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Unified and Joint Land Operations: Doctrine for Landpower

John A. Bonin

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**Unified and Joint Land Operations:
Doctrine for Landpower**

by

John A. Bonin

The Institute of Land Warfare
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER

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LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 102, August 2014

Unified and Joint Land Operations: Doctrine for Landpower

by John A. Bonin

Dr. John A. Bonin is the Professor, Concepts and Doctrine for the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. After graduating from AWC in 1995, he remained as the Director of Army Planning for seven years before retiring from active service.

A 1972 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, Colonel Bonin held a variety of field and academic positions during a career spanning more than 30 years. This included troop duty at Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Knox, Kentucky, as well as two tours in West Germany. He also spent three years as an assistant professor of military history at West Point and served two years as an instructor at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Dr. Bonin also has a master's degree in military history from Duke University and a doctorate in American military history from Temple University, where he studied under the late Professor Russell Weigley.

Dr. Bonin has served as AWC's civilian doctrine advisor since April 2003. He has twice been selected as the General of the Army George G. Marshall Chair of Military Studies. In addition to duty as a seminar instructor, he has served as a seminar historian, battlefield guide, instructor for the Joint Land Component Commander's Course and lead author of Joint Publication 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*; he also offers an elective on landpower for both the resident and nonresident courses. In June 2014, Dr. Bonin was one of eight faculty members to receive an inaugural service award.

This paper represents the opinions of the author and should not be taken to represent the views of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States government, the Institute of Land Warfare or the Association of the United States Army or its members.

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
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Foreword

Since the U.S. Army's initial organization for combat in World War II in North Africa in 1943, numerous land operations have been conducted involving joint and multinational forces. In addition, U.S. Army officers have frequently attempted to serve both as theater commanders and land component commanders (LCCs). While U.S. defeats early on in Tunisia or Korea could not be solely attributed to the lack of a separate ground component, the failure to effectively conduct land control operations contributed. Likewise, the difficulties in the last days of the Persian Gulf War and in Kosovo were perhaps beyond the expectations of a single ground commander to resolve. But during land operations in Normandy and Okinawa, separate LCCs successfully ensured proper coordination with other components and reduced the joint force commander's span of control, allowing him to focus at the strategic level. Most recently, operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been enhanced by utilizing a single joint/multinational forces land-focused commander, separate from the coalition/joint force commander and supported by a theater army headquarters serving as a theater-wide joint force land component commander.

Looking to the future, the U.S. Army has reevaluated its doctrine for the employment of landpower. The Army has completed a series of 15 Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs). ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, reflects an intellectual growth from the previous Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, and the Army's recent combat experience. It describes how Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as unified action. Army forces conduct decisive and sustainable land operations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations (or defense support of civil authorities) appropriate to the mission and environment. Army forces do not operate independently but as part of a larger joint, interagency and frequently multinational effort. Today the United States faces contemporary challenges in providing centralized command of land forces as part of joint/multinational forces. The Army's new Unified Land Operations doctrine, found in ADP 3-0 and FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps and Division Operations*, is fully compatible with the joint land operations doctrine found in the February 2014 version of Joint Publication 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. The simultaneous development of Army and joint doctrine has ensured that the requisite guidance needed for successful land control operations in the land domain benefits from both historic and recent operational experience employing both joint and multinational land forces.



Gordon R. Sullivan
General, U.S. Army Retired
President, Association of the United States Army

11 August 2014

Unified and Joint Land Operations: Doctrine for Landpower

We are convinced that significant operational flexibility is provided the combatant commander when Army corps and division headquarters are prepared to function as the core element of a joint task force or as a joint land component command.

General Raymond T. Odierno,
Chief of Staff, Army¹

Introduction

As the United States Army looks to the future, it has reevaluated its doctrine for the employment of landpower and completed its new series of 15 Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs). *Unified Land Operations*, ADP 3-0, reflects an intellectual growth from the Army's previous Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, and its recent combat experience. It describes how Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as "unified action." Army forces conduct decisive and sustainable land operations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations (or defense support of civil authorities) appropriate to the mission and environment. Army forces do not operate independently but as part of a larger joint, interagency and frequently multinational effort.² Based on Department of Defense strategic guidance, the Army has a distinct role in 10 of 11 specified missions across the range of military operations.³ In addition, as indicated above, the Army is prepared to provide its corps and division headquarters for duty as joint task force (JTF) or joint force land component commands (JFLCC).

Landpower

According to ADP 1, *The Army*, "The Army gives the United States landpower. *Landpower* is the ability—by threat, force or occupation—to gain, sustain and exploit control over land, resources and people."⁴ ADP 1 continues by stating that landpower includes the ability to:

- impose the nation's will on an enemy, by force if necessary;
- engage to influence, shape, prevent and deter in any operational environment;
- establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic growth;

- address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and man-made—to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services; and
- secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land and maritime domains of an operational environment.⁵

ADP 1 and the *Army Posture Statement* also describe several characteristics of landpower. The Army has been, and will continue to be, a critical part of the joint force because landpower remains decisive and is essential to America’s National Security Strategy. No major conflict has ever been won without “boots on the ground.” Joint campaigns require continuous concentric pressure exerted by all U.S. military forces, and those of partner nations, while working closely with civilian agencies. Soldiers not only seize, occupy and defend land area; they can also remain in the region until they secure the nation’s long-term objectives. Inserting ground troops is the most tangible measure of America’s commitment to defend its interests, protect its friends and defeat its enemies.⁶

But is the Army’s new unified land operations doctrine compatible with the historic joint and multinational application of land forces since World War II and with current joint doctrine for land operations? While the conduct of land operations has changed significantly since World War II, Army doctrine for the employment of Army forces in multinational and joint land operations has lagged.

Historical Background

World War II–North Africa. For the Allied invasion of North Africa, General Dwight D. Eisenhower served as both supreme allied commander and commanding general, North African Theater of Operations U.S. Army during Operation Torch in November 1942. In the latter capacity, he followed Army doctrine contained in FM 100-15, *Field Service Regulations Larger Units*, 29 June 1942.⁷ Operationally, he employed three geographic task forces to control the initial widely separated landings. Later, Eisenhower utilized air and sea component commanders but organized his ground forces along national lines with British, French and U.S. land commanders reporting directly to him. As the drive toward Tunis bogged down, Eisenhower could not adequately coordinate the ground efforts from his headquarters (HQ) in Algiers. He faced numerous political–military problems dealing with the French and the challenge of keeping both Washington and London informed. After the Allied repulses at Kasserine Pass, due both to poor command relationships of all components and to inexperience, Eisenhower restructured his command. Not only were all air elements brought under centralized control, but he consolidated all land forces under British General Harold Alexander’s 18th Army Group. This formed the first structure comprising modern joint and combined organization with coequal land, maritime and air component commanders under a theater commander and significantly contributed to the rapid defeat of the Axis in North Africa by May 1943.⁸ (See figure 1.)

World War II–Northwest Europe. For the invasion of France a year later, General Eisenhower exercised command similarly through three British functional component commanders: 21st Army Group (General Bernard Montgomery), air (Air Marshall Trafford Leigh-Mallory) and maritime (Admiral Bertram Ramsay). However, on 1 August, as General Omar Bradley’s 12th U.S. Army Group took control of U.S. forces breaking out at St. Lo, General Montgomery became a coequal land commander. General Eisenhower retained overall ground command as well as supreme command, but he delegated control through General Montgomery until September 1944. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower controlled, from Supreme Headquarters Allied




Figure 1 – Allied Command Relationships in North Africa and the Mediterranean, March 1943

Powers Europe, separate air and sea component commanders as well as eventually three land-centric army groups. As a “ground forces officer” Eisenhower believed, as did his staff, that they could perform both theater and ground force headquarters duties. However, several times during the campaign Eisenhower’s ability to perform both roles would be questioned, most notably during the Battle of the Bulge when General Montgomery was given control of the northern half of the entire front. Montgomery repeatedly requested unified control of all Allied ground forces (under himself) for a “single decisive thrust.” Eisenhower argued that his retaining ground command eliminated any perceived preferences for either the Americans or the British.⁹

World War II–Pacific. During the war in the Pacific, the most notable instance of Army/Marine Corps integration was the battle for Okinawa. Admiral Chester Nimitz served as the commander of Pacific Ocean Areas with Admiral Raymond Spruance commanding the Central Pacific and 5th Fleet. Vice Admiral Kelly Turner commanded the joint expeditionary force for the operation as Task Force (TF) 51. Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commanded the Joint Expeditionary Troops (TF 56) and Tenth Army. Tenth Army consisted of XXIV Corps (7th and 96th Divisions); III Amphibious Corps (1st and 6th Marine Divisions), commanded by Major General Roy Geiger; and three divisions (27th, 77th Infantry and 2nd Marine) in reserve. The Tactical Air Forces consisted of the 2nd Marine Air Wing and Army Air Force elements under Major General Francis P. Mulcahy, United States Marine Corps (USMC). The Island Command under Major General F. G. Wallace provided Army-level enabling troops—primarily from the U.S. Army—that grew to more than 150,000 personnel by June 1945.¹⁰ (See figure 2.)




Figure 2 – Organization of Expeditionary Troops for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945

General Buckner requested a joint staff for TF 56 and received augmentation by 60 Navy and Marine personnel and a Marine chief of staff. During planning for the operation, Tenth Army found it necessary to enlarge the troop list by 70,000 Army troops to include greater

numbers of supporting combat elements and service units. General Buckner also made known that he felt that Major General Geiger was capable of handling a field Army. When General Buckner was killed during the final push, Admiral Turner gave command of Tenth Army immediately to General Geiger until General Joseph Stilwell could arrive.

Korea

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur served as the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Far East, with his headquarters in Tokyo. He initially exercised command in Korea through air, naval and land (Eighth Army) components. However, for the landings at Inchon, General MacArthur created X Corps out of his General Headquarters troops: the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. Even after out-loading and moving to the east coast at Wonson, X Corps remained under MacArthur's direct control, with Major General Ned Almond, his chief of staff, as commander. In addition, MacArthur gave the Eighth Army commander the responsibility of providing logistical support to X Corps. This created a physical gap between the two commands that the Chinese exploited in their winter 1950 offensive. X Corps only joined Eighth Army on 26 December 1950 after being evacuated under pressure from ports in northern Korea.¹² Ultimately, by July 1953, Eighth U.S. Army evolved into a combination field and theater army that served as the coalition land forces headquarters commanding almost one million United Nations ground personnel, of which over 590,000 were Republic of Korea (ROK) troops (see figure 3).¹³

Vietnam

General William Westmoreland served from 1964 to 1968 as both commander of the sub-unified U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam under U.S. Pacific Command and commander of U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV). Unlike Korea, no combined command over South Vietnamese or other Free World Military Forces was established due to nationalist sensitivities.¹⁴ As deputy USARV commander, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer strongly recommended that USARV be converted to a field army with operational control of all Army combat forces (seven-plus divisions in Vietnam by 1967). But Westmoreland's desires—to parallel the South Vietnamese structure, which combined their joint and army chiefs and staff, and to retain direct ground command over two U.S. Army Field Forces and the III Marine Amphibious Force—prevailed (see figure 4 on page 6).¹⁵ This arrangement seriously overloaded Westmoreland and his staffs with direct control of all U.S. operations, direct command of all U.S. Army elements, management of the advisory and assistance efforts and politico-military functions of a combined theater-level command.

In January 1968, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), General Harold K. Johnson, directed a comprehensive review and analysis of Army command and control structures in Vietnam.¹⁶ The resulting report determined that “the doctrinal trend since World War I has provided increasing authority to the unified commander to directly exercise operational control of land combat forces.”¹⁷ The report found that “eliminating the Army component headquarters from the operational control channel . . . may create a difficult and awkward situation. . . . A better solution might be to use the Army component headquarters as the senior Army tactical headquarters having responsibility for both tactical and administrative support.”¹⁸ While not having a separate joint and multinational ground commander in Vietnam may not have been one of the United States's worst mistakes in that conflict, it contributed to the lack of unity of effort and diffused focus that affected the results.




Figure 3 – U.S. Army in Korea, 27 July 1953

Persian Gulf

General Norman Schwarzkopf, as the commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), followed the precedence discussed above by serving as the U.S. joint commander in a parallel command structure with his Saudi counterparts. While he had an Army Central (ARCENT) component in 3d Army, he declined to form an overarching land command. General Schwarzkopf's main reason for retaining joint ground command to himself was to avoid offending either Arab or Marine sensitivities. Additionally, he wanted to avoid creating another four-star land headquarters to control 3d Army/ARCENT's two corps, the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Arab land forces. Lieutenant General John Yeosock, ARCENT commander, established the Coalition, Coordination Communications and Integration Center (C3IC) under the Joint Military Committee to achieve unity of effort between Saudi and U.S. forces





Figure 4 – U.S./Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces/Free World Command Relationships, Vietnam, 1967

while maintaining the independence of both. Schwarzkopf did task the 3d Army staff with the responsibility of developing the overall ground operations plan in conjunction with the Marines and Arab Coalition partners, and he used his deputy commander, Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, as his primary assistant for ground combat issues. This convoluted arrangement violated the principles of simplicity and unity of command; created numerous challenges and difficulties in the coordinated application of air- and landpower; and contributed to the failure to destroy the Republican Guard (see figure 5).¹⁹



ARCENT – U.S. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command | CENTAF – U.S. Air Forces, U.S. Central Command | JFACC – Joint Force Air Component Command | MARCENT – U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Central Command | MEF – Marine Expeditionary Force | NAVCENT – U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command | SOCCENT – Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command

Figure 5 – Desert Shield/Desert Storm Command Relationships

Absence of JFLCC Doctrine

Actual doctrinal development significantly lagged behind experience and innovations in the field. After 1973 and the final issuance of FM 100-15, *Large Unit Operation*, the Army had become more interested in doctrine for corps and below.²⁰ While a functional land component command had been a joint force commander (JFC) option since 1986, the Army had not been interested in pushing for this. Historically, many Army commanders had served both as overall joint/multinational commander and as their own joint forces land component commander (JFLCC). In addition, the Marines opposed the concept of a JFLCC as they did not want to be dismembered by the two functional components: joint force air component commander (JFACC) and JFLCC. Post-Desert Storm, General Binford Peay, Commander, USCENTCOM, designated the ARCENT commander as Deputy JFLCC as an interim measure. Prior to 1995, no joint doctrine existed on JFLCC, and it received only a passing comment in the 1995 FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*.²¹ However, in 1996 the U.S. Army War College began producing a JFLCC Primer for instructional use.²² In April 1997, in response to an Army request, the Air Land Sea Application Center published a JFLCC Study that recommended against development of stand-alone JFLCC doctrine.²³

However, on 23 June 1998, after Operation Desert Thunder, Marine General Anthony C. Zinni, USCENTCOM, designated Lieutenant General Tommy Franks, Commanding General, ARCENT, as his JFLCC for operations in the Middle East. Zinni's action marked the first use of a formally designated functional land component commander and preceded actual joint doctrine.²⁴ At his retirement ceremony, General Zinni stated, "We can make the land component command arrangement work. There will be no more occasions in the Central Command's area of operations where Marines . . . fight one ground war and the Army fights a different ground war. There will be one ground war and a single land component commander."²⁵

Kosovo

During NATO Operation Allied Force in March 1999, General Wesley Clark as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) knew that "by doctrine . . . I would need to place someone in charge of the ground component."²⁶ But due to the political restrictions and the "short war syndrome," he established neither a combined nor a joint force land component commander for either the NATO operation or its associated U.S. operation. Consequently, he gave instructions to three U.S. and NATO land commanders separately. Admiral James Ellis—the NATO commander responsible for Allied Force and the U.S. commander of JTF Noble Anvil—concluded that ruling out a ground operation probably prolonged the air operation. He also stated that "the lack of a land component commander" to coordinate NATO actions in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo "was doctrinally flawed and operationally dangerous."²⁷ See figure 6 on the following page for the command and control relationships.

Development of JFLCC Doctrine

Following the problematic deployment of TF Hawk for Kosovo, General Eric K. Shinseki, the CSA, announced on 12 October 1999, "To improve strategic responsiveness, we will enable our Army service component commands [ASCCs] to function both as joint force land component command [JFLCC] and as Army Force [ARFOR] headquarters" and "we will enable our corps to function as JFLCC, ARFOR and joint task force [JTF] HQ."²⁸ General Shinseki's statements generated a renewed interest in actual JFLCC doctrine within the Army.




Figure 6 – Command Relationships Operation Allied Force (1 June 1999)

This resulted in a meeting in November 1999 at the new U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) hosted by Lieutenant General Thomas Burnette (Deputy CG, USJFCOM) to develop a solution to General Shinseki’s guidance (see figure 7). The primary points of this meeting included:

- Solid Army doctrine existed for corps and below as well as joint doctrine for joint task forces and above.
 - Joint doctrine adequately covers how commanders in chief (CINCs) and JTF commanders should operate.
 - Army doctrine for tactical units (corps, divisions, etc.) is also strong.
- However, voids and gaps existed in Army and joint doctrine for JFLCCs and ASCCs.
 - FM 100-7 addresses ARFOR and ASCC, but that publication is under revision.
 - There is no substantive joint doctrine for a JFLCC.
- The Army will continue to revise FM 100-7 to include doctrine for JFLCC.
- A new joint publication (JP) for joint land operations will be developed.²⁹

The Army submitted a proposal to the J7/Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in January 2000. The JWFC conducted a front-end analysis to provide an unbiased assessment of the proposal. The Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) approved development of JFLCC doctrine in April 2000. The Joint Staff directed the Army to serve as the lead agent on the development of JFLCC doctrine, with the Marine Corps supporting as the technical review authority (TRA). As




Figure 7 – Status of Doctrine (November 1999)

an interim, the Army and USMC also developed a JFLCC Handbook in April 2000 based on the U.S. Army War College JFLCC Primer that was officially published in December 2001 as FM 3-31/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.7. The joint staff published the first version of JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, in March 2004, after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on 11 September 2001.

Following General Peay, General Franks became the commander of CENTCOM. He also designated his replacement at ARCENT as the JFLCC in his war plans. Consequently, Lieutenant General P. T. Mikolashek assumed control of the land operations in the Afghanistan Joint Operations Area (JOA) in November 2001 for the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom and was designated the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC). As such Mikolashek controlled a unique combination of Army, Marines, special operations forces and Northern Alliance allies during the defeat of the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies (see figure 8 on the following page).³⁰

On 7 September 2002, Lieutenant General David McKiernan replaced Lieutenant General Mikolashek as the commanding general of Third Army/ARCENT and CFLCC. From September through March 2003, McKiernan supervised the preparation of CFLCC theater forces, coordinated with the other components and coalition partners, received in Kuwait almost 300,000 troops and completed the coalition land operations plan. To convert to a CFLCC headquarters, ARCENT gained more than 70 Marines and over 150 joint and coalition officers.³¹ Beginning 20 March 2003, Third Army/CFLCC conducted Operation Iraqi Freedom, supervising two large corps-sized forces (V Corps and I MEF) as well as more than 56,000 theater-level troops




Figure 8 – Command Relationships in Operation Enduring Freedom

during the defeat of Saddam Hussein. With the fall of Saddam’s regime in May 2003, General McKiernan assumed duties as the commander of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-Iraq, initially responsible for conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations country-wide. However, General Franks wanted ARCENT out of Iraq as soon as possible and refocused on its theater-wide responsibilities. On 15 June 2003, V Corps under Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez assumed duties as CJTF-7 with responsibility as the senior coalition headquarters for Iraq. From June 2003 to the present, ARCENT relocated to Kuwait, where it serves as the theater CFLCC, coordinating land planning and supporting land operations throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). See figure 9.³²

Beginning in September 2003, to adjust the Army to meet the requirements of the 21st century, CSA General Peter Schoomaker reorganized the Army. Under the concept of modularity, the Army moved toward more autonomous brigade combat teams no longer organic to a division headquarters. Modular corps and division headquarters provided the command and control structure into which capabilities-based BCTs and multifunctional or functional support brigades could be organized to meet geographic combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) requirements. In addition, theater army headquarters were redesigned to serve as ASCC headquarters. All types of modular division, corps and army headquarters were able to accept joint capabilities such as Standing Joint Force Headquarters elements. These headquarters had an organic capability, depending on the contingency, to perform the functions required of a JTF, a JFLCC headquarters or a multinational headquarters such as a CFLCC.




Figure 9 – Command Relationships in Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003)

Recent Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

During recent operations, a land component commander has not always been clearly designated. On 15 May 2004, Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) was formed out of CJTF-7 along with Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I). MNC-I directly supervised most of the coalition ground combat forces (U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and coalition) conducting stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq. This mission rotated among several U.S. Army corps headquarters. Consequently, MNC-I served as the de facto CFLCC for MNF-I.³³ In 2010, MNF-I converted to United States Forces–Iraq and absorbed I Corps, then serving as MNC-I. In addition, as operations shifted to focus on Afghanistan during 2009, U.S. forces surged to more than 100,000. NATO’s International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) formed the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) as a corps-level command to manage the ground operations of the several regional commands. In July 2011, I Corps became the nucleus of the IJC and the de facto CFLCC for Afghanistan and has subsequently been replaced by other U.S. Army corps headquarters in succession.³⁴

Current Joint Land Doctrine

On 24 February 2014 the Director of the Joint Staff signed the latest version of JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. This publication—a change in lieu of revision from JP 3-31 of 29 June 2010—incorporates the latest joint doctrine and reflects on recent experience in joint land operations. JP 3-31 provides a JFC several organizational options for employment of landpower in a theater by maintaining unity of effort among joint or multinational land forces.³⁵

JFLCC Authority

JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, allows a JFC to organize forces in several different ways. Combatant commanders with a geographic AOR have the authority to organize assigned or attached forces to best accomplish the mission within their theaters. One of their fundamental purposes is to achieve the synchronized cross-domain employment of all available land, maritime, air, space and special operations forces. Service component commanders may be used to direct operations, but interdependent functional component commands may also be established to orchestrate the capabilities of each service within the same domain.³⁶

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, states that “the JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more services must operate in the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command is a primary consideration.”³⁷

JP 3-0 defines the JFLCC as “the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.”³⁸ The JFLCC must be given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks by the establishing commander.

The primary purpose of a JFLCC is to employ landpower for the benefit of the joint force as a whole and to give the JFC a workable span of control. The type of command relationship given the JFLCC will be based upon the JFC’s concept of operations and political guidance. In the establishing directive, the JFC establishes the specific command authority of the JFLCC over the forces or capabilities provided by the service components or national elements. These typically include exercising operational control over assigned or attached forces and tactical control (TACON) over other military capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. Using a JFLCC eases the burden on the theater staff, frees the JFC to focus more on the strategic aspects of the campaign and provides a single ground headquarters for coordination with the other components. Normally, the service component commander with the preponderance of land forces to be tasked and the requisite command and control capabilities provides the JFLCC.³⁹

What changed in the 2014 version of JP 3-31 and why? This version updates several older joint definitions including *Joint Land Operations*, *Land Control Operations* and the *Land Domain*.

Joint Land Operations

In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations have encompassed the full diversity of air, land, maritime and space forces operating throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among all forces and the ability to communicate over large distances have made the application of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate **joint land operations** with other components' operations. Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, singly or in combination, performed across the range of military operations with land forces (Army, Marine or special operations) made available by service components in support of the JFC's operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint land operations also require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Normally, joint land operations will involve multinational land forces.⁴⁰

Joint land operations include **land control operations**. These are described as the employment of land forces, supported by maritime and air forces (as appropriate) to control vital land areas. Such operations are conducted to establish local military superiority in land operational areas. Land control operations may also be required to isolate, seize or secure weapons of mass destruction to prevent use, proliferation or loss. The key to successful land control operations is the availability and employment of resources to accomplish the mission. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, establishes the JFC's operational environment as composed of the air, land, maritime and space domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Domains are useful constructs to aid in visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations are conducted. Nothing in the definitions of or the use of the term "domain" implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy or command and control of that domain. The **land domain** is the land area of the Earth's surface ending at the high-water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals.⁴¹

Land operations are conducted in complex and diverse human and physical environments of the land domain. Numbers of civilians, amount of valuable infrastructure, avenues of approach, freedom of vehicular movement and communications functionality vary considerably among land environments, creating challenges for the JFLCC. The significant human dimension with complex cultural factors is one of the salient differences between the land and other domains. As a result, joint land operations require an effective and efficient command and control structure to achieve success (see figure 10).


Aspect	Urban	Desert	Jungle	Mountain	Subterranean
Number of civilians	High	Low	Low	Low	Low
Amount of valuable infrastructure	High	Low	Low	Low	High
Multidimensional operational environment	Yes	No	Some	Yes	Yes
Restrictive rules of engagement	Yes	No	No	No	No
Detection, observation, engagement fires	Short	Long	Short	Medium	Short
Avenues of approach	Many	Many	Few	Few	Few
Ease of vehicular movement and maneuver	Low	High	Low	Medium	N/A
Communications functionality	Degraded	Fully capable	Degraded	Degraded	Degraded
Logistics requirements	High	High	High	Medium	High

Figure 10 – Aspects of Land Environments

It is also important to understand that in today’s complex operational environment, adversary actions can be delivered on, from, within and outside the land domain, all with potentially global impacts and influence. To negate those threats, commanders at all levels must consider how cross-domain capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations.

JP 3-31 and Multiple JFLCCs

What else in JP 3-31 is new and pertinent to unified land operations? Not only can the GCC designate a JFLCC, but each subordinate JFC may also designate a JFLCC. Consequently, there may be multiple land component commanders—each with an organization, duties and responsibilities tailored to the requirements of their specific JFC—within a single AOR. Where multiple joint operations areas (JOAs) each have land operations being conducted, a theater JFLCC may also be designated directly by the GCC. The primary responsibilities of the theater JFLCC may be to provide coordination with other theater-level functional components, to provide general support to the multiple JFLCCs within the AOR, to conduct theater-level contingency planning or to conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI) for the entire joint land force. The most likely candidate for a theater JFLCC is the Army service component command (ASCC)/theater army. Within a JOA or when there is only one JFLCC in an AOR, the JFC forms a functional land component to improve combat efficiency, unity of effort, weapons system management and component interaction or to control the land scheme of maneuver. Forming a functional land component is a key organizational decision that will significantly influence the conduct of land operations (see figure 11).⁴² Recently, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, designated General Vincent K. Brooks, Commander, U.S. Army Pacific, as the theater JFLCC with Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, as his deputy. The June 2010 version of JP 3-31 was cited as the doctrinal reference.⁴³



JFLCC – Joint Force Land Component Command | JFMCC – Joint Force Maritime Component Command

Figure 11 – Area of Responsibility with Multiple Joint Force Land Component Commanders – JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*

JFLCC Composition

The primary headquarters to be used as a JFLCC “core” for major operations are Army corps or MEF HQ. While Marines are best employed as a sea-based amphibious force, they also have the capability to operate independently of the sea to support sustained operations ashore with the Army or multinational partners. When a JFLCC is established employing an Army headquarters, the JFLCC will normally exercise TACON of Marines made available for

tasking. The Marine Corps service component commander still provides administrative and logistical support for all assigned or attached Marine Corps forces.⁴⁴

When coalition elements are included, the command may then be designated a CFLCC. Staff representation at a CFLCC should be sought commensurate with the relative size of the coalition forces. A CFLCC normally does not include all of the land forces of the host nation, as many host forces will be retained for internal security. The functions and support arrangements for each member of the coalition will need to be carefully established (see figure 12).⁴⁵




Figure 12 – Joint Force Organized Using Functional Components

JFLCC Staff Organization

The staff should be representative of the land force that comprises the component command. The JFLCC may build his organization from the “core” of an existing service component structure with augmentation from the other services or multinational forces to provide representation and necessary expertise. Joint doctrine takes precedence over service when performing as a JFLCC. If provided by the Army, the ASCC retains responsibilities for internal Army support.⁴⁶

Summary

Since the initial organization for combat in North Africa in 1943 with coequal component commanders, numerous land operations have been conducted involving joint/multinational forces. Since then, Army officers have attempted to serve as both theater commander and land component commander. While the initial defeats at Kasserine Pass in 1943, the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, at the Yalu in late 1950 and in Vietnam were not totally caused by the lack of a single ground component, the failure to effectively conduct land control operations contributed. Likewise, the difficulties in the last days of the Persian Gulf War and in Kosovo were perhaps beyond the expectations of a single ground commander to resolve. But during land operations in Tunisia, Normandy and Okinawa, separate land component commanders successfully ensured proper coordination with other components, reduced the JFC’s span of control and allowed the JFC to focus at the strategic level. Most recently, operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan JOAs have been enhanced by utilizing a single joint/multinational forces

land-focused commander, separate from the coalition/joint force commander and supported by an ASCC serving as a theater JFLCC.

Today the United States faces contemporary challenges in providing centralized command of land forces as part of joint/multinational forces. In April 2014, the Army issued FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps and Division Operations* as the single field manual providing doctrine to echelons above brigade. While this manual presents Army corps headquarters as the “principal headquarters for applying landpower,” it also recognizes that theater armies “set conditions for effective landpower” and may be designated by the GCC as the AOR-wide JFLCC.⁴⁷ The Army’s new Unified Land Operations doctrine found in ADP and Army Doctrine and Training Publication (ADRP) 3-0 is fully compatible with the joint land operations doctrine found in the February 2014 version of JP 3-31. In addition, to reduce numbers of headquarters, land-centric JTFs are being considered by both NATO and the U.S. Army that combine the authorities of a JTF with the land focus and forces of a JFLCC. The simultaneous development of Army and joint doctrine ensures that the requisite guidance needed for successful land control operations in the land domain benefits from both historic and recent operational experience with joint and multinational land forces.

Endnotes

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