Increasing the Army's Commitments Requires Additional Resources

In determining the Army's budget requirements for a fully manned and equipped 28-division force, it is fundamentally important that the condition of the Army in 1975 not be ignored.

Often overlooked is the fact that the Army came out of Vietnam with weapons, equipment and facilities which were largely obsolescent, run-down or worn out. Unlike World War II and Korea, it did not have large stocks of ammunition and equipment left over to constitute war reserve supplies for use in an emergency.

In other words, the Army in 1975 desperately needed money and time to rebuild and re-equip its forces and to regain its fighting edge. It got neither; commitments multiplied while the Army's portion of defense dollars shrank.

Since then, every phase of Army activity has been seriously under-funded. The procurement account, through which new weapons and equipment are obtained, was dangerously low until 1981 and even today is inadequate to compensate for earlier years of neglect. Operations and maintenance—the costs associated with the daily running of the Army—has failed to meet growing training, logistics and readiness needs. Research and development, which grew from 8.15 percent of the Army budget in 1975 to 8.57 percent in 1977, has steadily shrunk to 6.41 percent in 1985, an alarmingly low level. Even military construction funds are well below the Army's realistic needs.

Obviously, these conditions result from the inadequate levels of support the Army has received. The Army has endeavored to "make do" with the means provided, but history clearly demonstrates that an effective "go-to-war and fight" 28-division force requires substantially more people, more units, more equipment, more supplies and more ammunition than are available today or programmed for the next five years.

What is needed for an adequate U.S. Landpower capability is a firm, reasonable "steady state" allocated to the Army of not less than 26 percent of the Defense Department budget. This increased annual funding, judiciously applied, is essential to insure that the Army is able to fulfill its central landpower role successfully.