Threat to the Rear: Real or Myth?

By Glenn K. Otis
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FOREWORD

The concept of using regular and irregular forces against an enemy's soft rear is not new. To be successful against such a threat requires that there be detailed plans, allocated forces and a continuous effort. In this paper, the author carefully traces Soviet use of partisan warfare to help defeat the Germans in World War II. Because the partisan movement succeeded in the Great Patriotic War, we can expect the rear battle will be an important adjunct to future Soviet operations. Though U.S. Army doctrine deals thoroughly with close and deep battle, we have not yet paid enough attention to the battle to be fought in the rear. So far, the doctrine stops short of prescribing the techniques and procedures that would be necessary for success against an organized partisan threat. Perhaps it is time to do so.

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Threat to the Rear: Real or Myth?

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The Paper represents the personal opinions of the author, and should not be taken to represent the views of the Institute of Land Warfare, the Association of the United States Army or its members.

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In 1988 the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) established within its existing organization a new entity known as the Institute of Land Warfare. Its purpose is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the Paper, but does suggest that the AUSA believes this Paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues.
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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army’s current war fighting doctrine is named Airland Battle. It calls for synchronized use of weapons and support systems to fight simultaneously the battles at the front, in the depths of the enemy’s rear area and in our own rear area. We have placed high priority on reconnaissance and surveillance means and on weapons with greater lethality at longer ranges, all of which directly affect our capability to wage the close-in battle and the deep battle against the enemy rear. But what about the battle in our own rear? Have we done enough about weapons, equipment, force structure, and doctrine to fight and win this dirty war? Or perhaps we are not concerned as to the size and importance of the threat to our rear areas — ?

The Great Patriotic War (World War II in Soviet parlance) provides a reservoir of “lessons learned” for the Soviet Military Forces. Forty-five years after the war, yet that war is still the single greatest event influencing Soviet military thought. So, it is both prudent and reasonable for us to review World War II and thereby to gain an insight to contemporary Soviet military thinking. Specifically, we orient on those things which point toward Soviet actions against its enemies’ rear areas. Moreover, since most Communist states in the world procure Soviet equipment and follow the Soviet lead for battle doctrine, clearly, this should provide a bright spotlight for enemy threats beyond that of solely the USSR.

Digging back in history to the 1940’s, an incredible story unfolds. Based on in-depth research and evidence from firsthand sources, the mosaic of a massive Soviet partisan movement building up in the German rear area emerges. Guided by the Soviet hierarchy, resupplied by Moscow, and even visited by the Soviet high command, the Russian partisan movement in World War II grew to a quarter of a million members. At one point in time this huge guerrilla Army forced the hard-pressed Germans to use up to 25 Divisions — which they could ill-afford — against this sustained rear area threat. The Germans looked at it seemingly as if it were a "war within a war." The USSR, on the other hand, knew that the battle in the German rear was a force multiplier because it drained fighting strength from the Germans when it was sorely needed by them at the front. There is no doubt that the Russian partisan movement in the German rear areas was not the decisive force leading to German defeat. There is equally no doubt that this orchestrated guerrilla movement was a significant aid to front line Russian commanders. Some of that story is pieced together here.

Learn from the errors of the past or be doomed to repeat them — a paraphrase from George Santayana. On the other hand, the devils advocate says that “the military” (who are they?) are always preparing to fight the last war instead of seeking to be ready for the next. The proper course is to understand the lessons of past wars and then apply that knowledge to the future with due consideration for changes in technology and the other accoutrements of war. Easily said — not so easily done.
The account that follows is a case in point. One great “lesson” from World War II hasn’t received much attention. Yet, the rear area partisans operating under Soviet direction against the mighty German war machine turned out to be a significant combat multiplier. There’s a message here which the U.S. — indeed the Western nations — needs to heed. Have we done so? Are we prepared? Let’s see.

Germany Invades Russia

German armies invaded Russia at 0300 hours on 22 June 1941 according to a detailed and rehearsed plan of operations.1/ For over three years, until July 1944, German forces battled the Russians on their own soil; and since then, these battles have received the attention of military historians probably to a greater extent than those of any other campaign in history. The strategy and tactics of both combatants have provided many valuable lessons to the student of military history. It is not our purpose here, however, to review the front line tactics of the major forces fighting the campaign; but rather it is to analyze the Russian partisan movement that grew in the German army rear areas. From this analysis several important features emerge: the size of the rear area threat; the methods used to combat the irregular forces operations; the impact of the partisan rear area actions on the major front line plans; and, most important, those factors which were present in 1941 to 1944 and which may be present again today or tomorrow in a conflict with Soviet or Soviet supported forces.

It will be necessary to refer frequently to the major actions between Germany and Russia at the front. Consequently, we outline both the operations plan for the invasion of Russia and the highlights of the offensive and defensive battles fought during the three-year period. In addition, certain aspects of the geography of western Russia significantly affected the partisan movement. Therefore, occasional terrain descriptions will be made where it seems appropriate.

The primary source materials are translations of captured German Army records together with the reports prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Government. These reports involved interrogation of hundreds of German Army prisoners of war, Russian prisoners of the Germans, and Russian partisans captured by the Germans.
The western border area of Russia can be loosely divided into three sectors from South to North: the Ukraine, White Russia (or Bellorussia), and the Baltic States (Map A). The Ukraine area, extending from the Black Sea to the Pripyat River located in the dense Pripyat marshes, is the “breadbasket” of Russia. It is characterized by broad unforested steppes and a generally poor road and rail net. White Russia on the other hand, has a better road and rail net and is astride the invasion route that leads most directly to Moscow. The northern area with Leningrad as both the principal industrial center and the communications center, lies on the path of any route to seize the critical Russian port city of Archangel. It was to these three broad sectors that the German Army High Command devoted its attention in “BARBAROSA,” the code name for Directive 21 which ordered the invasion of Russia.

**War at the Front**

The final plan for Operation “BARBAROSA” envisioned a single envelopment in the north aimed at Leningrad; a double envelopment in the center directed first at Minsk, then Smolensk; and double envelopments in the south to seize Kiev initially, then the Dnieper Bend and hence to isolate the Ukraine. It was recognized that swift thrusts to penetrate the Russian defenses were essential. This would allow the numerically inferior German armies to cut off the Russians in Eastern Europe, deny them the chance to prepare defensive lines within European Russia, cause the Russians to fight to the rear, and provide the Germans the best opportunity for a rapid seizure of Moscow (Map B).

To implement “BARBAROSA” the Germans assigned three army groups corresponding to the three geographic areas already mentioned: Army Group North with twenty-nine divisions, Army Group Center with fifty-one divisions, and Army Group South with thirty-eight divisions, leaving twenty-four divisions in reserve. Thirty-three divisions would come from Finland and Rumania to bring the total to 175 divisions for the start of the campaign. As already noted, the invasion began on 22 June 1941. By 5 December 1941 the German offensive had carried from Leningrad in the north to Moscow in the center and to Rostov in the south. However, these three key cities were still in Russian hands, and the German offensive was nearly out of breath (Map C). At this time the rear of each of the three German Army Groups was deep within European Russia, and lines of communication were both highly vulnerable and difficult to protect.

With this cursory treatment of the planning and first operational phase of the German eastern front campaign, let’s turn to the rear areas where a “front within a front” was forming, and record in more detail the rear area actions occurring there.

**Uprising in the Rear**

It should be clear at the outset that neither the rise of the partisan movement nor its overall effect on the German rear areas was primarily responsible for Germany’s defeat in Russia. However, the contribution that partisan actions made to the overall Russian effort must be appreciated; especially in the light of understanding why the partisan movement occurred, what was its composition, the extent of partisan operations,
and the degree to which these operations influenced the battle in the front. "The Soviet Partisan Movement ... was, in both conception and scope, the greatest irregular resistance movement in the history of warfare".7/

The third of July 1941 marks the beginning of the Russian Partisan Movement. On this date Joseph Stalin outlined the necessity for and the basic objectives of partisan warfare when he stated:

Partisan units, mounted and on foot, must be formed; diversionist groups must be organized to combat the enemy troops, to foment partisan warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores, transports. In the occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his associates. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step and all their measures frustrated.8/

The majority of the people in the German occupied areas of Russia might readily have ignored Stalin's plea for partisan warfare since the Community Party per se had little appeal in the western border regions. Cognizant of this fact, Stalin called upon the individual's love of homeland — his patriotism — as the motivation for action. Evoking sympathetic response by this device, Stalin not only avoided the divisive result of an appeal to the Communist Party but also succeeded in uniting party and non-party members in a common cause. Nevertheless, popular uprising was slow and at times painful. The Red Army, however, was quick to react with instructions and planning guidance for erstwhile partisans. On 20 July the Commander of the Russian Northwest Front, Major General Sobechikov, published a lengthy list of detailed requirements in a document entitled, "Instructions Concerning the Organization and Activity of Partisan Detachments and Diversionist Groups."9/ It is both interesting and important to note that even at this early date influence was brought to bear on the partisans by the Red Army; and, as shall be illustrated, this influence was eventually to extend to direct tactical cooperation. Of further pertinence is the fact that General Sobechikov gave specific instructions for both tactics and organization. Some of his orders shed light on actions to follow and are summarized below:

(1) Operate in forested areas against main lines of communication.

(2) In Red Army occupied areas, the NKVD (People's Commissariat of the Interior) and NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security) offices must organize "destruction battalions" to protect the Red Army rear against enemy airborne troops. If these areas are captured by the Germans, the destruction battalions will remain and become partisans.

(3) Utilize ambushes and raids; destroy railroad and highway bridges, and use horses or foot to stay more mobile than roadbound vehicles would permit.10/
SITUATION ON 5 DECEMBER 1941

MAP C
A Growing Threat

Hence it is true that within the first month of the German invasion, the Soviet hierarchy had ordered both its civilian and military population to resort to irregular warfare behind the German lines. It is also a fact that the Germans had early knowledge of the Russian plans to organize partisan warfare. On 14 July, for example, the Germans captured a document from a Soviet courier whose plane had made a forced landing. The document was en route from the Political Commissar of the Northwest Front intended for Moscow and reported the organization of twenty-two partisan units operating in Luga, Velikiye Luki, and Bologoye areas. Near the end of July in the vicinity of Smolensk, the Germans picked up another Russian document outlining the organization and functions of the previously mentioned destruction battalions. Despite these ominous warnings, the Germans failed to make a decisive move against the partisans during the first three months of operations.

There was Russian partisan activity in all three of the geographic areas of European Russia. However, the nature of the terrain in Bellorussia (the area of operations for German Army Group Center and Russian Army Group West) provides the best breeding ground for irregular warfare; and for this reason we devote most of this investigation to that area. Polotsk, Smolensk, Bryansk, and Minsk became centers of large partisan bands operating both independently and in conjunction with the Red Army. Some partisan actions in the Dnieper Bend area of Army Group South and in the Lake Ilmen area of Army Group North will be described only to show the difference from actions in the Center.

The partisan movement in the rear of Army Group Center grew from three general sources: (1) bypassed Red Army units who avoided capture and organized or joined partisan bands (By the summer of 1942 this element was the largest single increment of partisan strength), (2) Communist Party members who were overrun by attacking German forces or deliberately introduced there, and (3) civilian men and women indigenous to the area of operations who organized and joined the bands as a means of self-preservation or because of their nationalistic convictions. There is some evidence to indicate another category — partisan units trained and created by the Russians during peacetime and then introduced as a nucleus for partisan organizations in an enemy’s rear. This latter is really a part of (1) and (2) above, and may certainly be most significant in the future. In July 1941 when the Germans occupied the Smolensk area, the groundwork for partisan activity had already been laid as noted above by the documents captured by the Germans. At this same time a large part of the Russian 214th Airborne Brigade was infiltrated on foot through the Smolensk front and operated in civilian clothes in the German rear while their commander made several trips back and forth for conferences with Soviet officials. Two more companies of the same brigade were dropped behind the front in mid-August to act as partisans and organize partisan detachments from Red Army stragglers, homeless civilians, and Communist Party sympathizers. The following comments from a captured partisan radio operator illustrate the significance of this part of the early partisan buildup:
After the destruction of the 145th and 149th Divisions in the vicinity of Roslave, many groups of the battered units remained in the forests behind the German front. They were collected near Pochinok by a Captain (Shemov) presumably an officer of the 214th Airborne Brigade and organized into partisan detachments.

The unit with which he is familiar consists of approximately 180-220 men; it is divided into three groups of about sixty men each.

The first group was sent off to be employed in the area south of the Smolensk-Dorogobuzh road. ... The second group to which he himself belonged ... was sent over the Smolensk-Dorogobuzh road to make contact with parachutists who had landed there and to organize partisan units in the Dukhovshchina area (about ten miles northeast of Smolensk) ... The third group went from Pochinok ... to Velizh. ... It is supposed to organize partisan units in the Velizh area and also to establish contact with the numerous partisans of Bellorussi ... .

Each of the above-named groups has two radio transmitters, plus a submachine gun per man, explosives, and hand grenades. Weapons and explosives are dropped by planes with which the groups are in communication. ... The groups themselves do not go into action as complete units but have the assignment of organizing new partisan groups of five to ten men each. ... Basically their immediate assignment is not the committing of acts of sabotage since the result would be that individual units would come to the attention of the German Army. Their assignment is rather the formation of a complete and coherent organization behind the German front. Acts of sabotage ... are undertaken only when they can be done thoroughly and when the group can be certain of escaping capture.

Until the capture of this partisan, continuous radio communication existed among the three groups and with the Soviet Army and planes.

The individual partisans usually work on collective farms in the daytime. The purpose of their work, however, is not to earn bread but to recruit and organize partisan groups and to encourage others in resistance and sabotage.

The population supports the partisans to a very large degree (in weitestgehendem Masse). They supply them (the partisans) with the best provisions, slaughter for them, give them white bread, hide them, and help them on their way.
By October 1941, four months after the German invasion, there are two distinct parts of the partisan picture in the rear of Army Group Center. One scene is exemplified by disorganized pockets of by-passed units and Red Army stragglers. This element is further characterized by vigorous attempts of the Red Army to organize the remnants in order to regain control. The other scene is a conglomeration of homeless refugees and Communist Party members conducting sporadic raids when success seemed assured. Integrated efforts between the retreating Red Army and these partisan forces had not yet been achieved.

Germans React

Now the picture changes. From early October until early December (the time that the German offensive bogged down) the Germans were forced by tactical necessity to begin mopping up actions in the pockets formed as a result of their gigantic pincers which had succeeded in cutting off thousands of Red Army soldiers. In the rear of Army Group Center, a Commander of the Army Group Rear Area Center was responsible for security of the rear, and each Army within the Army Group had a Commander of the Rear. Regularly assigned "security divisions" were provided to each Army Group Rear Commander. A security division had actually the approximate strength of a reinforced regiment and was normally further assigned to the Army rear area. Early in a campaign, additional combat forces would be attached to the rear commands for mopping up actions, then moved up to the front again as the tactical situation dictated. Thus, when German orders were issued on 10 October 1941 to clear the pockets behind Army Group Center, several divisions were assigned to the rear area commands at Army level. The clearing actions by these divisions were largely successful in that they were able to capture thousands of Red Army soldiers and force the remainder, as well as the small partisan bands, deep into the forests and swamps which were prevalent in the area. For examples of the results, the 255th (GE) Division reported 2,236 prisoners by 28 October and 1,294 others by 17 November. The 137th Division, meanwhile, reported a total of 15,200 prisoners in their operations. Moreover, Army rear area commanders reported little or no partisan activity during this period. However, the situation at the front was not progressing according to German plans; and more fighting divisions were needed there. Therefore, despite reports by the rear area commanders which indicated that there were still many significant pockets of Russians remaining, combat units were called back to the front leaving only small, second-rate units for security in the rear.

Thus, another scene emerges in the rear of the German armies during October and November: concentrated German actions to eliminate Russian pockets resulting in some success but coupled with a retreat into hiding of sizeable numbers of partisans and potential partisans; a period of little actual partisan activity and certainly none that directly affected the war effort at the front. There is, however, an ominous note present in the situation. With the remnants of the Red Army taking refuge in the abundant forests and swamps in the area, the opportunity was created for organizing and equipping, for planning and preparing what was to become a "front within the front." A German security division in the rear of Army Group Center submitted this report on 4 December reflecting its evaluation of partisan actions for the month of November:
Partisan activity consisted exclusively of raids on villages for provisions and winter clothing and of construction of winter shelters. Planned attacks on individual vehicles of the armed forces or guards of the billets did not occur. There were few instances of sabotage — interruptions of telephone communications exclusively. On the other hand, it has been established that the partisans now attempt to terrorize all Russians who collaborate with the (German) troops, e.g., members of the indigenous auxiliary police, mayors, (kolkhoz) collective farm chairmen. The partisans took part in actual combat only when they were attacked and could no longer avoid it.23/

As 1941 drew to a close and as the German offensive ground to a halt, a new phase of the invasion occurs, and with it, a new phase of partisan activity. At this point we return to the front and review the campaigns there before continuing the assessment of partisan activities in the rear.
SITUATION IN MID-JANUARY 1942

MAP D
THE GROWTH OF PARTISAN WARFARE - JANUARY TO JUNE 1942

War at the Front

The situation at the front on 5 December 1941 marks the depth of the German penetration into Russia (Map C). The Russians still held Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov on the Sea of Azov. The Russian armies had been falling back on shorter and shorter lines of communication while the German Army was spread over a much extended front with nearly 1,000 miles of its lines of communication located in enemy territory. German reserve forces were now cut to a meager handful, and the Russian winter with temperatures as low as -50 degrees fahrenheit played havoc with poorly-prepared men and equipment. Under these conditions, and utilizing their large reserve of manpower (albeit untrained), the Russians launched a winter offensive. The offensive began with thrusts from Moscow and grew into a general offensive all along the front. Realizing initial success, the Russians pushed hard against stubborn, nearly fanatical, German defenses. By February, the Russian attack had run its course, and the front became relatively stable from March until late June as both opponents tried to recover from the heavy losses they had sustained due to battle and weather (Map D). German Army Group Center consisted of six armies: Ninth, Third Panzer, Fourth Panzer, Fourth, Second Panzer, and Second situated from north to south. It is in this sector that partisan activity once again becomes most significant.

War in the Rear

While the German armies faced what they estimated to be approximately four-and-a-half-million Russians along the front, they also began to feel that "fear and hatred inspire the Russian only to fight with courage of despair." Meanwhile, the buildup of partisan strength in the rear was becoming alarming. Reports from the Commander of the Rear Area of Fourth Army indicated tremendous growth of partisan activity in his area during the period 23 February to 8 March 1942. Two deserters from the partisans interrogated by the Germans confirmed that Red Army parachutists were being dropped to organize partisan resistance. By June 1942 a type of organization had emerged. The partisans were formed into detachments and the detachments into brigades (or regiments depending upon the accuracy of the translations used from Russian to German then to English). At any rate, a detachment consisted of from thirty to 150 men while a brigade usually controlled several detachments resulting in a brigade strength of 1,000 to 1,500 men. In many instances smaller elements operated as teams without much higher echelon control. In general, partisan organizations and strength varied with the area, the German efforts to eliminate the partisans in a particular sector, and the local leaders. A reliable report of overall partisan strengths shows that from a total of 30,000 on 1 January 1942, the partisan movement grew to about 150,000 members by the summer of 1942. In some areas this strength was sufficient to challenge the rather meager German rear area forces; in other places the partisans resorted entirely to guerrilla warfare. In the rear of Army Group Center, examples of both of these type actions occurred.
The rear of the German Fourth Army lay astride the rail line from Smolensk southeast to Bryansk. Much of the partisan activity was centered on the nearly 150 miles of railway. East of Smolensk lay Yelna and Dorogobuzh. On 15 February the partisans captured Yelna isolating a German garrison there. On 13 March the partisans occupied Dorogobuzh. These actions cut major lines of communication between Army Group Center rear, Fourth Army rear, and the front. Weak attempts by rear area commanders to eliminate partisan pockets were unsuccessful and resulted in the German Army High Command ordering major forces to be diverted from the front to rear area security. Even these forces (required from 19 March 1942 until late May) were able to regain only parts of this area, and at the expense of many casualties.31/

There were several partisan regiments operating throughout the rear of Army Group Center. Chart 1 illustrates the organization of one of these regiments, the Shabo Regiment (named for its commander). The strength of the Shabo Regiment reached approximately 1,000 by May 1942 and was still growing at the end of June 1942. There were many other regiments of varying sizes operating in this area, but the Shabo is a typical one.32/ From the foregoing account, it is apparent that the partisans in the Yelna area were organized along conventional military lines and were extremely effective.

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Chart 1. - Organization of the Identified Units of the Partisan Regiment Shabo
A rather different type partisan action played havoc with the Second Panzer Army farther south in the Bryansk area. Here, smaller partisan bands attacked lines of communication, ambushed trains and motor vehicles, and meted out punishments to civilians suspected of collaborating with the Germans. These actions demonstrated to the indigenous population the inability of the Germans to cope with the partisan bands. In one instance, the partisans literally annihilated a German engineer battalion by derailing the battalion’s troop train west of Bryansk and killing the dazed survivors of the wreck. Sabotage raids on German installations and convoys and attacks on railroads and highways were a constant source of irritation to the Germans. Only fifteen miles east of Bryansk, a railway construction company was repairing rails blown out by the partisans. When the Germans sent a patrol to reestablish contact with the construction company, the entire repair crew was found dead due to partisan attack. German concern began to mount. The Spring of 1942 was approaching and with it the thaws which turn roads into impassable quagmires. Under this condition, the German armies would become more critically dependent upon the railroads for resupply and troop movements. So, it was of no little concern to the commanders of the rear areas that partisan activity was increasing and their actions becoming bolder and more costly to the German campaign.

Farther east and deeper in the rear of Army Group Center lay the Polotsk lowlands. Here, too, the partisan bands were active. Beginning in March 1942 and rapidly increasing each month, partisan attacks against the railroads soon became significantly dangerous to the Germans. Then, on 1 May 1942, Stalin issued an order calling for even more partisan attacks on transportation and communication facilities (apparently to aid in hindering the forthcoming German summer offensive). The partisan reaction to this message was quickly felt by the Germans.
Partisan Tactics and Effects

It is clear, now, that the birth of the partisan movement occurred during the period July to December 1941. From December 1941 to the beginning of the German summer offensive on 28 June 1942, the partisans tested their strength, gained experience, and grew in stature. Yet, the results attained by the partisans during these periods of birth and growth were hardly more than harassments to the German war machine. During the next two years, however, from June 1942 until the major Russian offensive on 23 June 1944, the partisan movement reached maturity. The partisans played a part in Soviet strategy, interfered with German operations, and caused the Germans to commit major forces in anti-guerrilla operations. The accounts to follow will serve to determine the limitations as well as the successes of the partisan movement during these two years. In this segment of the assessment we adopt a slightly different approach. Instead of a chronological presentation of the actions at the front followed by an account of the partisan actions in the rear areas, the front and the rear will be treated concurrently. The emphasis, of course, will be on partisan actions. Only necessary references will be made to the war at the front, since operations conducted there are no longer so essential in understanding the war in the rear.

The Germans launched a summer offensive in June 1942. The Russians anticipated such a move well in advance and ordered an increase in partisan activity. In the Ukraine, between Kiev and Kursk, partisans increased attacks against rail lines. In the northern sector (Baltic) partisans attacked rail and highway bridges, small German Army detachments and military installations. In the rear of Sixteenth Army, for example, thirty switches, twenty locomotives, and 113 railroad cars were destroyed; while rails were broken in eighty-four places causing 1,129 hours of interrupted service. All this occurred in the three month period 1 May to 31 July 1942.

In the vicinity of Smolensk, the area of Army Group Center, an example of partisan activity is furnished by a document captured from the regiment operating there. Armed with weapons and equipment hidden by the Red Army as it retreated from this area in 1941, the Grishin Regiment reported killing over 2,700 Germans, destroying 182 vehicles, derailing twenty-seven trains, and mounting several other types of actions during the period April to November 1942. Despite the number of attacks made and amount of damage inflicted, evidence indicates that the partisans did not directly influence the tactical situation. On the other hand, the more than one-thousand partisan actions conducted in the rear of the Second Panzer Army between May and October 1942 resulted in assignment of another security division to this area indicating that partisan activity was certainly significant. The partisans were also of high value in obtaining intelligence for the Red Army. There are numerous examples of transmissions of intelligence reports on German movements and locations by the partisans to the Red Army. Another example of partisan activity occurred in the vicinity of Vitebsk. Here was a thinly held area in the German lines which the partisans attacked causing it to become a corridor to the German rear. Partisans actually kept this corridor open until the Spring of 1943. During the Fall of 1942 partisan strengths continued to grow and their activities increased. In October a partisan unit destroyed twelve miles of track in the vicinity of Bryansk by
simultaneously attacking all the guard details, blowing the track in 178 different points, and “demolishing some 2,400 continuous sections of trackage.” The partisan strength behind the Second Panzer Army in the Bransk area was estimated at 19,000 men in November 1942.

During the period from late Fall 1942 until the Spring of 1943 a reorganization and rebuilding of the partisan movement was accomplished. The purpose was two-fold: first, to bring the movement under more direct and integrated control as a Soviet auxiliary force; and, second, to put new leadership into an organization which had lost much of its initial Red Army leaders as a result of German anti-partisan actions. Nevertheless, partisan attacks continued. While the Russian Air Force bombed the supply lines, the partisans cooperated by attacking supply dumps and bridges. In March 1943, a double span railroad bridge across the Desna river southwest of Bryansk was destroyed when the partisans made a night attack on the platoon guarding the bridge. Loss of this key bridge blocked the main line to all traffic for five days.

The Chief of Transportation, Army Group Center, reported 1,392 incidents for August 1943, and complained bitterly that a 600-man Russian security detachment went over to the partisans. These actions were typical of those experienced within the entire rear area of the German Army.

When the Germans launched their short-lived offensive on 5 July 1943, the bands once again made their contribution. On 22 July partisan action on the north-south rail line through Bryansk blocked traffic for forty-eight hours. Two ammunition trains, a fuel train, and a trainload of critical “Tiger” tanks were destroyed between Minsk and Gomel. The strongest attack of this period occurred on the night of 2-3 August when 10,900 demolition charges and mines were set on the rail lines of the central sector. Throughout September partisan pressure continued and was directed primarily against rail lines, roads, and bridges. Pressure was also applied against supply dumps, communication facilities and individuals who dared to collaborate with the Germans. Attacks were planned to coincide with Russian advances and German withdrawals, and caused extremely critical situations in the rear of Army Group Center which was still the area of primary partisan concentration. After a lull in October, partisan activity increased again in November and December. The estimated partisan strength at this time, December, 1943, was placed at 200,000 men and would decline to about 150,000 by June 1944.

Throughout this investigation, the rear of Army Group Center has been the focal point of greatest partisan activities. During the period January 1944 to June 1944, however, a significant increase in guerrilla warfare occurred in the rear of both Army Group North and Army Group South. The rear of Eighteenth Army, part of Army Group North, reported partisan attacks against railroads and lines of communication. Strong Russian Army attacks against the front lines forced the Germans to move security divisions from the rear areas to the front. The weakened German rear area forces permitted the partisans to mass in sufficient strength to attack German reserves and hinder their movement. As a result, partisan activities in the rear of Army Group North “played particular havoc with all operational and logistical movement in the whole army area.” In the south, the increased guerrilla effort was neither so great nor so effective; but it nevertheless hindered German lines of communication. By May and June the partisans concentrated on reconnaissance and intelligence activities. They operated with Soviet strategic intelligence teams who forwarded the information to the Soviets directly or through the partisan radio net.
In the Summer of 1944, the Soviets were prepared to launch their offensive designed to break the back of the German occupation. Through direct contact with the partisans, coordinated plans had been prepared and orders issued. The great blow came on the night of 19-20 June when partisans set off 9,600 demolitions on rail lines. When the Soviets launched their main attack on 23 June, the partisans aided the effort by hitting specific targets and finally by joining Red Army units as the partisan areas were uncovered by the attacking Soviets. When the Soviet forces reached the western borders of Russia, partisan activity as such had completed its course.

German Counter-Measures

This account of partisan activity has been concerned chiefly with the actions of the bands and their cooperation with the Red Army. Little space has been devoted to the German efforts to counter the guerrillas; yet, several important lessons are to be learned from their successes and failures in these operations. At the outset, the Germans failed to plan properly for the contingency that they certainly knew existed. Then, when it became known that the partisan movement was beginning (as early as July 1941), the Germans apparently still felt that the speed with which they would conquer Russia would negate any concern over direct partisan action. Rear area security was treated as a function of logistics, and the established security divisions received their operational directives from Gen Qu (Army Chief of Supply and Administration). Gen Qu was responsible for supply, security of lines of communication and military government in areas behind the Army. Hitler’s early reaction to Stalin’s call for partisan warfare was: “This partisan warfare also has its advantages: it gives us the opportunity to... exterminate ... all who oppose us.” As a result, “throughout 1941 the German High Command thought only in terms of intensifying terror, which was directed not against the partisans but against the population as a prophylactic measure.” Captured and occupied territory was to be administered and exploited only for the purpose of supplying the German armies and the German nation. Therefore, even though initially “the local inhabitants were generally cooperative everywhere,” and primarily wanted to get back to peaceful living under German occupation, the harsh treatment they received quickly turned them against the Germans. Due largely to this ill-conceived and extremely harsh policy, the Germans created a breeding ground for a seething partisan uprising.

During the Fall of 1941, some offensive anti-partisan operations were initiated by the Germans (earlier German actions were defensive in nature). In the Ukraine, the 1st SS Brigade moved against the partisans in the Dnieper Bend, but they were relieved by the 444th Security Division and called to the front before the job was done. These actions resulted finally in clearing a pocket of some 350 partisans, but it required seven battalions to do the job. In March 1942, in the Yelna area, the 707th Infantry Division was committed against a partisan concentration. It killed 3,500 people, of which the minority were actually partisans, and left the area as a permanent seat of hatred against the Germans. Operation “Munich” consisted of three divisions under a corps headquarters supported by air and took nearly two months to open up the Yelna-Dorogobuzh area. In May 1942, Operation “Vogelsgang” in the northern area was conducted by two infantry regiments and one armored regiment. This operation succeeded in killing or capturing over 1,600 partisans, of a total of approximately 2,500. As a result, it was successful from one point of view. However, by May 1943 it was necessary to mount
Operation “Freischuetz” with two divisions and two regimental combat teams in this same area. The results of “Freischuetz” were the death or capture of 2,000 of the 3,000 partisans. Back in the southern sector behind Army Group Center, a number of large-scale anti-partisan operations were conducted. The most notable of these, “Nachbarlife,” by two division-sized task forces, lasted one month and succeeded in breaking up the bands in the area and destroying or capturing nearly 1,000 partisans. The largest anti-partisan operation in the Bryansk area, “Zigeunerbaron”, lasted three weeks in May-June 1943 and utilized six German divisions.

These large-scale German anti-partisan operations did much to neutralize the partisan effort in the rear, but this was accomplished only by using large numbers of front-line forces sorely needed in the actual combat zone. For example, a reliable estimate of German manpower figures indicates that in 1943 and 1944 there were between 200,000 and 250,000 security forces in the German rear. Clearly, then, the partisan movement in the German rear was a force that exerted a significant effect upon the war in Russia.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

There are some other interesting aspects of the partisan movement which shed light on the extent of Soviet support for this type of warfare and the reciprocal. The use of airpower, a precious resource, is itself an indicator of the priority the Soviets placed on partisan operations. Already mentioned was the use of air to drop “organizers” behind the German lines to establish a military or para-military organization. Besides this, the Soviets resorted to aerial resupply of the partisans in many areas. They brought in food, weapons, ammunition and medical supplies, and brought out casualties, intelligence information and leaders (to attend conferences and training schools in the rear). Planes were used to supply propaganda to the partisans aimed at the partisans themselves, at the civilian population and at the German forces (including collaborators). The morale factor of air support to the partisans and to the civilians of the occupied countries should not be underestimated, especially during the period of Russian defeats and withdrawals. The payoff for this kind of support has to be measured by the results achieved. As noted earlier, partisans lived in forests and swamps and hence were able frequently to deny the planned use by the Germans of critically needed lumber. Further, partisan “requisitions” on the local economy for food forced the Germans to import this essential rather than to depend on local procurement. Finally, the political influence of the partisans must be noted. Nearly every partisan band had its political officer (Politruk). By keeping party ideology alive within the band, as well as by fighting as a band member, the Politruk accomplished an important task even though the number of actual Communist Party members was a small minority of most bands. In addition, special training camps for partisans (begun in August 1941) played a role in the political indoctrination of their students.

This investigation of anti-partisan operations should not overlook two anti-partisan organizations supported and fostered by the Germans. One of these, the Kaminsky Brigade, achieved some early success but eventually ended in failure. The other, the Vlasov Movement, failed to get off the ground because the Germans distrusted its use; yet it might have produced significant results.

The Kaminsky Brigade began as an ambitious venture by a dissatisfied leader, Voskoboinikov, located in Lokot’ in the Bryansk area. After his area was occupied by the Germans in 1941, Voskoboinikov became leader of a “police force” with tacit approval of the local German commander. Since he was an avowed anti-Communist, Voskoboinikov fought against the partisan movement in his area. Killed in action on 7 January 1942, he was succeeded by Kaminsky, an anti-Bolshevik. By October 1943, Kaminsky, who controlled 6,000 soldiers and 25,000 civilians, was moved by the Germans to a partisan-held area in the vicinity of Lepel’. The Kaminsky Brigade was given a military mission in this new area. In Lokot’ the Brigade had been a significant help to the Germans in keeping the area relatively free of partisans. At Lepel’, however, the harsh policies and looting of the Brigade alienated the population and made the Kaminskys less than effective for the Germans. With the Russian advance in 1944, Kaminsky was moved to quell an uprising in Warsaw, Poland. His ruthlessness there was so great that he was murdered by the Germans and his brigade disbanded. Thus ended what was for a time a valuable anti-partisan rear area aid to the Germans.
Unlike the Kaminsky Brigade, the Vlasov Movement amounted to little more than a propaganda campaign aimed at the partisans by the Germans and with questionable results. General Andrei Vlasov of the Red Army was well-known for his agricultural reforms and in 1941 for his part in the defense of Moscow. Captured in July 1942, he used his name on propaganda leaflets issued by the Germans to aid in combatting the partisans. He also made appearances in partisan-infested areas on behalf of the Germans. By 1944 Vlasov was put in charge of all captured Russian troops who were willing to fight on the German side (Vlasov Army). But by this time, earlier German reluctance to make such a move had negated whatever value this concept might have had if it had been employed sooner. The Germans erred in their utilization of potential resources much as they had done previously in their administration of occupation policies.

What we have uncovered to this point can be summarized in four categories: (1) the cause of the rise of the partisan movement and its missions; (2) partisan tactics and cooperation with the Red Army; (3) the effects of the partisan movement on the campaign; and (4) the anti-partisan measures employed by the Germans.

Rise of the Partisan Movement - Its Missions

It is clear that partisan warfare was planned in advance by the Soviets as a part of their overall strategy. It is equally clear that ill-conceived German occupation policies were a significant factor leading to the size and extent of the partisan movement. Even with the use of trained Red Army organizers dropped into the German rear, the natural tendency of the population to return to peaceful pursuits would have greatly reduced the numbers who went into the ranks of the partisans. However, Stalin's appeal to Russian love of land and country, reinforced by the desire for self-preservation and a growing hatred of the tyrannical invader, induced thousands of Russians to resort to guerrilla warfare. The large numbers of Red Army troops cut off in the German rear were also a significant early factor that swelled partisan ranks and provided a competent nucleus for leadership as well as for training in irregular warfare. Soviet partisan schools played their part in contributing to the rise and organization of irregular bands. After the partisans had formed and could begin raids for reasons other than supporting themselves, they were assigned missions: procure intelligence for the Red Army; attack German lines of communication, installations and even German forces; and discourage collaboration with the Germans. Several effects resulted from the execution of these missions, a discussion of which is presented below.

Partisan Tactics and Red Army Cooperation

The tactics used by partisans varied from all-out conventional attacks on German units (such as those in the Vitebsk Corridor) to small unit ambushes on routes of supply. Organizations like the Grishin Regiment were capable of defending villages such as Yelna and Dorogobuzh which made it necessary for the Germans to employ sizeable forces to dislodge them. On the other hand, it is quite apparent that by far the bulk of partisan tactics amounted to mobile forces hitting critical areas by surprise, overcoming the guards, carrying out their assigned task of destruction, then melting quickly into forests and swamps. The open terrain in the southern sector together with the relatively small and ineffective partisan activity there tend to emphasize the large part that
favorable terrain plays on partisan warfare. The night raid, the ambush, demolitions exploding in several areas at once, key bridges blown up and terrorism: these are the tactics of irregulars today and were the tactics of Red partisans during 1941 to 1944.

Of even greater significance, however, was the cooperation by partisans with the Red Army. It has been shown that the Red Army provided organizers and leadership for the movement. Directives were issued by the Red Army and later by the Soviet Partisan High Command behind the Soviet lines. Training schools were set up and even manuals printed to aid the partisan movement. Soviet airpower was diverted to aid the partisans, and the partisans in turn provided the Red Army with a great amount of valuable intelligence. The massive attacks against German rail movement coinciding with Russian Army offensives in 1943 and 1944 point up once more the cooperation between the conventional and unconventional forces. It is evident, then, that there was a significant amount of coordinated action directed by the Soviet High Command which produced a direct link between the front and the “front behind the front.”

The Effects of the Partisan on the Campaign

The effects of partisan warfare on the campaign are not so readily susceptible to summary as one might expect. Statistics on manpower used by the Germans to combat the menace, and other statistics on the size of the movement itself all must be qualified by their source and its accuracy. Moreover, statistics alone are not always a valid measure of effectiveness. For example, Capt. N. Galay (an extremely reliable source) concludes that there were fifteen German field divisions, ten security divisions, twenty-seven police regiments, and 144 police battalions employed by the Germans against the partisans in the autumn of 1942. He further points out that twenty-five field divisions of the Axis Powers were likewise employed in the autumn of 1943 (this number represents 10% of the 257 divisions belonging to the Axis Powers on the eastern front). This investigation has already shown that between 200,000 and 250,000 security forces were used by the Germans in 1943 and 1944 to attempt to secure their rear areas. We conclude, therefore, that one effect of the partisan movement was to require employment of large forces to combat its menace. In the same light, the fact that the partisan movement reached a strength of nearly 250,000 during its height is prima facie evidence of a requirement for a large counter-force.

The disruptive effects of partisan actions against communications and means of transportation are also not easily measured, but certainly this was a significant result of partisan activities. Germany was required to expend a huge amount of resources to keep its lines of communications open. For example, all railway road beds were cleared of forest and crops to a distance of 300 yards on either side and wooden guard towers were spaced along the cleared area every 400 to 600 yards. If one considers only the labor and materials necessary to accomplish this (not to mention security forces for all installations and railroad repair crews with necessary materials) then it becomes evident that partisan efforts resulted in an enormous manpower drain on the resources available to the Germans. Yet, of even greater impact was the slowing and even halting of the great supply line from Germany to the Eastern Front. One cannot refer to a particular battle and claim that partisan action was responsible for its outcome; but a great degree of flexibility was certainly denied to the German High Command by the extent to which their supply and communications lines were disrupted by guerrilla actions.
Another particularly elusive quantity is the measure of partisan intelligence efforts. In the early stages of the movement, information about the German rear and troop movements served primarily as an aid to the partisans themselves. Later, as the Russian Army was able to move from a delaying and defensive posture to an attacking posture, the information relayed to the Soviets by the partisans assumed greater importance. Information of major troop movements to and from the front or laterally, and of large supply buildups were valuable additions to Soviet intelligence. Then, by late 1943 and throughout 1944, partisans acted to provide a base of operations and a communications link for trained Soviet intelligence agents. Once again, without alleging that the outcome of the campaign depended on partisan intelligence work, it is nevertheless certain that their efforts in this respect were a significant contribution to Red Army operations.

There were spin-off benefits to the Soviets which resulted from the mere existence of rear area enemy forces. The strength of the bands in some areas took a potential labor source away from the Germans. In addition, because the partisans were in many cases supported by the general population, people were not amenable to German occupation which in turn required larger village occupation forces and a resulting greater drain on German manpower. It has also been shown that the partisans resorted to terrorizing any erstwhile collaborators which undoubtedly discouraged many from indulging in this pursuit. Additionally, the partisans, by their presence in large numbers, denied raw materials such as lumber, foodstuffs and grain to the Germans forcing the enemy to resort to import rather than local procurement.

Although the benefits were many, partisan forces also entailed burdens. The Russians were forced to divert men and supplies in significant quantities to organize, train, equip, and maintain the partisan bands. The use of Russian airpower in logistic support to partisan organizations represented a diversion of this important military resource from the struggle at the front. A most important thought, however, is this: if the partisan movement had a strength of nearly 200,000 at one time, why is it not possible to show that this large “army” was responsible for winning an important battle by direct military action in conjunction with the Front? A discussion of this question would necessitate an investigation of the psychosocial factors of the people involved, a project beyond the scope of this paper. But it is safe to say that a force of the size known to have existed in the German rear certainly had a greater military potential than was demonstrated by the partisans. Consequently, we conclude that the partisan movement as a military force did not achieve the significant results it could have.

**German Anti-Partisan Measures**

The last area of prime interest is that of German counter-measures to combat the guerrillas in the rear. The first attempt, i.e., a harsh occupation policy of intimidation and terror, served to alienate the population of occupied Russia. Instead of becoming an anti-partisan measure, German occupation policy helped to drive the villagers into the forests and swamps to avoid German depredations. Once away from their homes, people found it a matter of self-preservation to form or join bands and eventually to become partisans. The Germans then turned to a defensive policy of local installation protection and the use of military forces called security divisions. However, security divisions were most often formed of individuals who were unfit for the rigors of front-line service. It was soon discovered that security divisions were less than adequate in most areas. Eventually, rear area commanders had to be allocated front-line combat forces especially trained for
guerrilla fighting. Finally, the German Army and Army Group Commanders were forced to mount large-scale operations, such as “Freischuetz” and “Nachbarhilfe,” in order to destroy and disperse the partisan bands. These latter operations met with some success and managed to neutralize the partisan menace in the areas concerned for some time thereafter. Local successes were realized by such activities as the Kaminsky Brigade and by “Vlasov’s Army”; but these measures were not exploited fully by the Germans, and hence they failed to attain the proportions they might have. German efforts aimed at the partisan movement were thus primarily defensive, often costly in men and materials, and only occasionally successful. As a whole they did help to prevent a more successful employment of this auxiliary by the Soviets.
LOOKING AHEAD

Since 1945 military organizations, doctrine and equipment have changed dramatically. Great leaps have been made in mechanization; the helicopter has become an important part of the force; anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles are available in large numbers; and sophisticated aircraft can now carry enormous loads of a variety of munitions at supersonic speeds and for relatively long ranges. Nevertheless, the lessons of World War II are still relevant, so long as they are interpreted in the light of today’s capabilities. It is clear from open Soviet sources that military thought in the USSR is attuned to exactly this notion. One such lesson is the vulnerability of an enemy’s rear area. The Soviets see an opportunity here and have prepared to exploit the vulnerability with both regular and irregular forces.

Regular Forces

Soviet airborne divisions are now a formidable threat. Well-trained and equipped with combat vehicles for ground mobility, each of the seven Soviet airborne divisions is capable of parachuting and air landing deep in enemy rear areas where two of their many missions are of particular interest here: (1) “Disrupt enemy rear area activities and destroy stocks of ammunition and fuel”; (2) “Seize tactical airfields, bridges, and other tactical objectives (nuclear delivery means?).” These airborne missions are not just “paper doctrine”, however, they are a reality. As far back as 1962, Lt. Col. Dobrovolskiy wrote that a Guards company on a training exercise was dropped at night “deep in an enemy’s rear” with the missions of destroying a “control center” and a rocket base. His description of the company’s actions gives an interesting insight to the realistic training being accomplished in this area. The Soviets also plan to use helicopters to introduce troops into enemy rear areas. Garthoff writes, quoting Major General Pokrovsky in Military Herald:

General Pokrovsky declared that the wide use of helicopters ‘will lead in the near future to significant changes in the character of military transport and the tactics of troops operating in the enemy’s rear.’

Once in an enemy’s rear area, it is planned that the airborne force will execute its missions; and then either be picked up, link up with ground forces, or revert to guerrilla warfare if the first two fail. Some airborne units have even been given special guerrilla training. In any event, it appears that “the Russians have already made up their mind that...airborne troops will play the leading part in the rear of the enemy.”

Another tactic of the regular forces which has an enemy’s rear area as its goal is ground infiltration. It was mentioned earlier that the Soviet soldier is adept at infiltration. During World War II, infiltration by regular forces into the German rear was used successfully by the Russians. The more dispersed battlefield of today and the fluid conditions expected to exist will provide a lucrative opportunity for infiltration tactics. During the winter months, and especially in the north, the Soviets are prepared for tactical infiltration. Col. Gorbunov makes generous reference to the infiltration techniques used in World War II; and then says that the “experience of exercises testifies to the fact that in modern conditions the role of small units, operating on skis, not only
has not diminished, but even grew (sic).” He further states that platoons and companies were used for rear area operations. It follows, then, that the Soviets will take advantage of dispersion on the battlefield in order to infiltrate units whose missions lie in the rear areas of the opponent.

There is another technique which the Red Army has used before and plans to employ again: that is, by-passed army units. The German Army’s pincer movements developed large pockets of by-passed Red Army soldiers during World War II, and many of these soldiers became guerrillas when the Germans failed to clear the pockets completely. There is ample evidence to indicate that Soviet soldiers are taught how to operate as guerrillas. The Department of the Army pamphlet on Communist Guerrilla Tactics states that if a Communist Army is beaten it is taught to break up into small groups who then revert to guerrilla warfare. This same concept is stated by Col. Ely, who says:

> The cardinal rule emphasized in the military regulations is that from the smallest unit upward, there must be no retreat. If the surrounded unit can exist no other way, then it must revert to partisan existence.

In assessing the threat to an invader’s rear area by regular Soviet forces other than by major ground force penetrations the conclusions reached indicate three sources: (1) airborne or airmobile units; (2) ground infiltration of small tactical units; and (3) by-passed Soviet ground units. The missions assigned these forces can range from seizure of key terrain to the destruction of lines of communications, nuclear delivery means or supply installations. Although none of these missions is likely to have a decisive effect on the front line battle, any one of them can cause serious disruption for an attacking army. If in addition one were to give the relatively small force the capability of being resupplied by air to accomplish its missions, then the significance of this type of action takes on even greater proportions. There is, however, another aspect of Soviet doctrine which may even more drastically affect the rear areas, and that is the employment of irregular forces.

**Irregular Forces**

The Soviets are also planning and preparing for extensive use of irregular warfare against the rear of an enemy. What follows is offered to substantiate this conclusion on the basis of Soviet sources and military writers of other nations:

Soviet soldiers are taught that the ...guerrillas will organize a second front in the U.S. rear to support the Red Army. On D-day these irregular forces will start unconventional warfare. ... Soviet field manuals and directives to communist parties preach the use of unconventional warfare to the utmost.
Marshal Sokolovskii had this to say:

The military preparation of the population (the preceding in italics) under present conditions is extremely important, and not only to replenish the Armed Forces during war. A militarily trained population can be enlisted in organized combat. ... Moreover, the population in potential military theaters must be ready for determined partisan operations against individual enemy formations invading our territory.

Sokolovskii goes on to say that the general population should be taught as much as possible about modern infantry weapons and the methods of operation of the enemy. Robert F. Delaney, writing for the United States Naval Institute, points out that in the “Sino-Soviet bloc, ambitious training programs have been initiated to instruct the youth and the mass of workers in elements of irregular warfare.” The French Colonel Nemo emphasizes that the place of guerrilla action in war is a choice place. Its rise to such a place, together with the atomic fact, dominates the transformation of war in the present era.

An anonymous “former Soviet-Russian officer,” now living in Germany, asserted that it is certain “in a military clash of major proportions, partisan action would play a far greater role than it did in World War II.” Walter Darnell Jacobs quotes Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov:

In wars of imperialism against the camp of socialism, the creation in the rear of the imperialistic front, where it will be possible, of a ‘partisan front’ will be characteristic.

One of the most significant preparations for irregular warfare is the Soviet expansion of special forces or SPETSNAZ. Hand-picked, specially and very highly trained, and now available in large numbers, SPETSNAZ teams are tailored for warfare against an enemy’s rear. Taught to “go to ground,” they can live in remote parts of an enemy rear area for extended periods. Equipped with high-powered communications equipment, their actions will be coordinated in time and space with Soviet front-line operations. They can be used for intelligence gathering, for raids and ambushes of high-leverage targets, and for assisting in organizing indigenous irregulars. In fact, it is undoubtedly true that SPETZNAZ nuclei are in place in peacetime, prepared to throw off their everyday cover in the event of crisis or war. Estimates on the number of available SPETSNAZ teams vary, but a conservative assessment of 12,000 is not unreasonable.

So the mosaic takes shape and the picture that emerges points to a very real and potent threat. Having learned from their experiences in The Great Patriotic War, the Soviets know that war in the rear is feasible and can be useful. They know that partisan movement of the 1940s was initially a spontaneous reaction upon which they capitalized. However, had the concept been planned and organized from the outset, it might have achieved far greater results. The Soviets realize that changes in warfare over the last five decades have served to increase the vulnerability of an opponent’s rear area. Consequently, the Soviets have laid the groundwork for the next war, if it should come, by planning and organizing what will be a “Front Within a Front” without the errors of the 1940’s.
What About The Non-Soviet World?

To this point we have concerned ourselves with the Soviets and thus with only a part of the world. Since U.S. national interests lie worldwide, what about rear area threats in a non-Soviet theater? Irregular warfare is now — and will be — employed in nearly every modern conflict. South Korea faces infiltrators even in peacetime — how much more so in war? Third world countries use guerrilla tactics as a major conflict measure because it “fits” their force levels and provides an opportunity for a lightly-equipped, unsophisticated army to achieve local successes against a more numerous, better-equipped force.

In addition to selling armaments to Communist nations and many other nonaligned countries throughout the world, the USSR has exported its military doctrine. Officer training institutions in the Soviet Union include large numbers of foreign officers with the result that Soviet doctrine is influencing the military thought of a significant proportion of the nations of the world. We can expect, therefore, that the partisan lessons of World War II have been widely transmitted. The question we need to answer is: are we prepared to meet this potentially large-scale threat to our “soft” rear whether the next conflict occurs in NATO-Europe against the Warsaw Pact, in Korea against the North Koreans, or in some other part of the world where a crisis erupts?

U.S. Response

The U.S. Airland Battle operational level doctrine does not answer the question. Yes, it acknowledges the need for rear area operations in conjunction with front-line and deep battles; but it does not address the forces required, the techniques which can be successful, nor the essential command arrangements to provide effective and sustained counter-guerrilla operations. The sine qua non for countering rear area guerrillas consists of at least these requirements: (1) a well-organized intelligence network; (2) forces trained to fight against irregulars; (3) unity of command.

How do we — the U.S. — stack up against only these three requirements? To visualize the situation, consider Chart 2, a schematic outline of a force laydown in a multi-corps theater. Area A comprises all the terrain from the corps rear boundary to the joint, combined command rear boundary — notionally some 40,000 square kilometers (km). Areas P, Q, R, and S are the corps rears of the four deployed corps. Note also that Q is the rear of a non-U.S. corps. This schematic could be overlaid in Korea, in NATO-Europe, in Southwest Asia, or even in some other land mass. For our purposes here, it is not necessary to develop any greater detail. We do need to agree on these points however:

- The joint-combined force commander has allocated the ground areas — except for area A — to his four corps.
- Intelligence operations are aimed at the forward line of troops (FLOT) and beyond into the depths of the enemy rear.
- There are hundreds of military activities located throughout Area A, nearly all of which are service support. Few of the
combat support organizations are designed for ground combat.

- The combat zone of greatest intensity lies in the region from the division's rear boundary forward to the FLOT and beyond.

- The areas most vulnerable to rear area operations by partisans, guerrillas, and the like are the corps rear areas, P, Q, R, S, and the joint-combined force rear, A.

CHART 2: MULTI-CORPS THEATER OF OPERATION
Rear Area Intelligence

Now let's look at the three fundamental criteria necessary to counter a rear area threat. The first one is intelligence. The U.S. Corps have a wide array of sensors and platforms. The joint-combined force command can request national systems from all involved nations to assist in the collection effort. So the potential information flow about the enemy at the FLOT and into the enemy's depths is great. But what about information on the "enemy" in Areas A, P, Q, R, and S? Here we have a clandestine enemy who hides, moves about in relatively small numbers, rarely stands and fights, avoids contact rather than looks for it, will not show up on an electronic sensor with a label which marks him "partisan" or guerrilla or even enemy. In fact, the intelligence effort against the rear area threat must be quite different from the standard front line collection efforts. Moreover, in the rear areas, our goal is to prevent a rear area threat from occurring rather than fighting one after it matures. Human source intelligence (HUMINT in the vernacular) and perhaps some communications intelligence will probably be the most productive means; but the resources to focus against the rear area threat and the intelligence infrastructure to analyze and produce the finished product must be trained and in place before a full-scale threat develops. Currently, U.S. rear area protection doctrine is oriented toward an overt threat, and principally one that is sporadic — that is, there is an attack by an enemy in our rear; we put together an ad hoc force to reduce the threat; and then we return to a "monitor," wait-and-see status. A full-scale intelligence operation aimed at preventing a threat and sustaining the prevention campaign is not currently envisioned. Moreover, the joint-combined command — which has the largest rear area — is not trained nor equipped to deal with this kind of threat. Its only recourse is to assign the mission to some subordinate headquarters which themselves are not equipped for such sustained operations.102/

Counter Guerrilla Training

The second basic criterion — forces trained to fight against irregulars — is of equal importance to the first. On this point the U.S. is better-prepared. U.S. Army light infantry divisions are being trained to operate in a counter insurgency role. The techniques — doctrine, tactics, procedures — are very similar to what would be needed against the rear area threat such as that portrayed for Areas A, P, Q, R and S in Chart 2. However, training for such a role carries with it the need for proper weapons, rapid transport and all the support measures needed for combat troops. Some of these, like helicopters and artillery, are not assigned to light divisions in sufficient quantity, which means that the joint-combined commander must be prepared to "divert" such resources from front line corps to rear areas. At any rate, the training criterion is being met by selected divisions of the U.S. Army. Armored and mechanized divisions are not so trained — and this means that their utility in a counter guerrilla rear area threat will be less than fully effective if the corps or joint-combined force commanders assign them such a mission.

Unity of Command in the Rear

The third and last sine qua non factor is unity of command, and the issues here are subtle. Referring to Chart 2, it is obvious that the overall commander here is the joint-combined force commander. For operations at the front and deep into the enemy's rear,
the joint-combined force campaign plan will serve to focus the actions of the four corps aimed at a single purpose. But what about the rear areas like Q, R, S and A? Partisans may be “holed-up” in Q but operating only in A with hit-and-run tactics. To deal effectively with such partisans will require a sustained military operation against the “base camps” of the partisans in Q, not just defensive actions in Area A. How is such a handover from the corps commander to the area commander in A (or the reciprocal) made to happen? Will the joint-combined force headquarters staff become day-to-day battle managers against the partisans (a role which they do not assume in the FLOT battle)? If not, how is unity of command achieved throughout the rear areas of the corps and the joint-combined force? The issue here is that partisans will operate without standard boundaries. Their targets will not be at some reasonably well-known FLOT of about 400 km length, but rather their targets will be relatively soft installations scattered throughout the more than 40,000 square km of the rear areas. Clearly, there will be needed an overall counterguerrilla commander with authority to orchestrate an aggressive campaign against the rear area enemy, not hampered by boundaries which serve the front line forces well but which fragment the needed sustained operations against the irregulars. It will take a new look, indeed a different concept of command and control in order to counter effectively a threat in the rear such as was experienced by the Germans during World War II.

Random Thoughts

Since World War II, terrorism, insurgency and low intensity conflict have grown to be the norm for violent responses to political disagreements. During the decade of the 1990's and into the 21st Century there is good reason to believe that this trend will continue. One knowledgeable political - military analyst projects that the U.S. will be faced with supporting insurgencies in the future with the Soviets cast in the role of counter-insurgency. Regardless of the nomenclature assigned to the conflict spectrum, the techniques that worked during the World War II partisan movement will guide Soviet actions while those World War II actions that failed will be avoided. Our course should be guided in part by this knowledge. A proactive campaign as opposed to a reactive response will be essential to our success.

Guerrilla success in World War II depended upon their acceptance by the population; places to hide rather than attempt sustained fighting, a source of resupply, and coordination within an overall campaign plan both as to time and place. In a future conflict, whether in mid-intensity or low-intensity operations, U.S. theater and battle commanders must plan for and conduct rear area operations with the same level of effort devoted to the battle at the front, in the enemy’s rear, or against the enemy’s non-linear regular fighting forces. Enemy units that get cut off from the main force are a source of later guerrilla actions. Our campaign plans should be sensitive to this fact and provide for effective mop-up operations.

Special forces are highly trained, superbly capable organizations which can wreak havoc in the vulnerable rear areas that contain critical but “soft” targets. Operating in small teams (8-10 men), hiding by day, using quick hit-and-run tactics, special forces can be much more than just a harassment. Moreover, they are a source of intelligence production to their operational level or strategic commanders; and can be a source of training, support, and organizational nucleus for irregulars in the rear areas. Recognizing
this menace, sizing it, and then synchronizing the needed means to find, fix and eliminate SPETSNAZ is no mean task. It can’t be and will not be done effectively by rear area commands who are service support oriented by mission and organization.

The Message

World War II conditions and circumstances are not likely to be repeated in the future. However, there are many things that came out of the war that still shape military thought. The German Blitzkrieg, for example, demonstrated the value of the battlefield integration of tanks, infantry, artillery, air and mobility. The effectiveness of the synchronized whole was much greater than the sum of the parts. Another lasting example is the need for allied commands with integrated staffs so that the forces of more than one nation can be employed by a single commander in accordance with an overall combined plan, and not as several disparate actions directed by various national authorities. In the same light, we should remember the uprising in the German rear. Airland battle doctrine gives us the broad doctrine for the three simultaneous battles that will face us. So far, we have concentrated on the close and the deep battles; it’s time we tackled the third battle, about which we know too little.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p.3.

3. Ibid., pp. 22-25.

4. Ibid., p. 36.


6. DA Pamphlet 20-261a, p. 86.

7. Edgar M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944, DA Pamphlet 20-244 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 203. Hereafter cited as DA Pamphlet 20-244. Throughout this paper, partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare and irregular warfare will be used synonymously to denote the actions of partisans (guerrillas) and any regular armed forces that are performing similar operations in an enemy's rear area.


9. War Documentation Project Staff, Selected Soviet Sources in World War II Partisan Movement, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), pp. 3-9, document number 1. This report consists of the translation of over 100 Soviet documents and some comments concerning them. It is one of several reports (most of them by one or more identified authors) accomplished under the code name of “Project Alexander”. Hereafter this report will be cited as Selected Soviet Sources ..., Project Alexander.

10. Ibid., pp. 5-7.


12. Ibid., pp. 13-14.


19. Ibid., p. 15.

20. Ibid., p. 16.


23. Ibid., p. 16.

24. DA Pamphlet 20-261a, pp. 97-142.

25. "Actual Strength of Committed Russian Forces as of February 1942", a report prepared by the Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies East Branch, German High Command, trans. The Directorate of Military Intelligence, Canadian Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, undated. (Mimeographed).

27. Ibid., p. 25.


30. Ziemke, Composition and Morale..., p. 9.


32. Ibid., pp. 42-52.


34. Ernst von Dohnanyi, “Combatting Soviet Guerrillas”, Marine Corps Gazette, 39 (February, 1955), pp. 5-61. The author of this two-part article was a former German Army officer who had personal experience against the Russian partisans in World War II.


36. Ibid., p. 20.

37. Ralph Mavrogordato and Earl Ziemke, The Partisan Movement in the Polotsk Lowland, a report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), p. 49. A Project Alexander report. Stalin Order No. 130, 1 May 1942: “Male and female partisans are ordered to increase partisan warfare in the rear of the German occupying forces, to destroy telephone and telegraph communications and the enemy’s means of transportation, and to spare not a bullet in the struggle against the oppressors of our fatherland.”

38. Ibid., p. 49.


40. DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 94.

41. Selected Soviet Sources ..., Project Alexander, pp. 120-121.

42. DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 95.


45. Mavrogordato and Ziemke, *The Partisan Movement in the Polotsk ...*, p. 11.

46. DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 95.


49. DA Pamphlet 20-240, p. 29.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 26. At this time there were over 110,000 Russian railroad men employed by the Germans in the sector of Army Group Center alone. In addition, the Germans were using many "eastern volunteer units," composed of indigenous people, to act as security detachments. During the period of German successes at the front, it was not uncommon to find large numbers of the local inhabitants willing to cooperate with the German occupation forces. However, as the Soviets gained in tactical success and partisan activity became strong, many of these security detachments transferred their allegiance back to the Russians. See: Ziemke, *Composition and Morale ...*, p. 6.

51. DA Pamphlet 20-240, p. 162.


55. DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 185.


59. Herbert Golz, Hans Reinhardt and Helmut Kreidel, *Battle Experiences Against Guerrillas - Critical Situations in the Rear of Army Group Central, Early 1942. Combatting the Guerrillas in Central Russia*, trans. ACSI, Department of the Army, 6 February 1963. (Mimeographed). On page 139 of this document the authors state: “Even though certain preparations by the USSR for guerrilla warfare were known to the Germans prior to their invasion of the USSR, timely preparations for counter measures were neglected. No one had been given command responsibility for counter guerrilla operation. . . .”

60. Ziemke, *The Soviet Partisan Movement in 1941*, p. 64.

61. DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 10.


64. *Ibid.*, p. 65. The Germans issued an order in October 1941, an extract of which read: “The fear on the part of the indigenous populace of German countermeasures must be greater than the threats of the roving Bolshevik remnants.”


72. War Documentation Project Staff, *The Soviet Partisan Movement in World War II: Summary and Conclusion, with Selected Bibliography and Glossary*, a report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), p. 7. A Project Alexander report, hereafter cited as Project Alexander, Summary and Conclusions. In connection with the quoted figures it must be noted that this total security force strength was not by any means composed only of manpower which could be used at the front. A large part were indigenous auxiliaries of questionable loyalties, older men who were not fit for combat, etc. On the other hand, their use as security forces denied them for use as productive labor manpower pools.

Ziemke, _Composition and Morale_, p. 28.

Project Alexander, _Summary and Conclusions_, p. 11. The statement is particularly true in the center and northern areas. In the south (Ukraine), partisan activity was not very effective in this respect.

Ziemke, _Composition and Morale_, pp. 3-4.


Dallin, Mavrogordato and Moll, _Partisan Psychological Warfare_, pp. 31-34.


1st Lt. Larry L. Wolff, "The Soviet Partisan Movement," _Military Review_, 35. (May, 1955), pp. 44-47. 1st Lt. Wolff, who has done considerable research in the area of Russian partisan warfare, lists a fourth mission: to reestablish the Communist Party in occupied areas. This author considers that as an effect rather than an assigned mission of the irregular bands, and a small effect at best.
82. Ibid., p. 16. Notebook for Partisans, Handbook for Partisans, and Instructions of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement are some of the Soviet publications which Lt. Wolff mentions.

83. General Staff of the Red Army, Collections of Materials ..., p. 137.


85. Ibid., p. 153.

86. By May 1944 the German High Command had special counter guerrilla schools in operation. In a pamphlet signed by General Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, a detailed analysis of the necessity for mobility and communications in anti-partisan forces is emphasized. Jodl further points out in the pamphlet that encirclement of partisan areas by trained forces, a subsequent squeezing of the enclosed bands with a consequently smaller diameter circle, and complete annihilation is necessary in located partisan areas. See: German Army Pamphlet, Fighting the Guerrillas, trans. Intelligence Division, General Staff of the U.S. Army, 1944 (German Armed Forces Operations Staff, Chief General Jodl, 1944). (Mimeographed).

87. Ibid., p. 34.

88. Lt. Col. A. Dobrovolskiy, “In the Rear of the Enemy”, Military Herald, No. 12 (December, 1962). Trans. ACSI, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. In this article the Soviet officer points out that the company dropped 3.5 km from its objective, had main and alternate assembly areas in woods, and the platoon leaders were given detailed instructions by the company commander. It is interesting to note that the company commander was able to use two of his platoons to hold off “enemy” troops while his third platoon executed the primary mission.


90. DA Pamphlet 30-50-1, p. 34.


93. Ibid., p. 385.


103. Rod Paschal (Unpublished Manuscript).