Redefining Competition

Transforming the Force for the Cognitive Age 

Today’s U.S. Army stands at the precipice of transformational change, striving to free itself from a long-standing routine of incremental modernization. This is not a new crossroad; it has been considered by the Army’s senior leaders three times since 1984. However, the speed of technological advancements in the commercial sector today, as well as the strategies and capabilities demonstrated by peer adversaries leveraging those advancements, have brought about a decisive inevitability and urgency for transformational change within the Army and all of DoD. 

The purpose of this report is to provide a collective way for the joint force in transforming organization, training and equipping of formations for Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) at the speed, scale and precision required by modern warfare. It addresses the fundamental differences in how the Services approach competition and conflict—and the changes necessary for aligning these differences with Congress and industry across current transformation initiatives. The framework offers a baseline structure for reforming processes, and it provides a common reference point for capabilities requirements that are continuously informed by software innovations, dynamic strategic environments and the vulnerabilities that these evolving conditions create. The overall intent of this paper is to posture DoD and the Services to achieve an unparalleled, enduring strategic overmatch, without escalating to traditional armed conflict, at a drastically reduced cost of casualties and resources.

Shaping and Deterring in Competition 

For the purposes of this article, competition is defined as the activities both of the individual Services to prepare forces for armed conflict and of the U.S. Combatant Commands (CCMD) in deterring threats such as Russia and China below the level of armed conflict. The biggest variance between the Services’ transformation is in the approach to competition. At the tactical terrestrial layer, the Army’s tasks and standards as part of the joint force have not changed: close with and destroy the enemy. Given that the U.S. Navy, Air Force and Space Force do not maintain large ground combat forces, this is an enduring role that Army units must be able to achieve with precision under increasingly complex changing conditions. 

During competition at the operational level, there is a fundamental difference between how the Services train, qualify and certify units and personnel. The Navy and Air Force and their component Services, the Marines and Space Force, prepare their units to conduct joint interagency threat vulnerability analysis and the development of pre-planned options to exploit known vulnerabilities. These consist of highly-technical skills that require using DoD-accredited certifications and data-basing onto highly-classified networks by DoD and combat support agencies. 

Prior to 2019, the Army had no ability to certify personnel and organizations in these disciplines. The majority of Army staffs are still educated on a non-technical method of finding, fixing and then rapidly killing an adversary as targets present themselves. This requires no formal certifications, is conducted on unclassified and secret networks and can best be observed during Army Warfighter Exercises and Combat Training Center rotations. Training units have an over-dependence on suspected enemy positions for planning operations, rather than leveraging the technically-developed enemy vulnerabilities maintained in CCMD operation plans (OPLAN) joint target lists (JTL).  

Theater operational command posts (CPs) also have a different organizational design than the Joint Force Commands and the Army Service Component Commands (ASCC). Based on the fidelity of the enemy that a threat vulnerability analysis provides to Combatant Commanders (COCOM) in competition, the staffs are organized to fight at a high tempo in conflict while maintaining persistent lethal and non-lethal attacks against an adversary. This organizational design also facilitates the COCOMs’ prioritization of operational pre-planned options across time, and it dictates the pace of what the enemy can or cannot do. 

Conversely, ASCC and below CPs are only resourced to command and control (C2) a tactical ground fight through the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). These CPs operate at a relatively slower, episodic tempo, involving a cyclical attack of “plan, prepare, execute and refit.” The inability of the unqualified staffs to exploit existing joint threat vulnerabilities in competition creates a heavy dependency on “action-reaction-counter action” when engaging an adversary in conflict. Although this approach may remain necessary for a tactical close ground fight, it hinders a ground force commander at the operational level from being able to interdict enemy ground maneuver threats at extended ranges with the full range of joint lethal and non-lethal capabilities well ahead of the tactical fight. 

Based on the different approaches to competition, DoD investments in JADO and in the associated joint warfighting concepts (JWC) are inadvertently absent of Army equities. JADO efforts are transforming DoD’s capacity from using “the threat of conflict” as a primary deterrent to an active “shape and deter” range of options in competition without escalating. Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) development has focused on the terrestrial layer and on providing capabilities to strengthen the use of conflict as a deterrent. 

Specifically, JADO is seeing technological improvements in how daily global information collection is used to identify, vet and validate vulnerabilities and in how to convert these to precision lethal and non-lethal points of exploitation. Artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) are also improving the capacity for operations personnel from across service domains to identify and provide pre-planned options to the National Command Authority. 

Due to the joint force’s reliance on the Army to provide a diverse range of ground maneuver forces, Army MDO initiatives are producing the necessary weapon platforms, systems and networks to effectively operate in contested space and cyberspace conflict environments. The Army’s major commands (ACOM) have been incredibly successful in identifying the terrestrial layer requirements and in modernizing the Army’s tactical integration process of “decide, detect, deliver and assess” to employ joint capabilities in a close cross-domain fight. Based on these successes, DoD and the Joint Staff are well-postured to merge these parallel JADO and MDO efforts into an integrated terrestrial-to-spacial approach for competing below armed conflict. 

The Way-Ahead for Competition  

The Army’s investment into Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) and their assigned Information Intelligence Cyber Electronic Warfare Space (I2CEWS) Battalion provides the necessary force structure for ASCCs to have a more active role of shaping and deterring in competition. The identification of the Corps Headquarters as the Army’s new unit of action provides CCMDs the means to synchronize JADO across the domains, particularly when it comes to electromagnetic battle control. This void was best captured by the 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on DoD’s needs for addressing electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) governance to ensure superiority when viewed through operational impacts.¹ 

Corps and MDTF headquarters would require the additional training, certification and reorganization of current staffs into intel, ops, fires and support functions, aligned by joint warfighting functions. Due to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) investments in 2017–2019, the Army has the DoD-accredited programs to meet these requirements. The joint force’s acknowledgement of the necessity of two interconnected types of kill chains—tactical and operational/strategic—would create the means for closing the missing terrestrial maneuver considerations in JADO, JWC and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). 

As the Army’s Operational Headquarters begin to develop joint interagency electronic target folders in competition, tactical formations across Services will have a more comprehensive understanding of threat capabilities, vulnerabilities and capability requirements for exploitation. During a time of limited resources, the Joint Staff would be able to stratify, prioritize and deconflict any duplication of effort toward the common goal of strategic overmatch. An example of this would be the AI/ML investments made by both the Air Force and the Navy in the last five years to address the ever-growing volume of information and intel available for processing. The Army could benefit from those investments with cost-saving service adjustments instead of beginning a new, time-consuming acquisition effort to achieve a similar capability. 

Although the current joint, interagency, combined policies and procedures that support the proposed changes already exist for competition, conflict, as discussed below, will provide a clear means of designing training and exercises for empowering Joint Forces’ CPs to assess and develop adaptable procedures for integrating future lethal/non-lethal platforms, inter-theater sustainment and national and theater reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) against U.S. competitors ahead of the 2028 and 2035 horizons.

Armed Conflict 

The “Why” of Different Army and Joint Methods for Conflict 

The distinct methods employed by the Army and Sister-Services for conflict has its roots in the 1982 publication of AirLand Battle.² The separation of the battlefield with a fire support coordination line provided a geometry for defeating superior Soviet forces, but it also set the course of each Services’ modernization efforts. The Army focused on tactical requirements and building capabilities for the low-altitude, 30–50km fight. The Air Force turned its attention to building a structure that would support the large number of joint, interagency and coalition partners that a high-altitude fight beyond 50km would entail. 

During the 1990 lead up to Desert Shield, DA made the initial attempt to tie into this new joint structure with the creation of a short-term fix called a Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE). This temporary organization embedded with the Air Component Command to coordinate the allocation of joint capabilities for the Land Component. Based on the success of Desert Shield, the Army codified the BCE into five permanent Battlefield Coordination Detachments (BCDs). 

In 2001, the Army made a second attempt to play a larger joint role. DA G-3/5/7 Force Management Directorate (DAMO-FM) initiated a DA targeting study that identified force structure requirements for ASCCs to conduct steady state planning with CCMDs. The 9/11 attacks postponed those changes and required DAMO-FM to remove force structure from ASCCs, Corps and Divisions in order to generate more brigade combat teams (BCTs) tailored for counterinsurgency operations. 

The 2015 TRADOC Army Lessons Learned Forum would initiate a third attempt. Several submissions from units deployed to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom indicated issues with the targeting hampering their ability to get joint capabilities for operations. The subsequent 2015 TRADOC targeting study revived the DA targeting study and confirmed that the gap between Army and joint approaches to conflict in 2001 had grown. 

The concurrent 2016 study of Russian New Generation Warfare necessitated a concerted effort by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) to close this gap with the development of a new concept—Multi-Domain Battle (MDB)—and through the establishment of an Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center to build the pre-requisite DoD programs in coordination with the Joint Staff and CCMDs. The DoD-accredited programs for the Army came online in January 2019, with U.S. Army Pacific being the lead Army Command for leveraging the new training and certifications ahead of their joint task force certification. 

Preparing for Armed Conflict in Competition 

Today, the current joint interagency methods for integrating capabilities in conflict requires a higher degree of preparation in competition than the Army methods, which are contingent upon having a specific area of assignment and tactical objectives for conflict. The Army absence in competition preparations is best depicted in the existing CCMD OPLAN and contingency plans (OPLAN/CONPLAN). Each plan consists of specific domain objectives for each Service to achieve. There is an initial allocation of capabilities—joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), strike, airspace, space, cyber, electronic warfare (EW) and information operations (IO)—aligned against the threat target system types that each Service has developed for achieving those operational objectives. 

These joint targets number in the thousands across CCMDs; they are collected by the larger intelligence community and are maintained by each Service, except for the Army, via each CCMD’s joint target lists and restricted target lists (JTL/RTL) on a weekly basis. The continued lack of Army threat vulnerability analysis or operational pre-planned options as of 1 October 2020 in the form of joint targets on the standing JTL/RTLs is indicative of the larger issues that were brought to the attention of HQDA in 1990, 2001 and 2016. 

The most significant issue is that, at the operational level, “targeting” is not aligned with fires personnel, but rather seen as a commander and operations role that synchronizes ISR, fires and maneuver. The CCMD J3s and J2s lead a monthly Joint Target Coordination Boards (JTCB) to discuss COCOM operational priorities, to get updates on each Services’ joint target management efforts and to inform government support agencies of emerging information requirements for real-world collection. Without trained and qualified staff, ASCCs historically do not have their G-3 or G-2 participate in the monthly JTCBs. Unfortunately, the field artillery chief warrant officers and other officers whom they do send are both unqualified and under-prepared by their professional military education to participate in these critical joint integration processes. 

The cascading effect of this Army-joint disconnect extends beyond over-generalized land domain objectives in current OPLAN/CONPLANs and the inability to allocate joint capabilities to any threat Army systems. It is reverberating into multiple DoD and Joint Staff JADO initiatives. For example, the developing JWC, the global campaign plan and the JADC2 cross-functional team (CFT) efforts do not capture either the significant role that the Army plays in strategic power projection or the relevance of the land domain in competing below the level of armed conflict. 

Joint Integration in All-Domain Contested Conflict 

Since no theater has enough kinetic or non-kinetic assets to simultaneously exploit all threat vulnerabilities databased on the JTL/RTLs, COCOMs utilize the joint targeting cycle (JTC) as their integration mechanism for executing joint combined interagency warfighting. The JTC provides the COCOM with a system for prioritizing which enemy capabilities to attack over time, while also providing joint warfighting function leads with the means for integrating Service-retained, cross-domain platforms across multiple prioritized attacks. Consequently, each service component staff is required to manage the employment of their capabilities across multiple time cycles in order for the CCMD to present persistent, all-domain disruption to an adversary. 

During a joint-led warfighter exercise, component commands nominate specific threat vulnerabilities daily for COCOM prioritization in the form of their joint targets. At the Combined Joint Target Coordination Board (CJTCB), the COCOM decides both the final prioritization of attack for the designated time-period and the respective joint targets that each component will prosecute in support. These decisions are what drives the concurrent planning cycles for synchronizing joint strike, theater ISR, pre-planned airspace and space, cyber, EW and IO capabilities. 

At the completion of each concurrent planning cycle, a corresponding operations order is published to establish the deliberate base-line sequences in which Services are to employ their capabilities over future designated 24-hour cycles. Published daily, each of the orders below are developed in 30–60 minute increments to allow for dynamic flexibility and re-tasking during the window of execution: 

• space and cyber tasking orders of supporting and supported effects; 
• theater ISR collection plan for R&S, direct support and assessments; 
• joint integrated prioritized target list for joint kinetic fires; 
• defended assets list of what will be protected for missile defense; and 
• joint airspace coordination order of pre-planned allocations. 

The simultaneity of the modern battlefield no longer lends itself to sequencing a domain objective as a precursor to achieving the next domain objective. For example, the Desert Storm 36-day air campaign to set conditions for a 4-day ground war is unfeasible today. As HQDA mans, trains and equips ASCCs and joint force land component commands to play more active roles in the joint integration processes, the terrestrial layer requirements for data, cloud, networks and EMS must be an integral component of the JADO transformation efforts in DoD. Although the impacts of an Army absence are not immediately seen at the strategic and operational levels, several joint simulations have shown that the effects at the tactical level can be devastating. 

Penetrate, Disintegrate, then Dominate 

The governing DoD policies, procedures and standards for joint interagency integration are well established; they continue to evolve as new commercial technologies and innovations continuously alter the battlespace in which militaries must be able to operate. As a result, the existing joint interagency framework has been the baseline mechanism for operationalizing Joint Staff (JS) JADO and convergence efforts. The following scenario demonstrates how this existing framework could be employed to conduct an extended joint forcible entry operation across hundreds of kilometers to penetrate, disintegrate and then dominate an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) maritime network. 

1. Army theater command posts and long-range fires would be positioned at strategic distances of 1,000+ miles and would employ JADO kinetic and non-kinetic range capabilities to prosecute joint targets with carrier strike groups and strategic bombers. 
2. Once a penetration is created in one or multiple domains, land forces would then need to get their 300–500km range fires and aviation assets into position as part of the joint force commanders’ prioritized disintegration of A2/AD threat vulnerabilities. 
3. Upon commitment of dominate forces, the Army maneuver formations would need to leverage the Army MDO integration process for integrating joint capabilities into close-range, fluid engagements. 

As a consequence of currently not being able to actively participate in the joint operational space, Army long-range capabilities are almost purely supporting other Services and are not listed on the defended asset lists for protection against threat long-range missiles. This translates to the commitment of ground tactical units coming into contact with an enemy ground force that has been un-attritted or interdicted, and having to assume a higher risk of casualties relative to the joint force. Rectifying this is a key component of the Army’s approach to the JADC2 CFT led by the JS. 

The Way Ahead for Combined Joint All-Domain C2 (CJADC2) and Convergence 

The 2020 signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Army and Air Force in the development of CJADC2 is a monumental accomplishment for DoD.³ Rather than separating the battlespace with AirLand Battle, the MoU recognizes a collective battle space of threats that are connected across a joint tactical grid for AI/ML-enabled prioritization and cross-domain capabilities prosecution. This Service-agnostic approach to sensors, C2 nodes and shooters has rammed open the door for holistically leveraging commercial innovation and adaptable technologies to get after data exchange, cloud computing and software development challenges. 

The two different starting points of JADO and MDO are beginning to merge under a more common objective of achieving convergence: systems capable of autonomously interacting with other systems, using AI/ML-informed computing to unburden commanders and staffs from performing most cognitive functions, allowing them to focus their efforts on rapid, optimized, overmatch-designed decisionmaking. As the Navy becomes a part of this collective effort, there are significant institutional and cultural Service norms that will still need to be transformed.⁴ 

During a potential period of reduced resources, interdependent cross-Service reform will be instrumental in securing national defense modernization goals. The most significant of these goals is changes in acquisition policies from their current basis in demonstration timelines to an experimentation-based approach, with the potential for generating superior materiel and non-materiel capabilities to the military at a faster rate and significantly reduced cost. These transformational changes already being pursued by the Army and the joint force—as well as future reforms on Capitol Hill and among industry, all for the common national defense—warrant further examination.

Transformational Change 

A Catalyst for Change 

The task of creating of a new directorate of strategic operations (DAMO-SO) consisted of consolidating several multi-domain-related, high-end technology portfolios that were dispersed across the DA G-3/5/7. The newly-formed Divisions consisted of DA enterprise systems, mission command, Army space, IO, cyber warfare and EW. DAMO-SO’s major initiatives also reflected several of Army leadership’s priorities for warfighting transformational change: CJADC2, data standardization, cloud migration and an MDO force capable of maneuvering in contested cyberspace and space environments. 

It is during the course of horizontally integrating the collective MDO efforts across the Army Staff (ARSTAF) and sister Services—and during the vertical integration among ACOM and the JS—that the necessity and relevance of DAMO-SO to identify and pursue necessary transformational changes is apparent. Proposed change efforts would be within both the Army and DoD; they would also need to be holistically present in Congress and in the commercial sector in order to be enduring. The common endstate would be a sustained national defense strategic overmatch with U.S. allies and partners. The following observations and recommendations to achieve all of this are categorized into three distinct groups: DoD, Congress and industry; ARSTAF and ACOM; and current JADO and MDO initiatives. 

The Speed-Technology-Innovation Trifecta: DoD, Congress and Industry 

Current DoD policies and congressional procedures for budgeting, contracting and testimony have served their purpose. They require renovation to a more rapid acquisition model of checks and balances. The current speed at which industry is able to leverage innovative technologies in the commercial sector for defense warrants this new approach. Additionally, the ability of America’s competitors to exploit this intrinsic delay between long-standing processes and current technology capabilities is a growing area of concern. Without reform, U.S. military platforms and systems acquired on a three- to five-year concept-to-capability timeline will reach a point of being obsolete before the first unit is fielded their “new” equipment. 

DoD reform would consist of transitioning from the current risk-averse model for acquiring new platforms to incentivized experimentation environments that would facilitate assessing commercial technologies capable of meeting requirements. An expanded role of federally-funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) and think tanks would expand thinking beyond common paradigms and allow outside-the-box and unbiased possible solutions for the most complex threats. FFRDCs would become service innovation centers. 

The ability to reform current DoD policies is contingent upon the support and cooperation from elected officials. To that end, congressional staff members, particularly those on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees (SASC/HASC), should be brought in earlier to the requirements sessions of an annual acquisition cycle. Framing this collective problem up front will inform them on deliverables and expectations at the end of a fiscal year, opening the aperture from systems demonstration to non-material investments. 

As the commercial sector is increasingly made up of software-based companies, the current model heavily favors the largest defense companies, excluding a significant market share of smaller, potentially more nimble companies from the acquisition table. An incentivized experimentation model would not only allow DoD to tap into the full range of available technologies; it would also provide the ability to layer several technologies into a more resilient and evolving series of capabilities instead of the proverbial “silver bullet.” 

An All-Domain Power Projection Service (ARSTAF and ACOMs) 

Although Army MDO has been a developing concept of the JS to contribute to JADO efforts, both Army Futures Command and TRADOC have positioned the Army to focus JADO on competition while keeping MDO transformation focused on conflict. In other words, the operational and tactical efforts within DoD are inextricably linked and should be integrated with every new JADO development.

As the Army looks at re-prioritizing Corps Headquarters and MDTFs as the primary units of action for MDO integration, it will require joint, JADO-related, education, training and exercising for joint capabilities integration and global power projection. Currently, Army units at every echelon in garrison train, exercise and build land-domain readiness to deploy to conflict or crisis hotspots. This would remain a Division tactical focus, with the objective of providing the joint force with the definitive precision weapon system that cannot only strike a 10-digit grid, but can also make multiple turns once inside a target area for very specific strikes. 

The task-organized BCTs would have to be able to perform current tasks and standards across the range of changing, contested, degraded conditions. These conditions are best demonstrated by Russian kinetic/non-kinetic coordinated attacks, highlighted in the Russian New Generation Warfare study, and by China’s on-going operations in the South China Sea. Formations must have an increased baseline understanding of the cyber, EW and IO battlespace and must have commanders and staffs that can offensively dominate the EMS through kinetic/non-kinetic means. Much of this effort has been prototyped by DAMO-SO with support from U.S. Army Forces Command for testing and refinement for deploying forces. 

The new Corps design could address a significant gap for the joint force in establishing a headquarters that can continuously integrate a JADO attack. The GAO report on DoD’s EMS operations highlighted the need of a service lead or governance structure to further develop what will be at the center of JADO—EMS battle control—once JADC2 and convergence are achieved. 

Adapting to the Modern Battlefield Today 

The JADC2 CFT efforts with the Services have become an increased area of interest for DoD, Congress and industry, both for the work that has been done and for the potential for transformative change that it represents. As JADC2 works to create an integrated network of autonomously interacting systems, there will be increased requirements on commercial technologies, necessitating a new range of technical skills (such as data and software expertise) that has previously been outsourced. The success of the supporting JADC2 efforts in joint all-domain situational awareness, joint tactical grid (JTG) and joint fires will be contingent upon leveraging, not building from scratch, AI/ML, cloud and edge computing and the 5G increased speeds and capacities.

Although the faster-than-human rates of deliberate and dynamic actions are common characteristic of operations in the private sector, the implications for military operations warrant further development, as they have become characteristics of today’s battlefields. The identification of which functions need to become autonomous, semi-autonomous and remain analog will be a major determining factor in the ability to achieve an enduring strategic overmatch. Using joint fires as an example, a non-kinetic to kinetic sensor-shooter network with autonomous functioning algorithms would outmatch a unit with a semi-autonomous design with which humans would have to analyze every sensed threat before it was fired upon. 

The efforts toward a JTG demonstrate the transformative potential for commercial technologies. Ubiquitous sensor networks are utilized in the commercial sector for connecting objects to functions and actions once an individual walks into an establishment. By expanding the scale of the establishment to a designated area of an all-domain battlefield, having objects within the area interconnected by military and civilian reconnaissance and by surveillance sensors and personal devices would provide a marked advantage over an adversary. 

Standardizing system information data, designing cloud-based architecture with a common repository with which ISR sensors, mission command systems and kinetic/non-kinetic shooters can connect, upload and download common data for JADC2 and the supporting initiatives was the central aim of 2020’s Army and Air Force warfighting talks. It was clear from the different purposes and objectives that the Services had with the Air Force Advanced Battle Management System and with the Army’s Project Convergence, that the signing of the Army Air Force MoU was critical in saving time and resources. The development of a common approach for the Army and the Air Force will be inclusive of coalition partners as well as provide future integration opportunities with the U.S. Navy’s Project Overmatch JADC2 efforts. 

Conclusion 

The Army’s contribution to the joint force with large-scale ground formations warrants the need for both MDO at the terrestrial layer and JADO at the aerial and spacial layers of an all-domain battlefield. Based on this dual-need, the Army is best suited for DoD to serve as the lead integrator for JADO. This will require some Doctrine, Organization, Training, Manning, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policies (DOTMLPF-P) adjustments and reallocation of resources. However, based on the investments and actions that the ACOMs have already produced over the past two years, the foundation is arguably already in place to achieve an all-domain capable force for the Army and for DoD strategic overmatch.

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Colonel Yi Se Gwon is currently the Chief of Staff for the Department of the Army G-3/5/7 Multi-Domain Operations Directorate, Army Strategic Operations. He previously served as the Director of the Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center to establish the DoD accredited Joint Intermediate and Advanced Target Development qualification courses with the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial Agency and Joint Staff J-7 for the Army. He has been assigned to U.S. Northern Command, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Forces Korea, where he was responsible for integrating a range of competition, crisis and conflict operations with joint, interagency and combined partners. He served as the Army’s primary representative to the Joint Staff’s Military Targeting Committee from 2017–2019, and he is JITD (joint intermediate target development) qualified. Additional highlights include serving as the Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and EUCOM Commander from 2013–2015 during the Ukraine incursions and serving as Brigade Commander of the Combined Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Headquarters, 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detachment-Korea (3BCD-K) from 2015–2017.