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Integrating Landpower in the Indo–Asia–Pacific Through 2020: Analysis of a Theater Army Campaign Design

Benjamin A. Bennett

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LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 107, May 2015

Integrating Landpower in the Indo–Asia–Pacific Through 2020: Analysis of a Theater Army Campaign Design

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Foreword

Growing out of the 2012 Department of Defense planning guidance, the United States Army has seen an increasing rebalance to the Indo–Asia–Pacific region over the past few years. This has manifested itself in multiple ways, including an elevation of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) to a four-star headquarters, a redistribution of resources to the region to support a new theater army campaign design—driving Army activity in the region in accordance with national security objectives and the Army Chief of Staff’s vision for the force—and an overall reaffirmation of the rebalance in the 2015 *National Security Strategy*.

Analyzing and examining this rebalance and USARPAC’s approach to operations, this paper focuses on four areas of campaign design: the land domain, i.e., the campaign environment; the campaign framework; the transformative structural reorganization; and an overview of the Campaign Assessment Process.

The Indo–Asia–Pacific is a complex region with strategically significant economic, political and military dynamics and unique challenges and opportunities. The creation of a new operational framework, in addition to other augmenting advantages, ensures that USARPAC is well-equipped to execute faithfully the increasing and complex duties expected to be performed in the region. It results in an approach that synchronizes the unique capabilities of land-domain forces, maintains security and stability and safeguards America’s interests in the region.



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11 May 2015

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Introduction

“The United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.”¹ These words, spoken by the President of the United States in 2011, signified the beginning of America’s “Rebalance to the Pacific.” First codified in the 2012 Department of Defense (DoD) planning guidance and reaffirmed in the 2015 *National Security Strategy*, the emphasis on the Indo–Asia–Pacific has driven change within the United States Army.² The elevation of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) to a four-star headquarters, a redistribution of assigned capability, a review of the role of landpower in the region and a new theater army campaign design are direct results of the national emphasis on the Indo–Asia–Pacific. USARPAC’s Theater Army Campaign drives Army activity in the region through 2020, is thoroughly nested with national security objectives, achieves the Chief of Staff of the Army’s vision for the force and describes how land capability enables the achievement of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) requirements in the region. Furthermore, the design leverages the land component’s unique ability to influence the environment through personal interaction with the human domain.

The following analysis will focus on four unique areas related to USARPAC’s campaign design, offering an examination of the command’s approach to campaign operations as well as key considerations that went into plan development. First, an examination of the significance of the land domain in the Indo–Asia–Pacific region is provided as a foundation for understanding USARPAC’s campaign environment. Second, an overview of the campaign framework is provided along with an investigation of how USARPAC has transformed its organizational structure to increase effectiveness. Finally, an overview of the Campaign Assessment Process is included as an example of how an organization can evaluate accuracy and precision and recognize change.

Overview of the Environment

The Indo–Asia–Pacific is economically, politically, socially and militarily complex. A region vast in area and diversity, it presents unique challenges and opportunities to senior decisionmakers. USARPAC’s area of responsibility includes 36 countries, 52 percent of the earth’s surface, 17 percent of the earth’s land mass and 60 percent of the earth’s population. There are 3,000 different languages spoken in the region, and five of the world’s most dominant religions are observed.³ Economically, the area includes the world’s three largest and seven

smallest economies and generates over half of the world's gross domestic product. Two-thirds of the world's oil and one-third of its shipping transit the region.⁴ Additionally, last year "40 percent of global economic growth was attributed to the region."⁵ Politically, the citizens of the Indo-Asia-Pacific represent the world's largest democracy, largest communist state and smallest republic—and suffer under one of the world's most oppressive dictatorships. Finally, five of America's seven mutual-defense treaty allies and five declared nuclear nations are located within the region.⁶

Although perceived primarily as a maritime environment, the land component maintains primacy in several areas: the majority of the nations in the region are led militarily by army flag officers; six of the world's largest ground forces are in the Pacific region; and of USPACOM's assigned strength, the land component represents the highest percentage, with the U.S. Army contributing more than 100,000 assigned personnel.⁷

Although currently stable, there are regional provocation cycles that periodically threaten stability. North Korea, with a military of approximately one million personnel, has 4,100 tanks and 8,500 artillery pieces; it "displays a propensity to use violence and provocations as part of a coercive strategy."⁸ "In recent years, North Korea has emphasized its asymmetric capabilities, including several hundred ballistic missiles, the world's second-largest chemical stockpile, a biological weapons research program, the world's largest special operations force and an active cyber warfare capability."⁹

In China, the land component is the largest element of the People's Liberation Army, with 18 separate corps dispersed among seven military area commands.¹⁰ The USPACOM commander states that China has "demonstrated belligerence . . . a willingness to assert its controversial claims of sovereignty . . . and raises doubts about the representation that China is interested in a peaceful rise."¹¹ The territorial disputes over the Senkaku and Spratly Islands combined with other border tensions—such as the ones between Cambodia and Thailand, China and India and Bangladesh and Burma—represent disputes within USPACOM's region directly related to the land domain.¹²

Furthermore, according to the Global Terrorism Index for 2014, India, the Philippines and Thailand represent three of the top ten countries in the world with the highest number of deaths by terrorism. Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are recognized as countries most at risk for increased levels of terrorism.¹³ These statistics, along with the approximately 100 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks that occur each month in the region, are indicative of tension and hostilities occurring within the land domain.¹⁴

Finally, over 80 percent of the world's most lethal natural disasters occur within the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Last year alone, there were 161 separate natural disaster events impacting more than 87 million people and costing over 58 billion dollars.¹⁵ During these times of crisis it is the indigenous land forces in the region, on the ground and in the villages, who provide the majority of assistance to the population. It is through this challenging array of factors that the campaign design team has developed a comprehensive campaign framework for the Theater Army in the Pacific.

Sub-campaigns, Lines of Effort and the Campaign

A critical responsibility of a theater army is to effectively integrate land forces into a Combatant Commander's Scheme of Maneuver.¹⁶ Effective integration among components,

across all phases of military operations, is vital to success in today's complex environment. History is rife with examples wherein an integration deficit among key stakeholders led to unnecessary expenditure of resources and, at times, defeat. In conflict, synergistic effects achieved through the seamless integration of joint capabilities place adversaries in a position of distinct disadvantage. Whether conducting humanitarian assistance, disaster response, stability operations or combined-arms maneuver, the joint force commander's integration of air, sea and land capabilities with a unified purpose accomplishes military objectives in a campaign.

A detailed analysis of USPACOM's strategic documents, the Army Chief of Staff's vision and USARPAC command priorities enabled the USARPAC design team to develop a Theater Army Campaign Support Plan. The USARPAC Theater Campaign Support Plan, as it supports the USPACOM commander's campaign, provides a five-year roadmap for the theater army. The plan ensures "all actions are aligned to meet the desired end states of developing resilient partnerships that enhance regional capabilities and developing a flexible and agile force positioned to deter aggression and rapidly respond to threats or provide humanitarian assistance where and when required."¹⁷

Central to the USARPAC plan are three specific sub-campaigns that provide a framework for articulating the primary focus of specific activities and objectives. USARPAC's Crisis Response, Advance Common Interest and Build Joint Team Capabilities sub-campaigns describe how USARPAC, as part of a joint team, prevents conflict, shapes the environment and resolves conflicts.

The Crisis Response sub-campaign includes those objectives that relate to the preparation and placement of capabilities within the region to respond to crisis. Whether the crisis is humanitarian assistance, disaster response or one that requires combined-arms maneuver, USARPAC oversees force posture and the readiness of assets necessary to respond to crisis or conflict. USARPAC provides security in the region and prevents conflict by ensuring that the land component is postured to respond to incidents that threaten security, stability and national interest. Activities associated with ensuring the theater is set and defending the homeland are represented within this sub-campaign.

The Advancing Common Interests sub-campaign describes those activities that focus primarily on establishing and maintaining relationships and increasing land-force interoperability among allies and partners in the region. USARPAC's security cooperation and exercise program, which coordinates more than 170 engagements and 24 large-scale multinational exercises annually, are represented within this sub-campaign.¹⁸ Emphasizing common interests among land forces allows for the identification and attainment of mutual goals, provides clarity of understanding and decreases the potential for miscalculation.

Building Joint Team Capabilities describes the initiatives that increase joint interoperability among services, improve land domain effectiveness and enhance access to the global commons. Integrated into this sub-campaign are objectives that directly support synchronization of all USPACOM land component entities—specifically, Marine Forces Pacific, Special Operations Command Pacific and U.S. Army Pacific. Additionally, activities that support maintaining access to the global commons embody much of this sub-campaign.


The goal of the campaign design team was to develop objectives that support multiple sub-campaigns. A prime example is Pacific Pathways; this innovative application of land forces places a tailored regionally-aligned unit, having attained high readiness through home station

and Combat Training Center experience, in motion west of the International Date Line for an extended period of time. Focused on participating in planned multinational exercises, Pacific Pathways *Advances Common Interests* through integration into the combatant commander’s exercise program wherein participants conduct exercises based on the interests of all parties involved, with host-nation desires having primacy. Pacific Pathways *Builds Joint Team Capability* and increases joint interoperability through the multinational and multiservice aspects of the exercises. Finally, participating land forces develop an increased level of readiness and have the opportunity to rehearse aspects of possible crisis scenarios.

Figure 1

Theater Campaign Support Plan Framework

U.S. Army Pacific uses the Shape, Posture, Ready and Communicate Lines of Effort to advance initiatives within the Crisis Response, Advance Common Interests and Building Joint Team Capability sub-campaigns. These initiatives lead to the achievement of specific objectives and desired end states.



Integral to the execution of the three sub-campaigns are USARPAC’s four Lines of Effort (LOEs). According to Army doctrine, LOEs “link multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.”¹⁹ The Shape, Posture, Ready and Communicate LOEs provide focus and precision to the campaign activities and serve as the foundation of the entire campaign process.

These four LOEs also ensure that the USARPAC Headquarters remains focused on theater-level responsibilities. Within the USARPAC staff, each LOE has a designated general officer and office of primary responsibility to guide and synchronize LOE activities.

The Shape LOE is responsible for the synchronization and facilitation of all activities associated with enabling command initiatives through partner nations within the region. The Shape LOE has primacy for coordinating security cooperation activities and ensures each engagement is synchronized to support all campaign objectives. More specifically, Shape strives to develop partner-nation advocacy for command priorities and to support every initiative that involves the 36 nations within the region. These activities, which prepare the operating environment and are focused on both partners and adversaries, are described by the commander as “actions we take to impact something other than us.”²⁰ Along with the Communicate LOE, Shape activities enable USARPAC initiatives within the region.

The Posture LOE is responsible for all activities associated with establishing and maintaining appropriate forces, footprints and agreements within the region. Posture describes actions that ensure the right assets are in the right footprints with appropriate host-nation agreements to enable a flexible response to regional requirements. More simply stated, Posture describes “where we are and what we have there.”²¹

The Ready LOE is responsible for all activities associated with ensuring USARPAC units are manned, trained and equipped to respond when and where required. Coordinating within the entire Army to ensure that USARPAC has the appropriate allocation of required capabilities—and ensuring that those capabilities maintain the appropriate readiness level—is the responsibility of the Ready LOE.²²

The Communicate LOE is responsible for clearly articulating the theater army’s message. This LOE develops strategies and focuses on message targeting and sequencing to build advocacy for USARPAC initiatives and objectives. These audiences include joint, interagency and government decisionmakers, allies and partners, as well as potential adversaries. Communicate describes “how [USARPAC] stays connected.”²³

USARPAC’s efforts to place humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) and training “activity sets” throughout the region illustrate the designed interaction of the LOEs. Through the analysis of historical HA/DR data, appreciation of host-nation capabilities and recognition of potential training opportunities, the Posture LOE identifies optimal partner-nation locations and requirements for recommended USARPAC activity sets. The Posture LOE synchronizes this information with U.S. Marine and special operations capabilities and requirements in the region to ensure that USARPAC activity sets are optimized for the entire land domain. Armed with this analysis, the Shape LOE develops a synchronized engagement strategy aimed at gaining partner-nation support for the positioning of specific assets in identified locations. The Ready LOE works with the Department of the Army and through USPACOM with DoD to identify and secure asset-sourcing solutions. Most important, the Communicate LOE develops a coordinated communication strategy, with consistent messaging, for use by all LOEs to ensure that the commander’s purpose and intent are clearly articulated.

Collectively the four LOEs create unity of effort within the USARPAC command to ensure the synchronization of theater army responsibilities. As described by the USARPAC commander, “The four lines of effort drive plans and operations and ensure all actions are aligned to meet the desired end states of developing resilient partnerships that enhance regional capabilities,

and developing a flexible and agile force positioned to deter aggression and rapidly respond to threats or provide humanitarian assistance where and when required.”²⁴

Structuring the Organization to Support Campaign Operations

A campaign design is more than identifying objectives, creating sub-campaigns and identifying LOEs. Structuring the organization to optimize effectiveness and to ensure staff investment in the accomplishment of campaign objectives is equally important. The challenge for those responsible for campaign development is to ensure that all in the organization understand their role within the campaign. Planners must strive to develop a framework that accounts for the organizational structure and clearly articulates how organizational efforts support campaign activities.

To create this campaign efficiency the USARPAC commander implemented five unique organizational changes to better align activities in support of campaign operations:

- establishing a Theater Joint Force Land Component Coordination Cell to coordinate land component activities per USPACOM direction;
- regionally and functionally aligning the command’s flag officer leadership;
- consolidating the staff entities most directly responsible for Shape and Communicate activities into a Strategy and Effects Directorate;
- creating a Special Programs Division to ensure that unique capabilities were consolidated under a single colonel-level division; and
- establishing the USARPAC Coordination Element in Korea to coordinate and execute theater army activities on the Korean Peninsula.

In response to the USPACOM commander’s designation of the USARPAC commander as the theater joint force land component commander (TJFLCC), USARPAC created the Theater Joint Force Land Component Coordination Cell (TJFLC-CC). Manned with Marine Forces Pacific and USARPAC personnel, the TJFLC-CC was established through the reassignment of personnel from within both headquarters. The TJFLC-CC maintains situational awareness across the land domain, integrates land-domain operating centers and coordinates land-domain employment options for the TJFLC-CC to recommend to the USPACOM commander.²⁵

Given the USARPAC commander’s dual appointment within USPACOM, the USARPAC staff must operate from a comprehensive land-domain perspective. This requires USARPAC Headquarters to become oriented on joint land component solutions. This designation also places the USARPAC commander in a position to advocate for the entire land domain through USPACOM to DoD for Marine Corps and special operations requirements.

To increase command presence in the region, increase the frequency and scope of engagements and leverage the flag officers within the command, the USARPAC commander designated the geographical and functional alignment of five flag officers. These deputy commanding generals (DCGs) assist the commanding general in the fulfillment of command responsibilities, provide an extension of command authority, represent the commanding general in all manner of activities and ensure actions are executed in a manner that supports the commander’s intent.”²⁶

The geographically-aligned deputies strengthen regional relationships through increased general officer contact with partner-nation land forces and provide mission command for activities that do not require an operational commander.²⁷ The DCG–North and the DCG–South

divide regional responsibilities and spend much of their time each year engaging allies and partners in the region. This includes participating in the design of exercises and creating a set of agreed-to activities to be jointly undertaken. By creating geographically-aligned deputies, the USARPAC commander is able to increase command presence and gain more timely insights associated with potential land-domain issues and opportunities within the region. This approach ensures consistent contact with allies and partners in the region, strengthens land-domain relationships and sends a clear message on U.S. Army commitment.²⁸

The deputy commanding generals for Sustainment, Homeland Defense and Reserve Integration are USARPAC's three functionally aligned DCGs. The commander of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command serves as the DCG for Sustainment. In this capacity he provides a mission-command element for logistic-centric operations; manages prepositioned stocks, port operations and assessments; oversees Army watercraft operations; and is responsible for the management of sustainment activities throughout the region. Ultimately the DCG–Sustainment integrates Army sustainment capabilities and organizes to sustain unified land operations.²⁹

The deputy commanders for Homeland Defense and Reserve Integration interface with the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Army Reserve Command; oversee state partnership programs; provide subject-matter expertise and unique mission-command capability for humanitarian assistance and defense support to civil authority; and integrate National Guard and Reserve assets into theater activities.³⁰

The USARPAC commander directed the establishment of a Strategy and Effects Directorate during staff reorganization. A member of the Senior Executive Service and a former brigade-level commander lead the command's Security Cooperation, Civil Military, Public Affairs, Special Programs Division, Protocol and Information Operations staff sections. This directorate is responsible for synchronizing staff interaction and strategic messaging with those elements most directly involved with executing strategic engagements and coordinating desired effects both at home and abroad.

The Special Programs Division consolidates the command's Space, Special Technical Operations and Cyber Electro Magnetic Activities sections under a single colonel-level division. This reflects USARPAC's belief that the integration of space and cyber capabilities is becoming increasingly important to maintaining freedom of maneuver in today's environment. The consolidation of these staff elements elevates the visibility of these often-overlooked critical capabilities and creates a senior staff advocate responsible for ensuring the collective integration of these capabilities throughout the command. Furthermore, this division is instrumental in providing the collective analysis and identification of potential gaps and vulnerabilities within the space and cyber domains.

The USARPAC Coordination Element (UCE), a rotating element from the USARPAC Headquarters, is deployed on the Korean Peninsula to coordinate and execute theater army responsibilities in direct support of United States Forces Korea. Not to be mistaken for a liaison, the UCE is integrated at multiple locations and is optimized to fuse information, connect key nodes, enhance staff integration, increase situational awareness and enhance USARPAC responsiveness.


Integrating Environmental and Campaign Assessments

The environment is inherently dynamic. All diplomatic, political, military and economic actions are inputs into the environmental system that create change. The magnitude and

consequences of these changes are often difficult to detect and evaluate; superficial assessment processes have the potential to drastically decrease the effectiveness of any campaign design. Accordingly, campaign objectives stimulate the environment and require a deliberate process to recognize positive and negative effects. Failing to do so ultimately increases the likelihood of missed opportunities and unintended consequences.

Figure 2
U.S. Army Pacific Campaign Process

Theater Campaign Support Plan is developed through analysis of higher strategic intent and is put into action through the orders and assessment process. The four Lines of Effort serve as the foundation underpinning all analysis, execution, coordination and assessment activities.



Source: U.S. Army Pacific

To meet this requirement, USARPAC implemented a two-part Campaign Assessment Process with the intent of recognizing whether environmental conditions were receptive to campaign inputs, whether those inputs were achieving the intended consequence and how the resulting changes would influence future activities. This process includes specific Environmental and Campaign Assessments that are integrated during the Executive Steering Board to provide increased overall awareness.

Led by the Strategy and Effects Directorate, the Environmental Assessment is based on inputs from internal and external organizations positioned to report on the elements of national power within the region. This information is consolidated to provide a detailed analysis of the political, military, social, infrastructure and information aspects of the environment. Most important, the Environmental Assessment is the precursor to all campaign-focused meetings and serves to identify potential influences on campaign-related activities.

The Operational Analysis Branch leads the Campaign Assessment processes. They analyze measures of effectiveness and measures of performance based on objectives, desired effects and overall end states. This analysis assists in determining accuracy and precision and in answering two standard questions: “Are we doing things right and are we doing the right things?”

The quarterly Executive Steering Board presents the commander and his deputy commanders with both the Environmental and Campaign Assessments. This board provides the commander the opportunity to assess the environment, understand the status of key initiatives, identify opportunities and potential setbacks, receive staff inputs and decide on campaign adjustments.

Conclusion

The Indo–Asia–Pacific is a complex region with strategically significant economic, political and military dynamics and unique challenges and opportunities. The dynamic military environment and regional influences mandate an approach that leverages the unique capabilities of all service components. Through the creation of sub-campaigns that focus on Crisis Response, Advancing Common Interests, Building Joint Team Capabilities and the integration of specific Lines of Effort, USARPAC has created a campaign design that ensures a synchronized approach to land-domain activities. This framework, combined with adjustments to the organizational structure and deliberate assessment process, helps ensure that USARPAC activities support both the Chief of Staff of the Army’s strategy for the Army and the USPACOM commander’s strategy for the region. The result is an integrated approach that synchronizes the unique capabilities of land-domain forces, maintains security and stability and safeguards America’s interests in the region.

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