The National Security Council Staff: Structure and Functions

By Christopher C. Shoemaker
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FOREWORD

The National Security Council (NSC) is the body established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies. To assist the NSC, the Act also authorizes a staff. Since its inception, the role of the NSC Staff has ranged from that of a purely administrative body to that of an organization charged with major, overarching responsibilities of national security, depending on the management style and personal preferences of the President. In this paper, which was presented at the 1989 AUSA Annual Meeting, it is suggested that "organizational discipline" must be brought to the NSC Staff if it is to fulfill its essential role. The functions which the NSC Staff must perform are identified. If the recent Iran-Contra Affair is symptomatic of institutional weaknesses in the national security process, then the observations and recommendations in this paper merit careful reading and consideration.

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In 1988 the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) established within its existing organization a new entity known as the Institute of Land Warfare. Its purpose is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the Paper, but does suggest that the AUSA believes this Paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues.
On November 3, 1986, the Beirut newsmagazine, Al Shiraa, reported that the United States had been secretly selling weapons to Iran, notwithstanding a formal arms embargo that had been in effect since the Tehran embassy seizure seven years before. This story was the tip of a policy and procedural iceberg that, when fully surfaced, would precipitate a major crisis for the Reagan Administration. As the details of the issue were gradually revealed, it became apparent that, apart from serious questions of judgment, the Iran-Contra affair demonstrated some major problems within the staff of the National Security Council, problems that called into question the nature and function of that organization. For the first time in its often controversial history, the NSC Staff was subjected to serious public scrutiny, and calls for major reform arose from many quarters. Even those favorably disposed towards the Administration began to ask how one small staff could wield so much power, even in the face of what was apparently determined opposition from the Departments of State and Defense. For students and practitioners of national security policy, the fundamental procedural and structural questions posed in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair warrant serious attention.

Since its inception in 1947, the National Security Council Staff has assumed an increasingly significant role in the formulation of national security policy in the United States. What began as essentially an administrative and clerical support group of the National Security Council has evolved into what, without exaggeration, has become the single most powerful staff in Washington, eclipsing other departmental staffs which, by statute and custom, should have been dominant in their respective fields. This rise in power has been most often ascribed to the powerful personalities who have headed the NSC Staff. However, personalities, even those as strong as Brzezinski and Kissinger, do not alone explain the remarkable bureaucratic clout of the NSC Staff. Indeed, during the Iran-Contra affair, the NSC Staff was headed by persons not noted for personal flair.

In order to understand the sources and implications of NSC Staff power, it is necessary to look beyond personalities and examine the functional roles played by the Staff as an institution. Only then does it become apparent that, regardless of the strength or weaknesses of the members of the National Security Council, the NSC Staff will continue to play a dominant role in the formulation of national security policy into the next century.

What follows is an effort to outline the functional requirements of the NSC Staff, to identify certain features of NSC Staff decision-making, and to explore mechanisms, both formal and informal, by which the NSC Staff executes its various functions. Such an examination is important, for heuristic as well as pragmatic reasons. From a scholarly perspective, much has been written about decision-making within the immediate circle
of the President, with both a conceptual and an anecdotal flavor. There is room, however, for a more rigorous look at the role of the NSC Staff, a look which will help modify or amplify to some extent, wisdom on the subject. From a policy perspective, a more thorough understanding of the functional requirements of the NSC Staff can help a new administration avoid replowing old ground and taking years to discover what its predecessors already knew. To the extent that this effort succeeds in these objectives, it will be useful.
CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF THE NSC

A meaningful discussion of the National Security Council Staff must begin with a review of the conceptual basis of national security, as well as a discussion of the formation and evolution of the NSC and its Staff as institutional bodies.1/ For in its roots we find both the underlying rationale that commands its existence and the deeply ingrained issues of departmental responsibilities and jealousies that determine its course today. By tracking the history of the NSC and by examining the different approaches that the eight NSC Presidents have adopted toward national security decision-making, two trends become apparent. First, the role of the NSC itself is highly dependent upon the psychological makeup of the President. Second, the NSC Staff has inexorably emerged as a primary actor in national security, largely independent of the President's use of the NSC itself as a decisional body.

In this chapter, we will examine the daunting issue of the nature of national security, and then we will explore the development of the National Security Council and its Staff from Truman to Nixon. The Carter and Reagan years will be examined in more detail in Chapter IV.

National Security - An Operational Definition

As bureaucratic institutions go, the National Security Council is but a governmental adolescent, a scant 40 years old. As such, the dramatic changes that have occurred in the structure and function of the NSC are hardly surprising. Indeed, the term "national security" is only slightly older than the NSC itself, having come into vogue immediately after the Second World War. The all-consuming nature of that war demonstrated to policy makers from the President down that there was a pressing need for an institutional body to deal with the overarching elements of national policy that transcended the responsibilities of individual departments.

But, as popular as the term national security has become, there is no widely accepted definition as to what it really encompasses. Such a definition is of great importance, because it is difficult for people to agree who should manage national security if they do not agree on what it is.

In the 1940s, national security was seen primarily as protection from external invasion, an attitude driven primarily by the war.2/ As a result, the original concept had a strong military component. The charter of the NSC, promulgated in 1947, created the NSC to "... enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."3/ Clearly, in 1947, the military dimension of national security was the first among equals.

This narrow definition facilitated the management of national security, and the process was dominated by the military establishment. The early discussions of the composition of the NSC reflected this orientation; in 1946, the Senate proposed that the Secretary of Defense chair the NSC. This is a far cry from the implicit definition of national security that led Secretary of State Alexander Haig to propose, in 1980, that he...
become the "vicar for the community of departments having an interest in the several dimensions of foreign policy."4/ Clearly, in Haig’s mind, national security was dominated by its foreign policy component.

The definition a President assigns to national security will help determine the roles each agency will play in the national security system. If, for example, the Haig view is adopted, the Secretary of State should be expected to dominate the national security machinery. If, on the other hand, the more traditional view is adopted, the Secretary of Defense will have a stronger voice. The third alternative is to view national security as a decisional discipline that is neither primarily foreign nor defense policy. Rather, national security is seen as an overarching, interdisciplinary paradigm embracing elements and responsibilities of a number of departments in dynamic proportion. Under this formulation, the White House emerges as the focus for the national security system.

It is this last approach that led to the formation of the National Security Council in the first place and is implicitly recognized today. But to say simply that national security transcends the responsibilities of any single department is not enough to provide any real guidance on the supporting structure or functions. It is important to provide a definition of national security that can be effectively operationalized into a meaningful structure to which primary players in the process can subscribe.

To that end, national security is the protection of the United States from major threats to our territorial, political, or economic well-being. The structure by which national security is protected is the National Security System and its process is primarily concerned with the integration and coordination of defense, foreign, international economic, and intelligence policies and procedures. This is graphically portrayed in figure 1.
As is evident in the figure 1 schematic, national security is a series of continua embracing principally the overlapping areas of the separate departmental responsibilities. This is not surprising, considering the wide-spread acceptance of the overarching paradigm. But national security also entails certain areas normally thought to involve only a single department. On the margin of departmental responsibilities, the discrimination of national security is often difficult. It is clear, for example, that the management of issues such as doctrinal changes in Army training (point 1 on figure 1) and the procurement of a new Army tank (point 2) are both Defense Department responsibilities, yet only the latter is a national security concern.

With this conceptual background, the growth, changes, and practical evolution of the National Security Council become more obvious and predictable. Moreover, the functional requisites of the National Security Council Staff, to be discussed in Chapter III, emerge as essential ingredients in the effective management of national security.

National Security - Institutional Management

Using the definition presented above, we now turn to a discussion of how the United States has developed and refined its national security system. For the purposes of examining contemporary issues of national security management, the history of the NSC breaks down into four segments: the conceptual period (1920-1945), the birth (1945-1949), the growth period (1949-1968), and institutional maturity (1969-present). Each of these will be discussed briefly below.

The Conceptual Period

Although the Second World War gave irreversible momentum to the establishment of the NSC, the need for such an organization had been identified much earlier. As early as 1919, Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed the establishment of a “Joint Planning Body,” to deal with issues that overlapped between the Departments of State, War and Navy. The failure of that initiative was manifest in the Washington Naval Limitations Conference, during which the State Department negotiated arbitrary limitations on capital vessels with virtually no coordination with the Navy.

Partially because of this debacle and partially because of the rising threat emerging from Germany and Japan, Secretary of State Cordell Hull proposed that the President establish the Standing Liaison Committee, an interagency group to coordinate defense and foreign policy. This organization, constituted in 1933 and composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, became the first institutionalized group to deal with what would later be called national security. But, as with any bureaucratic prototype, the Standing Liaison Committee did not live up to the expectations of its designer; its members were simply unschooled in the requirements of interagency coordination and jealously guarded their own interests. Moreover, the Committee had no independent staff to provide support continuity, and a national-level perspective.
The war, quite naturally, engendered a proliferation of interagency coordinating bodies of all types, dealing with a variety of issues. FDR, recognizing the gathering war clouds, established the War Council, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, as well as the Chief of the respective services. Despite the superficial similarities between the War Council and the NSC, the former did not provide for the genuine integration of diplomacy and defense; it was used primarily as a mechanism to formulate wartime strategy. The State Department assumed a decidedly secondary role and, after the war broke out, Hull was no longer even invited to attend War Council meetings.9

The first real effort to establish a meaningful interagency body on a permanent basis came in 1945 with the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. This group, consisting of the assistant secretaries of the respective departments, actually dealt with some cross-cutting issues from a national security perspective, rather than using the traditional stovepipe approaches of the departments. But the lack of real clout in the government and its inability to generate issues internally doomed the Coordinating Committee to irrelevance. However, like the Standing Liaison Committee before it, the Coordinating Committee took another important bureaucratic step in preparing the way for the establishment of an effective interagency body to manage national security affairs.

The Birth of the NSC

In the aftermath of the Second World War, it became apparent to President Truman that the United States needed an organization to coordinate the range of issues that were now being grouped under the rubric of national security. Between the recognition of this requirement and the establishment of the NSC, however, lay significant obstacles, many of which reflected functional issues that continue to plague the national security establishment today.

The primary reasons for the difficulty in developing and establishing the National Security Council were that the NSC itself represented a major change in the structure of government, and at the same time, it was inextricably intertwined with one of the most sweeping reforms of the U.S. government in American history. A quick review of the impact of the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment in 1949 demonstrates this point. Among other things, the Act accomplished the following:

1) It established the National Security Council.
2) It established the Secretary of Defense and an integrated DoD.
3) It established the Department of the Air Force.
4) It effectively demoted the service secretaries to sub-cabinet rank.
5) It established the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence.
 Needless to say, issues of this magnitude elicited both strong support and resistance throughout the government. The bureaucratic turmoil was further complicated by the ambiguity with which Truman himself approached the creation of the NSC. Although he understood the need for such an organization, he was concerned with the establishment of a body that would usurp his decision-making authority. Truman emphasized that "the council is purely an advisory body and has no policy-making or supervisory functions," underscoring his intention that the President not be bound by votes taken in the council or by decisions made by its members.10/

The actual formulation of the NSC grew out of yet another bureaucratic maneuver, the so-called "Forrestal revenge." As the post-war national security structure began to take shape, there was strong support for the complete unification of the Army and Navy, a proposal that Navy Secretary James Forrestal felt would doom the Navy to second class status. In order to forestall such a development, Forrestal commissioned Ferdinand Eberstadt, a kindred soul, to develop a plan for a national security organization. Not surprisingly, the Eberstadt Report recommended strongly against service unification but also stated that:11/

... to afford a permanent vehicle for maintaining active, close and continuous contact between the departments and agencies of our Government responsible, respectively, for our foreign and military policies and their implementation, we recommend the establishment of a National Security Council.

Because of the far-reaching implications of Truman's proposal, it took two full years for the National Security Act to come to fruition and another two years for the National Security Council, in its present form, to take shape. When finally passed, the language of the Act itself reflected the underlying rationale of the Eberstadt Report. It established the National Security Council with the following charter:12/

... the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.

At the same time, the Act established that "the Council shall have a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President."13/ As envisioned by the Eberstadt Report, the NSC Staff was to be a:14/

Secretariat ... charged with preparing its agenda, providing data essential to its deliberations, and distributing its conclusions to the departments and agencies concerned for information and appropriate action.

From these humble beginnings emerged the staff that was responsible for some of the highest and lowest moments in the conduct of the national security affairs of the United States.
The Growth Years

One of the most widely held views among students of national security is that the NSC is first and foremost a product of the President it serves. Truman clearly demonstrated the validity of this perspective; he first created the NSC with far-reaching potential and then insured that this potential was never realized.

From the beginning, Truman had no intention of allowing the NSC to evolve into anything more than an advisory body. Indeed, from the first meeting of the NSC in September, 1947 until the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the President attended only 12 of the 57 NSC sessions held. Truman wanted to avoid the precedent of making decisions at NSC meetings, a practice that could imply that votes would be taken and that the NSC would become a decisional body binding on the President. Truman also made it clear that he considered the Secretary of State to be first among equals in the NSC and appointed him president pro tempore of the council. Secretary of State Dean Acheson used that leverage to assume control over the machinery of national security decision-making. Acheson first bullied his ineffectual competitor, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and then coopted Johnson's successor, George Marshall. Truman, as a proponent of what Zbigniew Brzezinski describes as a "secretarial system" of national security decision-making, felt comfortable with Acheson's preeminent role on the NSC.

True to the spirit and letter of the Act, the initial NSC Staff was humble indeed, consisting of an Executive Secretary (Sidney W. Souers) and an NSC Staff of three professionals. Within two years, the Staff had grown to 15, grouped into three loose organizations: staff members, consultants, and the secretariat. Even with this growth, however, the functions of the staff had not changed significantly; it still acted principally as an administrative arm of the NSC. The NSC Staff was charged with the development of long-range studies, but the primary strategic direction of the nation came from other groups. In fact, the most famous of the Truman statements of national security, NSC-68, was developed by a joint State-Defense working group outside of the NSC structure and did not involve the NSC Staff.

Individual staff members, particularly the consultants, were creatures of the departments and owed primary loyalty to the secretaries they represented. By 1950, the Staff had been organized into a Senior Staff, consisting of assistant secretaries of the constituent departments, and Staff Assistants who were appointed by the Senior Staff. With this background, the NSC Staff developed no staff cohesion or bureaucratic orientation beyond the horizons of each department. Paradoxically, the Staff members themselves were not trusted by the departments they represented, so they experienced the worse of both worlds.

Moreover, Souers himself was in no way a philosophical competitor for the department secretaries; he described himself as "an anonymous servant of the Council." Indeed, there was not even a formal position for a National Security Advisor in the Truman administration. In Souers' words, "no new agent without accountability has been established with the power to influence policy."
The failure of the NSC to effect meaningful national security policy was perhaps best reflected in the vacillation and uncertainty that surrounded the Korean War. At the White House level, policy drifted along in response to battlefield developments, with articulated war aims changing every few months. In the absence of a powerful NSC, and with strong antagonists such as Acheson and MacArthur, the integration of the various elements of national power and the development of a long-term strategy proved impossible.

By the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration, the NSC had taken firm institutional root, but had yet to contribute substance. Because of the distrust with which Truman had approached the NSC and the very newness of the organization itself, Eisenhower offered the justifiable criticism that "the National Security Council as presently constituted is more a shadow agency than a really effective policy maker."22/ Eisenhower moved quickly to elevate the NSC to the "apex of national security policy-making" and, in 1953, appointed Robert Cutler to the newly created post of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.23/ Cutler did not replace the Executive Secretary of the NSC, a position which was, after all, mandated by law. The Special Assistant was an altogether new position, designed to institutionalize what had been a de facto national security post, filled by such men as Colonel House and Harry Hopkins in previous administrations. Although the Special Assistant initially had no formal supervisory responsibility over the NSC Staff, a marriage of convenience quickly occurred; the Special Assistant needed staff support to function in an increasingly complex government, and the NSC Staff needed a champion of substance to lead it into bureaucratic relevance. Yet, Cutler did not move to assert himself or the NSC Staff in the national security system. He appeared content to remain subordinate to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and to allow the departments to dominate the process.24/

Eisenhower .......... Robert Cutler
Reagan .... Richard Allen
Dillon Anderson William Clark
Kennedy .......... McGeorge Bundy
William Jackson Robert McFarlane
Gordon Gray John Poindexter

Eisenhower took two additional steps to elevate the functioning of the NSC. First, he appointed the Vice President to chair the NSC in his absence, replacing the Secretary of State in that capacity. This helped insure more equal treatment of the other members of the NSC and, therefore, more vigorous cooperation. Second, and more important, the President himself chaired more than 90% of the NSC meetings and made decisions. This guaranteed regular attendance by the other NSC principals and infused a new sense of purpose and importance in the NSC process.
The Staff evolved more slowly. While it grew in size and contained what Cutler called "some think people," it nonetheless remained primarily an administrative staff, providing support without real substance, and focusing on coordination and supervision of policy. Although the Hoover Commission suggested that the NSC Staff should "evolve policy ideas," Cutler opposed such a role because it would "intervene between the President and his cabinet members."25/

In addition to its support of the NSC itself, the Staff also provided most of the support to the two subcommittees of the NSC - the Planning Board and the Operations Coordination Board which supervised policy planning and execution respectively. This highly structured system lent a much-needed measure of order and integration to the NSC but proved too rigid to deal with issues requiring imagination and daring. Moreover, because of Eisenhower's desire for consensus prior to decisions reaching him, the NSC system often provided what Dean Acheson called "agreement by exhaustion" and only colorless compromise solutions to complex problems.26/ This was due, in no small measure, to the lack of an independent, forward-looking NSC Staff that could see beyond the simple integration of departmental positions. The Staff remained fundamentally a collection of agency representatives, rather than a fully cohesive organization serving a single master and with a life of its own. By the end of his administration, Eisenhower recognized the inflexibility of the system and saw great value in "a highly competent individual and a small staff" that could orchestrate the national security system more effectively.27/

Because of its spotty record of performance, the NSC came under Congressional scrutiny in 1960. After extensive hearings, the NSC was criticized by Senator Henry Jackson's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. The committee's report said:28/

The Council ... appears only marginally involved in helping resolve many of the most important problems which affect the future course of national security policy.

In a speech at the National war College, Senator Jackson further charged that the "NSC is a dangerously misleading facade," a criticism that sounds remarkably like that Eisenhower leveled at the Truman NSC.29/

All of this resonated strongly with John F. Kennedy who, unlike his predecessor, was a believer in a centralized, informal style of decision-making. One of the first tasks his Special Assistant, McGeorge Bundy, undertook was the dismantling of the Planning Board, the Operations Coordination Board, and the rigid NSC structure they supported. Kennedy opted for an informal structure that bordered on no structure at all, and the NSC fell into disuse. Indeed, the most daunting national security challenge faced by the 1000-day administration was the Cuban Missile Crisis, and that was not even handled by the NSC. The resolution of that crisis fell to the Executive Committee, an ad hoc group composed of trusted advisers, some of whom had no experience whatever in national security.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the decreasing use of the formal NSC, the Kennedy Administration wrought two basic changes in the NSC Staff. First, under McGeorge Bundy, the Assistant for National Security Affairs “came in out of the cold,” assuming a position of influence equal to that of the cabinet secretaries. Second, Bundy’s NSC Staff “came to serve the President, rather than the NSC.” Staff members were no longer appointed by the departments; they became independent advisers to the President, providing policy options, plumbing the bureaucracy for information and positions, and overseeing policy implementation. Bundy’s charge to the Staff was to “extend the range and enlarge the direct effectiveness of the man they serve.” For the first time, the NSC Staff assumed an identity of its own, capable of independent judgments and actions. As Robert Komer, a member of the Kennedy NSC Staff at the time, describes:

... Kennedy made it very clear we were his men, we operated for him, we had direct contact with him. This gave us the power to command the kind of results he wanted - a fascinating exercise in a presidential staff technique, which insofar as I know, has been unique in the history of the presidency.

The Bundy Staff thus set the precedent for the corporate development of subsequent Staffs, executing the critical functions of policy formulation and advocacy. At the same time, however, the requirements for policy coordination and administration diminished, primarily because the NSC itself was effectively bypassed.

Things did not change fundamentally with Lyndon Johnson under whom “the NSC system reached its nadir.” Johnson effectively replaced the formal National Security Council with his Tuesday Luncheon Group, another ad hoc committee that, for all practical purposes, ran Johnson’s most challenging national security issue, the Vietnam War. In a bow towards some measure of formalism, however, the system was restructured, and the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) was created with the Secretary of State in the chair. The SIG was a committee immediately subordinate to the NSC and was designed to coordinate the activities of lower level interagency groups in preparing issues for NSC consideration and to follow up on NSC decisions already made. But, since the NSC rarely met, the SIG was equally inactive.

The creation of the SIG was important for two reasons, neither of which had anything to do with the management of national security during the Johnson Administration. First, it established the precedent of a high level committee to do much of the work of the NSC - a mini-NSC of sorts. This was to be carried forward into every succeeding administration. Second, it reestablished at least the appearance of dominance by the State Department over the NSC process, something that had grown blurry since the end of the Eisenhower Administration. As Kissinger describes it:

The State Department considered this structure to be a major bureaucratic triumph. To the State Department, its preeminence (in national security policy), however hollow and formalistic, was a crucial symbol.

This perception was to become a major burden in the Nixon Administration.
While the NSC remained outside the orbit of meaningful decision-making, Special Assistant Walt Rostow and his NSC Staff maintained the roles and missions given them by Kennedy. Rostow continued Bundy’s elevation of the position by becoming something of a public spokesman for the administration; the NSC Staff remained strong, principally as a source of ideas and advice for the president. As with its predecessor, the Rostow staff had little to do in administration and coordination of NSC activities since the NSC was relatively inactive.

During the growth years, then, the NSC Staff saw dramatic changes in its roles and functions. In the Eisenhower NSC, the primary emphasis of the Staff was on policy coordination and on administration of an active NSC. Policy formulation, imagination, and planning suffered as a result. The Kennedy-Johnson years saw a radical swing in the other direction. Gone were the coordination and administrative functions; emphasis was now on ideas and strategies. This ad hoc approach of the 60s resulted in uncoordinated, undocumented decisions that, over the long-term, could not stand up to the stress of an increasingly complex national security environment.

The Maturing Years

For a variety of reasons, the National Security Council and its supporting staff reached functional maturity during the Nixon Administration. Nixon came into office promising to “restore the National Security Council to its preeminent role in national security planning.” Nixon, an ardent centralizer and highly suspicious of the State Department, sought to formalize a system under which the White House was clearly in charge. He also sought a system that would combine the functional advantages of the NSCs of the 50s and 60s.

The chief architect of this process was Henry Kissinger who agreed with Nelson Rockefeller that:

There exists no regular staff procedure for arriving at decisions; instead, ad hoc groups are formed as the need arises. No staff agency to monitor the carrying out of decisions is available. There is no focal point for long-range planning on an interagency basis. Without a centralized focus, foreign policy turns into a series of unrelated decisions.

After the highly idiosyncratic styles of Kennedy and Johnson, Kissinger resolved to restore regularity to the national security process. This he accomplished in two ways. First, he restructured the set of committees subordinate to the NSC, removed the State Department from its “first among equals” status, and centralized NSC and sub-NSC decision-making in the White House. Of the seven committees subordinate to the NSC, six were chaired by Kissinger. Second, he dramatically expanded the size and quality of the NSC Staff itself. From the 10-15 member professional staff that had endured since the late Truman Administration, Nixon’s NSC Staff expanded ultimately to more than 50 professionals (see figure 3). This led the NSC Staff to extend its functional responsibilities to such a degree that it assumed the dominant role among the various government agencies concerned with national security. For the first time, the NSC Staff assumed administrative and coordinating functions at the same time it was leading the bureaucracy in the development and articulation of policy. This was quite a dramatic departure from the responsibilities of the Staff first developed by Sidney Souers a generation earlier.
During the second Nixon Administration, Kissinger assumed the role of Secretary of State while maintaining his portfolio as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This unprecedented amalgamation of power, although relatively short-lived, gave great continuity and cohesion to American national security policy. It also gave rise to considerable bureaucratic rumblings that were only partially quieted when Gerald Ford appointed Air Force Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft to be his National Security Adviser to replace Kissinger. As noted by Donald Neuchterlein:

The dramatic aspect of the elaborate NSC machinery set up in 1969 was the pervasive influence of Henry Kissinger...he wielded enormous power over the foreign policy machinery of the government with the support of President Nixon, who found in Kissinger the person he needed in the White House to retain control of foreign policy.

The Nixon-Ford years demonstrated the maturing of the NSC system and of its supporting Staff. Under Kissinger, the NSC became the primary focal point for all national security planning, coordinating, decision-making, and supervision. The evolution did not occur, as many analysts would have us believe, simply because Richard Nixon hated the State Department. It happened far more because the U.S. government recognized that the scope of issues impacting on the security of the nation ranged far beyond the purview of a single department and that only the White House could effect the coordination demanded by the mounting complexity of the international system.
Conclusion

Since the end of the Second World War, it has become increasingly apparent that the 19th century model of foreign and military policy formulation is clearly inadequate. Expanding threats to the vital interests of the United States now emanate from a host of sources, including not just the foreign armies of the past, but also international economic competition, communications and transportation explosions, north-south developmental issues, political pressures from international fora and a host of other challenges. Under virtually any definition, national security now requires a thorough integration of all of the elements of power the United States can bring to bear. Yet, the government has been slow to design a system that responds to these demands - a system that facilitates the execution of critical national security functions.

Having examined briefly the dimensions of national security and the systems that six administrations designed to meet national security needs, it is apparent that some measure of intellectual and organizational discipline is required in order to transcend the idiosyncracies of each administration and to provide cohesion to national security decision-making. It is to that challenge that we now direct our attention.
CHAPTER III
THE FUNCTIONAL REQUISITES

In order to construct an effective model of the NSC Staff of the future, it is important to begin with an examination of the functions that the NSC staff must perform within the national security system. This is a fundamental point of analytical departure and is essential in understanding the NSC Staff beyond the level of bureaucratic infighting or media hype.

At the outset of any discussion of the NSC Staff, it is essential to first draw an obvious, yet important and often overlooked distinction. In many fora, it is popular to refer to the “NSC” when what is meant is the NSC staff. This is a common but misleading shorthand used by journalists and the like which tends to obscure the difference between the NSC itself and the Staff which provides its support. As was evident in the last chapter, the difference between the role of the NSC and that of its Staff may be of great significance. The NSC is, of course, a creature of the President; he can use it in any manner he sees fit as is apparent in the dramatic differences in the role of the NSC under Eisenhower and then under Kennedy. The NSC is, after all, simply a forum in which cabinet-level advisers to the President meet to discuss lofty issues of national security. As such, the NSC has no institutional cohesion, little corporate memory, and no life beyond that which the President gives it.

The NSC Staff, on the other hand, is an institutional body which has assumed a mounting role of importance over the past 40 years. Unlike its parent organization, the Staff must perform several critical functions, driven largely by the diverse nature of the international environment and generally independent of the psychology of the President himself. The Tower Commission, appointed by Ronald Reagan to investigate the Iran-Contra affair, stated that “there are certain functions which need to be performed in some way for any president.”1/ For analytical purposes, these might be called the NSC Staff’s Functional Requisites. The degree to which any national security structure supports the performance of these functions is directly related to the degree to which the management of national security within an administration will be successful.

The Functional Requisites

With the above as background, there are several vital functions that the NSC staff has periodically performed. These functions are:

1) Administration.
2) Policy Coordination and Integration.
3) Policy Supervision.
4) Policy Adjudication.
5) Crisis Management.
6) Policy Formulation, and
7) Policy Advocacy.

The execution of these functions has been the source of NSC staff effectiveness, or lack thereof, as well as bureaucratic in-fighting since the maturation of the national security system under Henry Kissinger. Some are widely accepted as the legitimate purview of the Staff while others elicit howls of protest from all sides of the national security spectrum (figure 4).

Regardless of the degree of controversy each function engenders, the execution of all of these functions is critical to the successful management of national security into the 21st century. A brief discussion of each function, with some illustration, follows.

Administration

In discussing the functional requisites, it is useful to begin with the least contentious end of the controversy spectrum: administration. Since its inception, the NSC Staff has always acted as the administrative arm of the National Security Council. The execution of this function was clearly the intent of the 1947 National Security Act that legislated into existence a “staff headed by a civilian executive secretary” to support the work of the NSC. There seems little dispute surrounding this function; even I.M. Destler, a frequent critic of the NSC and an advocate of abolishing the post of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, agrees that the administrative and organizational functions are critical and, indeed, should be the primary focus on the NSC Staff. Philip Odeen, who authored a major study on the NSC, characterizes this function as “managing the decision process” and argues that, by proper execution of this function, the Staff “can make the decision process more orderly and increase the flow of useful information, thereby increasing the likelihood of sensible decisions.”
Yet, as clearcut and needed as this function appears, there are aspects of administration that bear closer examination. In fact, the administration function is best seen as a continuum, running from the most mundane of tasks, such as the typing and distribution of NSC-related papers at one end, to potentially influential administrative requirements, such as NSC note-taking and preparation of summary documents, at the other. In executing the latter set of administrative functions, the NSC Staff can border on policy formulation, particularly in a highly centralized administration.

To accomplish the clerical dimensions of the administration function, the NSC Staff employs a support group of unparalleled capability. Not only do these individuals have impeccable clerical skills but also understand the complex issues with which they are dealing and, even more challenging, the bureaucratic milieu in which the Staff is operating. The obvious capabilities of Fawn Hall, a brief nova during the Iran-Contra hearings, are indicative of the caliber of personnel in the clerical side of the NSC Staff. To oversee the activities of this staff, as well as the technical details of administration, most administrations have followed the letter of the 1947 Act and have appointed an executive or staff secretary. Brzezinski describes the incumbent of this position as "the person who really makes the NSC Staff run." The Executive Secretary also manages the flow of papers throughout the NSC Staff and to the national security community, another responsibility fraught with challenge. It is one of the many ironies surrounding the NSC Staff that, alone among the various elements, the Executive Secretary precisely fulfills the functions outlined in the originating legislation.

As challenging as this dimension of administration can be, it is the aspect that receives widest support from the national security system and the one that elicits the least measure of controversy.

At the other end of this functional spectrum, the Staff members themselves have substantial administrative responsibilities that can heavily influence actual policy formulation. Two examples illustrate this point. First, the Assistant to the President is generally responsible for preparing the agenda for NSC meetings. Although on the surface this appears to be a straightforward task, in reality, control over the NSC agenda is a potentially powerful tool in managing national security affairs. The Assistant to the President, supported by the NSC Staff, determines which issues will actually reach the President and the formal NSC for deliberation and decision. Within limits, it thus becomes possible for the NSC Staff to exercise a bureaucratic pocket veto over an issue simply by insuring that it never reaches the President for decision. Moreover, agenda items can be scheduled for specific NSC meetings so that certain principals with strongly held views are not present to participate in the discussion. Secretary of State Vance, for example, was travelling when the issue of the Iran rescue attempt was debated in the NSC; he was a strong opponent of the effort and eventually resigned in protest.

Control of the agenda can also extend to the list of invitees. As mentioned earlier, the NSC itself is but a four-person body. But it is usually augmented by persons of cabinet rank who have an interest in a particular issue under consideration. By extending or withholding invitations, the NSC Staff can help shape the discussion and the outcome of the issue itself.
A second example of the potential for influencing policy in executing administrative tasks is note-taking. In the post-Watergate era, the White House has been understandably reluctant to tape meetings or even to have verbatim transcripts made. Instead, the NSC tends to rely on NSC Staff members to take notes and then to transcribe them into summaries for the President. The NSC Staff member invited to take the notes is usually the individual who has staff responsibility for the issue under discussion and has, therefore, more than a passing interest and expertise. This, coupled with an understandable lack of shorthand skills, can lead to the practice of “creative note taking” in which the Staff member, unintentionally or otherwise, highlights certain arguments, downplays others, and in general shades the notes with his particular perspective. In addition, because he is hardly a disinterested observer, the Staff member can get so wrapped up in the dynamics of the meeting itself that he forgets why he is there and misses some key point. He must then try to recreate what was said during his intellectual holiday. More will be said about creative note taking in succeeding chapters, but this practice reached its zenith during the Carter-Brzezinski years when such staff-developed summaries were not subject to review by the principals prior to submission to the President.

We, therefore, find that even in the seemingly innocuous function of administration, the NSC Staff has powerful avenues available to influence the NSC and presidential decisions themselves. Indeed, as Alexander Haig argues, administration or “managing the flow of paper” is one of the three levers of real power in the system. Despite these dangers, administration remains a critical function and must be executed.

**Coordination and Integration**

These two activities are so closely related in execution that they are, for all practical purposes, constituent parts of the same function. There are, however, subtle differences that bear mentioning for analytical rigor and therefore warrant the separate treatment of each sub-function.

**Coordination** is a relatively passive activity in which concepts, proposals, and policies are vetted with all relevant agencies prior to submission to the NSC or to the President. Concurring and opposing views on issue papers are collected, redundancies eliminated, and issues requiring resolution identified. Information is shared, and a forum is provided for the discussion and resolution of policy disagreements. Along with administration, the function of coordination is clearly what the 1947 Act had in mind when it established the NSC and its supporting Staff. One of the primary reasons for the existence of the NSC was:

... for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the government relating to the national security. (emphasis added)

Across the political spectrum, the coordinating function of the NSC Staff is widely accepted. Even NSC critics such as Destler and Leslie Gelb acknowledge that coordination of national security issues is a proper mission of the NSC Staff and essential to the successful execution of national security. Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush, has said “the NSC (Staff) has a crucial role to play ... in coordinating with other staff agencies, the press, the legislative liaison, economists, and others.”
One of the reasons for this wide acceptance is that, like administration, coordina-
tion on the surface requires virtually no substantive policy input from the NSC Staff. In
executing this function, more than in any other, the NSC Staff plays the part of the honest
broker, one of the essential roles identified by the Tower Commission. In theory, the
NSC Staff approaches the coordination function for a specific issue with no vested
interest and no position to push. The Staff insures that all departmental players
understand the issue, are given the opportunity to comment on a proposed solution, and
are encouraged to effect resolution on areas of disagreement. Moreover, the Staff insures
that unpopular but valid views are given full airing on an interagency basis.

The NSC Staff has been generally successful in executing the coordination
function. In each administration, there are countless issues that have been resolved in
interagency meetings in the Old Executive Office Building that had proved utterly
intractable on the 7th Floor of the State Department or on the E Ring of the Pentagon.

Contrary to widely accepted views, however, it is possible to have too much
coordination. The Eisenhower NSC is often criticized for being so strongly oriented
on coordination that the issues that ultimately reached the President were so watered
down with interagency compromise that they became “only vapid consensus posi-
tions.” In addition, the coordination process can become burdensome, particularly
when the issues being considered do not need full vetting by all agencies concerned with
national security. It is probably not necessary, for example, to obtain the views of the
Treasury Department (a member of the NSC in most administrations) on a proposed
naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Although perhaps an extreme example, it does
underscore the importance of judgement and discretion on the part of the NSC Staff in
deciding whether or not a certain issue needs the concurrence of a particular agency
involved in national security. Finally, over-coordination raises the risk of unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive or classified programs. An elaborate examination of the phe-
nomenon of leaks is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it is safe to say that the wider
the coordination of an issue, the greater the chances are of leaks. As a result, the fear of
leaks is the single greatest impediment to the effective coordination of policy.

With all this in mind, the NSC Staff must decide whether an issue warrants
interagency coordination and, if so, which agencies should be asked to provide com-
ments. Contrary to the popular view of the NSC, engendered in no small way by the
adventures of Oliver North, the tendency in the NSC Staff is to over-coordinate a
document and to send it out for comment when it is really unnecessary. The cost of this
is excessive delay in presenting an issue for decision as certain departments, with neither
expertise or interest, flail around to develop a position. The NSC Staff must, therefore,
tread a narrow line between submitting an uncoordinated paper for decision and
burdening the bureaucracy with unnecessary coordination requirements.

The coordination process is facilitated if the Assistant to the President chairs the
senior inter-departmental groups subordinate to the NSC, and the NSC Staff chairs the
more junior groups. This allows issues to be discussed with all participants on an equal
footing and able to consider proposals on their merit. The Tower Commission agrees,
saying that “the system generally operates better when the committees are chaired by the
individual with the greatest stake in making the NSC system work.”
Coordination, put simply, is the management of the exchange of information. The NSC Staff must act as the interagency conduit for information if this function is to be effectively executed. The flow of information must be managed throughout the life cycle of a policy - from its inception as an idea to its final execution as a presidential directive. But the NSC Staff must also exercise judgment to insure that the system does not become swamped with information or that sensitive programs are not exposed to unnecessary risk of compromise.

Integration is the next step beyond coordination. It is a more active concept and may be characterized as the melding of diverse, and possibly divergent, views into a single document. As Brzezinski contends:

Integration is needed, but this cannot be done from a departmental vantage point. No self-respecting Secretary of Defense will willingly agree to have his contribution ... integrated by another departmental secretary - notably the Secretary of State. It has to be done by someone close to the President.

The importance of effective integration stems from the nature of presidential decision-making. For every issue considered and discussed by the NSC, there are probably ten other issues that are decided on the basis of position papers alone. Integration of these papers is particularly critical in these latter cases.

The mechanics of Staff integration demonstrate the importance and the potential power of this function. If the national security system works properly, the issues that reach the President for decision are those that could not be resolved in interagency fora at levels below. They are by definition, the tough issues. As an issue is raised for NSC or presidential consideration, it is invariably supported by lengthy position papers developed by each department and designed to reflect that department’s view on the outcome. These are generally uncoordinated papers; the departments correctly consider that it is the NSC Staff’s job to effect necessary interagency coordination. The NSC Staff must take these papers and prepare a single summary document for the President. Each President has his own style when it comes to the format and length he prefers, but clearly no President could hope to wade through the flood of papers provided him by the departments. The NSC Staff must shrink these voluminous issue papers down to one or two pages which will be all the President will probably read and will be the basis for his decision. In preparing these summaries, the NSC Staff must integrate the views of several agencies, identify areas of agreement, and frame the remaining issues requiring presidential resolution.

In this role, the NSC Staff must be rigorously honest in presenting summarized arguments fairly, even though the Staff may have a different opinion as to the preferred option. Time and confidentiality often do not permit the Staff to coordinate these papers with the relevant departments; the NSC Staff may well become the final arbiter of what the President actually sees. A cleverly turned phrase, a dropped adjective here and there, an omitted but persuasive point, all can render inane the most cogent of departmental positions. The integrated summary paper is obviously a potentially powerful tool in the hands of the NSC Staff, particularly if the Staff has an axe to grind on a specific issue.
Thus, as with administration, coordination and integration are essential functions that must be performed. But both have a high potential for being abused by overzealous or unskilled Staff members or by a Staff unschooled in the importance of these functions for the entire national security system.

Policy Supervision

Once a decision has been reached, an effective system of government must have a mechanism responsible for ensuring that decisions are carried out and for supervising their implementation. Odeen argues that the government is generally weak in execution to begin with, devoting 80% of its efforts to policy development and only 20% to execution. In successful organizations, those percentages are reversed. Scowcroft asserts that “policy implementation is the poor stepchild of the whole governmental process.”

Compounding this problem are incidents of deliberate disobedience of presidential directives by the departments charged with implementation. In an ideal structure, disagreements on particular policy alternatives would disappear once the President reached a decision, and all involved would join hands to insure immediate implementation. Unfortunately, reality shows that the national security system does not work this way. It is a relatively simple matter, in the absence of an oversight mechanism, for a disgruntled department head to simply ignore a decision by the President or to establish so many obstacles to its implementation that it is rendered meaningless. Richard Nixon reports his “total exasperation” at the unwillingness of the Defense Department to carry out his decision to resupply Israel during the October War, despite his orders to “get the (resupply aircraft) in the air now.” After Jimmy Carter’s 1977 decision to restrict the sale of military hardware on a world-wide basis, virtually the entire security assistance community within the government set about undermining that policy until it was effectively rescinded three years later. Other examples of this sort of bureaucratic foot-dragging abound.

Beyond these instances of deliberate disregard of the President’s decisions, problems of policy execution more frequently stem from genuine misunderstanding, overwork, or lack of expertise on the part of well-meaning professionals. But whether the root cause is hostile or benign, policy execution remains the most challenging aspect of the policy process, demanding active and involved supervision.

It is difficult to see how the supervision function can be accomplished by any organization except the NSC Staff. Departments cannot be expected to tell on themselves, and they generally lack the credibility to intervene in each other’s internal operations even to insure that a particular policy decided by the President is carried out. The departments, quite simply, have lives unto themselves and are often only marginally responsive to the President, whom they may consider to be only a policy dilettante, temporarily thrust upon them. Dean Rusk said that:

After all, the foreign service does not share the view that the world was created at the last presidential election or that a world of more than 160 nations will somehow be different because we elected one man rather than another as president.
It is easy to see how this attitude, reflected and magnified deep within successive layers of the departments, can lead to an almost contemptuous attitude on the part of those charged with implementing presidential policy towards their task.22/

The President must have a trusted national security staff, the members of which owe their primary loyalty to him and have sufficient knowledge and bureaucratic access to supervise the implementation of specific policy decisions. The Tower Commission argues that:23/

It is the responsibility of the National Security Adviser (and the NSC Staff) to monitor policy implementation and to ensure that policies are executed in conformity with the intent of the President's decision. Monitoring includes initiating periodic reassessments of a policy or operation, especially when changed circumstances suggest that the policy or operation no longer serves U.S. interests.

This is by no means an easy feat. Even in a bureaucratically benign atmosphere in which the implementing departments approve of the President's decision, the implementation phase is fraught with potential hazards. The press of events, competing concerns, and the work involved often can bog down even the most conscientious departmental staff member to such an extent that implementation of a decision is placed on a back burner. Should the bureaucratic environment not be so benign, and should the implementing department oppose the President's decision, the management of its implementation becomes all the more difficult. Under either condition, knowledge that the President's NSC Staff is overwatching the implementation process provides powerful incentive for the implementing department to adhere to the President's decision.

The policy supervision function is widely accepted as an essential task for the NSC Staff. Both the Odeen Report and the Tower Commission identify supervision as a critical function. Theodore Sorensen, a former Kennedy adviser and a critic of a strong NSC allows that "the NSC Staff can monitor and coordinate the implementation of presidential decisions ... without usurping whatever advisory primacy the President may have bestowed upon the Secretary of State."24/

The supervision function is of great importance, but it must not be confused with an operational role for the NSC Staff. The Staff has neither the expertise nor the size to execute the policy decisions made at the presidential level, yet sometimes problems with policy implementation within the departments create pressures for the Staff to assume an operational role. In 1981, David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy in the Carter White House, pointed to the mounting and undesirable tendency for the NSC Staff to become more operational. The Staff "will conduct all kinds of surrogate activities simply because ... the bureaucracy is unresponsive."25/

The Iran-Contra affair demonstrated the validity of Aaron's concern and the danger of confusing supervision with implementation. Questions of illegalities aside, the principal failure of the effort was rooted in the amateurism with which Oliver North approached his task. Constantine Menges, a colleague of North's on the NSC Staff, paints a vivid and alarming picture of the whole affair, identifying the utter failure of virtually every aspect of the scheme. He says:26/
Like McFarlane and Poindexter, North always seemed impatient with, and insensitive to, the need for a competent, well-thought-out political strategy. North was moving in so many directions on so many details of projects that he often could not focus in a thoughtful way on how to obtain the overall desired results.

Although Menges goes on to document North's many personality anomalies, it is safe to say that probably few members of the NSC Staff would have done much better in an operational role such as North assumed. The Tower Commission Report extrapolates the North case into a general caveat against a role for the NSC Staff in the actual implementation of policy:

Implementation is the responsibility and strength of the departments and agencies. The National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff generally do not have the depth of resources for the conduct of operations. In addition, when they take on implementation responsibilities, they risk compromising their objectivity.

The supervision of policy implementation is thus an important and legitimate function of the NSC Staff. It must never be confused, however, with the actual implementation itself.

Policy Adjudication

Closely related to the function of policy supervision, adjudication involves the resolution of issues which arise as a result of confusion about the President's decision or its implementation. It is not particularly surprising to note that often the President's decisions are not clearly understood by all, even when articulated in writing. Odeen asserts that the NSC Staff is often weak in "clearly communicating the decisions, and their rationale, to the rest of the government." Moreover, because of the omnipresent fear of leaks, even clearly written presidential documents that convey the President's decisions are not usually made available to the action officers in the implementing departments who are charged with acting upon those decisions. To be sure, these individuals are given oral instructions, but then the "whisper chain" phenomenon sets in, and the final product in the ear of the action officer may bear little resemblance to the decision made by the President. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that disputes will arise within and amongst the departments as to the intent of a particular policy decision. This was one of the more obvious failures in the Iran-Contra affair; no one, least of all Oliver North, clearly understood the President's intent, and no one, least of all John Poindexter, adjudicated the implementation process.

In the same vein, disputes may also arise as to the specific implementing strategy to be followed. Unless the Presidential decision document gives detailed guidance on how to implement a particular policy - and most do not - there can develop considerable room for debate and discord during the implementation phase.
Under both these sets of circumstances, the NSC Staff must exercise its policy adjudication function. If the Staff has done its job and has established itself as an extension of the President, it can exercise considerable authority in adjudicating disputes within the bureaucracy. It can clarify the President's intent; it can referee between competing departmental views; it can resolve implementation issues without having to go to the President or to the NSC itself. Robert C. McFarlane confirms this perspective. "The NSA (and, by extension, the NSC Staff) must be a policy arbitrator, drawing heavily upon his personal knowledge of the President's values."22/

As a practical matter, the execution of the adjudication function can be greatly facilitated if the NSC Staff chairs the implementation monitoring committee. Ideally, such a committee will be mandated by the decision document itself; if it is not, then the NSC Staff may have to establish one. This committee or working group provides a useful forum for monitoring implementation and for resolving the inevitable implementation issues. In PD/NSC-58 (Continuity of Government), for example, the establishment of an oversight committee was required. This committee, chaired by the NSC Staff, was able to resolve a great number of issues, resulting in an effective implementation of the President's decision.

As with other aspects of NSC Staff effectiveness, the individual Staff member must clarify in his own mind what role he is playing in the adjudication process. He must separate his personal views on the matter and act both as an honest broker and as a reflection of the President. This can at times become exceedingly difficult, for the Staff member may not agree with the decision the President has reached. Under those circumstances, it is tempting to shade or alter the President's intent and refashion the policy, however subtly, into something more palatable to the Staff member himself. The temptation may be great, but such bureaucratic misbehavior is the root of his undoing. Over time, it will become apparent within the bureaucracy that this particular Staff member cannot be trusted, and he will quickly find himself exiled to the ash heap of bureaucratic irrelevance. More significantly, such activity can also seriously damage the credibility of the entire NSC Staff and can undermine its ability to accomplish the functions essential to the smooth administration of national security policy.

Crisis Management

Thus far, we have focused on what might be called the process functions - those functions that support the policy process under non-crisis conditions. The process functions are routinely executed under conditions in which the staffs of the departments and agencies can be fully involved in the decision-making process. This implies a certain luxury of time during which reasoned decisions may be reached and during which the full richness of the bureaucratic structure may be brought to bear. The management of crises within the government, on the other hand, presents an entirely new realm of decision-making, one which is not amenable to structured deliberation. It is the functional area of crisis management in which the NSC Staff is most needed. To be sure, there may be crises within government which can be handled wholly within one department. NSC Staff intervention in this type of crisis is both inappropriate and counterproductive. It is the more general crisis that cuts across departmental lines, however, that demands the active leadership of the NSC Staff. There is wide agreement on the locus of decision-making under these conditions. Most analysts agree with Brzezinski that "crisis management must stay in the White House."30/
The word “crisis” is surely one of the most abused in this generation; it is normally synonymous with any event that makes the evening news. This usage is obviously of no value in the national security business. In fact, and far more usefully, conventional wisdom defines a crisis as an event that:

1) comes as a surprise to decision-makers;
2) is perceived as requiring a rapid response; and
3) appears to threaten highly valued objectives or assets.

The first characteristic creates a sense of bureaucratic drama, and the third guarantees the involvement of the President. Of these three characteristics, it is the second - the perception of great urgency - that has the most significant impact on the mechanisms for making decisions. This perception of pressure is exacerbated by a sense of informational uncertainty. There is no time to go through the normal channels for insuring that information available to the President has been sufficiently reviewed to guarantee its accuracy or relevance. The President thus faces a decisional dilemma; he knows he must decide, but he does not wholly trust the information upon which he must base a decision.

Under such conditions, the President’s tendency is to turn to a few trusted advisers to formulate a response. Under the more disciplined, structured administrations, these individuals normally comprise the NSC. Indeed, it was to their respective NSCs that Presidents Ford and Carter turned during crises in their administrations. Under other regimes, the President may use informal, “kitchen cabinet” groups, such as Kennedy’s ExCom that handled the Cuban Missile Crisis. Regardless of their formal position within the government, the individuals involved in the President’s decisional entourage will rarely themselves have options and recommendations readily available. They, in turn, must rely upon trusted staff officers within their respective organizations for counsel. Thus, an extensive network of interlocking lines of communication are established in a crisis environment, a network which can only bear decisional fruit if it is integrated in a timely and effective fashion.

It is this function that the NSC Staff is uniquely able to perform. No single department could hope to orchestrate the entire bureaucracy in such a stressful atmosphere. Moreover, the NSC Staff is experienced at managing the bureaucratic short-circuits which come to the fore in crises. The Staff of the NSC is alone able to identify who the primary advisers are at the departments and agencies and pull them together to hammer out viable, acceptable alternatives to present to principals and to the President. In crisis decision-making, it is essential that as many issue areas as possible are defined and ironed out before options are sent to the President for decision. Time cannot be wasted in endless, pointless discussion in the NSC over issues which should have been resolved at a lower level.
The role of the NSC Staff as an advisory body to the President becomes crucially important in obtaining the quick agreement on issues and options necessary to deal with the crisis. Alone among the departments and agencies, the NSC Staff is in a position to speak with authority on those options which the President will consider and those which should be dismissed out of hand. In addition, the NSC Staff is uniquely positioned to see virtually all the relevant information and intelligence and to task the intelligence agencies for additional information as required.

In a crisis, then, the NSC Staff brings together into a coherent whole the separate, usually frenetic efforts underway in the departments and agencies. In addition, once a decision has been reached, the NSC Staff is best positioned to oversee general implementation and to provide feedback to the President in a timely manner. Since crisis decision-making is so often incremental in nature, this feedback mechanism becomes of critical importance in steering future decisions. The President must know, almost immediately, what the results of a particular action have been and how those results have impacted upon the crisis itself. Only then can future options be assessed and subsequent decisions made.

There is a more subtle dimension to crises which can impact on the fundamental development and execution of national security policy. A crisis can serve as a mechanism to overcome bureaucratic inertia, particularly when that inertia stems from a systemic flaw that renders the NSC Staff unable to execute its requisite functions. Crises tend to focus decision-making at the White House, and the NSC Staff, regardless of the structural imperatives of the administration, becomes a crucially important forum for policy formulation and execution. And, despite the perception that a crisis must be resolved quickly, crises can actually drag on for a considerable period of time; whatever ad hoc working groups were established to deal with the details of crisis management may take on a life all their own. Taken together, these factors mean that a crisis can serve to shift bureaucratic power away from the departments and agencies, and focus power within the NSC Staff. More will be said about this later, but it is an important dimension of crisis management which is sometimes overlooked.

The formal mechanisms established by each administration to manage crises have varied. Without exception, however, crisis decision-making has gravitated to the White House, and control over the management details has become the purview of the NSC Staff. Based on the preceding discussion, this is both efficient and necessary.

In general, the NSC Staff, according to Odeen, has a good record in managing crises. But there is another dimension in which the government in general, and the NSC Staff in particular, do not get passing marks and that is in crisis planning. Crisis planning in the NSC Staff is essentially contingency planning at the highest level, integrating all the diverse elements of national power that could be brought to bear in response to a crisis event. In practice, however, "too often, we find that we have planned for the wrong crisis; we have not properly anticipated the kind of problem that will arise." Thus, the NSC Staff is unprepared to respond rapidly.
Although Odeen’s assessment is accurate, there are cases in which the NSC Staff has properly executed the crisis planning requirement. David Aaron cites the negotiations in the late 70s that resulted in access agreements to bases in the Indian Ocean. These negotiations took place in the context of the Persian Gulf Security Framework, developed by Brzezinski and his military adviser, William E. Odom. Brzezinski, Odom, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown correctly anticipated that a major challenge requiring a military response would develop in the region and that a readily available basing infrastructure was essential. Aaron says “in what is probably the most high-priority crisis area in the world, crisis planning not only has taken place but has actually become operational.”

But, sadly, Aaron goes on to point out that “it is like pulling teeth to get people to focus on it seriously.”

Yet, crisis planning is an integral element of successful crisis management. Although the NSC Staff cannot be expected to anticipate the timing and nature of a specific crisis, it can and should seek out areas in which threats to vital U.S. objectives are likely to develop and begin to evaluate the tools necessary for successful resolution of a crisis.

Policy Formulation

Up until now, our task has been relatively straightforward; with few exceptions, analysts and practitioners of national security tend to agree with the list of functional requisites presented thus far. However, the last two functions, those of Policy Formulation and Policy Advocacy, enjoy no such consensus. The primary basis for opposing the execution of these functions by the NSC Staff is the zero-sum perspective that, as John Allen Williams argues:

(The) increased reliance on the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and NSC Staff, generally (comes) at the expense of the influence of the Secretary of State and the Department of State.

Henry Kissinger, the archetype of the powerful APNSA confesses that:

I have become convinced that a President should make the Secretary of State his principal adviser and use the national security adviser primarily as a senior administrator and coordinator to make certain that each significant point of view is heard. If the security adviser becomes active in the development and articulation of policy he must inevitably diminish the Secretary of State and reduce his effectiveness.

Implicit in this perspective is the assumption that policy formulation is the proper purview of the State Department, and any effort to dilute State’s leadership in this area is inherently wrong. Because competition between State and the NSC Staff is such an ubiquitous feature of the national security system, some discussion of this view is necessary. The issue really turns on two subordinate questions: what is the nature of presidential decision-making in the future and how capable is State in formulating policy?
Presidential decision-making. The role of the NSC Staff in the policy formulation function is, in theory, closely tied to the style of the President in making national security decisions. If the President is inclined to administer national security affairs in what Brzezinski calls a “secretarial system,” the preponderance of policy formulation will devolve to the departments, particularly the Department of State. If, on the other hand, the President adopts the “presidential system,” and acts “with intimate involvement” in national security matters, then the focus of national security administration will be in the White House, with the NSC Staff, in its capacity as the President’s national security staff, having a major role in policy formulation.

Although this distinction is useful from an analytical or historical perspective, in practice most presidents are driven to the presidential system. Brzezinski argues that this will become increasingly prevalent in the future because presidents want to be identified as being in charge of national security affairs; there is an increasing number of issues that cut across departmental lines; and the nuclear age leaves no margin for error. Kissinger confirms this perspective by arguing that “for reasons best left to psychologists, presidents tend to increasingly centralize decision-making in the White House.” To be sure, the curve towards centralization is not smooth, and some presidents are more centralized than others. But it does appear that the trend is that national security decision-making has been, and will continue to be, increasingly centered in the White House.

If this is true, then the requirement for the NSC Staff to execute its role in policy formulation becomes more critical than ever. Nowhere else in the government does the President have a staff upon which he can rely for national security advice which is tailored to suit his philosophy and which responds directly to the electoral mandate all Presidents believe they have. Moreover, the large Departments of State and Defense cannot provide advice and recommendations that consider all the elements of power available to the President. Except at the very highest levels, the departments are staffed by professionals who generally survive changes in administrations, even those which involve dramatic variations in Presidential ideologies, such as occurred when Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter. This is necessary to provide continuity in government and to buffer the country from wild swings in policy, but it also tends to insulate the bureaucracy from the philosophy and desires of the President. Only the NSC Staff can fully meet the demands of a presidential system in the formulation of national security policy. If such a system is the wave of the future, then the NSC Staff will continue to grow in importance.

Capabilities of State. Every President since Kennedy has come into office pledging to restore the primacy of the State Department in foreign and national security policy, and every President has been disappointed in what State provides him. Kennedy adviser Theodore Sorensen says that State was “unwilling or unable to assume its new responsibilities.” He characterizes the department as plagued by intellectual inertia, a lack of loyalty, and sluggish response to the demands of international pressures. Kennedy had “little use for State and invited Bundy to create a mini-State Department in the White House.” Lyndon Johnson handled the State Department with the same disdain; under Johnson, “State had lost ground in the competition for foreign policy leadership, avoided managerial reform, and continued the lack of planning and direction from the top.”
Richard Nixon's contempt for the State Department is widely known. Kissinger reports that Nixon "had very little confidence in the State Department. Its personnel had no loyalty to him; the Foreign Service had disdained him as Vice President and ignored him once he was out of office."45/ While he was Vice President, Nixon formed his opinion of Foreign Service Officers, telling Eisenhower that "an astonishing number of them have no obvious dedication to America and to its service - in fact, in some instances, they are far more vocal in their criticism of our country than were many of the foreigners."46/ During Gerald Ford's presidency, Kissinger remained the dominant force in national security, even after he became the Secretary of State. This did not mean, as it turns out, that State regained all the ground it had lost in the policy wars; Brent Scowcroft, who became Ford's National Security Adviser after Kissinger, points out that "Kissinger never really moved over to the State Department. He was never in a true sense of the word a Secretary of State."47/

Jimmy Carter, following the promises of many Presidents, came into office resolved to subordinate his National Security Adviser to the Secretary of State, making his NSA primarily act as an administrator, rather than a formulator of policy.48/ But, again, like many of his predecessors, Carter was disappointed. "I rarely received innovative ideas from (the State Department) staff about how to modify existing policy in order to meet changing conditions."49/

Although apologists for the State Department may argue that the drift of Presidential confidence away from State is due to ignorance, venality, or shortsightedness, the consistency with which Presidents of all political stripes have made this move indicates fundamental weaknesses within the Department itself. The most important weakness is the State Department's inability to formulate meaningful long-range policy. This rather important deficiency stems both from the structural makeup of the department and from historical proclivities of the Foreign Service.

Bureaucratic power within the State Department is normally vested in the regional bureaus which, despite their staffing by seasoned professionals, are virtually unable to come to grips with the development of long-range policy. This, in turn, is due to the "management by cable" syndrome, a malady caused by the development of a reasonably sophisticated encrypted telegram network that allows every desk officer within a particular region to look over the shoulder of the U.S. ambassador at any post in the world. The tendency then becomes for the embassy staff to refer every problem, no matter how minor, to the Department for resolution. Overworked desk officers and their immediate superiors have to spend so much time dealing with near-term issues that the development of longer-range policy is pushed aside.50/ Compounding this problem is the classic tendency to deal only with the immediate issue with little consideration of the long term implications of the particular solution. Desk officers, urged on by anxious embassy staffers, simply want to get an immediate problem solved without alienating anyone. The result is a series of decisions that add up to policy formulation with little coherence and no comprehensive relationship to any grander scheme. To its credit, the State Department has recognized this problem and, since 1949, has maintained a Policy Planning staff that is supposed to deal with longer range policy issues. However, Policy Planning has rarely demonstrated any real policy impact or bureaucratic clout within the Department.51/ It is not clear that the State Department has changed dramatically from the "antiquated, feeble organization enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another century," as it was described by John Hay's biographer.52/
This is not to say that the State Department should have no role in the formulation of policy. But it does argue, from both an historical and an organizational perspective, that sole reliance on the State Department for this vital function will result in disappointment in the best case and policy chaos in the worst.

To be sure, the National Security Council Staff also has significant weaknesses in the formulation of policy, primarily due to its small size and lack of trans-administration continuity. By itself, the NSC Staff cannot hope to formulate all national security policy; the task is far too great. But, at the same time, the NSC Staff has a number of important strengths that, if properly employed, can make it an important contributor, along with State, Defense, CIA and others, to the policy formulation process.

The chief advantage the NSC Staff brings to the process is its bureaucratic independence and its presidential perspective. Since Kennedy, the Staff has operated in direct support of the President, bringing an overarching White House view into the policy process. Departmental staffs owe their first loyalty to their departments; the NSC Staff’s basic allegiance is to the President. By the same token, if the President is to make sound judgments on national security policy issues, he must have a trusted body of advisers attuned to his specific desires and general philosophy. The departments simply cannot fulfill this role. It is difficult to imagine, for example, how the State Department, with its built-in conservatism, could have formulated the Persian Gulf Security Framework or could have forged the interagency cooperation necessary for its success. Only the NSC Staff, sensitive to the evolving maturity of Jimmy Carter in national security matters and to his mounting frustration with the region, could have pulled all the disparate elements of the government together and made the policy framework functional. As this example demonstrates, the NSC Staff must respond to the President’s needs by formulating viable policy options on specific issues and by developing long-range policy recommendations independent of those provided by the agencies and departments.

A final, practical aspect of the policy formulation function of the NSC Staff is the “short circuit” role it can play. Whereas it is true that large bureaucracies are an essential element of modern government, they tend to stifle creativity. Bright new ideas that exist in the lower strata of various departments may not surface at the policy level for active consideration if they are required to float up through the bureaucratic layers. The system is designed for cooperation and consensus but not great originality. In order to combat this, departments often establish “skunk works,” groups of bright thinkers with direct access to decision makers. But often these are not enough to foster creativity at the highest levels. The NCS Staff helps bridge the gap by providing direct access to the White House for lower level staff officers throughout the government. This access is provided through the oldest of all organizational techniques - personal contact. For, although the members of the Staff come from diverse backgrounds, one common feature is that they are all well-connected throughout the government and generally at a variety of levels. This breadth of contacts provides a rapid and ready avenue for departmental officers to surface ideas directly to the NSC. The system works quite simply; a departmental officer, or even an individual outside the government, with an idea which he has been unable to surface through normal channels calls or visits an NSC Staff acquaintance who may then adopt the idea and surface it at the policy level. Borrowing from the Jordan-Taylor model (figure 5), the NSC Staff provides a conduit through which ideas from the periphery are able to penetrate the insulating layers of the government.
This is an inelegant and somewhat awkward system that can sometimes cause problems, for the senior leadership of the departments may have ignored the idea for good reason. This short circuit technique may be used to surface impractical or silly ideas that were probably squelched within department channels. Because of this, as well as for less noble reasons such as institutional jealousies, the Secretaries of Defense and State have sometimes prohibited contact between their subordinates and the NSC Staff, but these directives have been almost universally ignored. Whatever problems this aspect of the policy formulation function may cause, it provides an otherwise unavailable avenue for original thought.

Policy Advocacy

Once policy positions are developed within the government, the NSC Staff must also assume an advocacy role, arguing issues before interagency groups, the NSC and the President himself, if necessary. It is important that this role be fully understood, so that the NSC Staff's advocacy of specific positions is not viewed as somehow infringing upon the prerogatives of the departments or violating a sacrosanct charter. If the President is to be well served, the NSC Staff must execute its advocacy function to the fullest extent possible, without subterfuge or apologies. In doing so, the Staff must come face to face with its dual nature; as a servant of the NSC, the Staff is bound to present coordinated departmental views accurately and fairly. But, as an advisory body to the President in its own right, the Staff must argue its own views and positions. The trick is to insure that the two responsibilities are kept separate and clear - a difficult but by no means impossible task.
Not surprisingly, positions taken by the NSC Staff may be in complete concert with those recommended by one or more of the departments. Under these conditions, the NSC Staff becomes a powerful ally, able to argue issues not only on their merit but also based on the Staff's understanding of the President's desires and needs. Recognition of the value of an alliance with the NSC Staff on a particular issue helps in the development of positions within the departments themselves. By using the NSC Staff as a sounding board for positions early in their development, it is often possible for the departments to develop more realistic and acceptable positions, thereby reducing the time spent in presenting politically frivolous recommendations to the NSC and the President. At the same time, this process helps educate the NSC Staff on the details of an issue, a never ending challenge, given the necessarily small size of the Staff.

There are three principal ways by which the NSC Staff executes its advocacy function as part of its role as the President's personal staff on national security. First, the Staff operates in the committees within the substrata of the NSC where most decisions are actually hammered out. By presenting arguments and positions in the committees and working groups subordinate to the NSC, the Staff advocates specific recommendations in a relatively loose and often creative environment. This is the venue in which the NSC Staff can make great contributions to long-range planning.

Second, the Staff can present positions in the summary memoranda that cover nearly every paper submitted to the President on national security matters. In this area, however, greatest care must be taken to segregate and identify the NSC Staff's position from the summary of the department's paper.

Third, the Staff makes recommendations through the APNSA in his role as national security adviser. He then presents these positions to the President, either in the forum of the NSC or directly in daily meetings.

Perhaps no other function arouses the anti-Staff faction within the government more quickly than policy advocacy. Critics of the NSC are often under the illusion that the bright, articulate people that make up the NSC Staff can somehow be muzzled and will not present their views on issues simply because someone told them their responsibility was reserved for the departments. Scowcroft says that "the President will seek people of substance," and people of that nature will present their views on issues of importance. In order to organize efficiently, the system should try to harness this pool of original thinkers, understand the critical role they must play, and exploit the tremendous advantages the Staff can offer to the policy process.

Conclusion

In this segment, we have explored the seven functional requisites of the NSC Staff and have identified the unique contributions the Staff can make to the national security process. Even from this brief look it is evident that most of the objections to the functions of the Staff arise when the Staff is acting in its capacity as an advisory body to the President. For a variety of reasons, many analysts and practitioners of national security are uncomfortable without the faceless layers of the bureaucracy having the sole responsibility for the development and advocacy of policy. They find comfort in the myth that great masses of well-meaning government officers, embedded in the intellec-
tual gridlock of the departments, can produce all the direction and planning for national security needed for the future. In fact, it has not happened that way in the past, and there is no reason to expect it to be different in the future.

Instead, the national security structure should be designed to exploit the unique capabilities of the NSC Staff and to facilitate the execution of its requisite functions. The structure that supports these functions will be best able to produce meaningful policy and to manage the complex affairs of national security in the future.
CHAPTER IV
THE NSC STRUCTURE

Having discussed the requisite functions of the NSC Staff, we now turn to the most important of the variables that impact on the efficient execution of these functions, the formal NSC system itself. More than any other single feature, the system's structure will dictate the ease or difficulty the NSC Staff will experience in executing its requisite functions. More importantly, the compatibility of the structure with its functions will determine the success or failure of the entire national security system. No administration has ever established a system based on an acknowledgement of the functional requisites of the NSC Staff; rather, all systems have been established in response to competing personality demands and to perceived systemic inadequacies of the previous administration. This has created significant discontinuities between the NSC Staff's functions and its supporting structure - a phenomenon we might call the Structural-Functional Mismatch.

The impact of structural weakness and the evolution of NSC systems to overcome these deficiencies and to respond to functional demands can be seen particularly well in two back-to-back administrations - those of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. In this chapter, we will examine the formal structures of both administrations and then measure them against their ability to execute the requisite functions.

PD-2 and the Carter NSC

The formal structure of the National Security Council System under the Carter Administration was laid out in Presidential Directive/NSC-2, dated January 20, 1977. PD-2, of course, was not produced in isolation; it was the product of the incoming administration's perception of the weaknesses of the Nixon-Ford NSC. During his successful campaign for the presidency, Jimmy Carter blasted the Kissinger model of national security decision-making, and the Secretary of State himself as a "Lone Ranger." The Republican national security strategy, Carter said, was "almost all style and spectacular, and not substance." He vowed that he would operate a "spokes of the wheel" system under which many voices would be heard in the national security decisional process. In addition, he was committed to decentralized, cabinet government in which his Secretary of State would be the leading player.

But, as Brzezinski acknowledged, Carter and his system would ultimately gravitate toward centralized control, with Brzezinski playing an even more visible and prominent role than his predecessor. Indeed, during the last 18 months of the Carter Administration, the Brzezinski NSC was almost identical in style and substance to the Kissinger model.

Unlike Kissinger, however, Brzezinski faced a Secretary of State unwilling to assume a second class status. Buttressed by a State Department suspicious of White House decision-making, Cyrus Vance continuously warred with Brzezinski virtually from the outset, with the advantage going to Vance early in the administration. It was not until the fall of the Shah in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian seizure of the American hostages in 1979 that Brzezinski was able to assume the dominant position in the national security structure, a position he did not surrender until the administration ended.
With Brzezinski’s ascension, the NSC Staff grew in importance as well. Although, with an average of 30 professionals, it was considerably slimmer than the Kissinger Staff, Brzezinski’s organization became the focal point for the entire NSC structure. At the end of the Carter Administration, the NSC Staff had resolved much of the Structural-Functional mismatch imbedded in PD-2, largely because the document itself provided the basic structure and the flexibility to allow the necessary growth.

PD-2 begins by saying that “the reorganization is intended to place more responsibility in the departments and agencies, while insuring that the NSC ... continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.” This contrasts sharply to the expressed basis for the Nixon-Kissinger system which pledged to “restore the National Security Council to its preeminent role in national security planning.” It was thus clear that the NSC, the source of bureaucratic strength for the “Lone Ranger,” was intended to have a much different role under the Carter Administration. Moreover, President Carter sought structural simplicity to replace what he saw as a labyrinth of committees within the national security system under the previous administration. “I want a simple, neater structure,” he told Brzezinski.

The result of these two perceptions was the creation of two organizations subordinate to the NSC to handle the full range of national security issues. The first of these was the Policy Review Committee (PRC) which consisted of the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Director of Central Intelligence, the APNSA, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as other cabinet members as required. The task of the PRC was: To develop national security policy for Presidential decision in those cases where the basic responsibilities fall primarily within a given department but where the subject also has important implications for other departments and agencies.

Because of its charter, the PRC was to be chaired by the cabinet official appropriate to the subject to be discussed. In practice, the Secretary of State occupied the chair of the PRC in most cases, and the PRC became the State Department’s primary mechanism for recommending national security policy to the President.

The second committee of concern was the Special Coordination Committee (SCC), created to “... deal with specific cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the implementation of Presidential decisions.” The membership of the SCC was the same as that in the PRC, with the vitally important difference that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs sat in the SCC chair. This was particularly significant in that it represented the first formal cabinet-level NSC committee to be chaired by the Assistant to the President; even Kissinger in his prime did not enjoy such formal clout.

Under PD-2, the PRC and SCC were chartered to deal with different sorts of issues. The PRC was to look after the range of foreign and defense policy issues, as well as international economic matters, and the preparation of the Intelligence Community Budget. The SCC, on the other hand, was to focus on a narrower spectrum of issues: arms control, covert actions and crisis management. The basic discriminator as to which
forum was to be used was the question of bureaucratic primacy: if responsibility for an issue lay primarily within one department, the PRC was to assume jurisdiction, with the appropriate secretary in the chair. If, on the other hand, departmental responsibility was not clear, the SCC would take the lead on the issue. The history of the Carter Administration, however, reveals that this division of labor became blurred, particularly as the system matured, and in that blurring process, the national security system became far more responsive to the immediate needs and desires of the President.

One important implication of PD-2 was that it formalized the cabinet status of the Assistant to the President. The PD makes it clear that, in the area of national security policy, the APNSA was not only on an equal footing with the members of the cabinet but, in the case of the SCC, was indeed first among equals. Moreover, at his first cabinet meeting, President Carter formally accorded Brzezinski cabinet status, a move unprecedented in the history of that position. As will be seen later, this issue was to be of considerable significance in the Reagan Administration.

One of the obvious implications of the PD-2 system was that it created competitive committees. The PRC was clearly the forum of the cabinet members, particularly the Secretary of State, while the SCC belonged to the APNSA and the National Security Council Staff he headed. One of the measures of bureaucratic power during the Carter Administration became the relative frequency with which the two committees met and the issues with which each dealt. In an environment of departmental dominance of the national security structure, we would expect to see more frequent PRC meetings covering a wide range of agenda items. Because the PRC was the functional mechanism by which the departments gained access to the President, an increase in meetings, coupled with an expanded agenda, would indicate a more aggressive leadership role for the departments with respect to the NSC Staff. If, on the other hand, the NSC Staff were dominant, the SCC would meet more frequently with a concomitant expansion in subject areas. Particularly significant in this regard would be any expansion of the SCC authority into areas nominally or by precedent belonging to the PRC.

And this, of course, is precisely what happened. Destler, Gelb, and Anthony Lake report a significant drop in PRC meetings beginning in 1979. Brzezinski confirms this assertion:

During the early phases of the Carter Administration, the PRC met more frequently, usually under Vance’s chairmanship. In time, however, the SCC became more active. I used the SCC to try to shape our policy toward the Persian Gulf, on European security issues, on strategic matters, as well as in determining our response to Soviet aggression.

Thus, the SCC not only expanded the frequency of its meetings but began to take on issues that would appear to have been more appropriately handled in the PRC.

In light of this history, it is ironic to note that the PRC had several important advantages in the struggle for bureaucratic dominance. First, it had authority to cover a wide range of issues. Virtually all long-range policy matters in the critical areas of foreign policy, defense, and intelligence fell nominally within the purview of the PRC. Moreover, the language of the PD was sufficiently broad to allow consideration of
practically any issue dealing with national security affairs in the administration. Perhaps more subtly, all of the principal members of the National Security Council, except the APNSA, had vested interests in supporting the power of the PRC. Since the PRC could be chaired by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or the Director of Central Intelligence, all would be apparently inclined to consider the PRC as his formal wedge into the Oval Office. The Secretary of Defense could hardly afford to support considering an issue in the SCC rather than the PRC without risking the authority of the PRC itself. The structure thus created a natural bureaucratic alliance among the cabinet secretaries and the DCI against the APNSA and the NSC Staff.

However, the PRC also had two significant drawbacks which, although not articulated in PD-2, provided important avenues through which the APNSA could expand the role and authority of the SCC. First, the PRC, like the SCC, met in the White House Situation Room and was supported by the NSC administrative staff. This created the strong impression, even among cabinet members themselves, that the White House was in fact in charge of the PRC, regardless of who sat in the chair. In addition, the PRC was subject to the vagaries of scheduling of the Situation Room, a factor which could be used to delay consideration of an issue by the PRC. More importantly, the formal documentation of the PRC rested with the APNSA and the NSC Staff. This included the critically important “Summary of Conclusions” of the meetings, the mechanism by which issues were presented to the President for his decision. Brzezinski summarizes this point by saying:16/

The report to the President, including the minutes of the meeting, or the option papers for the full NSC meeting, would be prepared by the NSC staff and submitted by me to the President directly. Though the PRC would be chaired by a secretary, the report on the meeting would go from me to the President.

This was obviously an enormously powerful lever enjoyed by the APNSA in the management of the PRC system. Regardless of which individual sat in the chair, the APNSA had the last word in submitting an issue to the individual who would ultimately make the decision. This reporting procedure caused much consternation among cabinet secretaries; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was particularly incensed at the system, pointing out that “this meant that the National Security Adviser had the power to interpret the thrust of the discussion,” unchallenged even by the committee chairman.17/ This system, however, remained unchanged throughout the administration.

Subordinate to the PRC and the SCC were the so-called mini-PRC and mini-SCC. As the name implies, these were committees that mirrored their senior counterparts, except that their memberships were at lower levels. The mini-SCC, for example, was chaired by Brzezinski’s deputy, David Aaron. These committees were charged with looking after issues of lesser magnitude that could be resolved without surfacing to the full PRC or SCC or the NSC itself. Two issues considered by the mini-SCC demonstrate the sorts of issues it considered. In 1979, increasing Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, coupled with the collapse of the Shah of Iran and the resulting turmoil in the region, created considerable concern in the Defense and State Departments as to the security of the flow of oil to the West through the Strait of Hormuz. The mini-PRC, with Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert in the chair, met to consider the
magnitude of the threat and measures that the U.S. could take to guarantee security of the Strait. This would ultimately lead to full PRC, SCC, and Presidential consideration. The following year, the mini-SCC met to consider whether the U.S. should challenge the increasingly belligerent Qaddafhi in his claim to the Gulf of Sidra, an issue which would receive considerably higher level attention in the Reagan Administration.18/ The mini-committees served, in David Aaron's view, as an "extremely useful tool both for preparation and follow-up."

The mini-PRC and SCC relieved much of the burden from the full committees and facilitated the decisional process at appropriate levels within the bureaucracy. As with the full committees, the "minis" met in the White House Situation Room, with agenda and minutes controlled by the NSC Staff.

In addition to chartering the PRC and the SCC, PD-2 also rather vaguely called for the continuation of the NSC Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) created by NSDM-2 under the Nixon Administration. They were to be subordinate to, and were to have memberships determined by, the PRC. In reality, the IGs were not formally constituted or used to any large extent.

The formal PD-2 structure of the national security system, coupled with the informal mechanism developed for managing the system, created powerful tools by which either the cabinet secretaries or the APNSA could gain dominance within the national security decisional apparatus.

In addition to the PRC/SCC system established by PD-2, there were two other formal national security management tools within the Carter Administration. These were Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs) and Presidential Directives (PDs). PRMs, which replaced the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) of the Nixon-Ford years, were the basic documents that generated formal policy studies. The most famous of these was PRM-10, a "broadly gauged review of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance."19/ Even before his inauguration, President-elect Carter commissioned some 15 PRMs on a host of important national security issues.20/

PRMs were designed to lead to Presidential Directives (PDs) which replaced the National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) of the Nixon Administration. PDs were the primary mechanism by which the Carter Administration promulgated its most basic tenets of national security policy and were considered to be of such significance that only 63 of them were issued during Carter's entire four years. In general, the subject matter covered in these 63 PDs was, in fact, of considerable importance. But the import with which PRMs and PDs were regarded eventually worked to the disadvantage of the Carter Administration; the bureaucracy began to regard these documents with such awe that the system was reluctant to undertake PRMs or to propose PDs because of the bureaucratic and conceptual struggle which would ensue before either document was completed. PRMs particularly fell victim to their perceived significance. They became cumbersome, unwieldy documents on which consensus was virtually impossible to achieve. Busy policy makers sought alternative means to achieve the same goals, and the preponderance of the last 20 PDs were issued without the benefit of a supporting PRM. The decline in popularity of the PRM was manifest in the decline in the number commissioned; the 15 chartered even before the Carter Administration took office constituted fully one third of the 45 PRMs tasked during the entire Administration.21/
PRMs and PDs were the products of the National Security Council Staff. Although the actual work in drafting the studies to support a PRM might be done on an interagency basis, the Terms of Reference by which the parameters of the study were fixed were drafted by the NSC Staff. More importantly, the PDs themselves were NSC Staff products and were sometimes presented to the President with only a cursory nod to the interagency process. This became even more routine after the demise of the PRM process which at least had the requirement for interagency review and attempts at coordination.

The formal NSC structure, as presented in PD-2, was a simply constructed system, reflective of the President's personal desires and perspectives. More importantly, it had sufficient flexibility to grow and evolve, as the functional requisites of the NSC Staff became more apparent and as the environmental variables changed.

**NSDD-2 and the Reagan NSC**

In what has become almost an American political tradition, Ronald Reagan heaped great abuse upon his predecessor’s national security structure:22/

The present administration has been unable to speak with one voice in foreign policy. My administration will restore leadership to U.S. foreign policy by organizing it in a more coherent way. An early priority will be to make structural changes in the foreign policy-making machinery so that the Secretary of State will be the President’s principal spokesman and adviser. The National Security Council will once again be the coordinator of the policy process. Its mission will be to assure that the President receives an orderly, balanced flow of information and analysis. The National Security Adviser will work closely in teamwork with the Secretary of State and the other members of the Council.

Even more so than PD-2, NSDD-2 was the product of the incoming administration’s perceptions of the weaknesses of its predecessor, as noted in the preceding statement. Recognizing that President Carter had come into office with pledges not to create any “Lone Rangers,” President-elect Reagan’s advisers saw Brzezinski as precisely that. Moreover, with the new President’s belief in cabinet government, the decentralization of decision-making demanded a less activist role for APNSA and the NSC Staff he headed. Ronald Reagan had repeatedly criticized the White House-centric NSC system and, true to his word, set about changing the system dramatically during his first year in office. The selection of Alexander Haig as Secretary of State reinforced Reagan’s desire to move back to cabinet government. Haig, a consummate bureaucrat from the Nixonian school of power brokerage, knew full well the potential for White House management of national security affairs and had no intention of allowing this to happen to his State Department. Moreover, his impressive credentials in the NSC, then as Nixon’s Chief of Staff, and finally as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, gave him the perception that he was well-qualified to act as the President’s vicar for national security policy.
Unlike the Nixon and Carter Administrations, the Reagan team did not have an
agreed-upon national security structure in hand on Inauguration Day. The new
administration knew that it did not want to repeat the perceived follies of NSDM-2 and
PD-2, but it did not know what it wanted to do for itself. Haig moved quickly into this
structural vacuum, presenting the White House with the draft NSDD-2 that essentially
vested all authority in the Secretary of State.23/

A hurried review of the draft in the White House, led by Generals William Odom
and Robert Schweitzer, alerted Reagan confidant Edwin Meese to the implications of the
Haig gambit, and as Haig laments, it was consigned to the black hole of Ed Meese’s
briefcase, never to see the light of day again.24/ The subsequent and much-publicized
squabble over control of the crisis management structure reinforced the directionless
split between Haig and the White House and created a structural atmosphere in which the
only agreement achieved was to function in an ad hoc fashion. It is no accident that
NSDD-2 was not signed until January 13, 1982, a full year into President Reagan’s first
term. By that time, nearly 20 NSDDs were in print on a variety of topics but none on the
most basic of all subjects, how to conduct the business of national security.

Although the articulation of the national security system took a full year, the
structure it codified was practiced from the inception of the administration. And,
although the principals could not agree on how to present the structure, they all agreed
on what they saw as the need to change the role of the APNSA and greatly reduce the
power of the NSC Staff. NSDD-2 did a very thorough job of both, to the detriment of
national security decision-making.

NSDD-2 contrasted sharply with PD-2 in both style and substance. The latter was
a concise, three page document that outlined the important features of the national
security system but allowed, by its general language, considerable flexibility that proved
invaluable in restructuring the system to respond to changing international realities.
NSDD-2, on the other hand, was a lengthy, seven page document, so full of legalisms and
structural rigidity that it needed to be either extensively modified or ignored when the
realities of the structural-functional mismatch became evident.

Even more significant were the substantive differences between the two docu­
mments. The emasculation of the NSC Staff under NSDD-2 began with the reduction of
the role of the APNSA. PD-2 was clear in assigning the APNSA certain roles and
missions. It specifically included the APNSA as an ad hoc member of the National
Security Council, and it assigned him as the chairman of one of the two cabinet-level
committees subordinate to the NSC. NSDD-2, by contrast, did neither. Not only was the
APNSA not given a committee to chair, he was not directed to sit with the NSC itself.
PD-2 outlined the role of the APNSA as a coequal member of the national security
decisional system; NSDD-2 envisioned the role of the APNSA to be restricted to that of
an administrative assistant, ensuring, for example, “... that the necessary papers are
prepared and — except in unusual circumstances — distributed in advance to Council
members. He shall staff and administer the National Security Council.”25/

The responsibilities for managing national security affairs devolved almost
entirely upon the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. These responsibilities were:
The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the execution of approved policy.

The Secretary of Defense is my principal defense policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy.

The Director of Central Intelligence is my principal advisor on intelligence matters. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities, policy, and proposals, as set forth in relevant Executive Orders.

This array of specified responsibilities left little substantive room for APNSA and for the entire NSC Staff. NSDD-2 succeeded in eliminating any policy role for the APNSA and in undermining his functional requisites in all areas, save administration of the system, by denying him a leadership role in the subcommittee system. Moreover, within the interagency system, he was accorded only sub-cabinet rank and was assigned membership in Interagency Groups (IGs) chaired, in some cases, by fourth echelon members of the Departments of State and Defense. Within a bureaucracy highly sensitive to the nuances of rank, this degradation of the role of the APNSA translated itself into an institutional contempt for the person of Richard V. Allen and for the NSC Staff he headed. Haig, certainly no ally of Allen's, says that "Allen was in an impossible position from the start," and this devolved upon the NSC Staff as well.

Like the Carter Administration, the Reagan NSC had a system of interagency reviews of policy called National Security Study Directives (NSSDs) and decision documents called National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs). These differed little in form from the Carter PRMs and PDs but were vastly different in their actual use. Recognizing the problems in the Brzezinski system in actually issuing PDs, the Reagan NSC was far more liberal in the use of NSDDs—more than 300 were signed during the Reagan years. But, the use of NSSDs was significantly less, particularly in the early years of the Reagan Administration, reflecting a certain inability to generate long-range policy studies.

The structural changes in the two NSCs were not limited to those embodied in NSDD-2. Within the White House hierarchy itself, the APNSA was reduced from being one of the assistants who had direct access to the President at any time to a second echelon functionary, subordinate to Edwin Meese, a man totally unschooled in national security matters. This lack of direct access to the President was perhaps the biggest factor that ultimately brought Allen down; he was completely unable to execute his role as National Security Adviser, nor was anyone else able to fill this functional void. Thus, as the result of deliberate actions taken by the new administration, the NSC Staff quickly became irrelevant to the national security process, and the functional requisites, for the most part, were left undone.
When it became clear that, in Brzezinski's words, "Ronald Reagan had pushed the degradation of the NSC too far," several readjustments occurred. First, Richard Allen was dismissed as APNSA, ostensibly for the damage done to his reputation by unfounded allegations of impropriety. Donald Regan, the President's Chief of Staff, says that "whispering campaigns broke into the press and destroyed (Allen's) dignity and, with it, his effectiveness." In reality, this was only the excuse for Allen's dismissal. He was in fact the victim of the system's inability to manage national security. Allen played the role of APNSA exactly as it was designed; Haig says that Allen was "enthusiastic about the definition of roles." Unfortunately for Allen, the definition was wholly unsatisfactory. He had no intention of formulating policy when that was exactly what was needed. Allen's dismissal was far more an indictment of the system than it was a reflection of the individual. He was replaced by William P. Clark, who had been Haig's deputy at State and was a trusted personal friend of the President's but again no expert on national security. Clark insisted, as one of his first acts, that he be accorded direct access to the President, restoring the custom enjoyed by every national security adviser since Bundy, with the sole exception of Richard Allen.

The second change occurred when Ed Meese was removed from the NSC Staff's chain of command, and Clark assumed a position equal to that of the other senior White House advisers. It was apparent that Meese's practice of the briefcase veto and his lack of background in national security issues were creating genuine obstacles in the management of national security within the administration.

Although these changes helped stop the erosion of the NSC Staff's ability to execute its requisite functions, they did nothing to redesign the system to reduce the structural-functional mismatch. Much more needed to be done, and slowly, with almost painful recognition, the system began to adjust itself to the functional needs that NSDD-2 had so effectively undermined. Three years into the Reagan Administration, the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) was established in an effort to trim the size of the formal NSC and allow for more creative planning. Then, in 1987, Frank Carlucci created the Senior Review Group (SRG) with the APNSA in the chair and with the statutory NSC, minus the President and Vice President, as members. Subordinate to the SRG was the Policy Review Group (PRG), chaired by the Deputy APNSA. In both membership and function, these committees closely resembled the SCC and the mini-SCC of the Carter Administration and were a step toward a more effective national security structure.

Even with these changes, however, the system remained fundamentally flawed in that it lacked a strong National Security Adviser. Each of Reagan's six APNSAs took seriously his responsibility to coordinate, but none had the intellectual clout or the institutional position to lead the process in the formulation of meaningful policy. This left the NSC Staff, throughout the administration, in a damage limiting role.

As a result, the system was unable to recover and was intellectually bankrupt in the planning arena. William E. Odom commented that "it is difficult to point to a single example of meaningful long-range planning that emerged from the Reagan national security system." Brzezinski observed that "policy was fragmented to an unprecedented degree." Less charitably, there was "virtual chaos in national security, with no systemic procedure for policy formulation."
It was in the context of this acute structural-functional mismatch that the Iran-Contra affair occurred, characterized as the “lowest point in the history of the NSC Staff.” Indeed, Henry Kissinger argues that the loss of NSC Staff clout within the bureaucracy led directly to the affair because the system’s structural weakness “tempted the NSC Staff into conducting special presidential missions no one else was eager to undertake” in an effort to recapture lost ground. Moreover, because the NSC Staff in general, and Oliver North in particular, had little ability to orchestrate the bureaucracy, the tendency was to try to ignore the bureaucracy altogether and to undertake missions outside the system.

Although all administrations have had their share of national security problems, none except the Reagan Administration has institutionalized a system that seemed to produce such disarray and disaster. The most basic problem with the Reagan system, Brzezinski argues, was “that (the NSC) has been too weak.”

**Grading the Structures**

Having sketched the structures of the two NSCs, we can now assess the effectiveness of PD-2 and NSDD-2 in meeting the functional requisites. Not surprisingly, we find major differences that directly bear on the successes and failures of each administration in national security affairs.

**Administration**

It appears that both structures supported the proper execution of administration, with the practical advantage belonging to NSDD-2. Partially by accident and partially by design, NSDD-2 and its application in the government reduced possibilities for the informal policy making process that can occur when executing the administration function. Ronald Reagan was an active participant in the NSC, chairing sometimes several meetings each week. Jimmy Carter, for all of his proclivities for being involved in detail, chose to rely far more on the PRC and SCC and rarely convened the NSC itself. This, coupled with the fact that summaries of the PRC and SCC meetings were not afforded interagency review, created a climate in which creative note taking flourished. President Reagan’s presence in NSC meetings reduced the possibilities of creative note taking, as well as the power of the summary memorandum; he was actually in the meetings, remembered what was said, and occasionally caught a creative note taker in the act.

Moreover, the proliferation of subcommittees that occurred under NSDD-2 helped guard against the manipulation of agendas and NSC meeting dates that could effectively kill an issue before it reached the President. NSDD-2 also established a separate secretariat for each SIG, thereby breaking the administrative monopoly the NSC Staff had maintained over the execution of this critical function. Although normative judgments are difficult to quantify, the structure of the administrative function under NSDD-2 supported a more thorough and honest execution.
Policy Coordination

PD-2 was rather light on the function of policy coordination, and the Carter NSC is sometimes accused of weakness in this area. Indeed, the absence of an operational structure below the level of the mini-SCC and PRC did nothing to help regularize the coordination requirement. Coordination of specific issues was left essentially to the discretion of the NSC Staff, with the end result that coordination became very uneven. Brzezinski, Aaron, and Odom all argue that PD-59, our basic nuclear targeting doctrine, was thoroughly coordinated with all the necessary players and was an excellent example of proper and effective coordination. The decision by President Carter to suspend production of the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) was, on the other hand, clearly uncoordinated within the system and had disastrous results. In both cases, coordination was handled in an ad hoc fashion, with little structural regularity.

Moreover, the practice of submitting summaries of SCC and PRC meetings directly to the President and preparing decision documents exclusively in the White House precluded effective coordination, even at the NSC level. To be sure, the weekly luncheon meetings among Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and Brzezinski (the VBB lunches) helped in this regard, but few formal notes ever emerged from these meetings and fewer still coordinated positions.

NSDD-2, by contrast, gave the function of coordination a prominent role. It called for the APNSA to “be responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing national security policy,” and was far more detailed on the establishment and responsibilities of the lower level coordinating committees - the Interagency Groups (IGs). Furthermore, some IGs were to be supported themselves by full-time working groups to coordinate interagency efforts on specific issues.

This layering and proliferation of committees helped guarantee that positions presented to the NSC were reasonably well coordinated, as long as issues were worked within the structure. As mentioned earlier, the parade of National Security Advisers in the Reagan Administration saw coordination as their first requirement, and each appears to have executed that function with a measured amount of success. McFarlane, for example, argued that “the NSC system must ... have the capacity to coordinate effectively the efforts of the many powerful and contentious components of the policy-making community.” The famous exception to this was, of course, the Iran-Contra operation which took place completely outside of the coordination process. But the failure of this misbegotten initiative was due far more to the ineptitude of Oliver North and John Poindexter than to any structural defect in coordination. In fact, the coordinated interagency view contained in NSDD-5 on Iran was that the United States should “continue the policy of discouraging arms transfers to Iran.” The coordinating mechanisms were in place; Poindexter and North simply chose to ignore them.

Policy Supervision

Both PD-2 and the NSDD-2 assign the policy supervision function to the APNSA and, through him, to the NSC Staff. Yet each Staff performed this function differently, based on the structural differences embedded in the two documents.
PD-2 specified that the SCC had, as one of its major responsibilities, supervision of "the implementation of Presidential decisions." Since the APNSA chaired the SCC, and his deputy ran the mini-SCC, it fell to the NSC Staff to assume a leading role in the supervision function. PD-2 provided the structural hook upon which the Staff could hang its role in supervision. Using that as a point of departure, the Staff built into many PDs an implementation monitoring committee that met under the aegis of the White House, a practice that greatly facilitated the execution of policy supervision.

NSDD-2 provided no such mechanism. Although the directive assigned the APNSA the responsibility for "developing, coordinating, and implementing national security policy," it gave the APNSA no means by which he could make this happen. The degradation of the APNSA and the concomitant loss of clout by the NSC Staff precluded a structural niche in which the Staff could execute this function. As a result, the Staff had to rely on its membership in various IGs to monitor implementation, but the Staff was but a single voice in committees chaired by other departments.

The execution of the supervision function was thus made far more difficult and contributed to the frustration within the Staff that, in turn, led to its operational role in the Iran-Contra affair. North had no confidence that the bureaucracy would carry out what he saw as a clear Presidential decision, so he undertook the mission himself. Had there been an effective, NSC Staff-led implementation committee, this sort of rogue elephant operation might never have occurred.

Policy Adjudication

Neither PD-2 nor NSDD-2 specifically addressed the function of policy adjudication, but it is clear from the structures mandated by each document that only PD-2 facilitated the execution of this function by the NSC Staff. PD-2 created a powerful APNSA and the post was filled by a powerful personality. Throughout his tenure, but particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of Iran, Brzezinski clearly spoke for the President; Carter himself said that "Zbig (spoke) with my approval and in consonance with my established and known policy." Accordingly, Brzezinski was able to resolve issues of presidential intent within the bureaucracy.

Quite naturally, the NSC Staff was also the recipient of this implied Presidential imprimatur. This made it a relatively straightforward matter for the NSC Staff to resolve disputes and to interpret presidential directives without having to go back to the President or even to Brzezinski for clarification and guidance.

Admittedly, the personal disputes between Brzezinski and Vance, then later Muskie, created confusion external to the bureaucracy as to which official was speaking for the President. But, internal to the bureaucracy, there was little doubt amongst those that mattered.

The adjudication role played by the Staff in the implementation of the Persian Gulf Security Framework (PD-63) is a useful illustration of effective structural support to this functional requisite. The Security Framework was a complex strategy, involving a host of initiatives and policies crossing a great many departmental lines and was described by Brzezinski as "the most important work of its kind in three decades." Needless to say,
there were many questions of intent and interpretation that had to be answered before meaningful progress could be made. In the absence of a strong Staff role in adjudication, the entire security framework might well have foundered amidst bureaucratic inertia. Because the Staff had structured PD-63 to support the adjudication function, however, most issues were resolved by the Staff, and the framework eventually provided “a bold and forward-looking statement ... on our successor’s agenda.”

Because of the debilitating weakness imposed on the APNSA and on the NSC Staff by NSDD-2, the execution of this function became far more problematic. Basically, no one listened to the NSC Staff, particularly in the beginning, and therefore each department was free to pursue its own interpretation of the President’s decisions - or to ignore the President altogether. This, in turn, led to great and public conflict between the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as to what Haig called the “babel” of the administration.

**Crisis Management**

PD-2 assigned the primary responsibility for crisis management to the SCC and, therefore, to the APNSA and the NSC Staff. This structural design was the mechanism by which Brzezinski and the NSC Staff finally wrested control of the national security system during the last two years of the Carter Administration. The catalytic crisis that precipitated this shift in power was the collapse of the Shah of Iran and the dramatic transformation of that erstwhile U.S. ally in the wake of the fundamentalist revolution. As PD-2 mandated, the SCC took the lead in managing the disasters that accompanied the Shah’s collapse - a crisis of national security under virtually anyone’s definition. The SCC met frequently, sometimes daily, during the crisis period to hammer out specific responses to the kaleidoscope of challenges emerging from revolutionary Iran. During this crisis, as well as in a host of others, the SCC provided a highly effective, interagency medium for crisis management.

Over the course of the several months that followed the fall of the Shah, however, Brzezinski and Odom gradually expanded the agenda of the SCC to include decidedly non-crisis issues. It had become apparent to the bureaucratically sensitive Odom that the dearth of long-range planning emerging from the government could only be overcome by assertive White House leadership. Thus, SCC meetings became increasingly regular features of the national security system. The SCC’s gathering momentum was strongly reinforced by the hostage crisis and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the two events that dominated the last year of the Carter Administration. As a result of the administration’s preoccupation with these events, Brzezinski succeeded in converting the SCC from a crisis response team of limited duration into a:

... broadly gauged body, coordinating all the facets of our response, from the diplomatic, the military, and the financial to the spheres of public relations and domestic politics.

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher described the procedures as follows:
The National Security Adviser ... established the agenda for each day’s meeting, assigned special studies, chaired the meetings, and prepared the minutes that went directly to the President.

Although the specifics of the negotiations to end the hostage problem were largely handled by an ad hoc group chaired by Christopher, the SCC continued to dominate the national security system. This procedure gave Brzezinski and his supporting NSC Staff tremendous power to execute the functional requisites under the aegis of crisis management. Gelb and Lake, senior State Department officials during this period, assert that:

The post-Afghanistan climate created an exceptionally favorable market for Brzezinski’s policy views, his penchant for crisis, and his bureaucratic maneuvering. The deeper the crises, the more they fell into his SCC orbit.

No responsibility for crisis management was assigned in NSDD-2. The sole reference to this function is that the “IGs (will) establish full-time working groups, which will provide support to the crisis management operations of the NSC.” The NSDD did not specify which IG would be responsible for crisis management and implies a proliferation of working groups with potential crisis management duties. More importantly, the NSDD was silent on the question of who was to be in charge of crisis management.

This lack of definition precipitated one of the more serious imbroglios of the first year of the Reagan Administration. Haig felt strongly that he should be in charge of crisis management (along with everything else), a view shared by his predecessor, Cyrus Vance. The NSC Staff, on the other hand, wanted to retain that function within the White House, operating under the principle that the President should be the ultimate crisis manager. In the end, Haig lost, and NSDD-3 was issued, establishing the Vice President as the overall coordinator of crises within the NSC structure.

The drafters of NSDD-3 were careful to insure that the NSDD required the NSC Staff to provide the support to the Vice President, reasoning that only the NSC Staff could effect the interagency coordination necessary to manage crises effectively. There were more subtle reasons for the structure of NSDD-3; to the experienced hands on the NSC Staff, it represented a last-ditched effort to establish a formal, structural base from which it could recoup its functional losses. It was no accident that the drafters of the NSDD were holdovers from the Brzezinski staff and had participated in the SCC process. They knew that, if NSDD-3 assigned crisis management to the NSC Staff, it could be the “camel’s nose under the tent” that could be later parlayed into a resurgence of the Staff and a reduction of the structural-functional mismatch. The lessons of the post-Iran SCC loomed powerful in the minds of the drafters of NSDD-3, and the creation of the standing Special Situation Group (SSG) to manage crises was a direct result. To support the SSG, a Crisis Preplanning Group (CPPG) was established, with the Deputy APNSA in the chair. The CPPG was active a number of times, perhaps most notably during the planning for the Grenada operation.

One unfortunate consequence of the NSDD was the evolution of the quasi-autonomous Crisis Management Center within the NSC Staff. According to McFarlane, the Crisis Management Center was designed to:
... conduct pre-crisis collection and analysis of information about likely crisis areas in an effort to anticipate events and to provide extensive background information to decision-makers as a crisis preventive.

In fact, it was the Crisis Management Center which Oliver North used as a private fiefdom to run the Iran-Contra operation. It is not clear that the Center, disbanded by Frank Carlucci in 1987, ever really managed a crisis but it did provide legitimacy to North’s independent actions.

What is clear is that the deficiencies in NSDD-2 were never fully resolved in NSDD-3 and that crisis management and crisis planning never received adequate structural support.

Policy Formulation

Perhaps the most glaring differences in the two structural directives is in the area of policy formulation. PD-2 clearly established an important, if not key, role for the APNSA and the NSC Staff in the “development of options” for Presidential consideration. As we have seen, the SCC ultimately became the most powerful policy formulation body in the Carter national security system. A strong policy formulation role for the NSC Staff is what Carter had in mind from the outset, and his mounting disenchantment with the State Department only served to underscore the utility of the structure PD-2 created. As President Carter describes:59/

Zbigniew Brzezinski and his relatively small group of experts were not handicapped by the inertia of a tenured bureaucracy or the responsibility for implementing policies as they were evolved. They were particularly adept at incisive analyses of strategic concepts, and were prolific in the production of new ideas, which they were always eager to present to me.

Perhaps most importantly, Carter appointed an adviser with a first rate intellect, well regarded in both academic and governmental circles for his ideas. Brzezinski, in turn, surrounded himself with men and women of similar innovative dispositions.

There was no such simplicity in NSDD-2. Although the APNSA was charged, as noted earlier, with “developing, coordinating, and implementing” policy, none of President Reagan’s six National Security Advisers in fact ever evinced any real interest in formulating policy. Moreover, none of them was particularly renowned for his ideas, nor did any of them command instant intellectual respect in academic or governmental circles. In short, they were either not interested in, or incapable of, formulating meaningful policy options.60/ McFarlane, as Reagan’s third APNSA, summarized this position in 1984 by saying:61/

The current NSC system is not intended to dominate the policy making process. Instead, it must perform the far more difficult task of policy facilitation and coordination.
Advisers of this persuasion cannot be expected to select or use a Staff of intellectual superstars. Although perhaps unfairly perjorative, the characterization of the early Reagan NSC as "ideologues and lightweights" reflected the anti-intellectual bias of the entire Reagan White House. The President did not demand from his National Security Adviser or his Staff alternative policy options to those presented by the departments, and his National Security Advisers obliged by not giving him any.

As a result, no one in the administration did any long-range planning, nor was there a staff used to develop policy options from a Presidential perspective. Evidence of this orientation is the fact that not a single policy review study (NSSD) was commissioned until March of the second year of the administration.62/ This contrasted sharply with the Carter Administration that assigned 15 such studies the day Carter was inaugurated. The dearth of meaningful long-range policy that was produced early in the Reagan Administration was the inevitable result.

Policy Advocacy

Neither document clearly outlines a specific responsibility for the NSC Staff to support and argue policy recommendations. PD-2, however, mandated a structure that, in fact, facilitated the performance of this function. The primacy of the SCC, the vigorous policy formulation role desired by the President, and the administrative systems under which the Staff had an exclusive channel to the President, all created the structure to allow the smooth execution of the advocacy function. Indeed, this dimension of the Brzezinski Staff grew so significant that Odeen faults the Staff for overemphasizing advocacy. He says "inadequate process management may be a price President Carter paid for asking the NSC Staff to give priority to policy advocacy."

The emasculation of the NSC Staff in the Reagan Administration neutralized the Staff's ability to execute its advocacy function. In his book on the NSC, Constantine Menges related his deep frustration in advocating policy from a position of bureaucratic weakness and watching the series of national security setbacks that were experienced during his tenure, and this view is shared by others from the NSC Staff. Richard Pipes, the Staff's Soviet specialist during the first 18 months of the Reagan Administration, summarized the general attitudes of the Staff in saying "this was a most difficult and demanding period for the entire Staff."

Conclusion

We have now examined the basic structures of the Carter and Reagan national security systems and have measured them against the functional requisites of the NSC Staff. Were we to grade these administrations, we would find the report card in figure 6.

It is evident that, although different presidents will affix their individual styles to their national security systems, the failure to acknowledge that there exists requisite functions that must be supported by structure will result in national security policy disarray. The Tower Commission acknowledged that "there are certain functions which need to be performed in some way for any President." Having said that, it is evident that much more attention must be paid to the formal structure that will create either avenues or obstacles to the execution of these functions.
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**Figure 6**

Given the above, is there an ideal structure that will serve all Presidents equally well? It is to that question that we now direct our attention.
CHAPTER V
A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE FUTURE

From the preceding discussion, it is evident that different Presidents have created different national security structures with differing degrees of success. Most analysts agree with the Tower Commission when it says that "the (national security) system is properly the President's creature. It must be left flexible to be molded by the President into the form most useful to him."1/

At the same time, it appears that the inexorable forces of the international system are driving modern Presidents into more intimate involvement in national security affairs and the Executive Branch into Brzezinski's Presidential system of decision-making. Within this context, it also appears that there are, indeed, functional requisites that must be performed if the national security system is to work. Given these two factors, and with the caveat that no two Presidents will structure the system identically, there should be basic similarities in how different administrations answer three fundamental questions:

1) What should the APNSA do?
2) How should the NSC Staff be configured? and
3) How should Staff responsibilities be articulated?

In this chapter, we will attempt to construct answers to these questions and, as a result, create a prototype for the future.

The Role of the Assistant to the President

Although the thrust of this discussion has been the Staff of the National Security Council, we must examine the role of the APNSA in order to present a meaningful position on the Staff itself. More than any other organization in the national security system, the NSC Staff is the product of its principal - in this case, the APNSA - and it is his role that will ultimately determine the ability of the Staff to execute its requisite functions.

As distasteful as it may be to many in the national security business, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs must be one of the three primary actors in national security. Leslie Gelb has argued that the system cannot "turn the prince back into a frog" and cannot return the APNSA to what some see as his ideal role - the Bundy or the Cutler model.2/ The chaos of the Reagan NSC was due, in a large measure, to the efforts of Meese and Haig to turn the clock back to a system now rendered irrelevant by the evolving demands of national security. Instead, the basic document that organizes the national security system in the future should recognize and facilitate the modern role of the APNSA. As Odeen says:3/

There has been a fundamental change in the nature of the problems over the past fifteen or twenty years that has tended to give the national security adviser a much heavier role, a much more public role, and a much more important role.

51
As we have seen, the APNSA must effectively function in two sometimes conflicting capacities. First, he must function as the manager of the national security system, wearing the hat of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Second, he must act as the personal counsellor to the President on national security matters in his capacity as the National Security Advisor. If the APNSA/NSA is deficient in either capacity, or if the structure creates insurmountable obstacles along either path, then the entire national security system will not work.

In his first role, the APNSA must oversee with objective eyes the operation of the National Security Council and its supporting Staff. He must insure that the process functions are executed by the Staff in an effective and judicious manner. As the Tower Commission asserts:

It is his responsibility to ensure that matters submitted for consideration by the Council cover the full range of issues on which review is required; that those issues are fully analyzed; that a full range of options is considered; that the prospects and risks of each are examined; that all relevant intelligence and other information is available to the principals; and that difficulties in implementation are confronted.

In this capacity, he serves primarily the institution of the National Security Council and, although perhaps not as invisible as Sidney Souers' "anonymous servant," he should be an honest, non-controversial broker of the system. His neutrality on issues, however, should not be confused with passivity; he may indeed be very assertive in what Odeen calls "decision forcing" and in policy supervision. The APNSA will have to crack the whip to make the national security system work, to forge consensus at the lowest level possible, to insure that the bureaucracy is presenting issues fairly and imaginatively, and to demand adherence to the President's decisions.

At the same time, the NSA must also serve as a personal adviser to the President. The Tower Commission reached the conclusion that "he is perhaps the one most able to see things from the President's perspective (and) is unburdened by departmental responsibilities." Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the beneficiary and the victim of a strong NSA, contends that "the NSC Advisor must do more than coordinate - he must represent the President's views." It is both unrealistic and dangerous to argue, as Haig does, that the "National Security Adviser should be a staff man - not a maker of policy." It is equally damaging to support I.M. Destler's view that the position should be abolished altogether.

Many critics of the NSA argue his role is based primarily on his public posture, sometimes measuring his performance by the number of times his name appears in print. Although this line of criticism becomes more emotional than real, it highlights the entire question of public posture and must be decided by the President. In the execution of the functional requisites, it is not essential that the NSA be a public spokesman, but if he is, then the administration needs to insure that the NSA and the other public figures in the government are espousing a coherent and consistent national security policy line.
The issue of whether or not the NSA is a public spokesman, however, should not be confused with the essential nature of the position itself. The national security system must recognize that the elevation of the NSA has been brought about, not as a by-product of strong egos and personalities, but by the demands of an increasingly complex international environment. For all its weaknesses, the Carter Administration recognized this reality and produced notable successes in national security. For all its strengths, the Reagan Administration did not, and the result was an unnecessarily chaotic and directionless national security system. Ever the journalist, Leslie Gelb summarizes the issue neatly in his two "iron laws." The first point, Gelb argues, is that "things won't work well with a strong national security adviser to the President." The second is that, "without a strong adviser, things won't work at all."11/

How, then, does an administration structure the national security system to facilitate the dual roles of the APNSA/NSA? Brzezinski, R.D. MacLaurin and others have proposed that the status of the APNSA be upgraded to formal cabinet level, either as the Director or the Secretary of National Security, possibly even subject to Senate confirmation.12/ These dramatic proposals would certainly resolve the internecine squabbling that seems endemic in each administration and would position the incumbent to fulfill both his primary roles. But these proposals, however attractive from a functional perspective, are probably not feasible; they would surely elicit a storm of protests, opposition, and cabinet-level resignations if they were seriously considered.

Short of that, the administration needs to spell out in detail the specific roles of the APNSA and give him the bureaucratic leverage he needs to execute them. At a minimum, the APNSA should chair the important sub-NSC committees in which much of the business of national security is conducted. The NSC Staff should then chair the committees subordinate to those chaired by the APNSA, in recognition of the validity of Haig's pronouncement that "he who controls the key IGs ... controls policy."13/

In addition, the APNSA should be explicitly assigned the crisis management portfolio and the ability to task throughout the government in the execution of his crisis management role. The APNSA must also be afforded unfettered access to the President with no intervening layers in the White House. Finally, he must be afforded clear cabinet status and be recognized as coequal to the Secretaries of State and Defense. These recommendations run against the grain of many NSC critics, but they are essential if the United States is to return to an effective national security system.

One of the important points separating the critics of a strong NSA from those who feel that strength in that position is necessary, is the issue of personal qualities. Critics argue that, although it would be nice if one person could effectively act in the dual roles demanded of the position, no such person can be found. Supporters contend that, although the population of such people is small, it does exist and can be drawn upon. Qualities necessary for success as the APNSA/NSA include the following:

1) **Competence.** The APNSA must be conversant in the entire range of national security issues or, at least, must know where his weaknesses are and act to redress them.
2) **Experience.** The APNSA cannot come into the government as a novice. He must understand not only the formal structure of the bureaucracy but also where the entrenched issues and individuals are found. He must also understand how and when to pull the right levers to make the system work.

3) **Intellect.** He must be both pragmatic and conceptual, able to generate ideas and then translate them into meaningful policy. Moreover, he must have an established intellectual reputation in order to command instant respect in the government, in the academic world, in the Congress, and in the media. He must be an intellectual magnet to attract the brightest and most innovative people into the NSC Staff.

4) **Ethics.** The APNSA must have a sufficiently strong ethical foundation to be able to act as the honest broker in coordinating and integrating the national security system. As Walt Rostow said, “he must be able to present another man’s case as well as the man himself could.” The entire national security system must have confidence that the APNSA will present alternate views fairly and will not take advantage of propinquity in the coordination of papers and positions. He must be able to present bad news to the President and to sniff out and squelch misbehavior before it becomes a problem. He must be scrupulously honest in presenting Presidential decisions and in monitoring the implementation process. Perhaps most importantly, he must impart the same sense of ethical behavior to the Staff he leads.

5) **Loyalty.** If he is to function as a personal adviser to the President, the NSA must believe in the man he serves. He must consider that his first duty is to support the President while insuring that he never overshadows or upstages his boss. He must elicit trust and confidence of the President in order to act effectively in his stead within the national security system.

6) **Tact.** The APNSA will, by the very nature of his position, elicit envy and animosity from departments. He must make a concerted and continuous effort to salve wounded egos, to maintain cordial relations with abrasive personalities all over the government, and to present triumphs and defeats in a manner that helps smooth the way for cooperation on the next issue.

7) **Confidence.** He must be confident in his own abilities and in those of his staff in order to hold his own in the tumult of conflicting opinions that marks any national security system.

A final quality is that the APNSA/NSA should be a civilian. A military officer, although certainly capable of possessing all of the traits listed above, operates from two perceptual disadvantages. First, military officers are unfairly seen to possess only modest intellectual capabilities. This makes it especially difficult for an officer to be
taken seriously in the formulation and advocacy of policy. Second, there remains within the government a psycho-historical suspicion of a strong military role in the development of policy. Many Americans are simply uncomfortable with an officer crossing the line between policy execution and policy formulation. For these reasons, the position of APNSA/NSA is better filled with a civilian.

Although this is a daunting list of qualities, there are certainly those in government, in academia, and in the private sector who meet all of them. These should form the population from which the APNSA/NSA is drawn.

The National Security Council Staff

As has been argued throughout this discussion, the NSC Staff must be supported by a national security structure that allows for the smooth execution of the functional requisites. In addition to the external structure, the size, internal organization, and composition of the Staff itself are key variables that will impact on the effectiveness of the entire system.

Size

The NSC Staff has varied greatly in size, ranging from three to over fifty professionals. In determining the appropriate size, a balance must be struck between efficiency and flexibility; the Staff must be large enough to cover the entire spectrum of national security issues with some degree of expertise. Scowcroft points out that long-range planning is often inadequately done because “the NSC Staff is constrained as to the number of people available (and) our limited personnel assets were used to put out fires.” At the same time, the Staff must be small enough so that it is able to avoid the rigidity that marks most large organizations. Moreover, a large Staff creates yet additional evidence that a rival State (or Defense) Department has been created in the White House, a perception that leads to unnecessary friction. Although persuasive justification for an exact size probably cannot be offered, it appears that 40-45 professionals is about the right number. A Staff much smaller than that cannot contend with the range of issues that must be considered by the NSC; a Staff much larger will become a bureaucracy unto itself in which individual Staff members will lose their personal relationships with the APNSA and with the President they support.

Staff Organization

The Tower Commission, reacting to the aberration that was the Iran-Contra affair, recommended an organization designed to maximize supervision. “Clear vertical lines of control and authority, responsibility, and accountability, are essential to good management.” This is a useful point of departure, but caution must be exercised; such an organization can become excessively structured and rigid. The designers of the next Staff organization must not try to remedy the Oliver North phenomenon by structural solutions; the Iran-Contra affair occurred primarily because of personality flaws in North and Poindexter rather than in faults within the system itself. Supervision and accountability are necessary but should not come at the expense of flexibility and intellectual freedom. Staff members must be able to interact with each other across nominal staff lines, to form ad hoc working groups to deal with specific issues, and to draw upon each other’s expertise.
The organization that best supports this is a three-tiered system as outlined in figure 7. The first tier is made up of the APNSA, his deputy, his executive secretary, and whatever personal staff he may have. The next layer is composed of the directors of the regional and functional groups. Finally, there is the layer of Staff members who, although nominally under the supervision of their respective directors, are expected to interact with one another as issues require.

The Staff organization must be at once flexible and structured. It must be flexible by fostering horizontal coordination between Staff members and between directors; it must be structured by discouraging direct, special relationships from developing between the first tier and the Staff members such as occurred between Poindexter and North.

The purpose of executive secretary bears special mention. This is the only Staff position specifically authorized in the 1947 legislation, and it can be used to great advantage by the APNSA and the Staff in executing the process functions. In this, the executive secretary can help relieve the APNSA from much of the more mundane, yet critical, process functions, freeing him up to focus more attention on policy substance. In many ways, the indomitable Christine Dodson, Staff Secretary under Brzezinski, is the archetype for this position. As Brzezinski said, “she brought a personal commitment to the job in addition to her administrative abilities and ... ruled the NSC with an iron hand.” The executive secretary position fell into disuse during the Nixon and Ford years but can be a post of great utility. In the same vein, there is value in establishing a small and relatively permanent policy group within the Staff, in addition to the current non-policy secretariat. This would allow for substantive and administrative continuity between Presidencies and would help prevent each administration from having to learn the same lessons that its predecessor struggled to learn.
Staff Composition

In 1961, McGeorge Bundy said, in a letter to Senator Henry Jackson, the NSC Staff “should be composed of men (sic) equally well versed in the process of planning and in that of operational follow-up.” Twenty years later, this is still sound guidance. The members of the NSC Staff should be drawn from the widest range of sources possible: The State and Defense Departments, the Intelligence Community, Treasury, the academic world, and the private sector. They should share the qualities of the APNSA, with emphasis on selflessness and confidence. They must be experienced within the government and be well-connected with all relevant departments and agencies.

But they should not stay on the Staff indefinitely. One of the conclusions of the Tower Commission is that members of the Staff should not remain for longer than four years. Rotation of the Staff members is the safest way to insure that new ideas and fresh approaches are continuously being introduced into the system. Moreover, and perhaps less ideallyistically, rotation of the members of the Staff is the best way to hedge against the folly of individual Staff members losing touch with their ethical foundations and constitutional idealism. Many members of the Staff have commented on the erosion of ethical values that occurs after the third year on the White House staff and how morally numbing the entire process becomes.

Articulation of the Structure

Many administrations, regardless of their individual national security systems, have developed implicit understandings about the roles and missions of the Staff. But no President has outlined his desires for the NSC Staff clearly and with formal presidential blessing. PD-2, for example, says only that “The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council Staff, as provided by law.” NSDD-2 is silent on the role of the Staff altogether.

In light of all that has been discussed thus far, it is apparent that the responsibilities of the NSC Staff must be explicitly articulated in a presidential directive document. This document should be separate from that which lays out the basic national security system and should be clear in what the Staff should and should not do. What follows is a proposed directive document which can serve as a point of departure for any administration in insuring that the structural-functional mismatch within the national security system is minimized.

National Security Directive - 3

The National Security Council Staff

In support of the National Security Council System mandated in NSD-2 and in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council Staff is established.

I. Functions of the National Security Council Staff. The NSC Staff shall act in three capacities.
First, it shall serve as the Staff of the National Security Council under the direction of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In that capacity, the Staff shall be responsible for the administration of the NSC system. It shall also be responsible for the coordination and integration of policy in preparation for submission to the NSC for consideration. It shall also be responsible for supervising the implementation of my decisions and for interpreting specific policies.

Second, the Staff shall provide support to the Assistant to the President in his capacity as coordinator of crisis management. The NSC Staff shall effect coordination throughout the relevant agencies to insure the presentation of options and the implementation of decisions in a timely manner. It shall convene crisis management working groups subordinate to the NSC and composed of representatives of the involved departments and agencies. It shall also be responsible for crisis contingency planning, drawing upon the departments and agencies for support.

Third, the Staff shall support the Assistant to the President in his capacity as the National Security Adviser. In this regard, the Staff shall be one of my personal staffs and will provide me, through the National Security Adviser, with recommendations on national security matters.

II. Organization of the NSC Staff. The Staff shall be organized into three echelons. At the top shall be the Assistant to the President, his Deputy, and the Executive Secretary of the NSC. Next, there shall be nine Directors chairing groups in the following regional and functional areas: Europe and the Soviet Union, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Far East, Intelligence, International Economics, Transnational Issues, and Defense Policy. Third, there shall be Staff Officers in each regional and functional group whose work will be supervised by the Directors. In addition, there shall be established a Staff Secretariat responsible for administrative support to the NSC and composed of permanent civil servants. It is my intention that the Staff Secretariat provide the administrative continuity between administrations.

III. Size and Composition of the NSC Staff. The size of the Staff shall not exceed 45 professionals, excluding the Assistant to the President, his Deputy, the Executive Secretary, and the Staff Secretariat. The Staff shall be composed of representatives of the Foreign Service, the Armed Forces, the Intelligence Community the academic community, and the private sector.

IV. Equivalent Rank of the NSC Staff. For the purposes of seniority and protocol, the NSC Staff shall have equivalent rank as follows. The Assistant to the President shall rank as a member of my cabinet. The Deputy Assistant to the President shall rank as a deputy secretary. The Executive
Secretary and the Group Directors shall rank as assistant secretaries. The Staff Officers shall rank as deputy assistant secretaries.

V. **Modifications to this Directive.** The Assistant to the President may change the composition and structure of the functional and regional groups as required.

The proposed directive is built to address the requisite functions and to clarify other aspects of the NSC Staff that have been long neglected. In paragraph one, the directive outlines the Staff's responsibilities for the execution of the requisite functions and provides bureaucratic mechanisms by which these functions can be accomplished. Paragraph two provides a defined, vertical NSC Staff structure that allows for flexibility and accountability. Next, the directive caps the size of the Staff and requires that a cross-section of national security talent be employed. Paragraph four resolves a long-standing, if silent, element of friction within the government by identifying the equivalent rank for each position within the NSC Staff. Finally, the directive allows the APNSA some flexibility in the regional and functional groups but does not allow him to expand the size of the Staff or the scope of its responsibilities.

Such a document could be useful, not as a final product to be signed immediately by the President, but as a vehicle to engender discussion long overdue and as a base upon which to construct a definitive articulation of the structure and function of the NSC Staff.

**Conclusion**

For the first 170 years of our existence, the management of our international affairs was quite effectively handled by the Department of State, with occasional help from the War and Navy Departments. Since the end of the Second World War, however, the international environment has changed so dramatically that this time-honored managerial system just does not work today. Every administration since that of JFK has either implicitly recognized this phenomenon and moved to a White House centered management structure, or has ignored it and created a chaotic national security process. It is now time to formalize what has been the de facto system and to create the sort of structure that will help guarantee the proper and efficient management of national security affairs into the next century. This can only be accomplished if we acknowledge the inability of the 18th century system to deal with 21st century challenges and if we assign a formal, Presidential mandate to the APNSA/NSA and to the National Security Staff.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Iran-Contra affair, if it accomplished nothing else, placed an institutional spotlight on the National Security Council Staff, subjecting it to scrutiny unprecedented in its 40-year history. As with any such careful examination, it is important that the right lessons be learned and that appropriate remedies be applied. The most basic lesson is that the affair was symptomatic of a larger problem; it occurred not because the NSC Staff was too strong but rather because it was too weak. The Iran-Contra affair is a manifestation of the much deeper issue that has plagued every administration since Truman - the structural-functional mismatch.

The remedies for this problem are contrary to those proposed in many circles. They are based on a recognition that the nature of contemporary national security and the challenges posed by the international environment demand that the President play the pivotal role in the national security system. It is no accident that every President since Kennedy has found the State Department wholly inadequate in the formulation of national security policy; indeed, the existence of foreign policy as a discipline separate from the broader sweep of national security is itself highly debatable. To paraphrase Clemenceau, diplomacy is now too important to be left to the diplomats.

The effective management of national security in the future requires a more thorough integration of the various components of national power - an integration that must take place in the White House. In order to design a system to support this approach, the seven functional requisites must form the foundation. Imbedded in these functional requisites is the duality of the NSC Staff. The Staff must both serve the National Security Council as an institution, and it must serve the President as a personal staff. Once this duality is recognized and accepted, the functional requisites flow as a natural consequence.

The national security system that is fashioned by any administration must support the execution of these requisite functions. Although forms, committee names, and specific responsibilities will vary, several principles should be followed.

1) The President must be at the center. There can be no vicar of national security.

2) The APNSA and the NSC Staff must chair at least one of the key NSC subcommittees at each level.

3) The system must promote intellectual competition. Such competition becomes dysfunctional only when there are no institutionalized avenues for resolution.

4) The system must support the dual roles of the APNSA/NSA and the NSC Staff. The NSA and the Staff must have direct access to the President.
5) The system’s design and the functional responsibilities of the Staff must be clearly directed by the President in a written document at the beginning of the administration. Changes must be similarly formalized.

If these principles are followed, the prospects for a reduced structural-functional mismatch and for an effective national security system are greatly improved. It is significant to note that the Bush Administration adopted several of these principles in National Security Directive - 1, in which the APNSA was given the chair of the Principals Committee, and the Deputy APNSA chaired the Deputies Committee.1/

It is important to make a final comment about people. Our discussion has focused extensively on systems, structure, and organization, but it is the people that make it all work. The most skillfully designed national security system will fail utterly when it is not staffed by men and women of great character, intellect, and commitment. More than any other such organization in Washington, the NSC Staff depends upon its people. There are no insulating layers to screen the system from the egocentric, the foolish, and the venal. The President must, therefore, select his APNSA with the knowledge that it should be his most important, and careful, appointment. The APNSA must then select his Staff with equal care, demanding the highest standards of demonstrated competence, intellectual daring, and selfless dedication.

Driven by the demands of the national security system, the National Security Council Staff will continue to occupy a position of prominence into the next century. The President should take it as a task of the first order to design a system that recognizes the functional requisites and the central role the President must exercise in the management of national security. The challenges of the 21st Century demand no less.
Chapter II

1. Throughout this discussion, several abbreviations will be used. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will appear as APNSA. Occasionally, this position will be referred to as the National Security Advisor (NSA) when appropriate. The NSC Staff will often be called the Staff.

2. This is reflected in the composition of the original NSC; of its original seven members, four represented the defense community.


6. Ibid., p. 10.


8. May, pp. 11-12.

9. Ibid., p. 12.

10. Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 3.

11. Ibid.


16. Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 42.


21. Ibid., p. 54.

22. Cited in Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 43.


24. Cutler's role as the Special Assistant is often cited as the model by those who oppose an activist APNSA.


28. "Organizing for National Security," in Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 84. This report of the Jackson Subcommittee has been described as the most comprehensive examination of the NSC system prior to the Tower Commission.


30. Brzezinski, p. 86.

31. Endicott, p. 188.


33. Cited in Endicott, p. 188.

34. Williams, p. 327.

36. Ibid., p. 38.

37. Ibid., p. 39. For the record, it was at the beginning of the Nixon Administration that the “Special” was dropped from the APNSA’s title. Neither Kissinger nor Nixon knew what it meant.


Chapter III


6. Gary Sick, *All Fall Down*, New York, Random House, 1985, p. 209. Sick acknowledges that, upon Vance’s return, he was afforded a special NSC meeting to review the bidding. This was, however, more to soothe Vance’s wounded feelings than to reopen the debate; the President’s mind was already made up.


12. Scowcroft, p. 30, argues that “I think the least of our worries is that we are going to overintegrate our system.”


17. Acheson talks about the “anguish of decision” that is the first responsibility of a President. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, New York, Norton, 1969, p. 733.


22. For example, in late 1981, Ronald Reagan made a policy decision on how to handle Ethiopia’s Marxist leader Mengistu. The State Department desk officer charged with managing U.S.-Ethiopian relations stated in an implementation meeting that the President did not understand the issue and that he was not going to follow the President’s guidance. “After all,” he said, “Ronald Reagan won’t be here after 1984 and I will.”


25. David Aaron, in Korb and Hahn, p. 32.


27. Tower, p. V-3


32. Odeen, in Korb and Hahn, p. 7.

33. Ibid.

34. Aaron, in Korb and Hahn, p. 24.

35. Ibid.


39. Ibid., p. 92.


42. Cited in Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 91.


45. Kissinger, p. 11.

46. Rubin, pp. 142-132.
47. Scowcroft, p. 40.


51. The Policy Planning Staff, established in 1949, is normally not manned by Foreign Service Officers, placing it at a decided disadvantage.


54. Scowcroft, p. 32.

Chapter IV


2. Ibid., p. 9.


8. PD-2 says that the membership of the PRC shall consist of “the statutory members of the NSC and the Assistant for National Security Affairs,” implying that the President and the Vice President are included. This was never done and was obviously never intended.


10. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 59. He says “the PRC met most often under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, occasionally under the Secretary of Defense, and only two or three times under the Secretary of the Treasury.”


12. The distinction is subtle; of the seven important subcommittees in the Nixon Administration, Kissinger chaired six of them, but they were not formally constituted, cabinet-level organizations.


16. Ibid., p. 61.

17. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983, p. 37. There was a nominal effort to change this system when Muskie replaced Vance as Secretary of State, but nothing really came of it.

18. At the mini-SCC, attended by David McGiffert (ASD-ISA) and David Newsome (Under Secretary of State-PA), and with David Aaron in the chair, it was decided to forego the exercise in order to avoid a confrontation with Qaddafhi.


20. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

21. The difficulties in the PRM process are evidenced by the unresponsiveness of the system to a request for a PRM on the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the collapse of the Shah of Iran. Most people agreed with the need for such a study, but nobody wanted to undertake the bureaucratic wrestling match to get one underway.


23. In his memoirs, Haig talks repeatedly about NSDD-1. In fact, NSDD-1 was an innocuous document defining the terms of national security. His proposal would have become NSDD-2.

24. Ed Meese’s briefcase became something of a punchline in the early Reagan years. If an idea or a proposal went “into Meese’s briefcase,” it had been rejected, discarded, or more likely, not understood.


28. Allen was investigated for allegations that he had accepted $1000 from some Japanese reporters for arranging an interview with Nancy Reagan. He was subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing. Somewhat ironically, the $1000 was initially discovered in a safe that was being cleared out for some temporary occupants to use during the AWACS debate in 1981. Among these temporary occupants who found the money was Oliver North.


31. The tremendous frustration of the Staff members in this role cannot be overstated.


39. Coordination is often in the eyes of the beholder. Brzezinski, Brown, and Aaron all contend that the process worked well and that, as the issues became more clearly defined, certain agencies were dropped from the coordination process. Others, such as Muskie and Leslie Gelb argue that Brzezinski dropped the State Department from the coordinating process prematurely and because State had some significant reservations about the issue.
40. The ERW debacle stemmed from the reversal of President Carter's decision to produce and deploy the warheads in Europe. After European leaders, most notably Helmut Schmidt, had spent some political capital in paving the way for the controversial deployments, Carter unilaterally reversed his position, causing great consternation in the Alliance.


42. Cited in Donnelly, p. 22.


44. Carter, PD-2, p. 3.


47. Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 15 January, 1981.


49. Haig, p. 86.


52. Destler, Gelb, and Lake, p. 223.


54. One of the reasons that NSDD-2 does not address crisis management is that it was issued some nine months after NSDD-3, the crisis management document. It would have been somewhat embarrassing to reference NSDD-3 in a document that should have been issued a full year before it was actually promulgated.

55. Vance argued that crisis management "was properly the responsibility of the Secretary of State." Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 62.

56. The term "special situation" was used for two reasons. First, the drafters felt that the group should be able to convene without alarming an ever-attentive media that a crisis was occurring. Second, the drafters felt that the more general term would allow the group to address a wider range of issues than those normally subsumed under the heading of crises.


60. McFarlane, for example, states that the "NSA must occasionally be a policy initiator," clearly indicating the secondary nature of that function. McFarlane, Saunders, and Shull, p. 266.

61. Ibid., p. 262.

62. The first NSSD to be issued was on global strategy. It was entitled NSSD 1-82, rather than NSSD-1, because the drafters felt that it would be embarrassing to admit, through the numbering system, that this was the first NSSD issued by an administration a full year old. By adding the year, it was felt that this would camouflage the problem.

63. Odeen, p. 345.


Chapter V


5. Odeen, p. 9.


10. Ibid., p. 322.

11. Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 296.


13. Haig, p. 60.


15. The Scowcroft NSC Staff in the Bush Administration began at numbers lower than those of the Reagan Administration.

16. Tower, p. V-4


Chapter VI