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Building a Strategy-based Force Structure

by

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Introduction

The post-Cold War period is nearly a decade old. Before the last of the regional threats—North Korea and Iraq—are gone, we must ask ourselves: Wither military force structure absent these threats? The answer to this question is complex, for it leads toward a new political-military construct—a strategy-based force structure.

We find ourselves at a point in history where the very concept of war—narrowly interpreted as the conventional forces of one nation-state fighting those of one or more others—has again expanded. We are seeing now, as history has shown us before, that war comes in many varieties. Technology has changed, is changing, and will continue to change the tools with which wars are fought. Also changing is the context within which forces are used and wars fought—international treaty structures, alliances, economic frameworks.¹ In the lexicon of a recent *Washington Post* article, the post-Cold War period finds American forces fighting “warriors” more often than soldiers.² One should not be surprised, therefore, that the way in which America structures its military forces should also change.

This essay first summarizes our National Security Strategy and the lessons of our post-Cold War experience, then suggests a force structure consistent with that strategy and experience. The force structure described is a start toward answering the difficult question posed above—wither military force structure absent two regional threats.

Lessons from the Initial Post-Cold War Period

All organizations must learn and adapt to stay healthy and relevant. The military is no different. “Continuity” must reign over those principles, practices and organizations that remain useful; “change,” over those variables that have lost their utility. Some of the lessons listed and described below are relearned; they are more like historical reminders than new conclusions. Others are new and emerge from the specific strategic situation in which the United States finds itself. Regardless of

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the category, these lessons provide useful guides when thinking about future U.S. military force structure.

Strategy should determine force structure. Without doubt, the size and composition of America's military derives from a large set of complex and important factors: strategic, economic, political and bureaucratic. Equally without doubt is this: Regardless of administration, America's long-term strategic interests have driven our national security and national military strategies.³ Military forces are instruments; they have no worth in and of themselves. Their value lies in two chief areas: to achieve national strategic aims at least cost to the nation in terms of lives, dollars and time; and to provide options to our political leaders. Strategy, then, must be a primary factor in determining size and composition of America's armed forces.

At present, our national security strategy is guided by one basic principle: "American leadership and engagement in the world are vital for our security, and the world is a safer place as a result."⁴ The strategy continues,

In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity. . . . Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States must support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world.⁵

Engagement and involvement around the world, then, are the cornerstones of America's post-Cold War security strategy.

The national military strategy "builds on the premise that the United States will remain globally engaged" to:

shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security. It emphasizes that our armed forces must **respond** to the full spectrum of crises in order to protect our national interests . . . [and] must also take steps to **prepare now** for an uncertain future.(emphasis in original)⁶

Shaping the international environment includes taking actions, conducting exercises, providing training or education, and participating in military exchanges of many kinds. While these activities cement long-standing relationships with friends and allies as well as encourage new ones, they also demonstrate American military capability to potential adversaries and would-be regional bullies. In sum, these kinds of actions promote regional stability and help prevent or contain a crisis.

Responding to the full spectrum of crises ranges from threatening to use force in what some call "operations other than war"; to combat in small-scale contingency operations; to full-scale, conventional war. Success in these operations not only ensures that our national interests are protected but also helps shape the international environment and deter potential aggression. Finally, "to prepare now" concerns taking full advantage of current and upcoming military technologies by modernizing our equipment, doctrine and military organizations. "To prepare now" can also have a preventative element: If our modernization efforts can stay at least one step ahead of potential adversaries—whether conventional or "nontraditional"—that adversary will "think twice" before threatening American interests or upsetting regional stability.

Peace doesn't keep itself. To put it another way, keeping the peace is not always a peaceful endeavor. A future war is not preordained; it arises from the set of decisions and circumstances human beings and their institutions create or allow to develop. We write our future each day through our diplomatic and military actions—of commission and omission. "Not every crisis . . . leads to war," we are told in *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*:

The secret of success of our species has been its ability to learn from experience and adapt . . . accordingly. . . . The art of war is of vital importance . . . a matter of life and death . . . no less vital is the art of avoiding war and no more may the attempt to understand its origins and causes safely be neglected.⁷

Whatever the time, effort and money spent on preventing wars, it is much less than what would be spent in fighting and winning them.

At least three justifications for “prevention operations” seem important in this post-Cold War period: first, that borders not be changed by force; second, that legitimate governments not be deposed by force;⁸ and third, that governments not be allowed to savage their own people.

While other situations certainly would permit the use of force, these three cases seem vital to the preservation of peace and continued economic growth. For each is a case which, if left unchallenged often encourages those who used force to do so again, or encourages others to follow suit. Former President George Bush explains it in this way: “If we fail to live up to our responsibilities, if we shirk the role which only we can assume, if we retreat from our obligation to the world into indifference, we will one day, pay the highest price once again for our neglect.”⁹ Force unchallenged by those who seek to preserve peace simply creates petri-dish conditions in which more force breeds. Strategists must avoid the false belief that has seduced others in previous interwar periods, that is: One can preserve peace only through acting peacefully.

These three cases do not erode the presumption of the long-recognized principle of non-intervention or the concepts of political sovereignty and territorial integrity which form the foundation of that principle.¹⁰ Rather, the cases above demonstrate the ambiguity of prevention operations and the necessity to proceed cautiously even when justified.

There will be other, unexpected cases beyond the three listed above. Some will be directly related to U.S. interests, possibly linked to our vital interests; others may have a more tenuous relationship. In each case, however, America expects her military to execute the orders it is given and succeed when employed.

Strength deters. Those who use or contemplate using force understand and respect it. Bosnia, Iraq and North Korea—all are examples which prove the rule. Diplomacy always counts, but when dealing with certain types of governments or “terrorist” organizations, military strength—brute force—and the political will to use it correctly also count. Why? Because these kinds of regimes have come into existence and remain in power through the use of force. Force is their language; power, their logic.

Diplomacy and force are two sides of the same coin. For those who seek to preserve peace, diplomacy must always be the first choice. Diplomacy turns vacuous, however, if in the final analysis one must yield to the adversary’s force. Those who would interrupt the peace by using force to get what they want are bullies and thugs—and bullies and thugs do not back down in the face of diplomacy alone. Rather, they back down in the face of something they understand and fear—more force than they have, a force that threatens their hold on power and their existence. It’s a matter of human nature. Simply put, diplomats unbacked by credible force and the will to use it correctly have fewer options than those with such backing and will.

Conventional war remains a possibility. As much as we would like to prevent all war, realism dictates otherwise. Not all wars are avoidable.

Further, the root causes of war are plentiful and ubiquitous. Fear, hate, envy, resentment, suspicion, anger, prestige, humiliation, revenge, pride, vengeance, god, credibility, justice, reputation, power, desire, love, and a host of other very human traits—each has been central to past wars. All remain present in human nature. Any could be the “cause” of the next war. De Tocqueville

reminds us that “nothing is more difficult to overcome than the problems we thought we overcame.” War is just such a problem. While there may be a revolution in technology, there is no revolution of the human heart. We will never overcome war because its root cause lies within the depths of human nature. We can take active steps to prevent wars before they break out. If prevention fails, however, we must be prepared to fight and win.

Much has been written about the transformation of war and the demise of conventional combat, but realism again suggests otherwise.¹¹ One needs only to survey the arsenals around the world to see that tanks, infantry, planes, missiles and ships are being used to force one person’s will on another. Rather than the demise of conventional combat, we are actually seeing war as the chameleon it has always been.¹²

The history of warfare is the continued search for asymmetry. One side searches to avoid the other’s strength. One seeks to apply its own strength against the other’s weakness. The forms of warfare—whether conventional, guerrilla, terrorist or informational—follow this general pattern.¹³ The development of weaponry also follows this cycle—as tanks gained strength, better antitank weapons were developed; as the airplane dominated, better anti-aircraft weapons emerged; as battleships reigned supreme, submarines and aircraft carriers arrived. Tactics and weapons mirror war’s general pattern.

Today, America’s conventional strength appears to be less useful, but that appearance is deceiving. America has had to fight fewer conventional wars, just because our conventional forces are strong. Our adversaries are seeking alternative methods. If we choose to weaken our conventional capability, we will see a corresponding rise in its use by our adversaries. The logic of war is paradoxical.¹⁴

War has more than one face. As long as America’s conventional strength remains we deter some forms of war, but we face others.

The ones we face are becoming too familiar: terrorism; the use of “volunteers,” “militias” or “special police” as surrogate armies; the “hiding” of military facilities or conventional forces by placing them within civilian areas; violence used at the border between crime and war. These are the methods that must now be employed by thugs, bullies, and others—whether nation-states or not—who use force to further their own purposes. They employ these methods because they know and fear the result of fighting a “straight up” conventional war. Our enemies in these “other” forms of war often come from one or more the five categories of “warriors” so aptly described by Ralph Peters: underclass and undereducated thugs and murderers; otherwise ordinary youth who become fodder because of closed schools, ravaged families and broken communities; opportunists, entrepreneurs of conflict, organized gangsters who use war to expand their take; true believers, ideologues, heroes to their own people; and dispossessed, former military men, mercenaries who sell their expertise to the highest bidder.¹⁵

These forms of war—and “war” they are, regardless of how many euphemisms some may use to describe them—are most ambiguous and most difficult for Americans to understand and to fight. Winning in these forms of war requires diplomatic skill; political and national will—and more often than not, international and interagency will as well; and disciplined, adaptive, well-led military forces.

The strategic environment in which military forces are employed has changed dramatically. The parameters within which military forces were employed were narrower during the Cold War than they are now. Military organizations expected to be employed within a well-defined command and logistic structure, in accordance with well-rehearsed operational plans against an unambiguous enemy, and in an established alliance system. Certainly there would be some

ambiguity; hence, from time to time a military organization would have to be modified to fit a specific mission—task organization.

Now the parameters are wider. The missions that our military forces have been called upon to execute in the past 10 years, and equally important the conditions within which the missions are conducted, are much more varied. Many have been in undeveloped theaters, with little or no command or logistics structure. Rather than the mature operational plans developed for what would have been World War III, our forces are executing contingency operations where the plans often unfold as they are executed. The “enemy” in contingency operations has varied from conventional combat formations to paramilitary forces to thugs, criminals and gangs—or some combination thereof. Ad hoc coalitions are far more frequent than established alliances. These are the conditions in which our military forces have been employed since the end of the Cold War, and these seem to be the kind of conditions we will continue to face in a world absent a North Korea and a hostile Iraq. The changed strategic environment has also had an effect on role of reserve component forces.

The Gulf War; our interventions into Somalia, Haiti and Panama; and our current operation in Bosnia have all demonstrated the death of an old Cold War paradigm—that reserve forces are used in sequence, following the employment of active forces. Gone are the days of this general scenario: first engaged are active, forward-deployed forces, reinforced with mostly active, continental United States (CONUS)-based force, then with mobilized reserve forces. The number and frequency of operations in the first decade of the post-Cold War period as well as the mix of skills necessary for those operations have produced an entirely new requirement on reserve forces. Immediate utility and accessibility has replaced the “expansibility” requirement of the Cold War. The concept of selective individual and unit call-up has replaced that of mass mobilization.

In sum, the reality of the initial post-Cold War period has not met the expectations of some who believed, falsely, that the fall of the Berlin Wall would usher in a time during which military forces would be less used. Reality and expectation have diverged quickly and onto nearly opposite paths. The near decade-long post-Cold War period has found that the use of military force has been necessary to execute a strategy of engagement, to shape the international environment, and to respond to crises. Military forces are also being called upon to modernize and develop the doctrine and means to combat “new” forms of warfare—while executing engagement operations and maintaining conventional strength.

Implications for Force Structure

What was once vague is now alarmingly clear: The military tempo of the post-Cold War period is exponentially greater than that of the Cold War era. The prevailing thought immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall was that with the demise of the threat of global nuclear war, the necessity for and utility of military force would be lessened, so force structure could be reduced. The logic of reduction in the early 1990s was *negative* (governed mostly by what was no longer needed) rather than *positive* (what would be needed). The reductions were also governed more by a desire to save money than by matching force structure with strategic requirements. The rush to reduce, yield a “peace dividend” and help reverse the economic weaknesses identified in the late 1980s and early 1990s overcame a thoughtful, objective, consensus-building process to identify new strategic requirements upon which to base military force structure. The Bottom-Up Review tried to provide a new logic, as did the last Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The reality of two real theater threats—Korea and Iraq—and the fact that the strategic landscape was still emerging, however, mitigated any dramatic shift from the logic of the past.¹⁶ Therefore, in place of the threat of the Soviet Union, both strategic reviews used the threat of two near-simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs). If the future finds these two threats gone, however, strategists must derive force structure in a fundamentally different way.

To be sure, threat-based logic will always remain a necessary element of deriving military force structure. But such logic can neither be the dominant element nor sufficient by itself. The dominant use of threat-based logic is partially the cause of the “unreadiness” now experienced by each of the services. Since 1989 we have used the two-MTW logic to “justify” reducing the military budget and force structure by about 40 percent. At the same time, the use of military forces has increased by about 300 percent. This increase reflects the actual requirements of the post-Cold War strategy and the realities of the post-Cold War international environment. Deriving our military force structure from what is needed to fight two MTWs has resulted in the force structure that we have now. If these two theater threats go away at some time in the future, and we follow the same threat-based, budget-driven logic that we have followed so far, then the future will find a smaller military with greater readiness challenges and even more “overuse” than is now the case.

Simply put, we must derive our force structure from what is needed to execute our national security strategy—a strategy-based force structure. In creating such a force, however, we must face reality. Our post-Cold War strategy of engagement requires a larger force structure than we have now. A constrictive military program cannot meet the requirements of an expansive security strategy. Right now fewer forces are being used more, causing observable stress on each of the military services. If we think we can retain the same security strategy while we reduce our military even more (when the two regional threats are gone), we are fooling ourselves. Deeper reductions, while maintaining current post-Cold War strategic requirements, will simply break America’s military strength, reduce the options that future political leaders will have, and increase the potential for war.

To avoid a vicious, downward readiness spiral, we must see the world as it actually is, not as we would like it to be. A more realistic view will result in a change in the way we structure our military forces and create sufficient forces to execute our nation’s strategy. During the Cold War, military force structure had these four components: first, overseas, active forces necessary for immediate response to a Warsaw Pact attack; second, CONUS-based, active forces for immediate reinforcement; third, Reserve and National Guard forces for subsequent reinforcement; and last, the training, doctrine and logistics forces necessary to generate and sustain the fighting forces. A very similar structure was used for the Bottom-Up Review and the last Quadrennial Defense Review.

This structure no longer fits the requirements of our strategy or the realities of the current strategic environment. It will be even less useful in a world devoid of a North Korea and hostile Iraq. A strategy-based force structure, one more in line with current and potentially future requirements and realities, might be composed in the following ways.

A prevention and deterrent force. These units would have one main purpose: to practice conventional warfighting skills and respond to combat in all its varieties—from small-scale contingencies (SSCs) like Operation Just Cause in Panama to full, major-theater wars like the Gulf War. Threat-based logic would determine the size and composition of this force. It would have to consist of forces from each service—active, Guard and Reserve—in sufficient numbers to fight and defeat any one of the “top three” actual or potential adversaries of our nation without help from an ally or coalition partner.

The prevention and deterrent force could be stationed any number of places but would have to have the capability of projecting its power anywhere on the globe and sustaining that power, even in the most austere of theaters, as long as necessary in order to prevail. These forces should *not* be available for engagement operations for in such use their fighting skills, and therefore their deterrent value, would erode. These forces should, however, conduct exercises in each theater so as to practice deployment skills and demonstrate their conventional warfighting powers.

An engagement force. The purpose of these units is to shape the international environment in three ways: first, to conduct the daily, ongoing operations required of our engagement strategy; second, to provide additional forces available to the National Command Authorities when the prevention and deterrent force is committed; and third, to provide for homeland defense and react to domestic emergencies.

The engagement force is an integrated force comprised of active, Guard and Reserve forces and organized by regional theater. Its size and composition would be determined by two principles: first, the U.S. regional security goals and objectives, to include those associated with the defense of the continental United States; and second, the "1:4" rule, i.e., for every one force deployed conducting one form of engagement operations or another, we must have three others. One of these noncommitted forces would be preparing to assume responsibilities for the ongoing operation; a second, recovering from it and conducting conventional combat training; and a third, on a "support, leave and professional schooling" cycle. This rule may seem excessive at first glance, but a closer examination reveals that the rule is prudent.

About a quarter of the engagement force would be in use every day in support of regional security objectives. The presence of these forces, whether permanent or temporary, would demonstrate America's commitment in the region. They would reassure regional allies, prevent or contain hostilities, deter potential adversaries, and engage potential friends. Participation in peace support operations, involvement in training exercises and demonstrations, and conducting exchanges of many kinds, individual as well as unit—these are just a few ways in which the engagement force would be used every day.

The units of the engagement force need conventional combat training because such training is the foundation upon which all engagement operations rest. Success in engagement operations results from cohesive, disciplined servicemembers and units; conventional combat training is the means to develop these qualities. Conventional combat training is also required for other reasons. The engagement force "backs up" the prevention and deterrent force; it adds strategic depth to our forces, thus providing options to political leaders. Further, during any peace operation—as is well evidenced in the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and was the case in both Haiti and Somalia—the committed engagement force must protect itself and be ready to fight if and when conditions change. Finally, demonstrating American resolve and preventing hostilities requires manifesting a fighting capability.

Thus, the engagement force is not a "second-class" prevention and deterrent force that could be kept at a lower rate of readiness—quite the opposite. Units in the engagement—whether active, Guard or Reserve—must be well-trained, disciplined, ready-to-fight forces. The very nature of the operations they conduct requires these characteristics.

The 1:4 rule is needed for several reasons. First, the reality of an engagement policy is this: Engagement is long-term. Our force structure has to face this reality. The operational "model" of a quick, decisive defeat of an enemy followed by a withdrawal of military forces does not fit the circumstances associated with engagement. Second, one cannot assume that strategic realities would allow withdrawal of forces involved in ongoing engagement operations—such as those now in Bosnia or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia—in order to reinforce the prevention and deterrent force. Third, American interests are larger than one theater. Should a war erupt in one place, our political leaders would not want to be "optionless" in a second. Nor would political leaders want to encourage a potential adversary in a second theater who would understand that the American military could only perform in a "one-act play." Finally, the 1:4 rule will ensure a reasonable operation tempo (optempo) for the force, one that would not adversely affect quality of life or retention of those in the services or the recruitment of new servicemembers.

Initially, some may suggest that the engagement force could be largely Guard and Reserve. Such a suggestion, while seemingly attractive for budget reasons, does not stand close scrutiny. One quarter of this force is always “engaged”—meaning deployed—either permanently or temporarily. Part of this engaged force should and must be from the reserve components, but we would be asking entirely too much of our citizen-soldiers if we gave them the dominant portion of these missions. The real strategic task with respect to the reserve component units in the engagement force is to find ways to increase their utility. On the individual level, for example, we should provide better job protection and better health and insurance packages. On the organizational level, more creative “packaging” of Guard and Reserve forces and more flexible call-up options would reduce reliance on a “volunteer-only” use of reserve components.

An experimental force. So as to prepare now for an uncertain future, the military force must modernize and experiment. Modernization is a fairly well known and understood process; experimentation, less so.

Experimentation falls into three general categories. First, experimenting with conventional combat: These experiments, in themselves, have deterrent value; they demonstrate to potential adversaries that the United States will stay “one step ahead” in order to deter the resurgence of conventional war. Second, experimenting with the other-than-conventional forms of warfare: These forms of war are with us now and will remain with us as long as we retain our conventional strength. We must learn how to adapt to these forms of warfare better and faster, else we will give the initiative to our adversaries. Last, experimenting with emerging learning and training methods and developing new doctrine.

To retain their “competitive edge,” American military forces must keep improving. Improvement means not just having modern equipment, but becoming more proficient in using that equipment. Combat power derives not from the force with the most technologically advanced equipment; rather, from the force whose equipment is “sufficiently” advanced and whose units and leaders can use that equipment better than its opponent. “Use” involves appropriate leadership, training and doctrine.

Currently experimentation occurs with active, operational forces. While this does have some advantages—for certainly there is some coincidence in the training and experimenting—it is a method of necessity, not a primary choice. Using operational forces dissipates their focus on conventional combat training, takes them “out of the line-up” for engagement operations, and increases troop optempo. A separate, experimental force—again comprised of active, Guard and Reserve forces—is the preferable method.

A generation and sustainment force. There is more to a military than the forces employed to conduct operations. The purposes of the generation and sustainment force are to recruit, educate and train; to provide the nondeploying logistics and acquisition structure; to provide the testing ground for the experimental force; to provide for living areas and base operations; and to provide overall management and leadership. As with each of the other elements of military force structure, this element must also include active, Guard and Reserve units.

The current generation and sustainment force contains a number of bases, facilities and organizations still “left over” from the size of armed force needed to fight a global nuclear war. That requirement no longer exists. In a world absent two major theater threats, the need is even less. While some of the post-Gulf War downsizing was aimed at reducing this unneeded “infrastructure,” more work remains in both the active and reserve components. More Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds will be necessary, and more organizational adjustments required. Furthermore, some of the functions and work force of the generation and sustainment force can be handed over to civilian organizations. A good bit of outsourcing work is going on, but like reductions in infrastructure and organizations, more work remains. In the final analysis, however, a uniformed, multicomponent generation and sustainment force is still required. The entire function cannot—and should not—be divested.

Integration of the active, Guard and Reserve forces into each of the four forces described above and to the extent outlined above challenges the current ways our forces are organized, funded and trained. It also challenges their current reserve component employment paradigm. New laws governing the use of Guard and Reserve forces and protecting their civilian employment—whether employed in the United States or overseas—are necessary. In the force outlined above, nonvoluntary call-up and repetitive use of individuals and units will become the norm. When the nation needs a skill—whether found in an individual, a small team or a unit—we cannot rely solely on volunteers. We must be able to call up those we need, in the precise package and for the time we need them; and those who answer the call must be confident that their civilian lives will be there when they get back. A second significant shift in the reserve component is this: simultaneous use, not sequential use, of Guard and Reserve forces as the primary method of employment. Already in use, simultaneous employment of active, Guard and Reserve forces will become even more common in the future. Simultaneous use suggests that units of the Guard and Reserve alter the way they are structured and organized.

Last, the size and composition of Guard and Reserve forces will no longer be determined by how many are needed to fight in the two MTWs or by the sequence in which they “flow” into the conventional fight. Rather, it will be determined by (a) what immediate usable capabilities they have that are necessary in the deployment, execution or recovery of the prevention/deterrent force; (b) what forces are necessary for domestic defense; (c) what capabilities they have that can be used as part of continuous, engagement rotations in each of the regional commander in chief (CINC) areas; (d) what experiments are necessary to ensure continued upgrade of Guard and Reserve individual, leader and unit skills; and (e) what functions of the generation and sustaining force they might perform.

The four types of forces—prevention/deterrent, engagement, experimental and generation/sustainment—each integrated with active, Guard and Reserve forces, seem useful for several reasons. First, a thoroughly integrated force is more in line with our democratic heritage. Because it is smaller, the America military is at risk of being disconnected from our citizenry. That risk emerged in the 1970s when the draft ended and increased in the 1990s when we downsized. We can mitigate that risk by a more fully integrated active, Guard and Reserve armed force. Second, the forces match our national strategy of engagement, our “shape-respond-prepare now” military strategy, and the lessons of the initial post-Cold War period. Last, these four forces provide a way to look at military force structure other than through the strictly “threat-based,” global-war framework of the Cold War, or the “threat-based” major theater war framework of the Bottom-Up Review and the recent QDR. Thus, the strategy-based force structure outlined above provides an alternative worthy of examination.

Conclusion

Sooner or later the West’s last two villains will dissipate. When they do, if we conduct a second post-Cold War military downsizing based primarily on budget rather than on strategic requirements, we run the risk of creating an even higher military operation tempo and more readiness and retention challenges than currently exist. We may be able to avoid this risk, if we alter the ways in which we think about military force structure.

“Every age must remember its history anew,” *The Passion of the Western Mind* reminds us. “Each generation must examine and think through again, from its own distinctive vantage point, the ideas that have shaped its understanding of the world.”¹⁷ This is sound advice for military strategists. The post-Cold War era provides a distinctive vantage point, different from that of the Cold War. Current strategists must first know and understand the ideas that have brought us to where we are today. Then, retain only those ideas which are applicable to current strategic requirements and realities; the rest must be cast aside or adapted to the new realities. Such has always been the role of strategic thinking; it is a pragmatic affair.

Endnotes

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15. Peters, "Soldier vs. Warrior."
16. Colonel James M. Dubik, "Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Structure," Association of the United States Army's Institute of Land Warfare Landpower Essay Series, No. 97-1, February 1997.
17. Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), p. xiv.
(MG Dubik is currently serving as Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Lewis, Washington.)