The perils and challenges of the 21st century are increasingly apparent. The United States’ sense of domestic invulnerability to external threats was destroyed on 9/11. Since then, we have been at war—a long-term ideological struggle with a global extremist network. More than one million have served in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more than 5,100 of our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen and civilians have sacrificed their lives.

These opening engagements of the 21st century are harbingers of the emerging security environment. In the years ahead, the United States will confront complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to our national security and to the collective security of our friends and allies. These challenges will occur in many forms and will be waged across the spectrum of conflict—ranging from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between—and in all domains—land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.
To succeed in this new environment, our Secretary of Defense has reinforced the principle of balance in our defense strategy: balance in our response to the current conflict vice preparing for future conflicts; balance in preparing for irregular warfare vice conventional warfare; and balance between the cultural advantages that have given us security vice the cultural changes needed to preserve it.

Given the emerging security environment, the evolving character of conflict, and the Secretary of Defense’s vision of balance in our defense strategy, we see four roles for land forces in the 21st century: prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies; support civil authorities at home and abroad; deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.

To fulfill these four roles, we need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies—all at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force. To achieve this, we must continuously adapt our force and the institutions that support and generate it.

**An Era of Persistent Conflict**

After more than seven years at war, we are facing a future in which several global trends will shape the emerging security environment and exacerbate the ideological struggle we are engaged in. Although such trends pose both dilemmas and opportunities, their comprehensive impact will increase security challenges and frame the conflicts confronting our nation.

Globalization can spread prosperity by accelerating the transfer of trade, technology and ideas, but it can also propagate destabilizing influences. While globalization has brought prosperity to people around the world, its benefits are unequally distributed, creating “have” and “have not” conditions that can spawn conflict. In addition, the interdependence of the global economy amplifies the local impact of distant crises, as demonstrated by the food, energy and financial disruptions of the last year.

Technology is another double-edged sword. Inexpensive access to information enables entrepreneurs and innovators to collaborate in developing new technologies and improving existing ones. Yet our adversaries can exploit these same technologies to export terror around the globe.

Population growth in the developing world expands markets, but the accompanying “youth bulge” can also increase the potential for instability and extremism. Studies predict that the populations in some developing countries will double in the next few decades, and some estimates hold that by 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population will live in cities. This speaks volumes about the densely populated urban areas in which our land forces will operate in the future. Conversely, in some portions of the developed world, population growth is negative; depopulation undermines established economies and cultures, inviting potentially destabilizing immigration.

Increased resource demand is a consequence of growing global prosperity and populations. While this demand may encourage more efficient use of natural resources and the development of alternatives, burgeoning middle classes in countries like China and India will exacerbate demands on already scarce resources. These rising demands for energy, water and food may enhance the potential for conflict.

Climate change and natural disasters have energized states and international institutions to work closer together to alleviate suffering. They can also compound already dif-
ficult conditions in developing countries, causing humani-
tarian crises, driving destabilizing population migrations
and raising the potential for epidemic diseases.

The two trends of greatest concern are proliferation and
failing states. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) increases the potential for catastrophic attacks that
may be globally destabilizing. Al Qaeda and affiliated terror-
ist groups already seek WMDs and, given the opportunity,
will use them against Western interests. Meanwhile, failed or
failing states that lack the capacity or will to maintain territo-
rial control can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export op-
operations. The merging of these two
trends is particularly worrisome: failing
states that offer safe haven to terrorists
seeking weapons of mass destruction.

The combined impact of these trends
makes it likely that the next decades
will be ones of persistent conflict—pro-
tracted confrontation among state,
nonstate and individual actors that are
increasingly willing to use violence to
achieve their political and ideological
ends. In the years ahead, as interests
collide across the globe, protracted
competition and friction will manifest
themselves in many forms. As a result,
our commitments in the future will be
more frequent and continuous; con-
flicts will arise unpredictably, vary in
intensity and scope, and will be less
susceptible to the traditional mecha-
nisms of conflict resolution.

The Character of Conflict Evolves

Nations and other actors will act to serve their own in-
terests, so conflict is a “normal” aspect of our environment.
Although the fundamental nature of conflict is timeless, its
chacter reflects the particular conditions of each epoch.
The global trends that shape this era of persistent conflict
will also significantly shape the character of conflict in the
21st century.

Conflicts will be waged between and among diverse ac-
tors, both state and nonstate, with the former frequently
acting covertly and the latter sometimes acting through
state sponsorship or as a proxy for a state. The Second
Lebanon War in 2006 pitted the state of Israel against a
nonstate actor, Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, in-
side the territory of Lebanon. Such situations pose special
challenges to an international system that has been focused
on conflict between and among nation-states. Conflict mo-
tives, objectives and even the identities of protagonists will
be difficult to discern and will shift over time. The pres-
ence and power of nonstate actors, in particular their abil-
ity to challenge nation-states, is a significant shift in the
character of conflict. States no longer hold a monopoly on
the instruments of war.

Ideological competition for sovereignty and influence
over populations also characterizes current conflict. Gain-
ing the support of indigenous populations, always instru-
mental to the outcome of conflict, is now so important that
conflict cannot be waged around the people—it is unavoid-
ably waged among the people. Many of the safe havens we
encounter today are “safe” not because of their geographic
location, but because of the popular support our adver-
saries find in those locations. Adversaries will seek to miti-
gate our advantages, operating anonymously among in-
digenous populations to avoid detection and counteraction.
Hezbollah, for example, made extensive use of civilian ar-
eas to deter Israeli counterstrikes.

Future conflicts will be unpredictable and may arise
suddenly, expand rapidly into unanticipated locations, and
last for unexpected durations. Adversaries will pursue dy-
namic combinations of means, shifting their employment
in rapid succession and exploiting the element of surprise.
Conflicts may also expand to areas historically immune to
conflict, such as space and cyberspace. Previous trends
may be reversed suddenly: Hezbollah inflicted more Is-
raeli casualties per Arab fighter in 2006 than did any oppo-

Local conflicts and their social, economic and political
consequences offer increasing potential for spillover, creat-
ning regional and globally destabilizing effects. Moreover,
the interconnectedness of a globalized world can cause
crises to spread quickly while the conditions necessary to
resolve crises, such as governance or effective rule of law,
usually evolve slowly; this poses increased challenges for
governments.

Conflicts will continue to take place under the unblink-
ing scrutiny of the 24-hour media cycle and the World
Wide Web. A global media presence and increasingly uni-
Universal access to information will ensure that details of a conflict are rapidly available through social and cyber networks. Adversaries will have many forums in which to disseminate their messages worldwide.

Future conflicts will also present a new array of threats that defy simple categorization. Formerly, we could differentiate and categorize threats as conventional or unconventional; regular or irregular; high intensity or low intensity; traditional, terrorist or criminal. Such categorization was useful because each categorized threat had an associated counter. It is no longer enough to discern the “correct” conflict category and then pursue a singular solution; we are more likely to face hybrid threats—dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages.

The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict also illustrates the potential impact of hybrid threats. Hezbollah employed modern civil technology (secure cell phones, computers and video telecommunications systems) combined with military means (antitank, surface-to-air and antiship missiles, rockets, mortars and unmanned aerial vehicles) and improvised explosive devices in an innovative array of unanticipated patterns. In addition, Hezbollah placed an emphasis on holding ground, concentrated its forces and engaged in sustained fights associated more with conventional forces. Hezbollah’s methods and tactics were a mix of the conventional and unconventional.

Clearly, today’s nonstate actors are not limited to irregular, guerrilla methods. The future is not simply irregular warfare by nonstate actors—adversaries can be expected to use a full spectrum of options, including every political, economic, informational and military measure at their disposal. When combined with cultural and demographic factors, these measures will present U.S. military leaders with complex challenges that will require increasingly complex solutions. Hybrid threats necessitate hybrid solutions, and such solutions increasingly require military forces that are adaptive and versatile enough to function in a variety of situations against myriad threats with a diverse set of national, allied and indigenous partners.

Given the strategic environment and the projected character of 21st-century conflict, we believe that, for the next several decades, we should prepare our land forces, as part of a joint and interagency team, to:

- **Prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns.** It is imperative that we prevail in our current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Successful coun-
ter insurgency (COIN) operations are inherently protracted, and we must be prepared to sustain the required level of commitment to prevail in these and future COIN operations.

- Engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies. The Army can help in preventing future conflicts by increasing the capacity of other nations’ security forces—both military and police—to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order and deny their territory to terrorists.

- Support civil authorities at home and abroad. We work primarily through the National Guard to provide support to civil authorities in the United States, augmenting them with active forces as necessary. Abroad, we will provide support to various agencies of governments, as we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan today, helping them plan, integrate and execute the political, economic and information elements of national strategy. This should be seen as a national asset.

- Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors. While we do not anticipate a “near-peer competitor” challenging us in the foreseeable future, we can never lose sight of the requirement to train and prepare for this state-on-state conflict. There are nations in the world today training their forces with our Army as their primary threat.

A Balanced Army for the 21st Century

Fulfilling these four roles for land forces will require a fundamentally different Army from the one we had before 9/11. While the Army has been progressively adapting since the end of the Cold War, we must take advantage of what we continue to learn in our current operations, use emerging technology and continuously adapt to build a balanced Army to meet the demands of 21st-century conflict.

We need to continuously adapt to a versatile mix of tailor able and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies—at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force.

One truism about predicting the future is that we will never get it exactly right; indeed, we can only aspire not to be too wrong. Thus we need to build versatility into our force. We will develop a versatile mix of forces that allows us to address the broadest range of future requirements, providing a base from which to adapt to reality as it unfolds. The advent of modular brigades is a great first step in building this versatile mix of organizations, but it is not the only step. A versatile army must provide operational commanders a balanced mix of force types—heavy, Stryker, light, special operations forces (SOF) and enablers—so that they can devise effective combinations for any tactical situation. It is our strategic esti-
ARMY Capabilities (FY11 Goal)
1:2 (AC) and 1:4 (RC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Package</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Reset</th>
<th>Train – Ready</th>
<th>Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 x RC Force Pools</td>
<td>Recovery From Deployment</td>
<td>Full Spectrum Training/Prepare for Deployment</td>
<td>Available for Deployment/Engagement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVITY</td>
<td>READINESS LEVEL</td>
<td>AVAILABILITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manned and Equipped at C2 Levels to C1 Levels</td>
<td>&gt; 180 Days</td>
<td>90–180 Days</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE PACKAGE</td>
<td>1 Corps HQ</td>
<td>20 BCTs</td>
<td>92K Enablers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of RC Forces*</td>
<td>1 Corps HQ</td>
<td>5 Div HQs</td>
<td>92K Enablers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Div HQs</td>
<td>20 BCTs</td>
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*The remainder of our 18 divisions, 73 BCTs and enablers would rotate through the force pools at a 1:4 ratio.

Five tactical headquarters; 20 Infantry, Stryker and armored BCTs; and enabling forces organized, trained and equipped for full spectrum operations at a sustainable rate of one to two AC and one to four RC. This versatile mix of land forces could sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and, at lower demand levels, provide ready global reaction forces and regionally oriented forces for engagement in support of combatant commander theater security cooperation programs. Further, this model allows us to surge portions of another five-division corps and enabling forces from the train-ready pool to respond to unexpected contingencies across the spectrum of conflict, and it allows us to have two more corps available at longer commitment times to provide strategic depth.

The enablers generated as part of each force package are an essential component of the ability of the Army to sustain land campaigns and to provide support to the joint force. These enablers provide a versatile mix of operational capabilities. They consist of tailorable packages of aviation, artillery, engineers, intelligence, sustainment and other capabilities that enable commanders to organize their operational areas to achieve their campaign objectives. Enablers also provide the versatility to conduct full spectrum operations by permitting tailoring of force packages with the type and amount of capabilities required for a specific environment or mission. Our modular enablers are designed to “plug-in” to allow for rapid adjustment within a force when the environment or enemy changes.

We are building an integrated Total Force in which our RC forces are also on a rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate of about half that of their AC counterparts. This cyclical readiness model will increase predictability for soldiers, families, employers and communities, and enable our RC to remain an integral element of the operational force while providing the nation with a strategic reserve (that is, those nondeployed RC units that are two to three years from commitment).

The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the size of our AC force, require that we routinely employ RC forces as part of our operational force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to sustaining current operations, as is improving the overall operational experience and quality of our RC forces. In addition, adequate Army National Guard forces will be ready and immediately available to their state and territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises.

We have begun the implementation of ARFORGEN and are already using the model to meet the requirements for Army forces around the world, but we are doing so mostly with institutions and processes that were originally de-
signed for an Army of a different era. Our generating force, the force that recruits, equips, trains and sustains our Army, is critically important to building the Army of the 21st century. Without our generating force, we would not have been able to sustain the last eight years of continuous mobilization and combat operations across two separate theaters. No other nation in the world has the quality or capacity in its generating force that America has. While the generating force has been constantly adapting to meet the requirements of the operating force over the last eight years, we must now look for fundamental change in the generating force to support an Army operating on a rotational cycle. The generating force must be as versatile as the operating force it supports. This will require making fundamental changes to the processes and policies we use to manage the Army. Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and continuously adapt—tailoring force packages and quickly readjusting training, staffing and equipping—to ensure units have all of the tools necessary to succeed. Adapting our institutions and generating-force processes to support an Army operating on a rotational cycle is an essential element of our transformation.

**Land Force Qualities**

A balanced Army adapted to the requirements of 21st-century conflict will be fundamentally different in every dimension of doctrine, organization, training, staffing, equipping, stationing and support from the Army we had on 9/11. A balanced Army must be organized to be versatile; deployable enough to be expeditionary; responsive enough to be agile; precise enough to be lethal; robust and protected enough to be sustainable; and flexible enough to be interoperable with a wide range of partners. These qualities—being versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable and interoperable—are the defining qualities of a balanced Army. They describe not only the operating force, but also the generating force, and will form the basis of our overall modernization strategy and for the ground combat vehicle.

**Versatile.** Versatility is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army. It is this quality that will enable our forces and institutions to effectively execute operations across the spectrum of conflict. Versatility implies that: Precision is impossible when predicting force requirements in this volatile and uncertain strategic environment, and that our Army must be able to react to the future as it actually presents itself. A versatile force must possess a balanced mix of multipurpose capabilities and sufficient capacity to execute our doctrine of full spectrum operations across the range of military operations, from peacetime engagement to major combat.

Versatility begins with how the Army thinks—a solid foundation of coherent, relevant and adaptive concepts and doctrine. The revision of Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations established full spectrum operations as our capstone operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive and stability or civil-support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. The concepts supporting full spectrum operations are further refined in updates to subordinate doctrinal manuals such FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency and FM 3-07 Stability Operations.

Most importantly, the Army is only as versatile as its soldiers, leaders and civilians. Every soldier is a warrior, and each must be trained and ready to effectively operate in any environment. Versatile leaders are competent in their core proficiencies, yet broad enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Army civilians must be adaptable, providing broad expertise and stability across myriad tasks and functions. Developing versatile soldiers, leaders and civilians will enable us to lead the versatile Army we need to overcome 21st-century challenges.

**Expeditionary.** The dynamic and global character of conflict will require the Army, as part of a joint force, to deploy to the site of problems in austere and unfamiliar locations around the world, to sustain operations for extended periods of time, and to engage with the security forces of other nations. To do this, we must be expeditionary. The Army must be organized, trained and equipped to provide forces capable of operating in austere environments, comfortable in diverse cultural environments, able to conduct joint forcible entry operations and able to fight, if necessary, upon arrival.

The ARFORGEN model and the Army's global force posture define the available start points for expeditionary response. We have recently shifted to a more continental U.S.-
based posture, adjusting our forward stationing. There is a natural tension between the flexibility of a continental U.S.-based response posture and the immediacy of forward presence. Forward-stationed forces are an indicator of our regional commitment and a source of assurance to our friends and allies. They also provide a mechanism to increase our cultural awareness and sensitivity. This shift to a continental U.S.-based posture puts added significance on maintaining a robust joint forcible entry capability.

An expeditionary Army must also retain an expeditionary mind-set—the confidence and competence to quickly adapt and function effectively in any physical or cultural environment. Such a mind-set requires soldiers, leaders and civilians to be mentally prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. Soldiers possessing an expeditionary mind-set have the critical-thinking skills necessary to adapt quickly to unexpected situations in unfamiliar physical surroundings and are prepared to succeed in austere and complex conditions.

An expeditionary mind-set also has a cultural component. In an era characterized by conflicts in which interaction between soldiers and indigenous populations could mean the difference between victory and defeat, soldiers, leaders and civilians must feel confident interacting with people of different cultural backgrounds and perspectives. Developing this confidence demands that soldiers, leaders and civilians become culturally astute and able to use this awareness to operate innovatively.

Agile. While versatility is the ability to do different tasks, agility is the ability to rapidly shift from one task to another. An agile Army must have forces that can quickly adapt to exploit opportunities in complex environments. To do this, we require not only agile units but also agile minds and institutions.

To build and maintain our agility, we must remain a learning organization, quickly absorbing lessons learned, sharing them and applying them to current and future problems. One key to institutionalizing our learning is adaptive doctrine. Doctrine must grow and adapt based on the hard-earned lessons being learned daily in the field. Our institutions must be able to quickly collect, analyze, learn and disseminate best practices from units in contact and adapt Army doctrine.

Soldiers must possess the mental agility to react quickly and appropriately to changing situations and complex environments. We must prepare soldiers and leaders to function effectively in these complex operational environments through a variety of institutional, operational and self-development educational and training opportunities. Army training and education programs must be dynamic and adaptive, instilling full spectrum capabilities in the operating force while keeping pace with constantly evolving doctrine and operational requirements. We will continue to incorporate hard-learned battlefield tactics, techniques and procedures into individual and collective training so that soldiers and leaders possess the requisite and relevant skills for full spectrum operations. Diverse, realistic training and education will develop the agile soldiers and leaders that make up agile units.

To direct agile soldiers, the Army must continue to develop agile leaders able to handle the challenges of full spectrum operations. Agile leaders are adaptive thinkers who use their individual initiative and understanding of the environ-
ment to quickly and boldly seize and exploit opportunities as they present themselves. While our junior officers and noncommissioned officers have had ample opportunities to develop their mental agility on the battlefield, we must develop and empower agile, adaptive leaders at all levels, from the tactical to the strategic.

Agile soldiers deserve agile institutions. While focused on building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments, the institutional Army has continued to utilize processes and procedures designed to support a static Army. To support an agile operating force, the Army must have an agile generating force. This requires fundamentally transforming generating-force and supporting processes to more effectively and efficiently prepare trained and ready forces for combatant commanders. Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities of the future as they present themselves.

*Lethal.* Only the armed forces possess the core competency of applying lethal force. This competency requires the capability to overmatch any enemy across the spectrum of conflict while mitigating collateral damage. The Army achieves such competency by operating as part of a joint team with air, naval and special operations forces.

Conflicts among populations require the use of proportional lethal force with precision. To do so, soldiers and leaders must be able to quickly and accurately identify targets; discriminate between hostile, friendly and neutral actors; and apply precise lethal effects on identified targets.

Lethal precision requires superior intelligence capabilities, precise delivery systems and broad situational awareness. As the Army provides “capability packages” to BCTs currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, these systems will provide precision fires and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, exponentially increasing soldiers’ ability to positively identify and apply precision lethality to legitimate threats. Concurrently, these systems enable operational-level commanders to gain broader situational awareness and shift resources appropriately to gain an advantage over the threat, while mitigating collateral damage to the surrounding populace.

Finally, the requirement for precision also extends to how we apply nonlethal effects. In a population-centric operating environment, we must be precise in the execution of information operations to ensure that we are sending the most effective message to the right audience in a timely manner. Mastery of the information environment is a critical component of full spectrum operations.

*Sustainable.* The anticipated expeditionary nature of Army operations in the 21st century—abroad for extended periods of time in austere and unfamiliar locations—requires a fundamentally different view of sustainability. A sustainable Army must integrate national and global resources to ensure that forces are physically available, properly equipped, at the right place at the right time, with the right tools to support the combatant commanders. Flexibility and agility must be the hallmarks of expeditionary sustainability. In addition, our sustainment footprint must
take into account the social and political realities of the countries to which we may deploy.

The modularity of the Army sustainment force structure has kept pace with the remainder of the Army. Today our sustainability is achieved through a mix of soldiers, civilians and contractors. We must continually assess that mix to ensure that it will be adequate across the entire spectrum of potential operations to provide the most expeditionary sustainment capability for the operational force.

The Army has developed an affordable equipping strategy that supports ARFORGEN and an Army on a rotational readiness cycle. Army acquisition must use technologies that make us lighter and more mobile while maintaining or improving our survivability and lethality. We must continue to push research and development to produce smaller and lighter energy sources, fuel-efficient engines, and lighter and stronger protection materials.

Our view of the future security environment includes the proliferation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) across the battlefield. This puts added emphasis on developing technologies that make us lighter and more mobile while maintaining or improving our survivability and lethality. We must continue to push research and development to produce smaller and lighter energy sources, fuel-efficient engines, and lighter and stronger protection materials.

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Interoperable. Well beyond the capability to operate on the same radio frequencies and utilize the same caliber ammunition, an interoperable army must be able to build unity of effort with other government agencies, indigenous forces and international partners. The Army can lead the development of interoperability with other agencies, allies and indigenous forces by sharing our planning and organizational skills. The Army can also facilitate unity of effort through the development of both an interoperable mind-set and interoperable technologies.

To enhance the Army’s interoperability and ensure a common view of how the Army, the joint force and civil government agencies should work collaboratively, we must actively contribute to the development of interagency doctrine. Such doctrine would provide the intellectual and institutional basis for success in full spectrum operations and would ensure that we are integrating all joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts to achieve our common strategic objectives.

Leading Change

The 21st-century security environment and the continuous adaptation of the Army in order to remain ahead of rapidly evolving threats will put a premium on leaders of character and competence, leaders grounded in Army Values and the Warrior Ethos. This will require a commitment by the institution, leaders and individuals to lifelong learning and development as well as a balanced approach to training, education and experience as the foundation of any leader-development plan. Furthermore, our leader-development policies and programs must support ARFORGEN and the rotational readiness model in order to provide balance and predictability for our all-volunteer Army.

The Army of the 21st century described here will require continuous change. Our strategic environment has evolved dramatically, and so has the Army. The challenges of institutional change in large organizations like the Army are substantial, especially as we are adapting an organization that is already the best in the world at what it does. Our test must not be, “Have we changed?” It must be, “Have we changed enough?” Everything is on the table except our core values. We are building an agile, disciplined warrior team that is dominant across the spectrum of 21st-century conflict. It will be, inherently, a balanced Army for a balanced strategy.