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MILITARY OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER AND MAINTAIN PEACE

by

Colonel John W. McDonald, USA Ret.

Introduction

The last three years appear to mark the beginning of a new era in the nature of relations among nations. While the Western strategy of containment has apparently eliminated the potential for war between the superpowers and the strident ideological conflict between competing blocs, it has also sparked an outbreak of regional and intrastate conflict. Escalating violence ranging from overt Iraqi aggression against Kuwait to a "humanitarian nightmare" in Yugoslavia has focused international attention on means to maintain and restore peace and security worldwide. Iraqi aggression threatened the vital interests of both the industrialized and Arab worlds and produced a unified international military effort to restore peace and order. On the other hand, the civil war raging in the former Yugoslavia, while lamentable from a humanitarian perspective, fails to present a direct and immediate threat to Western, and particularly U.S., interests. The difficulty of restoring peace in this region of lesser importance has so far deterred international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meanwhile, a U.S.-led, U.N.-sponsored international intervention in Somalia — for purely humanitarian reasons — has again sparked interest in intervention in the more intractable situations facing the post-Cold War world.

Humanitarian concerns and, some might add, a threat to European stability, are inexorably dragging Western nations into the most dangerous regional conflict, that in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But similar situations exist in other regions — in Cambodia, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Tajikistan. Increasingly, the United Nations and other multilateral organizations are being called upon to restore order. But these conflicts, fueled by long-simmering ethnic, cultural and religious animosities, do not lend themselves to easy solutions. Yet, momentum toward responding to these requests for assistance is growing. The recent United States intervention to provide security for humanitarian efforts in Somalia breaks a pattern of staunch opposition to involvement in these civil conflicts. And U.S. military forces will likely be increasingly directed to participate in international or regional efforts to restore order and maintain peace in civil conflicts over the next decade.

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The U.S. national military strategy calls for strengthening “world response to crises through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations.”¹ While this strategy appears to include peacekeeping efforts, U.S. commitment to regional peacekeeping missions could generate tension in U.S. political and military domains. Civil wars and ethnic conflict are perhaps the most distasteful forms of warfare and exhibit few prospects for quick resolution. The U.S., however, has demonstrated a great intolerance for prolonged commitment to small wars and their high costs in human life. This specter of Vietnam contrasts with increasing prospects that the U.S. will ultimately become engaged in conflicts like that in Yugoslavia. Consequently, it is timely to review the kinds of commitments anticipated in peacekeeping operations.

Definition of Terms

Frequently, the terms “peacekeeping” and “peacemaking” emerge to describe multilateral operations to which U.S. forces could be committed to restore peace. However, these terms are often used interchangeably and confuse rather than clarify. To conform with international and academic use of the term “peacemaking,” this analysis provides the following definitions:

Peacemaking: Efforts to settle a conflict through mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement.²

Peacekeeping: “The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”³

Enforcement: Military operations by sea, air or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, whether or not the belligerents are consenting to the intervention. (Derived from Article 42, Chapter VII, U.N. Charter)

Peacemaking combines negotiation with nonmilitary tools of coercion to achieve resolution of conflict. When these tools are inadequate, military tools — peacekeeping and enforcement — can be used to establish and maintain, forcibly if necessary, a cessation of hostilities. A quiescent environment better allows diplomats to pursue peaceful solutions to the conflict.

Peacemaking normally precedes the initiation of military operations and continues throughout the duration. The political goals and objectives established for the peacemaking effort help define the military objectives of the intervening forces and provide the commander parameters within which to develop a supporting scheme of maneuver. Thus, peacemaking constitutes the political framework for application of military force.

Peacekeeping was not an activity originally envisaged by the drafters of the United Nations Charter, but emerged during the Cold War from an inability of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree on the enforcement measures foreseen in Chapter VII of the Charter. The authority for peacekeeping derives from Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” which allows referral of these matters to the General Assembly, bypassing a deadlocked Security Council.

However, enforcement measures remain the sole purview of the Security Council. Until the last two years the Security Council had been unable to undertake a more active role to restore order and maintain peace. Even then, the Security Council has options other than a United Nations-sponsored effort. Chapter VIII of the Charter, for example, encourages use of "regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority." With the approval of the Security Council, regional entities, like NATO, have international legitimacy in both pacific resolution of conflicts and military intervention to enforce the peace.

Peacekeeping and enforcement operations support diplomatic goals and objectives. The operational commander of the military effort develops a campaign plan for the peace effort in concert with an appointed political authority. This authority usually represents an international organization, such as the United Nations, or a regional group of states, such as the European Community. In the past, commanders of U.N. peacekeeping forces have often reported directly to the Secretary General. However, in the case of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, a separate international organization with its own director-general supervises the peacekeeping activities on behalf of the participating nations. Peace operations, with their primarily political rather than military goals, demand closer and more continuous coordination between the appointed political authority and the military commander than in war to insure that military operations achieve the political objectives while protecting the force, its legitimacy, and its neutrality.

Peacekeeping and Enforcement Operations

Figure 1 (page 4) displays a spectrum of peacekeeping and enforcement operations. Several points are pertinent. First, peacekeeping or enforcement operations occur simultaneously with and support diplomatic and political efforts — peacemaking — to achieve long-term resolution of the conflict. They are not otherwise viable options for conflict resolution. Failure of the U.N. Emergency Force I in the Sinai in 1967 reflected a breakdown in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Arab confrontation states. Similarly, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus following the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in 1974 resulted from the failure to achieve a peace after ten years of negotiations. Without a peacemaking venue, peacekeeping and enforcement efforts will fail.

Second, each conflict is unique. The underlying political, social and economic causes demand different military approaches. The level of hostilities and commitment of the belligerents to military solutions will determine, in large part, the need for peacekeeping or enforcement operations. However, no clear line exists between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. A force structured and deployed for peacekeeping risks shifting imperceptibly along the continuum into a situation demanding enforcement. Inability of the peacekeeping force to adapt or unwillingness of political or military authorities to recognize the new nature of the operation poses physical risks to the force and jeopardizes the mission. Conversely, forces deployed for enforcement operations may find themselves maladapted or so inured to the rigors of enforcement that they cannot adequately perform the peacekeeping mission. Political and military decision-makers must understand and clearly specify the nature of the mission of forces deployed to assist in restoring peace. Further, they must continuously review the circumstances under which the force was committed to insure it remains suited to that mission. The catastrophic failure of the Multi-National Forces in Lebanon in 1983 presents the most vivid example of this danger.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO PEACEMAKING ACTIVITIES




Figure 1. Spectrum of Military Activities

Finally, collective war under international auspices against an aggressor constitutes an extreme and unique case of enforcement. It does not share the normal characteristics of peacekeeping or enforcement operations. For example, the committed forces are neither neutral nor impartial. The military objective is victory and, as a minimum, restoration of the status quo ante bellum. War lacks much of the ambiguity and restraint inherent in peace enforcement activities, but it may be the easiest to execute, despite its high costs in human life. The United Nations actions in Korea from June until October 1950 constitute the best example of this extreme.

Peacekeeping Operations

Characteristics. Operations along the peacekeeping portion of the spectrum share common characteristics.

First, they occur with the consent, cooperation, and support of the belligerents to the conflict. Peacekeeping operations can begin only when the belligerent parties agree to the intervention of specific third-party forces to maintain and supervise a negotiated peace.

Because these operations have a recognized mandate from both the participants and the international community, their legitimacy acts to deter hostilities directed against them.

In many cases, sufficient time exists to allow the force commander to develop, with the political authority appointed to supervise the peacekeeping activity, a scheme of maneuver and rules of engagement to support the political objectives of the intervention. The commander can task elements of the peacekeeping force with predeployment planning and training and assume some degree of readiness upon arrival in the theater. An integrated multinational logistics capability can be formed and ready to support the operation.

Peacekeeping forces assume that use of force will not be required to carry out their tasks, except in self-defense. They are structured, trained and equipped under this assumption. Extreme restraint in both appearance and application of force is crucial to maintain a posture of impartiality and neutrality toward the former belligerents.

Finally, peacekeeping forces possess a quality often called the "hostage effect."⁴ Lightly armed and operating under restrictive rules of engagement, the peacekeeping force derives protection from the belligerents by its inability to change the military balance and its nonthreatening posture. This allows the force unimpeded access throughout the country to carry out its duties.

Employment Considerations. Peacekeeping forces share common considerations, as well as characteristics, in their employment.

First, the greatest military consideration in peacekeeping is the nonmilitary objective of the operation. Military forces operate within clearly and carefully prescribed political limits established by agreement between the belligerents and the organization sponsoring the peacekeeping.⁵

Withdrawal of the consent of any belligerent to the peacekeeping operation, implicitly or explicitly, changes the nature of the operation. The sponsor of the peacekeeping mission must then determine whether to terminate the peacekeeping operation and withdraw the force, accept risk

that the force may be maladapted to the new conditions, or redefine, with the authority of the United Nations Security Council, the mission as peace enforcement. In the latter case, the peacekeeping force requires a new mandate, revised political and military goals and objectives, a new scheme of maneuver, changed rules of engagement, and force augmentation to create a visible and credible capability to conduct combat operations. The experience of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in 1967 is most relevant to this issue. The inability of the international community to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1956 and 1967, or of the U.N. Security Council to reach consensus on an enforcement operation following the Egyptian request to withdraw the force, required its immediate withdrawal from the Sinai in the face of imminent hostilities. Similarly, when forces of the South West Africa People's Organization crossed into Namibia in 1989 in violation of their agreement, the U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a purely peacekeeping force, was incapable of responding to the incursion.

Planning requires early development and constant updating of contingencies for evacuation, force protection, and self-defense. Political agreement on measures to be taken by peacekeeping forces when their mission becomes untenable would be useful prior to their commitment. While the peacekeeping force must maintain a nonprovocative posture to reassure the belligerents, they must also remain prepared to respond to changes in the political and military conditions of the established peace. The experiences of both the UNEF I and Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon demonstrate this need.

Great risk exists in any change in the political or military alignment of the peacekeeping force with a belligerent. Yet, this may occur imperceptibly over time. Once one of the belligerents determines that the peacekeeping force is no longer neutral and impartial, it loses the protection afforded by that status and itself becomes a de facto belligerent to the conflict. Periodic, formal review of actions of the peacekeeping force and reassessment of their continued neutrality by both political and military authorities will reduce the possibility of an unperceived change in alignment and attenuate risk. Both the French and U.S. contingents to the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon in 1983 allowed events to imperceptibly change their status as neutral and impartial peacekeepers, which exposed them to hostilities from other Lebanese belligerents.

Hostile actions by dissident or splinter groups of the principal belligerents against the peacekeeping force may occur. Designed to destroy the conditions required for peacekeeping and return the belligerents to a state of war, such action will succeed to the extent it inflicts casualties on an unprepared peacekeeping force. Deployed forces must maintain an appropriate defensive posture to deter and defeat terrorist actions. Active force protection measures by the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) have limited casualties and protected the continuity of their peacekeeping efforts.

Enforcement Operations

Lack of experience at this end of the peacemaking spectrum causes reliance on a limited number of cases and extrapolation of experience in other operations to these situations. Enforcement operations as envisaged in the U.N. Charter include a range of activities:

- 1) protection of the human rights of minorities and humanitarian relief operations. Persecution of minorities incurring significant loss of life from either military action or denial

of the basic necessities for survival by a hostile government may provoke international and U.S. opinion to the extent that military forces would be committed to protect these groups. While this constitutes intervention in the internal affairs of another nation, precedent exists for such action and, if conducted under the auspices of the Security Council or another regional organization with the support of the Security Council, has legitimacy.

2) separation of warring parties and restoration of order. Commitment of military force under the auspices of an international effort to separate belligerent parties, while political authorities seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict, could occur with international or regional consensus. The situation in the former Yugoslavia illustrates the complexity of this mission and the apprehension of world leaders to become involved.

3) restoration of the territorial integrity of a nation, e.g., military operations in South Korea in 1950 and in Kuwait in 1991. This case constitutes the extreme of enforcement operations.

Characteristics. Enforcement operations share common traits, except in the most extreme case of collective war.

First, enforcement operations do not have the consent of all belligerents. An intervening force, regardless of its mandate, may be seen as a party to the conflict by one or more nonconsenting belligerents. Such a perception deprives it of the protection normally afforded a peacekeeping force.

Because the enforcement force may resort to use of arms to impose its mandate on noncooperative belligerents, it must deploy and employ, if necessary, sufficient military strength to achieve those objectives established by political authorities. Unlike peacekeeping, enforcement will require a full range of military capabilities that meets or exceeds that of the belligerents. Although the preferred objective is commitment of superior military force to dissuade belligerents from further conflict, forces deployed for these operations should assume for planning purposes that use of force will be necessary to restore peace. But unlike war, enforcement operations are more constrained by political factors designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table. Settlement, not victory, is the goal. In fact, victory may only set the stage for later, more virulent attacks by the defeated party.

The crisis nature of enforcement operations means that adequate time will rarely exist to plan fully for these operations. The sponsoring organizations may have difficulty attaining rapid consensus on collective action, but will be anxious to demonstrate commitment to resolution of the crisis. Consequently, once consensus is attained, forces will be asked to deploy immediately. In many cases, this will occur earlier than is militarily desirable.

Ambiguity in military goals and objectives will result from a pressing need to take immediate action. Vague guidance to the military commander may result from an inability of the sponsoring multilateral organization to agree fully on the desired political end state of the intervention. For the commander of the intervening force, ambiguous guidance may lead him to an overly cautious application of force that could prolong conflict and jeopardize his troops.

Regardless of the clarity of the guidance, commanders of intervening forces will want to exercise restraint in the use of force. While enforcement activities rely on both political and military

factors to impose their will on the belligerents, the political factor remains dominant. International condemnation of violent acts of belligerents, noncoercive measures, and the presence of decisive combat power are intended to convince the parties to accede to a cessation of hostilities and peaceful negotiation. Restraint in use of force is necessary to avoid large numbers of belligerent casualties which could make compromise by parties to the conflict impossible.

Employment Considerations. Employment considerations for forces engaged in enforcement operations differ significantly from those applied to peacekeeping forces. Not only are risks to the force far higher, but failure to achieve a cease-fire through the application of measured international force could also make the conflict more intractable and prolonged.

The commander must design a scheme of maneuver that separates belligerents, attains a cease-fire, and makes negotiation the preferred alternative. The scheme must achieve this with minimum casualties to avoid creating the rationale for a later resumption of hostilities. Enforcement operations and peacemaking must be explicitly linked to insure that all parties, especially the belligerents, understand the nature, scope, and intent of the international operation to restore peace. Operational restraint in the use of force can be used to signal the intent of the intervening force and will help set the conditions for negotiations. Commanders may want to use superior maneuver and surprise to achieve strategic advantage over the belligerents and avoid battle. U.N. Operations in the Congo (UNOC), initially deployed as peacekeepers, enforced the peace when hostile parties opposed the nascent government. Adroit maneuver of the U.N. forces between the rival factions reduced the level of conflict and ultimately allowed a negotiated settlement.

Early and decisive application of combat power is critical. The early presence of trained, disciplined military forces with a willingness to use force selectively, if provoked, could convince the belligerents that peaceful resolution is in their best interests. Once open warfare begins, it becomes more difficult both to recruit nations to the international effort to restore peace and to eliminate the violence. In part, the difficulty in determining what to do in Yugoslavia derives from this problem. Ethnic animosities, fueled by months of a savage war, have reduced the chances that an enforcement operation could succeed quickly or without great violence against the well-armed, organized factions.

A clear chain of command from the appointed political authority through the operational commander to each subordinate command is essential to coordinate efforts of the multinational contingents. The sensitivity of political outcomes to restrained enforcement actions means subordinate elements must have the ability to communicate quickly with the force headquarters for decisions.

Planning for enforcement operations must accommodate the potential for rapid and unpredictable change. Forces must know in advance how to respond. The ability to react in a measured, decisive manner to a range of situations can convince the belligerents that they cannot succeed through continued violence.

An enforcement operation could transition to a peacekeeping operation. At that point, the former belligerents will determine the composition of the peacekeeping force. While forces involved in enforcement operations could become the peacekeepers, risk exists that latent hostility toward them could translate into actions to disrupt or discredit the peace, particularly if the negotiated peace were unacceptable to certain segments of the belligerent parties. The preferable option is

to withdraw forces involved in peace enforcement and replace them with other contingents for the peacekeeping phase.

Failure to achieve a cessation to hostilities, either forcibly or through negotiation, could cause an enforcement effort to degenerate into protracted, low-level conflict with one or more of the belligerents. U.S. and international support for a protracted conflict is unlikely. This possible outcome to intervention demands consideration in the deliberative stages prior to mounting an enforcement operation.

Common Factors in Peacekeeping and Enforcement

Success in peace operations will depend on U.S. leadership and active participation for the foreseeable future. U.S. dominance in the post-Cold War period makes other nations reluctant to field military forces, even as part of a collective military effort, without U.S. support and backing. Further, the U.S. reputation as an "honest broker" contributes to a perception that equitable solutions can be found. The U.S. does not have to bear the burden of these operations, but its unwillingness to participate in some form will likely curtail any serious international initiatives. A small, but visible, role will suffice to prompt action. Indeed, a large United States role may be counterproductive, as it detracts from the international character of the intervention and assumes a unilateral aspect more representative of the Cold War. However, U.S. contingents must include some front-line forces to assure equitable risk with other participating nations. Delay over deployment of a U.N. force to Cambodia arose in part from U.S. reluctance to commit forces to the effort.

Neutral, impartial forces are critical to success of both peacekeeping and enforcement operations. Actions of international forces perceived as biased by any party to the conflict dim prospects for long-term peace and establish grounds for later claims of an unjust peace. While difficult, operations executed within carefully prescribed limits articulated to all parties provide legitimacy to the use of force against those who violate the peace. Turkish assertions that U.N. peacekeepers had abandoned their neutrality and allowed the Greek population of Cyprus to repress Turkish Cypriots was a contributing factor in their 1974 decision to invade Cyprus.

Both activities imply the need for a long-term, sustained effort. Ideally, enforcement operations would end quickly and transition to peacekeeping. The longer it takes to restore peace, the greater the potential for the enforcers to become aligned with one of the belligerents or for protracted conflict to consume the patience and support of the participating nations. Neither case enhances the prospects for peace.

Effectiveness of these operations depends on recognition of the effort by the preponderance of the international community. Recognition lends the peacemaking effort diplomatic support, legitimacy, international opprobrium when the peace is violated, and cooperation with complementing nonmilitary measures, such as embargoes.

Military forces trained for combat operations do not necessarily make productive peacekeepers or enforcers.⁶ Indeed, their training to react swiftly with overwhelming force to hostile actions on the part of an enemy may impede progress in resolving conflict at the lowest possible level. The following military capabilities, deduced from years of experience of nations participating in these

kinds of operations, enhance opportunities for success in peacekeeping and enforcement operations: experience and training in combined operations, cultural awareness, abundant linguistic skills to meet extensive liaison and coordination requirements, effective command, control and communications across the theater, specialized intelligence capabilities, capabilities for civil affairs, psychological operations and public affairs, and an integrated or federated logistics system. Doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, and education and training implications for these operations are significant.

The Future

Conflict has become a constant in the post-Cold War world. Stability on the global level has allowed the reemergence of chronic regional disputes of a secondary nature. The resulting world order will likely face a continuous agenda of problems arising from political ambition, inequality, avarice, irrational behavior, inhumanity, and threat or use of force to achieve political and social ends.⁷

The potential need for peacekeeping and enforcement activities in reducing the level of violence in inter- and intrastate conflict, supporting humanitarian efforts to aid the victims of war, and establishing conditions, perhaps over long periods of time, for a negotiated settlement to war seems assured. However, the decades of fear of apocalyptic nuclear war has brought about a general desire for a more peaceful and prosperous world. The issue now is whether the nations of the world are willing to pay the costs of peace.

The past two years have seen an impetus toward multilateral action to resolve regional crises. The U.N. has assumed a more activist role, a role envisaged by the drafters of the U.N. Charter and codified in Chapter VII. It has sponsored more peace operations in the last two years than in the previous decade. It has exercised its authority under Chapter VIII to call on regional organizations and agencies to assist in maintaining international peace and security.

Multilateral engagement represents an opportunity to restore and maintain peace in regions beset by conflict. It requires the U.S., at this point, to lead the effort. It does not require the U.S. to shoulder the entire burden. U.S. leadership, commitment to a "share" of military forces (principally transport and logistics) and willingness to endure a lengthy commitment in concert with other nations of the world, under the aegis of the U.N. or other existing multilateral organizations, are the essential attributes of a new U.S. policy. And U.S. leadership does not imply the "U.S. solution," but rather U.S. support for peacemaking and, where necessary, contribution to combined forces for peacekeeping or enforcement under non-U.S. control.

For the Defense community, such a policy implies change in expectations of the outcome of use of force, in doctrine for employment of force, in training, and in equipment. Education of leaders would focus more on limits of use of force, understanding of the political and social contexts within which force would be applied, and redefining winning. Training of soldiers and units would hone military skills extant in the force, but teach their application with greater restraint, caution, and precision. A peacekeeper or enforcer has no "enemies" in the traditional sense. His role is to maintain peace, a neutral function. This change in mindset demands exceptional soldiers and training. Leaders and soldiers, while still warriors, would become more negotiators and mediators, reserving use of force to last resort. Perhaps some U.S. units could specialize in peace operations,

maintaining highly skilled, dedicated, rapidly deployable forces competent in a combined operational environment for commitment to multilateral operations.

Emerging technologies could enhance military capabilities for peacekeeping and enforcement. U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance systems could easily target belligerent forces, their movements, capabilities and intentions. Few nations possess the intelligence means available to U.S. forces. Their imaginative use could greatly decrease peacekeeping and enforcement risks and allow proactive measures to counter violence.

Precision weapons could allow more discrete use of force, when necessary, to limit collateral damage and numbers of casualties. Use of force in these situations is designed not to win battles but to halt acts of violence.

Development and fielding of nonlethal weapons would increase opportunities for success in enforcement operations. Disabling or disarming belligerent forces engaged in hostilities with minimal loss of life would maintain the status of peacekeepers and enforcers as impartial players, and eliminate revenge as a motive for the belligerents to attack multinational forces.

Conclusions

A new world order emerging from the era of the "balance of terror" now faces different, but more real, sources of terror. The senseless killing, dislocation, and deprivation of millions of innocent men, women and children in the name of self-determination have shocked a sense of post-Cold War civility. But with this outbreak of violence comes a new phenomenon, a renascent United Nations and a Security Council with the ability to employ military force in its peacekeeping and enforcement functions. Other multinational forums, such as the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have the competence, if not the will, to help. U.S. leadership in a policy of multilateral engagement to restore and maintain peace is crucial to exploit opportunities.

Trends indicate a growing inclination in the international community to commit military force to reduce the level of violence in these intractable regional conflicts and thereby provide diplomats and politicians an opportunity to accommodate the views of the warring parties peacefully. Peacekeeping will surely remain the principal venue for military action, and many nations already have a wealth of experience in these kinds of operations. Because the U.S. was one of the protagonists of the Cold War, the U.S. military participated in few peacekeeping operations and now must adapt to this new role. But it will not be difficult given the quality of U.S. forces today. Some adaptation of doctrine and means of employing combat multipliers, such as intelligence, civil affairs and psychological operations, will occur to meet the unique demands of these situations. The greater difficulty will reside in educating leaders and training soldiers and units to operate in a multinational environment where use of force is the last-not the first-option, where negotiation and mediation of disputes on the ground, not use of arms, becomes the principal task of military forces.

A far more impassioned debate will surround commitment of military force to the enforcement function. In cases of direct aggression of one state against another, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the international community will be more likely to respond, the more so if vital interests of

Great Powers are involved. Intervention in civil wars creates the dilemma. The reality of these enforcement operations, despite the objective of deterring further conflict between the warring parties by the presence of overwhelming military force, lies in the possibility of significant casualties in a prolonged, indecisive conflict. Even with a concerted peacemaking effort, military operations could continue for months, if not years, in suppressing well-armed dissident factions. It is unlikely that the U.S. or other Western allies would have the patience to sustain this kind of effort. Yet, the alternatives are not pleasant. Without commitment of force to restrain the level of violence, massive civilian casualties and destruction could result, making a peace more difficult to achieve.

The U.S. stands at a crossroads in policy. While the suffering of innocent peoples evokes emotional responses from the public, the consequences of military involvement generate even stronger reactions. The nature of enforcement operations runs counter to political and military values developed in the post-Vietnam era of U.S. foreign policy, and certainly to public expectations from commitment of U.S. force. But ignoring situations requiring enforcement operations, such as the "humanitarian nightmare" in Yugoslavia, opposes traditional U.S. values. The current tension between these views seriously inhibits a more proactive U.S. policy and demands vigorous debate to determine the appropriate course for the future. In any event, U.S. military forces must be prepared to take on these expanded missions.

ENDNOTES

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2. International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: International Peace Academy Publication, 1978), p.I-1.
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6. Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, p.12.
7. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *The Power to Keep Peace* (Berkeley: World Without War Council Publications, 1971), p.19.

(Colonel McDonald authored the September 1992 AUSA/ADPA report, "Seminar Series on U.S. Industrial Base Preparedness." Currently, he is a senior analyst with Science Applications International Corporation.)