



THE TOTAL ARMY: NOW MORE THAN EVER

The U.S. Army is a key ingredient in the nation's joint warfighting team, providing the essential capability of sustained landpower and the ability to dominate events on land.

Overall Army missions today include deterrence, power projection and operations other than war. Within practical resource constraints the challenge is to accomplish all of these effectively, making the optimum use of both active and reserve component forces. There are, however, practical limits on how lean the total force can be and still perform these important missions.

For deterrence to be credible the Army must have sufficient forces for forward presence, meet peacekeeping obligations, be able to reinforce rapidly and have a credible capability for expansion.

For power projection, the Army must have an adequate force with the capability by air- and sealift to move rapidly to crisis locations. This means a ready contingency force (five divisions) supplemented with reserve contingency forces.

Operations other than war include a spectrum of operations on foreign soil as well as emergency requirements within the United States. Both the reserve and active components are essential players.

Seeking the right solution for the future Total Army in terms of size, organization and structure requires practical accommodation in the face of competing demands. National security, however, is not optional — it is an absolute necessity. There must be enough, or the nation cannot effectively pursue its foreign policy objectives or adequately pursue its critical national interests. The force must be sufficient, ready, well trained and equipped with state-of-the-art modern weapons.

By FY 1999, the Total Army is projected to be down to a 10-division active force (from today's 12 divisions), 15 enhanced readiness brigades in the Army National Guard, and ready combat service support units from the Army Reserve. The Army forces projected for the future are too lean, underfunded and pose too great a risk. From a practical standpoint, all assumptions will not materialize and all events will not happen as planned. A larger Total Army than the one projected for FY 1999 is needed to fully accomplish all specified and implied missions.

The Army is faced with maintaining military capabilities at a high level of readiness while reducing structure and strength. Fortunately, the Army has large reserve components. This permits more flexibility and more options on how to reorganize for the future. Clearly, more dependence will be placed on both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. The key here is to make maximum use of the strengths of each component. They must be used in the most efficient and productive manner to achieve the optimum synergistic effect. This is what the reorganization and restructuring is all about. As reserves are limited, there will have to be some changes to cover all missions, foreign and domestic.

The Army's recent approach to obtaining a common understanding among the active and reserve components was sound and in the best interests of the Total Army — the objective being to make the best use of all the components and create the best fit for future missions.

Resource constraints and defense guidelines specify that the Army's reserve components maintain a total personnel strength of 575,000. This makes it imperative that there be agreement on a logical division of end strength between the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve and the organizational and functional adjustments to best meet future

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needs. War fighting and contingency functions — with priority support for contingency forces — and emergency domestic support within the United States were the major missions considered in reaching the restructuring agreement.

Reserve component restructuring agreed to by the active and reserve components' leadership provides for a strength split of 367,000 for the Army National Guard and 208,000 for the Army Reserve. The concept of some shifting between the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve was also addressed, with combat elements shifting to the Army National Guard and combat service support to the Army Reserve.

The proposed changes among the Army's components will take place over the next five years. The public must be vigilant to ensure that a strong Total Army is maintained, to include a competent and effective reserve force. Toward this end, and in light of greater dependence on the reserve components in future crisis responses, Congress must increase the time available under a presidential call-up from 90 days to 180 days, with an additional 180-day extension. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense needs to be given the authority to call up a maximum of 25,000 reserve component soldiers and their units to support operational missions. With this added authority, the nation's Total Army can better meet the requirements of crisis intervention in an unpredictable world.

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