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Special Operators: A Key Ingredient for Successful Peacekeeping Operations Management

by

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Low-intensity operations cannot be won or contained by military power alone. They require the application of all elements of national power across the entire range of conditions which are the source of the conflict.¹

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Special Forces

Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.²

Former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold

Multinational and regional alliances, as well as the Charter of the United Nations, include “terms that reflect a determination to provide an international institution that could control conflict” in the Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) spectrum of war.³ As a defense contractor employed by Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, I recently had a unique opportunity to participate directly in the Military Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru (MOMEPE), an LIC reduction operation conducted by conventional military forces with management influence by Special Operations Forces (SOF).

The tenets of campaign analysis—e.g., military historical perspectives, force structure, command and control capabilities and military objectives—provide a paradigm to demonstrate clearly the effectiveness of this conflict management mission performed by SOF in accordance with the ten focus areas stipulated by John M. Collins in *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment*.⁴ The MOMEPE Confidence Building Measure (CBM) was an example of SOF and conventional military force elements at their operational best. The Organization of American States (OAS), due to the actions of the SOF and conventional units assigned to MOMEPE, would experience a successful CBM Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) in a regional context.

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Historical and Strategic Setting—Contention from the Start—Border Conflict

The history of the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru, and the resulting MOMEPA campaign, begins with efforts to unify diverse geographic and demographic realities in one area. In 1829, Gran Colombia and Peru went to war over the border area of Ecuador and Peru. Simon Bolivar easily defeated Peru, and an identifiable border was established. The countries failed to ratify peace treaties, however, as Gran Colombia became the states of Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia. The current Peru-Ecuador border continued to be in dispute. After numerous wars and efforts to resolve the dispute, even through Papal intervention, the two nations in 1936 asked the United States to assist in a resolution. Before long, peace talks deteriorated, and the two nations went to war again in 1941. This time, Peru defeated Ecuador.

After an outbreak of hostilities on 15 July 1941 due to the border dispute, the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile established an agreement in 1942 referred to as the guidance of the Rio Protocol.⁵ This protocol separated military forces until a border could be delineated.⁶ The agreement was based on the assumption that a border could be demarcated using the theory of the “divorce of waters,” or the *divortium aquarum* concept. This notion demonstrated a natural border due to the flow of water into separate river basins caused by the weather and the geological impact of existing mountain ranges. Because of oil explorations in the area in addition to the difficult terrain of rivers, mountains and jungle, and extremes in temperature, humidity and rainfall, the border was never defined. From 1947 until 1960, Ecuador claimed the Rio Protocol to be inapplicable.

Military clashes occurred periodically in the border area, most notably in 1981, 1991 and again in January 1995. This latest war drew the attention of the Guarantors of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty),⁷ who saw the conflict as a threat to regional stability due to the scale and weapons used. The Guarantors formalized a cease-fire agreement in March 1995, and MOMEPA was established as a CBM to bring Ecuador and Peru to the peace table. It was designed to be temporary in duration in order to achieve the desired results of the conflict resolution processes involved in peacekeeping operations.⁸

Based on the lack of accurate definition of the border between Peru and Ecuador along a 78-kilometer front, both countries organized military frontier base camps and observation posts along the Cenepa River Valley and the Condor Cordillera. This frontier, located in the Oriente Region of Ecuador and the northern Peruvian gateway to the Amazon, is inhabited by Jivaro Indians—including Ashur and Shur tribes—and local country people (*companeros*). It has triple-canopy jungle growth, is exposed to high humidity, temperatures and rainfall, has few improved roads and has high mountains and fast-flowing rivers.⁹ It is inhospitable to foreigners, yet a paradise to the local populations and ecotourists.¹⁰ Bharat Karmad wrote that “Undefined borders spawn what a RAND study calls *drivers of conflict*.”¹¹ This was certainly the case between Ecuador and Peru.

The Ecuadorian and Peruvian militaries, as well as the militaries of the other Guarantors, had a strong history of joint training and operations, especially regarding SOF areas of responsibility and operations.¹² This experience would assist the MOMEPA CBM, particularly in the area of command, control, intelligence and special operations missions, as “interoperability enhanced by common training and doctrine, compatible equipment and capabilities, well-defined command structures, common control procedures, and similar modus operandi” was promoted primarily via SOF troops assigned to MOMEPA.¹³ SOF, of course, provides the United States with “immediate

and primary capability to respond to terrorism” and is the “military mainstay of the United States for the purpose of nation-building and training friendly foreign forces in order to preclude deployment or combat involving the conventional or strategic forces of the United States.”¹⁴ This would be a key ingredient to MOMEF.

The United States Congress, by way of implementing Title 10, United States Code regarding the armed forces, specified by statute ten focus areas for SOF efforts. To make MOMEF successful, its participants would use elements of these ten focus areas:

1. Direct Action: Engage in short-duration, small-scale offensive activities such as raids, ambushes, hostage rescues and surgical strikes to neutralize, seize or destroy critical targets.
2. Strategic Reconnaissance: Gather information regarding the capabilities, intentions and activities of actual/potential enemies, geographic, demographic and regional characteristics, and post-strike battle damage assessments.
3. Unconventional Warfare: Assist insurgents, secessionists and resistance movements, including assistance with organization, equipping and training of such forces, as well as furnish various kinds of support, survival, evasion and escape networks and methods.
4. Foreign Internal Defense: Support interdepartmental/interagency efforts to assist a foreign government through training and assistance to local military or paramilitary forces that strengthen host nation political, economic and security institutions to forestall or defeat insurgency, lawlessness or subversion.
5. Civil Affairs: Promote civil-military cooperation between U.S. military forces and foreign populations, governments and nongovernmental organizations before, during and after hostile actions or emergencies. Provide for the administration of occupied areas and the rebuilding of civil infrastructure and institutions.
6. Psychological Operations: Planned use of propaganda and actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of selected target audiences which assist in the attainment of security objectives before, during and after hostilities.
7. Counterterrorism: Perform in conjunction with other interdepartmental/interagency efforts to deter/defeat domestic and transnational terrorism.
8. Humanitarian Assistance: Provide for disaster relief services, medical and dental services and basic water purification, construction and transportation services.
9. Theater Search and Rescue: Use ground, surface/subsurface, air vehicles and other technologies and procedures to locate and recover aircrews.
10. Other such activities that may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.¹⁵

The Ecuadorian military, as well as other Guarantor nations’ militaries, had extensive knowledge of U.S. SOF operations and the re-architecture of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), as well as the establishment and sustainment of peacekeeping/CBM efforts in Panama, Somalia and Bosnia. Ecuadorian officers reportedly studied the U.S. reactions to SOF and military support requests from the Falklands incident with the United Kingdom, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, Operation Just Cause in Panama and operations in the Balkans. They knew what SOF/coalition warfare/peacekeeping methodologies

were to be practiced by U.S. commanders in chief (CINCs) in the mid-1990s to reduce LICs.¹⁶ The Peruvian military had similar information.¹⁷

Operational Setting of Belligerents—A Limited, Aggressive War—Direct Action

A confrontation between the Ecuadorians and Peruvians occurred at a frontier outpost in December 1994, according to Ecuadorian members of MOMEF. Skirmishes were first started by Ecuadorian SOF elements on 11 January 1995. Neither side appeared willing to stand down. On 26 January, coordinated combined-arms fighting commenced between the warring factions. The action took place principally between Ecuador's 21st Brigade, the "Condor Brigade," based at Patuca, Ecuador and commanded by Colonel Jorge Brito, and elements of the Peruvian VI Military Region command, forward-based in Bagua, Peru.¹⁸ Small, 40-man SOF infantry units participated in the combat. These SOF units were trained in the locale and could live off the land. Ecuadorian SOF used automatic handheld weapons, mortars, mines, handheld Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and VHF radio packs. They were resupplied via road and air; helicopter transport was no problem except for weather delays.

The Ecuadorian Army had reinforced fighting positions along various jungle escarpments in the battle zone, similar to "A" camps built by U.S. Special Forces during the Vietnam conflict.¹⁹ In two weeks during the initial conflict, more than 3,000 Ecuadorian Army troops and 2,000 Peruvian troops deployed into the upper Cenepa River Valley area. Both opposing parties used Kfir, Sukhoi and Mirage fixed-wing aircraft, and MIL-8's, Pumas and lighter French-made helicopters. Ecuador tapped the skills of local, indigenous troops and used modern technology such as GPS and satellites to pinpoint targets.²⁰

Both belligerents continued to mass forces and marshal tanks and artillery along their western coastal border in anticipation of combat spreading. This was a diversionary tactic first instituted by Ecuador, which did not want to risk its port of Guayaquil. This tactic pressed Peru to focus its attentions westward while allowing Ecuador to move quickly and exploit its internal lines of communication toward the Oriente region.²¹ Later, during the MOMEF effort when tensions increased during peace talks, Peru placed its Navy and Army on alert in the western coastal areas to coerce concessions.²²

The Ecuadorians, using their shorter and well-prepared lines of communication (LOCs), swiftly took advantage of the highest ground of the Cordillera Del Condor mountain range to direct fire from mortars and multiple rocket launchers on Peruvian soldiers trying to reinforce their positions.²³ These LOCs were secured and patrolled by SOF and pathfinder elements of Shur Indians.²⁴ Ecuadorian civilians used these same routes to evacuate from areas as far south as Yantzaza and Guallaquiza toward Macas via Mendez and Patuca.

On 10 February, Ecuador shot down three Peruvian aircraft in the Oriente. By the end of the short, aggressive war, Ecuador was credited with shooting down nine Peruvian aircraft—four fixed-wing and five helicopters—through a combination of automatic antiaircraft weapons, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and Kfir aircraft. In contrast, Ecuador suffered no losses to aircraft.²⁵ Likewise, due to careful logistical planning and execution of rapid resupply by helicopter, Ecuador's artillery, SOF reconnaissance and jungle infantry units dominated the ground.²⁶ The most serious fighting centered near two frontier outposts on the Peruvian side of the un-demarcated border area, which were occupied by SOF jungle fighters from the 21st Ecuadorian Army Condor Brigade.

Two of these outposts, PV-1 and Cuangos, would become key MOMEPE observation posts manned by SOF personnel.²⁷

The local press reported 27 killed in action and more than 80 injured for Ecuador along with 46 killed and as many as 300 noncombat casualties for Peru, according to some MOMEPE participants. The Peruvian equipment losses and noncombatant casualties proved that Peru was far less prepared for the engagements than was Ecuador. The Ecuadorian military had preplanned this aggressive and limited conflict using classic air and land combined-arms and SOF tactics. The war was not designed to escalate from a minor border incident. Further, the prowess executed by Ecuador in the Cenepa Valley basin pointed to the adaptation of doctrine learned by Ecuadorian military officers, at various levels in various services, from instruction received in the United States. Superior intelligence, SOF training, preparation of the battlefield and prepared LOCs led to a tactical victory for the Ecuadorian military. In contrast, Peru's military intelligence sources failed to recognize the preparations and capabilities of Ecuador. Peruvian forces could not quickly respond to the Ecuadorian presence in the disputed area and capitalize on greater raw military strength. Peru's government claimed it had been focusing on combating internal terrorism.²⁸

The limited war and quick victory by Ecuador in the Oriente Region of the Cenepa River Valley achieved a new threshold in the age-old conflict. This threshold was anticipated well by Ecuador as it intended the SOF direct action to carry the day. Ecuador successfully defeated Peru for the first time since the 1829 Battle of Tarqui.²⁹ The Ecuadorian military successfully integrated strategic, SOF and tactical elements of its military with an assertive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign. Logistically, the planning by Ecuador was efficient to allow for rapid deployment, flexible responses, simple operations and smooth sustainment. The victory was a significant accomplishment for the nation and the nation's military, which had been planning for this war since 1981.

Peacekeeping Campaign Execution—Rio Treaty Response—Foreign Internal Defense

The U.S. Department of State, USSOUTHCOM and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) immediately tried to intervene and facilitate a cease-fire agreement.³⁰ The conflict was brought to the OAS, the Rio Treaty Guarantors. The Guarantor nations had the distinct advantage of attaining a meaningful consensus to require a peacekeeping operation to resolve the border conflict. By contrast, the United Nations may not have achieved such a consensus.³¹ A cease-fire agreement and a separation-of-forces agreement were in place after stressful meetings in Brasilia and Montevideo. The Guarantors also had the necessary resources and organization to properly support MOMEPE. These agreements stipulated the more "traditional" military objectives of peacekeeping requirements for MOMEPE.³² The settlement was executed on 17 February 1995 as the Treaty of Itamaraty, colloquially referred to as the MOMEPE Treaty. The treaty defined the mission of the MOMEPE CBM. It was clear and specific in its terminology, characteristics considered key factors in the success of a CBM.³³ MOMEPE would be extended several times until the formal peace treaty and border demarcation were completed in June 1999.

USSOUTHCOM and USSOCOM had warning orders, as well as U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) guidance in January 1995, upon the commencement of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru.³⁴ They executed deployment orders on 11 March 1995 at 0241 Zulu, in accordance with

the CINC's guidance and specified Rules of Engagement (ROE).³⁵ These orders included the following points USSOUTHCOM/USSOCOM forces and forces from the other Rio Treaty Guarantors (Chile, Brazil and Argentina, which were primarily SOF), would adhere to:

- Observe, report and verify compliance with the terms of the ceasefire;
- Verify the ceasefire;
- Verify troop withdrawals;
- Verify Demilitarized Zone(s) (DMZs);
- Assist in the investigation of violations of the terms of the agreement; and,
- Periodically visit forward positions to observe and report on the disposition of forces of Ecuador and Peru.³⁶

As the title of MOMEP depicted, this was an observer mission and traditional in its application, at least at the outset. Comparing these ROEs to those promulgated in the *UN Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations*, as well as those rules for PKOs as discussed by John Hillen (*Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*) and Paul Diehl (*International Peacekeeping*), MOMEP was a traditional PKO in concept. MOMEP operations were to be more “akin to armed police work than standard combat.”³⁷ Yet, the military composition and participation in MOMEP was equitable in regard to geographic representation along the lines of the concepts for second-generation PKOs.³⁸ It also fit several of the focus areas of SOF, e.g., direct action, strategic reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, civil affairs, theater search and rescue and humanitarian assistance.

MOMEP was a unique, ad hoc peacekeeping/confidence-building measure, as it was not under the auspices of the United Nations and was financed by the Guarantors of the Rio Treaty.³⁹ The funding streams, as well as the military participants (including the SOF and conventional forces assigned to MOMEP), did not allow for the traditional UN requirement for neutrality in PKOs.⁴⁰ MOMEP by design and treaty did not have a commanding general officer but rather a SOF-qualified coordinating general officer. Additionally, members of the Guarantor nations' foreign ministries provided technical experts (most of whom were SOF personnel) as consultants to MOMEP.⁴¹

An Overview of the SOF Table of Organization and Equipment

The MOMEP mission was headquartered at Patuca, Ecuador, 30 kilometers from the disputed border area in the Oriente' region of the Condor mountains. Numerous MOMEP meetings were also held in Bagua, Peru, as well as in Guarantor nations. Patuca is home to the 21st Ecuadorian Army Brigade, a force of approximately 2,500 personnel. This “Condor Brigade” had specific SOF elements and Shur Indian pathfinders. The brigade commander had an intelligence officer with him at all times. It was his brigade that won the war in 1995.

Macas, Ecuador, a rural city of approximately 35,000 residents and a paved runway of 8,500 feet, is 2½ hours north of Patuca by road, while the historical city of Cuenca, Ecuador, is 7½ hours by road to the southwest. A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter can make the trip to Macas from Patuca in 12 minutes. Patuca is at an elevation of 1,780 feet above sea level on the east bank of the Upano River. This river joins several others in various confluences and flows into the Amazon

River through the Cenepa River Valley. This area is part of the crucial headwaters of the Amazon River system and is covered by double- and triple-canopy jungle. Temperatures range from 40 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit. Rain is frequent; humidity is high. The area has mountains and volcanoes up to 20,000 feet and is tectonically active. Indigenous population is native Jivaro Indian tribes, which are part of the Shur Indian culture. The local economy is agrarian. The poverty level is distinctly low.

Guarantor nations provided a military command group at Patuca. Patuca had a dirt runway 3,500 feet in length which the Ecuadorian military, using MOMEF funds, upgraded to 8,500 feet and paved to accommodate C-130 aircraft as part of the Civil Affairs infrastructure construction effort of MOMEF SOF operations. A helicopter ramp and apron area were also added as part of the MOMEF mission requirements to support UH-60 aircraft and later to support Ecuadorian military aircraft after MOMEF aircraft were reserved for the MOMEF forces.

The U.S. military supported MOMEF under the designation of U.S. Joint Task Force Safe Border (USJTFSB), which included approximately 60 U.S. military personnel, most of whom were on 90-day rotations from the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army 1/228th Aviation Regiment at Fort Kobe, Panama, and Soto Cano, Honduras, and Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams from the U. S. Army's 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The language, weapons, communication and diplomatic skills of these SOF personnel were key to the MOMEF mission's success. Besides sending SOF observers, the United States provided conventional force elements for logistical support, airlift, mess facilities, communications, weather reporting, resupply, medical evacuation and medical care with support from Chilean SOF medics. Most important, the U.S. Air Force provided C-27 fixed-wing aircraft from Howard AFB in Panama, and U.S. Army South (USARSO) provided four UH-60A aircraft until 1 November 1997.

A split-based logistics concept supported these helicopter assets and provided the six member nations of MOMEF with a means to fly, by prescribed routes, to two and then three DMZs. These DMZs were in the disputed border area and were, and still are, heavily and indiscriminately mined after the 1981 conflicts.⁴² Each Guarantor nation, as well as Peru and Ecuador, provided observers, mostly SOF commissioned officers, who flew aboard the assigned UH-60 aircraft for air patrols and treaty verification flights and lived for periods of time in remote jungle forward camps in the two DMZs. Reports relative to compliance to the MOMEF Treaty and support for MOMEF negotiations were part of the SOF observers' mission, in accordance with the ROE. The total complement of personnel assigned to MOMEF from the six nations was fewer than 100. This composition fit the small troop size requirements normally found within UN observer missions in a traditional PKO context and the more employable context of SOF.⁴³ This support was in place from mid-1995 until June 1999.

The United States gradually transitioned out of its lead operational/logistical role for MOMEF during the third quarter of 1997, yet the USJTFSB remained with a full compliment of USSOCOM troops. The Brazilian Army, in December 1997, relieved the majority of U.S. personnel. Brazil took over the aviation mission with its own UH-60L aircraft, which were maintained under a direct commercial contract with the Brazilian Army by Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation's international support affiliate Sikorsky International Products, Inc. (SIPI) per the MOMEF II Agreement.⁴⁴ Argentina and Chile picked up additional elements of the mission as well. This transition was part of the MOMEF II and III treaties' requirements, and illustrated the unique multinational character

of this campaign. Because the transition was well planned and a forecasted event, it allowed for less force turbulence, which can be harmful to special operations such as PKOs.⁴⁵

Although Brazil was the head Guarantor nation, the lead role of the mission had been assumed by the U.S. State Department.⁴⁶ USARSO, using USSOUTHCOM and USSOCOM assets, provided stability and security operations for MOMEP at Patuca. A portion of the Ecuadorian Army's 21st Brigade's cantonment mission, or M elements, were divided and periodically shifted among the Guarantors, e.g., M-1, M-2, M-3 and M-4 (administration, intelligence, operations and logistics, respectively). Leadership elements were always SOF troopers. The official language of MOMEP was Spanish. This gave MOMEP an appearance worthy of what today could be described as a second-generation type of mission.⁴⁷ USSOUTHCOM and USSOCOM initially provided for the M-4 section with various USARSO and U.S. Air Force South (USAFSOUTH) elements and assets. These elements were organized under a "joint" forces commander, usually an O-6 (colonel).

These elements worked in concert with M elements supported by military personnel from other Guarantor nations. They provided administration, logistics and aviation assets for observer missions, as well as resupply and mission logistics to and from the MOMEP area of operational requirements (AOR), intelligence, weather station services, force protection, military police services, crash-fire rescue, communications and medical clinic services. USSOCOM also provided for observers assigned to the M-3 section of MOMEP. USSOCOM and Guarantors' SOF observers were positioned at posts along the border and DMZs, especially at PV-1 and Cuangos.⁴⁸ These observers were normally Special Forces personnel from the Guarantor nations. U.S. observers usually comprised ODA teams from USSOCOM's 7th Group, led by a U.S. Army National Guard SOF-qualified colonel. The U.S. lead observer's tour of duty was 180 to 360 days.⁴⁹

As a risk reduction effort, the right of self-defense was employed at MOMEP for the peacekeepers. As described by Alex Morrison, under "no circumstances can a peacekeeper's right or obligation to act in self defense be removed [in PKOs]. The right of self defense applies to individuals, and ROE's must never interfere [with such]."⁵⁰ The MOMEP contingent had weapons for self-defense and extraction methods, which were well rehearsed and periodically updated.

The command and control procedures of MOMEP allowed deliberate mission planning processes guided by the ODA team members, which eliminated most operational uncertainties.⁵¹ This would be a key ingredient to MOMEP's mission success. Also, the structure of MOMEP, based on the Guarantor militaries' understanding of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, troops available and civilians (METT-TC), decreased the potential for "friction in the chain of command."⁵² MOMEP contingent commanders, all of whom were SOF-qualified troopers, had a superb sense of "strategic coherence" between the political and military means of this particular CBM.⁵³ More than 650 U.S. military personnel and contractors were assigned to MOMEP on varying-duration tours. Hundreds of visitors, technical experts, flight crews, press and officials from the Guarantor nations and various members of the Guarantor nations' formal commissions on MOMEP periodically visited Patuca from March 1995 until the demobilization of the mission in June 1999.⁵⁴

MOMEP CBM—Influenced by SOF Focus Areas

MOMEP, from an operational/analytical perspective, was a military peacekeeping campaign and appears to have accomplished a traditional peacekeeping effort. This effort included "cease

fire, truce, and armistice functions, frontier control, inter-positional functions, assistance in the restoration of law and order, security functions in zones placed under United Nations (UN) [or other] control” and other related efforts.⁵⁵ Still, due to its multinational makeup of participants and the SOF and conventional force cadres employed, it took on additional characteristics.⁵⁶ MOMEP was more closely resembled a second-generation PKO and can be more accurately viewed as a peace mission that operated in “special” and “war-like conditions.”⁵⁷ Furthermore, MOMEP was a classic SOF-style operation when reviewed against John Collin’s ten focus areas of SOF operations, as outlined below.⁵⁸

First, MOMEP provided for strategic (special) reconnaissance. Significant intelligence gathering was being done through a variety of sources (e.g., human, signal, communications and satellite/electronic imagery) by all parties involved in MOMEP. As Collins’ second focus area and Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, would dictate, intelligence analysis on nonmilitary topics such as politics, economics and demographics clearly marks the military nature of a Special Operation focus area and a PKO.⁵⁹ Terrain, infrastructure of belligerents, local politics and threats, weather, economic pressures and other information were important to the MOMEP operation. Heated debates involving intelligence and observation matters arose frequently prior to, or shortly after, air missions into the zones. Most debates were handled locally, but some were elevated to national levels of Guarantor members’ intelligence and command communities.⁶⁰

For instance, when Peruvian laser-guided surface-to-air weapons locked on UH-60 helicopters during a preplanned and routine observer flight over a designated “box” in the DMZ Alpha Zone, or when an Ecuadorian Army ground reconnaissance patrol wandered out of a prescribed area, intelligence communities from various nations swiftly brought to bear their assets in efforts to de-escalate the treaty violations. The strength of the OAS, and particularly the United States, provided coercion to enforce MOMEP requirements and reduced tension in such instances.

The United States also elected to use Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and satellite surveillance to support its national security interests and those of the Guarantors involved in MOMEP. An instance during August 1998 involved troop movements by both Peru and Ecuador, initially started by Ecuador, into a border area south of the DMZ.⁶¹ Peru chose to send a sizable naval force toward the Ecuadorian port city of Guayaquil and prepositioned MiG fighters in closer proximity to the area of contention and Patuca, too.⁶² Ecuador increased its troop strength in the Oriente region and increased border flying with Mirage fighters. Ecuadorian Mirages periodically flew low and fast along the border areas through 16 June 1999, the day before the final MOMEP flag-lowering ceremony at Patuca.⁶³ Due to the receipt of this technologically delivered intelligence from AWACS aircraft, as well as human intelligence from MOMEP SOF observers and SIPI personnel on the ground at Patuca, the USJTFSB-led MOMEP forces were able to de-escalate the crisis with joint discussions, troop verifications and an establishment of a new zone of control, or third DMZ.⁶⁴ The United States let the belligerents know through the MOMEP campaign structure that the infringements by both sides were being reviewed at the National Command level within the U.S. National Security Council. Additional elements from the USSOCOM Aviation Regiment, Task Force 160th, forward stationed at Howard AFB in Panama, were deployed to a location less than 70 kilometers from Patuca to support, if required, the evacuation and force protection of MOMEP participants and the termination of vital MOMEP assets to deny their use by the belligerent parties.⁶⁵ Release of such Strategic

Reconnaissance to the warring parties, and particularly Ecuador, clearly underscored how the Guarantor nations viewed this last-ditch attempt to disrupt the peace negotiations and the final treaty. Ecuador had tried to gain border concessions as the OAS Commission of Border Demarcation was meeting to finalize the specific locations of the border markers, but its effort failed due to the information provided via Strategic Reconnaissance by MOMEPE.⁶⁶

Second, MOMEPE included a great emphasis on nation assistance and humanitarian efforts. MOMEPE SOF and conventional military personnel routinely performed civil affairs operations and humanitarian assistance efforts in the forward locales surrounding the DMZs. This was true in Patuca, in the town of Mendez seven kilometers west of Patuca and in the Shur village two kilometers north of Patuca. Members of the USJTFSB and ODA teams provided medical assistance to these areas. For instance, 7th Group medical personnel immunized a great number of Mendez inhabitants for yellow fever and rabies. MOMEPE personnel also performed construction projects. Housing and sewage control projects were completed. Most important, MOMEPE provided jobs for numerous local personnel. MOMEPE employed day laborers for construction projects, landscaping and mess hall services. SIPI maintenance personnel organized clothing drives for the local Shur tribes. Orphans of the local area were “adopted” by MOMEPE and SIPI, whose members provided clothing and monetary support for several children directly, as well as to the local orphanage in Mendez. These activities clearly promote positive psychological impact features of MOMEPE and the OAS. Despite certain viewpoints that purport humanitarian assistance efforts should be separate and distinct with no political linkage to peacekeeping operations, MOMEPE was strengthened by such efforts performed by the SOF troopers.⁶⁷

Third, an effort to increase the scope of MOMEPE was under way, especially with Brazil transitioning into the lead role. As such, in the realm of SOF-supported operations, MOMEPE supported the foreign internal defense parameters of the belligerents. MOMEPE operations sought to “strengthen host nation political, economic, social, and national security institutions.”⁶⁸ Subtle yet significant power projection efforts—such as the runway expansion at Patuca, the paving of the runway and ramp space, the increase in personnel assigned to the mission from Brazil, Argentina and Chile, the sizable increase in tons and type of equipment shipped to Patuca, and the building of quarters and facilities such as the expeditionary/dismountable hangar and base camp erected by SIPI for on-site maintenance of the Brazilian Army UH-60L helicopters—all suggested the more committed and permanent nature of this CBM and of the Ecuadorian military posture in this vicinity. MOMEPE personnel, purchasing local hardware and materials, performed many construction projects. Housing and sewage control projects were completed, and simple issues, such as promoting water purification, meant a great deal to the local population. MOMEPE funds and foreign aid attributed to the expansions, invigorating the local economy from Macas to Mendez, and even to Quito and Guayaquil.⁶⁹

In April and May 1999, late in the MOMEPE campaign, another civil affairs and foreign internal defense effort got under way to increase the scope of MOMEPE.⁷⁰ The Ecuadorian military requested infrastructure upgrades at Patuca, such as the ramp and runway expansion, after U.S. Air Force surveys were completed. The increase in personnel required more substantial quarters and facilities, new electrical upgrades for the MOMEPE soldiers’ living camp and water purification systems, all paid for with U.S. Army Operation and Maintenance and Military Construction funds. Patuca thus became a high-value Ecuadorian military asset.⁷¹ Planners discussed using it as a location to stage future mine clearing operations along the Ecuadorian border⁷² and the site of a museum to recognize

the border struggle and MOMEPE participation. The area also will support ecotourism, which is an economic benefit for the Ecuadorian military-owned airlines and a key economic factor for the indigenous population.⁷³ All these efforts extending up to June 1999 were financed by foreign sources, with additional economic and operational gain going to the Ecuadorian military and its enterprises. Seemingly, the neutrality and impartiality of MOMEPE as a PKO was compromised when efforts such as these were brought to light; yet MOMEPE's credibility remained intact.

Fourth, PSYOP, a critical focus area of SOF, played a major and effective role in the MOMEPE PKO campaign. From an operational, tactical and even strategic concept analysis, PSYOP did not substitute for combat power, but it significantly enhanced MOMEPE's mission accomplishment.⁷⁴ The best definition in regard to PSYOP in missions other than war, such as the MOMEPE CBM, can be found in John Collins' description of the sixth focus area of SOF:

PSYOP activities involve the planned use of propaganda and actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of friends, neutrals, and enemies in ways that assist accomplishment of security objectives before, during, and after hostilities.⁷⁵

This definition is broad enough to encompass the PSYOP used in MOMEPE, especially by the SOF assigned to MOMEPE and by the Ecuadorian military. It is a definition unencumbered by negative connotations sometimes attributed to PSYOP and allows for exploration of the multinational use of PSYOP by SOF during MOMEPE.

MOMEPE as a CBM resembles a PSYOP contingency operation that supports the "stability fulcrum" of national security interests of Ecuador, as well as those of the Guarantor nations, with "proactive and early response to threats" using fewer national and international assets, which resulted in less mission risk.⁷⁶ MOMEPE was essentially a military-managed campaign influenced by SOF that exemplified "propaganda of the deed."⁷⁷ Six member nations of MOMEPE were involved to varying degrees in military exercises, deployment of military forces, contact with foreign nationals and "civic action and specific types of combat operations" spanning the elements of the operational continuum.⁷⁸ Themes and issues were developed and discussed by SOF troops assigned to the M and J sections of MOMEPE, as well as at the command level of the 21st Ecuadorian Army Brigade. These themes and issues related to such topics as perceptions of the United States and other Guarantor nations, socioeconomic considerations impacting the peace process (e.g., International Monetary Fund relief amounts), the rights of commerce and navigation, mineral rights in the Amazon region, and additional security assistance commitments, as well as the perceptions of aggressor nations' leadership, both civilian and military, and their populations. These were disseminated via the media.⁷⁹ No "policy drift" occurred in this case; MOMEPE policy did not deviate because MOMEPE campaign PSYOP results were disseminated and shown publicly until the treaty signing in May 1999.

Major events at MOMEPE were truly media events, primarily orchestrated and staged by the Ecuadorian military, and to a lesser extent with the concurrence, input and cooperation of the Guarantors. Change-of-command ceremonies and mission milestone events, such as completion of border markers, were most press-worthy. Television and print media were invited to the base of operations. The U.S. military, Brazilian Army and Ecuadorian Air Force aircraft provided transportation for these events. Film and news media crews, both public and joint military, were briefed on the status of the mission and allowed to film MOMEPE facilities and presentations. The press reports interwove the military efforts surrounding MOMEPE with the economic crisis in Ecuador

and the El Nino-caused economic and physical disruption in Ecuador and Peru. The media coverage was timely and appropriate.⁸⁰ It helped the populations and the politicians, both military and civilian, to realize their war efforts along the border were hampering their economies. The media also assisted in not allowing the CBM to become a lengthy, drawn-out affair, as had PKOs in Cyprus and the Sinai.

In the case of MOMEPE, the news media, directed by the Ecuadorian military, was a PSYOP additive. It helped alleviate the “non-material factors such as history, culture and ideas” surrounding the border conflict.⁸¹ Prompted by the Ecuadorian military, the media provided a “blending” of military and civilian/political PSYOP.⁸² The media took the MOMEPE operation from the grassroots to an international level of recognition, which proved the legitimacy of the CBM and assisted the Ecuadorian military in promoting its prestige, led to U.S. funds and joint air force operations at Manta, Ecuador, the replacement for Howard AFB in Panama and perhaps to further investment by the United States.⁸³

MOMEPE, as a CBM with strong reliance on PSYOP, also saved lives and reduced the need for Ecuador to mobilize additional elements of its military and further deplete its weakened economy to press military engagements on the border issue. This was a primary goal for the Ecuadorian military from the onset.⁸⁴ Adding to the mission’s difficulty were feelings of distrust between the two nations, fueled by such factors as the increase in arms sales, especially to Peru, the sale of MiG -29 fighters, belligerent moves by the Peruvian Congress, a constitutional crisis concerning succession requirements in Ecuador, mortar attacks, mine casualties in the DMZs, sustained psychological warfare pursued by both Ecuador and Peru in the press and in local protests, the El Nino-driven physical and economic problems and bank closures in Ecuador.⁸⁵ Activities such as these occurred as the second round of MOMEPE peace discussions convened in Brasilia in late November 1997, and continued through the MOMEPE flag-lowering ceremony on 17 June 1999.

Fifth, MOMEPE as an SOF PKO provided theater search and rescue (SAR) in keeping with the definition of the ninth focus area of SOF operations. MOMEPE participants took part in numerous SAR operations for military personnel from all nations assigned, as well as for indigenous personnel and Shur Indians. For instance, in April 1999 when 15 indigenous personnel were swept down the Upano River after a bridge collapsed near Sucua, a town north of Patuca on the Macas road, MOMEPE responded. A Brazilian Army UH-60L launched from Patuca, and Brazilian SOF troopers rescued ten survivors via external hoist and transported them to a local hospital in Macas. Also that April, an SAR mission launched after an Ecuadorian Army Puma helicopter experienced mechanical problems and landed in a minefield near PV-1. These types of efforts showed that the multinational MOMEPE force was not choosing a side in the conflict. Through missions such as these, audiences on both sides of the border experienced and perceived the commitment of MOMEPE to a lasting peace.⁸⁶

Conclusion: Mission Success—SOF Management of CBMs

The changes that impacted MOMEPE provide insight that this PKO, originally developed by OAS planners, transitioned into a robust Confidence Building Measure. Defined as “cooperative measures” of “sharing information and avoiding certain practices, the possibility of accidental war will decline and obstacles to premeditated conflict will be increased,” CBMs “are closely tied to initiatives in diplomacy, defense policy, international law, and of course arms control, but are not

limited to these categories.”⁸⁷ MOMEPE could not have been successful without SOF. It is not likely conventional forces alone could have contended with the unique aspects of MOMEPE.

In and of themselves conventional forces would have been politically, militarily or economically inappropriate for MOMEPE.⁸⁸ The SOF elements from all participating nations were “small, self-reliant and readily deployable units” that allowed mission accomplishments in ways that minimized risks of escalation while maximizing returns compared with orthodox applications of military power, which normally emphasize mass.⁸⁹ Deployment of SOF elements to MOMEPE reduced the quantity of conventional forces required for MOMEPE. When viewed as a CBM, MOMEPE provided other attributes, e.g., openness, visibility and transparency, which will “reduce both the motivations and the opportunities for conflict.”⁹⁰ Such attributes the Guarantors promoted via a carefully thought-out military-political peacekeeping campaign, supported by significant applications of various elements of the ten SOF focus areas of concentration.

From an operational standpoint, MOMEPE clearly fits into another element of the CBM definition, as it increased its function and expanded its scope. MOMEPE “[denied] any aggressor [the element of] surprise.” CBMs prevent “an unobserved military buildup, or undetected access to strategic areas.”⁹¹ MOMEPE, as a SOF operation, allowed other nations not to escalate the conflict from its low level. With the air procedures, the required number and type of air missions, rotations of SOF observers and frequencies of such, the civil affairs and humanitarian efforts, the PSYOP, theater search and rescue elements and the dissemination of the information gathered via strategic reconnaissance, MOMEPE, in fact, reduced and controlled the hostile intent of the belligerents.

Looking back at the history of the border dispute, the need to control the region of the Amazon environmentally, economically and militarily, the potentially belligerent themes of the Peruvian regime then in power in Lima, the political and economic strife of Ecuador, the military forces of the belligerents, the terms of both the Rio Treaty and MOMEPE, and the previously mentioned commitments based on direct interface with U.S. Department of State, USSOUTHCOM, USSOCOM and USARSO representatives, the United States, as a nation, was well committed to MOMEPE. This is true despite the U.S. military friction between the Powell and Clinton doctrinal dichotomy and between peacekeeping and warfighting, which was highlighted during the second-generation PKOs in the Balkans and in Kosovo, contemporaneous with MOMEPE.⁹² Direct support from the United States for this CBM was solidly in place and required for the other Guarantors to operate MOMEPE. U.S. SOF involvement in and of itself was one of the greatest motivators of MOMEPE. The United States, through application of its SOF and conventional soldiers as peacekeepers, capitalized on its requirement for regional stability in USSOUTHCOM’s area of operations.

This region has seen positive political and economic developments. Democracy is prospering, and foreign direct investments and trade worldwide have significantly increased. The Ecuadorian military realized many challenges face “fledgling democracies throughout the region. Most notably . . . militaries working to redefine their roles under civilian-led governments. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are prime examples.”⁹³ For the duration of MOMEPE, these nations were “grappling with internal rivalries and other economic challenges. Mistrust among bordering countries, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and illegal border migration . . . threaten the fragile peace that now exists.”⁹⁴ Since the end of MOMEPE, the Guarantor nations have focused on antinarcotic efforts in Colombia. Plan Colombia initiatives are still under way.

The United States is financing operations on a joint basis to the level of more than \$2 billion.⁹⁵ More aid is forthcoming.⁹⁶

In the final assessment, MOMEPE, in its Confidence Building Measure and Peacekeeping Operations roles, was successful. MOMEPE succeeded in changing the behavior of states. It resolved the conflict and will remain an example of risk management and reduction measures that ensure regional stability as well as national security for its participants.⁹⁷ Regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, and their representative military contingents showed the proper degree of incentive and restraint. Hence they were able to make MOMEPE and the SOF participation—and perhaps future regional peacekeeping and confidence-building measures—successful. MOMEPE is an example of a regional multinational military peacekeeping effort, conducted by conventional forces from various nations with influence and guidance from SOF, that succeeded without reliance upon the United Nations. MOMEPE was sufficiently robust, with an adequate mission mandate, executable Rules of Engagement, durable force stability and effective command and control, intelligence, logistics, financing and force protection elements all expertly managed by SOF.

CBM campaigns such as this, supported via SOF, frequently involve the “presentation of general principles and guidelines” that may (and should) influence behavior.⁹⁸ Such presentation was achieved through effective use of the ten SOF focus areas. Follow-through on the MOMEPE mission’s success was difficult at best, as the continuing political and economic tensions throughout USSOUTHCOM’s AOR underscore, and yet to date the newly demarcated border has been relatively peaceful. Therefore, the Military Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru was a total success, for in low-intensity conflicts such as peace operations, settlement, not victory, is the ultimate measure of success.⁹⁹

Endnotes

- ¹ Robin Neillands, *In the Combat Zone: Special Forces Since 1945* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), p. 127.
- ² Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 1994).
- ³ John Norton Moore, *National Security Law* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1990), p. 194.
- ⁴ John M. Collins, *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 3.
- ⁵ United States Army 44th Military History Detachment, *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History* (Fort McPherson, Ga.: Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, 1998), p. I-3, hereinafter referred to as *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*. The text of the Rio Protocol is available online at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ep/ep_rio01291942.html; the list of Guarantors is available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-29.html>.
- ⁶ Laurie Scott, “Centuries of Conflict,” *Soldiers*, May 1997, p. 38.
- ⁷ The text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) is available online at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-29.html>.
- ⁸ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 39.
- ⁹ Some observers could say the Ecuadorian military used lessons learned from the use of the Huks by the Communists in the Philippines and the Montagnards by U.S. SOF in Vietnam, as described by Robin Neillands, *In the Combat Zone*, pp. 67–68 and 162–164, respectively. Based on observations and discussions by the author with MOMEPE participants and U.S. State Department personnel, the Ecuadorian military supported the *companeros* and Jivaro populations with humanitarian efforts and therefore inspired their “hearts and minds” to be loyal to the Ecuadorian military. Its SOF also relied on their labor for self-sufficiency goals, e.g., farming, personal goods/services, construction and economic income through production jobs in military-owned enterprises (such as hotels and airlines). The Ecuadorian Army had numerous military-constructed and -maintained roads in the Oriente Region of the country and had access to numerous remote landing strips and landing zones for limited, gross-weight, fixed-wing cargo aircraft and helicopters. Due to the more riverine environment in the Peruvian area of the frontier, Peru lacked these essential lines of communications.
- ¹⁰ Philippe Descola, *The Spear of Twilight: Life and Death in the Amazon Jungle* (London: The New Press, 1996). These eco-tourists, mostly Europeans and Americans on side trips from the Galapagos, were a scourge to the MOMEPE participants, who had to launch several search-and-rescue missions to find wayward kayakers and hikers, thereby diverting MOMEPE assets and mission schedules.
- ¹¹ Bharat Karnad, “Winning Low Intensity Conflict: Special Operations Forces,” *Indian Defence Review*, Oct–Dec 2000, p. 21.
- ¹² Author’s personal observations and discussions with SOF elements assigned to MOMEPE.
- ¹³ John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998), p. 92; Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*.
- ¹⁴ Collins, *Special Operations Forces*, p. 3.

- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 3–5.
- ¹⁶ Author’s personal discussions with Ecuadorian MOMEPE participants, 1997.
- ¹⁷ Author’s personal discussions with Brazilian and Argentine MOMEPE observers, 1998.
- ¹⁸ Author’s discussions with Colonel Jorge Brito, circa April 1998.
- ¹⁹ Based on author’s observations, these fortifications were similar to those depicted in the *U.S. Army Special Forces “A” Camp Manual* and referenced in the *Special Forces Leaders Guide for Operational Detachment Personnel*, both published by the Army Research Institute, Fort Benning Field Unit.
- ²⁰ *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*, p. I-3.
- ²¹ Author’s discussions with former 21st Ecuadorian Army Brigade Commander, Colonel Jorge Brito, November 1999.
- ²² Author’s discussions with 7th Group personnel assigned to MOMEPE, June 1998.
- ²³ Gabriel Marcella, *War and Peace in the Amazon: Strategic Implications for the United States and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 24 November 1995), p. 5.
- ²⁴ Author and CCE personnel met a long-range patrol by happenstance on the road to Porto Morona near the Rio Morona crossing in the southwest area of the Alpha DMZ, April 1999. The patrol comprised two Shur guides and five Ecuadorian SOF troopers. The Shur had no firearms but carried spears and machetes. The soldiers were lightly equipped with automatic rifles, machetes and small rucksacks. They obviously lived off the land for food and cover. The patrol intercepted the MOMEPE vehicle on a curve and uphill portion of a dirt trail/road used by the author during a site survey to the Rio Morona port of embarkation.
- ²⁵ *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*, p. I-5.
- ²⁶ Author’s discussions with USJTFSB commander, October 1997.
- ²⁷ USJTFSB DMZ map, reviewed by SIPI, August 1997.
- ²⁸ *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*, p. I-5.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 123.
- ³² Declaration of Itamaraty, “The MOMEPE Treaty,” Washington D.C., copy provided to SIPI by U.S. Department of State’s Peru Desk officer, 1998.
- ³³ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, pp. 72–75.
- ³⁴ *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*, p. II-2.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. II-5.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. II-4.
- ³⁷ Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, p. 102.
- ³⁸ Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, p. 154; and Collins, *Special Operations Forces*.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*

- ⁴⁰ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 128.
- ⁴¹ Author's discussions with Peru desk officer, U.S. Department of State, January, 1998, as well as collaborative information from the MOMEPE Treaty and the *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*.
- ⁴² *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*, Chapter I.
- ⁴³ Collins, *Special Operations Forces*, p. 6.
- ⁴⁴ *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*, Chapter VII.
- ⁴⁵ Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, p. 123.
- ⁴⁶ Author's personal discussions with U.S. State Department desk officers, Washington, D.C., September 1997.
- ⁴⁷ Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, pp. 150–151 and Collins, *Special Operations Forces*.
- ⁴⁸ Defense Mapping Agency map grids 17MRS003089 and 17MRS078134 respectively.
- ⁴⁹ Operational Detachment Alpha 736 was the USSOCOM element that assisted the SIPI team during the transition from the USARSO 1/228th aviation to the Brazilian army 4th Aviation Squadron efforts for MOMEPE air support.
- ⁵⁰ Alex Morrison, *Peacekeeping by Proxy* (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997).
- ⁵¹ Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, p. 111.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 168.
- ⁵⁴ *USJTFSB-MOMEPE History*, p. C-1.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 227.
- ⁵⁶ Moore, Tipson, Turner, *National Security Law*, p. 38.
- ⁵⁷ Alex Morrison, Douglas A. Fraser and James D. Kiras, eds., *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution* (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 1994), p. 21.
- ⁵⁸ Collins, *Special Operations Forces*, Chapter 1.
- ⁵⁹ Collins, *Special Operations Forces*, Chapter 1; and FM 100-23, p. 45.
- ⁶⁰ Author's discussions with USJTFSB personnel, summer 1998.
- ⁶¹ Author's discussions with USJTFSB command personnel, August 1998.
- ⁶² *Ibid.* Peru moved aircraft into Iquitos and also into Bagua.
- ⁶³ Author's personal observation, 16 June 1999.
- ⁶⁴ "Gana la Paz," *Hoy*, 14 May 1999, Quito.
- ⁶⁵ Author's discussions and meetings with USJTFSB commander and staff regarding SIPI/USJTFSB emergency planning for MOMEPE.
- ⁶⁶ During troop verifications performed by the Guarantors of MOMEPE, after the additional zone of control was established the Ecuadorians transported troops out of the zone of control by helicopter to be counted and released. They were then transported by truck back into the zone of control, only to be lifted back out again to be counted. Here is ample evidence of the

Ecuadorian military using its own PSYOP to enlarge its capabilities in the minds of Peru and MOMEF members. Upon careful observation, most of these recycled personnel appeared to be garrison troops with little equipment, fresh uniforms, few arms and little awareness of what they were supposed to do. These troops allowed Ecuador to keep its true jungle fighting elements well within the zone of control, while showing the local media and MOMEF observers that they were abiding by the requirement set forth in the zone of control agreement. MOMEF had limited assets on the ground at the verification site in Yantzaza. Upon noticing what was happening and bringing it to the attention of the commander of the USJTFSB, who was the chief troop verifier at Yantzaza, SIPI personnel assisted in regauging the helicopter missions to reverify the actual troop movements out of the zone of control.

- ⁶⁷ Morrison et al., *Peacekeeping with Muscle*, p. 82.
- ⁶⁸ Collins, *Special Operations Forces*, p. 4.
- ⁶⁹ All MOMEF forces brought in supplies from their nations via Quito and Guayaquil and bought supplies and services ranging from closed-circuit television to trucks in these areas. SIPI used local freight-forwarding affiliates of BAX Global and local Quito-based subcontractors for service support at Patuca. The United States leased space and ramp services in Guayaquil for C-27 and C-5 aircraft and used local hotels for billeting.
- ⁷⁰ “Moncayo destaca el relevo de logistica en frontera con Peru,” *El Telegrafo*, Guayaquil, 3 November 1997.
- ⁷¹ Contracting Consulting Engineering, L.L.C. (CCE) contract with U.S. Army South, May 1999.
- ⁷² Author’s meetings with the Organization of American States Military Advisory Group, April 1999, Washington, D.C.
- ⁷³ Author’s meetings with local Shur Indian Chief and Ecuadorian Army 21st Brigade MOMEF Contingent Commander, December 1998.
- ⁷⁴ Field Manual (FM) 33-1, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, now known as FM 3-05.301, issued 12/31/2003, pp. 2-3–2-5.
- ⁷⁵ Collins, *Special Operations Forces*, p. 5.
- ⁷⁶ FM 33-1, p. 1-9.
- ⁷⁷ Janos Radvanyi, *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic Planning* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1990), p. 25.
- ⁷⁸ FM 33-1, p. 1-7.
- ⁷⁹ FM 33-1-1, Chapter 5. As discussed in the U.S. Army Field manuals, loudspeakers were often used in the frontier region of both Ecuador and Peru by governmental agencies to broadcast the news and impact of MOMEF. This loudspeaker dissemination was used due to the mountainous terrain and lack of good television reception, as well as the impoverished condition of local companeros and indigenous populations on both sides of the disputed area. Such broadcasts were also used to promote local and national political platforms.
- ⁸⁰ FM 33-1-1, p. 9-7.
- ⁸¹ Carnes Lord, “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,” *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, American Military University reprint, p. 78.

- ⁸² Benjamin, Fidley, Jr., Col., USAFR, “Blending Civilian and Military PSYOPS Paradigms,” *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, American Military University reprint, pp. 51–65.
- ⁸³ “Manta: 150 militares mas en abril,” *El Comercio*, Quito, 9 March 2000.
- ⁸⁴ Lord, “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,” p. 79.
- ⁸⁵ “Pro-Fujimori party quits Peru election over Fraud Charges,” *The Daily Herald*, The Caribbean Herald, N.V., St. Marteen, 17 March 2000.
- ⁸⁶ The Ecuadorian military also used instances such as these to promote further its commitment to the border demarcation objectives. It is noteworthy that the area the Puma landed in was supposed to have been cleared of mines by the Ecuadorian Army.
- ⁸⁷ Moore, Tipson, Norton, *National Security Law*, p. 641.
- ⁸⁸ Collins, *Special Operations Forces*, p. 6.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 643.
- ⁹² David Jablonsky, “Army Transformation: A Tale of Two Doctrines,” *Parameters*, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 56.
- ⁹³ Philip R. Kensinger, “U.S. Army South; Expanding to New Horizons,” *ARMY*, October 1997, p. 179.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 180.
- ⁹⁵ Author’s discussions with U.S. State Department personnel, November 1998–March, 1999.
- ⁹⁶ Colombian Ambassador Moreno’s address on CSPAN, 9 May 2002.
- ⁹⁷ “Peru and Ecuador Leaders Seal Border Treaty,” *The New York Times*, 14 May 1999.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁹ FM 100-23, p. v.

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