missions. As this trend continues, the long-standing social contract that reserve components will be used only for domestic emergencies or for a major war in defense of the nation is facing revision.

## **The Road Ahead**

Although arguably not intended, emerging from the convergence of these three factors is the potential dismemberment of the Abrams Doctrine. Trends in the 1990s have resulted in a dual challenge to overall military capability: funding has declined while demands on the military have increased. Members of the force are departing in greater numbers,<sup>9</sup> and because membership in the U.S. military is voluntary, the task of recruiting enlistees has become more difficult and expensive.<sup>10</sup> Recruiting and retaining military members must today compete with other options, many of which are a result of a healthy economy, low unemployment and a high percentage of high school graduates going to college. These, along with a generally upbeat national sense of well-being in which military service is deemphasized, are formidable challenges to recruiters.

Additional trends are further undermining the foundation upon which the Abrams Doctrine has rested. The noncombat nature of the majority of U.S. military deployments has placed a heavy burden on a disproportionately small number of active and reserve component “support” units. This has placed a high demand on civil affairs, military police, medical, water purification, engineer, air transport, environmental and other units, which are small in numbers. Active component combat (maneuver) forces are also stretched, but the bulk of reserve component combat (maneuver) units are not called upon proportionately. Instead, recurring missions, often end to end, are placed on the small portion of specialized combat support and combat service support reserve and active force units. The result of these imbalances is the creation of a two-tier reserve force.

In the larger tier, reserve component members still drill one weekend each month and two weeks each year, with high-priority and mainly Guard units requiring greater time commitments from unit members in many instances. This is the bulk of the “traditional” or M-day (mobilization day) reserve force made up of National Guard and Reserve members and is built on the American concept of a citizen soldier reserve in support of the active military.<sup>11</sup>

The second and smaller tier consists of reserve component members who serve on active duty several weeks to several months at a time but are not permanent members of the active or regular military.

A third group, although not a tier, is the full-time force supporting the reserve components.

The availability of these soldiers for potential deployment is complicated by the two methods through which servicemembers are activated. The first method is a

Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) in which unit members are involuntarily placed on active duty for up to 180 days. Unit members are legally obligated to participate in the mobilization. The second method is voluntary service in which unit members may elect to participate. Either group consists of full-time and traditional drilling soldiers. Drilling unit members often have employment obligations and community ties that affect their willingness to volunteer for deployments and which also favor the shortest possible term for involuntary service.

Conditions threatening the future health and visibility of U.S. military active and reserve forces can be found in both tiers. In the first tier, the Army Guard has created fifteen “enhanced” brigades. These units have received increased full-time personnel and equipment modernization. It is common for unit members to find themselves drilling more than the one weekend a month and two weeks annually. For the members who are not full-time, the pace can be highly demanding and can adversely affect their desire to serve. Already, strength figures in several of these units show a decline.<sup>12</sup>

In both the first and second tiers, the potential for repetitive deployments of units with specialties few in number but high in demand are apparent. Also in both groups, so long as the operational tempo of active component missions is high, the need for reserve units or individuals for “filler” augmentation will also be significant.

For first-tier units that are mobilized, unit members experience significant disruptions in their lives. However, thus far only a small portion, perhaps 5 percent of the total Reserve and Guard force, has been effected through PRC involuntary mobilizations. Levels of stress in the first tier due to involuntary separation from work, family and community activities are understandably greater than stress levels experienced by volunteers in the second tier. However, every mobilization has its share of stress for all participants.<sup>13</sup>

As the reserve force is more broadly utilized for extended support to active units or is assigned more directly and independently as implementers of National Military Strategy, the complexities and complications resulting from these deployments will require greater attention from military planners.

Creation of the National Guard enhanced brigades is a step in the direction of large-scale reserve component maneuver unit readiness for short-notice mobilizations. These units are the Army Guard’s answer to the Army’s need for a reserve component maneuver force capable of quickly meeting short-notice deployments for national contingencies. Present indications are that these units will be capable of performing, but the price for readiness will be high and not all of the units will be at the same level all the time. Finding and keeping the people necessary to maintain the enhanced brigades at desired levels of readiness will be the key to success.

### **Keeping the Force Relevant**

In the mid- and late 1990s, the term “relevance” had much to do with defining standing between and among reserve component units. Relevance, for purposes here, can be understood as meaning rough parity between active and reserve force capabilities, or alternatively, having the capabilities needed by the warfighting commanders in chief for mission accomplishment. Accordingly, in keeping with this

mantra, if the Guard in particular is to be relevant, it must maintain overall standards of readiness throughout its force structure that make the case. In the instance of combat forces, the enhanced brigades are, for the Army Guard, its relevance vanguard.

Taking shape over the last decade is the conundrum that while maneuver forces will be at the center of a conventional major theater war, other (reserve component) units are much more likely to be used under conditions short of a large-scale deployment. In addition, an unaddressed issue is whether the Army should place reserve component units in a high-use but part-time status in order to achieve “relevance” as defined above.

In a post-Cold War world, relevance for the reserve forces still includes being prepared for the “big one,” but in addition it now means greater availability for a variety of lesser missions. On its present course, the drive for relevance may appear to lead to a higher degree of readiness in the reserve components, but it may also drastically and detrimentally take the “citizen” out of the reserve component citizen soldier. Coincidentally, the conflicting expectation for reserve component units to simultaneously be both Cold War-era backup forces and modern-day “relevant” forces capable of performing a wider and more readily available range of missions may make it difficult to be either.

The growth of a nontraditional (more than monthly drills and two weeks annually, but not full-time) use of reserve components is already the basis for pronouncements that the era of the weekend warrior is over.<sup>14</sup> In 2000, members of the Guard and Reserve performed the equivalent of 35,000 man-years of service. The periods of service ranged from a few days to virtually the full year in non-active duty missions and exercise support roles and were often in addition to the traditional monthly drills and two-week training periods. This trend is not yet having a broad impact on reserve component force structure, but it is increasing and must be considered in the development of expectations for reserve component utilization in future roles and missions.

### **The Nonmilitary Dimension**

Surrounding these developments is an emerging and societal issue of national will and direction. Just how will the greatest and most prosperous nation on earth see itself militarily and how will it maintain its historically balanced active and reserve military posture? All U.S. military components are facing the force structure issues touched upon above. The Army continues to be a work in progress as mission responsibilities and expectations are inextricably intertwined with recruiting, retention, quality-of-life and employment issues. All things considered, the Army, active and reserve, may face the greatest test.

For strategic military planners, a balanced use of Army active and reserve forces will be a central issue in the next millennium. Complex and important questions must be addressed. Among them: Is the traditional role of the civilian soldier Guard member and Reservist changing? Is the Abrams concept in need of reconsideration? Is creation of a temporary full-time nonwar conflict intervention force inevitable? Does the National Security Strategy need reexamination in view of its impact on

military operational requirements? Is the part-time citizen soldier concept worth protecting or is it just a goal that, while desirable, is now obsolete?

### **Who Will Hire the Soldier?**

The extent to which employers support reserve component military members will be a central issue.<sup>15</sup>

The litany of post-Cold War challenges to national security and the accompanying need for a readily available reserve force has done little to rally enthusiastic public support for an increased use of reserve forces. While policymakers, scholars and other experts categorize threats to national security as “survival,” “critical” or “significant,” the distinction is often lost on the American people, especially when extended deployments for reserve forces are part of the equation. Gray-area phenomena, asymmetrical threats, terrorist activity, information warfare and operations other than war, including humanitarian operations, have not been catalysts sufficient to cause American employers to enthusiastically view their reserve component forces employees as candidates for new and more active roles. Absent a threat to the survival of the nation, the burden of proof for an expanded use of reserve forces will remain firmly on military and government leaders.

Despite misgivings, however, most American employers affected by the utilization of Guard and Reserve members and the American public in general have not opposed an expanded utilization of reserve components. This is not the same as unqualified support. Future deployments may be viewed by the public as routine and neither overly disruptive nor disproportionately unfair to those affected. This accommodation may change abruptly, however, if American military members, active or reserve, are seen as having been unnecessarily and for extended periods of time placed in conditions and under circumstances without sufficient justification. In public opinion polls, Americans (and employers) do support and show a concern for combating domestic or “homeland” threats that could be of catastrophic dimensions. However, their preference, deeply embedded in concerns about using the U.S. military against U.S. citizens, is for law enforcement to take the lead and for the military, active and reserve, to be used only against clear threats to national security and in response to natural disasters and civil disturbances at home.

Like the rest of the American people, some employers believe in limited involvement of the U.S. military beyond U.S. boundaries while others support a more assertive stance.<sup>16</sup> Of the many challenges ahead for the maintenance of a strong and capable military both active and reserve, the intersection of employer and employee relationships may represent one of the greatest. Many other factors fall under the employer penumbra: an almost unprecedented (although mercurial) level of employment in the United States; a long period of peace; and evolving societal attitudes about where and when the United States should use military force.

The employers’ refrain is, “I will support my employees in their traditional Guard and Reserve roles and I will support them if they have to go to war in large numbers to defend the nation (including another Gulf War scenario and maybe Kosovo). Beyond that, expect me to be skeptical and less than enthusiastic about supporting a policy that causes me to lose my employees for extended periods. Especially, you can expect me to question a policy that allows my employees to leave me voluntarily for

an extended period (not under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up) under supposed threats to the nation that I am hard pressed to rationalize and which then may require me to work at a competitive handicap and then to take them back as if they never left.”

Strategic policymakers expect, and many employers will support, voluntary participation by reserve components in extended missions and deployments, but more than limited resistance can be expected in the future. The extent and degree of resistance remains speculative. However, the limits of tolerance among small businesses will almost assuredly surface. The counterpoint to this view is the following: In the context of the overall work force, numbers of Reserve and Guard members will be miniscule and insufficient to cause a significant negative reaction, much less a groundswell, should they serve in a military mobilization. The reply to that point is that a pervasive utilization of reserve component members may not be required to trigger a challenge to use of the reserve components. Something far less may tilt the scale. Employers may not have to face these issues. The reserve members themselves may short-circuit the process and leave the military on their own. The result could well be a military with insufficient people to do the job.

Tax benefits have been suggested as an incentive to offset losses for employers whose employees volunteer or are called to duty. Tax benefits may have an impact. However, in a competitive private-sector free-market economy where key employees can make a difference between profit and loss, and when unemployment is so low as to make replacement difficult and, if a replacement is found, the replacement may be employed only until the servicemember returns, the benefits of tax relief are questionable. Time will tell whether tax or other benefits to employers will make a difference. Perhaps a low-cost, high-deductible, full-time health insurance plan for all Guard and Reserve component members is a better incentive.

### **Are We Willing to Pay the Price?**

While the American people are varied in their opinions about the role of the United States as a global stabilizer, a further examination of this attitude suggests that Americans do not understand current national security policy. When confronted with a policy of “selective and flexible engagement,” with humanitarian components and implications for numerous and continuous deployments of U.S. military forces (active and reserve), most Americans would rather keep the troops at home!<sup>17</sup>

But when and where should the United States use military force? Since Vietnam, the U.S. military has moved on a path of technological innovation, with applications not only to space and cyberspace but across the conventional battlefield as well. Great emphasis has been placed on new capabilities for individual soldiers, including enhanced weaponry and communications.

The results have been impressive. In the Gulf War, the United States suffered 150 casualties in a mobilization of more than 500,000 military personnel over a period of six months. In Haiti, no losses were attributed to combat, and the same has been true in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Mogadishu remains an exception; eighteen U.S. soldiers were lost in a violent and bloody confrontation that angered, saddened and repulsed the American people. Despite the possibility for an ultimate military victory and the completion of a related

humanitarian mission that both had saved many lives and was intended to contain ruthless anarchy and widespread suffering, the United States withdrew. On reflection, it appears that the Clinton administration and Congress (in its role as bellwether of American public opinion) could not reconcile the gains and losses. No one could convincingly state how warlords in Somalia threatened American vital interests. A humanitarian mission turned bloody was not an environment in which the Clinton administration chose to take a stand.

To say that the Mogadishu experience was a watershed for American willingness to support casualties in future conflicts is an overstatement. However, when combined with the relatively few casualties that have resulted in recent U.S. military missions involving life-threatening conditions, including combat, Mogadishu is a major event. One result is that in future conflicts where the U.S. military faces combat, the rate and level of casualties will have direct impact on sustaining the support of the American people. Although the Kosovo air campaign continued, at one point the loss of two U.S. aircraft in Kosovo raised claims that the United States should not have been involved. In future conflicts involving the U.S. military, a reappearance of this viewpoint should come as no surprise.

The message from the American people seems to be, “Use the military, but not as global policemen. We don’t know in advance where the boundary lies between permissible military utilization and stepping over the line, but we will tell you when we see it. We will accept casualties but only under conditions of close scrutiny, and they had better be low so long as we are not at war (i.e., protecting the survival interests of the nation).”

## **Conclusion**

Looking back to Stephen Ambrose, America has never seen warfare as a substitute for the free-enterprise system. When war has been necessary and the American people were convinced it was so, America went to war, but only as long as necessary and then got the troops home and got back to business.

How will a long-term occupation of Bosnia affect this historic attitude? What about forces presently positioned in the Middle East? How will future National Security and National Military Strategies translate to the use of reserve components? It is difficult to say, but this much is true: Despite the increased use of both active and reserve forces in a variety of overseas operations, there is today no groundswell of opposition to these forms of military intervention. It is clear, however, that increased use of the diminished active component military will also require greater reserve component involvement. As the use of reserve components increases, one question may become increasingly demanding of an answer: “Is the traditional description of U.S. reserve component citizen soldiers about to be rewritten and if so, will a fundamental linkage by which the American people demonstrate support for the military missions determined by political and military leaders be weakened?”<sup>18</sup> The Abrams Doctrine begs for an answer.

## Endnotes

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7. James T. Currie, "Remember, They're Not Replacements," *The Washington Post*, March 25, 2001, p. B3.
8. P.H. Liotta, "To Die For: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties," *Parameters* (Summer 2000), p. 55.
9. One in ten identified enlistees makes it through the interview, testing and evaluation process to basic training. According to recruiters, the greatest reason given by interviewees for not enlisting is the dislike or concern for the structure, discipline and "terse" treatment that they associate with the military. See also, *Military Personnel, First-Term Recruiting and Attrition Continue to Require Focused Attention* statement for the record of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 24, 2001, p. 10.
10. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command estimates that the cost to enlist a single recruit is in excess of \$20,000. This does not include the over \$72,000 cost for each recruit to complete basic schools training.
11. The Constitution speaks of a militia, but this is not the National Guard per se. The constitutional militia is the citizen militia that exists outside of government. It is the "people." The Guard embraces the spirit of the constitutional militia in that the majority of its members are not full-time military members. Nonetheless, Guard and Reserve members are recognized members of the U.S. military and therefore fall outside of the pure militia as contemplated in the Second Amendment to the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. See also the articles on the subject "Citizens, Soldiers and Service to this Nation" in *Parameters*, Summer 2001.
12. Draft (Restricted for Official Use), *Army National Guard Readiness Has Improved, But Enhanced Brigades Struggle with Personnel Problems and Too Many Missions*, United States General Accounting Office, April 2000.



13. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), *1999 Survey of Families of Deployed National Guard and Reserve Members*, May 22, 2000.
14. Charles L. Cragin, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, "The Demise of the Weekend Warrior," *Bangor (Maine) Daily News*, May 27, 1999.
15. Veronica Nieva, et al., *1999 Reserve Employer Survey Final Report*, Report to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), prepared by Westaf, Inc., August 2000, pp. 3-9, 3-13. This report paints a generally bright picture about attitudes toward reserve component members serving in the conventional one-drill-per-month-and-two-weeks-annually role. Employer concerns about longer absences from work were found to be significant, however.
16. Somalia, Mogadishu, Rwanda, Burundi, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, even Panama and the Dominion Republic are all case studies that supporters and detractors of U.S. international assertiveness will cite.
17. Poll conducted by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, reported in an article entitled "Poll: Americans want to fight terrorists, not protect others," by David Briscoe for the Associated Press, March 15, 1999. For a slightly different view see, "America Willing to Risk Your Life—Despite possible casualties, most surveyed believe ethnic cleaning must stop," by Matthew Cox, *Army Times*, June 7, 1999, p. 10. See also, "Clinton's doctrine for intervention—guidelines for military force could shape future," Jodi Enda, Knight Ridder News Service, *Lexington (Kentucky) Herald-Leader*, June 20, 1999, p. A1, and "When should the U.S. use force to save lives? The scale of suffering isn't only factor," Calvin Woodward, Associated Press, *Lexington (Kentucky) Herald-Leader*, March 28, 1999, p. A6.
18. Contained within this question are many issues, but in particular is the continued stridency with which reserve component leaders, adjutants general specifically, are advocates for inclusion of reserve components in missions where U.S. maneuver units are deployed in anticipation of combat. It is the view of the writer that where combat is expected, reserve component combat forces would play a part. This puts in place the litmus test that occurs when community- or regionally-based reserve component units are mobilized and bring with them the concentrated support, concerns, apprehensions and outlooks of a particular community. It is this community that is a representation of America writ large, much like a jury is a representation of the community. Under these conditions, a community serves as a microcosm that passes judgment on the worthiness of the sacrifices that may result and through its collective voice supports or challenges its validity.

Also, conditions exist now where senior reserve component leaders and commanders are advocates for greater reserve component participation in missions where combat is not likely and where national security interests are less convincing. It is here that the potential for further and permanent damage to the historic and traditional role and expected obligations of reserve component deployments must be carefully considered. Despite allegations by national civilian and military policymakers that if reserve units are not available to serve under these conditions, they cannot be considered "relevant" in modern force structure terminology, and to not be relevant is to be dispensable, the very opposite may be

true. "Relevance" may have less to do with availability of reserve component forces for a wide range of long deployments missions and much more to do with maintaining a healthy citizen-soldier force that is capable and ready to assist with opposing major threats to the nation. As assessments of the best alignment of active and reserve components in the support of the nation's needs evolve, the definition of relevance for reserve components may increasingly emphasize preservation of the traditional citizen soldier while making allowances for the selected use of reserve components who are primarily volunteers. The needs of the nation from time to time will require exceptions to this policy, but the policy should stand.