In his January ARMY Magazine article, “Mission Command,” GEN Martin E. Dempsey discussed some of the adaptations the Army is making to concepts and doctrine that are informed by the serious study of the hard-earned lessons of a decade of war and the emerging trends we see in the 21st-century security environment. His article explained that this has led to the concept of mission command replacing battle command as an activity and mission command replacing command and control as a warfighting function. GEN Dempsey observed that we are living the principles of mission command in Iraq and Afghanistan but they must be made institutional in order to make their employment a reality across the force. Making mission command institutional requires appropriate changes in doctrine and training. Furthermore, we must “pervade the force” so that these new concepts drive our leader development, our organizational design and our materiel acquisitions. As GEN Dempsey stated,
Mission command, as an activity, is defined as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of full spectrum operations (FSO). It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. As a warfighting function, mission command develops and integrates those activities enabling a commander to balance what was formerly described as command and control. It is an adaptation that captures what we’ve learned in a decade of war, including the changing roles and responsibilities of commanders and leaders in distributed and increasingly decentralized operations; the requirement for leaders at every echelon to cocrete the context for operations; the importance of teaming and collaborating with joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners; and the need for leaders to anticipate and manage transitions during the course of a campaign.

Commanders think of capabilities in terms of combat power; they apply combat power by integrating the capabilities of the six warfighting functions—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, mission command, and protection. They apply combat power by integrating the capabilities of the six warfighting functions during operations, integrates and synchronizes mission command and network capability-development efforts across the CoEs/warfighting functions. The MC CoE is essentially the operational force commanders’ representative and overarching tie to the generating force.

TRADOC established the MC CoE to integrate mission command DOTMLPF solutions at all levels of command, from Army service component commands to platoons. The MC CoE will play a significant role in determining network requirements and network integration. It captures and rapidly disseminates Army observations, insights and lessons and integrates them into doctrine and capability development. It leads designated essential mission command force modernization proponencies and is the TRADOC capabilities manager with responsibilities in 12 areas, including FSO, airspace command and control, mission command, electronic warfare (EW), information operations (IO), Army operational knowledge management (AOKM) and site exploitation, among others. The MC CoE’s Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell integrates the irregular warfare (IW) activities of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, and Army security force assistance, and it coordinates IW activities with the Asymmetric Warfare Group, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance.

In order to make mission command institutional, the MC CoE integrates mission command capability-development issues across CAC and with each of the other warfighting centers of excellence. At Fort Leavenworth, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and the Mission Command Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate have reorganized under the MC CoE to better inject lessons learned into doctrine and capability-development processes and share them across the Army. Assigning essential mission command proponencies such as EW, IO and FSO to the MC CoE results in better-integrated capability-development efforts across the mission command warfighting function. The MC CoE headquarters now includes the AOKM proponency, charged with building the collaborative tools, processes and procedures to operationalize much of mission command.

Mission command is already an integral part of The Army Capstone Concept, The Army Operating Concept, and the newly published Army Functional Concept for Mission Command 2016–2028 (MC AFC). These documents provide the vision for how the Army will look and operate from 2016 on. Using the MC AFC as a baseline, a comprehensive analysis of mission command requirements is being conducted in the Mission Command Capabilities Based Assessment (MC CBA) and will be completed in the next several months. The MC CBA is an analytic process that identifies future capabilities and integrates assigned DOTMLPF dimensions. This includes a new MC CoE that, similar to how the commander applies combat power through the warfighting functions during operations, integrates and synchronizes mission command and network capability-development efforts across the CoEs/warfighting functions. The MC CoE is essentially the operational force commanders’ representative and overarching tie to the generating force.

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identifies mission command capability gaps and potential solutions. The results of the MC CBA will refine and focus ongoing and new capability-development efforts, as an MC CoE priority will be to address those results.

The Army’s capstone doctrine publication, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations, describes how the Army operates now and guides Army training and leader development and education. It has already been revised to include the essential doctrinal tenets of mission command, and the first change to FM 3-0 is anticipated to be approved and published shortly. The publication and dissemination of the revised FM 3-0 will enable mission command to pervade the force and will have an immediate impact across the Army through leader development and education venues, such as the Command and General Staff College, and training venues including Battle Command Training Program seminars.

A priority of MC CoE is to streamline and refine the Army Lessons Learned program with the Rapid Adaptation Initiative (RAI). This process initiative will streamline the capturing of lessons learned, accelerating their dissemination across the Army at large and adapting them into all aspects of Army soldier preparation. RAI will also enable peer-to-peer discussion of lessons learned across all personnel, regardless of rank and position, within the Army. The MC CoE will use the RAI process to produce responsiveness to requests from the operational force and to provide timely input to doctrine and capability-development efforts. The Center for Army Lessons Learned and our AOKM capabilities will be critical in providing effective knowledge-management support of training, advisors and assessment teams across the Army.

The network enables mission command. In the network’s requirement, acquisition and implementation processes, it is critical to maintain a commander and operator’s perspective, and it is the MC CoE that provides this perspective to the network’s supporting system through its role in determining Army network requirements and network integration.

During nearly a decade of war, both the operating environment and how the Army operates in this environment have changed. The principles of mission command are being executed by operational forces, and now the generating force must capture current lessons learned and the vision of the future to ensure that the Army is properly trained, staffed and equipped. The Mission Command Center of Excellence is charged with making mission command institutional across the Army, and it will do this by integrating DOTMLPF across all levels of command, from the Army service component command to the platoon. TRADOC, CAC and the MC CoE have already taken significant initial steps toward this end, and they will continue to aggressively move forward to ensure that the Army is prepared and sufficiently adaptable to win on today’s and tomorrow’s FSO battlefields.