Over the past three years, I have used the *Green Book* and the subsequent AUSA Annual Meeting and Exposition as launch points to frame future directions for our Army.

In 2007, I described the Army as out of balance and framed our approach—centered on the four imperatives (sustain, prepare, reset and transform)—to get back in balance by the end of 2011. I also described a view of the future strategic environment that warned of a decade or more of persistent conflict—protracted confrontation among states, nonstates and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use violence to accomplish their political and ideological objectives.

In 2008, I described how we saw the character of conflict that our land forces would likely face in the early decades
of the 21st century; introduced the concept of hybrid threats—diverse combinations of conventional, irregular, criminal and terrorist capabilities arrayed asymmetrically to counter our strengths; and described the six qualities that land forces would require to be successful against these threats: versatile, expeditionary, lethal, agile, sustainable and interoperable.

In 2009, I described the four roles that land forces would most likely be called on to perform in the future: prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; engage to help others build capacity and to assure friends and allies; support civil authorities both at home and abroad; and deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.

I further described the Army that we would need to accomplish these roles—a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle—and established the basis for setting the Army on a fully integrated rotational model of one year deployed to two years at home (one-to-two) for the active component (AC) and one year deployed to four years at home (one-to-four) for the reserve components (RC) beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2012. This will be essential if we are to support sustained commitments and build the capacity to surge against unexpected threats at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for this magnificent, all-volunteer force.

We are well on our way to making these ideas operational, and I believe they form a sound foundation as we head into the second decade of the 21st century and of war.

Over the past three years, we have made great progress towards restoring balance to the force, and we can anticipate reaching a point by the end of next year when we will have a more sustainable deployment tempo for our forces. As we approach this point, we face a key challenge: maintaining our combat edge while reconstituting the force for other missions and dealing with the continuing impacts of war. The war is not over, and the future holds complex, dynamic and unanticipated threats to our national security. We cannot afford to lose our combat edge in this turbulent period.

It seems the right time to review and reflect on where we have been as an Army, where we are now and where we need to go to ensure that we remain the Army the nation needs for the latter decades of the 21st century.

Where We Have Been

The United States has been at war for nearly a decade, engaged in a long-term ideological struggle against a global extremist network. This is the longest period of continuous combat ever for our all-volunteer force. While we have liberated more than 50 million people from tyranny and transformed on the fly to master a different form of warfare, the cumulative effects of this war have been substantial and will be with us for some time. More than 1 million servicemembers have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and more than 4,100 of them have given their lives, leaving more than 20,000 surviving family members. Another 27,000 have been
wounded, more than 7,500 of them seriously enough to require long-term care. Almost 100,000 soldiers have been diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries, and another 45,000 have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress. We cannot and will not forget these “fallen comrades.”

In 2007, I described the Army as out of balance and put in place a four-year plan centered on the four imperatives to restore balance across the force:

- **Sustain** our soldiers, families and civilians;
- **Continue** to prepare soldiers for success in the current conflict;
- **Reset** them effectively when they return; and
- **Continue to transform** for an uncertain future.

We started the final year of the plan this month. As an Army, we are beginning to see the positive effects of the progress we have made in restoring balance. We are in a much better position today than we were in 2007, and with the FY 2011 budget request, we are funded and poised to largely meet our goals by the end of next year. Let me highlight some of this progress.

**Growth.** In summer 2009, all components of the Army completed the growth of 74,000 soldiers authorized by the President in 2007. Even as we completed that growth, we recognized that we were still struggling to meet our deployment staffing objectives for the active force. A decade of continuous combat has resulted in increases in temporarily nondeployable personnel, increased fillers for joint headquarters and transition teams, and increases in our wounded warriors. With these shortages in mind, in 2009 the Secretary of Defense approved an additional temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 soldiers. We have completed 15,000 of that growth. The remaining 7,000 will be completed over the next year. In the last three years, the active Army has increased in size by 80,000 soldiers, and the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Reserve have increased modestly, significantly improving our ability to reduce the tempo of deployments.

**Dwell.** I believe that the most important thing we can do to restore balance to the Army is to increase the amount of time our soldiers spend at home. With the completed growth of the Army and the drawdown in Iraq, we are able to increase the dwell time of most units and individuals at home station to two years (AC) and four years (RC) beginning in FY 2012. This will allow our soldiers time to fully recover themselves and to reconnect with their families. It also allows us more time to retrain and reset units and equipment so that we can begin to prepare units for operations other than counterinsurgency.

**Restationing.** We are in the final year of a complex and detailed effort to complete our portion of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC). Over the past five years, we have seen a lot of construction across the Army. The outcome of this construction is greatly improved facilities for units, soldiers, families and civilians. By this time next year, we will have moved more than 380,000 people to new locations. The BRAC plan is on track and scheduled to be complete by September 2011.

**Modularity and Rebalancing.** Our plan called for converting all 302 Army brigades from Cold War formations to more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular formations. These modular formations have already proven their power and relevance on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We have completed the conversion of 288 of the brigades, and by this time next year we will have converted 297, leaving a handful to be completed in 2012. At the same time, we undertook a program to rebalance our skills to better prepare for the future. We converted forma-
tions that were relevant in the Cold War to ones more relevant in the 21st century. We have rebalanced more than 124,000 positions so far, and by this time next year will have completed 150,000. Taken together, the modular conversions and rebalancing represent the largest reorganization of the Army since World War II—and we have done this while preparing and recovering 150,000 soldiers a year to and from deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Rotational Model.** We are putting the entire Army on an integrated rotational model—Army force generation (ARFORGEN)—as depicted in the graph above. While there is much work left to do in adapting our institutional systems to support ARFORGEN, we have made significant progress towards making the model operational. We are at the point now that we will begin operating the force on a one-to-two/one-to-four cycle beginning in FY 2012. This will represent a vast improvement in predictability for the force. This model fully integrates all components and is designed to produce the Army’s annual output of one corps, five divisions (one ARNG), 20 brigade combat teams (BCTs) (five ARNG) and 90,000 enablers (more than half from the National Guard and Reserve). The ARFORGEN model will enable us to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for the combatant commanders and to hedge against unexpected requirements at a tempo that is sustainable for the all-volunteer force. We continue to examine the feasibility of moving to a one-to-three/one-to-five model in 2015.

**Strategic Flexibility.** For some time now, because of the pace and quantity of our deployments and the size of our force, we have been without a robust ground force to hedge against unexpected contingencies. With the growth of our forces, the drawdown in Iraq and the implementation of the ARFORGEN model, we are in a position to begin constituting such a force, to staff and equip it appropriately, and to train it for the full spectrum of operations. In the ARFORGEN model, this is called the surge force. It is one corps, three divisions, 10 BCTs and 41,000 enablers. We expect to fully constitute this force and have it available in the next several years. With a lot of hard work and sacrifice, we are well on our way to restoring balance to our force. We are not quite there, but we are in a place where it is appropriate to shift our focus to what our Army may be called on to do in the second decade of the 21st century and this war.

**The Second Decade—Our Way Ahead**

After almost a decade at war, we are still facing a future in which several global trends continue to shape the emerging security environment and exacerbate the ideological struggle we are engaged in. Although such trends pose both dilemmas and opportunities, their collective impact will increase security challenges and frame the conflicts confronting the United States and our allies. Globalization has spread prosperity around the globe, but still with unequal distribution—85 percent of the world’s wealth is held by 10 percent of the population; the bottom
50 percent of the world’s population shares only about 1 percent of the wealth. This creates a large disparity in “haves” and “have nots,” creating populations increasingly susceptible to radicalization.

The pace of technological advances continues to increase, but technology is a double-edged sword. The same technology that allows easy access to information enables extremists to spread their ideology and to export terrorism around the globe. More than 51 states and nonstate actors now have access to satellites and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Africa has more cellular phone users than does the United States. By 2025, mobile phones will have the same computing power that our desktop computers have today. China, Russia, North Korea and Iran all have government-sponsored cyber programs, and cybercrime is on the rise and will create problems for individuals and governments.

Population growth in the developing world expands markets, but the accompanying “youth bulge” can create a population of unemployed, increasingly disenfranchised youth more easily indoctrinated to radical ideologies. In 67 of the world’s countries, two-thirds of the population are under the age of 30; 60 percent of the population of the Middle East is under the age of 25. Studies predict that the populations in some developing countries will double in the next few decades, and other estimates hold that by 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population will live in cities, increasing the likelihood that future land operations will take place in densely populated urban areas.

Increased resource demand is a consequence of growing global prosperity and populations. While this demand may encourage more efficient use of natural resources and the development of alternatives, burgeoning middle classes in countries like China and India will exacerbate demands on already scarce resources. These rising demands for energy, water and food may enhance the potential for conflict.

Proliferation and failing states are the two trends of greatest concern. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increases the potential for destabilizing catastrophic attacks. Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups already seek weapons of mass destruction and will use them against Western interests when given the opportunity. Meanwhile, failed or failing states that lack the capacity or will to maintain territorial control can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export terrorism. The merging of these two trends is particularly worrisome: failing states that offer safe haven to terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Our continued analysis of the future strategic environment seems to reaffirm our view that the next decades will be ones of persistent conflict. This confrontation and friction will manifest themselves in many forms as interests collide across the globe. As a result, our commitments in the future will be more frequent and continuous. Conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and will be less susceptible to the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution. Our Army must remain alert to changes in this volatile environment and build the agility to anticipate and react to change.

Maintaining Our Combat Edge

With an Army stretched from a decade at war and adapting to an era of persistent conflict, how can we best prepare ourselves to succeed in the current war and prevail in future conflicts? Even with our recent success in Iraq, the war is not over. We will continue to send soldiers into harm’s way for some time, even as we prepare others for different missions. All the while, we cannot forget our solemn obligations to our comrades in arms and our families who have borne the burdens of this war. In addition, we need to examine the impact of the last nine years at war on our profession.

Our first task going forward is to find the right balance as we maintain our combat edge while simultaneously dealing with the continuing impacts of war. Beginning in FY 2012, after completing the drawdown in Iraq, we will have about as many BCTs available that are not earmarked for Iraq and Afghanistan as we will have of those deploying. It will be imperative that we remain focused on tough, demanding training at home station and at our training centers to ensure that our soldiers and units sustain their combat edge. This training must be accomplished at an appropriate
tempo and while meeting the unique challenges associated with increased time at home after nine years of war. If we are not thoughtful in making this transition, combat-seasoned soldiers, used to the fast-paced conditions of combat and the increased level of autonomy and authority associated with small-unit operations, may feel stifled in a garrison environment. We must find the right balance in restoring our administrative skills and systems to deal with the continuing impacts of war as we maintain our combat edge. We should focus on: building resilience in the force by making operational and institutional the comprehensive soldier fitness program and our program for health promotion, risk reduction and suicide prevention; refining our understanding of full spectrum operations through training and professional dialogue; reducing the backlog in our professional military education programs; revitalizing our home-station training programs; and undertaking some basic recovery after a decade of combat and transformation.

The recently completed 15-month study resulting in the Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention report is especially informative in framing some of the challenges we face. Over the last nine years, some of the systems designed to take care of soldiers and families have atrophied with the pace of our operational deployments. We need to dedicate time to revise these systems and inform and educate our soldiers and leaders on how to access them to enable us to better deal with the continuing impacts of this war.

Reconstituting the Force

Maintaining our combat edge as we reconstitute the force will require engaged leadership at all levels. Reconstitution requires not only resting and resetting the force, but also continuous adaption. We are reconstituting this force for the future.

We are almost complete with our transformation to modular organizations and rebalancing the force. Yet even as we complete these actions, we have begun a review to account for the lessons we have learned in the last decade of combat. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has undertaken an intensive study of both our force mix and force design to ensure that we have the right capabilities.
in the right numbers in the right organizations for the future. We will continue to transform our organizations to ensure that we maintain versatile organizations that can prevail in any environment.

Another area that requires adaptation is the mix between the active and reserve components. The relationship between the components is better than I have ever seen it. We have fought and bled together in combat, and we must not break this relationship. We are One Army—a Total Force. We have relied heavily on our reserve components in the past decade. We have more than 70,000 reservists on active duty today participating in or supporting operations around the world. We are actively studying what the role of the reserve components should rightly be in an era of persistent conflict. We will work on this important issue transparently and collaboratively because of its long-term impact on our force.

We also need to adapt our modernization strategy. The goal of Army modernization is to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full spectrum operations today and tomorrow. Modernization involves developing and fielding new capabilities and continuously modernizing current equipment through procurement of upgraded capabilities, recapitalization and divestment. Army modernization programs will be designed to give our soldiers a decisive advantage in any fight.

The primary focus of our modernization program is on developing the network and a new ground combat vehicle. We have made great progress on establishing a network that enables soldiers to know where they are, where their
buddies are, where the enemy is and to kill the enemy with precision in any environment. This year, we passed a significant network milestone by establishing a stable network architecture in our test unit at Fort Bliss, Texas. This gives us a solid foundation from which to develop the specific tactics, techniques and procedures for operating the network in future conflicts. We are also in the final stages of reviewing the requirements for a new ground combat vehicle, the first fighting vehicle designed to operate in an improvised explosive device environment.

We also need to reconstitute and refine our doctrine and warfighting concepts. The Army’s operational concept is full spectrum operations (FSO). While our understanding of FSO has evolved and matured, we still do not have an adequate understanding of how we will conduct FSO across the spectrum of conflict. We have been rightfully consumed with preparing and deploying units to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now that units will begin to have more time at home, we will have the opportunity to begin to conduct rotations at the combat training centers and the battle command training program against a broader range of threats in a broader range of environments. These rotations, along with other studies, will improve the level of professional understanding that we need to fully implement FSO across the force and to refine and adapt it to drive the continuous adaptation of the force.

The Profession of Arms

I believe it is time to examine the impact of the last nine years at war on our profession—the profession of arms. The effects of war have changed us as individuals, as professionals and as a profession in ways that we don’t yet fully appreciate. For us to succeed as an Army in the second decade of this century and of this war, it is imperative that we gain a better understanding of how a decade of war has affected us both personally and professionally.

As a profession, the Army is a vocation composed of experts in the ethical application of land combat power serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. Our country places special trust and confidence in soldiers as individuals and in the Army as an institution to perform our duties with character and competence in the complex and chaotic cauldron of war. No other occupation or profession manifests this level of responsibility to the nation. It is imperative that we maintain the high level of trust the American people and their elected representatives have afforded us.

As such, it is essential that we take a hard look at ourselves and ensure that we fully understand what we have been through, how we have changed and how we must adapt to succeed in an era of persistent conflict. I encourage all leaders to think about how to accomplish this. It is essential to the continued effectiveness of our profession and to ensure that our young leaders are prepared for success in the decade ahead.

As we have witnessed through our years of combat, the American people have maintained and displayed admiration and support for our troops. We cannot ever afford to let our actions be the cause of losing that support. Our soldiers are experts, skilled in the profession of arms, bonded with comrades in a shared culture of sacrifice and service to the nation and the Constitution, who adhere to the highest ethical standards and values and who live the Army Ethos. To this end, I have directed GEN Martin E. Dempsey and TRADOC to conduct a study and to lead a dialogue over the next year on the impacts of a decade of war on our profession, to inform our views on what it means to be professional soldiers in an era of persistent conflict.

I thank soldiers, families and civilians for your service and sacrifices. Because of your efforts, we are prevailing in Iraq against a ruthless and dedicated enemy and have given the Iraqi people the opportunity for a better future. We effectively and efficiently withdrew forces and equipment from Iraq at the same time that we increased our forces in Afghanistan, and we completed both on schedule—a logistical miracle. All the while, we have been learning, adapting and transforming this 1.1 million-person organization to ensure that we are prepared to prevail in the second decade of the 21st century and this war. No other organization in the world could have accomplished what you have accomplished to the very high standard that you have achieved. Your actions continue to make a difference in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. I could not be prouder of you or this institution. Army Strong!