February 1993 marks a turning point for the West. In both the United States and Germany, major defense budget decisions were reached to reshape their military institutions for the era of peace among democratic nations, Pax Democratica. That is, the military means of national security strategy were being cut dramatically, but the new ends of the strategy were yet to be formulated. Indeed, while both Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin were articulating the adjustment of military means to attain domestic ends, the civil war in the Balkans underscored the challenge for decision makers to define (quickly) the framework, and objectives, for collective engagement in a democratic world.¹

This is not a new challenge. Our country has faced similar ones in the past. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger calls it “the De Toqueville challenge” because the noted 19th century writer observed presciently that “… a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It can not combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.”²

The era of Pax Democratica demands a grand strategy for peace just as the Cold War required a grand strategy for containment and deterrence, plus a military strategy for prosecuting the global war. America’s fixed design and perseverance for the past four and a half decades provides a testimonial to democratic populist patience, but it was a patience engendered more by the potential horror of 20th century nuclear warfare than by the nature of democratic impulses. So, it is quite true that the anticommunist consensus that sustained America’s Cold War national security strategy was unusually broad and deep. It “united Republicans and Democrats, business and labor, conservative nationalists and liberal internationalists.”³ But the depth of the consensus — absent the unifying threat — is not fully transferable to a new grand strategy for peace.
The presidential elections of 1992 point to a significant broad consensus among the American people that the world is indeed small, that nations are interlinked through television, commerce and ideas, and that the United States ought to remain engaged in the international arena to provide for the economic well-being of its citizenry. The election outcome, and the bipartisan support it engendered for international engagement, provides the foundation to build a U.S. grand strategy for peace. The question arising from these first post-Cold War elections is not should we be active in the international arena but, rather, for what purpose, on what terms, and at what cost to match means with ends of U.S. grand strategy in times of peace.

Given unlimited resources, the United States could pursue a Pax Americana world order imposed through military power. The Cold War, though, has left us with a crippling debt and deferral of debilitating domestic issues that must be addressed. The American public demanded a refocus. The political leadership changed because of it. Rebuilding our economic vitality, addressing social issues and reducing the federal deficit have become the first order of business.

From a long-term perspective, Paul Kennedy, the editor of Grand Strategies in War and Peace, has it right. We ought to frame our strategy in peace to renew the societal sinews and capabilities that we will need for challenges ahead in the 21st century. He suggests that the task at hand is “to structure the armed forces, and the economy and society upon which they rest, to be in a good position to meet contingencies — so that if a ‘1920s’ world unfortunately turns into a ‘1930s’ world at some point in the future, the nation (as did Britain) would not then discover that its grand strategy for war was crippled by a whole series of deficiencies which a faltering economy could not easily correct.” The 1990s, though, do not constitute a full parallel of the 1920s. Despite the fact that the new administration intends to focus on the domestic frontiers like a laser beam, the international arena is so turbulent and unpredictable that our grand strategy in peace must have a compelling vision of the objectives and sufficient means to achieve the requisite ends. Put another way, in the era of Pax Democratica, our nation requires a focus on both the principles of Wilsonian democracy and the sinews of Roosevelt’s internationalism. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the national security environment of Europe.

The Collective Security Challenge

Our challenge in Europe is to shape the peace and seize the window of opportunity to build a regional security framework that anchors both the East and the West. Having led the NATO alliance through the Cold War, the United States needs to forge a new trans-Atlantic partnership that provides for collective security and that legitimizes the changed relationships in Central and Eastern Europe. Collective security derives from the Wilsonian notion that the interests of all key actors, and their willingness to take risks, run parallel on the issues of peace. But, as the civil upheaval among Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims clearly points out, Europe has not found the will, nor the political fortitude, to face collectively the dangers emanating from the Balkans precisely because the risks do not run parallel.

While the American people focused inward in 1992 on the domestic issues of the presidential political campaign, so did the Europeans focus on respective national concerns. It was not a good year for further integration of the European community. In fact, in 1992, Europe was caught in the “clash between two opposing forces: the logic of economics and interdependence that spells community, and the logic of ethnicity and nationality that demands separation.” The forces of ethnicity and nationality carried the day. The hopes pinned on the Maastricht treaty were lost
among the Danish and French plebiscites, economic refugees (South to North) and asylum seekers
(East to West) swamped national social safety nets, the European Monetary System fell victim to
the German interest rate structure to rebuild the East German "Neue Laender" (new states), and
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) proved "unable to bring either
security or cooperation to the Balkans."6 By year's end, the new Europe, so confident of mastering
its own future in early 1992, had proven unable to coalesce around a single purpose. Only the
reintrans mission of the United States in late December narrowed the leadership gap.

With a reluctant Britain in tow, the Bush administration decided to ask the United Nations
Security Council for a mandate that would sanction the use of force to uphold the Serbian flight ban
in Bosnia. To be sure, the West European Union (WEU) became the security arm of the European
Economic Community (EEC). However, the ambassadors from WEU member nations posted to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were simply assigned concurrently to the WEU.
Only NATO, as the preeminent security institution, made some progress. The multinational corps
structures became more fully defined, out-of-sector roles and missions were articulated, and NATO
developed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to embrace post-Communist states. On
balance, 1992 declared loudly the demise of bipolarity in Europe through liberated ethnic passions,
resurgent nationalism and religious fervor. Ambassador Adrian Basara, currently serving as the
U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic and a close observer of Europe, captured it best when
he suggested that "traditional centrifugal forces are rising to the fore. Burdened by fleeing refugees
and rampant ethnic nationalism, Central and East European governments are cast upon the sea
of power rivalries with no security framework any longer in place."7

In sum, Europe's experience in 1992 has opened a window for the United States to reassess
its position in Europe, to generate an approach to deal with collective security in a nationalistic
environment, and to think in terms of our peacetime national security strategy goals. How long this
window will stay open is a matter of conjecture. Given the history of the 1920s and the 1930s, when
democracies perished in the aftermath of World War I, we may indeed have a limited opportunity
"to lead and shape — as only America can."8 We must not miss this opportunity to develop new
approaches for dealing with European allies and new friends in a cooperative security environment.

U.S. Interests in Europe

Any focus on Europe to define American interests would do well to invoke the Chrysler
Corporation query "What business am I in? What am I not interested in?" Clearly, the top U.S.-
geopolitical concern for the next several years will be the fate of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Belorus, Georgia, and the key central European states of Poland and Hungary. We have a truly
historic opportunity to draw Russia to the West, but there is a tremendous fragility in the fledgling
Russian democracy. Boris Yeltsin may well follow the fate of Mikhail Gorbachev, only to be replaced
by a totalitarian regime — given the character of Russian society. In Central Europe the challenge
is vested in states which are building market economies, but are hampered in finding access for
their products, such as steel.9 Germany, the fulcrum for so many years in our NATO forward
defense strategy, in turn "seeks to bury any fears of its future in European and trans-Atlantic
institutions."10 We must, therefore, continue to be facilitative in this regard. With respect to the
European Community, the challenge is to channel it eastward and to continue its integrative focus.

The question of what we should not be interested in becomes clearer in light of the February
1993 $88 billion Department of Defense (DoD) budget cuts. The Clinton administration's
commitment to U.S. force presence in Europe was capped at a "level of approximately 100,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 1996." It follows then, that the United States will not bear major responsibilities for European security through substantial force contributions. Instead, it will seek to shape European security through diplomacy, moral leadership, targeted economic assistance, and "promotion of complementary European security institutions, while maintaining 75,000 to 100,000 U.S. troops in NATO as an insurance policy."12

Examining the shift in purpose of U.S. force contributions in Europe from forward defense, to forward presence, to forward engagement, one can define a conceptual continuity. Each case constitutes a strategy paradigm shift, with forward engagement still to be defined. Forward defense entailed two U.S. Army heavy corps, along with supporting Air Force wings, that were forward deployed to guard the 1,100 kilometers of the former inter-German border. The shift to forward presence saw those forces cut in half, a hedge, as we transitioned from the Cold War to Pax Democratica. In turn, forward engagement force contributions are intended to focus on the synergy of maintaining coalition stability and enhancing cooperative relationships. These are essential to a framework for common reasoning in an alliance and cooperative security setting. Therefore, maintaining 75,000-100,000 U.S. troops in NATO as an insurance policy constitutes less an insurance matter and more the glue that binds together the democratic nations in Europe and the emerging U.S. grand strategy for peace through collective security and cooperative economics.

NATO is indeed the premier regional security structure. With its well-honed infrastructure, policies and documents, procedures, and already-developed contingency options, NATO is recognized in both the West and East as the most effective existing forum for cooperative security. The practical consequence of this legacy translates directly into the sphere of cooperative economics. That is, there is a perceived linkage between U.S. efforts to sustain collective security through NATO and U.S. economic market access to the European nations.

To the extent that these U.S. military contributions to European security are indeed the facilitative glue, they also have an inordinate value for being appropriately positioned in Europe for Central, East European and Middle East peacekeeping operations within a United Nations-sponsored collective security setting. For example, the Clinton administration has offered to provide U.S. ground troops to U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping force for Bosnia if talks underway among the Bosnian factions produce an accord. Similarly, multilateral peacemaking is supported by virtue of the overlapping security arrangements arising not only from NATO but also from the CSCE and the WEU. Finally, contingency support, wherever it may be, is enhanced through the special relationships forged during the Cold War and now during the peace among democratic nations. U.S. forces stationed in Europe have, therefore, a strategic positional leverage, particularly in their reach to the east to influence the "crown jewels of the Cold War," to the Middle East (as demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm) and to Africa.

In sum, the constructive linkage between (vital) U.S. national security interests in Europe, military force purposes within stipulated resource constraints, and strategic positional advantage to operate within the U.N., NATO, WEU and CSCE and with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) structures, begins to define the new conceptual framework for U.S. Army roles in Europe in an era of Pax Democratica. The political-military domain now ranges from the Urals to the Atlantic, from military consultative discussions in Tbilisi, Georgia, to Mons, Belgium, and sharing strategy-doctrine lessons learned at the Frunze military academy in Moscow, to defining the institutional role of an army in a democratic society at the proposed George Marshall Center for Strategic Studies.
at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. What follows from this is the realization that force structures
designed for the Cold War — for forward defense and forward presence — may not be the most
appropriate for the concurrent coalition and cooperative security setting that ranges from
Vancouver to Vladivostok. Within this window of history that has presented itself as an opportunity,
we should reexamine rigorously the kinds of force contributions our Army and the nation ought to
undertake in Europe, their roles and missions, and their relevance.

A Conceptual Force Contributions Framework

The force contributions we ought to undertake in this era are tied to three fundamental
concepts — resonance, representation and role model — the three Rs of collective engagement
in peace. Since European democracies demonstrated their inward bias in 1992, it seems that the
premier contribution we can make is to act as a sounding board, catalyst and amplifier for integrative
security approaches. Given our global communications systems, capacity to collect detailed
information, and utilization of computer networks, we can provide — through our command, control,
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) networks — real-time interpretation of events
between the U.S. Department of Defense and the decision fora throughout Europe. Secretary of
Defense Aspin’s restructured policy-making apparatus in the Pentagon will do much to facilitate
this effort from one side of the Atlantic, but we need to couple it explicitly with the European side
and leverage it in the context of cooperative efforts. The United States has a unique ability to test
the resonance of proposed concepts and solutions — do they ring true or are they hollow, are they
self-serving, nationalist in bias, or collective, helpful and integrative?

Secondly, representation throughout the various security communities is essential. Mature
representation provides information on substance and insights on the common view in diverse
organizations such as CIS, CSCE, WEU and NATO, and in U.N. operations. Such professional
representation relies on the competence of liaison officers, fact-finding teams, exchange pro-
grams, defense attaches and Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs). Representation that is
explicitly hooked into the C4I systems enhances the common view of current, ongoing security
issues and builds toward future cooperation and trust. For example, U.S. Army liaison officers with
the French Foreign Legion in the East African country of Djibouti can highlight Italian perceptions
within NATO’s Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) to U.S. liaison officers at Livorno, Italy, to get a
stalled medical evacuation underway. Or, an exchange program with Ukraine could provide
insights about tactical nuclear warhead consolidation efforts and expected Ukrainian access to
defense conversion funds (pursuant to the 1992 Freedom Support Act) so that critical officer
housing shortages are addressed. Representation must not be an afterthought. Given the
maturity and experience required, it may well mean reprioritizing dramatically the Army’s colonel
and lieutenant colonel assets within the current officer allowances or revisiting the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act’s (DOPMA) officer ceiling restrictions.

The third R, role model, strikes at the heart of the American experience, the history of our
nation. We can provide a 200-year old living example — at the institutional, organizational and
individual levels — of a military that derives from and is part of a constantly renewing democratic
society. Such role modeling can highlight the U.S. Army’s unique role within the development of
our nation and society during the past two centuries, the citizen-soldier traditions, civil-military
relations, and the limits of institutional powers based on laws and the constitution. A new dimension
of cooperative security is how to deal with the militaries of Central and Eastern Europe. From an
institutional perspective, their officer corps are key to the development of these nations as they face
the enormous problems of economic infrastructure dislocation, environmental cleanup, and potential anarchy. Conveying the traditions, norms and values that are appropriate for both peace and war can have a high payoff in the long term. Certainly, studies at the Army's Center for Military History which define the military role in "winning the peace at home" provide insights that have utility for Polish and Czech officers. Similarly, the renewed efforts of our own reserve components in providing training to our nation's youth, apprenticeship programs, medical support to Indian reservations, and engineer projects for local communities have just as much efficacy as redefining the Polish wartime doctrine and strategy in the CSCE environment.\textsuperscript{16 17}

**Collective Engagement and Cooperative Security Force Options**

In light of the above, Army force structure allocation and force sizing in Europe should be revisited. In fact, a new mind-set is required. Military competence of fighting within a multinational corps in the central European region simply requires more flexibility. The transition from a highly professional deterrent killing machine to refugee problem solving in Northern Iraq is stark and demands mental agility. We must, therefore, think in terms of honing and maintaining not only the raison d'etre of the professional U.S. Army but also the new skills required to deal with the emerging situations in Central and Eastern Europe. Leader simulation exercises for deploying to and operating a cordon sanitaire in Kosova and Macedonia, extracting an isolated U.N. force in Serbia, or conducting political-military situational exercises such as those taught by the U.N. Peace Keeping Academy in New York, will do much to enhance organizational balance between "most likely" and "least likely" missions. Additionally, technology must be harnessed to help those soldiers earmarked for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The age of television demands the application of firepower with precision, and in a highly selective manner. Only thorough and frequent training — whether live field exercises or virtual reality simulations — provides the basis for minimizing collateral damage legally, morally, and in the public eye.

The new reality in Europe is that U.S. Army organizations not directly involved in the three Rs of peacetime operations will deploy beyond Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels. It may be to Tbilisi, Georgia, in the form of a 1,000-bed hospital; to Ghana to service a Liberian refugee camp; or to Somalia with long-range tactical aviation in support of Operation Restore Hope. Some would argue that the kinds of assets we ought to position in Europe are not necessarily the premier warfighting organizations, but those that are critical to enhancing the peace. For example, the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), which deployed from Germany to Zagreb, Croatia, with its highly skilled doctors, medics and state of the art laboratory, has a very high payoff to coalition partners and indigenous populations alike. Certainly, the French public and its senior military officers are grateful for the lives of their peacekeepers saved thus far. We might, therefore, observe that power projection in an era of peace entails leading with support capabilities with embedded leading-edge technology.

In redefining flexible power projection packages stationed within Europe, we ought to focus first on high utility combat service support (CSS) (communications, intelligence, intratheater transportation, medical) and combat support (CS) organizations (air defense, artillery counterfire, and attack helicopters) versus direct-fire combat formations. Secondly, we should retain those formations which have a high NATO alliance payoff, such as the Patriot air defense systems, Apache helicopter battalions and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) with precision munitions. The remaining combat formations designed for the Cold War require revamping to account for the synergism of digitization, lethality and organizational acumen. (Note: If the Army as an institution
is unwilling to tackle this force design issue sooner rather than later, the Joint Staff may well force restructuring under its adaptive Joint Force Package concept."

Further, in light of Secretary of Defense Aspin’s final Fiscal Year 1994 budget decisions with respect to U.S. Army force levels in Europe (end strength goal of 65,000), a reassessment of the locations and the types of combat formations that we want to have resident in Europe is warranted. For example, with our focus shifting to the Mediterranean rim and the Balkans, formations trained in close terrain — cities, forests and mountains — are more useful than heavy forces. These forces would parallel the increasingly deployable European counterparts as exemplified by the Italian Alpini, the Dutch Airmobile Division and the German Luftlande formations. Don Snider, in his "Residual U.S. Military Forces in Europe," points to stationing a brigade-size task force in the United Kingdom that is committed to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps and collocated for training and interoperability purposes with the British division committed to the same corps. A parallel approach could be undertaken by an air assault or light infantry brigade assigned through rotational exercises to the German-Franco Corps, or an armored brigade assigned to the Turkish Corps stationed on the west side of the Dardanelles.

For senior U.S. commanders, the challenge ahead is rethinking their roles within the Pax Democritica context. Forward engagement has in part the nuances, lessons learned and parallel concepts of those used by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Latin America and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Specifically, the design of nation building in Latin America through the use of both active and reserve components, or the forging of long term relationships through repetitive exercise programs, such as Bright Star, and consultative discussions with the Pakistanis during exercise Zarb-E-Momin II, all point the way to both new thinking and joint approaches.

For the European Command (EUCOM) the challenge is no less. While this nation has committed itself up to now to station a heavy corps in central Germany, the decisions announced during the Wehrkunde conference in Munich, Germany — involving U.S. troop reductions — militate against the robustness of that commitment. Careful reassessment of the troop strength components, realignment of force structure spaces to the most critical tasks, and a skeletonized corps will produce U.S. ground force capabilities in Europe that are foremost flexible and versatile. If additional combat capability and lethality were called for by peacekeeping operations or peace enforcement requirements, these could then be pulled forward from the contingency forces in the continental United States. For that matter, complementary force packages out of the Marine Corps could be employed with the Turks along the Dardanelles in lieu of an Army heavy brigade. Additionally, assets, training initiatives and exchange programs from the reserve components may well prove to be the most useful tool in dealing with Central and East European nations so as not to antagonize the sensibilities of the principal CIS nations. Packaging creative means aimed at the operational center of gravity is the art and province of theater commanders in chief. For Europe, that center of gravity is collective engagement and cooperative security relationships, built to last for the long haul.

Conclusion

This era of peace among democratic nations is a singular opportunity for us to reassess our national security interests in Europe and to define approaches to enhance collective engagement and cooperative security from the Atlantic to the Urals. While the means available to play a leading
role in Europe have been reduced, they are sufficient. In Europe, Pax Democratica places a premium on fresh approaches such as those embodied in the three Rs: resonance, representation and role modeling. It also points to taking a hard look at the means to accomplish the military-political role of our emerging national security strategy. This year, 1993, therefore, promises to be a particularly incandescent one because it is the first year that the United States is operating within a new paradigm. The Cold War paradigm has not been lost, we have simply outlived it.¹⁹

A new paradigm is about to be created to serve us for the balance of the 20th century. It may not have the clarion call, the precision and the sharpness which the Cold War mustered, but it may well pass the de Toqueville challenge. That is, "... persevere in a fixed design, and ... execution in spite of serious obstacles."²⁰ As we continue to define fully the strategic ends of Pax Democratica, for a democratic world that is truly turbulent and filled with divergent tendencies, the requirements for shaping collective engagement and cooperative security approaches in Europe are evident. We must find the will, in spite of serious obstacles, to provide the requisite substance and innovative application of military power to serve our national interests in Europe.

NOTES


6. Ibid., p. 43.


20. Schlesinger, “Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” p. 27.

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