THE UNITED STATES ARMY — YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

by

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The Army

The United States Army, older by a year than the nation it serves, descendant of the fighting men and militias of colonial history, legacy of the soldiers who fought America’s wars for more than two hundred years, remains today the final instrument for coping with threats to our national interests. The Army engages in land combat, confronting, dominating and destroying enemy forces and their ability to resist the imposition of policies pursuant to the national goals of the United States. From the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781 to the Safwan Conference in 1991 that ended the hostilities of the Persian Gulf War, the Army has created the fundamental conditions of settlement for almost all of the confrontational disputes in which we have been involved.

Today the Army continues to be the critical member of the Joint Team of the Armed Forces, the arm of decision. It is simultaneously the force that is fully dependent upon the United States Navy and the United States Air Force to deploy it to an area of crisis and to deliver means of support and sustainment until a decision is reached. The Army is comfortable proclaiming “We won the war, but we never could have done it without the Navy and the Air Force!” as not only a reflection of past successes but also a continuing, more demanding requirement for the future.
The Army today, active and reserve, is second to none in the world in quality and capability, employing skilled, superbly trained and motivated soldiers, equipped with superior weaponry and technology and using systems, operational techniques and doctrine evolved over centuries of successful warfare. The operational prowess demonstrated in Operations Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm (Persian Gulf) will serve as paradigms for military commanders of future centuries and for political leaders who must contemplate the employment of military power.

Why an Army Today?

For the first two hundred years of our existence the people of this nation responded to each dire national crisis by building the armed forces needed to end satisfactorily the threat then extant. Without exception we had time, for varying reasons, to produce or obtain the wherewithal required for the successful prosecution of war. On most occasions the costs of being unprepared at the outset were offset by the ultimate successes of the forces constructed. But the lessons of that history coupled with the geometrically explosive growth in lethality and effectiveness of today’s weaponry, equipment, transport and forces establishes that time is no longer a guarantor against failure. The speed and decisiveness with which Saddam Hussein conquered Kuwait and threatened derangement of the world’s oil traffic are indicative of the kinds of threats for which our national interests will demand retaliatory military action. The existence of armed forces ready for employment is the condition that must be the norm for the foreseeable future.

Since World War II, the Truman Doctrine, “Massive Retaliation,” “Graduated Response,” whatever the national strategy, the requirement to be prepared to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously has been fundamental to the structure of our armed forces. Given the state of the world today, there is no change in the realization that the engagement of the United States in one theater of operations can signal an opportunity to an aggressor in another part of the world. The demand of today’s national strategy, that we remain prepared to fight in two major regional contingencies almost simultaneously, is no more than today’s validation of the findings and recommendations of legions of national strategists who have studied the problem for the past fifty years.

It is true that the threat to the United States has abated and can only be defined as non-specific. Fear of an intercontinental nuclear attack has lessened. Fear of a Warsaw Pact army overrunning Europe has disappeared. Fear of a third World War is almost nonexistent. But acknowledging that military power and the resort to war around the globe are ongoing and continuing threats is axiomatic. World peace is not at hand and where it exists at all, its continuation demands a vigilant and capable deterrent power.

The National Strategy of the United States and its subordinate National Military Strategy today require that the Army be prepared, as required by Title 10 of the United States Code, for “prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land” whenever and wherever committed. It must be capable of rapid reaction across a full spectrum of operations, from general war to limited war to the engagement of paramilitary forces to operations other than war, a category delimited only by the will of a President who determines a need for military action to cope with a national crisis. It must, with the assistance of the other services, sustain itself and its efforts for the duration
of conflict. This historic mission remains the fundamental reason for the Army's existence; however, the answer to "Why an Army today?" is, as it has been for half a century: as an integral of the armed forces of the United States, to deter an enemy from taking military action inimical to the interests of the nation and, if that deterrence fails, to engage the enemy swiftly and decisively to guarantee an outcome satisfactory to our political aims. Only the Army can conclude a conquest. Only the Army can control an enemy's land, infrastructure and people.

What is the Army?

The United States Army is a collective mass of disparate elements, each of which contributes uniquely to the purpose of success on the battlefield. The mass is divided grossly into the combat forces, of which there are three categories—combat, combat support, and combat service support—and all others which make up the great sustaining base or infrastructure of the Army.
Combat forces engage the enemy, seeking dominance over land areas and opposing forces through the destruction of their powers to resist. Combat support forces contribute specialized forms of firepower, maneuver capabilities or intelligence collection that improve the performance and chances of success of the combat forces. Combat service support forces provide and sustain the resource requirements of all forces committed in the combat zone. A proper balance of these three kinds of forces is essential to sustained combat action in any and all parts of the world.

Combat forces include varied infantry forces — airborne, airmobile, mechanized, mountain, special operations — armor, cavalry, air defense and some artillery, aviation, engineer, signal and intelligence forces who carry the battle to the enemy. For the purpose of definition, all soldiers assigned to a division are identified as combat personnel.

Combat support forces are other air defense, field artillery, engineer, signal and intelligence forces supplemented by military police, transportation and forward support elements of the logistics systems that operate in close proximity to the combat forces.

Combat service support forces include administrative forces that operate the personnel replacement system, military pay and accounting, mail delivery, the military justice system and mortuary services. They include the logistics forces, the quartermaster, ordnance and transportation units that deliver food, fuel, ammunition, repair parts, replacement equipment, special supplies (barbed wire, construction materials) and who repair and maintain the equipage of the force in the field. They include the medical forces that treat, and evacuate the sick and injured and maintain the health of the command in the field. And they include more signal units that build and maintain the long lines of communication, engineers who build and repair roads and buildings, military police and many other units that assure the functioning of all the support services.

Interwoven among these forces are the headquarters that, through five echelons — corps, division, brigade, battalion and company — maintain command and control of the forces, directing operations, reporting successes or failures and allocating appropriate support and services among those pursuing the objectives of the command. Each headquarters’ purposes are the direction of actions designed to accomplish a mission, the coordination and synchronization of all possible support for the combat forces engaged, and the obtainment of any and all information that will assist commanders’ decisionmaking.

Behind the combat zone and stretching all the way to the continental United States (CONUS) is what can be called the infrastructure of the Army. In the theater of operations, behind the combat zone, the communications zone is the area in which the deployed support and service installations and units are located. The movement of personnel, equipment and supplies into and out of ports and airports, the repair and rebuilding of equipment, the hospitalization of the wounded, burial of the dead, and the conduct of civil affairs or military government are all functions requiring space, time and organizations. The sustainment of combat operations, along with maintenance of forces in the field who are not fighting, requires the continuing pursuit of communications zone activities.
Located somewhere in the theater of operations are the joint and unified command headquarters, key command elements in the echelons above the corps. Each of these headquarters exercises command and control of its assigned forces and directs the combat operations appropriate to its mission. Each joint and unified command has an Army component, sometimes directing land force operations, sometimes acting only in a support role, assuring that Army forces are trained, equipped, supplied and capable of performing their land force mission. The component commands overseas are U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), U.S. Army, South (USARSO) and Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

The communications zone is anchored in the United States, home to the Army’s support base and the bulk of the sustaining infrastructure. Headquarters, Department of the Army and nine major commands acquire, organize, train, equip and ready for war the resources required to build fighting forces. The broadest functional responsibilities fall to: Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Army Materiel Command (AMC). Medical Command (MEDCOM), Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Information Systems Command (ISCOM), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Criminal Investigation Command (CIDCOM) and the Military District of Washington (MDW) take on specialized supporting roles. Headquarters, Department of Army Staff (DA) is the coordinating center for all Army activities.

Rounding out the structure of the Army are the components of the unified commands and defense agencies located in CONUS, including but not limited to: Central Command, Atlantic Command, Special Operations Command, Transportation Command, Space Command and the National Guard Bureau.
The coordinating nucleus of the Department of the Army is the Army Staff (ARSTAF). Collectively, it acts as the agent of the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) in supervising the activities and operations of all organizations of the Army. The ARSTAF conducts long-range planning, resource determination and allocation, the development of Army-wide objectives, the formulation of broad policy guidance, and the supervision and control of operations.

Together the combat, combat support and combat service support forces of the active and reserve components total approximately 865,000 soldiers. Almost 80 percent of the Total Army is deployable to a theater of war for combat operations — not all at the same time, not all with the most modern equipment, not all having reached the same level of training and readiness, but all designed and organized for employment and utilization in the combat zone.

That total combat capability is sustained in peace and war by the Army’s infrastructure — 30 percent of the active force, less than 22 percent of the Total Army. Some expansion of the infrastructure occurs under wartime/full mobilization conditions, but current plans require no additional installations and add manpower only to extend hours of operation by existing facilities.

Undergirding the Army commands and agencies is a culture reflecting almost 400 years of military history peculiar to the American nation. Beginning in 1607 in Jamestown and 1620 at Plymouth Rock, the new settlers became an instrument of conquest and, with few exceptions, soldiers were merely the defenders and protectors of the settlers. In such fashion the colonies ex-
panded and the new nation extended its control over the vast area of North America that has become the United States. The "Minuteman" became the symbol of immediate response to danger while the active soldiery served as reserve forces committed to rout the enemy when attacks threatened the pioneers and their encroachments.

The practice is truly a phenomenon in recorded history, duplicated only, and in some aspects, by the Boers in South Africa and the Canadians who followed their fur traders westward. The norm of history reflects the exploits of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Genghis Khan creating empires by military conquest followed by civil administrations kept in power by military garrisons. Their pattern has been the paradigm for more than 2,000 years, whether the Norman conquest of Britain, the Spanish subjugation of Latin America, or the World War II attempt of Adolf Hitler to define the Thousand Year Reich. Only in America was the cutting edge forged and sustained for almost three hundred years by the civilian populace.

Three important elements of Army culture derived from this practice. The first is military subservience to civilian control. From the earliest responses to civilian calls for help through the dire crisis of a civil war, the armed forces of this country have never threatened to supplant or overthrow the civil government, nor have they refused any mission or commitment established by the government as a legitimate interest of the nation. The American people have been blessed, uniquely, with a military that has never sought power over internal affairs or government operations.
The second cultural derivative is an Army comprised of twenty-six military branches, each with its distinct heritage, its peculiar insignia and the loyal convictions of its assigned personnel. Today’s Army began as ten infantry companies activated by the Continental Congress in 1775. Subsequently, military activities identified the need for engineers, signaleers and artillerymen. The horse provided mobility and the cavalry claimed its role in the expanding Army. As each specialty group evolved, pride in its contributions caused it to adopt uniforms, distinctive headgear, and/or items of insignia that identified membership and incidentally, bragging rights and celebrity status. The practice has continued into modern times, with the Transportation Corps and Air Defense coming into being in World War II; the Intelligence branch spawned by a burgeoning information collection system; Army Aviation, the latest new branch; and the adoption of maroon, green and black berets by airborne, Special Forces and Ranger personnel respectively.

Often cited as an example of excessive Army overhead costs, the branch system actually consumes no resources and serves as a morale and esprit de corps factor for military personnel. Army organizations are designed functionally and personnel are assigned to fulfill specialty requirements regardless of the number and identity of their branches. The Army school system is functionally organized and although the fire support function is principally the realm of the artilleryman, it is fire support being taught at Fort Sill, not field artillery. Eliminating branches would not change any resource demand or allocation across the spectrum of Army activities, but it would dilute if not damage the competitive spirit and pride of association that now pervades the thousands of men and women who like and admire the distinctions they maintain.

The third element of Army culture is a strong reliance on reserve components. More than a million soldiers are today engaged in civilian pursuits in their daily lives, but their avocation is a devotion to being prepared and ready for military service in time of national crisis. These soldiers spend time and effort to train as part of the organizations of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) to assure that adequate forces can be mobilized by the nation to meet any foreseeable crisis. The wisdom of our founding fathers, who opposed the creation of a large standing army, is honored today by the policy of maintaining in active service only the eighth largest Army in the world while relying on over a million men and women civilians to answer an emergency call to service that guarantees both our immediate and long-term military prowess.

The Army today is second-to-none in the world in quality and capability, employing skilled, superbly trained troops equipped with superior weaponry and technologies in systems and operational techniques that have proved successful over the centuries of our existence as a nation.

**The Army of the Future**

The United States Army of the future will be an evolving successor of the Army of today, adapting and adopting new technologies, more effective equipment and improved techniques in a quest to remain master of the battlefield. Many refer to the coming years as a new age — the information age in which information is collected and shared with an immediacy never before
contemplated. The military stage for this age was set with the establishment of the global positioning system, microprocessing and other advances in modernization. The Army of the future will exploit these information technologies.

The strategic necessity of the Army — the mission of deterrence followed by guaranteed victory if deterrence fails — and the principles of war will remain unchanged in the coming years. These absolutes form the foundation on which the future Army structure will be based and on which the successful pursuit of the nation’s aims and goals will depend.

There is no doubt that the threat to the worldwide interests of the United States has changed. There is argument that economic structures and political extremism have supplanted an enemy’s military forces as the greatest threats to the nation. The demise of the Soviet Union and the lack of superpower capacities in any other nation have contributed to the persuasion that military defense is now almost unnecessary, certainly of lower priority among the affairs of the government.

Unfortunately, the causes of the Persian Gulf War, the need for an invasion of Panama and the American reaction to Somalian unrest provide continuing examples both of the need for military power and the judicious use of such power in pursuit of legitimate American interests. In fact, we face an array of threats ranging from regional war, through lesser conflicts, to a variety of peace and humanitarian operations. When the intense emotions that nationalistic and fundamental ideologies generate are combined with the availability of weapons of mass destruction, more reliable means of delivery and high technology weapons, the unpredictability and volatility of the threat come into sharp focus. Clearly, we have not arrived at the period of peace and stability that would justify abandoning our military stature.

Following the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, two U.S. administrations have studied the world situation and concluded that a baseline force capable of responding to two almost simultaneous military contingencies, comparable to the Persian Gulf War, is a continuing requirement. The studies that support this conclusion again validate theories of every national security policy adopted from the end of World War II to the present: The United States must remain ready and able to fight in at least two areas of the world against powerful enemies capable of major regional military operations.

The Army has chosen “Force XXI” to designate the forces necessary to meet this threat and accomplish the continuing mission. The dimensions of this force, the elements of its composition and the organization and doctrine for its deployment are undefined. Unquestionably, the Army knows how and why and what it can accomplish with today’s forces. It knows what new equipment and new technologies are planned for acquisition and what changes will be made because of them. It does not know what other technological breakthrough or equipment design might be discovered or found to be exploitable in the future. Hence, Force XXI is a dynamic concept promising an evolution that results from experimentation, testing and the exploitation of new capabilities across the spectra of military functions and time. The end result is not an ultimate organization or structure, but rather a force in being at any time that can employ the best resources and the most effective methods to satisfy the military purposes of our government.
Fulfilling the Promise

The Size of the Army. The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the inexorable crumbling of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the Cold War foundation of the U.S. armed forces. From 1989 to the present, defense management has been preoccupied with identifying what size and for what purpose we need these forces. For the Army, this has been an excruciatingly demanding time, for it is the service that has suffered the greatest reduction in manpower, force structure and funds. In specific terms, the Army is smaller by 36 percent active and 22 percent reserve personnel, by 36 percent of its civilians, by eight active and two Army National Guard divisions and by $37 billion (39 percent) in current-year dollars. Its procurement and research and development funds are down by $13 billion, more than 55 percent, to a figure seven percent less than its share of the Army budget in 1989.

![Active Personnel Chart]

![Reserve Personnel Chart]

**OUR SHRINKING ARMY**

![Civilian Personnel Chart]

![Modernization Chart]

During this period two principal policy decisions controlled the pace of reductions and the ultimate target numbers. First the Bush administration's Baseline Force, produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and approved by the Secretary of Defense, projected an Army of 12 active and 8 reserve divisions at a strength of 520,000 active and 567,000 reserve. In this structure many active units required reserve roundout augmentation to be at full strength. At the same time, after a "bottom-up" review (BUR), a force of ten active divisions at a strength of 476,000 was proposed.
The BUR force, which proposed a complete withdrawal of divisions from Germany, was later adopted by the Clinton administration but modified to leave a two-division corps in Europe and a strength figure of 495,000. Both the Baseline Force and the BUR force were proposed as adequate for the National Military Strategy requirement that the Army be able to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingency missions of the Persian Gulf War size — a requirement, incidentally, that continues to validate the conclusion of every national security study since World War II that the United States must be prepared to fight in at least two theaters of operation.

There are many factors besides the National Military Strategy that affect the Army’s force structure. Chief among them is the demand placed on the Army to support the other services and agencies of the government. The nation’s civil works program is largely the responsibility of the Army’s Chief of Engineers and 70 percent of his organization is devoted to this mission. The Army provides the in-theater common items logistics support for Air Force, Navy and Marine forces employed there. In the Persian Gulf, the total U.S. force of 540,000 was 57 percent Army but the responsibility for receiving and distributing food, fuel and ammunition was 100 percent Army.

The U.S. Marine Corps, with its “lean and mean” image, has no ability to sustain itself in land combat, relying on the Navy to deliver supplies to the shoreline, the Army to deliver inland. (Nevertheless, the USMC at 175,000 and three divisions has a division slice of 58,300 compared to the Army’s 495,000 for ten divisions, a slice of 49,500.)

The Army conducts 80 percent of the Marine Corps training program, from basic field artillery through the War College, with no direct compensation to the Army budget. The Army also provides certain specialized training for the Air Force and the Special Operations Forces, all of which adds to the total infrastructure described earlier in the paper.

The training of the Army’s reserve components, from basic trainees to battalion rotations at the National Training Center, places resource demands on TRADOC, AMC and FORSCOM, including the congressionally-mandated 5,000 active officers assigned as advisors to reserve organizations.

Given all of these factors and the current national strategy, the proper size of the Army, now dictated at 10 divisions, 495,000 and proposed by some at eight divisions and 450,000, remains a matter of arguable conjecture. Given the current BUR force augmented by the two divisions remaining in Europe, both the Baseline and BUR analyses referred to above seem to have come to very similar conclusions that 12 divisions and about 550,000 soldiers satisfy the strategy. As the Army proceeds to design and develop Force XXI, it would appear prudent to seek the capability of a 12-division, 550,000 force as its objective.

Modernization. The invasion of Panama (Operation Just Cause) and the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) provide convincing if not irrefutable evidence that highly-trained, technologically superior and properly motivated soldiers enjoy overwhelming advantage on the battlefield. The proper application of such resources by skilled commanders resulted in complete victory in 48 hours in Panama, in 100 hours in the Persian Gulf.
Guaranteeing the ability to repeat those performances in the future depends entirely upon two fundamentals:

1. Funding the training, education and readiness programs that produce trained, motivated, capable units and organizations.

2. Funding a continuing and comprehensive modernization program that adapts and adopts technological and materiel advances that guarantee that U.S. forces will be the best equipped on any future battlefield.

From the end of the Gulf War to the present, the armed forces have assigned the highest priority to obtaining and maintaining the resources required for readiness. The requirements for operations and maintenance funds have been satisfied during this period to a degree that has allowed the chiefs of all services to proclaim their forces as “the finest in the world,” “the best I’ve ever seen,” “fully ready for any commitment.” Unfortunately, particularly in the case of the Army, readiness has been guaranteed at the expense of the RDA (research, development and acquisition) program, and the promise of the future is clouded by the portent of fighting wars in the year 2000 with the equipment of 1990 designed in the 1970s.

Force XXI is a complex product. It depends upon continuing hardware improvements, i.e., new or improved weapons, radios, transport or materials handling equipment. It depends as well on adopting new techniques for assimilating and distributing knowledge, i.e., intelligence collection, the exploitation of computer communications and the dissemination of information to all echelons and across the spectrum of military operations. It depends also on the updating of doctrine for training personnel to employ these things most effectively in battle.

Given those fundamentals, the Army’s hardware program requires the Comanche helicopter, theater ballistic missile defenses and improvements to its tanks, field artillery and combat vehicles. To protect its personnel it needs continuing improvement in body armor, chemical and biological defenses and the extension of greater medical support. To improve its information dissemination ability it requires the most modern signal equipment, the latest computer technology and the extension of communication and computer utility to soldiers engaged in the fight. To guarantee the upgrading of doctrine it requires support of the Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Labs concepts that are experimenting, testing and designing change. The challenge for each element of this total program is assurance that whenever the Army is committed to fight, it will deploy with the latest, most modern equipment, techniques and tactics available. Anything less subjects the force to less than optimum capability, greater than necessary casualty lists and an inefficient use of resources committed.

At present, and for the foreseeable future in the current defense program, the funds for Army modernization are woefully inadequate. We are not guaranteed an Army, a decade from now or beyond, that will outclass its potential foes. We are programming potentially for costly, less efficient and less effective campaigns if we do not increase support for Army modernization. At a time when our air and naval forces are not only the strongest in the world, but also are devoid of any
serious threat to their prowess, it would seem a good time to divert whatever funds necessary to assure that Army modernization is accomplished on a reasonable time schedule. The imbalance among the services can be corrected.

**The Army Share.** World War II created the medium in which the exaltation of airpower became widespread. German Stukas led the Blitzkrieg. Japanese Zeroes laid waste Pearl Harbor and the United States Navy. The Royal Air Force Spitfires prevented the invasion of Britain. Strategic bombing created havoc at Coventry, laid waste to much of German industry and ended the war with Japan with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The carrier displaced the battleship as the potent weapon of sea warfare and pilots basked in the glory of Billy Mitchell's exoneration. The conclusion that airpower won the war and was unquestionably the wave of the future was widespread and solidly anchored by the exaggerated claims of its proponents.

Little attention was paid to the fact that the decisive moments of World War II, the culminating points, occurred when land forces reoccupied North Africa, captured Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima, invaded Normandy, overran Germany and had to occupy Japan to confirm victory. The die had been cast and the perception of the public, the press, the U.S. government and the shapers of military concepts and doctrine raised airpower to the dominant feature of military thought. Defense reorganization in 1947 created the United States Air Force to manage and exploit the new capabilities.

The Korean War, stalemated when the costs of a decisive land campaign were more than we wished to pay, had little effect on the growing faith in the nuclear triad — the linkage of long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarines. In the 1950s the guarantee of nuclear dominance was the principal objective of defense planners and budgeteers.

The Cuban and Berlin crises of the early 1960s spawned a sudden realization that ground forces still had a role in military confrontations. The Vietnam War again demonstrated that air power alone does not settle things and that landpower tentatively applied foregoes any possibility of decisive action.

Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf have again proved the absolute requirement for land forces to achieve the ultimate objective, always with the support and augmentation of air power and sea power as essential elements of modern warfare.

With few exceptions, the Army has fought its battles for resource allocations during this entire period defensively and as an unwelcome participant in defense affairs. Only in the Kennedy administration and the early Reagan years has the Army budget approached adequacy, and even then never at the expense of the other services.

The Kennedy initiatives produced Army forces in the early 1960s that earned a respect not enjoyed by American forces since World War II. They also established the credibility and foundation of today's Special Operations Forces, now recognized as a valuable element of our military capabilities.
The Reagan years provided the funds that procured modern equipment, supported the recruitment and training of high-quality personnel and sustained the activities that promoted the effectiveness and capabilities demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. Perhaps most important was the commitment to progress that resulted in the exploitation of strategic intelligence and communications systems supporting the war. Despite stresses, strains and requirements for expediency, field commanders were better served by the high-level hierarchy than ever before.

These aberrations aside, the Army has struggled to obtain a 25 percent slice of the Defense budget, more often than not having to do with less and suffering program damage as a result.

Today the Army’s share of the budget — 24.6 percent in Fiscal Year 1995 and 24.1 percent for FY96 — shows a continuing downward trend and inadequate financing of the Army’s needs. Procurement funds have been halved in the past five years and Army R&D is now supported with less money than that allocated to the Defense agencies. Modernization of the force cannot be attempted let alone achieved, with that kind of funding.

The pay of personnel, military and civilian, has risen from 53 percent to 62 percent of the budget. This, coupled with other funding reductions associated with the loss of personnel over the past three years, has further compounded the impact on RDA.

The Army share of the Defense budget has been dwarfed since World War II by the demands of the other services. The costs of the nuclear triad alone have exceeded the amounts of money spent on the total Army. Coupling those costs with the needs for conventional air and naval forces
created the pressures that delimited the Army share in most years and prescribed a real annual decline for the decade 1986 to 1995. No enterprise, no matter how efficient, can sustain itself on a budget that provides, continuously, for less than absolute needs.

In the past 25 years, despite the surges provided by the ending of the Vietnam War and the Reagan administration that allowed the fulfillment of many Army modernization initiatives, the list of Army programs terminated for lack of funds is long and depressing. The MBT-70 tank became too costly. The heavy-lift helicopter and two scout vehicles, (one ground and one air) were deleted from a Big 8 program to fully fund the Big 5 (the Abrams main battle tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, UH-60 Black Hawk air assault helicopter, and Patriot air defense system). The Roland, Division Air Defense (DIVAD) and Air Defense Antitank System (ADATS) air defense weapons were defunded and no replacements have yet been fielded. The Viper, still perhaps the best shoulder-fired antitank weapon in the world, never went into production and infantry units have been equipped with riskier, less effective weapons ever since. The Total Army has never been equipped with the latest, most effective communications equipment; its air ambulance is an obsolete conveyance; and its truck fleet perennially provides vehicles older than their drivers. The long-term penury, in comparative terms, of the Army budget has assured that the Army costs less per person than any service, but that statistic is no consolation when it affects the future of the force.

Regardless of this history, the Army today is robust, better-equipped than its potential adversaries, better manned and trained than any Army in the world, and confident of its ability to satisfy its role in the national defense program. To sustain this excellence, however, the Army needs a modest two to four billion additional dollars annually for the next five years to assure that it enters the next millennium with a modern, capable organization with which it can continue its role as a guarantor of the interests of the people of the United States.
APPENDIX

Military Spaces Authorized - FY 96
(in thousands)

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<td>EUSA(^2)</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training, Transients, Holdees &amp; Students (Non-available)</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USAR 150.5\(^3\) 79.5\(^3\) 230\(^3\)

ARNG 340.3\(^4\) 32.7\(^4\) 373\(^4\)

NOTES:

1. In the event of a significant deployment approximately 40 percent of MEDCOM personnel would move to fill medical vacancies in operational force units.

2. MACOM authorizations outside of CONUS total approximately 27,000. When these spaces are added to USAREUR, USARPAC, USARSO and EUSA authorizations they equal the military force structure ceilings in Europe, Korea, Panama, and the Pacific.
3. USAR figures include 10,500 Individual Mobilization Augmentees and over 10,000 Reservists serving in a variety of active staff positions. Approximately 10,000 reservists in infrastructure positions would be available to deploy in a crisis and are therefore counted as operational forces.

4. In order to reflect authorized strength at FY 96 end strength limits, reported ARNG operational and infrastructure figures have been proportionately reduced to their 373,000 end strength cap.

(General Kroesen is currently a Senior Fellow for the Institute of Land Warfare.)

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