Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Structure

by

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Introduction

The world has changed. No one should be surprised, therefore, that the logic governing how America structures its armed forces has changed. But a change in logic is not merely an academic exercise; rather, it has monumental practical consequences. At stake are jobs, professions, communities and “rice bowls” of every variety. Debates over fundamental frameworks and logic are not really about problem-solving; rather, they are about money, power and prestige.¹

The purpose of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)² is to provide a “comprehensive examination of defense strategy, the force structure of the active, guard, and reserve components, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policy in order to determine and express the defense strategy of the United States.”³ There is every possibility, however, that the outcome will vary considerably from the purpose. Why? Because accomplishing the purpose requires a shift in logic — no easy accomplishment for any bureaucracy, let alone one as complex as the set of institutions which comprise our national security apparatus. The international strategic environment has changed, and so must the logic linking national security strategy and military force structure.

This essay will describe the logic of the Cold War, demonstrate that the Bottom-Up Review was an extension of that logic, and present a logic that may be more applicable for the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. In sum, unless there is a change in logic for the Quadrennial Defense Review, Cold War thinking will continue, just as it did during the Bottom-Up Review. The potential result may be this: a smaller, highly lethal but — with respect to the strategic objectives of the nation — less useful and possibly irrelevant armed force.
The Logic of the Past: Cold War Thinking

The context of the Cold War is well documented: a relatively bipolar world — the United States, NATO and their allies on one hand, and the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact and their allies on the other; the ubiquitous threat of a global, conventional and potentially nuclear war with the main battlefield in central Europe and other battlefields — whether land, air or sea — essential but more as “enablers” for the decisive fight, as they had been in World War II.

The strategy of the Cold War is equally well documented: containment and deterrence. Containing the Soviet threat provided the rationale for actions during the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, our opposition to Soviet forces in Afghanistan and their surrogates in Central American and Africa, and all points in between. From containment flowed deterrence — both defensive aims. The United States would not take the offense, it would provide “counterforce.” This defensive strategy had important military force structure consequences. As the perceived threat of Soviet communism grew global, so did the American defensive capability.

For fifty years, the military forces of the Soviet Union provided the benchmark for American military strategists. The arms race — in missiles, aircraft, ships, tanks and divisions — was a race in which each side attempted to determine exactly what the other side had, then built and fielded equipment as good or better. Over time, the Department of Defense and each of the services built computer models to use in determining the size and composition of the military force. “The stability of the Cold War,” explains General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret.,

had enabled us to create a planning and budgeting environment in which we had estimated the Soviet threat, modeled a hypothetical war with the Soviets, and made investments at the margin based on that analysis.4

Inputs concerned threat force locations, compositions and capabilities; outputs were those forces required to counter that threat.

Center stage throughout was the potential for nuclear clash in Europe. Certainly there were clashes in the third world — Africa, Southeast Asia and Central America. These actions, however, were peripheral, “lesser included contingencies.” They did not govern the size and composition of U.S. armed forces; quite the contrary. Operating throughout the Cold War were two central assumptions. First, the armed force necessary for the “warfight” — meaning what would be required to defeat the Soviet global, conventional forces — would be large enough and have sufficient capability that it could handle any “lesser included contingency” that might come up. Second, the United States would “offset” numerical inferiority with technological superiority. We would not match the Soviet Union plane-for-plane, ship-for-ship or tank-for-tank; rather, we would build fewer but technologically superior planes, ships and tanks. These assumptions worked well. Even with the technology offset, the size of the U.S. Cold War military ensured that national leaders had sufficient options and flexibility in facing the variety of “lesser contingencies” that arose during that fifty-year period. In sum, figure 1 depicts the threat-based logic of the Cold War.

The Cold War also fostered two distinct relationships between the military and the nation. The most well-known is the military-industrial complex — job-providing industries that manufactured military-unique items. The lesser-known component was social — community, and in some cases regional, dependency on what seemed to be “permanent” military bases. The military-industrial complex explained how America’s national security strategy and the size and composition of its military force were related directly to the industrial job market. The military-community relationship explained the indirect relationship among strategy, force structure and community or regional job markets. Both the military-industrial complex and the military-community dependency grew during the near half-century of the Cold War.
The logic of the Cold War was simple: It flowed in a single direction from its threat base. First, from the size and composition of the communist threat poised to wage global, nuclear war, we derived the size and composition of the American military. The forces needed to win "the big one" were large enough to handle whatever else the nation would face. The military-industrial complex followed the same logic. Research, development and fielding were directly linked to U.S. forces' need to stay one step ahead of the Soviets. Finally, the military-community dependency deepened as the bases, depots, training areas and other facilities required to store, house, train and educate the military became "permanent."

Then, in 1989, all of this was brought into question. The apparent certainties of the Cold War fell with the Berlin Wall. National security strategy, the model and central assumptions by which American armed forces were built, the military-industrial and the military-communal relationships — all found themselves overtaken by the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Cold War was over. The West declared victory, called for the reduction of its armed forces, and demanded the return of its peace dividend. American strategic thinking entered a period of uncertainty. Enter the Bottom-Up Review (BUR).

**Cold War Logic Continued: The Bottom-Up Review**

Ambiguity is the defining characteristic of the post-Cold War international environment. Strategists knew that the world was no longer bipolar, but what was it? Multipolar? Unipolar?
Tripolar? Debate roared. Gone were the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the threat of global, nuclear war. But would a new threat emerge? Where would the next battlefields be? Theories aplenty posited emergent threats, residual threats, nontraditional threats, no threats — but in reality uncertainty reigned. And what of American leadership? Or of NATO? The immediate post-Cold War period was similar to the immediate post-World War II period; a new international environment had yet to emerge. Things were simply unknown, and to some degree unknowable.

Also uncertain was U.S. national security strategy. With the Soviets and their allies gone, who would we contain? What would we deter? Both neo-isolationism and global engagement, as well as every variant in between, were discussed in journals, offices and meeting rooms. In the conventional sense, North Korea remained a regional threat and Iraq emerged as one, but nothing of the superpower confrontation remained. Containment was, by this time, irrelevant.

From almost every corner of the country came calls for a peace dividend and a mass reduction of U.S. military forces. How were strategists to determine the correct size and composition of America’s armed forces absent the global threat of a communist Soviet Union and without a national security strategy? Uncertain as to what the future held, they were pragmatic.

The size of U.S. forces was reduced to that necessary to ensure defeat of the remaining communist threat — North Korea — as well as the defeat of the regional hegemon who threatened an area vital to Western interests — Iraq. This approach became known as the “two near-simultaneous MRCs” (major regional contingencies) strategy. Defense planners removed Soviet forces and the global war scenarios from their models and inserted those of the two MRCs, then derived the size and composition of the force necessary to win in the two-MRC scenarios. In reality, however, the two-MRC strategy was no strategy; it was merely a sizing function — a place-holder during an uncertain time. As Army General John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, explains,

> We found it necessary to focus almost exclusively on short and mid-range modifications to Cold War force structure. This process resulted in the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review. The latter provided a “sizing scenario” for designing force structure.\(^5\)

The logic of the BUR was a continuation of threat-based, Cold War logic as seen in figure 2.

The two-MRC sizing function did have two results. First, a physical result: During the 1992-96 period, military forces — active, Guard and Reserve — and associated costs were cut by almost 40 percent. For example, the active Army now has 250,000 fewer soldiers than it had in 1990, and Army reserve components have about 200,000 fewer. The Navy and the Air Force reduced similarly. Well known are the corresponding reductions in defense-related industries — fewer employees, smaller factories or ones closed all together, and evaporated markets. A similar reduction in infrastructure resulted from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions, but complete success in this area has been elusive. Currently, there is less infrastructure than was present prior to 1989, but that so much excess remains underscores just how strong the military-community dependency grew during the Cold War.

Second, coincidentally with the Bottom-Up Review, military and civilian strategists also started to think about emerging changes in the conduct of war. Between the U.S. operation in Panama and the end of the Gulf War, strategists started thinking about what future conventional war might look like: fewer forces; projecting power from the United States rather than reinforcing forward-deployed units; using more information with more precision; making faster and more accurate decisions; and conducting near-simultaneous, faster-paced, more lethal joint operations throughout a theater of war. No one knew exactly where all this would lead, but most were — and still are — convinced that this was the face of future conventional combat.
The physical and conceptual effects of the BUR are substantial. In terms of the logic of force structure, however, the BUR merely extended the life of Cold War thinking. The BUR force was built using Cold War logic, including the use of the two central assumptions of Cold War. First, from the size and composition of the North Korean and Southwest Asian threat poised to wage two nearly-simultaneous regional wars, we derived the size and composition of the U.S. military. Again, no other threats or possible employment scenarios received much attention; the force necessary to win the two MRCs was large enough to handle whatever else the nation would face. Second, the BUR continued offsetting quantity with technology. Technology was described as a “combat multiplier” during the BUR, as such it was used directly to assist defense planners in justifying reductions in each of the services.

The military-industrial complex also followed the same Cold War logic. Research, development and fielding — albeit reduced in scope — were directly linked to what was needed to get better at fighting in Korea or Southwest Asia (SWA). Finally, try as it may, BRAC could not sufficiently alter the military-community dependency. Many communities found that almost overnight they went from stable to unstable, from permanent to ambiguous, from directly related to the maintenance of national security to contrary to the needs of national security. BRAC’s work is unfinished. The nation still has too much military infrastructure — necessary during the Cold War to support the armed force prepared to fight “World War III,” but now counterproductive to the kind of military America needs.
With this background, strategists arrive at the Quadrennial Defense Review. Some have suggested an extension of this Cold War logic for the upcoming QDR, with a different sizing function — one MRC, or "one-plus." The realities of 1996 suggest — no, they mandate — a different logic.

**Capability-Based Logic: Required for the QDR**

The post-Cold War period is nearly a decade old, and that decade has been revealing. Consider the major employment of U.S. armed forces since the end of the Cold War: in Panama, Iraq and Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia and Macedonia — as well as in the Los Angeles riots, Florida hurricane, midwestern flooding, western wild fires, and the counterdrugs effort. Further, the United States continued its Army presence in the Sinai, Korea, Saudi Arabia and Europe, while conducting scores of smaller operations such as those in Libya, Liberia and Guantanamo Bay and expanding our links to Central and Eastern Europe and Russia through the Partnership for Peace and other exercises and programs. In fact, during the time when military forces structure and budget has been reduced by almost 40 percent, use of military force has increased by 300 percent. What strategists should distill from the past decade is this: Paradox, asymmetry and uncertainty govern the international environment now and into the foreseeable future.

Paradoxically, integration and fragmentation both govern our world and will continue to govern it. The information age and global economy are pulling some parts of the world together while, at the same time, pushing others apart. No longer is the world divided as "East and West" or "North and South." Rather the divisions are along the "haves and have nots," those with optimistic futures and those who are hopeless. Such divisions, we have seen for the past ten years, are literally seeds for conflict, for they give rise to fear, hate, envy, greed, revenge and other basic human emotions known for their violent propensities. The squalor created by these conditions, the death and destruction and disease, the civil wars, the human anguish on the faces of children do not rest easy on the conscience of Americans. Nor should they. As already seen, these developments have, and will continue to, affect national security decisionmaking. A nation as blessed as ours will not be able to look itself in the mirror and ignore the conditions in which most of the world must live. True: We cannot police the world, nor can we heal all wounds. Equally true: We cannot ignore all around us and also espouse our national values. We must be involved in the world. The only questions is: To what extent or degree?

When strategists view the world, they often focus on symmetrical threats, i.e., on potential adversaries against whom the United States would have to employ its conventional sea, air and land forces. This view is necessary because these threats do exist, but it is insufficient. The asymmetry of our world is much more perplexing.

Asymmetrical threats will continue to challenge our national security and economic security, for our adversaries realize only these have a chance to succeed. Just because the U.S. conventional military forces are so devastatingly capable, no potential adversary wants to fight the United States or its allies on the conventional battlefield. The United States must maintain sufficient conventional military strength to continue to deter interstate conventional war and potential regional hegemons. We must also continue to develop military capabilities that can prevent and defeat asymmetrical threats. We fought asymmetrical wars in Panama and Iraq; potential adversaries saw how decisively effective these were. They will look for methods within their means to achieve their objectives. Terrorism is the classical example of an asymmetrical threat to U.S. power. Too often thought of as "merely" criminal activity, terrorism can also be a form of warfare — force, violent means, that a group uses to attain its political aims. "Cyberwar" or "information warfare" is another example of an emerging, potentially violent, asymmetrical means of conducting warfare.
Paradox and asymmetry yield uncertainty. Profound change is already affecting the security interests of the United States. Demographic, climatic and environmental changes are shifting whole peoples. Movement of peoples, information and money, as well as the development of health and ecological problems requiring multinational solutions and global cooperation, are eroding “national sovereignty.” New patterns of international trade, industry and technology are altering economic relationships. Agrichemicals and biotechnology are changing agricultural methods. Shifts in the political, social and economic composition of Russia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia are affecting strategic dynamics in ways not yet fully revealed. Given the pace of change and the ways in which changes affect one another, no one can be certain about the outcome. Shifts of this magnitude will continue to produce unrest, strife, crisis, conflict and — unless prevented — war.

As the nature and characteristics of the post-Cold War environment have unfolded, so has U.S. strategy. American strategists have learned since 1989 that our armed forces will be called upon to succeed — when deemed in the national interest — in a variety of geographic, climactic, coalition, political and threat circumstances. Strategy has adapted to accommodate this reality. U.S. strategic thinking has congealed around four concepts: prevent, deter and win in the international arena and support domestic authorities at home. Secretary of Defense William Perry describes three of these concepts in this way:

In the post-Cold War security environment, U.S. strategy for managing conflict rests on three basic lines of defense. The first line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging, the second is to deter threats that do emerge; and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to defeat the threat using military force.\(^6\)

Just as containment and deterrence evolved into a bipartisan national strategy with debate only over how to execute it, the post-Cold War strategy of prevent, deter, win and support is also emerging.

Our first strategic objective concerns prevention. We seek to prevent conflict from starting — not everywhere, but where our interests dictate. And if conflict starts, we seek to prevent it from spreading or escalating into interstate or regional war. The second concerns deterrence of conventional or nuclear war or the use of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States, usually with allies and other friendly nations, also seeks to deter a regional hegemon from gaining control in areas of national or common interests. Deterrence is a form of prevention, but deserves its own place in strategy because of its importance. Conventional or nuclear war and regional hegemony, as well as employment of other weapons of mass destruction, have potentially catastrophic consequences. The means to prevent this from happening, therefore, are vitally important. Third, should prevention and deterrence fail and the United States deploys its forces, alone or as part of a coalition, the nation will demand victory — on its terms and those of our allies and friends. The last national security objective involves support to domestic authorities in keeping the peace, enforcing laws or recovering from natural disasters.

These four elements of national security strategy are important with respect to U.S. military force, for strategy determines military requirements. Military forces are instruments; they have no worth in and of themselves. Their worth is measured by their usefulness in attaining the strategic aims of the nation. When strategists talk of a “capability-based force” rather than a “threat-based force,” what they mean is this: United States military capabilities must be derived from the full spectrum of requirements dictated by our national security strategy. “Capability” is a relative term, and in this context military capability is relative to national security requirements.

The emergence of the “prevent-deter-win-support” national security strategy is important to the QDR process. Unlike the BUR, the nation now has a sufficiently formed strategy from which to derive
the proper, post-Cold War military force structure. Strategists no longer need a sizing function upon which to base the size and structure of the military. They can now divorce themselves from the threat-based logic of the Cold War and ask a more precise question: “What set of capabilities must the American military forces have to execute national security strategy?” This question is much different from the one presently dominating the military force structure debate, i.e., “What size and type of force is necessary to fight and win in a one- or two-MRC scenario?” The difference between these two questions illustrates the first conceptual challenge to defense planners and strategists.

Those who have run the computer models associated with validating Cold War and BUR force structures will be unhappy with the change in questions. Their unhappiness comes from the fact that their models are less useful now than they had been. Figure 3 depicts the capability-based logic required by the post-Cold War environment.

Fig. 3 — CAPABILITY-BASED MODEL

Support Domestic Authorities

Prevent

Deter*

Fight & Win

- natural disasters
- civil disturbances
- domestic defense
- state missions
- exchanges
- regional commitments
- mil-to-mil contacts
- operations, e.g., Bosnia, Macedonia, Africa, Haiti, Somalia
- counter-narcotics
- Partnership for Peace
- CINC exercises
- SWA, Sinai
- North Korea
- Pacific
- WMD
- Europe
- emergent “near peer” competitor

FORCE GENERATION CAPABILITY

Build This Force

- Technological superiority DOES NOT offset numerical inferiority in these arenas as much as it does in the realm of conventional combat.
- These are the “fixed costs” of American leadership, global involvement, and treaty obligations.

*NOTE: Deterrent value derives from recognized capability to fight and win, PLUS military and political will to use that force.
The challenge to today’s strategists is more complex than computing and comparing fleets, aircraft, divisions and missiles. Even when reliance on models is appropriate, the assumptions upon which QDR models must run will have to change.

A second group will be unhappy with deriving force structure from the question, “What set of capabilities must the American military forces have to execute the national security strategy?” This group contains those who define “war” as “the armies of one nation-state or group of nation-states fighting those of another” and go on to call all other uses of military force something “other than war.” This definition is too narrow, and it does not fit reality. Wars have been, are being and will be conducted not only by states but also by corporations, religious groups, terrorist organizations, tribes, guerrilla bands, drug cartels and clan leaders — to name just a few. A more accurate definition of “war” is this: violence used to compel an enemy to do your will so as to achieve a political objective. Post-Cold War military forces must be “warfighters” in this expanded sense, not just within the narrower definition.

The difference between a threat-based model and a capability-based one also illustrates a challenge to the validity of the two central assumptions of the Cold War and Bottom-Up Review. The past three generations of civilian and military strategists have believed, correctly, that the size and capability of the force necessary to defeat the global Soviet threat could handle anything else the nation may ask of it and that the United States could offset the inferior size of U.S. forces with superior U.S. technology. The validity of these two assumptions is now in question.

If strategists were to derive the size and composition of U.S. armed forces only from that necessary to fight and win one or two major regional contingencies against a “conventional enemy,” that force would be inadequate to execute the full range of national security requirements. In the realm of conventional combat, offsetting quantity with technology still applies, but only up to a point. The United States can bring to bear significant technological advantage to its conventional forces, and it should. Ground maneuver forces, artillery, helicopters, surface missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, surface vessels and submarines — all can be connected via information technologies. This connectivity allows the massing of effects from platforms of each of the services in a way not possible even as recent as the Gulf War. Thus, there is overall a reduction in force possible in the arena of conventional combat, for massing forces physically is no longer needed to achieve the same effect on an enemy.

But the offset principle has important limitations. With respect to conventional combat, there is a threshold below which the principle does not apply. Physical mass on the ground still counts. The commanders in chief need a proper mix of the massing of ground maneuver units and precision fires delivered from air-, land- and sea-based platforms. Physical mass on the ground also counts in operations such as those in Bosnia, Macedonia, Haiti and Somalia — operations aimed at preventing war from starting, spreading or escalating. Finally, physical mass counts in civil disturbance operations as well as in those in reaction to natural disasters. Remote-controlled, sterile, bloodless, video-game warfare is a figment in the minds of the uninitiated. Technology is still very useful — often vital — but it cannot offset the physical presence of troops on the ground, even in conventional combat.

Further, almost any recent intelligence, think-tank or academic analysis has observed that the most likely use of military forces in the next five to 15 years will be in the “nontraditional” category or “unconventional combat” under strict rules of engagement. This observation, when coupled with an opponent who will pose an asymmetrical threat to offset America’s conventional strength, leads inexorably to this conclusion: During the QDR, strategists must take care not to optimize U.S. armed forces for only one narrow band of strategic requirements.
The logic governing post-Cold War force structure is different from that which applied in the Cold War and during the Bottom-Up Review. Paradox, asymmetry and uncertainty all argue for a flexible military force, not an optimized one. Utility with respect to the full spectrum of national security objectives should be the governing principle in determining the structure of U.S. armed forces.

Does this mean the United States ought not to develop a high-tech conventional force? Absolutely not. The United States needs to have this capability. Deterrence of conventional combat and winning when deterrence fails are important. Deterrent value derives from recognized proficiency in conventional combat and the political will to use it. However, the logic of strategy, as Edward Luttwak explains in *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, is paradoxical. If the United States optimizes its forces for the win-deter aspects of the strategy and attends less to the deter-prevent portions, it will increase the probability of the need to fight and win. Similarly, if the United States attends solely to the prevent-deter side and spends too little on the deter-win, it will increase the probability of war. The issue is not one of either-or, but of balance and risk. Right now the tendency seems to be to focus on the technological aspects of conventional combat — a very narrow band relative to the full spectrum of national security requirements. If the QDR process does not widen that focus, the nation runs the risk of producing a military force that — while highly lethal — is largely irrelevant.

What strategists must determine in the QDR is how high-tech the American force must be to stay one step ahead of a potential adversary. That is all the nation needs to gain maximum deter-win value. At present, the United States has the most powerful, most capable, most lethal armed force on the face of the earth. Such a force is both necessary and valuable. It helps prevent conventional war from starting and, if required, it helps end wars decisively on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Enough money to stay one step ahead of potential adversaries in the conventional arena is money well spent. There is a possibility of excess, however. Right now, for example, the United States has the best tanks, fighter aircraft, bombers, surface vessels and submarines on earth. We need not spend a lot of money building new ones — product improvements and research and development may suffice in this area. We can afford to take risk here. The issue is one of balance.

Some might be tempted to believe that the military force needed to execute the national security strategy is bifurcated: one force aimed at conventional combat, the other at operations other than conventional combat. This is a false belief, however, drawn by those unfamiliar with the realities of operations associated with prevention and deterrence. Military forces successful in Bosnia, Macedonia and Haiti, for example, are successful just because of the skills developed while training for conventional combat. Balancing the prevent-deter portion of the national security strategy with the deter-win portions does not mean creating two distinct “militaries.” Such a decision would not only be cost ineffective, but also reflect optimization at its worst. Rather, the issue is shifting priority and resources from those elements of the U.S. armed forces that are overly optimized to those that are more “full-spectrum” forces. The QDR has the opportunity to break the paradigm of the past and allocate resources by strategic requirements, rather than military-industrial demands. This kind of move does not require an increase in defense spending; rather, only a reallocation. In this way, the QDR could not only aim to create a force structure that gets the “biggest bang for the buck,” it would also create a force from which the nation gets the “most use for the buck.”

Getting the prevent-deter-win-support balance right will also affect the military-industrial and military-community relationships in obvious ways. With respect to industry: On one hand, the military needs fewer tanks, aircraft and ships; on the other hand, the nation needs productive capacity for the future. This balance will be difficult to achieve, but we must find a way. Not all procurement will stop, and product improvements will continue. There could be expansion in industrial vice military research and development. An increased use of “off-the-shelf” or “civilian specifications” items rather than “military-unique” items is also possible.
The military-community relationship has been affected by the shift from mass logistics of the industrial era to the precision logistics that information technology allows. This doctrinal and organizational shift and the near 40 percent reduction in size means that the military needs fewer installations, depots and facilities. The nation must stay connected to its armed force, however. The QDR, therefore, should face squarely this aspect of the national security equation. This is another very tough issue, but it is one that needs resolution: How can the nation eliminate excess capacity, unused and unnecessary facilities that drain resources needed elsewhere, yet maintain an adequate military-community relationship?

There is a second reason that strategists of the QDR must discover a new form of military-community relationship. The volunteer force — as good as it is, and as many benefits as it has brought — has distanced Americans from their armed forces. Fewer citizens, lawmakers, business leaders and academics have served in the military. New recruits often come from families in which neither parents nor aunts or uncles have served. This trend will not have positive results, especially in a representative democracy like that of the United States.

The nation must raise, train and sustain an armed force of sufficient size and capability to execute the full range of national security objectives — all in light of the requirement to balance the budget. Unless strategists tackle the hard questions involved with the military-industrial and military-community relationships, the easy answer becomes too seductive: to use the logic of the past to create the wrong armed force for our times — one that can fight and win two or fewer major regional contingencies but is useful in only a very narrow band of national security requirements.

Shifting from one logical framework to another is not easy. When faced with such a task, Thomas Kuhn reminds us in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, the tendency is to “devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications to [the present] theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict."8 If the civilian and military strategists involved in the QDR merely extend the logic of the Cold War and BUR, they will have fallen prey to this very tendency. To create the military needed for today and tomorrow, strategists must change the fundamental logic governing the structuring of U.S. armed forces.

**Conclusion**

What principles might govern this new logic? Perhaps the following:

1. Build a capability-based force that derives its size and composition from the full spectrum of national security requirements rather than from a sizing function or conventional, threat-based analysis.

2. Use the technology-offset principle only in those areas of military operations and conventional combat where it applies.

3. Retain strong military-industrial and military-community relationships, but develop these relationships differently from those of the Cold War.

Following World War I, the American philosopher John Dewey observed that the certainty of the 19th century had passed. “Uncertainty as to what the future has in store casts its heavy and black shadow over all aspects of the present,” Dewey remarked.9 The world had changed. With this change,
he continued, came new realities to understand and new problems to solve. The past would be a helpful
guide, but in the final analysis what was needed were new concepts, understandings, and ways to think
about the world and act in it. Reality demanded adjustment — conceptual, behavioral and physical.

Dewey’s ideas are particularly poignant today. Gone with the Cold War is the paradigm that
explained how to structure military force in that kind of world. Reality once again demands conceptual
growth and change in behavior. John Dewey’s task to reconstruct philosophy after World War I was
difficult, but that task pales in comparison to the one before the QDR.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago


4. General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret., and Colonel Michael V. Harper, USA Ret., Hope Is Not A

5. General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, “A Word from the Chairman,” Joint Force Quarterly,
Summer 1996.


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