GUIDEPOSTS FOR LIVES OF SERVICE

by

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(Verbatim remarks delivered at AUSA’s 37th Annual Meeting, 16 October 1991, upon receiving the Association’s George Catlett Marshall Medal "... for selfless and outstanding service to the United States of America.")

It is a great honor to be here tonight in this military setting and receive this award. As I do so, my thoughts and thanks go back more than half a century — to all those who have meant so much to me along the way — to my classmates and fellow cadets at West Point, to the men and officers of my commands in war and peace, to my colleagues in many and diverse staff assignments, to the distinguished leaders it has been my privilege to know and serve, and above all to my wife Dossy who has put up with all this, has taken a dedicated part in all of it, and has been a constant source of support and good sense — and whenever occasion required, an alert and dependable critic.

Gathered here this evening — on an occasion named for General Marshall and the U.S. Army, in the reflected glow of the victory in the Persian Gulf — it seems especially fitting to ask ourselves what we can learn from each — the man, the institution, the historic event — that can be brought to bear on the challenges that lie ahead for each of us, for our Army and for our country. The lessons are of course many, and time will allow mention of only a very few. I hope, though, that you may find in them, as I have, worthy guideposts for a life of service. They can help us to understand the issues of today, and to solve the problems of tomorrow.

Our Army’s task as it appears to me has always been and remains two-fold:

— to fight our country’s wars, or be prepared to do so, to provide security for our people, our homeland and our way of life;

— at the same time, to safeguard the lives and well-being of our troops.
There is a statue at West Point, a statue to the American soldier, erected by the West Point classes of 1935 and 1936. The statue itself, by Felix de Weldon, is quite inspiring, the inscription on the base even more so. That inscription reads "To the Corps of Cadets: The lives and destinies of valiant Americans are entrusted to your care and leadership — The Class of 1935; the Class of 1936."

General Marshall, not himself a West Pointer, gave us as fine a response to those two imperatives — care and leadership — as our country has ever seen. Some years ago, General Matthew Ridgway, who had served under General Marshall when he was chief of staff, said, "We seek leaders with the vision to see, the wisdom to choose, and the courage to act." In General Marshall our country found such a leader at a time of critical need.

As a young officer serving in the Philippines under General Franklin Bell, he quickly showed his mettle. In World War I, as G-3 under General Pershing, he planned a shift of front for the entire command that is still a military classic. As deputy commandant at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, he took careful note of the officers who showed particular ability for command, which came to them in the Second World War, and guided the preparation of the book *Infantry in Battle*, which I myself as a young officer found to be a treasure of lessons of judgment, decision and leadership. When sent out to take charge of reserve affairs in Illinois, he schooled the units in maneuver and realistic field operations. And then as chief of the War Plans Division and acting chief of staff of the Army, he finished off his preparation for the heavy responsibilities that lay ahead for him as chief of staff.

As the war clouds gathered and spread, his was a key role in the call-up of forces, their retention in service by a one-vote margin in the Congress just four months before the war began. That was his first great task — to create the weapon, that is, to mobilize, train and equip the forces; choose the leaders; train the commanders; build the Army from 112,000 to 7,700,000 and deploy its fighting elements overseas.

His second great task was to direct the employment of the force, that is, to guide the military conduct of the war, working with the highest military and civilian leaders — Admirals King and Leahy, General Hap Arnold, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and major theater commanders General MacArthur and General Eisenhower. General Marshall's papers, recently published up to May 1943 — the end of the North African campaign — are a revelation in setting out the problems he faced, and the ways he dealt with them.

The stories of his leadership methods are legion: "Put it on a single page for me — if you can't get the key issue for decision on a single page, you haven't thought it through." And "Don't bring me problems; bring me proposed solutions." General Max Taylor told me the story how he, as a young major in Marshall's office, took in a paper presenting a disagreement between two of Marshall's assistant chiefs of staff. He said, "Taylor, what do you think my decision should be?" To Taylor's reply, "Sir, I haven't thought about it," Marshall said, "Please do so," and handed it back. General Taylor told me, "It only took once."

Through all he did ran an extraordinary ability to see and to define for others what needed to be done, a strength of character in hewing to the mainline, resisting diversion and dissipation of effort, despite every proposal by Prime Minister Churchill for example, finally gaining, pressing...
and never losing the initiative in Europe and against Japan. But while he walked with presidents and prime ministers he never lost the understanding and care for the individual soldier. It was he who said, "When all are tired, cold and hungry at the end of the day, it is the leader who puts aside his personal discomfort to look to the needs of his soldier."

In the last year of war I myself was back in the United States in OPD, once called General Marshall's Command Post. My direct contacts were relatively few — though I assure you, memorable.

Late in the war, Secretary Stimson called from the White House to say that President Truman, who was meeting with President Osmena of the Philippines, wanted to sign an agreement the next day defining our U.S. future base needs to make clear that this issue would not delay Philippine independence. On his return to the Pentagon he told my boss, General (Big-Abe) Lincoln, another staff officer (Col. Phil Greaseley) and me what was needed, and that in his view it should be short and a statement of principles. But he then added, "But General Marshall disagrees with me; go around and talk to him." You know, I am sure, how much these two men respected each other. You should also know they were probably the two best informed men in Washington about the Philippines and this specific issue. Secretary Stimson had himself been governor general of the Philippines early in the century. And General Marshall had distinguished himself there. I myself, born in Granite City, Illinois, had never been west of San Francisco. General Marshall simply said, "If it doesn't spell out the specifics, it will soon be worthless." Then the two men stood in the doorway between their offices where the door was never closed, and talked to us briefly. Each adhered to his view. Finally General Marshall — and this is the point of this long story — turned to us with a frosty twinkle and said, "I think that's all the help we can give you."

Suffice it to say, we worked all night, with staff help, and came up with a compromise document, the statement of principles favored by Mr. Stimson to be signed by the two presidents, attaching as part of the agreement a detailed listing of the bases favored by General Marshall. By 1030 the next morning the document was signed by the two presidents. Looking back, I would say the experience gave graphic meaning to General Marshall's guidance to the staff, "Man is made for action."

During all of this, it was clear to me as to all of us in the Strategy Section just what kind of man we were working for — selfless, incisive with a power of concentrated thought and commitment that made him a leader among leaders. He was a model in each of those attributes for the kind of Army leaders on which our nation's security will continue to depend.

The Army that we led rose to the challenge as it has so many times in the past, true to the tradition, "When we were needed we were there." Thoughtful people wonder and ask how was it possible to build, train, equip and lead an Army that was in 1944 more than 70 times what it was in 1939 — after twenty years of peace and short rations following the end of the War that was to end all Wars, or so our people thought. Again, from the words of the song, "It wasn't always easy, and it wasn't always fair." On Bataan and Corregidor, as later in Korea, the price of unpreparedness was high, just as — it must be said — the cost of flawed and irresolute national leadership was in Vietnam. But the Army held to the task, as it had at Valley Forge and Yorktown, at Chippewa and Cerro Gordo, at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Atlanta, in the Indian campaigns, at San Juan Hill, St. Mihiel and the Marne.
As we look around the world we in the Army — as in our sister services — can take particular pride in our unbroken tradition of loyal support and response to higher authority. Never has it acted — or even thought of acting — against the government. We have been true to our oath to support and defend the Constitution, including, notably, the constitutionally established processes of government. It is not a simple matter to link a strong military to a democratic system of control. Our success in this country is shown by a recent initiative in which leaders in both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federated Republic have turned to the Atlantic Council of the United States, where I serve as chairman, for advice and counsel on civil-military relations in the new regime they are creating.

A strong and continuous strand of courage and commitment, of understanding of what it takes to lead American soldiers, has run through all of this, and does so today. The Army system of schools, protected even in past times of great stringency, bears much of the credit. The role of the American noncommissioned officer — a source of amazement to many of our Soviet visitors today — has provided much of the Army’s backbone of professional skill and knowledge, and hard training.

Over the years, in a wide range of assignments, I have never ceased to be impressed and inspired by the talent and dedication that stand ready at hand to tackle whatever task the Army is called upon to do. In my own recent experience, when I went to West Point as superintendent at a time of troubles, it was evident right from the outset that there was immediately available such a wealth of talent and dedication that the problems would surely be surmounted. It was to me a source of the greatest possible gratification to see that talent and dedication come to bear, successfully, on the challenges of rebuilding that we faced, once we had achieved a clearer, more sharply focused sense of West Point’s true purpose.

In Grenada and Panama, the Army did what needed to be done, and did it well. Its quick response to need in Grenada, its thorough planning, preparation and effective combat leadership in Panama added well-earned luster to the Army’s record of service and told us in advance of the quality of performance we might expect to see in the Persian Gulf.

Much attention has been given, and rightly so, to the superbly effective equipment and weaponry employed by our troops in the Gulf — the tanks, the helicopters, the fighting vehicles, the artillery and much, much more — vindicated after sometimes years of disparagement in many cases. Thank God the Army and those who produced them held fast to their faith in those weapons, and to their convictions as to their need and value, all the while responding constructively to the results of tests and evaluations. Yes, the modern equipment and advanced technologies had a vital role. But I like to insist that it was modern technology *professionally applied*. It takes nothing away from the contribution of the Army’s high-performance arms and equipment to emphasize, as I wish to do, the human side of the story — the men and women in uniform who manned the tanks, flew the helicopters and operated those other items of equipment; their leaders at every level; and the superbly-trained units in which they served.

A number of years ago, at the time of my first retirement in fact, I tried to respond to requests to identify, on the basis of observation and experience, a set of principles for successful leadership, effective unit operations and mission performance. As I thought about them recently, it seemed
to me that several of them had a lot of application to the human side of the Army’s story in the Persian Gulf. I am speaking here of such things as clear sense of purpose, teamwork, fair dealing, mutual trust, professional competence and full commitment. All of these were in ample evidence in the Persian Gulf.

The first principle I would cite is clarity of purpose — the objective in terms of the traditional Principles of War. When purpose is clear and well-focused, every problem and task can be put in its larger mission context, keeping the approach objective, not falling prey to special or parochial lesser interests — a matter extremely important in joint and allied command situations. When I was commandant of the National War College, clear purpose was the first thing I emphasized to my students, drawing on my earlier experiences in both command and staff assignments. I put it this way, “If you don’t know where you want to go, you’re not likely to get there.” They looked at me in some amazement — it seems so obvious — but several have told me in years since that this is one thing they remember — something bound to warm any teacher’s heart. This clarity of purpose was surely the case for our forces in the Persian Gulf, running right from the president to the troops on the ground.

A second principle is a readiness to face up to problems openly, responsibly, decisively, courageously. In the Gulf War, there was early recognition of what might be needed — and in fact proved to be needed — along with the courage to provide it. We did not rest our policy on the hope that sanctions would suffice or — as in Vietnam — that “messages” conveyed by limited and gradualist actions would overcome Saddam Hussein without facing up to the full-scale effort required. When I served with Creighton Abrams in Vietnam, he once called such gradualism the “nip and tuck” theory of warfare. We saw none of that in the Persian Gulf.

The third principle is to work always as a military team. Clear purpose and readiness to face up to the issue help greatly in this regard. Where the operation challenge is complex — involving land, sea and air, and a determined enemy and a multiservice, multinational force as in the Gulf — coordinated pulling together becomes imperative if success is to be achieved. There is no place for an adversarial relationship between the civilian and military echelons of responsibility, and we may be grateful that such did not exist during the Gulf War. The experience was, in fact, quite the contrary.

One thing that this means, as a follow-on principle, is that responsibility and loyalty have to run downward as well as upward. There can be no place for self-seeking and self-serving as an influence, real or perceived, on decision and action. Instead, in the Gulf we saw leaders bound to their missions, caring for their troops in the true Army tradition.

There must next be readiness to give trust and support to subordinates. For the American soldier, success comes from making them a full part of the operation, evoking their initiative, their dedication and determination, their sense of responsibility for the task at hand. There must be courage to delegate, to rely on junior leaders. One time in sitting and talking with President Eisenhower I offered the view, “It takes guts to delegate.” He responded, “That’s right, but there’s a more elegant way of saying it,” which he attributed to Von Moltke: “Centralization is the refuge of fear.” In the Gulf War, leadership with the courage to delegate was evidenced at every level — from the White House to the Pentagon to the field commands to the individual tank crews.
There must be a readiness — indeed an urge, an enthusiasm — to strike out in new directions, to meet new and unique problems, of which there were many in the Gulf, with new and unique solutions. It takes moral courage to think independently, to act decisively and take responsibility, but that is what got us through and around the Iraqi minefields with stunning effect and minimum losses. Never mind the talk about burying some Iraqi soldiers in their tank defenses. Just ask anyone who has spent any time in minefields under fire what he thinks about the issue.

Underlying every other principle must be personal and professional integrity. As we know, it takes a thousand forms — the courage of our convictions; straight dealing, with everything above-board; intellectual honesty; readiness to face the hard issues; accepting for ourselves the demands we place on others. We saw this in full measure in the Gulf War, and it was confirmed in the trust and confidence that have been accorded to our troops and their leaders by the American people all across the land.

We thus see in the leadership of General Marshall — duty translated into decision and action, in the tradition of brave and loyal service rendered to our country by its Army in every time of need, in the professional effectiveness of our forces and their leaders translated into victory in the Persian Gulf — a rich storehouse of well-proven ways to "provide for the common defense" in the language of the Constitution to which we take our oath. We will have need to draw from that storehouse as we now face the tasks of the present and the needs of the future.

We have come to a time of great and turbulent change in the course of world affairs. Much of the change has been good — the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, the freedom of the nations of East and Central Europe, the release of the Baltic republics from Soviet control, the end to Soviet communist expansionism and the demise of the Communist Party.

But there remain grounds for enduring concern as well, and this at a time when our defense establishment is faced with a daunting task of realignment and restructuring.

Europe is an area of major concern. Germany is deeply engaged internally in the enormous task of bringing what was East Germany into a unified society, economy and political system. Externally, we have yet to see just what the new role of Germany will be in Europe, in the Atlantic Community and on the world stage. We will watch with particular interest its relations with the countries of East and Central Europe and with the Soviet Union. Those countries of East and Central Europe and now the Baltic republics have yet to establish their future relations with Europe, the Atlantic Community and especially the United States and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, the historic tinderbox, may no longer be so, but seems likely to stay in conflict or near-conflict, as other ancient national and territorial disputes reemerge throughout the Balkans. And the breakup of the Soviet empire, the possessor of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, may take forms now impossible to predict. The course to be followed by the Russian republic, the source of imperialism in the past, will be of key importance. Coming at a time of deep economic crisis and breakaway nationalism, we can only hope for the best, and help as much as we can, in the transformations that are shaking the continents of Europe and Asia, and indeed the whole world.

In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli dispute continues to fester, and Moslem fundamentalism continues to threaten many of the brittle political systems that exist throughout the region. And this is an area where, as our Persian Gulf intervention illustrated, there are "blue-chip" national interests of the United States that are deeply involved and that our armed forces must be ready to defend.
In the Far East the future policy and posture of mainland China, after the present aged generation of leaders passes from the scene, are yet to be seen. And the harsh confrontation of North Korea with the South has yet to ease in any significant way.

Faced as they are with these uncertainties and potential dangers to U.S. security and national interests, our defense leaders are faced with a demanding three-fold task. It is here that the lessons drawn from General Marshall, the Army’s service to the nation and the sources of the success in the Persian Gulf can be of great help.

The three-fold task involves first, reductions from past force levels wherever needs have diminished or disappeared. Our deployments in Europe, both conventional and nuclear, can prudently be cut back step-by-step — the conventional to half their previous levels — as Soviet forces in fact withdraw from Germany and Poland. But the need for NATO, and its collective military force with substantial U.S. participation, as an element of stability in a period of turbulent change, will continue as far forward as we can now see.

The second part of the task involves restructuring as we look to the future to support missions now much harder to define than when massive Soviet forces confronted those of our own across the Iron Curtain that has now disappeared. The task of our military leaders in gaining and retaining public support for forces to deter conflict if possible, but handle it decisively if it nevertheless comes, takes us back to General Marshall on that day when the Congress, by a single vote, saved the Army from practical disbandment. Here the Association of the U.S. Army, with its sister organizations, has a tremendously important role to play. The detractors and nay-sayers will be gnawing away at the Army’s support, and must be countered. In the intense competition for budgets that surely lies ahead, the needs for a high-quality restructured force must not be evaded, or allowed to go unfulfilled. The notion that we can rely on light forces only, or on forces that need months to attain combat readiness, is no more than a dangerous illusion. A strong, ready force, with a corps or more of heavy divisions, capable of being committed around the world in days or weeks, not months, will remain essential for deterrence, and for combat if it comes. Sun Tzu said, “Speed is the essence of war;” and Nathan Bedford Forrest added, “Git thar fustest with the mostest” — advice that is good today.

The third part of the task the Army faces is the enormous challenge of decision and action to get us from where we have been to where we want to be, that is, to the time-phased restructured forces we will require in the future. We can identify a dozen or more sub-tasks, each a major undertaking in itself. They range from revising procurement programs (what to continue, to stop and to start) to shipping, storing and disposing of vast amounts of equipment, closing bases and other facilities, reducing manpower levels and accession rates, disbanding some active forces and reserves, retraining for new missions while maintaining high-capability forces for any contingency, reevaluating service roles and missions and so on and on. It will be of vital importance to find ways to maintain our technological edge. These are tasks requiring vision and leadership from both the government and the private sector.

Fending off piecemeal proposals and special interest pressures, holding to a well-focused mainline purpose to get us to the outcome we need, will require the talents and strengths of many George Marshalls in the time ahead. Fortunately the Army leadership has seized onto these tasks, and has put in place a well-thought-out plan to guide the myriad actions underway.
For the Army in dealing with its tasks has available today just as in the past the same wealth of talent and dedication that I mentioned earlier. And this is the final point I wish to make, and to me the most important I can put before you — the need to see that this reservoir of talent and dedication is sustained and supported, and that the purpose they serve is kept clear and strong. I do not hesitate to say that we have today the finest American Army that has ever taken the field. We must see that it remains so during these welcome but nevertheless taxing times of peace. It is people who make up the force, who train the troops and the units, who prepare the plans, who provide the leadership and the military advice to our highest authority. It is people who will put their lives on the line when duty calls.

They will find their reward as General Marshall did, as you do and I have done, in the opportunity to serve.

It is our task to see that they get the respect and support they deserve.

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First presented in 1960 to the Honorable Robert A. Lovett, the George Catlett Marshall Medal has been awarded to a distinguished list of Americans (soldiers, statesmen and others) in recognition of their inspiration and devotion to country and to mankind.

The Association of the U.S. Army's Council of Trustees selected General Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army Retired, to receive its highest award for his worldwide accomplishments as an Army officer, foreign policy expert, diplomat, educator, military strategist, author, scholar, statesman and presidential advisor.

Born in Granite City, Illinois, General Goodpaster graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1939. Later in his military career he attended Princeton University, where he earned a Master of Science degree in engineering and a Master of Arts degree and Ph.D. in international relations.

General Goodpaster served as staff secretary to President Eisenhower; assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; director of the Joint Staff; commandant of the National War College; deputy commander, U.S. Forces in Vietnam; and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from 1969 until his retirement from the Army in 1974.

Upon his retirement, General Goodpaster became a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center and later professor of Government and International Studies at the Citadel. In 1977 President Carter recalled him to active duty to serve, in the grade of lieutenant general, as the 51st Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy.

Following his second retirement, General Goodpaster served as president of the Institute for Defense Analysis from 1983 to 1985 and chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission from 1986 to 1990. He now serves as chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

Author of For Common Defense, General Goodpaster has also been awarded the Medal of Freedom, the White Burkett Millar Award (University of Virginia), the James Madison Award (Princeton University) and the Ben Castle Award (West Point Association of Graduates).