SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE CFE TREATY:  
PUTTING THE JUGGERNAUT ON STAND-BY

The Soviet military has made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) accord, signed in Paris on November 21, 1990, and most particularly with the way in which it was handled by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The generals wanted much more time to complete their troop reorganizations and withdrawals, and greatly resented pressure by Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze and his (allegedly) pro-West staffers to accelerate the date of signature of the treaty.

In 1988, by the Soviets' own count, their forces in Europe — the expanse from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Mountains (ATTU) (see below) — included some 41,500 tanks, 45,000 other armored vehicles, and 50,300 artillery pieces. The as yet unratified CFE Treaty limits each alliance (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) to a total of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 other armored vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters in the ATTU area. Since the forces of the Soviets' former allies account for a significant portion of the Warsaw Pact total, the Soviets find themselves having to pare down over the next three years to only 13,175 tanks, 20,000 other armored vehicles, 13,175 artillery pieces, 5,150 combat aircraft and 1,500 attack helicopters. The remaining equipment must be disposed of one way or another.

The Soviet newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya quotes international affairs expert V. Litov as saying that the military is now attempting to "repair the errors" of the internationalists and to salvage as much modern military equipment as possible from the scrap yards. Units with older models of equipment have been reequipped, and those with shortages have been topped off. Still, there are tons of materiel to be disposed of.

Train after train is now chugging through the mountains to designated locations in the east, outside the ATTU area. Aboard are tanks, artillery and other armored vehicles, the former pride of the principal striking elements of the groups of forces and western military districts. The objective is to get them out of harm's way — threatened not by enemy attack, but by the perceived connivance of the Soviet Foreign Ministry with Western interests. In Siberia the equipment will be prepared for lengthy storage — and quick recall in case of emergency. The full magnitude of the effort is not yet clear, but the Soviets have acknowledged shipping 16,400 tanks so far.

To grasp what the Soviet military has in mind with this maneuver, one needs to recall the terrible surprise the Germans encountered some six or eight weeks into their attack on the Soviet Union, "Operation Barbarossa," in June 1941.

On New Year's Eve 1940, Hitler's Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW) issued an estimate of Soviet forces, including a count of 182 Soviet divisions (not counting internal security forces). Further, OKW estimated that only 141 of the divisions could probably be expected to be employed against the invasion because of other security requirements. In June and July 1941, as the panzers thrust eastward, the General Staff kept careful track of the Soviet units trapped in the huge pincer maneuvers and those still on the loose. The shocking reality was that even as tens of thousands of prisoners were taken in, the count of divisions identified along the front was not dropping — instead, it was bounding ahead at frightening speed. By mid-August, General Halder wrote in his diary, "We underestimated them. We have now discovered and identified 360 of their divisions!"
It was true that the Germans had miscalculated in the beginning, but that was not the most
serious error. What they did not understand was the Soviet system for generation of an entire second
army. As in 1941, the Soviet mobilization process today is much more extensive than a simple
capability for bringing low readiness units up to fighting strength. It includes a capacity for
materializing a second "invisible division" for every one in the active structure. Nowhere is the unit
to be seen: no barracks, no troops, no equipment parks. And yet, in a matter of a few weeks, the
divisions can appear with experienced officers in command at all levels.

Every active Soviet unit in peacetime has a commander and two deputy commanders. But
when the unit is committed to combat, it goes with only a commander and one deputy. The second
deputy remains behind and becomes the commander of a new unit of the same size. A third of the
platoon commanders may remain, too, ready to become company commanders. Hence, an "invisible
division" will have experienced commanders waiting for it at every level from company or battery
on up when it begins to form. Reservists from the ten-million-man pool report as ordered by their
district commissariats. Equipment arrives from deep storage. Much of it is old, but in many cases
it is the same as that with which the reservists trained when they were on active duty doing their
national service. In short order, an entire new division is in existence, filling the same barracks
previously occupied by the parent division. At a minimum, the Germans should have doubled their
original estimate of expected Soviet strength.

It is clear what is now happening with the filling of storage areas east of the Urals. The
juggernaut is going on stand-by, not out of business.

### THE CFE TREATY AT A GLANCE ###

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limits *</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Arm Veh</th>
<th>Atk Hel</th>
<th>Cbt Aft</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
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<td>40,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<td>Each Alliance</td>
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<td>Flanking Zone</td>
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<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,900</td>
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</table>

Explanation of terms:

* Sufficiency — Maximum which may be held by any one state.
* Active Units — Maximum number of weapon systems that may be held by units with more than 5 percent
  of their authorized wartime strength.
* Zone 4 — Central Region (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
  Poland).
* Zone 3 — Zone 4 plus Denmark, France, Italy, UK, and the Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian Military
  Districts of the USSR.
* Zone 2 — Zone 3 plus Portugal, Spain, and the Moscow and Volga/Urals Military Districts.
* Zone 1 — Entire Atlantic-to-the Urals (ATTU) area.
* Flanking Zone — Norway, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, North and
  Trans-Caucasus Military Districts.

* A protocol of the treaty also limits each alliance to a maximum of 430 land-based maritime aircraft and 700
  armored vehicle launched bridges.

(This Background Brief was prepared by MG Edward B. Atkeson, USA Ret., currently a Senior Fellow at the A USA
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