Is India’s Military Modernization Evidence of an Aggressive National Security Policy?

Christopher L. Budihas
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An Institute of Land Warfare Paper

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Land Warfare Paper No. 110, October 2016

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by Christopher L. Budihas

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Preface

America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced U.S. diplomatic ties with India, leading to a number of academic debates surrounding India’s foreign policies and regional military ambitions. In 2009–10, a number of defense policy analysts published a series of articles assessing India’s economic growth and international aspirations. Some suggested that the United States could influence India to use its modernizing military to support U.S goals vis-à-vis China. Further, many authors argued that India was attempting to develop naval and other expeditionary capacities to enforce a more assertive security policy.

Among those writers were James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, who labeled India’s security policy an Indian version of the Monroe Doctrine. Another author, David Scott, called the policy “India’s Extended-Neighborhood Concept.” Walter C. Ladwig III—in his article “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?”—concentrated on security to explain India’s ascendance as an Indo–Pacific power. Collectively, these authors claimed that India was increasing its military capacity commensurate with its rising economic power. If their claims are incorrect, U.S. reliance on India in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea would be improvident.

Six years have passed since those claims were made. Thus, it is reasonable to ask whether current evidence still supports the conclusion that India is committed to more aggressive foreign and national security policies. Determining the direction of India’s security policy requires a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the aforementioned articles contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data and thereby assess whether the authors’ claims still have merit.

The evidence reveals that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically-based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive its foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy will have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The modest attempts of the Ministry of Defence to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Conclusively, then, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the United States to rely on India to counterbalance Chinese ambitions in the Asia–Pacific region.
Is India’s Military Modernization Evidence of an Aggressive National Security Policy?

Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia; the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783

Introduction

Naval cooperation between India and the United States was on the rise during the 1980s and 90s until India’s controversial nuclear test in 1998—its first since 1974. However, with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, the George W. Bush administration quickly restarted relations between the two powers. India’s newfound interest in cooperation with the United States represented an uncharacteristic break from India’s traditional military independence. During his 2010 visit to India, in reference to the joint accomplishments achieved under the 2005 New Framework for U.S.–India Defense Relationship agreement, President Barack Obama indicated that this would be a “defining partnership of the 21st century.” The following year, the President announced the intent of the United States to rebalance American strategic efforts by refocusing on the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States’ strategic pivot encompasses a comprehensive series of diplomatic, economic and security efforts that address international concerns over growing Chinese assertiveness, while simultaneously supporting both regional and American economic interests. America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced U.S. diplomatic ties with India and has led to a number of academic debates surrounding India’s foreign policies and military ambitions across the Indo-Pacific regions. Several foreign policy experts have further speculated that, given the reduction of U.S. military forces and projected declines in U.S. military budgets, America could leverage a perceived growing Indian maritime fleet to offset a smaller U.S. military presence in the region. Furthermore, other policy experts contend that India’s military modernization efforts over the past decade indicate that India is pursuing a more aggressive national security strategy. Such claims conflict with India’s traditionally passive or neutral foreign policies and are not supportable based on current Indian national defense allocations that show New Delhi has cut defense spending to enable domestic economic growth.
These debates about India’s supposed boost in defense modernization activities are critical to any American strategic calculation that the United States can effectively partner with India to counterbalance Chinese ambitions. Getting this assessment wrong could lead to a major American strategic miscalculation as the United States balances multiple competing global security demands with finite military resources.

In 2009–10, a number of defense policy analysts published a series of articles and books assessing India’s economic growth and international aspirations. Several of those authors argued that India was attempting to develop naval and other expeditionary capacities to enforce a more assertive security policy. Among those writers were James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, who labeled India’s security policy an Indian version of the “Monroe Doctrine.”10 Another author, David Scott, called the policy “India’s extended-neighborhood concept.”11 Additionally, Walter C. Ladwig III—in his article “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?”—concentrated on security to explain India’s ascendance as an Indo–Pacific power.12 Collectively, these authors inferred from statements by international scholars that India was increasing its military capacity commensurate with its rising economic power.13 Their claims, if correct, would support a U.S. rebalancing strategy that leverages a militarily strong India. However, an Indian security policy such as that described by Holmes and Yoshihara would stand counter to India’s historic defensive strategic posture, which reflects India’s lack of territorial ambition.14 Such a misjudgment of Indian foreign policies and military capabilities would disappoint American expectations that India could effectively dissuade contentious Chinese behavior. Altogether, getting this assessment wrong would lead the United States to position insufficient forces in the Indo–Pacific region. Therefore, in light of India’s long-standing defensive military posture and the passing of six years since these articles were published, it is reasonable to question the Western authors’ claims to determine whether current evidence supports the conclusion that India’s military modernization efforts reflect its commitment to more aggressive foreign and national security policies.

To determine whether these efforts represent a significant shift from traditional Indian foreign and security policies requires first a standard by which to assess India’s military modernization and its connection to India’s current foreign policy. Fortunately, the articles that offered those initial claims provide metrics. Using the metrics of those authors, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the data originally used and thereby assess whether the inferences drawn in 2009 and 2010 still have merit.

David Scott used four geo-economic factors to assess India’s extended-neighborhood concept: trade, energy, security and military concerns.15 Scott concluded that India’s influence in extra-regional locations are aimed primarily toward supporting its domestic economic growth, while security concerns are focused on the safe transit of trade and on preventing other nations, specifically China, from achieving preeminence in India’s extended neighborhood.16 In contrast, Holmes and Yoshihara drew their inferences by examining references to the Monroe Doctrine in scholarly debates. The authors presented three force models to measure which Indian naval and air capabilities could enforce a Monroe-like strategy.17 The authors concluded that as the Indian economy continued to strengthen, New Delhi would devote more resources in the coming years to increasing its military capacity.18

Unlike that of Holmes and Yoshihara, Walter Ladwig’s research centered on statements by the three Indian military service chiefs, who claimed that their branches require the capability to operate beyond their immediate neighborhood. Ladwig found in 2010 that India’s military
capabilities were “limited, but [that] growing power-projection capability [would] soon give it the capacity to help police the global commons.”

If the collective authors’ assertion that India is modernizing its military commensurate with its economic rise is in fact incorrect, then a U.S. attempt to leverage India to counter growing Chinese maritime power is strategically dangerous. A reevaluation of the authors’ original assertions will find that India’s domestic economic ambitions conclusively drive its foreign policies, whereas governmental investments in defense modernization programs are negligible and are not evidence of aggressive national security policies.

**Strategic Context circa 2009–10**

Since Scott, Ladwig, Holmes and Yoshihara wrote their articles more than six years ago, a brief review of the professional debate occurring in 2009–10 is required to understand the strategic context in which the articles were written. In the early years of this century, a flurry of articles were published by a variety of policy scholars and political commentators discussing India’s great economic rise in the international community. Many of these articles said there existed a parity between India’s increased diplomatic engagements and economic activities that required India to invest in its defense capabilities to protect interests abroad. Most of these authors’ arguments focused on language in the navy’s 2004 *Indian Maritime Doctrine*, which stated that the nation’s maritime capacity must be capable of operating from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Additionally, they latched on to statements in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) *Annual Reports* that discussed New Delhi’s aspirations to operate in their extended neighborhood. Next, many academics, convinced that the Indian government would invest in the military, speculated that India would increase its naval capabilities to serve as a counterbalance to increased Chinese activities in the Indo-Pacific regions. Others predicted, based on the 2005 *New Framework for U.S.–India Defense Relationship* agreement, that this bilateral relationship would allow America to leverage a perceived growing Indian maritime fleet to deter Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. This was the strategic context in 2009 that influenced claims by Scott, Ladwig, Holmes and Yoshihara that India was evolving into a significant regional power.

Scott, Ladwig, Holmes and Yoshihara collectively claim that in some capacity India was increasing its military capabilities commensurate with its rising economic power. However, for much of India’s independence, the Indian government has not sought to assert its interests in military terms. Thus, to assess these authors’ claims, it is wise to investigate the pattern of Indian foreign and security policy behavior.

In his comprehensive study of India’s foreign policy frameworks between 1947 and 1962, Srinath Raghavan stated that there are few well-researched studies of Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru, but he offered some historical observations that influence today’s policy-making. Nehru’s positions must be found by reviewing his official speeches, interviews, books and memoirs; during his tenure as prime minister no national strategic or foreign policies were published. Raghavan observed that most Indian scholars group Nehru policy perspectives into one of two categories: the idealist or the revisionist. From the 1950s to the 1970s, India participated in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and Nehru envisioned India as the leader and voice of those countries that did not want to be trapped in the Soviet–Western Bloc competition. In their book *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers*, Deepa Ollapally and Henry Nau state that this “Nehruvian paradigm” is best described as an inward-looking economic and
non-aligned foreign policy. Therefore, during Nehru’s era the Indian government established a consistent foreign-policy outlook that continues to influence present-day politics. That outlook holds that India must remain firmly neutral in tenuous international political issues and place economics first to enable domestic self-sufficiency. Additionally, the Nehru years instilled in the minds of Indian political leaders the attitude that defense spending must be restricted to avoid diverting limited national resources away from economic development.

From 1947 into the early 1970s, despite armed clashes with Pakistan and an embarrassingly lopsided defeat by China, India eschewed heavy military investments. However, after the 1962 border war with China, India temporarily departed from the established pattern of defense spending and allocated additional resources to the army and air force. In 1966, with these military conflicts fresh in India’s history, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi adopted a more militant stance. Because of the country’s political and security struggles, she took a realist’s approach to foreign policy. Labeling her position the “Indira Doctrine,” the Indian government half-heartedly pursued a more militant policy because of the tough realities of Cold War politics. This doctrine proclaimed that India would not interfere in a regional nation’s domestic affairs unless requested by that government, nor would India allow other countries to interfere with Indian affairs. India’s role as head of a self-appointed regional protectorate was a poor attempt to ward off the Cold War superpowers and was meant to reinforce the Nehru-centric idea of national self-sufficiency in foreign affairs. Thus, Indira Gandhi’s years in office reinforced an Indian political culture that stressed strategic autonomy via non-alignment, cautiousness towards high defense spending and attention to domestic economics.

India’s non-alignment strategy during the Cold War resulted in four decades of domestic economic strain. In the 1990s, India’s foreign policy strategy sought to expand diplomatic relations to boost the economy. In “India’s New Foreign Policy Strategy,” Raja Mohan reinforced this point by stating that India refocused its political interests to implement aggressive economic initiatives in growing international markets to strengthen India’s domestic industries. In 1991, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao launched India’s Look East Policy, which sought to liberalize India’s economy and build a fiscal bridge between India and greater Asia. The Look East Policy Prime Minister (then Finance Minister), Dr. Manmohan Singh, stated, “The economic policies of India take into account the dynamism of this region, which shall soon be the tiger economy of the world.” The Look East Policy changed India’s foreign policy focus from an inward-looking, socialist-like domestic economy to one that looked outward to engage nations to meet its domestic economic goals. From 2004 to 2014, as Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh adjusted policy because he recognized that India must actively participate in the international system to secure Indian economic prosperity and security and to earn a respected position in the global community. Therefore, despite Singh’s more active foreign policies, those policies might have actually reinforced many of India’s traditional policy preferences dating from Nehru’s era. The authors who wrote in 2009 inferred from Indian policy documents and actions that India’s foreign policy had shifted; only a time series analysis of Indian security policy since then can determine whether the long-term pattern of Indian foreign and security policy preferences had changed. However, to make that assessment requires first a thorough examination of Scott’s, Ladwig’s and Holmes and Yoshihara’s arguments.

David Scott’s Extended Neighborhood

All four authors created a link within their arguments between expanding Indian trade, the movement of ever more goods and resources through the Indian Ocean and growing energy
requirements. However, their arguments were different, so each author must be analyzed individually, beginning with David Scott. In “India’s ‘Extended-Neighborhood’ Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power,” Scott observed that the term “extended neighborhood” had been woven into India’s foreign-policy formulation. He referred to the 2006 MEA Annual Report that contained the term “extended neighborhood.” Scott’s article used the term to identify those areas India intends to influence—from the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf and West Africa to the Straits of Malacca, Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific. Scott stated that India’s objective is to project both hard and soft power to gain and maintain effective economic, security, political and cultural advantages in those regions. The author placed great weight on the change in diplomatic language between the MEA Annual Report of 1999–2000 and the first use of the extended-neighborhood concept in the Annual Report for 2000–2001. Additionally, Scott references MOD Annual Reports from 2001 and 2007 to show that India is attempting to increase military cooperation with other nations in the extended neighborhood. Ultimately, Scott claimed that this increase in military cooperation with other countries was evidence of an evolution in India’s foreign and security policies because he perceived it as a break from India’s tradition of non-alignment.

In the 2009 article, Scott specifically used trade, energy, security and military factors both as metrics with which to measure Indian aspirations and as evidence of governmental policy progress in various extra-regional locations. Scott’s argument was focused on (then) Prime Minister Manmohan’s aggressive domestic economic development to explain previously unprecedented diplomatic engagements and militarily exercises. The article primarily analyzed India’s export and import trade and, to a lesser extent, security requirements. Those analyses served as evidence to support Scott’s claim that India was breaking from its non-aligned past.

Scott relied predominantly on Ministry of Commerce 2007–08 trade percentages (see tables 1 and 2) as evidence to support his claim that India was increasing international economic relationships in its extended neighborhoods to support its growing domestic economy. The author also selectively sampled 2003–08 sub-regional trade statistics, using them to demonstrate export and import activities in specific markets to back his claim that India was economically pursuing this strategy. The statistics showed that during those five years Indian economic activities had increased in the Persian Gulf, Africa, Central Asia and China.

In the article, Scott used comments made by various Ministry of Defence (MOD) officials in 2005 and 2007 to support his assertion that because India’s economic interests were expanding beyond the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), so should its military capabilities. Scott interpreted MOD comments to mean that India’s security focus had shifted its immediate neighborhood to protection of Indian interests abroad. Scott claimed that as India’s economic concerns increased in the extended neighborhoods, so would New Delhi’s investment in defense modernization to protect those interests. Finally, the author claimed that the Indian navy would have a more prominent role in expanding Indian influence into those neighborhoods.

Because the Indian government’s use of the term “extended neighborhood” is central to Scott’s argument, any change in the Indian government’s foreign policy terminology since 2009 would potentially undermine Scott’s conclusion and change the interpretation of the other evidence used by Scott: trade, energy, security and military considerations. A review of MEA Annual Reports from 2008 to 2015 reveals that the term “extended neighborhood” appears in all reports except the 2009–10 and 2010–11 editions. Though the term was not specifically mentioned by name in these two reports, the verbiage within them alludes to the government’s
intent to execute such a policy. For example, the 2010–11 report says, “India has always regarded the concept of neighborhood as one of widening concentric circles, around a central axis.” MEA reports from 2011–12 to the present emphasize the governmental requirement for extensive diplomatic engagement to facilitate India’s economic development to meet the growing demands of a diverse international market system. These reports repeatedly cite the importance of active diplomatic engagement that enables India to compete successfully in a dynamic global system. However, the term “extended neighborhood” has disappeared.

Although the term “extended neighborhood” has vanished, MEA Annual Reports over the past six years contain a number of recurring themes. These reports repeatedly stress that Indian foreign policies and engagement strategies must be implemented for India to achieve global-power status. Therefore, the reports partially support Scott’s claim because these official documents make access to foreign markets a priority to feed India’s growing domestic economy. However, to achieve New Delhi’s domestic goals and stability via a healthy domestic economy, India’s policies still focus foremost on achieving a stable immediate neighborhood. In addition, contrary to Scott’s claim that the requirement for a secure neighborhood will drive increased military spending; these reports do not refer to a need to increase the pace of defense modernization to support such geo-economic efforts in India’s extended neighborhoods. Therefore, India’s public statements provide no evidence that its military modernization is tied to regional market ambitions as Scott claimed.

Next, Scott’s argument also referred to portions of the MOD Annual Reports in 2001 and 2007. An examination of MOD Annual Reports from 2009 to the present shows that, unlike the MEA reports, MOD Annual Reports continued to use the term “extended neighborhood.” The research established that these reports used the terms “immediate” and “extended” neighborhoods to orient and explain India’s strategic relationships with its close neighbors and other nearby regional neighbors. The reports continued to use Scott’s definition of extended neighborhood to explain placing priority on protecting seaborne trade from the Suez Canal to Southeast Asia. According to the 2014–15 MOD Annual Report, India’s defense strategies focused on addressing a variety of conventional and irregular security challenges confronting the nation. The report announces India’s goals of building military capacities for strategic self-reliance and promoting regional stability while pursuing engagement opportunities through exercises and personnel exchanges. The report assessed the probability of a full-scale conventional war as low, though India remains cautious of Pakistan. The MOD does acknowledge in the report such current threats as piracy, transnational terrorism and criminal networks, disputed territorial borders, cyberattack, natural and man-made disasters and pandemics. Therefore, because Delhi considers the probability of a conventional naval conflict to be low and acknowledges only minor maritime threats, India has no compelling reason to accelerate the navy’s modernization activities. The evidence undermines the credibility of Scott’s 2009 prediction that India will increase its rate of defense modernization.

However, Scott’s argument was not built solely on official statements by the MOD and the MEA. He also inferred a change in Indian foreign policy from trends in trade, energy, security and other military concerns. The question, therefore, is whether those trends on which Scott relied have actually continued. He used 2007–08 import and export trade data to support his assertion that New Delhi was increasing its influence in its extended neighborhoods. Similar data drawn from trade reports from 2007–08 to the first half of 2015 (tables 1 and 2 below) show no
significant increase in aggregate trade percentages. The percentages of export and import trade to Europe and Asia show a decline of more than 3 percent. India’s exports and imports to and from China continued to rise steadily, but the overall percentage of trade with Asia declined because of a drop in trade with Southeast Asian countries. With net trade reductions in Europe and Asia, there was a nearly corresponding growth in the percentage of trade with Africa, the Middle East and North America. This boost in African and Middle Eastern export trade is attributed to greater Indian access to foreign markets and to imports of foreign energy resources. Therefore, these statistics mildly support Scott’s claim that India is pursuing increased market access in its extended neighborhoods to feed its domestic economy by increasing trade relations in the Persian Gulf, Africa, North America and China. However, given the decline in the percentage of trade with Europe and Asia, this data does not show the impact of trade on either the size or the growth rate of the Indian economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Import Trade by Region</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>19.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa &amp; Middle East</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>62.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia &amp; Russia</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Regions</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Export Trade by Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>23.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa &amp; Middle East</td>
<td>6.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>11.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>3.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>53.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia &amp; Russia</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Regions</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
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Therefore, comparing Scott’s statistics against updated (2007–15) Ministry of Commerce trade figures, it is fair to conclude that Scott had an accurate view of the trend in India’s trade relations but not necessarily as it related to military spending or military requirements in the
Persian Gulf, Africa, Central Asia and China. Scott does make a valid assertion that access to energy resources and new markets was a prime objective behind New Delhi’s foreign policy efforts. Ultimately these trade statistics—and the fact that India’s domestic energy production will drop to a projected low of 15 percent by 2025—confirm that New Delhi will continue to seek diplomatic engagements and foreign-policy initiatives to benefit the economy in the extended neighborhood.

Unlike economic and trade factors, Scott did not provide criteria with which to measure Indian military and security efforts and relate those efforts to the extended-neighborhood concept. Instead, he relies heavily on 2005–07 MEA Annual Reports and Chiefs of Naval Staff (CNS) statements. Scott cited former CNS Admiral Arun Prakash, who proclaimed that the navy has a responsibility to protect the country’s economic interests. Because New Delhi was focusing its political efforts on economics, Scott inferred that India would inevitably invest in its navy to protect trade into its extended neighborhood. Finally, Scott attempted to reinforce this assertion by quoting Minister of Defense A.K. Antony, who stated that India must develop stronger military capabilities to protect increasing economic interests overseas.

Though statements by Indian officials alluded to the navy’s assumption of a more significant role in supporting foreign diplomacy, it is not clear that those statements actually influenced either the size or the allocation of monies to the military services. In the years prior to publication of Scott’s article, there had been a nominal increase in annual defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), but thereafter military expenditures as a percentage of GDP declined. The decline was partly due to currency inflation related to economic growth. Table 3 displays two measures of India’s defense spending from 2005 to 2018—annual expenditures in U.S. dollars and spending as a percentage of GDP. Even though the military service chiefs annually seek 3 to 3.5 percent of GDP for defense, yearly increases in nominal gross monetary allocations were small and buying power was greatly affected by currency depreciation. This is the result of the constant rise in inflation and a weak rupee. The national annual inflation rate hovers around 6–7 percent. Additionally, the average international inflation rate for defense equipment costs runs between 12 and 15 percent annually. As the world’s second largest importer of defense equipment, India’s military modernization activities are significantly impacted by this inflation rate. Hence, these statistics provide no evidence that New Delhi is accelerating those activities.

Table 3

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP %</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>2.23%</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
<td>2.16%</td>
<td>2.23%</td>
<td>2.16%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant 2015 USD in Millions</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>36,300</td>
<td>42,824</td>
<td>45,392</td>
<td>47,080</td>
<td>49,654</td>
<td>54,839</td>
<td>56,919</td>
<td>59,739</td>
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Also not mentioned in Scott’s article, many budget and resource allocation issues affect the MOD’s modernization efforts. Recent analysis by the Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDS) finds that since 2009 there has been an ever-widening gap between MOD budgetary resource projections (plan to buy) and realized allocations (actual purchase). In
2009–10, there existed an 8 percent gap between projections and allocations; in 2014–15, there was a staggering 26 percent gap. Additionally, bureaucratic acquisition mismanagement from 2006 to 2013 resulted in the MOD spending only 88 percent of its defense budgetary capital on planned programs, thereby failing to spend 12 percent, or approximately USD$38.8 billion allocated dollars, on planned acquisitions. This is the result of cumbersome bureaucratic processes that ensure poor budget planning and execution.

Dr. Laxman Kumar Behera, a Research Fellow at IDSA and a defense budget expert, conducted a thorough analysis of the central government’s budget projections and allocations based on the 14th Finance Commission’s decisions. He found three major concerns in military budgeting.

First is the gap that exists between current modernization aspirations and actual tangible gains due to small governmental budgetary appropriations. Current projections for 2016 to 2020 show the Finance Commission projecting a GDP allocation to defense of 2.3 percent or less. Second, the commission’s effort to increase the share of tax revenue provided to Indian states will result in less revenue for use by the central government. Therefore, the already small defense budget will be in direct competition with other ministries for funds. This will likely result in the MOD being allocated less money than is currently projected in the out-years. Finally, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced a campaign to build domestic defense capabilities. The campaign, called “Make in India,” will compete with the central government’s efforts to relocate tax revenue across New Delhi’s ministries and state governments. Additionally, the Make in India campaign will slow modernization purchases while Indian companies develop the capability to build military equipment or furnish required components. Therefore, there is no evidence to validate Scott’s claim that India will seek to fund defense modernization in support of its extended-neighborhood aspirations.

Historically, India's existential threats have been its immediate neighbors. These land-based threats from Pakistan and China cause New Delhi to allocate much of its defense spending to the army. The navy budget has always been and continues to be dead last among defense priorities. The army was the only service to receive a substantial increase for capital acquisition in 2015: USD$1.1 billion more than in 2014. Both the navy and air force received crippling reductions in last year’s budget—USD$300 million and USD$1 billion respectively. The failure to invest in maritime modernization suggests that the Indian government is not serious about using the navy to expand influence in accordance with Scott’s extended-neighborhood concept. The defense spending pattern further substantiates the claim that India is not pursuing military capabilities commensurate with its economic growth to enforce aggressive national security policies.

Though statements by Indian defense officials in 2007 alluded to the navy’s assuming a more significant role in supporting foreign diplomacy, Scott provided no empirical evidence to support that claim. He listed a variety of military exercises in which the navy has participated, but he failed to tangibly measure the value of such maritime activities to advance the extended-neighborhood concept. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude from Scott’s trade analysis that New Delhi is economically influencing its extended neighbors to support India’s economic growth, not its military modernization. The claim that India is pursuing a more aggressive security policy abroad is speculative at best. Scott contended that New Delhi was telegraphing in more forceful political language an Indian willingness to invest in military capacity to operate abroad, but he provided no evidence to support such a historically unprecedented prediction. Scott also assumed that with America pivoting to the Pacific, India would be capable of assuming from the United States increased security responsibilities in the IOR. Additionally, he stated
without any clear evidence that India was accelerating its maritime modernization program to offset increased Chinese maritime activities in the Indo–Pacific regions. Such claims without supportable evidence are dangerous. To an outsider, Scott’s assertions would lead to a conclusion that India is more militarily capable than is actually the case. If the United States overestimates India’s political will and its military’s abilities, America would be making a strategic miscalculation and thereby potentially forfeiting naval dominance in the South Pacific to the Chinese.

**Holmes and Yoshihara’s Indian “Monroe Doctrine”**

In 2009, Holmes and Yoshihara also used the Monroe Doctrine as a historical model and also used metrics to determine Indian maritime aspirations and capabilities. They drew their inferences by examining references to the Monroe Doctrine in scholarly debate. Holmes and Yoshihara concluded that, as the Indian economy continued to strengthen, New Delhi would inevitably devote more resources in the coming years to increasing its military capacity.

America’s implementation of the Monroe Doctrine aimed to deter European powers in the 19th and earlier 20th centuries from making new encroachments in the Western Hemisphere. Holmes and Yoshihara used this American maritime concept to infer that India was implementing a similar strategy. The authors pointed to specific terms and phrases in the 2004 *Indian Maritime Doctrine* and 2007 *Maritime Military Strategy* to back their assertion that India was building its military capabilities to achieve its own “manifest destiny” to control the Indian Ocean. By selectively choosing statements in these naval documents and other academic debates, Holmes and Yoshihara promoted the claim that New Delhi was pursuing a Monroe-like strategy for India.

In the article, Holmes and Yoshihara used the antiquated American maritime concept to define three models by which to assess Indian naval capabilities: free-rider, constable and strongman. The free-rider variant is the least aggressive model, requiring only the naval capacity to suppress low-level maritime instability such as piracy, illegal trafficking and terrorism. This model allows the nation to focus its resources on economic development rather than on expensive military hardware by leveraging another maritime force’s dominant naval presence to guarantee maritime security. In India’s case, the United States serves as its guarantor. When there is no maritime guarantor, the situation requires the more forceful constable model. In this model, political restraint is exercised to ensure dominant maritime security while not prematurely provoking conflict by forcefully denying other nations’ access. Finally, the strongman model is sought when a nation is militarily required to deny external threats’ maritime access. Holmes and Yoshihara numerically measured the navy’s capabilities (types of platforms) and capacities (total number of platforms) and concluded that India fit the free-rider model and aspired to become a constabulary force.

A review of each military service’s capabilities against Holmes and Yoshihara’s claims revealed the changes that have or have not occurred in the past six years. Because the four authors center a majority of their claims on the Indian navy, this research measured India’s maritime capacity to support a Monroe Doctrine by examining MOD *Annual Reports*. The 2014–15 report declared that the navy’s mission was to guarantee the nation’s maritime sovereignty and full use-of-sea. This report stated that the navy’s strategic objective is to deter and dissuade acts against its national interest and, if required, to defeat any adversary. However, the MOD report concluded that the likelihood of a conventional naval war in the Indian Ocean was very
low. Therefore, given the low probability of maritime conflict, New Delhi ostensibly finds no compelling reason to invest in expensive naval modernization programs. Holmes and Yoshihara’s article specifically used the number of aircraft carriers, amphibious landing ships and submarine capabilities (types) and capacities (sizes) to measure the navy’s ability to enforce a Monroe Doctrine. Table 4 displays the navy’s growth and shrinkage by platform type and total over a period of some 25 years. The aggregate numbers over time show that, despite claims of a growing Indian navy, there has been relatively little change.

<table>
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<th>Table 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Comparative Analysis of Naval Major End Items Strengths by Year</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
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<td>Destroyers</td>
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<td>Frigates</td>
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<td>Corvettes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious Ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious Mechanical Landing Craft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare – Ocean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare – Inshore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auxiliary – Refueling Ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Patrol/Anti-Submarine Warfare/Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
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There is a plethora of reasons for the limited change in the number and type of platforms in the past six years. Many of these reasons were not considered in the four authors’ articles. The first reason is the navy’s operational requirement to replace its aging fleet while faced with insufficient annual maritime budgets. The navy currently decommissions older ships and submarines at nearly the same rate as it commissions or leases new ones. India’s previous reliance on purchasing or leasing used foreign vessels has further reduced the service life and reliability of their fleet. One recent example of the modernization of the navy is the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya—after a ten-year series of delays, in June 2015, Prime Minister Modi commissioned India’s newest used aircraft carrier.

Like Scott, Holmes and Yoshihara assigned significant importance to aircraft carriers in their argument about Indian naval power-projection. Collectively, all four authors agreed that carriers have the capacity to execute traditional and nontraditional maritime roles such as air-to-air combat, air-ground attack, sea denial, anti-submarine, anti-surface warfare, mine and
countermine, anti-piracy and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).\textsuperscript{76} Thus, Holmes and Yoshihara used the total number of aircraft carriers as a benchmark to measure the navy’s power-projection capabilities.\textsuperscript{77} Holmes and Yoshihara stated that the navy needs four to six carriers, with a minimum of two carriers underway at all times, to enable an Indian constable model.\textsuperscript{78} Additionally, they stated that to be a maritime strongman the navy needs six to nine carriers. According to Shishir Upadhyaya’s article “Projecting power . . . and Politics? Carriers in the Indian Ocean,” the navy wants a three-carrier fleet by 2018.\textsuperscript{79} They would position one each in their East and West Coast fleets, with a third in a refit and training cycle.\textsuperscript{80} However, an examination of official literature revealed that the Indian government has neither the interest nor the military budget to invest in more than a two-carrier fleet. Therefore, given political constraints, the Indian government will settle for a navy suited to Holmes and Yoshihara’s free-rider model.

To counter threats to maritime security from Pakistan and China, both of which are increasing submarine capability, India must expand its own fleet of submarines. Since 1999, Indian maritime force-structure planning has consistently stated that to conduct sea-denial and chokepoint-control operations along the IOR periphery, the navy needs a minimum of 24 attack submarines.\textsuperscript{81} Holmes and Yoshihara calculated that for the navy to serve as a constabulary force it needs two to three SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines)\textsuperscript{82} and to achieve strongman status, four to six SSBNs; both models require a total of 24 attack submarines. Table 4 makes it clear that the Indian navy is woefully short of these totals, and current acquisition plans show that the fleet will add only one SSBN in the next five years. While India’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capacity has grown modestly with the addition of new maritime patrol aircraft,\textsuperscript{83} helicopters and destroyers, the navy is still lacking in total subsurface capacity.\textsuperscript{84} With a decreasing aggregate number of attack submarines and an insufficient maritime budget, it is predictable that India’s subsurface capability will limit the navy to following Holmes and Yoshihara’s free-rider model.

Worth noting, Holmes and Yoshihara’s article failed to discuss the importance of auxiliary refueling ships.\textsuperscript{85} Auxiliary refueling ships enable maritime-force missions of long distances and durations that enforce Monroe-like sea-denial operations. In 2011, the navy purchased two additional refueling tankers to extend its operational reach, but the purchase increased the total capacity to only three vessels. Holmes and Yoshihara also did not provide a numerical measure for India’s amphibious capabilities, though they broadly stated that the vessel type was required. Finally, another issue the authors failed to consider was how poor personnel recruiting impeded naval modernization and growth. The total number of personnel in the maritime service demonstrates that the navy is considerably smaller than the army. The army’s 1.1 million-man force dwarfs the 58,380 active duty navy—and that figure includes a naval aviation force of 7,000 and a marine component of 1,200.\textsuperscript{86} While India’s meager maritime budget significantly affects modernization, so does a 23 percent shortfall in naval officers.\textsuperscript{87}

Even though Scott, Ladwig, Holmes and Yoshihara primarily centered their arguments on the navy, each author did mention with some level of detail the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) role in power projection. An examination of Indian political and military leadership decisionmaking found that they consistently chose to focus the IAF on countering conventional threats to their homeland. Additionally, the IAF’s ability to support expeditionary power-projection remains significantly limited. Like the navy, the IAF’s modernization programs have many challenges that preclude it from effectively supporting military operations to enforce a Monroe Doctrine.
The data in table 5 shows negligible increases in IAF capabilities to support Indian security policies beyond their immediate neighborhood. Contract delays and cancellations, bureaucratic corruption and the failure in recent defense investment to upgrade or replace aging aircraft are major obstacles to IAF modernization. Another issue plaguing the IAF is its inability to receive parts for imported foreign aircraft and poor depot-level maintenance. The aircraft fleet’s 2011–14 operational readiness averages were disastrous, hovering around 65 percent for transport aircraft and 55 percent for fighters.

The addition since 2009 of eight U.S.-made C-17 Globemasters has increased the IAF power-projection capacity. A critical component of force projection is aerial refueling; in the past six years India has not expanded this capacity beyond the current fleet of six Russian-made IL-78 refuelers. Another capability overlooked by all four authors was the IAF’s reconnaissance and airborne electronic warfare (AEW) platforms. Since 2009, the IAF has grown from two AEW platforms to a mixture of 13 aircraft—with another six on order. While these increases are important, they do not fill the shortfall in strategic airlift capacity required to move and support both troops and equipment over extended distances and durations. Examining the figures in table 5 and other relevant material reveals overwhelming evidence that the IAF’s leadership values intra-theater airlift capabilities over more expensive strategic inter-theater operations.

Though not mentioned by Scott, Ladwig, Holmes and Yoshihara, the fighter and attack aircraft totals displayed in table 5 highlight New Delhi’s and the IAF’s leadership focus for defense spending. It is evident that they give priority to fighter-type aircraft for territorial defense over the need to project power abroad. Another consideration affecting inter-theater aircraft investment is the IAF’s need to retire most of its aging fleet of MiG-21s and all of its MiG-23s during the period 2014–19. Therefore, the evidence clearly indicates that the IAF is not only not spending its budget allocations on capabilities that increase long-range force projection but is also investing in fighter replacements. Finally, the Indian leadership has historically invested in IAF capabilities to counter a traditionally hostile Pakistan and a suspicious Chinese neighbor rather than to influence their extended neighborhood. Therefore, the assertion by Holmes and Yoshihara that India is developing capabilities to assert its own form of the Monroe Doctrine is unfounded.

An evaluation of updated data sets ultimately determined India is not pursuing a fleet consistent with a Monroe-like policy. Holmes and Yoshihara contended that rising economic powers such as India invariably build their military capabilities proportionate to their national

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**Table 5**

Comparative Analysis of IAF Major End Items Strengths by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011 (July)</th>
<th>2012 (September)</th>
<th>2013 (November)</th>
<th>2015 (September)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/Attack Total</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Transport – II-76MD</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Transport – C-17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Refuelers – II-76MKI</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-theater Transport Total</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data in table 5 shows negligible increases in IAF capabilities to support Indian security policies beyond their immediate neighborhood. Contract delays and cancellations, bureaucratic corruption and the failure in recent defense investment to upgrade or replace aging aircraft are major obstacles to IAF modernization. Another issue plaguing the IAF is its inability to receive parts for imported foreign aircraft and poor depot-level maintenance. The aircraft fleet’s 2011–14 operational readiness averages were disastrous, hovering around 65 percent for transport aircraft and 55 percent for fighters.

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An evaluation of updated data sets ultimately determined India is not pursuing a fleet consistent with a Monroe-like policy. Holmes and Yoshihara contended that rising economic powers such as India invariably build their military capabilities proportionate to their national
wealth but provided only a limited analysis that does not support that assertion. They boldly claimed that Indian leaders aspire to create a constabulary force to meet Indian security needs within the IOR. However, Holmes and Yoshihara provided no evidence upon which to conclude that New Delhi was seeking these uncharacteristic aggressive national security policies. Nor does the article consider India’s traditional political behavior that eschews costly military investment. This is evident in their bold prediction that New Delhi would fiscally invest in the navy to become the regional maritime constable. Given the dearth of evidence of an Indian naval expansion, Holmes and Yoshihara’s argument was entirely speculative.

Ladwig’s “Will the Land of Gandhi become a Conventional Great Power?”

In contrast to the previous authors, Walter Ladwig’s 2010 article referred to statements by the Indian military service chiefs over the period 2002–07 to argue that the military required the capacity to project power outside India’s immediate neighborhood. Ladwig centered the article on the term “power projection,” which appeared in the 2007 India’s Maritime Military Strategy, to determine if and how India will apply military force abroad. He concluded that India’s force-projection capabilities were limited but steadily increasing to meet New Delhi’s aspirations.

Ladwig used historical examples of small-scale Indian military operations to measure and evaluate India’s power-projection capabilities. He did so by dividing the cases of intervention into nine power-projection missions and analyzed the missions by sorting them into the sub-categories of hard and soft power. The four soft-power categories were securing sea lines of communication (SLOC), noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and peacekeeping. Ladwig’s five hard-power categories were showing the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention and conquest. By analyzing these missions, Ladwig predicted—based on his historical assessment, India’s 2009 military capabilities and traditional political behavior—which of the nine missions the Indians might perform in the future.

Ladwig placed great weight on statements in MEA and MOD reports—and on articles written in 2009 by Scott, Holmes and Yoshihara and other scholars—to identify the land-, sea- and airpower missions the Indian military was physically capable of prosecuting. Like Scott, Ladwig relied on the MEA 2006 Annual Report’s extended neighborhood to determine Indian security aspirations. Ladwig noted that the Indian navy’s capabilities were limited, but he argued that those capabilities were adequate to achieve India’s goals in its extended neighborhood. Ladwig quoted senior IAF and army leaders to support his claim that New Delhi was supporting its military leaders’ desires for additional power-projection capabilities. Ladwig used metrics derived from other military experts in maritime, air and ground capabilities to determine the capacities required of the Indian military to project power effectively.

In 2010, with a strengthening domestic economy, Ladwig assumed without definitive evidence that the Indian government would fund limited yet increasing military power-projection capabilities in the proceeding years. He briefly mentioned New Delhi’s historical political apprehensions about employing force abroad. However, he haphazardly predicted without convincing evidence that India would increase funds for military modernization programs. In light of new evidence, Ladwig’s conclusions were improvident.

Ladwig measured India’s power-projection effectiveness by evaluating the navy’s capabilities and capacities. He specifically focused on aircraft carriers, amphibious landing ships and
submarines as measures of the navy’s ability to project power abroad (see table 4). Ladwig put significant stock in aircraft carriers to support his assertion about India’s increasing maritime power-projection capabilities. Thus, he referred to and used Holmes and Yoshihara’s methodology by applying the total number of aircraft carriers as the standard by which to measure the navy’s power-projection capability. Ladwig stated that the navy required a three-carrier fleet to provide a minimum of one ship continuously underway to achieve minimum maritime effectiveness in the IOR. One aircraft carrier underway would be effective in providing security for Indian commercial sea-lanes. Additionally, Ladwig agreed with Holmes and Yoshihara’s assessment that to act as the regional maritime constable would require the Indian navy to maintain four to six carriers, with a minimum of two carriers underway at all times. However, as stated previously in the discussion of Holmes and Yoshihara’s article, New Delhi is not interested in investing in a fleet of more than two carriers.

Ladwig’s analysis of other Indian maritime capabilities lacked the details presented by Holmes and Yoshihara. While Ladwig briefly mentioned the need for submarines, ASW platforms, auxiliary refuelers and minesweepers, he provided little proof that determines whether the Indian government was funding the navy to increase those capabilities. However, unlike the previous authors, Ladwig did examine amphibious warfare capabilities and found the military’s amphibious capacity to be severely limited. The navy’s capacity to execute amphibious operations has declined with the decommissioning of outdated Landing Ship Tank (LST) vessels. However, by purchasing a more technologically advanced (albeit used) vessel—a U.S. Navy Landing Platform Dock (LPD)—India has restored and, perhaps, improved this expeditionary capability to project force. Ladwig credited the navy for adding the LPD but stated that India needed to combine it with the remaining LSTs and an aircraft carrier to deploy a force package approximately similar to a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit (approximately 3,000 personnel). Additionally, Ladwig claimed that the navy was building an amphibious capacity sufficient to lift a 10,000-man expeditionary force, but research has revealed that India is well short of this objective. In his book about the Indian navy, Geoffrey Till predicted that the Indian military would be hard pressed to execute amphibious operations. Till also elaborated on India’s logistic deficiencies; India cannot sustain a force over extended distances and durations. Logistic difficulties would handicap Indian amphibious operations even in permissive or semi-hostile environments. Therefore, the navy will remain severely restricted in the types of amphibious operations it can execute. Consequently, Indian amphibious operations are likely to be restricted to NEOs and HA/DR missions in the immediate future.

Though the Indian navy has refurbished an aircraft carrier, leased slightly more capable submarines and purchased a newer amphibious ship, its aggregate capabilities are marginal based on their capacity. While these slight increases in technological maritime capabilities are positive, the aggregate size of the fleet has remained constant. Political priorities, limited naval budgets and an aging fleet are the major challenges preventing the Indian navy from growing. Ultimately, Indian political priorities remain focused on building their economy. When it comes to national security, New Delhi is more concerned about the existential land-based threats posed by its adjacent neighbors than about enforcing a costly maritime strategy against a nonexistent conventional naval threat in India’s immediate neighborhood. Thus, while the navy will make slow technological gains in its naval capabilities over the next five years, the total maritime capacity will increase only marginally.

Unlike Scott, Holmes and Yoshihara, Ladwig did measure the IAF’s role in power projection. Ladwig assessed the requirements for deploying an expeditionary battalion (800 personnel). To
support such a deployment requires 19 C-17 Globemasters to complete the task in a 24-hour period and 55 C-17s to lift a brigade combat team (approximately 3,000 personnel). This airlift capacity moves only the force package and does not account for the additional lift required to logistically sustain the forward location. Therefore, using Ladwig’s planning figures, the IAF’s strategic airlift capacity is woefully short of requirements for deploying even a battalion. More recent literature finds India’s leadership focused on the IAF’s capability for countering conventional threats to the homeland; expeditionary power projection is not a priority.

The army has focused its efforts on defending the homeland from conventional and terrorist threats, not supporting an extended-neighborhood concept. However, the army can support power-projection operations when strategic lift is available from the navy or IAF. Evidence shows that New Delhi is most concerned about threats from its immediate neighbors and, therefore, annually allocates the majority of its defense budget to train and maintain its army. Research concluded that while the army receives the biggest allocation of the defense budget, its modernization activities contribute little toward India’s foreign-policy efforts. Currently, the army’s modernization programs focus on upgrading its mechanized formations and on increasing the number of self-propelled artillery, combat helicopters and battlefield network systems. Therefore, there was no evidence found to support the claim that the army was developing equipment and training organizations for expeditionary operations outside of its immediate neighborhood.

Although Ladwig recognized that the army possessed only limited capacity to project force into its extended neighborhood, he still briefly considered the army’s role in amphibious, airborne or air-land military operations. Ladwig pointed out that although its army is large, India possesses only one airborne brigade, one amphibious brigade and eight special operations battalions with which to conduct force-projection operations. He also notes that these units are not readily available for deployment because they currently support domestic counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the evidence strongly indicates that New Delhi remains focused on protecting the homeland from active domestic and transnational terrorism and from conventional threats posed by its immediate neighbors.

The assessment of Ladwig’s claims produced no evidence that New Delhi was steadily investing in maritime modernization so that India could assume a more prominent role in securing the global commons. India is politically unwilling to invest in the MOD, which means India is unlikely to pursue defense modernization programs such as envisioned by Ladwig. Neither is India pursuing military capabilities commensurate with its economic growth. Finally, given the low probability of a conventional naval conflict, New Delhi is not compelled to invest in expensive maritime modernization programs.

Conclusion

The proposition that the United States can leverage an allegedly growing Indian maritime fleet as a counter to assertive China is a popular idea in academic literature, but the argument is built largely on wishful thinking. As the United States shifts attention to Asia and the Pacific, American leaders must understand what the Indian government is willing to support and the missions its military is capable of executing. Misinterpreting Indian history, motives and military capacities would result in an American strategic miscalculation. The academic claims made six years ago that India’s military modernization efforts were evidence of a more aggressive Indian foreign and national security policy appear wildly inaccurate.
Since Scott, Ladwig, Holmes and Yoshihara set forward their views, India has neither increased its defense modernization activities nor implemented more contentious foreign or national security policies. While collectively these authors made the assertion that India was increasing its military capabilities commensurate with its growing economy, no empirical evidence has been found to support this claim. New Delhi always focuses on economics first. It has not diverted additional national treasure to increase costly military modernization programs. In addition, claims that India is pursuing forceful policies directly conflict with its tradition of strategic autonomy. Finally, Indian national defense allocations do not support these arguments for increased modernization activities because New Delhi has actually cut defense spending to fuel domestic economic growth.

In 2009, Scott focused on Indian export and import trade, providing evidence to support his claim that India was breaking from its passive history and establishing closer international relationships to foster a growing economy. Trade statistics continue to support Scott’s assertion that access to foreign markets and energy resources is key to New Delhi’s foreign-policy goals. Scott provided no quantifiable proof that India was modernizing the military nor that Indian maritime activities in the extended neighborhood provide measurable effects with which to advance this concept. Scott assumed that as the United States pivots towards Asia, India would be militarily capable of assuming more security responsibilities and of offsetting China in the South China Sea. In contrast, analysis of Holmes and Yoshihara’s claim found no evidence that a rising economic power such as India would invariably build its military capabilities proportionate to its national wealth. The authors’ bold prediction that the Indian government would invest in the navy to make it a constabulary force finds no support in Indian military activities and defense spending. There is no evidence to argue that New Delhi has accelerated its defense modernization activities to enforce a Monroe-like policy. In comparison, Walter Ladwig attempted to assess India’s effectiveness and capacity to execute land-, sea- and airpower missions abroad. Ladwig provided some evidence to support his assessment that the Indian maritime force possesses a limited capacity to marginally support India’s extended-neighborhood concept. Finally, Ladwig did not fully consider that Indian governmental deficiencies effectively impede defense modernization efforts, but he nevertheless casually predicted that New Delhi would fund military growth in the proceeding years. Indian military budgets do not support his conclusion.

While many academics and military commentators still debate Indian power-projection capabilities, the evidence presented here demonstrates that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute such aggressive strategies. Indian government leaders possess three strong historically-based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. First, India’s economic ambitions always drive its foreign policy. Second, investments in maritime modernization to support those economic objectives will remain marginal because domestic economics come first. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment will remain handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Finally, New Delhi will continue to focus defense spending on military capabilities that defend their homeland against the conventional and terror threats in their immediate neighborhood. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies in their extended neighborhoods. Nor do Indians have the capacities defined by Holmes and Yoshihara to pursue a constable variation of a Monroe-like gunboat diplomacy. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the United States to rely on India to counterbalance Chinese ambitions in the Asia–Pacific region.
Endnotes


2 Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign Policy,” *India Review*, vol. 8, no. 1, January–March 2009), pp. 15–16.


5 *Ibid*.


15 Scott, “India’s ‘Extended Neighborhood’ Concept,” p. 113.


24 Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2010), pp. 1–5.
25 Mohan, “Rising India,” pp. 134–136. The Non-Aligned Movement is said to originate from the “scars of colonial rule.” Nehru believed in liberal internationalism and universalism, which convinced him that India must dutifully work with the United Nations (UN) in two major areas, human rights and collective security. Nehru wanted a post-World War II international system, where the UN is the international medium for mediating all issues between nation-states. Their collective body would resolve any issue to ensure equitability in problem resolution and to ensure global stability.
26 Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 80. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly in December 1947, Nehru stated that India’s foreign policy is intrinsically linked to the prosperity of the nation’s economy.
27 Ganguly and Pardesi, “Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign Policy,” p. 7.
28 Ibid., p. 8.
32 Dalmia and Malone, “Historical Influences on India’s Foreign Policy,” pp. 1044–45.
34 “External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia, 6 August 2015, p. 1.
38 Scott, “India’s ‘Extended Neighborhood’ Concept,” p. 108.
40 Ibid., p. 113.
41 Ibid., p. 109.
42 Ibid., pp. 111–113.
43 Ibid.
44 Minister of External Affairs, Annual Reports, accessed 15 September 2015, www.mea.gov.in. This Indian official webpage was used to access all 2009–2015 MEA Annual Reports.
47 India Minister of Defence, Annual Report 2014–2015, p. 4. This Indian official webpage was used to access all 2009–2015 MOD Annual Reports.


51 Scott, “India’s ‘Extended Neighborhood’ Concept,” p. 110.


59 *Ibid.*, p. 7; Kanwal, “India’s Defense Budget is Inadequate,” p. 1. The author states that “Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defense has repeatedly recommended the gradual raising of defense expenditures to 3 percent of the GDP. However, the 13th Finance Commission had recommended that the nation’s defense expenditure should progressively come down to 1.76 percent of the GDP by 2014–15.”


61 “Asia,” *The Military Balance*, 15 February 2015, p. 220; Kanwal, “India’s Defense Budget is Inadequate,” p. 1. India’s future modernization efforts focus on the Army’s upgrading of their antiquated intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, cyber defense and command and control systems to enable precision targeting and the ability to more effectively direct military operations.


64 Scott, “India’s ‘Extended Neighborhood’ Concept,” pp. 122–123.


Till, *Asia’s Naval Expansion*, p. 95.

Shishir Upadhyaya, “Projecting Power . . . and Politics? Carriers in the Indian Ocean,” *Jane’s Navy International*, February 2015, p. 9. This ship is a retrofitted Russian Kiev-class STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) platform and can carry only 16 x MiG 29k Fulcrum-Ds. It is less capable than U.S. aircraft carriers that typically carry 68 or more multifunctional aircraft. The INS *Viraat*, formerly a UK aircraft carrier, is scheduled for decommissioning in 2018. Under India’s Project 71, the INS *Viraat* is to be replaced by the new INS *Vikrant*, which is being domestically constructed in the Chochin Shipyard. However, this one-for-one replacement will give India only two total platforms.


“Asia,” *The Military Balance*, p. 218. Currently India has two STOBAR carriers with limited aircraft transporting and operating capacity.


Upadhyaya, “Projecting power . . . and Politics?” p. 10.

*Ibid.*, pp. 3–9. Upadhyaya commented that if the government is serious about power projection, they should invest in less costly aircraft carriers and instead acquire smaller ships and submarines to offset adversaries to protect their security interests.


“Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia,” p. 5. The Indian Navy commissioned its first nuclear-powered attack submarine in April 2012.

“World Air Forces 2015 Report,” *Flight Global*, 2015, p. 17. The Indian Navy has increased its long-range maritime patrol and anti-submarine capacity with the addition of six U.S.-made P-8I *Poseidon* aircraft. Two more are due for delivery and another 16 are on order.


“Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia,” p. 12. In 2011, these tankers were used to support the evacuation of citizens from Libya, therefore demonstrating the operational need for like-platforms to conduct long-range and -duration “extended neighborhood” operations.


“Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia,” p. 1. Officer shortages—a 23 percent shortage in the Indian navy and 21 percent in the army—are affecting operational readiness and growth. In a March 2015 personnel assessment, the army was short 9,642 officers, the navy 1,322 and the air force 152.


“World Air Forces 2015 Report,” *Flight Global*, 2015, pp. 17, 41. In July 2015, the IAF received the eighth of ten C-17s originally ordered in 2011. As of November 2015, the IAF possessed nine U.S.-made C-17 Globemasters and 24 Russian-made Ilyushin IL-76 aircraft to support Indian strategic airlift activities.


Ibid., pp. 1–2. This is due to these airframes’ extremely high accident rates over the past decade.


Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 344–345.

Ladwig, “India and Military Power Projection,” p. 1162. As the term “power projection” is used throughout this monograph, both a definition and an explanation are required. Military power projection is the ability to deploy, execute and sustain military operations over an extended period of time beyond one’s territorial boundaries. This study specifically delves into India’s expeditionary force projection with naval and strategic airlift assets. To exert power from the sea and air, capacity (total numbers) and capabilities (types) are essential ingredients.

Ibid., p. 1183.

Ibid., p. 1166.

Ibid., pp. 1177–1182.

Ibid., p. 1178. For example, Ladwig referred to a study in the *Australian Aviation Journal* about U.S. Air Force operations in Operation Desert Storm.

Ibid., p. 1175.

“Central and South Asia,” *The Military Balance*, 2015, p. 251. The Indian navy possesses an extremely small Marine commando force of approximately 1,200 personnel. In 2009, the Indian army fielded the dedicated amphibious 91st Infantry Brigade (3,000 personnel).


Ibid., p. 1181.


Ibid., p. 3–4.

Ibid.

