Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces: Interoperability and Interdependence

by

William B. Ostlund

There is no limit to what a man can do so long as he does not care a straw who gets the credit for it.

Charles Edward Montague

When the campaign plan is understood and all forces proactively contribute to the accomplishment of campaign objectives with an eye to the endstate, while complementing each other’s efforts—with no ego or concern for individual or unit credit—interoperability is increased and interdependence is achieved. We saw this occur in Iraq and we built upon that success in Afghanistan. Conventional forces and special operations forces must continuously strive to increase interoperability and interdependence in training, in the current operating environment and in future operating environments; this will deliver the greatest effects to the commander, our country and the participating partners.

Lieutenant General Joseph L. Votel, USA
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Introduction

The history of the war in Afghanistan will be written in years to come. However, there are immediate lessons that should be captured, as they are not only applicable to the remaining time in Afghanistan but will be applicable to future operations as well.

Although not unique, my background set the conditions for me to understand, appreciate and seek the synergy of all entities where disparate contributors (individuals and units) complement one another to achieve unity of effort and effects rather than compete with one another to get credit for real or perceived effects achieved.

Background

In the 1980s I was an enlisted Ranger and a noncommissioned officer (NCO) in 1st Ranger Battalion. As a young Ranger in that unit, I learned that contributors—young and old, junior and seasoned—were respected for what they contributed. As a second lieutenant I served in Desert Shield/Storm. Although the book Moving Mountains, by Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, USA Retired, highlights the monumental logistical feats of the time, the support of Soldiers on the ground, enablers and complementary effects were lacking by
current standards. In 2007, I commanded a supporting-effort battalion in remote, austere and contested Kunar Province, Afghanistan. We fought with limited priority and limited resources; of necessity, we incorporated and synchronized all tools and entities, to include a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), for best effects. We intuitively understood unity of effort and unity of effects as we set conditions for all to contribute and complement in Kunar. Later, on two occasions, I commanded the resource-laden Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF) in Afghanistan. While in command of the CTTF, I sought to use the available resources to aggressively support the battlespace owners who then faced the foes I previously faced with limited resources. Most recently, I commanded 3d Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 1st Infantry Division—Combined Task Force Duke (another supporting effort)—in Zabul Province, Afghanistan.

CTF Duke was task organized under Regional Command–South (RC-S) and for most of our tour, 4th Infantry Division commanded RC-S. In Zabul, CTF Duke had Battle Space Owner/Integrator (BSO/I) as well as Security Force Advise and Assist (SFAA) responsibilities. The task force comprised a U.S. infantry battalion; a Romanian infantry battalion; reduced special troops and brigade support battalions; a U.S. Special Forces advanced operating base (AOB) with three ODAs and several enablers; a Jordanian special operations force company; a Lithuanian Special Forces detachment; and a Slovakian SFAA team. A host of small but important enabling units, as well as 700 contractors, also served in Zabul. Further, CTF Duke retained administrative control (ADCON) of its organic artillery battalion, which served as a BSO/I in Spin Boldak (Kandahar Province, RC-S), a cavalry squadron that served as a BSO/I in Regional Command–North; and an infantry battalion that provided a preponderance of village stability operations (VSO) uplift support (security) throughout Afghanistan for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).

For clarity, special operations forces (SOF) perform 12 core functions: direct action; special reconnaissance; countering weapons of mass destruction; counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; security force assistance; hostage rescue and recovery; counterinsurgency; foreign humanitarian assistance; military information support operations; and civil affairs operations. SOF and CF forces are inherently interdependent. With few exceptions, SOF missions are planned with and complement CF efforts whether the CF is the supported or supporting effort. In addition, as per Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, “Sometimes SOF require CF support to optimize overall operational effectiveness” and “most special operations missions require CF logistics support.”

As 3-1 IBCT prepared for deployment, the deployment timeline and mission were ambiguous and changing. The IBCT benefited from guidance received during a fortuitous meeting with then Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) commander General David M. Rodriguez. He stated that the mission and deployment timeline would change many times and that the IBCT’s training plan should focus on decisive action in an austere and complex counterinsurgency environment. Knowing that competence leads to confident Soldiers who can operate in any environment, the IBCT found this guidance—which was also largely echoed by the deployed 1st Infantry Division commander—to be apt and useful.

With guidance in hand, 3-1 IBCT embarked on an enviable training path that aggressively incorporated multi-echelon, scenario-driven training. The brigade and battalion command teams and staffs learned and applied Army Design Methodology, which can be found in both joint and Army doctrine, while focusing on leader training and development, mission command, resource allocation, intelligence-driven targeting—D3EA/F3EA (decide, detect, deliver and assess/find, fix, finish, exploit and assess)—inform and influence activities (I2A), care for Soldiers and families and monitoring Soldier fundamentals. Company-level leaders focused on the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Big 6—discipline/standards, physical and mental toughness, medical proficiency, marksmanship/livefire (including a complex fire support coordination exercise), crew/battle drills and mobility (navigation, driving and air assault) while all understood the importance of three enablers—communication, safety/accountability/maintenance (SAMS) and operational security (OPSEC).

Among many superb training events and opportunities, the BCT’s early focus on Design was important as it inculcated a culture of proactive contribution wherein all BCT members were expected to think critically.
and creatively about complex problems (and further contribute to solving these problems). In addition to increased training and operational effects, the BCT empirically saved millions of dollars in training and likely tens of millions throughout its deployment. In addition, the BCT sought inputs from the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), which ran the Master Army Profession and Ethics Trainer (MAPET) course for our company command teams. Training the command teams as MAPETs allowed the company-level leaders to incorporate ethics (further thinking) into the scenario-driven training directed by the BCT through the battalions, which allowed for better decisionmaking and thus better effects while deployed to Afghanistan.

3-1 IBCT is stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky—a well-known SOF training area. As companies and battalions trained there, it was relatively effortless to take advantage of training opportunities with visiting SOF units; additionally, a number of Special Forces units accepted invitations to train at Fort Knox with our conventional BCT, knowing the BCT would provide the logistical support and opposing forces required for the training. The initiative and willingness to complement each other’s training objectives laid a solid foundation that would grow into an integrated pre-mission training (PMT) plan, which furthered the interoperability and interdependence experienced in Afghanistan.

The BCT’s deployed mission began to solidify in the weeks prior to a scheduled Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the rotation served as the BCT’s Mission Ready Exercise (MRE). To the credit of JRTC, the center retooled the rotation in the weeks prior to our MRE as we sought to replicate our multiple deployed mission sets. In addition, to best replicate and prepare for the VSO mission, we coordinated with two Special Forces battalions from two separate Special Forces groups to conduct simultaneous PMT at Playas (New Mexico), Yakima Training Center (Washington) and JRTC. This training was invaluable as it stressed mission command, taught tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), conveyed expectations and developed relationships prior to deploying. Despite varying deployment timelines and varying tour lengths, 70 percent of the VSO uplift Soldiers served in Afghanistan alongside the team with whom they had trained during PMT. This led to empirically better effects throughout Afghanistan.

Conventional and coalition force interoperability and interdependence with U.S. and coalition special operations forces must begin in training and be sustained through contingency operations. The routine interaction of these forces in training and during operations builds relationships and respect for each other’s capabilities. Over time this translates into trust, which becomes that intangible that spans the different operating cultures. This will require relooking doctrine, training opportunities and training center rotations that best prepare our forces for interdependence in the operating environment.

Major General Austin Scott Miller, USA
Commander, NATO Special Operations Command–Afghanistan

Combined pre-deployment PMT should be sustained. PMT conducted with supporting infantry prior to a combined combat operation or a regionally aligned force operation or other shared deployment supports the Stability Principal of Unity of Effort, which will increase achieved effects.

Upon completion of the JRTC MRE and PMT, the cavalry squadron’s deployment timeline was accelerated. Given that the MRE certified the BCT as ready for combat, the acceleration was seamless for the BCT, squadron and Soldiers. The squadron deployed and redeployed without issue.

Major General Paul A. LaCamera, commander of 4th Infantry Division and RC-S, was clear when he issued his guidance to CTF Duke: “By, with, through or for [the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF], just get effects” to neutralize the enemy and improve the Afghan Security Forces and Afghan government. To optimize this guidance, CTF Duke (as the Zabul BSO/I) assumed a position of “owning all things in Zabul”—responsible for coordinating and synchronizing disparate force effects, which required quickly taking stock of available forces, resources and opportunities and then creating a methodology to coordinate and synchronize the forces, resources and effects. What came from this methodology was CF and SOF interdependence. The two force types quickly moved through deconfliction, integration and synchronization to interoperability and interdependence that produced continuous and enduring complementary effects. To begin
this effort required communication among all parties in Zabul, which created relationships, which lent credibility to all entities and increased effects through the province. This concerted effort created unity of effort, which delivered increased effects in weeks, not months.

As a command, we anticipated decreasing numbers and committed to maintain or increase the requisite efforts to neutralize the Taliban in Regional Command–South while bettering the Afghan Security Forces and the Afghan government. This commitment required proactive engagement and teamwork of all coalition forces, to include special operation forces, in the Regional Command’s purview. I anticipate engagement, interoperability and interdependence will remain required principles in future contingency and combat operations.13

Major General Paul A. LaCamera, Commander,
4th Infantry Division and Regional Command–South

The RC-S commander set the tone for interoperability and interdependence, while the Special Forces battalion and AOB commanders were the optimal partners to ensure successful efforts to create an environment of conventional forces and special operations forces interoperability and interdependence. Each U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) SOF unit was present at the weekly RC-S operations and intelligence update to the commander, and each SOF unit had a speaking role. The CTF Duke operations officer and the AOB commander (first a Navy SEAL lieutenant commander and then an Army Special Forces major) met or talked almost daily. The AOB commander and the CTF Duke commander talked almost daily and met weekly as a scheduled event. In addition, the AOB commander was invited to and attended every senior leader visit and forum conducted in Zabul; he was also invited to every secure video teleconference that affected Zabul Province. The daily communication, interactions and transparency furthered trust and effects throughout the operating environment (OE).

On countless occasions the AOB in Zabul contributed timely, needed and agile effects. The experienced and fearless ODAs could and would move quickly with limited information and resources and accomplish the mission without fail or falter. Likewise, the AOB appreciated and benefitted from the CTF’s ability to quickly levy comparatively immense resources to address issues—reinforce, recover, retrograde—that could fix an ODA or AOB. Interdependence allowed the CTF to support the ODAs and AOB while the ODAs maintained a very high operational tempo, which supported the CTF and all in the OE.

While serving in Zabul, the CTF and AOB were required to draw down forces and experienced a drawdown of supporting enablers throughout the OE. A product of Design and interdependence was the idea that as forces drew down in Zabul Province, there was a very real and reasonable expectation that the CTF and AOB in Zabul would sustain the effects associated with their respective “icons”—that is, a BCT/CTF icon on the RC-S commander’s map equated to a BCT’s worth of effects; likewise, an AOB icon on the Special Operations Task Force–South (SOTF-S) commander’s map equated to an AOB’s worth of effects, regardless of the units’ task organization or personnel strength.

To sustain, and actually increase, effects in Zabul, the CTF continuously used Design to think critically and creatively about the associated complex challenges. The outputs were shared with the AOB and the AOB’s shared intellectual acumen led to complementary solutions to the challenges in the OE. As the enemy sought gaps or seams, the CTF and ANSF attacked those gaps and seams. The AOB complemented the CTF operations and many times led the combined operations—including the AOB commander serving as the ground force commander, with an attached infantry company and other CTF enablers, for a complex operation in contested Daychopan District, Zabul. When political conditions forced the stand-down of the AOB’s partnering Afghan National Army (ANA) SOF and commandos, the AOB’s ODAs partnered with ANA conventional forces to sustain effects required in the OE; this U.S. SOF and ANA CF solution sustained operations tempo (OPTEMPO) in the OE. When a U.S. helicopter was downed in the mountains of Zabul, the CF Aerial Reaction Force, led by a CTF lieutenant, was the first element to secure the site; next to arrive was an ODA, led by a captain, to assume ground force commander responsibilities, followed by a CTF battalion
commander who assumed ground force commander duties. This was a seamless echelonment of capability into an ambiguous situation, in the mountains, at night, in sub-freezing temperatures. Scores of similar examples are available from Zabul as the CTF and AOB continuously sought complementary effects (and proactively provided complementary support).

The CTF and AOB shared an understanding of targeting. Ascribing to the find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze (F3EA) methodology, both elements used the nine components of the enemy network as defined by the Counterterrorism Analytical Framework (CTAF) to target the enemy. A planning effort using Design principles illuminated a number of points. Personality targeting is high-risk in a strategically sensitive and politically charged environment and, in the case of Afghanistan, personalities (or leaders) are proficient at making themselves hard (if not impossible) to target. However, leaders are but one component of the network; when they are not targetable, eight elements of their network remain exposed and targetable and many components are shared by multiple leaders, allowing for a significant impact on multiple networks simultaneously. Continuously targeting the nine components of the network—eight when leaders were not targetable—allowed for sustained pressure on the enemies in the OE. Coupling lethal targeting with equally aggressive, combined and complementary inform and influence activities (I2A) ensured CTF, AOB, ANSF, the Afghan government, population and even nongovernmental organization (NGO) freedom of action throughout the OE.

The drawdown in forces required the closure of CTF and AOB tactical infrastructure (TI)—forward operating bases and village stability platforms/district stability platforms. The CTF had a brigade support battalion (minus), multiple route-clearance packages and a very clear line to request RC-S enabling assets to secure and rapidly close TI. Although the AOB was capable of and enabled to close TI, by planning together and working together the CTF supported the AOB’s multiple efforts, allowing for more secure and rapid closures, which allowed the AOB’s ODAs to conduct more operations in the OE.

During the drawdown of personnel and as the brigade-sized CTF set the conditions for a battalion-sized CTF to replace it in Zabul, a number of enabling assets were removed from the task brigade task organization. Focusing on the RC S and CJSOTF-A commanders’ intents, the CTF and AOB developed a transparent and aggressive plan to consolidate bases and to eliminate or reduce redundant facilities, forces and contractors while sustaining shared capability. Together the CTF staff and AOB consolidated the bases, reorganized the CTF base to best accommodate the AOB and designated ODAs, and seamlessly sustained pressure on the enemy networks while improving the ANSF and Zabul governance. The consolidation led to efficiencies and greater effectiveness in the OE.

The Integrated Province Augmentation Team (IPAT), an AOB asset, brought incredible capability to the OE. The team included civil affairs personnel and governance and military advisors. The IPAT worked particularly well in the nonlethal-effects realm and was tied into the AOB and CTF inform and influence assets to best deliver their effects. As the brigade reduced assets, the IPAT combined with the remaining brigade assets to establish a shared government and an I2A cell, which proved invaluable to both the CTF and the AOB. Relationships matter and facilitate unity of effort; the IPAT restructure is an example of critical thought delivering a creative solution to the complex drawdown problem. The relationships and critical thought ensured effects were sustained and enhanced in Zabul.

Throughout the tour, the AOB benefitted from the capabilities inherent in a BCT/CTF—command and control; fires; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); emergency resupply/logistics; medical evacuation; and enhanced ability to move items and retrograde. The CTF consistently benefitted from the AOB’s situational awareness—attained through credible relationships in the OE and their outstanding targeting of enablers—and the ODAs’ continuous high OPTEMPO, which neutralized enemy and improved the ANSF. At every turn, the CTF and the AOB benefitted from unity of effort and complementary effects—interdependence.

Conclusion

Most have heard the adage “What we do in training we will do in combat.” This adage is generally used to invoke or encourage tough, realistic training. Over the course of the war on terrorism—as in previous
wars—the adage has been proven true time and time again. 3-1 IBCT proactively levied doctrine (including Army Design Methodology), a host of Army resources (to include CAPE) and relationships to conduct tough, realistic comprehensive training with known, anticipated and possible future teammates. The emphasis on training with Special Forces early in our training was a product of many converging factors that included the experiences of numerous BCT leaders, respect for the various SOF elements, proximity to various elements as they trained at Fort Knox and the comparatively new VSO mission levied on the BCT. Proactive efforts to train together rapidly increased interoperability and trust. Successful training venues illuminated or provided resources that when shared provided additional opportunities to the BCT and SOF elements. Interoperability and shared training venues set the conditions for seamless interoperability and interdependence in a tough, contested, complex, reduced-resource, ever-changing and politically charged operating environment while preparing for decisive elections and drawing down forces.

**Lessons Learned**

1. **Design Methodology** incorporated into unit culture saved our BCT thousands of staff hours and millions of dollars in garrison, training and combat. The method induces critical creative thought about complex problems; this likely saved lives in garrison, training and combat as well.

2. **Personalities matter and relationships are required.** Some people cannot build teams and cannot work with others. Placing such personalities in command of a training event or an operating environment that is replete with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) and various SOF forces will neither facilitate unity of effort nor deliver best effects.

3. **Sustain pre-deployment pre-mission training.** In the absence of PMT, ODAs and supporting conventional forces must quickly build one interoperable and interdependent team. Without exception, SF senior NCOs highlighted, in PMT and while deployed, that there was one team; neither the enemy nor the Afghan forces could tell the difference or cared who was who. Infantrymen serving with SF are not SF; the infantry, generally comprising younger and less experienced Soldiers, retains requirements for discipline and standards appropriate for the experience and maturity they bring to the fight. SF senior NCOs must support the Infantry NCOs in their efforts to retain discipline and high standards. SOF units should not have separate gym, morale or dining facilities; this duplication is a waste of resources and does not build or sustain the team.

4. **Identify the Battle Space Owner/Integrator (BSO/I)—** the one responsible for proactively facilitating interdependence and the one responsible for addressing all missteps and perceived missteps in the OE. Once established, focus on relationships and complementary efforts and effects vs. command and control diagrams. Transparency and communication vs. stereotype and assumption is critical to relationship-building and delivery of effects.

5. **The BSO/I will always outrank the senior SOF entity in the OE.** The BSO/I should assume a leadership role and support the “supporting” SOF element as any other contributing force in the OE. The SOF commander/leader should not be forced to fight multiple higher headquarters to accomplish the BSO/I commander’s intent and deliver effects in the OE.

6. **The BSO/I must be proactive and consistent at inviting the SOF commanders/leaders to relevant forums and the SOF commanders/leaders must accept and engage** in the opportunities provided.

7. **The BSO/I should expect and acknowledge the SOF elements’ contributions.** Likewise, the SOF commanders should acknowledge that the BSO/I has a responsibility to the local government, security forces and population for all things, particularly missteps, that occur in the operating environment.

8. **Clear intent and refinement of shared goals/objectives and endstate** are critical to keeping all forces contributing to unity of effort and delivery of best effects.

9. As an AOB commander stated, “If we can’t blend with U.S. and coalition forces, it’s unlikely that we can blend with indigenous or enemy forces.”
10. **Over-classification** of intelligence and other products is something the CTF and AOB commanders successfully quelled. This led to more intelligence and targeting packets shared among conventional, SOF, coalition and ANSF forces—which led to greater effects in the OE.

11. **The BSO/I and SOF lethal targeting process must be understood** if not replicated. The intent and endstate must be understood if not shared. In the case of Zabul, the CTF and AOB understood and vigorously used the CTAF (nine components of the network) to attack the enemy network in depth with conventional, coalition, SOF and ANSF forces—with substantial and enduring effects in the OE.

12. An **ability and desire to fight I2A** (nonlethally) as vigorously as fighting the lethal fight is required in all war. I2A maintains freedom of action for friendly forces and reduces freedom of action for enemy forces while influencing “fence sitters” to side with the friendly forces. The CTF embraced I2A and the AOB brought capabilities that could be leveraged in the fight—again, shared intent and endstates.

13. **Engagement as the seventh warfighting function.** At the January 2014 Association of the United States Army Aviation Symposium, General Robert W. Cone, then commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, highlighted that “engagement” will be added as a seventh warfighting function and that this function will **involve skills used to influence foreign governments and militaries.** I suggest engagement also include influencing U.S. conventional forces, special operation forces and intelligence agencies—all forces—to mutually and proactively engage one another in order to maintain relationships forged over the past 12 years. This **domestic engagement** will foster relationships and trust as personalities change and will further contribute to unity of effort and increased effects.

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**Endnotes**


The BCT was allotted a budget from FORSCOM to execute the IBCT Mission Ready Exercise. At about the same time, very restrictive budget constraints were imposed on the Army and DoD. Although our budget was trimmed, through transparent creative thinking and execution the BCT was able to pay for a 1st Infantry Division aviation task force to train at JRTC—a task force that eventually supported the deployed BCT. Simultaneously, the BCT funded pre-mission training with two Special Forces groups at two separate locations. Approximately 70 percent of the trained BCT Soldiers eventually served while deployed with the SF teams with whom they had trained. Although JRTC is very good about not comparing units, the BCT was credited with the lowest accident rate, the lowest rate of vehicle damage and the lowest rate of lost/damaged Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) gear in memory—this while performing phenomenally well across all mission sets. The limited losses and accidents saved hundreds if not thousands of staff hours on Financial Liability Investigations of Property Loss (FLIPLs) and other administrative issues. This methodology carried into combat with like results.

Design, engaged company-level leadership and Master Army Profession and Ethic Trainer (MAPET) training attributed to the deployed BCT’s 87.5 percent decrease in accidents and its 75 percent decrease in misconduct compared to the unit’s prior deployment despite greater dispersion of units and leaders.

Major General Austin Scott Miller, U.S. Army, Commander, NATO Special Operations Command–Afghanistan, e-mail interview with author, 6 March and 9 June 2014.


Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) to Regional Command–South and Zabul Province, April 2013. Major General Paul A. LaCamera was also conducting his PDSS; in conversation he said he envisioned directing “by, with, through or for [the ANSF], just get effects”—neutralize the enemy, better the Afghan Security Forces and Afghan government. This intent was reiterated throughout our tour.

Major General Paul A. LaCamera, U.S. Army, Commander, Regional Command South and 4th Infantry Division, interview with author, 5 March 2014, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan.

Joint Publication 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, Joint Staff J-5, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (Suffolk, VA: 13 November 2009), p. V-4 (figure V-1), identifies the Counterterrorism Analytical Framework (CTAF) as consisting of nine categories—leadership, safe haven, finance, communication, movement, intelligence, weapons, personnel and ideology. “CTAF functional connections show possible linkages from COG [center of gravity]/critical capabilities to critical vulnerabilities.” “While CTAF component functions and systems can appear interdependent or mutually exclusive of each other, they are interrelated through a series of simple or complex nodal relationships.” p. V-5. The CTF and AOB used the CTAF to inform effective targeting of the insurgent groups in the OE.